Ampoule. Forgotten WWII weapons? Ammunition \32O jet mines

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The female name Katyusha entered the history of Russia and world history as the name of one of the most terrible types of weapons of the Second World War.
At the same time, none of the weapons was surrounded by such a veil of secrecy and disinformation ...

PAGES OF HISTORY

No matter how much our fathers-commanders kept the Katyusha materiel secret, just a few weeks after the first combat use, it fell into the hands of the Germans and ceased to be a secret. But the history of the creation of "Katyusha" for many years was kept "with seven seals" both because of the ideological attitudes and because of the ambitions of the designers.

The first question is why rocket artillery was used only in 1941? After all, powder rockets were used by the Chinese a thousand years ago. In the first half of the 19th century, rockets were widely used in European armies (rockets by V. Kongrev, A. Zasyadko, K. Konstantinov and others).

Rocket launchers of the early 19th century. V. Kongrev (a) and I. Kosinsky (b)

Alas, the combat use of missiles was limited by their huge dispersion. At first, long poles made of wood or iron - “tails” were used to stabilize them. But such missiles were effective only for hitting area targets. So, for example, in 1854, the Anglo-French from rowing barges fired rockets at Odessa, and the Russians in the 50-70s of the XIX century - the Central Asian cities.

But with the introduction of rifled guns, powder rockets become an anachronism, and between 1860-1880 they are removed from service with all European armies (in Austria - in 1866, in England - in 1885, in Russia - in 1879). In 1914, only signal rockets remained in the armies and navies of all countries. Nevertheless, Russian inventors constantly turned to the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) with projects for combat missiles. So, in September 1905, the Artillery Committee rejected the high-explosive rocket project. The warhead of this rocket was stuffed with pyroxylin, and not black, but smokeless powder was used as fuel. Moreover, the good fellows from the State Agrarian University did not even try to work out an interesting project, but swept it away from the threshold. It is curious that the designer was ... Hieromonk Kirik.

It was not until World War I that interest in rockets revived. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, slow-burning gunpowder was created, which made it possible to dramatically increase the flight speed and firing range. Accordingly, with an increase in flight speed, it became possible to effectively use the wing stabilizers and improve the accuracy of fire.

The second reason: the need to create powerful weapons for airplanes of the First World War - "flying whatnots".

And, finally, the most important reason - the rocket was best suited as a means of delivering chemical weapons.


CHEMICAL PROJECT

As early as June 15, 1936, the head of the chemical department of the Red Army, corps engineer Y. Fishman, was presented with a report from the director of the RNII, military engineer 1st rank I. Kleimenov and the head of the 1st department, military engineer 2nd rank K. Glukharev on preliminary tests of 132 / 82-mm short-range rocket-chemical mines . This munition supplemented the 250/132 mm short-range chemical mine, the tests of which were completed by May 1936.

Rocket M-13.
The M-13 projectile consists of a head and a body. The head has a shell and a combat charge. A fuse is fixed in front of the head. The hull provides the flight of a rocket projectile and consists of a skin, a combustion chamber, a nozzle and stabilizers. In front of the combustion chamber there are two electro-powder igniters. On the outer surface of the shell of the combustion chamber there are two guide pins screwed on the thread, which serve to hold the rocket projectile in the guide mounts. 1 - fuse retaining ring, 2 - GVMZ fuse, 3 - detonator block, 4 - bursting charge, 5 - warhead, 6 - igniter, 7 - chamber bottom, 8 - guide pin, 9 - powder rocket charge, 10 - rocket part, 11 - grate, 12 - critical section of the nozzle, 13 - nozzle, 14 - stabilizer, 15 - remote fuse check, 16 - AGDT remote fuse, 17 - igniter.

Thus, “RNII has completed all the preliminary development of the issue of creating a powerful short-range chemical attack weapon, and is expecting from you a general conclusion on testing and an indication of the need for further work in this direction. For its part, the RNII considers it necessary now to issue a pilot-gross order for the manufacture of RHM-250 (300 pieces) and RHM-132 (300 pieces) in order to conduct field and military tests. The five pieces of RHM-250 remaining from the preliminary tests, of which three at the Central Chemical Test Site (Prichernavskaya station) and three RHM-132 can be used for additional tests according to your instructions.

Experimental installation M-8 on a tank

According to the RNII report on the main activity for 1936 on topic No. 1, samples of 132-mm and 250-mm chemical rockets with a warhead capacity of 6 and 30 liters of OM were manufactured and tested. Tests carried out in the presence of the head of the VOKHIMU of the Red Army gave satisfactory results and received a positive assessment. But VOKHIMA did nothing to introduce these shells into the Red Army and gave the RNII new tasks for shells with a longer range.

For the first time, the Katyusha prototype (BM-13) was mentioned on January 3, 1939 in a letter from People's Commissar of the Defense Industry Mikhail Kaganovich to his brother, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lazar Kaganovich: basically passed factory tests by shooting at the Sofrinsky control and test artillery range and is currently undergoing field tests at the Central Military Chemical Range in Prichernavskaya.

Experimental installation M-13 on a trailer

Note that the customers of the future Katyusha are military chemists. The work was also financed through the Chemical Department and, finally, the warheads of the missiles are exclusively chemical.

132-mm RHS-132 chemical projectiles were fire tested at the Pavlograd artillery range on August 1, 1938. The fire was fired by single shells and series of 6 and 12 shells. The duration of firing a series of full ammunition did not exceed 4 seconds. During this time, the target area reached 156 liters of RH, which, in terms of an artillery caliber of 152 mm, was equivalent to 63 artillery shells when firing in a salvo of 21 three-gun batteries or 1.3 artillery regiments, provided that the fire was fired with unstable RH. The tests focused on the fact that the metal consumption per 156 liters of RH when firing rocket projectiles was 550 kg, while when firing chemical 152-mm projectiles, the weight of the metal was 2370 kg, that is, 4.3 times more.

The test report stated: “The automotive mechanized rocket launcher for chemical attack during the test showed significant advantages over artillery systems. A system is installed on a three-ton machine that is capable of firing both a single fire and a series of 24 shots within 3 seconds. The speed of movement is normal for a truck. Transfer from marching to combat position takes 3-4 minutes. Firing - from the driver's cab or from cover.

The first experimental installation M-13 on a car chassis

The warhead of one RHS (reactive-chemical projectile. - “NVO”) holds 8 liters of OM, and in artillery shells of a similar caliber - only 2 liters. To create a dead zone on an area of ​​12 hectares, one volley from three trucks is enough, which replaces 150 howitzers or 3 artillery regiments. At a distance of 6 km, the area of ​​​​contamination of OM with one volley is 6-8 hectares.

I note that the Germans also prepared their multiple rocket launchers exclusively for chemical warfare. So, in the late 1930s, the German engineer Nebel designed a 15-cm rocket projectile and a six-barreled tubular installation, which the Germans called a six-barreled mortar. Mortar tests began in 1937. The system received the name "15-cm smoke mortar type" D ". In 1941, it was renamed 15 cm Nb.W 41 (Nebelwerfer), i.e. 15 cm smoke mortar mod. 41. Naturally, their main purpose was not to set up smoke screens, but to fire rockets filled with poisonous substances. Interestingly, the Soviet soldiers called 15 cm Nb.W 41 "Vanyusha", by analogy with the M-13, called "Katyusha".

Nb.W 41

The first launch of the Katyusha prototype (designed by Tikhomirov and Artemyev) took place in the USSR on March 3, 1928. The range of the 22.7-kg rocket was 1300 m, and the Van Deren mortar was used as a launcher.

The caliber of our rockets of the period of the Great Patriotic War - 82 mm and 132 mm - was determined by nothing more than the diameter of the powder cartridges of the engine. Seven 24-mm powder cartridges, tightly packed into the combustion chamber, give a diameter of 72 mm, the thickness of the chamber walls is 5 mm, hence the diameter (caliber) of the rocket is 82 mm. Seven thicker (40 mm) checkers in the same way give a caliber of 132 mm.

The most important issue in the design of rockets was the method of stabilization. Soviet designers preferred feathered rockets and adhered to this principle until the end of the war.

In the 1930s, rockets with an annular stabilizer that did not exceed the dimensions of the projectile were tested. Such shells could be fired from tubular guides. But tests have shown that it is impossible to achieve stable flight with the help of an annular stabilizer.

Then they fired 82-mm rockets with a four-bladed tail span of 200, 180, 160, 140 and 120 mm. The results were quite definite - with a decrease in the scope of the plumage, flight stability and accuracy decreased. The plumage with a span of more than 200 mm shifted the center of gravity of the projectile back, which also worsened the stability of the flight. Lightening the plumage by reducing the thickness of the stabilizer blades caused strong oscillations of the blades up to their destruction.

Grooved guides were adopted as launchers for feathered missiles. Experiments have shown that the longer they are, the higher the accuracy of the shells. The length of 5 m for the RS-132 became the maximum due to restrictions on railway dimensions.

I note that the Germans stabilized their rockets until 1942 exclusively by rotation. Turbojet rockets were also tested in the USSR, but they did not go into mass production. As it often happens with us, the reason for the failures during the tests was explained not by the wretchedness of execution, but by the irrationality of the concept.

FIRST volleys

Whether we like it or not, for the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the Germans used multiple launch rocket systems on June 22, 1941 near Brest. “And then the arrows showed 03.15, the command “Fire!” sounded, and the devilish dance began. The earth shook. The nine batteries of the 4th Special Purpose Mortar Regiment also contributed to the infernal symphony. In half an hour, 2880 shells whistled over the Bug and hit the city and fortress on the eastern bank of the river. Heavy 600-mm mortars and 210-mm guns of the 98th Artillery Regiment unleashed their volleys on the fortifications of the citadel and hit point targets - the positions of Soviet artillery. It seemed that there would be no stone left unturned from the fortress.”

This is how the historian Paul Karel described the first use of 15 cm rocket-propelled mortars. In addition, the Germans in 1941 used heavy 28 cm high-explosive and 32 cm incendiary turbojet shells. The shells were over-caliber and had one powder engine (the diameter of the engine part was 140 mm).

