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Nine years ago there was a man-made disaster at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP accident causes and consequences

The Sayano-Shushensky hydropower complex is located on the Yenisei River in the southeast of the Republic of Khakassia in the Sayan Canyon at the river's outlet into the Minusinsk Basin. The complex includes the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, as well as the counter-regulating Mainsky hydroelectric complex located downstream and a coastal spillway.

Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station named after P.S. Neporozhny (SSHGES) is a branch of the Russian energy holding RusHydro.

The HPP building houses 10 radial-axial hydraulic units with a capacity of 640 megawatts each.

Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP before the accident on August 17, 2009 was the most powerful source of peak load coverage in the Unified Energy System of Russia and Siberia. The main consumers of electricity from the SSHHPP were the Sayanogorsk aluminum plant, the Khakass aluminum plant, the Krasnoyarsk aluminum plant, the Novokuznetsk aluminum plant, and the Kuznetsk ferroalloy plant.

On August 17, 2009 at 08.15 (04.15 Moscow time) due to the destruction of fasteners at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, an accident occurred, the cover of the second hydraulic unit was torn off by a stream of water, into the turbine room. Repair shops were flooded, in which there were people. The accident killed 75 people.

At the time of the accident, nine hydroelectric units of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP were in operation (hydraulic unit No. 6 was in reserve). The total active power of the operating units was 4400 megawatts. The release of water from the crater of the turbine of the second hydraulic unit led to a partial collapse of building structures in the area from the first to the fifth hydroelectric units; the supporting columns of the building were damaged and in some places destroyed, as well as the equipment of the regulation and control systems of hydroelectric units; five phases of power transformers received mechanical damage of varying degrees; the building structures of the transformer site in the area of ​​the first and second units were damaged.

All ten units of the SSHHPP were damaged or completely destroyed, more than 40 tons of engine oil spilled into the waters of the Yenisei.

As a result of the accident, the production levels below the turbine hall were flooded. A short circuit in the generator control systems led to a complete shutdown of the hydroelectric power plant, including for its own needs.

The territory adjacent to the power plant was also under water. However, flooding of settlements is still

The accident did not affect the state of the SSHHPP dam.

At 09.20 (05.20 Moscow time), the emergency repair gates of the hydraulic units were closed by the station personnel and contractors and the flow of water into the turbine hall was stopped.

In the premises of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP destroyed and flooded with water. In the machine room where the technological accident occurred, emergency recovery work was started. 115 people were involved, of which 98 people were the personnel of the Russian Emergencies Ministry for Khakassia (firefighters, rescuers, task forces) and 21 pieces of equipment.

An oil slick, formed as a result of transformer oil leakage, five kilometers downstream of the Yenisei.

At 11.40 (06.40 Moscow time) the gates of the spillway dam were opened and the balance of flow through the hydroelectric complex was restored. Prior to the opening of the gates of the spillway dam, the regulation of the sanitary release along the Yenisei River was carried out by the Mainskaya HPP.

Due to an accident at the SSHHPP in the energy system of Siberia. Power engineers were forced to work at a number of Kuzbass enterprises. In particular, temporary restrictions affected the largest metallurgical plants owned by Evraz Group - Novokuznetsk Iron and Steel Works (NKMK) and West Siberian Iron and Steel Works (ZapSib), a number of coal mines and cuts.

The shutdown of the Sayan and Khakas aluminum smelters was carried out, the load was reduced at the Krasnoyarsk aluminum smelter, the Kemerovo ferroalloy plant (load reduction by 150 megawatts),

At 21.10 Moscow time, during a conference call in the crisis center of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation, it was reported that there were 10 dead, 11 wounded, the fate of 72 people is being specified. Debris has been sorted out, and the power supply scheme is being restored.

Less than a day after the accident in two fish farms located downstream of the Yenisei from the hydroelectric power station in the village of Maina, due to the ingress of machine oil from the destroyed hydraulic units into the Yenisei. About 400 tons of commercial trout perished. In the Yenisei, the fish migrated away from the spot, so they did not die, but in trout farms they were in pontoons, they did not have the opportunity to leave.

During the liquidation of the consequences of the accident at the plant, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, in cooperation with the Ministry of Energy of Russia, involved up to 2.7 thousand people (including about 2 thousand people directly at the HPP), more than 200 pieces of equipment, including including 11 aircraft and 15 watercraft. More than 5,000 cubic meters of debris were dismantled, more than 277,000 cubic meters of water were pumped out. 9683 meters of booms were installed, 324.2 tons of oil-containing emulsion were collected.

