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Biography. Finance, money circulation and credit Khandruev Alexander Andreevich biography

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Khandruev Alexander Andreevich was born in 1945 in Moscow. In 1970 he graduated with honors from the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University. M. V. Lomonosov.

After receiving his education, he took up teaching. In 1970-1975, he was a lecturer at the Moscow Institute of Management. S. Ordzhonikidze, in 1975-1979 - senior researcher at the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University, in 1979-1988 - associate professor at the Academy of National Economy. G. V. Plekhanov.

In 1988, he joined the Credit and Financial Research Institute, where he rose through the ranks from the position of deputy director to the head.

At that time, the transition to a market economy was brewing in Russia. And from July to December 1991, Khandruev worked in the State Council for Economic Reform of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, and in 1991-1992 he was vice president of the Reform Foundation for Economic and Social Reforms, where his immediate supervisor was Stanislav Shatalin, the author of the 500 days."

In 1992, Khandruev came to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation as a deputy chairman. It is responsible for the Research, Information and Statistics Department, the Administrative and Legal Departments, the Personnel Training Department and the General Directorate of Inspection of Commercial Banks. In addition, at this time, Khandruev turns into one of the most famous leaders of the Bank of Russia: as a rule, it is he who voices the policy of the Central Bank and holds press conferences.

In 1995, Alexander Andreevich became the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank, and on November 8 of the same year he was appointed by the president of Russia as interim chairman of the Central Bank. In this post, he works until November 22, and then again becomes the first deputy chairman. July 31, 1998 - two weeks before the announcement of the state default and the onset of the crisis - resigns.

After leaving the Bank of Russia, Alexander Andreevich is again engaged in teaching. From 1998 to 1999 he was Vice-Rector of the Academy of National Economy under the Government of Russia.

In 1999, he returned to the Fund for Economic and Social Reforms (Reform Fund), where he worked until 2001 as vice president.

In addition, Alexander Andreevich is engaged in the consulting business, since 2001 he has been managing the consulting group “Banks. Finance. Investments” (BFI).

Since May 2002 - in the Association of Regional Banks of the Russian Federation (Association "Russia"). Initially, he was Vice President and led the expert and analytical work related to banking issues. Currently - First Vice President.

Khandruev has a doctorate in economics, professor, scientific supervisor of the Faculty of Finance and Banking, head of the Department of Finance, Money Circulation and Credit of the Academy of National Economy. He teaches the courses "Organization of the activity of the Central Bank", "Organization of the activity of a commercial bank", "Money, banks, financial markets", "Banking management". Author of more than 100 scientific papers and books.

Son Andrey Alexandrovich Khandruev is also a banker, chairman of the board of Soyuz Bank.

Russian scientist-economist, banker, vice-president of the Association of Regional Banks.


Graduated from the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University. M. V. Lomonosov (1970; with honors). Doctor of Economics, Professor.

In 1970-1975 - a teacher at the Moscow Institute of Management. S. Ordzhonikidze.

In 1975-1979 - senior researcher at the Faculty of Economics, Moscow State University.

In 1979-1988 - Associate Professor at the Academy of National Economy.

In 1988-1991 - Deputy Director, Acting Director, Director of the Credit and Financial Research Institute at the State Bank of the USSR.

In July - December 1991 - Deputy Chairman of the State Council for Economic Reform of the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR.

In 1991-1992 - Vice-President of the Fund for Economic and Social Reforms (Fund "Reform").

In 1992-1995 - Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia.

In 1995-1997 - First Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia

From 8 to 22 November 1995 - Acting Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia.

In 1997-1998 - Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia.

In 1998-1999 - Vice-Rector of the Academy of National Economy under the Government of Russia.

In 1999-2000 - Vice-President of the Fund for Economic and Social Reforms (Fund "Reform").

Since 2001 - Head of the Consulting Group "Banks. Finance. Investments." (BFI).

Since May 2002 - Vice-President of the Association of Regional Banks of the Russian Federation (Association "Russia"). Heads expert and analytical work related to banking issues. Then - the first vice-president of the Association.

Scientific supervisor of the Faculty of Finance and Banking, head of the graduating department "Finance, money circulation and credit" of the Academy of National Economy. Courses taught by him at the Academy: "Organization of the activities of the Central Bank"; "Organization of the activities of a commercial bank"; "Money, banks, financial markets"; "Banking Management".

Vladimir Baburin:

Our guest today is Alexander Khandruev, former Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. The program is hosted by Vladimir Baburin, and Alexander Khandruev will be asked questions by Celestine Bowin, The New York Times, and

But first, as always, the biography of our today's guest.

Alexander Khandruev was born on August 23, 1945, graduated with honors from the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University in 1970. Doctor of Economic Sciences. From 1970 to 1975 - teacher at the Moscow Institute of Management. From 1975 to 1979 - senior researcher at the Faculty of Economics, Moscow State University, from 1979 to 1988 - associate professor, professor at the Academy of National Economy.

From 1988 to 1991 - Director of the Research Institute of Banks at the State Bank of the Soviet Union. From July to December 1991 - Deputy Chairman of the State Council for Economic Reform of the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR. Then he went to work at the Reform Foundation for Social and Economic Reforms, the Reform Foundation of Stanislav Shatalin, and was its vice president from December 1991 to 1992.

After leaving the State Bank, Viktor Gerashchenko worked for some time in the Reform Foundation under the supervision of Khandruev, and when he returned to the Central Bank, he invited him to the post of deputy chairman. This was in 1992. Since March 27, 1995 - First Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia.

Under Gerashchenko, Khandruev supervised the departments of information research and statistics of informatization - administratively and legally this is a lot - the department of personnel training and the main department for inspecting commercial banks. In addition, he voiced the policy of the Central Bank.

Since November 8, 1995 - acting chairman of the Central Bank instead of Tatyana Paramonova. In the same year, after Dubinin was appointed chairman of the Central Bank, he became his first deputy.

In May 1997, he was included in the Commission of the Government of the Russian Federation on Operational Issues. At the present time - Vice-Rector of the Academy of National Economy under the Government of the Russian Federation. Married. Two children.

Alexander Andreevich, is everything correct?

Alexander Khandruev:

Almost everything is correct. I just did not supervise informatization. It wasn't. Well, and so - everything is correct.