A 28-cm high-explosive mine, with a direct hit on a stone house, completely destroyed it. The mine successfully destroyed field-type shelters. Living targets within a radius of several tens of meters were hit by a blast wave. Fragments of the mine flew at a distance of up to 800 m. The head part contained 50 kg of liquid TNT or ammatol brand 40/60. It is curious that both 28-cm and 32-cm German mines (rockets) were transported and launched from the simplest wooden closure such as a box.

The first use of Katyushas took place on July 14, 1941. The battery of Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov fired two salvos from seven launchers at the Orsha railway station. The appearance of "Katyusha" was a complete surprise for the leadership of the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht. On August 14, the High Command of the German Ground Forces notified its troops: “The Russians have an automatic multi-barreled flamethrower cannon ... The shot is fired by electricity. During the shot, smoke is generated ... When capturing such guns, report immediately. Two weeks later, a directive appeared entitled "Russian gun throwing rocket-like projectiles." It said: “... Troops report on the use by the Russians of a new type of weapon that fires rockets. A large number of shots can be fired from one installation within 3-5 seconds ... Each appearance of these guns must be reported to the general, commander of the chemical troops at the high command, on the same day.

Where the name "Katyusha" came from is not known for certain. The version of Pyotr Hook is curious: “Both at the front, and then, after the war, when I got acquainted with the archives, talked with veterans, read their speeches in the press, I met a variety of explanations of how a formidable weapon received a girl's name. Some believed that the beginning was laid by the letter "K", which was put by the Voronezh Comintern on their products. There was a legend among the troops that the guards mortars were named after a dashing partisan girl who destroyed many Nazis.

When the fighters and commanders asked the representative of the GAU to name the “true” name of the combat installation at the firing range, he advised: “Call the installation as an ordinary artillery piece. It's important to maintain secrecy."

Soon, a younger brother named Luka showed up at Katyusha. In May 1942, a group of officers of the Main Armaments Directorate developed the M-30 projectile, in which a powerful over-caliber warhead made in the shape of an ellipsoid with a maximum diameter of 300 mm was attached to the rocket engine from the M-13.

Installation M-30 "Luka"

After successful ground tests, on June 8, 1942, the State Defense Committee (GKO) issued a decree on the adoption of the M-30 and the start of its mass production. In Stalin's times, all important problems were solved quickly, and by July 10, 1942, the first 20 M-30 Guards mortar divisions were created. Each of them had a three-battery composition, the battery consisted of 32 four-charged single-tier launchers. The divisional salvo, respectively, was 384 shells.

The first combat use of the M-30 took place in the 61st Army of the Western Front near the city of Belev. On the afternoon of June 5, two regimental volleys hit the German positions in Annino and Upper Doltsy with a thunderous roar. Both villages were wiped off the face of the earth, after which the infantry occupied them without loss.

The power of the Luka shells (M-30 and its modifications M-31) made a great impression both on the enemy and on our soldiers. There were many different assumptions and inventions about the Luka at the front. One of the legends was that it was as if the warhead of the rocket was stuffed with some kind of special, especially powerful, explosive substance capable of burning everything in the area of ​​​​the gap. In fact, conventional explosives were used in the warheads. The exceptional effect of the Luka shells was achieved through volley fire. With the simultaneous or almost simultaneous explosion of a whole group of projectiles, the law of addition of impulses from shock waves came into force.

Installation of the M-30 "Luka" on the Studebaker chassis

M-30 shells had high-explosive, chemical and incendiary warheads. However, a high-explosive warhead was mainly used. For the characteristic shape of the head of the M-30, the front-line soldiers called it "Luka Mudischev" (the hero of Barkov's poem of the same name). Naturally, this nickname, in contrast to the replicated "Katyusha", the official press preferred not to mention. The Luka, like the German 28 cm and 30 cm shells, was launched from a wooden corking box in which it was delivered from the factory. Four, and later eight of these boxes were placed on a special frame, resulting in a simple launcher.

Needless to say, after the war, the journalistic and writer fraternity commemorated Katyusha out of place and out of place, but chose to forget her much more formidable brother Luka. In the 1970s and 1980s, at the first mention of Luka, veterans asked me with surprise: “How do you know? You didn't fight."

ANTI-TANK MYTH

"Katyusha" was a first-class weapon. As often happens, the father commanders wished it to become a universal weapon, including an anti-tank weapon.

An order is an order, and victorious reports rushed to the headquarters. If you believe the secret publication "Field Rocket Artillery in the Great Patriotic War" (Moscow, 1955), then on the Kursk Bulge in two days in three episodes "Katyushas" destroyed 95 enemy tanks! If this were true, then the anti-tank artillery should have been disbanded and replaced by multiple rocket launchers.

In some ways, the huge numbers of wrecked tanks were influenced by the fact that for each wrecked tank, the crew of the combat vehicle received 2,000 rubles, of which 500 rubles. - commander, 500 rubles. - to the gunner, the rest - to the rest.

Alas, due to the huge dispersion, shooting at tanks is ineffective. Here I am picking up the most boring brochure "Tables of firing rockets M-13" of the 1942 edition. It follows from it that at a firing range of 3000 m, the range deviation was 257 m, and the side deviation was 51 m. For shorter distances, the range deviation was not given at all, since the dispersion of shells could not be calculated. It is not difficult to imagine the probability of a rocket hitting a tank at such a distance. If, theoretically, we imagine that the combat vehicle somehow managed to shoot at the tank point-blank, then even here the muzzle velocity of the 132-mm projectile was only 70 m / s, which is clearly not enough to penetrate the armor of the Tiger or Panther.

It is not without reason that the year of publication of the shooting tables is specified here. According to the TS-13 firing tables of the same M-13 rocket, the average range deviation in 1944 is 105 m, and in 1957 - 135 m, and the side deviation is 200 and 300 m, respectively. Obviously, the 1957 table is more accurate, in which the dispersion increased by almost 1.5 times, so that in the tables of 1944 there are errors in the calculations or, most likely, deliberate falsification to raise the morale of the personnel.

There is no doubt that if an M-13 projectile hits a medium or light tank, it will be disabled. The frontal armor of the "Tiger" is not able to penetrate the M-13 projectile. But in order to be guaranteed to hit a single tank from a distance of the same 3 thousand meters, it is necessary to fire from 300 to 900 M-13 shells due to their huge dispersion, while at shorter distances an even larger number of missiles will be required.

And here is another example, told by veteran Dmitry Loza. During the Uman-Botoshansk offensive on March 15, 1944, two Shermans from the 45th mechanized brigade of the 5th mechanized corps got stuck in the mud. The troops jumped off the tanks and retreated. German soldiers surrounded the stuck tanks, “smeared the viewing slots with mud, covered the aiming holes in the turret with black soil, completely blinding the crew. They knocked on hatches, tried to open them with rifle bayonets. And everyone bawled: “Rus, kaput! Give up! But then two combat vehicles BM-13 left. "Katyusha" front wheels quickly descended into the ditch and fired a volley of direct fire. Bright fiery arrows hissed and whistled into the hollow. A moment later, blinding flames danced around. When the smoke from the rocket explosions dissipated, the tanks stood unharmed at first glance, only the hulls and turrets were covered with thick soot ...

Having corrected the damage to the tracks, having thrown out the burnt tarpaulins, the Emcha went to Mogilev-Podolsky. So, thirty-two 132-mm M-13 shells were fired at point-blank range at two Shermans, and they ... only burned the tarpaulin.

WAR STATISTICS

The first M-13 firing mounts had the BM-13-16 index and were mounted on the chassis of a ZIS-6 vehicle. The 82 mm BM-8-36 launcher was also mounted on the same chassis. There were only a few hundred ZIS-6 vehicles, and at the beginning of 1942 their production was stopped.

The launchers of the M-8 and M-13 missiles in 1941-1942 were mounted on anything. So, six M-8 guide shells were installed on machines from the Maxim machine gun, 12 M-8 guides - on a motorcycle, sled and snowmobile (M-8 and M-13), T-40 and T-60 tanks, armored railway platforms (BM-8-48, BM-8-72, BM-13-16), river and sea boats, etc. But basically, launchers in 1942-1944 were mounted on cars received under Lend-Lease: Austin, Dodge, Ford Marmont, Bedford, etc.

During the 5 years of the war, out of 3374 chassis used for combat vehicles, the ZIS-6 accounted for 372 (11%), the Studebaker - 1845 (54.7%), the remaining 17 types of chassis (except for the Willis with mountain launchers) - 1157 (34.3%). Finally, it was decided to standardize combat vehicles based on the Studebaker car. In April 1943, such a system was put into service under the symbol BM-13N (normalized). In March 1944, a self-propelled launcher for the M-13 was adopted on the BM-31-12 Studebaker chassis.

But in the post-war years, the Studebakers were ordered to be forgotten, although combat vehicles on its chassis were in service until the early 1960s. In secret instructions, the Studebaker was referred to as a "cross-country vehicle." Mutant Katyushas mounted on the ZIS-5 chassis or post-war vehicles, which stubbornly pass off as genuine military relics, ascended on numerous pedestals, but the original BM-13-16 on the ZIS-6 chassis was preserved only in the Artillery Museum in St. Petersburg.

As already mentioned, back in 1941 the Germans captured several launchers and hundreds of 132-mm M-13 and 82-mm M-8 shells. The Wehrmacht command believed that their turbojet shells and tubular launchers with revolver-type guides were better than Soviet wing-stabilized shells. But the SS took up the M-8 and M-13 and ordered the Skoda company to copy them.

In 1942, on the basis of the 82-mm Soviet M-8 projectile, 8 cm R.Sprgr rockets were created in Zbroevka. In fact, it was a new projectile, and not a copy of the M-8, although outwardly the German projectile was very similar to the M-8.

Unlike the Soviet projectile, the stabilizer feathers were placed obliquely at an angle of 1.5 degrees to the longitudinal axis. Due to this, the projectile rotated in flight. The rotation speed was many times less than that of a turbojet projectile, and did not play any role in projectile stabilization, but it eliminated the thrust eccentricity of a single-nozzle rocket engine. But the eccentricity, that is, the displacement of the engine thrust vector due to the uneven burning of gunpowder in checkers, was the main reason for the low accuracy of Soviet M-8 and M-13 missiles.