In order to coordinate the interaction of the organizations involved during the period of emergency rescue operations, in the future, to promptly resolve the issues of restoring the HPP, an operational headquarters of the Ministry of Energy of Russia headed by the Deputy Minister of Energy was created at the station.

The project of restoration and complex reconstruction of SSHHPP. According to the plan approved by the Russian Ministry of Energy, the hydroelectric power plant should be fully restored in 2014.

In July 2013, the third hydroelectric unit of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was stopped for reconstruction, which is one of the four units that were the least affected in the 2009 man-made accident. By this time, the remaining nine units had already been reconstructed. The third hydraulic unit according to the plan

The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources

Caused by additional dynamic loads of a variable nature, which was preceded by education and development fatigue damage fasteners, which led to the failure of the cover and the flooding of the machine room of the station.

The accident is currently the largest hydroelectric disaster in history. Russia and one of the most significant in the history of the world hydropower. “The accident is unique,” ​​said, in particular, Minister of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters S. K. Shoigu. “Nothing like this has ever been seen in world practice.”

Nevertheless, the assessment of the consequences of the disaster in the expert and political community is ambiguous. Some specialists and organizations, including Sergei Shoigu himself, compared the Sayano-Shushenskaya accident in terms of its significance and impact on the economic and sociological aspects of life in Russia with accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant .

Catastrophe

At the time of the accident, the station was carrying a load of 4100 MW, out of 10 hydroelectric units, 9 were in operation (hydraulic unit No. 6 was under repair). At 8:13 local time August 17 2009 there was a sudden destruction of the hydraulic unit No. 2 with the flow of the hydraulic unit through the shaft under a large pressure significant volumes of water. The power plant personnel, who were in the engine room, heard a loud bang in the area of ​​hydroelectric unit No. 2 and saw the release of a powerful column of water. Oleg Myakishev, an eyewitness to the accident, describes this moment as follows:

... I was standing at the top, I heard some kind of growing noise, then I saw how the corrugated coating of the hydroelectric unit was rising, rearing up. Then I saw how from under it rises rotor. He was spinning. My eyes didn't believe it. He climbed three meters. Stones flew, pieces of reinforcement, we began to dodge them ... The corrugation was already somewhere under the roof, and the roof itself was blown ... I figured: water was rising, 380 cubic meters per second, and - tear, in the direction of the tenth unit. I thought I wouldn’t make it, I went up higher, stopped, looked down - I see how everything collapses, water comes in, people try to swim ... I thought that closures must be closed urgently, manually, to stop the water ... Manually, because voltage No, none of the defenses worked.

Streams of water quickly flooded the engine room and the rooms below it. All hydraulic units of the HPP were flooded, while on the working hydro generators there were short circuits(their flashes are clearly visible in the amateur video of the disaster), which disabled them. There was a complete load shedding of the hydroelectric power station, which led, among other things, to a de-energization of the station itself. On the central control panel of the station, a light and sound signaling, after which the remote control was de-energized - operational communication was lost, power supply lighting, automation and alarm devices. The automatic systems that stop the hydroelectric units worked only on the hydroelectric unit No. 5, guide apparatus which was automatically closed. The gates on the water intakes of other hydraulic units remained open, and the water water conduits continued to flow to the turbines, which led to the destruction of hydraulic units No. 7 and 9 (heavily damaged stators and crosses generators). Water flows and flying fragments of hydroelectric units completely destroyed the walls and floors of the turbine hall in the area of ​​hydraulic aggregates No. 2, 3, 4. Hydroaggregates No. 3, 4 and 5 were littered with fragments of the turbine hall. Those employees of the station who had such an opportunity quickly left the scene of the accident.

At the time of the accident, from the station management in their places were Chief Engineer HPP A. N. Mitrofanov, Acting Chief of Staff civil defense and emergency situations M. I. Chiglintsev, head of the equipment monitoring service A. V. Matvienko, head of the reliability and safety service N. V. Churichkov. After the accident, the chief engineer arrived at the central control point and gave the order to the station shift supervisor M. G. Nefyodov, who was there, to close the gates. Chiglintsev, Matvienko and Churichkov left the territory of the station after the accident.