Vladimir Baburin:

Thank you. Then one addition. Here, in your biography, which we received, there is this line: "Voiced the policy of the Central Bank and arranged information leaks to the press." It's true?

Alexander Khandruev:

There were such definitions that "Gerashchenko's nightingale is Khandruev." I supervised the Public Relations Department, and therefore we prepared press releases, press conferences. But I did not voice the policy of the Bank of Russia, but gave interviews, especially during the period of the exchange of old banknotes, in July 1993.

Therefore, perhaps, the rumor connected me with the fact that I was "Gerashchenko's nightingale." Although these were not my functions, this is the first. And secondly, the Central Bank, you know, since I have been working in this organization, has never been involved in the organization of information leakage, because we perfectly understood that it is very easy to psychologically undermine the confidence of the population, and the rumors did not come from Central Bank. They walked around the Central Bank. But they did not flow from the Central Bank.

Vladimir Baburin:

Alexander Andreevich, and yet, how is it connected with your name, although personally I don’t want to connect it in any way? There is very little left before the elections to the State Duma, a little more - before the presidential ones. And there is such a thing, which is called "black PR" - leaking information to a variety of newspapers, even very high-circulation ones. What do you think about it?

Alexander Khandruev:

I take this very negatively. In my opinion, a completely unworthy campaign is being waged in Russia to discredit individuals, organizations, and commercial banks, and we have done ourselves a lot of damage. Here is some kind of Samoyed, or something, attitude towards people in general. This is, let's say, just a new way of waging a civil war. Russia has suffered a lot from this. Unfortunately, we have not drawn any conclusions from history.

But at the same time, "black PR" is already a fact of real life. And I think the best defense against that here is simply the moral stance of journalists. Do not participate in lies, as Solzhenitsyn once said about this. The person may not be telling the truth. Well, it is not always possible to tell the truth, due to various points. But you don't tell deliberate lies, that's all.

Vladimir Baburin:

We are with you, of course. Let's get on with this topic, but now it's a question from Celestine Bowin, The New York Times.

Celestine Bowin:

Well, we talked about information from the Central Bank. And this week, information has already come out about... the audit report that was made over the past three months. And I see here the main fact that the report itself has not been published and, as I understand it, the Central Bank is not going to do so yet. How do you feel about it? Is this information supposed to be?

Alexander Khandruev:

Yes. I believe that the report, the conclusion of an audit firm, should be published, but there is a short and, so to speak, large version. And in previous years, when the Central Bank sent its annual report to the State Duma, it always sent an auditor's report. And it was published.

But as for the large version, the entire report, it is not customary in world practice to publish it. Therefore, the short version, of course, will be published by the Central Bank, and as for the full version, this is obviously the right of the Central Bank itself.

Vladimir Baburin:

Moses Gelman, "Parliamentary newspaper".

Moses Gelman:

I want to touch upon a very important, from my point of view, issue, the solution of which depends on the country's economy getting out of the crisis. We are talking about money supply, money circulation. The fact is that, as you know, money was invented in order to be able to freely exchange goods. And money should be freely transferred from one person to another. And in order for the produced commodities to get freely to those who want to buy them, a certain ratio must be observed between the money supply and the total value of the mass of commodities.

I will allow myself to give a certain image of commodity-money circulation. Commodity-money circulation resembles the work of a water mill. In order for a water mill to continuously and properly grind grain, a balance must be maintained between the force created by the water falling on the mill wheel and the millstones. If there is more water, then the mill ... well, let's say a flood, then the mill may collapse. If there is a drought, the mill may stop.

This is a complete analogy of commodity-money circulation. That is, if there is a lot of money, monetary inflation occurs, goods can be immediately purchased and production will stop. The same will happen when there is a shortage of money, what is called deflation, in which case commodity production also stops.

So, according to the same ... the very theory of monetarism, which the reformers trumped, the balance of money circulation must be observed. This law, one of the basic laws of monetarism, which states... it requires that the amount of money in circulation be equal to the total value of the mass of commodities, taking into account its turnover.

In normal countries, the ratio of money supply to gross domestic product is usually sixty to seventy percent. I'm not talking about the United States of America, where this figure is one hundred and thirty percent. but there a significant part of the dollars is simply sent to other countries, in particular, to Russia, in order to provide the missing cash flow.

In our country, for some reason, reformers throughout the years of reforms maintain this ratio at the level of thirteen to fourteen percent of the gross domestic product. This explains all the negative consequences, in particular, the shortfall in taxes, non-payments, barter, and so on and so forth.

I have a question. Why did the Central Bank, which is obliged in all countries - this is its main task - to maintain the balance of commodity-money circulation, went on about, I would say, incompetent people?

Alexander Khandruev:

Well, the task of the Central Bank is to ensure the stability of the national currency, the exchange rate and prices in the economy. The coefficient of monetization in Russia is what it should be in a country where there are non-payments, alternative settlement systems, barter, promissory notes, quasi-settlement schemes, a drop in production of over forty percent - in short, everything that has been happening with us since the beginning of ... the nineties years and high inflation.

The monetization coefficient is what the Russian economy deserves. The thing is that any attempts to artificially, forcibly increase the money supply only result in a surge in prices and a weakening of the national currency, an increase in the dollar, and the depletion of gold and foreign exchange reserves.

I think that the merit of the Central Bank lies in the fact that in recent years it has pursued a balanced, fairly tight monetary policy. And the fact that after the events in August last year, despite the increase in inflation rates in general, inflation for the year amounted to more than eight and four percent, now our monthly inflation rate is somewhere in the region of one and a half to two percent.

The forecast given by the Bank of Russia - thirty percent of inflation per year, is perhaps too optimistic, but somewhere around forty percent, thirty-five to forty, we can very well come out.

Therefore, now, it seems to me that it would be very wrong to talk about the lack of money in circulation. The economy is not capable of absorbing a large amount of money without disturbing this balance, which is fragile and very, very, so to speak, socio-economically important for the country.

Vladimir Baburin:

"Face to face. Leader answers reporters." Weekly Sunday program of the Moscow edition of Radio Liberty. Our guest today is Vice-Rector of the Academy of National Economy under the Government of the Russian Federation, former Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia Alexander Khandruev. He is being asked questions by Celestine Bowin, The New York Times, United States, and Moses Gelman, The Parliamentary Gazette. The program is hosted by Vladimir Baburin.