German installation for firing prototypes of Soviet missiles

On the basis of the Soviet M-13, the Skoda company created a whole range of 15-cm missiles with oblique wings for the SS and Luftwaffe, but they were produced in small batches. Our troops captured several samples of German 8-cm shells, and our designers made their own samples based on them. Missiles M-13 and M-31 with oblique plumage were adopted by the Red Army in 1944, they were assigned special ballistic indices - TS-46 and TS-47.

R.Sprgr projectile

The apotheosis of the combat use of the Katyusha and Luka was the assault on Berlin. In total, more than 44 thousand guns and mortars, as well as 1,785 M-30 and M-31 launchers, 1,620 rocket artillery combat vehicles (219 divisions) were involved in the Berlin operation. In the battles for Berlin, rocket artillery units used the rich experience they had gained in the battles for Poznan, which consisted in direct fire with single projectiles M-31, M-20 and even M-13.

At first glance, this method of firing may seem primitive, but its results turned out to be very significant. Shooting single rockets during the fighting in such a huge city as Berlin has found the widest application.

To conduct such fire in the guards mortar units, assault groups of approximately the following composition were created: an officer - group commander, an electrical engineer, 25 sergeants and soldiers for the M-31 assault group and 8–10 for the M-13 assault group.

The intensity of the battles and the fire missions performed by rocket artillery in the battles for Berlin can be judged by the number of rockets used up in these battles. In the offensive zone of the 3rd shock army, the following were used up: M-13 shells - 6270; shells M-31 - 3674; shells M-20 - 600; shells M-8 - 1878.

Of this amount, rocket artillery assault groups used up: M-8 shells - 1638; shells M-13 - 3353; shells M-20 - 191; shells M-31 - 479.

These groups in Berlin destroyed 120 buildings that were strong centers of enemy resistance, destroyed three 75-mm guns, suppressed dozens of firing points, and killed over 1,000 enemy soldiers and officers.

So, our glorious "Katyusha" and her unfairly offended brother "Luka" became a weapon of victory in the full sense of the word!

The information used in the writing of this material is, in principle, generally known. But maybe at least someone will learn something new for themselves

Here is a small illustration:

Suppose I read in a 12-volume book (which usually exaggerates the strength of the Germans and satellites opposing us) that by the beginning of 1944 on the Soviet-German front, the ratio of forces in artillery pieces and mortars was 1.7: 1 (95,604 Soviet against 54,570 enemy). More than one and a half overall superiority. That is, in active sectors it could be brought up to three times (for example, in the Belarusian operation, 29,000 Soviet against 10,000 enemy) Does this mean that the enemy could not raise his head under the hurricane fire of Soviet artillery? No, an artillery piece is just a tool for firing shells. There are no shells - and the gun is a useless toy. And providing shells is just the task of logistics.

In 2009, at VIF, Isaev posted a comparison of the ammunition consumption of Soviet and German artillery (1942: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1718/1718985.htm, 1943: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/ forum/0/archive/1706/1706490.htm , 1944: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1733/1733134.htm , 1945: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/ 0/archive/1733/1733171.htm). I collected everything in a table, supplemented it with rocket artillery, for the Germans I added from Hann the consumption of captured calibers (often it gives a negligible addition) and the consumption of tank calibers for comparability - in Soviet figures, tank calibers (20-mm ShVAK and 85-mm non-anti-aircraft) are present. Posted. Well, grouped a little differently. It turns out to be pretty interesting. Despite the superiority of Soviet artillery in the number of barrels, the Germans shot more shells in pieces, if we take artillery calibers (i.e. guns 75 mm and above, without anti-aircraft guns) the Germans have more:
USSR Germany 1942 37,983,800 45,261,822 1943 82,125,480 69,928,496 1944 98,564,568 113,663,900
If translated into tons, then the superiority is even more noticeable:
USSR Germany 1942 446.113 709.957 1943 828.193 1.121.545 1944 1.000.962 1.540.933
Tons here are taken by the weight of the projectile, not the shot. That is, the weight of metal and explosives falling directly on the head of the opposing side. I note that I did not count the armor-piercing shells of tank and anti-tank guns for the Germans (I hope you understand why). It is not possible to exclude them for the Soviet side, but, judging by the Germans, the amendment will come out insignificant. In Germany, consumption is given on all fronts, which begins to play a role in 1944.

In the Soviet army, on average, 3.6-3.8 shells were fired per day on the barrel of a gun from 76.2 mm and above in the active army (without RGK). The figure is quite stable both in years and in calibers: in 1944, the average daily shot for all calibers was 3.6 per barrel, for a 122-mm howitzer - 3.0, for 76.2 mm barrels (regimental, divisional, tank) - 3.7. The average daily shot per mortar barrel, on the contrary, is growing year by year: from 2.0 in 1942 to 4.1 in 1944.

As for the Germans, I do not have the presence of guns in the army. But if we take the total availability of guns, then the average daily shot per barrel of 75-mm and higher caliber in 1944 will be about 8.5. At the same time, the main workhorse of divisional artillery (105-mm howitzers - almost a third of the total tonnage of shells) shot an average of 14.5 shells per barrel per day, and the second main caliber (150-mm divisional howitzers - 20% of the total tonnage) about 10, 7. Mortars were used much less intensively - 81-mm mortars fired 4.4 rounds per barrel per day, and 120-mm only 2.3. Regimental artillery guns gave a consumption closer to the average (75-mm infantry gun 7 rounds per barrel, 150-mm infantry gun - 8.3).

Another instructive metric is the expenditure of shells per division.

The division was the main organizational building block, but typically the divisions were reinforced by units. It is interesting to see what supported the middle division in terms of firepower. In 1942-44, the USSR had in the active army (without the RGC) about 500 calculated divisions (weighted average: 1942 - 425 divisions, 1943 - 494 divisions, 1944 - 510 divisions). There were approximately 5.5 million in the ground forces of the active army, that is, there were approximately 11 thousand people per division. This "had to" naturally, taking into account both the actual composition of the division, and all the reinforcement and support units that worked for it both directly and in the rear.

Among the Germans, the average number of troops per division of the Eastern Front, calculated in the same way, decreased from 16,000 in 1943 to 13,800 in 1944, approximately 1.45-1.25 times "thicker" than the Soviet one. At the same time, the average daily shot on the Soviet division in 1944 was about 5.4 tons (1942 - 2.9; 1943 - 4.6), and on the German - three times more (16.2 tons). If we calculate for 10,000 people of the active army, then from the Soviet side to support their actions in 1944 5 tons of ammunition were spent per day, and from the German 13.8 tons.

The American division in the European theater in this sense stands out even more. It had three times as many people as the Soviet one: 34,000 (this is without Supply Command troops), and the daily ammunition consumption was almost ten times more (52.3 tons). Or 15.4 tons per day per 10,000 people, that is, more than three times more than in the Red Army.

In this sense, it was the Americans who implemented the recommendation of Joseph Vissarionovich "to fight with little blood but with a lot of shells." It can be compared - in June 1944 the distance to the Elbe was approximately the same from Omaha Beach and from Vitebsk. The Russians and the Americans also reached the Elbe at about the same time. That is, they ensured the same speed of advancement for themselves. However, the Americans on this route used up 15 tons per day per 10,000 personnel and lost an average of 3.8% of troops per month in killed, wounded, captured and missing. Soviet troops advancing at the same speed spent (specifically) three times less shells, but they also lost 8.5% per month. Those. speed was provided by the expenditure of manpower.

It is also interesting to see the distribution of the weight consumption of ammunition by types of guns:

I remind you that all the numbers here are for artillery of 75 mm and above, that is, without anti-aircraft guns, without 50 mm mortars, without battalion / anti-tank guns with a caliber of 28 to 57 mm. Infantry guns include German guns with this name, Soviet 76-mm regiments and American 75-mm howitzer. The remaining guns weighing less than 8 tons in combat position are counted as field guns. Systems such as the Soviet 152 mm ML-20 howitzer gun and the German s.FH 18 fall here at the upper limit. Heavier guns such as the Soviet 203 mm B-4 howitzer, the American 203 mm M1 howitzer or the German 210 mm mortar, as well as 152-155-170-mm long-range guns on their carriages fall into the next class - heavy and long-range artillery.

It can be seen that in the Red Army the lion's share of fire falls on mortars and regimental guns, i.e. to fire on the near tactical zone. Heavy artillery plays a very insignificant role (in 1945 more, but not by much). In field artillery, forces (by weight of projectiles fired) are roughly evenly distributed between the 76mm cannon, 122mm howitzer, and 152mm howitzer/howitzer cannon. Which leads to the fact that the average weight of the Soviet projectile is one and a half times less than the German one.

In addition, it should be noted that the farther the target, the (on average) it is less covered. In the near tactical zone, most of the targets are somehow dug / covered, while in the depths there are such uncovered targets as advancing reserves, enemy troops in clusters, headquarters locations, etc. In other words, a projectile that hits the target in depth on average does more damage than a projectile fired at the leading edge (on the other hand, the dispersion of projectiles at long distances is higher).

Then, if the enemy has parity in the weight of fired shells of shells, but at the same time keeps half as many people at the front, thereby he gives half as many targets to our artillery.

All this works for the observed loss ratio.

(As an extended commentary on

Everyone is familiar with the lubok image of the Soviet "soldier-liberator". In the view of the Soviet people, the Red Army soldiers of the Great Patriotic War are emaciated people in dirty overcoats who run in a crowd to attack after the tanks, or tired elderly men smoking cigarettes on the parapet of a trench. After all, it was precisely such shots that were mainly captured by military newsreels. In the late 1980s, filmmakers and post-Soviet historians put the "victim of repression" on a cart, handed over a "three-ruler" without cartridges, sending fascists towards the armored hordes - under the supervision of barrage detachments.

Now I propose to see what really happened. It can be responsibly stated that our weapons were in no way inferior to foreign ones, while being more suitable for local conditions of use. For example, a three-line rifle had larger gaps and tolerances than foreign ones, but this "flaw" was a forced feature - gun grease, thickening in the cold, did not take the weapon out of combat.

So, review.

N agan- a revolver developed by the Belgian gunsmiths brothers Emil (1830-1902) and Leon (1833-1900) Nagans, which was in service and produced in a number of countries at the end of the 19th - the middle of the 20th century.