Due to the loss of power supply, the gates could only be closed manually, for which the personnel had to enter a special room on the crest of the dam. At about 08:30, eight operational personnel reached the shutter room, after which they contacted the station shift supervisor by cell phone, who instructed the shutters to be lowered. Having cracked the iron door, the station workers A. V. Kataytsev, R. Gaifullin, E. V. Kondrattsev, I. M. Bagautdinov, P. A. Mayoroshin and N. N. Tretyakov manually reset the emergency repair gates within an hour water intakes by stopping the flow of water into the engine room. The closure of water conduits led to the need to open gates spillway dam in order to ensure sanitary release in the downstream of the SSHHPP. By 11:32 the food was organized gantry crane dam crest from movable diesel generator, at 11:50 the operation to lift the shutters began. By 13:07, all 11 gates of the spillway dam were open, and empty water flow began.

Rescue work

Search and rescue, repair and restoration work at the station began almost immediately after the accident by the station personnel and employees Siberian regional center Ministry of Emergency Situations. On the same day, the head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations flew to the accident area Sergei Shoigu, who led the work to eliminate the consequences of the accident, the transfer of additional forces of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and employees of various divisions of JSC RusHydro began. Already on the day of the accident, diving work began to inspect the flooded premises of the station in order to search for survivors, as well as the bodies of the dead. On the first day after the accident, it was possible to save two people who were in "air bags" and gave signals for help - one 2 hours after the accident, the other 15 hours later. However, as early as August 18, the likelihood of finding other survivors was assessed as negligible. On August 20, pumping out of water from the premises of the engine room began; by this time, 17 bodies of the dead had been found, 58 people were listed as missing. As the internal premises of the station were freed from water, the number of found bodies of the dead grew rapidly, reaching 69 people by August 23, when work on pumping water entered the final stage. On August 23, the Ministry of Emergency Situations began to complete its work at the station, and work at the hydroelectric power station began to gradually move from the phase of a search and rescue operation to the phase of restoring facilities and equipment. On August 28, the regime was abolished in Khakassia emergency introduced in connection with the accident. In total, up to 2,700 people were involved in search and rescue operations (of which about 2,000 people worked directly at the HPP) and more than 200 pieces of equipment. During the work, more than 5,000 m³ of debris was dismantled and removed, more than 277,000 m³ of water was pumped out of the station premises. To eliminate oil pollution water areas Yenisei was installed 9683 meters booms and collected 324.2 tons oily emulsions .

Development of the accident

Hydroelectric unit No. 2 was put into operation from the reserve at 23:14 local time (19:14 Moscow time) on August 16, 2009 and assigned by the plant personnel as a priority for changing the load when the power control ranges are exhausted. The change in the power of the hydraulic unit was carried out automatically under the influence of the GRARM regulator in accordance with the commands of the ARCM. At that moment, the station was operating according to the planned dispatch schedule. At 20:20 Moscow time, a fire was recorded in one of the premises Bratsk HPP, as a result of which the communication lines between the Bratsk HPP and the dispatching department of the Siberian energy system were damaged (a number of media hastened to declare these events the “trigger” of the disaster, which forced the launch of the ill-fated hydroelectric unit No. work).

Bratsk HPP

Since the Bratskaya HPP, which operated under the control of the ARCM, "fell" out of control of the system, the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP took over its role, and at 20:31 Moscow time the dispatcher gave the command to transfer the GRARM station to the automatic control mode from the ARCM. In total, 6 hydraulic units (No. 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 9) worked under the control of GRARM, three more hydro units (No. 3, 8 and 10) worked under the individual control of the personnel, hydro unit No. 6 was under repair.

From 08:12 there was a decrease in the capacity of hydroelectric unit No. 2 at the direction of GRARM. When the hydraulic unit entered the zone not recommended for operation, a break occurred studs turbine covers. The destruction of a significant part of the 80 studs was due to fatigue phenomena; on six studs (out of 41 examined) were absent at the time of the accident nuts- probably due to self-unwinding as a result of vibration (their locking was not provided for by the design of the turbine). Under the influence of water pressure in the hydraulic unit, the rotor of the hydraulic unit with the turbine cover and the upper cross began to move upward, and, due to depressurization, water began to fill the volume of the turbine shaft, acting on the elements of the generator. When the impeller rim reached the level of 314.6 m, the impeller moved into pumping mode and due to the stored energy of the generator rotor created excess pressure on the input edges of the impeller blades, which led to the breakage of the guide vane blades.

Through the vacated shaft of the hydraulic unit, water began to flow into the machine room of the station. The automatic control systems of the hydraulic units, which stop them in case of emergency, could only function if there was power supply, but in the conditions of flooding of the turbine hall and a massive short circuit of the electrical equipment, the power supply to the station itself was lost very quickly, and the automation managed to stop only one hydraulic unit - No. 5. Water inflow to the turbine hall of the station continued until the manual closing of the emergency gates by the station personnel from the crest of the dam, which was completed by 9.30.