Alexander Andreevich, the text of the joint document of the Central Bank and the government for the International Fund has already been prepared. Here, colleague Gelman spoke about the incompetence of people in the Russian economy. How important do you think this International Monetary Fund money really is, and how do you assess the competence of the leaders... the top leaders of the country? Because, for example, the famous statement of the speaker of the State Duma... oh, I'm sorry, he doesn't like the "speaker", the chairman of the State Duma, Gennady Seleznev, that "yes, we need to give them this money, that's all." - "And where to get it?" - "Yes, print!" ...

Alexander Khandruev:

The statement of the government of the Central Bank is indeed very important for the country, but not in terms of obtaining additional loans, although Russia is now unable to cope with servicing its external debt. Seventeen, approximately, billion dollars a year, Russia is now unable to pay, and we need additional loans to simply refinance the servicing of external debt.

But the main thing is something else - that the agreement with the Monetary Fund, although measured by a very small amount (there ... four and six tenths of a billion dollars), opens the way to productive negotiations with the Paris Club, the London Club, creditor countries such as Japan , other countries.

And most importantly, that the joint statement imposes mutual obligations on Russia to adhere to the standards and procedures of economic policy that are adopted in countries with market economies, on the one hand. On the other hand, certain obligations are imposed on the international financial community. If Russia accepts the rules of the game that have been jointly worked out, then, consequently, the matter cannot be brought to a default.

As for the competence of people, I have an old biblical rule: do not judge - you will not be judged. Every person in a democratic society has the right to express his point of view. But now, I think that one person never has the truth in his pocket.

Since 1992, we have taken seventy billion dollars of loans. Of these, two-thirds turned out, as life has shown, to be budget-substituting. Two-thirds are budget-substituting. Twenty-eight from the Monetary Fund and the World Bank, six from Eurobonds, and another thirty-four to thirty-five billion, approximately, from different, so to speak, creditors, countries and private banks.

Two-thirds. And what is it? It was an emission, essentially. This is an offer of money. Because if you take out a loan and then you sell the currency on the market, then you issue rubles. Yes, you have gold and foreign exchange reserves. But then it was necessary to pursue an adequate exchange rate policy. From November 1997 to August 1998, we squandered seventeen billion from our gold and foreign exchange reserves. In July-August alone, we lost nine billion gold and foreign exchange reserves.

This is the price we paid for what I think is an inadequate exchange rate policy. There is also an indirect fault in this, by the way, not only the government ... the Monetary Fund, and not just the government or the Central Bank. These were collective decisions, essentially. After all, these decisions were made within the framework of agreements with the Monetary Fund, within the framework of joint statements by the government and the Central Bank.

So the question is what steps seem to be the most appropriate... I think the answer is clear - those that are in line with global practice. If Russia wants to remain among the countries that carry out market reforms, I think that these agreements are of priority importance.

Vladimir Baburin:

You, perhaps, will leave the answer, but I still, in addition, will ask about competence. The second change of government has already taken place after August 17, and now there are actually two people at the head of the government: the prime minister and the first deputy prime minister. People ... well, so, to put it mildly, far from the economy.

Alexander Khandruev:

But after all, although Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov was an academician-economist, he was an international specialist. He, of course, is closer to the economy, but he was still more engaged in diplomacy. But after all, Primakov's cabinet, I think, was one ... perhaps the most successful cabinet, in my opinion, since the start of market reforms, because he managed to achieve the main thing - to ensure relative stabilization in the economy in a fairly short time.

After all, no one believed in September-October that we would be able to keep the exchange rate at the level of twenty-four rubles forty-two kopecks by July 7th ... by July 9th, 1999. Or that inflation after April will be less than three percent per month. However, it happened.

This happened, and this is a great merit of the Primakov government, which, contrary to its own statements, to restore order, nationalize, raise ... that means increase emission, raise the role of the state ... pursued a very wise policy. Here... It tried not to interfere as much as possible. By the way, the economy has shown that it already has some ability to adapt. This is already .. you know, this is already a plus in the transformations that have been made in the country since 1992.

And the government that is now ... well, still in essence, sort of ... well ... works in the mode of inertia of those tasks, attitudes, problems that, in general, were inherited from the previous government.

I think that the next one is ... it is customary to say - a hundred days, right? Let's wait a little longer, and then the government's policy priorities will become apparent. Although I assess the government that currently exists in Russia as very competent. the composition of the government was well chosen. It is not necessary for the prime minister to be an economist by education. The Prime Minister is primarily a political figure. This is first. And secondly, this is a person who knows how to prioritize.

Vladimir Baburin:

"Face to face. Leader answers reporters." Weekly Sunday program of the Moscow edition of Radio Liberty. Our guest is Alexander Khandruev, Vice-Rector of the Academy of National Economy under the Russian Government and former Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank. The program is hosted by Vladimir Baburin. Questions from Moses Gelman, Parliamentary Gazette, and Celestine Bowin, The New York Times, United States of America.

Celestine Bowin, please, your question.

Celestine Bowin:

I would like to return to the issue of Central Bank operations. Again the report that is now out. I was at Dubinin's press conference the other day, and I was surprised at how he says that all issues have already been resolved. No questions can be opened because the prosecutor's office closed the case because the report was that there were big violations. Significant, I don't remember the words.

But in fact, there are a lot of questions, and they remain. And the first one is if we... you were talking about the money that was given to Russia for reserves. Now it turns out that part of this money did not remain in reserves, was used or was ... transferred to the budget, but through very strange, long and incomprehensible chains. Including FIMACO, including Eurobank, including Eurofinance.

Here's the very first question... because I have a lot - was such an operation created, and was the purpose exactly to hide where the money disappeared to?

Alexander Khandruev:

I think that there was no purpose to hide the money, because the gold and foreign exchange reserves of any country are placed somewhere. They can be placed in American treasury bills, German securities, they can be kept in some institutions, banks.