TC(Tulsky, Korovina) - the first Soviet serial self-loading pistol. In 1925, the Dynamo sports society ordered the Tula Arms Plant to develop a compact pistol chambered for 6.35 × 15 mm Browning for sports and civilian needs.

Work on the creation of the pistol took place in the design bureau of the Tula Arms Plant. In the autumn of 1926, the designer-gunsmith S. A. Korovin completed the development of a pistol, which was named the pistol TK (Tula Korovin).

At the end of 1926, TOZ began producing a pistol, the following year the pistol was approved for use, receiving the official name "Pistol Tulsky, Korovin, model 1926."

TK pistols entered service with the NKVD of the USSR, middle and senior officers of the Red Army, civil servants and party workers.

Also, the TC was used as a gift or award weapon (for example, there are known cases of awarding Stakhanovites with it). Between the autumn of 1926 and 1935, several tens of thousands of Korovins were produced. In the period after the Great Patriotic War, TK pistols were kept for some time in savings banks as a backup weapon for employees and collectors.


Pistol arr. 1933 TT(Tulsky, Tokareva) - the first army self-loading pistol of the USSR, developed in 1930 by the Soviet designer Fedor Vasilyevich Tokarev. The TT pistol was developed for the 1929 competition for a new army pistol, announced to replace the Nagant revolver and several foreign-made revolvers and pistols that were in service with the Red Army by the mid-1920s. The German cartridge 7.63 × 25 mm Mauser was adopted as a regular cartridge, which was purchased in significant quantities for the Mauser S-96 pistols in service.

Mosin rifle. 7.62-mm (3-line) rifle of the 1891 model (Mosin rifle, three-line) is a repeating rifle adopted by the Russian Imperial Army in 1891.

It was actively used from 1891 until the end of the Great Patriotic War, during this period it was repeatedly modernized.

The name of the three-ruler comes from the caliber of the rifle barrel, which is equal to three Russian lines (an old measure of length equal to one tenth of an inch, or 2.54 mm - respectively, three lines are equal to 7.62 mm).

On the basis of the rifle of the 1891 model and its modifications, a number of samples of sports and hunting weapons, both rifled and smoothbore, were created.

Simonov automatic rifle. 7.62 mm automatic rifle of the Simonov system of 1936, AVS-36 - Soviet automatic rifle designed by gunsmith Sergei Simonov.

It was originally designed as a self-loading rifle, but in the course of improvements, an automatic fire mode was added for use in an emergency. The first automatic rifle developed in the USSR and put into service.

With Tokarev self-loading rifle. 7.62-mm self-loading rifles of the Tokarev system of the 1938 and 1940s (SVT-38, SVT-40), as well as the Tokarev automatic rifle of the 1940 model, a modification of the Soviet self-loading rifle developed by F. V. Tokarev.

The SVT-38 was developed as a replacement for the Simonov automatic rifle and was adopted by the Red Army on February 26, 1939. The first SVT arr. 1938 was released on July 16, 1939. On October 1, 1939, gross production began at the Tula, and from 1940 at the Izhevsk Arms Plant.

Self-loading carbine Simonov. The 7.62 mm Simonov self-loading carbine (also known as SKS-45 abroad) is a Soviet self-loading carbine designed by Sergei Simonov, put into service in 1949.

The first copies began to arrive in active units at the beginning of 1945 - this was the only case of using the 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge in World War II.

Tokarev submachine gun, or the original name - Tokarev's light carbine - an experimental model of automatic weapons created in 1927 for the modified Nagant revolver cartridge, the first submachine gun developed in the USSR. It was not adopted for service, it was released by a small experimental batch, it was used to a limited extent in the Great Patriotic War.

P submachine gun Degtyarev. 7.62-mm submachine guns of models 1934, 1934/38 and 1940 of the Degtyarev system are various modifications of the submachine gun developed by the Soviet gunsmith Vasily Degtyarev in the early 1930s. The first submachine gun adopted by the Red Army.

The Degtyarev submachine gun was a fairly typical representative of the first generation of this type of weapon. It was used in the Finnish campaign of 1939-40, as well as at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War.

Shpagin submachine gun. 7.62-mm submachine gun of the 1941 model of the Shpagin system (PPSh) is a Soviet submachine gun developed in 1940 by designer G.S. Shpagin and adopted by the Red Army on December 21, 1940. PPSh was the main submachine gun of the Soviet armed forces in the Great Patriotic War.

After the end of the war, in the early 1950s, the PPSh was withdrawn from service with the Soviet Army and gradually replaced by the Kalashnikov assault rifle, it remained in service with the rear and auxiliary units, parts of the internal troops and railway troops for a little longer. In service with paramilitary security units was at least until the mid-1980s.

Also, in the post-war period, PPSh was supplied in significant quantities to countries friendly to the USSR, was in service with the armies of various states for a long time, was used by irregular formations, and throughout the 20th century was used in armed conflicts around the world.

Submachine gun Sudayev. 7.62-mm submachine guns of the 1942 and 1943 models of the Sudayev system (PPS) are variants of the submachine gun developed by the Soviet designer Alexei Sudayev in 1942. Used by Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War.

Often PPS is considered as the best submachine gun of World War II.

Gun "Maxim" model 1910. Machine gun "Maxim" model 1910 - easel machine gun, a variant of the British machine gun Maxim, widely used by the Russian and Soviet armies during the First World War and the Second World War. The Maxim machine gun was used to destroy open group targets and enemy fire weapons at a distance of up to 1000 m.

Anti-aircraft variant
- 7.62-mm quad machine gun "Maxim" on the U-431 anti-aircraft gun
- 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun "Maxim" on the U-432 anti-aircraft gun

P Ulmet Maxim-Tokarev- Soviet light machine gun designed by F. V. Tokarev, created in 1924 on the basis of the Maxim machine gun.

DP(Degtyareva Infantry) - a light machine gun developed by V. A. Degtyarev. The first ten serial DP machine guns were manufactured at the Kovrov plant on November 12, 1927, then a batch of 100 machine guns was transferred to military trials, as a result of which the machine gun was adopted by the Red Army on December 21, 1927. DP became one of the first samples of small arms created in the USSR. The machine gun was massively used as the main weapon of fire support for infantry at the platoon-company level until the end of World War II.

DT(Degtyarev tank) - a tank machine gun developed by V. A. Degtyarev in 1929. Entered service with the Red Army in 1929 under the designation "7.62-mm tank machine gun of the Degtyarev system arr. 1929" (DT-29)

DS-39(7.62-mm machine gun Degtyarev model 1939).

SG-43. 7.62 mm Goryunov machine gun (SG-43) - Soviet machine gun. It was developed by the gunsmith P. M. Goryunov with the participation of M. M. Goryunov and V. E. Voronkov at the Kovrov Mechanical Plant. Adopted on May 15, 1943. SG-43 began to enter the troops in the second half of 1943.

DShK And DShKM- heavy machine guns chambered for 12.7 × 108 mm. The result of the modernization of the heavy machine gun DK (Degtyarev Large-caliber). DShK was adopted by the Red Army in 1938 under the designation "12.7 mm heavy machine gun Degtyarev - Shpagin model 1938"

In 1946, under the designation DShKM(Degtyarev, Shpagin, modernized large-caliber,) machine gun was adopted by the Soviet Army.

PTRD. Anti-tank single-shot rifle arr. 1941 of the Degtyarev system, put into service on August 29, 1941. It was intended to fight medium and light tanks and armored vehicles at distances up to 500 m. Also, the gun could fire at pillboxes / bunkers and firing points covered with armor at distances up to 800 m and at aircraft at distances up to 500 m.

PTRS. Anti-tank self-loading rifle mod. 1941 of the Simonov system) is a Soviet self-loading anti-tank rifle, put into service on August 29, 1941. It was intended to fight medium and light tanks and armored vehicles at distances up to 500 m. Also, the gun could fire at pillboxes / bunkers and firing points covered with armor at distances up to 800 m and at aircraft at distances up to 500 m. During the war some of the guns were captured and used by the Germans. The guns were named Panzerbüchse 784 (R) or PzB 784 (R).

Dyakonov grenade launcher. A rifle grenade launcher of the Dyakonov system, designed to destroy living, mostly closed, targets with fragmentation grenades that are inaccessible to flat-fire weapons.

It was widely used in pre-war conflicts, during the Soviet-Finnish war and at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War. According to the state of the rifle regiment in 1939, each rifle squad was armed with a rifle grenade launcher of the Dyakonov system. In the documents of that time it was called a manual mortar for throwing rifle grenades.

125 mm ampoule gun model 1941- the only model of the ampoule gun mass-produced in the USSR. It was widely used with varying success by the Red Army at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War, it was often made in semi-handicraft conditions.

The most commonly used projectile was a glass or tin ball filled with a flammable liquid "KS", but the range of ammunition included mines, a smoke bomb, and even makeshift "propaganda shells". With the help of a blank 12-gauge rifle cartridge, the projectile was fired at 250-500 meters, thus being an effective tool against some fortifications and many types of armored vehicles, including tanks. However, difficulties in use and maintenance led to the fact that in 1942 the ampoule gun was withdrawn from service.

ROKS-3(Knapsack Flamethrower Klyuev-Sergeev) - Soviet infantry backpack flamethrower of the Great Patriotic War. The first model of the ROKS-1 backpack flamethrower was developed in the USSR in the early 1930s. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the rifle regiments of the Red Army had flamethrower teams consisting of two squads, armed with 20 ROKS-2 knapsack flamethrowers. Based on the experience of using these flamethrowers at the beginning of 1942, the designer of the Research Institute of Chemical Engineering M.P. Sergeev and the designer of the military plant No. 846 V.N. Klyuev developed a more advanced backpack flamethrower ROKS-3, which was in service with individual companies and battalions of backpack flamethrowers of the Red Army throughout the war.

Bottles with a combustible mixture ("Molotov Cocktail").