The Central Bank divides its reserves into two parts, the so-called investment and operating portfolio. Part of the gold and foreign exchange reserves... well, foreign exchange reserves, they are very small. A very small one is historically kept in Russian foreign banks, because from the Soviet Union the Bank of Russia inherited Russian foreign banks, Russian foreign banks, in Frankfurt am Main, in Paris, in London, in Vienna, in Luxembourg, until recently. And part of the reserves, very insignificant, was in these foreign banks. Moreover, this is less than five percent of all foreign exchange reserves of the country.

As for FIMACO, this is an organization that was created as a subsidiary of Roszagranbank, and it was created according to the rules adopted in France. It was not a company that, as it were, was laundering some kind of dirty money, it was created in accordance with the current legislation.

Why was it created? Because you know that in the early nineties, the Swiss company "NAGA" filed suits against the Russian government and, by the way, part of the assets, foreign assets, including the Central Bank, although it is not a body of a branch of the executive branch, an executive body - were arrested. In Luxembourg, by the way. And there was a possibility that the funds of the Central Bank could be arrested. Therefore, the company "FIMAKO" was created, where relatively little money was allocated. The amounts mentioned in the prosecutor's notes are simply turnover, not balances. Well, the amount is large, of course, more than three billion dollars, but it is not fifty, not sixty billion, as it appeared.

From this point of view, there were no violations. There were other violations. I believe that according to the unwritten law among central banks, central banks do not buy their own securities with their official foreign exchange reserves. But if the auditors' conclusion confirms the fact that the Central Bank of Russia used its official foreign exchange reserves to buy its own securities, having insider information and influencing the profitability of these securities, since although the issuer was the Ministry of Finance, about fifty percent of the entire GKO portfolio was in Central Bank and Savings Bank.

It is clear that the weather on the GKO market was made by the Central Bank and the Savings Bank. There are separate issues of GKOs, for which there were very high interest rates, high yields, and it was these issues that FIMACO acquired in a roundabout way - this, I think, of course, is a violation of moral and ethical principles. But there is no subject for criminal law.

Vladimir Baburin:

"Face to face. Leader answers reporters." Weekly Sunday program of the Moscow edition of Radio Liberty. Our guest today is Vice-Rector of the Academy of National Economy under the Russian Government, former Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank Alexander Khandruev.

The program is hosted by Vladimir Baburin. Questions to our guest are being asked by Celestine Bowin, The New York Times, and Moses Gelman, columnist for the Parliamentary Newspaper. Moses, please, your question.

Moses Gelman:

Alexander Andreevich, I want to return to my previous question. So, you said that this ratio - thirteen-fourteen percent - seems to be optimal today, and there seems to be no demand for this money. I want to give the data for 1997, insofar as it was the last stable year in a series of years.

Commodity production, which is the main source of tax revenues to the budget, is about forty percent of GDP. In 1997, the volume of commodity production amounted to one trillion six hundred billion rubles. Unfortunately, a significant part of the money supply was diverted to financial speculative markets, and in the sphere of commodity production, the money turnover was only ten percent. This explains why ninety percent of goods and services have reached and continue to reach consumers without money. Hence - sixty-seventy percent barter, and the rest - surrogates.

So. If there were normal money circulation, then thirty to forty percent of one thousand six hundred rubles, what should fall into the federal budget, amounted to about five hundred to six hundred thousand rubles, and only two hundred billion rubles were collected. Here are those same ten or fifteen percent.

It turns out somehow not logical. We borrow money, issue rubles against it, remain debtors to the same International Monetary Fund, create surplus value and export it. Why couldn't the money be printed immediately? Why was it necessary to be drawn into such a deep crisis, to create an artificial monetary deficit, and from here to ruin payment circulations in the country?

What action do you think should be taken? I understand that today we, being bound by imports, cannot print them right away. What measures, in your opinion, should be taken, or rather, the sequence of measures, in order to be able to normalize our domestic money circulation?

Alexander Khandruev:

Well, very briefly: these measures include, first of all, overcoming the debt crisis in the real sector. This can be achieved by freeing the real sector from bankrupt enterprises. Unfortunately, the previous governments practically did not do this work.

The real sector should be represented by solvent and competitive enterprises. Without this, money, investments in the real sector will not go.

Businesses have already begun to adapt to work in the face of severe demand and restrictions. Enterprises are already starting to build their production program based on a portfolio of orders. But in order for the money to go to the real sector, it is also necessary to have financial intermediation.

The banking crisis dealt a terrible blow to the financial intermediation system. Curtailed, destroyed the interbank market, the financial market, the market for corporate securities, government securities, the interbank foreign exchange market.

Here, the restoration of the financial structure, financial markets, including through institutional reforms, the strengthening of the legislative framework, and active actions, including by the Central Bank, seem quite legitimate.

I do not understand why, so to speak, the International Monetary Fund objects to the accounting and rediscounting of first-class commercial or commercial bills. I believe that the Central Bank should work more vigorously to create conditions for commercial banks to provide loans to the real sector.

And another very important element of this work to restore confidence is, of course, persistent efforts to restore confidence, to restore investor confidence, primarily in the form of direct investment, not only portfolio investment, in the Russian economy. Because now the Russian economy is operating in the mode of eating up the national income.

I assess the prospects for economic growth very, very pessimistic. It may be only in the sphere of small and medium-sized businesses - due, for example, to the service sector, redistribution, again - to achieve something, by using reserve capacities. But by and large, if we are talking about restoring, so to speak, balanced economic growth, then we need significant amounts of investment, the creation of conditions for attracting domestic and foreign investment. But in this real sector, where we don't know... Here are two enterprises. One enterprise can be very, very good in terms of the quality of its products, but it is not paid for the products and it finds itself in a critical financial situation. And next to it is a bankrupt enterprise, but which feels great thanks to barter and bill schemes.

You see, as long as the government does not take up this rough work of clearing the real sector from freeloaders, parasites, and bankrupt enterprises, I think that we will not achieve tangible progress.

And pumping money into the economy is, you understand ... we will get nothing but another collapse of the ruble exchange rate and price increases. The monetization coefficient, among other things, also reflects the demand for the national currency, the demand for rubles. If you have no demand, if your economy is unable to absorb this money for productive purposes, then you will get nothing but inflation and depreciation of the exchange rate.

In addition, the last thing I want to add is that the velocity of money in Russia is extremely, extremely unstable. Extremely unstable. Therefore, to use such an instrument as emission to solve the problem of restoring economic growth, I think it would be unreasonable, dear colleague.

Vladimir Baburin:

Alexander Andreevich, well, maybe even in continuation of this question ... Well, we can’t do without the Beavers. It is clear that we are not talking about cute animals ...

Alexander Khandruev:

"Beavers" are simply not needed.

Vladimir Baburin:

But nevertheless, this happened back when you worked at the Central Bank, and now there is a fairly widespread opinion that these new government securities, which have been designated with such a pretty name, can completely repeat the story of the GKO and create a new state pyramid. Don't you think so?

Alexander Khandruev:

No, I don't think so, but one small correction. "Beavers" are after all the obligations of the Central Bank. This is even more than government securities, these are the obligations of the issuing institution. Therefore, all the more so, the issue of "Beavers" should be used extremely and extremely carefully. Extremely cautious, basically.

I don't think that this can lead to some kind of ... to some kind of financial pyramid, because, in accordance with the federal law adopted by the State Duma, the volume of "Beavers" is limited to about ten billion rubles. And then only until the end of the year, this year, the Central Bank has the right to issue Beavers. This is first.

And secondly, I just do not see any need. I think that this is a useless job for the Central Bank. If the "Beavers" are designed to somehow tie up excess liquidity, then the Central Bank does this very well with the help of deposits. Banks can keep deposits with the Central Bank.

If it is necessary that these deposits become some kind of financial market instruments, please, they can be made tradable deposits, please. That's all. But to spend efforts on issuing useless, useless securities, in conditions when it is necessary to solve a lot of issues related to the restructuring of the banking system, in particular, I think that it is simply unproductive.

Vladimir Baburin:

Celestine Bowin, The New York Times.

Celestine Bowin:

I return to my favorite topic again. You said that there were... that there were violations, as I understood...

Alexander Khandruev:

Moral and ethical plan.

Celestine Bowin:

Yes. Which, as I understand it, were also in the fact that they created a system for somehow a separate ... release. GKO for some specific ...

Alexander Khandruev:

If there is information that, indeed, FIMACO participated in the GKO OFZ market, then since it was a structure, say, related to the Central Bank (and the Central Bank had all the necessary information), then we can say that those issues that were the most, say, profitable.

Celestine Bowin:

But if there is such a violation, why ... no one is responsible for this, why somehow everyone ... somehow does not want to look at this fact? This fact speaks of trust, speaks of publicity, speaks of operations in the Central Bank.

Alexander Khandruev:

I completely agree with you that perhaps the most important task for the Central Bank now is to restore confidence. That is why I, at a recent press conference, came up with the idea of ​​publishing the minutes of the Board of Directors, the way the Bank of England does it, for example, the Bank of Japan is doing it now. That a Monetary Policy Committee be created on the basis of the Banking Council, as in France, again - in England, in Japan, and in many other countries. It is necessary to restore confidence in the policy pursued by the Central Bank.

As for the fact that no one has been punished... Well, again, I'm not a representative of the law enforcement agencies. Well, in some cases, the police come, so to speak. In other cases ... there ... here, Russian officers, for example ... And not only in Russia, they, for example, put a bullet in their foreheads there, right? Still others, for example, wrote a letter of resignation. And the fourth ones - "So what, you think! For me, the chair is the most important thing!" - this is his motto of life behavior.

Well, you see, life sooner or later puts everything in its place. Because no matter how a person suggests, but the Lord, he disposes.

Vladimir Baburin:

"Face to face. Leader answers reporters." Weekly Sunday program of the Moscow edition of Radio Liberty. Our guest today is Alexander Khandruev, Vice-Rector of the Academy of National Economy under the Russian Government, former Deputy of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

The program is hosted by Vladimir Baburin. Questions are being asked by Celestine Bowin, The New York Times, and Moses Gelman, a columnist for the Parliamentary Gazette. Moses, please, your question.

Moses Gelman:

Alexander Andreevich, money is, as you know, a measure of value. It should be added: national commodity mass, national. This means that the amount of money in circulation must equal the value of the national mass of commodities.

Today, our money supply is actually tied to the country's dollar reserve. And thus, we have a foreign currency, which is a measure of the value of the American mass of commodities, and in essence, the bearer of this measure of value, it has become a commodity for us, which it is not. And thus, any, really, emission leads to the fact that they begin to buy more dollars, the dollar is growing, the ruble is falling.

So I'm asking this question. Here in Western countries, in the same United States, export products are sold for their own currency. In this case, the exchange rate is automatically set as a weighted average. The weighted average purchasing power parity for a basket of export goods. And who prevented us from doing this? After all, we trade, in general, quite liquid products - oil, gas, until recently - metals. Moreover, these types of products give up to seventy to eighty percent.

In addition, we have a positive balance of foreign trade turnover. In 1997, we had twenty billion, last year it fell by half - for well-known reasons. After all, in this way we would have provided an objective exchange rate. After all, in the same Western countries, the exchange rate, what is called the market rate, is less than purchasing power parity.

Alexander Khandruev:

Well, it's different. Because purchasing power parity theory...

Moses Gelman:

I mean the countries of the European Community, there, Japan...

Alexander Khandruev:

Purchasing power parity theory is a very remarkable theory, but it is only a theory, and its adequacy to existing practice seems to be confirmed only over relatively long periods of time. Because there are a number of factors that prevent, let's say, the full mechanical, automatic use of the theory of purchasing power parity in establishing a real equilibrium exchange rate.

Your question is interesting in that it raises the problem of choosing an equilibrium exchange rate for Russia. I think that with the help of some artificial procedures such a course cannot be introduced, and we must not forget that the United States of America or there, Western Europe, for many hundreds, tens of hundreds of years were agents of international trade. And Russia, for a period of almost a century, seventy years, was isolated from international trade as such. Accordingly, there was no quotation of the national currency, and so on.

Therefore, Russia is now gradually entering this “water” of world trade, and we see that now the forces of supply and demand are already influencing the dynamics of the exchange rate to a much greater extent than it was, for example, in 1990, in the nineties.

The Central Bank is counting the so-called commodity ruble. Approximately fifty percent of exports are taken, a ten percent cape is made, and an approximately equilibrium exchange rate is determined in this way. Right now, approximately, it is somewhere - twenty-two - twenty-three rubles.