At the beginning of the war, the State Defense Committee decided to use bottles with a combustible mixture in the fight against tanks. Already on July 7, 1941, the State Defense Committee adopted a special resolution “On anti-tank incendiary grenades (bottles)”, which ordered the People's Commissariat of the Food Industry to organize, from July 10, 1941, the equipment of liter glass bottles with fire mixture according to the recipe of Research Institute 6 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition. And the head of the Military Chemical Defense Directorate of the Red Army (later - the Main Military Chemical Directorate) was ordered to begin "supplying military units with hand-held incendiary grenades" from July 14th.

Dozens of distilleries and beer factories throughout the USSR turned into military enterprises on the go. Moreover, the "Molotov Cocktail" (named after the then deputy I.V. Stalin for the State Defense Committee) was prepared directly on the old factory lines, where only yesterday they poured soda, port wines and fizzy "Abrau-Durso". From the first batches of such bottles, they often did not even have time to tear off the "peaceful" alcohol labels. In addition to the liter bottles indicated in the legendary "Molotov" decree, the "cocktail" was also made in beer and wine-cognac containers with a volume of 0.5 and 0.7 liters.

Two types of incendiary bottles were adopted by the Red Army: with self-igniting liquid KS (a mixture of phosphorus and sulfur) and with combustible mixtures No. 1 and No. 3, which are a mixture of aviation gasoline, kerosene, ligroin, thickened with oils or a special hardening powder OP- 2, developed in 1939 under the leadership of A.P. Ionov - in fact, it was the prototype of modern napalm. The abbreviation "KS" is deciphered in different ways: and "Koshkinskaya mixture" - by the name of the inventor N.V. Koshkin, and "Old Cognac", and "Kachugin-Solodovnik" - by the name of other inventors of liquid grenades.

A bottle with a self-igniting liquid KC, falling on a solid body, broke, the liquid spilled and burned with a bright flame for up to 3 minutes, developing a temperature of up to 1000°C. At the same time, being sticky, it stuck to the armor or covered up viewing slots, glasses, observation devices, blinded the crew with smoke, smoking it out of the tank and burning everything inside the tank. Getting on the body, a drop of burning liquid caused severe, difficult to heal burns.

Combustible mixtures No. 1 and No. 3 burned for up to 60 seconds at temperatures up to 800 ° C and emitting a lot of black smoke. As a cheaper option, bottles of gasoline were used, and as an incendiary, thin glass ampoules-tubes with KS liquid were used, which were attached to the bottle with the help of pharmaceutical rubber bands. Sometimes the ampoules were put inside the bottles before being thrown.

B body armor PZ-ZIF-20(protective shell, Frunze Plant). It is also CH-38 of the Cuirass type (CH-1, steel breastplate). It can be called the first mass Soviet body armor, although it was called a steel breastplate, which does not change its purpose.

The bulletproof vest provided protection against the German submachine gun, pistols. Also, the bulletproof vest provided protection against fragments of grenades and mines. The body armor was recommended to be worn by assault groups, signalmen (during the laying and repair of cables) and when performing other operations at the discretion of the commander.

Information often comes across that the PZ-ZIF-20 is not a bulletproof vest SP-38 (SN-1), which is not true, since the PZ-ZIF-20 was created according to the documentation of 1938, and industrial production was established in 1943. The second point is that in appearance they have 100% similarity. Among the military search detachments, it has the name "Volkhov", "Leningrad", "five-section".
Reconstruction photo:

Steel bibs CH-42

Soviet assault engineer-sapper guards brigade in steel bibs SN-42 and with DP-27 machine guns. 1st ShISBr. 1st Belorussian Front, summer 1944.

ROG-43 hand grenade

ROG-43 hand fragmentation grenade (index 57-G-722) of remote action, designed to defeat enemy manpower in offensive and defensive combat. The new grenade was developed in the first half of the Great Patriotic War at the plant. Kalinin and had the factory designation RGK-42. After being put into service in 1943, the grenade received the designation ROG-43.

Hand smoke grenade RDG.

RDG device

Smoke grenades were used to provide curtains of 8 - 10 m in size and were used mainly to "dazzle" the enemy in shelters, to create local curtains in order to mask the crews leaving the armored vehicles, as well as to simulate the burning of armored vehicles. Under favorable conditions, one RDG grenade created an invisible cloud 25-30 m long.

Burning grenades did not sink in water, so they could be used to force water barriers. The grenade could smoke from 1 to 1.5 minutes, forming, depending on the composition of the smoke mixture, thick gray-black or white smoke.

RPG-6 grenade.


RPG-6 exploded instantly at the moment of impact on a rigid barrier, destroyed armor, hit the crew of an armored target, its weapons and equipment, and could also ignite fuel and explode ammunition. Military tests of the RPG-6 grenade took place in September 1943. The captured Ferdinand assault gun was used as a target, which had frontal armor up to 200 mm and side armor up to 85 mm. The tests carried out showed that the RPG-6 grenade, when the head part hit the target, could penetrate armor up to 120 mm.

Hand anti-tank grenade mod. 1943 RPG-43

Hand-held anti-tank grenade model 1941 RPG-41 percussion

RPG-41 was intended to combat armored vehicles and light tanks with armor up to 20 - 25 mm thick, and could also be used to combat pillboxes and field-type shelters. The RPG-41 could also be used to destroy medium and heavy tanks when it hit the vehicle's weak points (roof, tracks, undercarriage, etc.)

Chemical grenade model 1917


According to the "Temporary rifle charter of the Red Army. Part 1. Small arms. Rifle and hand grenades ”, published by the head of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs and the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR in 1927, a hand chemical grenade mod. 1917 from a stock prepared during the First World War.

Grenade VKG-40

In service with the Red Army in the 1920-1930s was the muzzle-loading "Dyakonov grenade launcher", created at the end of the First World War and subsequently modernized.

The grenade launcher consisted of a mortar, a bipod and a quadrant sight and served to defeat manpower with a fragmentation grenade. The barrel of the mortar had a caliber of 41 mm, three screw grooves, was rigidly fastened in a cup screwed onto the neck, which was put on the rifle barrel, being fixed on the front sight with a cutout.

RG-42 hand grenade

RG-42 model 1942 with a UZRG fuse. After being put into service, the grenade was assigned the index RG-42 (1942 hand grenade). The new UZRG fuse used in the grenade became the same for both the RG-42 and the F-1.

The RG-42 grenade was used both offensively and defensively. In appearance, it resembled an RGD-33 grenade, only without a handle. RG-42 with a fuse UZRG belonged to the type of remote offensive fragmentation grenades. It was intended to defeat enemy manpower.

Rifle anti-tank grenade VPGS-41



VPGS-41 when using

A characteristic distinguishing feature of ramrod grenades was the presence of a "tail" (ramrod) inserted into the bore of the rifle and serving as a stabilizer. The grenade was fired with a blank cartridge.

Soviet hand grenade mod. 1914/30 with protective cover

Soviet hand grenade mod. 1914/30 refers to anti-personnel fragmentation hand grenades of remote action of the double type. This means that it is designed to destroy enemy personnel with hull fragments during its explosion. Remote action - means that the grenade will explode after a certain period, regardless of other conditions, after the soldier releases it from his hands.

Double type - means that the grenade can be used as an offensive, i.e. grenade fragments have a small mass and fly at a distance less than the possible throw range; or as defensive, i.e. fragments fly at a distance exceeding the throwing range.

The double action of the grenade is achieved by putting on the grenade the so-called "shirt" - a cover made of thick metal, which provides, during the explosion, fragments of a larger mass flying over a greater distance.

Hand grenade RGD-33

An explosive charge is placed inside the case - up to 140 grams of TNT. Between the explosive charge and the case, a steel tape with a square notch is placed to obtain fragments during the explosion, rolled up in three or four layers.


The grenade was equipped with a defensive cover, which was used only when throwing a grenade from a trench or shelter. In other cases, the protective cover was removed.

And of course, F-1 grenade

Initially, the F-1 grenade used a fuse designed by F.V. Koveshnikov, which was much more reliable and convenient in the use of the French fuse. The deceleration time of the Koveshnikov fuse was 3.5-4.5 sec.

In 1941, the designers E.M. Viceni and A.A. Bednyakov developed and put into service instead of Koveshnikov's fuse, a new, safer and simpler fuse for the F-1 hand grenade.

In 1942, the new fuse became the same for F-1 and RG-42 hand grenades, it was called UZRG - "unified fuse for hand grenades."

* * *
After the above, it cannot be argued that only rusty three-rulers without cartridges were in service.
About chemical weapons during the Second World War, the conversation is separate and special ...

Often we find shell casings from the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars in the ground. Almost all of them have some kind of their own difference. Today we will consider the marking of cartridge cases, which is located on the cartridge capsule, regardless of the brand and caliber of the weapon.

Consider some types and markings of the Austro-Hungarian types of cartridges of 1905-1916. For this type of cartridge case, the primer is divided into four parts with the help of dashes, the inscriptions are embossed. The left, respectively, and the right cell is the year of production, the upper month, and the designation of the plant in the lower part.

• In Fig. 1. - G. Roth, Vienna.
• Fig 2. - Bello and Celle, the city of Prague.
• Fig 3. - Wöllersdorf plant.
• Fig 4. - Hartenberg factory.
• Figure 5. - the same Hartenberg, but the Kellery Co. plant.

Later Hungarian 1930-40s, have some differences. Fig 6. - Chapelsky arsenal, year of issue from the bottom. Fig 7. - Budapest. Fig 8. - Veszprem military plant.

Germany, imperialist war.

The German marking of the shell casings of the imperialist war has two types with a clear division (Fig. 9) using dashes into four equal parts of the primer and with a conditional one (Fig. 10). The inscription is embossed; in the second version, the letters and numbers of the designation are directed towards the primer.

In the upper part, the marking S 67, in different versions: together, separately, through a dot, without numbers. The lower part is the month of production, on the left is the year, and on the right is the plant. In some cases, the year and plant are swapped, or the location of all divisions is reversed completely.

Fascist Germany.

Sleeves and their markings in Nazi Germany (Mauser type) have many options, because the cartridges were produced in almost all factories of the occupied countries of Western Europe: Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Italy.

Consider Figure 11-14, this case is made in Denmark. The capsule is divided into four parts: on the top is the letter P with numbers, on the bottom is the week, on the left side is the year, on the right is the letter S and a star (five-pointed or six-pointed). In figures 15-17 we see some more types of cartridges produced in Denmark.

In Figure 18 we see capsules, presumably of Czechoslovak and Polish production. The capsule is divided into four parts: at the top - Z, at the bottom - the month of manufacture, on the left and right - the year. There is an option when “SMS” is written at the top, and the caliber is 7.92 at the bottom.

• In Fig. 19-23 German shells by G. Genshov and Co. in Durly;
• Figure 24. - RVS, Browning, caliber 7.65, Nuremberg;
• Figures 25 and 26 - DVM, Karlsruhe.

More options for Polish-made cartridges.

• Figure 27 - Skarzysko-Kamenna;
• Figure 28 and 29 - "Pochinsk", Warsaw.

The signs on the cartridges of the Mosin rifle are not depressed, but convex. Above is usually the letter of the manufacturer, below are the numbers of the year of manufacture.

• Figure 30 - Lugansk plant;
• Fig 31 - plant from Russia;
• Figure 32 - Tula plant.

Some more capsule options:

• Figure 33 - Tula plant;
• Figure 34 - Russian plant;
• Fig 35 - Moscow;
• Figure 36 - Russian-Belgian;
• Fig 37 - Riga;
• Fig 38 - Leningrad;
• Figure 39, 40, 41, 42 - different plants in Russia.

In the first weeks of the war, the fronts suffered significant losses and losses accumulated in the troops of the border military districts in the prewar years. Most of the artillery factories and munitions factories were evacuated from the threatened areas to the east.

The supply of arms and ammunition by military factories in the south of the country has ceased. All this greatly complicated the production of weapons and ammunition and the provision of them to the army and new military formations. Shortcomings in the work of the Main Artillery Directorate also had a negative effect on the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition. The GAU did not always accurately know the state of security of the troops of the fronts, since strict accountability for this service was not established before the war. The report card for urgent reports on ammunition was introduced at the end of ., and on weapons - in April

Soon changes were made to the organization of the Main Artillery Directorate. In July 1941, the Directorate for the Supply of Ground Artillery Weapons was formed, and on September 20 of the same year, the post of chief of artillery of the Soviet Army was restored with the GAU subordinate to him. The head of the GAU became the first deputy head of artillery of the Soviet Army. The adopted structure of the GAU did not change throughout the war and fully justified itself. With the introduction of the post of Chief of Logistics of the Soviet Army, close cooperation was established between the GAU, the headquarters of the Chief of Logistics of the Soviet Army and the Central Directorate of Military Communications.

The heroic labor of the working class, scientists, engineers and technicians at the military enterprises of the central and eastern regions of the country, the firm and skillful leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, local party organizations in restructuring the entire national economy on a war footing allowed the Soviet military industry to produce in the second half of 1941 30.2 thousand guns, including 9.9 thousand 76-mm and larger calibers, 42.3 thousand mortars (of which 19.1 thousand 82-mm caliber and larger), 106.2 thousand machine guns , 89.7 thousand machine guns, 1.6 million rifles and carbines and 62.9 million shells, bombs and mines 215. But since these deliveries of weapons and ammunition only partially covered the losses of 1941, the situation with the provision of troops Army weapons and ammunition continued to be tense. It took a huge effort of the military industry, the work of the central organs of the rear, the artillery supply service of the GAU in order to satisfy the needs of the fronts in weapons, and especially in ammunition.

During the defensive battle near Moscow, due to the current production, which was continuously growing in the eastern regions of the country, first of all, it was provided with weapons for the reserve associations of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command - the 1st shock, 20th and 10th armies, formed in the depths of the country and transferred to the beginning of the counteroffensive near Moscow as part of the Western Front. Due to the current production of weapons, the needs of the troops and other fronts participating in the defensive battle and counteroffensive near Moscow were also met.

During this difficult period for our country, Moscow factories did a great deal of work on the manufacture of various types of weapons. As a result, by December 1941, the number of armaments on the Western Front increased from 50-80 to 370-640 per cent for its individual types. A significant increase in armament was also in the troops of other fronts.

During the counter-offensive near Moscow, a mass repair of out-of-service weapons and military equipment was organized in military repair shops, at enterprises in Moscow and the Moscow region. Nevertheless, the situation with the provision of troops during this period was so difficult that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin personally distributed anti-tank rifles, machine guns, anti-tank 76-mm regimental and divisional guns between the fronts.

With the entry into operation of military factories, especially in the Urals, in Western and Eastern Siberia, in Kazakhstan, already in the second quarter of 1942, the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition began to noticeably improve. In 1942, the military industry supplied the front with tens of thousands of guns of 76 mm and larger caliber, over 100,000 mortars (82-120 mm), and many millions of shells and mines.

In 1942, the main and most difficult task was to provide for the troops of the fronts operating in the Stalingrad region, in the large bend of the Don and in the Caucasus.

The consumption of ammunition in the defensive battle near Stalingrad was very high. So, for example, from July 12 to November 18, 1942, the troops of the Don, Stalingrad and South-Western fronts spent: 7,610 thousand shells and mines, including about 5 million shells and mines by the troops of the Stalingrad Front 216.

Due to the huge workload of the railways with operational transportation, the transports with ammunition moved slowly and were unloaded at the stations of the front-line railway section (Elton, Dzhanybek, Kaisatskaya, Krasny Kut). In order to deliver ammunition to the troops faster, the Stalingrad Front Artillery Supply Directorate was assigned two automobile battalions, which managed to transport over 500 wagons of ammunition in an extremely limited time frame.

The provision of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the Stalingrad Front was complicated by the enemy's continuous bombardment of crossings across the Volga. As a result of enemy air raids and shelling, the artillery depots of the front and armies were often forced to change their location. The trains were unloaded only at night. In order to disperse supply railway trains, ammunition was sent to army warehouses and their departments located near the railway, in flying cars, 5-10 wagons each, and then to the troops in small automobile columns (10-12 cars each), which usually followed different routes. This method of transportation ensured the safety of ammunition, but at the same time lengthened the time for their delivery to the troops.

The supply of weapons and ammunition to the troops of other fronts operating in the Volga and Don region during this period was less complicated and laborious. During the period of the defensive battle near Stalingrad, all three fronts received 5,388 wagons of ammunition, 123,000 rifles and machine guns, 53,000 machine guns, and 8,000 guns.

Along with the current supply of troops, the rear services of the center, fronts and armies during the defensive battle near Stalingrad carried out the accumulation of weapons and ammunition. As a result of the work done, by the beginning of the counteroffensive, the troops were mainly provided with ammunition (Table 19).

Table 19

Provision of troops of three fronts with ammunition (in ammunition) as of November 19, 1942 218

Ammunition	Front
	Stalingrad	Donskoy	Southwestern
Rifle cartridges	3,0	1,8	3,2
Cartridges for pistols	2,4	2,5	1,3
Cartridges for anti-tank rifles	1,2	1,5	1,6
Hand and anti-tank grenades	1,0	1,5	2,9
50mm mines	1,3	1,4	2,4
82 mm mines	1,5	0,7	2,4
120 mm mines	1,2	1,3	2,7
Shots:
45 mm cannon	2,9	2,9	4,9
76 mm cannon regimental artillery	2,1	1,4	3,3
76-mm cannon divisional artillery	1,8	2,8	4,0
122 mm howitzer	1,7	0,9	3,3
122 mm cannon	0,4	2,2	—
152 mm howitzer	1,2	7,2	5,7
152 mm howitzer-cannon	1,1	3,5	3,6
203 mm howitzer	—	—	—
37 mm anti-aircraft	2,4	3,2	5,1
76 mm anti-aircraft	—	5,1	4,5
85 mm anti-aircraft	—	3,0	4,2

A great deal of work to provide the troops with ammunition during this period was done by the heads of the artillery supply services of the fronts: Stalingrad - Colonel A. I. Markov, Donskoy - Colonel N. M. Bocharov, South-West - Colonel S. G. Algasov, as well as a special group of GAU led by the deputy head of the GAU, Lieutenant General of Artillery K. R. Myshkov, who died on August 10, 1942 during an enemy air raid on Stalingrad.

Simultaneously with the fighting that unfolded on the banks of the Volga and in the steppes of the Don, the battle for the Caucasus began in a vast area from the Black Sea to the Caspian. Supplying the troops of the Transcaucasian Front (Northern and Black Sea groups) with weapons and ammunition was an even more difficult problem than at Stalingrad. The supply of weapons and ammunition was carried out in a roundabout way, that is, from the Urals and from Siberia through Tashkent, Krasnovodsk, Baku. Separate transports went through Astrakhan, Baku or Makhachkala. A long route for transports with ammunition (5170-5370 km) and the need for repeated transshipment of goods from rail to water transport and vice versa, or from rail to road and mountain pack, greatly increased the time for their delivery to front-line and army warehouses. For example, transport No. 83/0418, sent on September 1, 1942 from the Urals to the Transcaucasian Front, arrived at its destination only on December 1. Transport No. 83/0334 traveled from Eastern Siberia to Transcaucasia, equal to 7027 km. But, despite such huge distances, transports with ammunition regularly went to the Caucasus. During the six months of hostilities, the Transcaucasian (North Caucasian) Front received about 2,000 wagons of ammunition 219.

It was very difficult to deliver ammunition from the front and army warehouses to the troops defending the mountain passes and passes of the Caucasus Range. The main means of transportation here were army and military pack companies. In the 20th Guards Rifle Division, which was defending the Belorechensk direction, shells were delivered from Sukhumi to Sochi by sea, then to the divisional warehouse - by road, and to regimental combat nutrition points - by pack transport. For the 394th Rifle Division, ammunition was delivered by U-2 aircraft from the Sukhumi airfield. Ammunition was delivered in this way for almost all divisions of the 46th Army.

The working people of Transcaucasia rendered great help to the front. Up to 30 mechanical factories and workshops in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia were involved in the manufacture of cases of hand grenades, mines and shells of medium caliber. From October 1, 1942 to March 1, 1943, they manufactured 1.3 million cases of hand grenades, 1 million mines and 226 thousand cases of shells. The local industry of Transcaucasia manufactured in 1942 4294 50-mm mortars, 688 82-mm mortars, 46,492 machine guns 220.