Here, in order for exporters to receive a ten percent profit with the existing export-import structure (because, at purchasing power parity, you have to choose a basket of what to compare), the exchange rate of twenty-two rubles is acceptable for exporters.

So, this means that the actual exchange rate, which has now developed, is, in principle, close to equilibrium, for, so to speak, exporters. And in Russia, it is really necessary to start from the interests of exporters, because if the Russian economy has survived over the years of reforms, it is due to the fact that export-oriented industries, so to speak, ensured the maintenance of economic relations in the mode of functioning of some, more or less just enough not to fall apart completely.

Vladimir Baburin:

Celestine Bowin, The New York Times, United States.

Celestine Bowin:

Well, once again - the operations of the Central Bank. Here I still see the main interest and the main role of Roszagranbank, which is a feature of the Russian Central Bank. And I know the history: they were created in Soviet times, they had their own goals. And now, what do you think, what roles do they play and what profits will they bring to the country?

Alexander Khandruev:

Well, you know that Russian foreign banks found themselves in a critical financial situation at the time when the Soviet Union refused to fulfill its foreign debt obligations. I had to spend money to maintain their liquidity and solvency. Now the financial position of these banks, one might say, is recovering, although, of course, it is not necessary to say that they are working with large profits.

It is not normal for the Central Bank when it has organizations engaged in commercial activities. These are commercial banks. And the question has already been raised of gradually transferring controlling stakes to some other structures. But the supervisory authorities of those countries where Russian foreign banks are located object to the fact that some commercial banks come instead of the Central Bank.

Although, let's say, East-West, a bank in Luxembourg, the controlling stake is already not with the Central Bank, but with the Imperial bank, which has been revoked, and now has its license returned. "Danau-bank". Vneshtorgbank has a controlling stake there. Although Vneshtorgbank is a subsidiary of the Central Bank, it is still not the Central Bank directly.

In my opinion, it is necessary to raise the question of gradually, so to speak, transferring controlling stakes to some bodies and structures. Well, for example, Vneshtorgbank, let's say... It could be the Ministry of State Property, if necessary, and so on.

But Russian foreign banks are doing a very useful job, because they represent the interests of Russian business circles as well. Through them, Western firms work with Russian companies. Because these banks are subject to the national legislation of the countries where they are located, and they have more opportunities than Russian banks to conduct operations in the money market, the capital market.

Vladimir Baburin:

And this will probably be the last question. You mentioned Bank Imperial. Do you think that the reorganization of the banking system, which is now being carried out in Russia, is it, of course, necessary? Is it carried out correctly, or is it still... the same Imperial? They took away the license, returned the license... It's not clear.

Alexander Khandruev:

Well... after August last year, the Central Bank of Russia faced such difficult, problematic tasks... Everyone was expecting a landslide collapse, a landslide crisis of the banking system, but it did not happen. Not a single country in the world has restructured the banking system without additional financial resources, without the active support of the state. Well, in Russia... Well, "ARKO"... They started to create "ARKO". The money allocated is clearly insufficient. The amount of work is huge. The license was revoked, but the necessary procedures were not carried out with hundreds of banks. Not enough staff.

Therefore, it is very easy to give assessments: something is being done wrong ... I would refrain from this, from such assessments. But nevertheless, it seems to me that, in general, the policy was carried out in accordance with the capabilities and resources that the Central Bank had. They were only, in my opinion, allowed ... the slowness of a number of events.

Well, first of all, it was necessary to clean up the balance sheets already in the fall of last year. It was necessary to show which assets were good and which were bad, working and not working... well, so that good assets would not be diverted to other banks or abroad. After all, in fact, investors and creditors were deceived, you understand.

Vladimir Baburin:

How long do you think it will take to restore confidence in banks? Well, people don't trust banks. Here I do not believe. Here I receive a salary - I take off, I'm afraid.

Alexander Khandruev:

I think several years. Three to five years. And here, I think, banks with the participation of foreign capital can play a good role. Here, in particular, four banks... the Bank of Austria, Reicheisen Bank, one Turkish bank and a Chinese bank have announced that they are starting to attract deposits from the population. There is no need to exaggerate the possibility of these banks, it is necessary to create a network of service branches, but they will begin to attract elite clients.

This will, firstly, undermine the monopoly of Sberbank... In general, I am against monopolies and I believe that where a monopoly begins, life ends there. Secondly, confidence in the banking system will spread. This, by the way, will make it faster to adopt a law on compulsory insurance of deposits.

Now Russian banks, having realized that the population will leave them, - and the resource where the real money is, of course, is the population, you understand? They will no longer oppose, but will, on the contrary, lobby to pass that law.

Therefore, these concrete steps... organizing the work of banks with the participation of foreign capital, the adoption of a law on guaranteeing deposits, more vigorous work on the liquidation of insolvent banks, the forced restructuring of insolvent banks, will allow us to restore - step by step, gradually - confidence in Russian banks. But this is a long process. Because, as world experience shows, restructuring requires ten to twenty-five percent of GDP.

Incidentally, in the early 1980s, when savings and loan associations in the United States suffered heavy losses, as a result of changes in the real estate market, three percent of GDP, one hundred and fifty billion dollars, it took the United States to overcome the crisis of savings and loan associations. Do you understand?

And to think that we can restore its solvency without investments in the banking sector is naive. After all, you know that the Russian banking system is undercapitalized. Well, on the other hand, giving money to those banks that will take them offshore is also stupid. That is why it is necessary to liquidate those banks that are insolvent. Necessarily. And here I fully agree with the position of the International Monetary Fund.

Vladimir Baburin:

This was the last question, and now I ask my fellow journalists to tell me what was the main thing in this almost hour-long conversation with Alexander Khandruev. Please, Celestine Bowen.

Celestine Bowin:

Well, I think this is the first time that I have heard from a person who either works or worked at the Central Bank that there were some serious violations, and these violations must be seriously looked into and somehow answered. It's nice to hear such "auto-criticism".

Vladimir Baburin:

Moses Gelman, "Parliamentary newspaper".