The working class of besieged Leningrad worked heroically. Delivery of weapons and ammunition to the besieged city was extremely difficult, so the production of them on the spot was often of decisive importance. From September until the end of 1941 alone, the industry of the city gave the front 12,085 machine guns and signal pistols, 7,682 mortars, 2,298 artillery pieces and 41 rocket launchers. In addition, Leningraders produced 3.2 million shells and mines, over 5 million hand grenades.

Leningrad supplied weapons to other fronts as well. In the difficult days of November 1941, when the enemy was rushing towards Moscow, by decision of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, 926 mortars and 431 76-mm regimental guns were sent to Moscow. Disassembled guns were loaded onto aircraft and sent to the Cherepovets station, where an artillery shop was equipped to assemble them. Then the assembled weapons were loaded onto platforms and delivered by rail to Moscow. In the same period, Leningrad sent 39,700 76-mm armor-piercing shells to Moscow by air.

Despite the difficulties of the first period of the war, our industry steadily increased output from month to month. In 1942, the GAU received from military factories 125.6 thousand mortars (82-120 mm), 33.1 thousand guns of 76 mm caliber and larger without tank guns, 127.4 million shells without aircraft and mines 221, 2,069 thousand rockets 222. This made it possible to fully compensate for the combat losses of weapons and the consumption of ammunition.

Providing the troops of the army with weapons and ammunition remained difficult even in the second period of the war, which was marked by the beginning of a powerful counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad. By the beginning of the counteroffensive, the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts had 30.4 thousand guns and mortars, including 16,755 units of caliber 76 mm and above 223, about 6 million shells and mines, 380 million cartridges for small arms and 1.2 million hand grenades. The supply of ammunition from the central bases and warehouses of the GAU for the entire time of the counteroffensive and liquidation of the encircled enemy grouping was carried out continuously. From November 19, 1942 to January 1, 1943, the Stalingrad Front received 1,095 wagons of ammunition, the Don Front (from November 16, 1942 to February 2, 1943) - 1,460 wagons, the South-West (from November 19, 1942 to January 1, 1942) - 1090 cars and the Voronezh Front (from December 15, 1942 to January 1, 1943) - 278 cars. In total, four fronts for the period November 1942 - January 1943 received 3923 carloads of ammunition.

The total consumption of ammunition in the battle for Stalingrad, starting from July 12, 1942, reached 9539 wagons 224 and had no equal in the history of previous wars. It amounted to a third of the ammunition consumption of the entire Russian army during the four years of the First World War and twice the consumption of ammunition by both belligerents near Verdun.

A huge amount of weapons and ammunition had to be supplied during the second period of the war to the Transcaucasian and North Caucasian fronts, which liberated the North Caucasus from Nazi troops.

Thanks to the effective measures of the Communist Party, the Soviet government, the State Defense Committee, local party and Soviet bodies, and the heroic labor of the working class, the production of weapons and ammunition increased significantly in 1942. This made it possible to increase their supply to the troops. The increase in the number of weapons in the troops of the fronts at the beginning of 1943 compared with 1942 is shown in Table. 20 225.

Table 20

The hostilities that unfolded in 1943 posed new, even more complex tasks for the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army in the timely accumulation and current supply of front troops with weapons and ammunition.

The volume of deliveries of weapons and ammunition especially increased during the preparations for the Battle of Kursk. In the period March - July 1943, more than half a million rifles and machine guns, 31.6 thousand light and heavy machine guns, 520 heavy machine guns, 21.8 thousand anti-tank rifles, 12,326 guns and mortars were sent to the fronts from the central bases and warehouses of the GAU , or a total of 3100 weapons wagons 226.

In preparation for the Battle of Kursk, the artillery supply authorities of the center, fronts and armies already had some experience in planning to provide the troops of the army with weapons and ammunition. It was carried out in the following way. Monthly, the General Staff issued a directive, which indicated which front, in which queue, how much ammunition (in ammunition) and by what date should be sent. On the basis of these instructions, the report cards of the fronts and their applications, the GAU planned to send ammunition to the troops of the active army, based on their availability at the NPO bases and warehouses, production capabilities within a month, security and needs of the fronts. When the GAU did not have the necessary resources, it, in agreement with the General Staff, made adjustments to the established volume of ammunition supply. The plan was considered and signed by Colonel-General, Commander of Artillery of the Soviet Army, then Chief Marshal of Artillery N.N.

On the basis of this plan, the organizational and planning department of the GAU (headed by General P.P. Volkotrubenko) reported data on the release and dispatch of ammunition to the fronts and gave orders to the Ammunition Supply Department. The latter, together with the TsUPVOSO, planned the dispatch of transports on terms in the range of five days and informed the fronts of the transport numbers, places and dates of their dispatch. As a rule, the dispatch of transports with ammunition to the fronts began on the 5th and ended on the 25th of each month. This method of planning and sending ammunition to the fronts from the central bases and warehouses of the NPO was preserved until the end of the war.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk (July 1, 1943), the Central and Voronezh Fronts had 21,686 guns and mortars (without 50-mm mortars), 518 rocket artillery installations, 3,489 tanks and 227 self-propelled guns.

A large number of weapons in the troops of the fronts operating on the Kursk Bulge, and the intensity of hostilities in the planned offensive operations, required an increase in the supply of ammunition to them. During April-June 1943, over 4.2 million shells and mines, about 300 million small arms ammunition and almost 2 million hand grenades (over 4 thousand wagons) were delivered to the Central, Voronezh and Bryansk fronts. By the beginning of the defensive battle, the fronts were provided with: 76-mm rounds - 2.7-4.3 ammunition; 122-mm howitzer shots - 2.4-3.4; 120 mm mines - 2.4-4; large-caliber ammunition - 3-5 rounds of ammunition 228. In addition, during the Battle of Kursk, 4781 wagons (over 119 full-weight trains) of various types of ammunition were supplied to these fronts from central bases and warehouses. Their average daily supply to the Central Front was 51 wagons, to Voronezh - 72 wagons and to Bryansk - 31 wagons 229.

The consumption of ammunition in the Battle of Kursk was especially high. Only during the period of July 5-12, 1943, the troops of the Central Front, repelling the fierce tank attacks of the enemy, used up 1083 wagons of ammunition (135 wagons per day). The main part falls on the 13th Army, which used up 817 wagons of ammunition in eight days, or 100 wagons per day. In just 50 days of the Battle of Kursk, the three fronts used up about 10,640 wagons of ammunition (excluding rockets), including 733 wagons of cartridges for small arms, 70 wagons of cartridges for anti-tank rifles, 234 wagons of hand grenades, 3,369 wagons of mines, 276 wagons of shots of anti-aircraft artillery and 5950 wagons of shots of ground artillery 230.

Artillery supply in the Battle of Kursk was led by the chiefs of the artillery supply service of the fronts: Central - Colonel V. I. Shebanin, Voronezh - Colonel T. M. Moskalenko, Bryansk - Colonel M. V. Kuznetsov.

In the third period of the war, the supply of front troops with weapons and ammunition improved significantly. Already by the beginning of this period, the Soviet military industry could supply them to the troops of the army in the field and new military formations of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. At the bases and warehouses of the GAU, significant stocks of guns, mortars, and especially small arms were created. In this regard, in 1944, the production of small arms and ground artillery guns was somewhat reduced. If in 1943 the military industry supplied the Soviet Army with 130.3 thousand guns, then in 1944 - 122.5 thousand. The deliveries of rocket launchers also decreased (from 3330 in 1943 to 2564 in 1944). Due to this, the production of tanks and self-propelled guns continued to grow (29 thousand in 1944 against 24 thousand in 1943).

At the same time, the supply of ammunition to the troops of the active army continued to be tight, especially with shells of 122 mm and higher caliber, due to their high consumption. The total stocks of these munitions decreased: for 122-mm rounds - by 670 thousand, for 152-mm shells - by 1.2 million and for 203-mm shells - by 172 thousand 231

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the State Defense Committee, having considered the situation with the production of extremely scarce shells on the eve of decisive offensive operations, set the military industry the task of radically revising production programs for 1944 in the direction of a sharp increase in the production of all types of ammunition, and especially scarce ones.

By decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee, the production of ammunition in 1944 was significantly increased compared to 1943: especially 122-mm and 152-mm shells, 76-mm - by 3,064 thousand (9 percent), M-13 - by 385.5 thousand (19 percent) and M-31 shells - by 15.2 thousand (4 percent) 232. This made it possible to provide the troops of the fronts with all types of ammunition in offensive operations of the third period of the war.

On the eve of the Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts had about 50 thousand guns and mortars, 2 million rifles and machine guns, 10 thousand machine guns 233, 12.2 million shells and mines, 700 million ammunition to small arms and 5 million hand grenades, which amounted to 1-2 front-line ammunition. During the operation, these fronts were supplied with more than 1,300 wagons of all types of ammunition 234. There were no interruptions in their supply. However, due to the early spring thaw on military roads and military supply routes, the movement of road transport became impossible, and the fronts began to experience great difficulties in transporting ammunition to the troops and to artillery firing positions. Tractors had to be used, and in some cases soldiers and the local population had to be brought in on impassable sections of the road to bring shells, cartridges, and grenades. Transport aircraft were also used to deliver ammunition to the front line.

To provide ammunition for tank formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front, advancing in the operational depth of the enemy’s defense, Po-2 aircraft were used. On February 7 and 8, 1944, from the Fursy airfield, they delivered 4.5 million rounds of ammunition, 5.5 thousand hand grenades, 15 thousand 82- and 120-mm mines and 10 thousand 76- and 122 mm shells. Every day, 80-85 aircraft delivered ammunition to tank units, making three to four flights a day. In total, more than 400 tons of ammunition were delivered by planes to the advancing troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Despite the great difficulties with the supply, the units, units and formations participating in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation were fully provided with ammunition. In addition, their consumption in this operation was relatively small. In total, the troops of the two fronts used up only about 5.6 million rounds, including 400 thousand anti-aircraft artillery shells, 2.6 million ground artillery shells and 2.56 million mines.

The provision of troops with ammunition and weapons was led by the chiefs of the artillery supply of the fronts: the 1st Ukrainian - Major General of Artillery N. E. Manzhurin, the 2nd Ukrainian - Major General of Artillery P. A. Rozhkov.

A huge amount of weapons and ammunition was required during the preparation and conduct of the Belarusian offensive operation, one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War. To fully equip the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts that took part in it, in May - July 1944, 6370 guns and mortars, over 10 thousand machine guns and 260 thousand rifles were submitted and machine guns 236. By the beginning of the operation, the fronts had 2-2.5 ammunition for small arms, 2.5-5 ammunition for mines, 2.5-4 ammunition for anti-aircraft rounds, 3-4 ammunition for 76-mm shells, 2.5-5 .3 rounds of 122-mm howitzer shells, 3.0-8.3 rounds of 152-mm shells.

Such a high supply of ammunition to front troops has never been seen in any of the previously conducted offensive operations on a strategic scale. For the shipment of weapons and ammunition to the fronts, the bases, warehouses and arsenals of the NGOs worked with maximum load. The personnel of all units of the rear, the workers of the railway transport did everything in their power to deliver weapons and ammunition to the troops in a timely manner.

However, during the Belarusian operation, due to the rapid separation of troops from the bases, as well as due to the insufficiently high rates of restoration of railway communications badly destroyed by the enemy, the supply of fronts with ammunition was often complicated. Road transport worked with great tension, but alone could not cope with the huge volume of supplies in the operational and military rear.

Even the relatively frequent advance of the head sections of the front and army artillery depots did not solve the problem of the timely delivery of ammunition to the troops advancing in the wooded and swampy terrain, in off-road conditions. The dispersion of ammunition stocks along the front line and in depth also had a negative effect. For example, on August 1, 1944, two warehouses of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front were located at six points at a distance of 60 to 650 km from the front line. A similar situation was in a number of armies of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts. The advancing units and formations could not lift all the stocks of ammunition accumulated in them during the preparation of the operation. The military councils of the fronts and armies were forced to allocate a large number of motor vehicles to collect and deliver to the troops the ammunition remaining in the rear. For example, the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front allocated 150 vehicles for this purpose, and the head of logistics of the 50th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front - 60 vehicles and a working company of 120 people. On the 2nd Belorussian Front in the areas of Krichev and Mogilev, by the end of July 1944, ammunition stocks were at 85 points, and at the initial positions of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front - at 100. The command was forced to transfer them by planes 237. Leaving ammunition at the initial frontiers, firing positions of artillery and in the way of advancement of units and formations led to the fact that the troops began to experience a shortage of them, although there was a sufficient amount of ammunition registered in the fronts and armies.

The total consumption of ammunition of all calibers during the Belarusian strategic offensive operation was significant. But if we proceed from the large availability of weapons, then it was generally relatively small. During the operation, 270 million (460 wagons) ammunition for small arms, 2,832,000 (1,700 wagons) mines, 478,000 (115 wagons) rounds of anti-aircraft artillery, about 3,434.6 thousand (3,656 wagons) shots of ground artillery 238.

The supply of troops with ammunition during the Belarusian offensive operation was led by the chiefs of the artillery supply of the fronts: 1st Baltic - Major General of Artillery A.P. Baikov, 3rd Belorussian - Major General of Engineering and Technical Service A.S. Volkov, 2nd Belorussian - Colonel-Engineer E. N. Ivanov and the 1st Belorussian - Major General of the Engineering and Technical Service V. I. Shebanin.

The consumption of ammunition in the Lvov-Sandomierz and Brest-Lublin offensive operations was also significant. During July and August, the 1st Ukrainian Front used up 4,706 wagons of ammunition, and the 1st Belorussian Front - 2,372 wagons of ammunition. As in the Belorussian operation, the supply of ammunition was fraught with serious difficulties due to the high pace of the advance of the troops and their large separation from the artillery depots of the fronts and armies, poor road conditions and the large volume of supply that fell on the shoulders of road transport.

A similar situation developed in the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts that participated in the Iasi-Kishinev operation. Before the start of the offensive, from two to three rounds of ammunition were concentrated directly in the troops. But in the course of breaking through the enemy defenses, they were not completely used up. The troops advanced quickly and took with them only the ammunition that their motor transport could lift. A significant amount of ammunition remained in divisional warehouses on the right and left banks of the Dniester. Due to the great length of the military routes, their supply stopped after two days, and five to six days after the start of the offensive, the troops began to experience a great need for ammunition, despite their small consumption. After the resolute intervention of the military councils and rear services of the fronts, all vehicles were mobilized, and the situation was soon rectified. This made it possible to successfully complete the Iasi-Kishinev operation.

During the offensive operations of 1945, there were no particular difficulties in providing the troops with weapons and ammunition. The total stocks of ammunition as of January 1, 1945, as compared to 1944, increased: by 54 percent for mines, by 35 percent for anti-aircraft artillery shots, and by 11 percent for ground artillery shots. Nazi Germany not only fully provided for the needs of the troops of the army in the field, but also managed to create additional stocks of ammunition at the front and army warehouses of the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern and Transbaikal fronts.

The beginning of 1945 was marked by two major offensive operations - East Prussian and Vistula-Oder. During the period of their training, the troops were fully provided with weapons and ammunition. There were no serious difficulties in transporting them during operations due to the presence of a well-developed network of railways and highways.

The East Prussian operation, which lasted about three months, was distinguished by the largest consumption of ammunition in the entire Great Patriotic War. During its course, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts used up 15,038 wagons of ammunition (5382 wagons in the Vistula-Oder operation).

After the successful completion of the Vistula-Oder offensive operation, our troops reached the line of the river. Oder (Odra) and began to prepare for the assault on the main citadel of Nazism - Berlin. In terms of the degree of equipment of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts with military equipment and weapons, the Berlin offensive operation surpasses all offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet rear and the Rear of the Armed Forces proper provided the troops with everything they needed to inflict the last crushing blow on fascist Germany. During the preparation of the operation, over 2 thousand guns and mortars, almost 11 million shells and mines, over 292.3 million cartridges and about 1.5 million hand grenades were sent to the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. By the beginning of the operation, they had over 2 million rifles and machine guns, over 76 thousand machine guns and 48 thousand guns and mortars 240. During the Berlin operation (from April 16 to May 8), 1945, 7.2 million (5924 wagons) of shells and mines, which (taking into account stocks) fully provided for the consumption and made it possible to create the necessary reserve of them by the end of the operation.

In the final operation of the Great Patriotic War, more than 10 million shells and mines, 392 million cartridges and almost 3 million hand grenades were used up - a total of 9,715 wagons of ammunition. In addition, 241.7 thousand (1920 wagons) of 241 rockets were used up. During preparation and during the operation, ammunition was transported along the Allied and Western European gauge railways, and from here to the troops - by front-line and army vehicles. At the junctions of railways of the Allied and Western European gauges, the transshipment of ammunition was widely practiced in the areas of specially created transshipment bases. It was quite laborious and difficult work.

In general, the supply of ammunition to the troops of the fronts in 1945 significantly exceeded the level of previous years of the Great Patriotic War. If in the fourth quarter of 1944 31,736 wagons of ammunition (793 trains) arrived at the fronts, then in four months of 1945 - 44,041 wagons (1,101 trains). To this figure, we must add the supply of ammunition to the country's air defense forces, as well as parts of the marine corps. Taking into account its total number of ammunition sent from the central bases and warehouses to the troops of the army in the four months of 1945, amounted to 1327 trains 242.

The domestic military industry and the rear services of the Soviet Army successfully coped with the task of supplying the troops of the fronts and new formations with weapons and ammunition in the past war.

The active army used up more than 10 million tons of ammunition during the war. As you know, the military industry supplied individual elements of shots to artillery bases. In total, about 500 thousand wagons of these elements were delivered during the war, which were assembled into ready-made shells and sent to the fronts. This colossal and complex work was carried out at the GAU artillery bases mainly by women, old people and teenagers. They stood at the conveyors for 16-18 hours a day, did not leave the workshops for several days, ate and rested right there, at the machines. Their heroic, selfless work during the war years will never be forgotten by the grateful socialist Fatherland.

Summing up the work of the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army during the past war, it should be emphasized once again that the basis of this type of material support for the Armed Forces was industry, which during the war years supplied the army with several million units of small arms, hundreds of thousands of guns and mortars, hundreds of millions of shells and mines, tens of billions of rounds. Along with the steady growth in the mass production of weapons and ammunition, a number of qualitatively new types of ground and anti-aircraft artillery were created, new types of small arms were developed, as well as sub-caliber and cumulative shells. All these weapons were successfully used by the Soviet troops in the operations of the Great Patriotic War.

As for the import of weapons, it was very insignificant and, in fact, did not have a big impact on the equipment of the Soviet troops. In addition, imported weapons were inferior to Soviet weapons in terms of their tactical and technical data. Received by import in the third period of the war, several anti-aircraft artillery systems were only partially used in the air defense forces, and 40-mm anti-aircraft guns remained at the GAU bases until the end of the war.

The good quality of weapons and ammunition supplied by the domestic military industry to the Soviet Army during the war years was largely ensured by a wide network of military representatives (military acceptance) of the GAU. Equally important in the timely supply of armaments and ammunition to the troops of the army in the field was the fact that it was based on strictly planned production and provision. Establishing since 1942 a system of accounting and reporting of weapons and ammunition in the troops, armies and fronts, as well as planning their supply to the fronts, the artillery supply service continuously improved and improved organizational forms, methods and methods of work to provide the troops of the army in the field. Rigid centralization of leadership from top to bottom, close and continuous interaction of the artillery supply service of the center, fronts and armies, formations and units with other rear services, and especially with the rear headquarters and the military communications service, the hard work of all types of transport made it possible to provide the troops of the fronts and new formations of the Stavka Supreme High Command of Arms and Ammunition. In the Main Artillery Directorate, which worked under the direct supervision of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, a coherent system of systematic and targeted provision of troops with weapons and ammunition was developed, corresponding to the nature of the war, its scope and methods of warfare. This system fully justified itself throughout the war. The uninterrupted provision of the army with weapons and ammunition was achieved thanks to the enormous organizational and creative activity of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, the Soviet government, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the precise work of the USSR State Planning Committee, employees of the defense people's commissariats and all links in the rear of the Soviet Army, the selfless and heroic work of the working class .