Moses Gelman:

And I, unfortunately, once again have to state with bitterness that the federal government is scattering personnel and will not gather a team of specialists under its roof, many of whom today do not work in federal structures, and will not entrust them with the formation of strategic policy in the field of the economy countries.

Vladimir Baburin:

And I will finish, Vladimir Baburin. Although Moses said almost exactly what I wanted to say, I will repeat myself first. A month ago, in the same studio, I told Mr. Aleksashenko, your colleague, everything, and as a journalist who, among other things, writes on economic issues, that I am always just amazed by people who can talk about the economy in normal Russian. So, this is understandable to a person with a three-year education.

And the second. I really agree with Moses: now, in the short time left before the elections, there are a very large number of unclaimed people in Russia, many of whom were in this studio. And I would like to hope that Alexander Khandruev, already in his new capacity, which will certainly be, will not forget Radio Liberty and will come to us again.

Alexander Andreevich Khandruev(born August 23, 1945 in Moscow) - Russian economist and banker, vice president of the Association of Regional Banks.

Biography

Graduated from the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University. M. V. Lomonosov (1970; with honors). Doctor of Economics, Professor.

  • In 1970-1975 - a teacher at the Moscow Institute of Management. S. Ordzhonikidze.
  • In 1975-1979 - senior researcher at the Faculty of Economics, Moscow State University.
  • In 1979-1988 - Associate Professor at the Academy of National Economy.
  • In 1988-1991 - Deputy Director, Acting Director, Director of the Credit and Financial Research Institute at the State Bank of the USSR.
  • In July - December 1991 - Deputy Chairman of the State Council for Economic Reform of the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR.
  • In 1991-1992 - Vice-President of the Fund for Economic and Social Reforms (Fund "Reform").
  • In 1992-1995 - Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia.
  • In 1995-1997 - First Deputy Chairman of the Bank of Russia
  • From 8 to 22 November 1995 - Acting Chairman of the Bank of Russia.
  • In 1997-1998 - Deputy Chairman of the Bank of Russia.
  • In 1998-1999 - Vice-Rector of the Academy of National Economy under the Government of the Russian Federation.
  • In 1999-2000 - Vice-President of the Fund for Economic and Social Reforms (Fund "Reform").
  • Since 2001 - Head of the Consulting Group "Banks. Finance. Investments” (BFI).
  • Since May 2002 - Vice-President of the Association of Regional Banks of the Russian Federation (Association "Russia"). Heads expert and analytical work related to banking issues. Then - the first vice-president of the Association.

Scientific Supervisor of the Faculty of Finance and Banking, Head of the Department of Finance, Money Circulation and Credit of the Academy of National Economy. Courses taught by him at the Academy: "Organization of the activities of the Central Bank"; "Organization of the activities of a commercial bank"; "Money, banks, financial markets"; "Banking Management".

Winner of the Banking Award.

Proceedings

  • Money in the economy of modern capitalism. - M., 1983.
  • Hegel and political economy. - M., 1990.

Is a member

  • Supervisory Board of the Debt Expert magazine.
  • Member of the Board of Directors of "My Bank" (banking license revoked - the bank lost liquidity)
  • Former member of the Board of Directors of JSCB Investbank (banking license revoked - the bank lost liquidity)
  • Member of the Board of Directors of Unicorbank (banking license revoked - the bank lost liquidity)

tel.: +7(495) 433-25-91

Teaching disciplines and courses: international monetary and financial relations

Area of ​​scientific knowledge:

Economy. Economic Sciences

Membership in councils, commissions and associations:

  • Vice President of the Association of Regional Banks of the Russian Federation (Association "Russia")
  • Chairman of the Expert Council of the Deposit Insurance Agency
Professional experience:
  • 1988 -1991 - Deputy Director, Acting Director, Director of the Credit and Financial Research Institute under the State Bank of the USSR
  • 1991 - Deputy Chairman of the State Council for Economic Reform of the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR
  • 1991 - 1992 - Vice-President of the Fund for Economic and Social Reforms (Reform Fund)
  • 1992 - 1998 - Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia
  • 1995 - 1997 - First Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia
  • 1995 - Acting Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia
  • 1998 - 1999 - Vice-Rector of the Academy of National Economy under the Government of the Russian Federation
  • 1999 - 2000 - Vice-President of the Fund for Economic and Social Reforms (Reform Fund)
  • From 2001 to present - Head of the Consulting group “Banks. Finance. Investments." (BFI)
  • From May 2002 to present - Vice-President of the Association of Regional Banks of the Russian Federation (Association "Russia")
  • In the present - First Vice-President of the Association of Regional Banks (Association "Russia"), Chairman of the Expert Council of the Deposit Insurance Agency.
Total work experience: 44 years
  • In 1970 he graduated with honors from the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov with a degree in political economy.
  • In 1973 he defended his dissertation for the degree of candidate of economic sciences on the topic "Evolution of the monetary systems of capitalism."
  • In 1985 he defended his dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Economics on the topic "Theory of money and money circulation in the conditions of modern capitalism."
  • In 1987 he was awarded the title of Associate Professor.
  • In 1987, he defended his doctoral dissertation at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

Academic degree: Doctor of Economic Sciences

Academic title: Professor

Scientific publications and interviews:

  1. Khandruev A.A. The birth of the Russian model of an integrated financial regulator: at the crossroads of roads and interests // Journal of the New Economic Association. 2013
  2. Khandruev A.A. Banking system of Russia 2013: growth potential and scenarios for its implementation / Khandruev A.A. , A.G. Vasiliev // Information and analytical materials for the XVI All-Russian Banking Conference. 2013 -5 p.
  3. Khandruev A.A. Supervision and regulation of the financial market: Russia and international practice / Khandruev A.A. , A.G. Vasiliev // Information and analytical materials for the XI International Banking Forum, Sochi. 2013 -7 p.
  4. Khandruev A.A. Integrated financial regulator: the Russian model in the context // Journal "Money and Credit". 2013 No. 10, -1 p.
  5. Khandruev A.A. Inflating the credit bubble // Journal "Direct Investments". 2013 No. 11,
  6. Khandruev A.A. Integrated Supervision // Journal "Direct Investments". 2013 №4,
  7. Khandruev A.A. Russian banking system in 2013 // Economics. Taxes. Right". 2013 No. 5,
  8. Khandruev A.A. Megaregulator: the beginning of a long journey // Journal "Direct Investments". 2013 №9,
  9. Khandruev A.A. Hurry // Journal "Expert". 2013 No. 32,
  10. Khandruev A.A. Megaregulator in England: the second attempt // Journal "Expert". 2013 No. 32,
  11. Khandruev A.A. The banking system of Russia 2009: strategies for overcoming the crisis / Khandruev A.A. , A.A. Chumachenko, A.V. Vetrova // journal "Direct Investments". 2009 No. 04,
  12. Khandruev A.A. Increasing the stability of the national banking system: Russia and the global financial crisis / Khandruev A.A. , A.A. Chumachenko// journal "Direct Investments". 2009 No. 09,
  13. The gold standard will win the currency war. Commentary by Alexander Khandruev to the Gazeta newspaper (http://www.gazeta.ru/financial/2010/11/08/3435729.shtml)
  14. http://echo.msk.ru/programs/creditworthiness/715650-echo/)
  15. On the presence of foreigners in the Russian financial market. Comment by Alexander Khandruev radio
  16. "Freedom" (http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/2177307.html)
  17. There will be no shortage of currency exchange. Alexander Khandruev gave an interview to the press center of the Rossiya Association (http://www.asros.ru/ru/press/firstpage/?id=344)
  18. dry residue. Alexander Khandruev took part in the program "Special Economy in a Special Democracy" on radio "Finam.fm"
  19. Bankruptcy will protect honest borrowers. Alexander Khandruev live on the program "Special Opinion" on Radio Russia (http://www.radiorus.ru/news.html?id=498616)
  20. Special tax on risky "krupnyak". Commentary by RBC Daily on BFI analytical materials (http://www.rbcdaily.ru/2010/08/31/finance/506632)
  21. http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/creditworthiness/705271-echo/q.html)
  22. Credit of trust. Alexander Khandruev live on Echo of Moscow radio station (http://echo.msk.ru/programs/creditworthiness/702016-echo/)
  23. Credit of trust. Alexander Khandruev live on Echo of Moscow radio station (http://echo.msk.ru/programs/creditworthiness/698628-echo/)
  24. Credit of trust. Alexander Khandruev live on Echo of Moscow radio station (http://echo.msk.ru/programs/creditworthiness/698628-echo/)
  25. Individual Bankruptcy Law. Alexander Khandruev live on the program "Special Opinion" on Radio Russia (http://www.radiorus.ru/issue.html?iid=277318&rid=346)
  26. Mortgages are hard to believe. Alexander Khandruev commented on the survey of the Bankir.ru portal (http://bankir.ru/publication/article/5577196)
  27. Credit of trust. Alexander Khandruev spoke live on the Echo of Moscow radio station (http://echo.msk.ru/programs/creditworthiness/685794-echo/)
  28. dry residue. Alexander Khandruev took part in the Dry Residue program on Finam.fm radio
  29. Bank deposits and ice cream. Alexander Khandruev in the program "Middle class" on NTV (http://sklass.ntv.ru/issue/14341/)
  30. The collapse of the euro is a lesson for Russia. Commentary by Alexander Khandruev to the Svobodnaya Pressa newspaper (http://svpressa.ru/economy/article/25463/)
  31. "Market" mortgage laws. Commentary by Alexander Khandruev on the Bankir.Ru portal (http://bankir.ru/publication/article/5175525)
  32. One way is to the bank. Commentary by Alexander Khandruev to the Novye Izvestiya newspaper (http://www.newizv.ru/news/2010-05-11/126221/)
  33. Bankruptcy of individuals. Alexander Khandruev spoke live on City FM radio station in the program “About money”
  34. Banks avoided collapse. Interview of Alexander Khandruev in the Tribuna newspaper
  35. Release of toxic assets. Article by Andrey Chumachenko and Sergey Makrushin in the journal "Direct Investments" (Full version of the article)
  36. Skolkovo and credit agreements. Alexander Khandruev in the program "Middle class" on NTV (http://sklass.ntv.ru/issue/13701/
  37. Credit of trust. Alexander Khandruev will perform live on Ekho Moskvy radio station (http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/creditworthiness/673644-echo/)
  38. The global financial market - marking time? What to expect from the G20? Alexander Khandruev will answer questions live on the Dry Residue program with Yuri Pronko
  39. Credit of trust. Alexander Khandruev live on Echo of Moscow radio station (http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/creditworthiness/641799-echo/)
  40. Troubled Assets of the Russian Banking Sector: Assessments and Solutions. Article by Alexander Khandruev, Andrey Chumachenko and Sergey Makrushin in the Journal of the New Economic Association No. 5, 2010 ((Read the article
  41. Sberbank bypassed the percentage ban. Commentary by Alexander Khandruev to the Gazeta newspaper
  42. Capital changes. Article by Andrey Chumachenko and Anatoly Vasiliev in the journal "Direct Investments" (Full version of the article)
  43. Unemployment kills mortgages. Commentary by Alexander Khandruev to the Trud newspaper (http://www.trud.ru/article/07-04-2010/239616_ipoteku_ubivaet_bezrabotitsa.html)
  44. Business first hand: PM Questionnaire. Alina Vetrova answered the questionnaire
  45. Paying for risk: consumer loans in Russia could become very expensive. Commentary by Alexander Khandruev to the Novye Izvestiya newspaper
  46. Lifebuoy for the eurozone Alexander Khandruev spoke live on Radio Liberty
  47. Alexander Khandruev spoke live on Radio Russia in the Persona Grata program
  48. The countries of the Customs Union dream of "Azio". Commentary by Alexander Khandruev to the Svobodnaya Pressa online publication
  49. Restructured loans will sooner or later be serviced. "The main news of the day" of the website of the Association "Russia" is commented by Alexander Khandruev
  50. “Problems of the banking system: delay in payments on loans; non-core assets. Alexander Khandruev took part in the program "Angle of View" on the TV channel Expert-TV
  51. Kudrin promised himself a low bank interest. Commentary by Alexander Khandruev to the Internet publication Free Press (http://svpressa.ru/economy/article/20098/)
  52. Mortgage - not a luxury? Alexander Khandruev took part in the program "Dialogue" of the RBC-TV channel