According to the head of Rostekhnadzor N. G. Kutina , similar accident associated with the destruction of the fastenings of the cover of the hydraulic unit (but without human casualties) has already happened in 1983 on the Nurek HPP in Tajikistan, but Ministry of Energy of the USSR decided to classify information about that incident.

Effects

Social Consequences

At the time of the accident, there were 116 people in the turbine hall of the station, including one person on the roof of the hall, 52 people on the hall floor (327 m mark) and 63 people in the interior below the hall floor level (at elevations of 315 and 320 m). Of these, 15 people were station employees, the rest were employees of various contracting organizations that carried out repair work (most of them were employees of Sayano-Shushensky Hydroenergoremont OJSC). In total, there were about 300 people on the territory of the station (including outside the zone affected by the accident). As a result of the accident, 75 people died and 13 people were injured. The body of the last deceased was found 23 September. with an indication of the places where the bodies were found was published in the act of the technical investigation of the commission of Rostekhnadzor. A large number of deaths is explained by the fact that most people were in the interior of the station below the floor of the turbine hall and the rapid flooding of these rooms.

From the first day of the accident, estimates of the chances of survival of people who could be inside the water-flooded turbine hall were disappointing. In particular, board member RusHydro company, the former general director of the HPP Alexander Toloshinov stated:

The lack of official information about the accident and the state of the dam during the first hours, interruptions in communication, and, later, mistrust of the statements of local authorities based on experience, caused panic in the settlements lying downstream of the river - Cheryomushki , Sayanogorsk , Abakan , Minusinsk .

Sayanogorsk

Residents hurriedly left to stay with relatives, away from the dam, and to nearby hills, which led to numerous queues for petrol stations, traffic jams and car accidents. According to Sergei Shoigu ,

In this regard, the Khakass administration Federal Antimonopoly Service conducted an inspection of gasoline prices, which did not reveal an increase.

August 19 2009 Chief Editor Internet magazine "New Focus" Mikhail Afanasiev posted in his blog a message that there are allegedly living people in the flooded engine room of the station, with a proposal of possible measures to save them. This message, which caused a great resonance, served as a pretext for inciting against Afanasiev criminal case under Art. 129 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation ( slander). Subsequently, the criminal case was terminated due to the lack of corpus delicti.

August 19 announced in Khakassia day of mourning. Holidays of the City Day in Abakan ( August 22) and Chernogorsk (August 29) have been cancelled. In addition, a number of major sporting and social events have been postponed. 25-th of August in all branches and subsidiaries and affiliates JSC RusHydro has been declared a day of mourning.

Compensation and social assistance

Financial assistance to the families of the victims was provided from various sources. RusHydro made payments in the amount of 1 million rubles to the families of each of the victims, separately paid two months of earnings for the victims, and allocated funds for organizing the funeral. Those who survived but were injured in the accident received lump-sum payments ranging from 50,000 to 150,000 rubles, depending on the severity of the damage. The company is working to provide housing for families in need, and also implements other social programs to help the families of the victims. In total, the company allocated 185 million rubles for social assistance programs.

Creation". More than 5 million rubles were received on the account trade union stations. This money was subsequently distributed taking into account the needs of the families of those killed and injured in the accident.

As part of our own charitable program Sberbank of Russia undertook to repay mortgage loans to the families of the victims for a total of 6 million rubles.

Environmental consequences

The accident had a negative impact on the environment: oil from the lubrication baths of hydraulic unit thrust bearings, from the destroyed control systems of guide vanes and transformers got into the Yenisei, the resulting slick stretched for 130 km. The total volume of oil leaks from the station equipment amounted to 436.5 m³, of which approximately 45 m³, mainly turbine oil, entered the river. In order to prevent further spread of oil along the river, booms; to facilitate the collection of oil, a special sorbent, but it was not possible to promptly stop the distribution of oil products; the stain was completely eliminated only 24 August and coastal cleanup activities were scheduled to be completed by December 31, 2009.

Water pollution with oil products has led to the death of about 400 tons of industrial trout in fish farms located downstream of the river.

tank trucks

The built chapel near the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP

See the beginning on the website: Spurs on the RSChS - Disaster at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP PartI

The Sayano-Shushensky hydropower complex is located on the Yenisei River in the southeast of the Republic of Khakassia in the Sayan Canyon at the river's outlet into the Minusinsk Basin. The complex includes the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, as well as the counter-regulating Mainsky hydroelectric complex located downstream and a coastal spillway.

Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station named after P.S. Neporozhny (SSHGES) is a branch of the Russian energy holding RusHydro.

The HPP building houses 10 radial-axial hydraulic units with a capacity of 640 megawatts each.

Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP before the accident on August 17, 2009 was the most powerful source of peak load coverage in the Unified Energy System of Russia and Siberia. The main consumers of electricity from the SSHHPP were the Sayanogorsk aluminum plant, the Khakass aluminum plant, the Krasnoyarsk aluminum plant, the Novokuznetsk aluminum plant, and the Kuznetsk ferroalloy plant.

On August 17, 2009 at 08.15 (04.15 Moscow time) due to the destruction of fasteners at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, an accident occurred, the cover of the second hydraulic unit was torn off by a stream of water, into the turbine room. Repair shops were flooded, in which there were people. The accident killed 75 people.

At the time of the accident, nine hydroelectric units of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP were in operation (hydraulic unit No. 6 was in reserve). The total active power of the operating units was 4400 megawatts. The release of water from the crater of the turbine of the second hydraulic unit led to a partial collapse of building structures in the area from the first to the fifth hydroelectric units; the supporting columns of the building were damaged and in some places destroyed, as well as the equipment of the regulation and control systems of hydroelectric units; five phases of power transformers received mechanical damage of varying degrees; the building structures of the transformer site in the area of ​​the first and second units were damaged.

All ten units of the SSHHPP were damaged or completely destroyed, more than 40 tons of engine oil spilled into the waters of the Yenisei.

As a result of the accident, the production levels below the turbine hall were flooded. A short circuit in the generator control systems led to a complete shutdown of the hydroelectric power plant, including for its own needs.

The territory adjacent to the power plant was also under water. However, flooding of settlements is still

The accident did not affect the state of the SSHHPP dam.

At 09.20 (05.20 Moscow time), the emergency repair gates of the hydraulic units were closed by the station personnel and contractors and the flow of water into the turbine hall was stopped.

In the premises of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP destroyed and flooded with water. In the machine room where the technological accident occurred, emergency recovery work was started. 115 people were involved, of which 98 people were the personnel of the Russian Emergencies Ministry for Khakassia (firefighters, rescuers, task forces) and 21 pieces of equipment.

An oil slick, formed as a result of transformer oil leakage, five kilometers downstream of the Yenisei.

At 11.40 (06.40 Moscow time) the gates of the spillway dam were opened and the balance of flow through the hydroelectric complex was restored. Prior to the opening of the gates of the spillway dam, the regulation of the sanitary release along the Yenisei River was carried out by the Mainskaya HPP.

Due to an accident at the SSHHPP in the energy system of Siberia. Power engineers were forced to work at a number of Kuzbass enterprises. In particular, temporary restrictions affected the largest metallurgical plants owned by Evraz Group - Novokuznetsk Iron and Steel Works (NKMK) and West Siberian Iron and Steel Works (ZapSib), a number of coal mines and cuts.

The shutdown of the Sayan and Khakas aluminum smelters was carried out, the load was reduced at the Krasnoyarsk aluminum smelter, the Kemerovo ferroalloy plant (load reduction by 150 megawatts),

At 21.10 Moscow time, during a conference call in the crisis center of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation, it was reported that there were 10 dead, 11 wounded, the fate of 72 people is being specified. Debris has been sorted out, and the power supply scheme is being restored.

Less than a day after the accident in two fish farms located downstream of the Yenisei from the hydroelectric power station in the village of Maina, due to the ingress of machine oil from the destroyed hydraulic units into the Yenisei. About 400 tons of commercial trout perished. In the Yenisei, the fish migrated away from the spot, so they did not die, but in trout farms they were in pontoons, they did not have the opportunity to leave.

During the liquidation of the consequences of the accident at the plant, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, in cooperation with the Ministry of Energy of Russia, involved up to 2.7 thousand people (including about 2 thousand people directly at the HPP), more than 200 pieces of equipment, including including 11 aircraft and 15 watercraft. More than 5,000 cubic meters of debris were dismantled, more than 277,000 cubic meters of water were pumped out. 9683 meters of booms were installed, 324.2 tons of oil-containing emulsion were collected.

In order to coordinate the interaction of the organizations involved during the period of emergency rescue operations, in the future, to promptly resolve the issues of restoring the HPP, an operational headquarters of the Ministry of Energy of Russia headed by the Deputy Minister of Energy was created at the station.

The project of restoration and complex reconstruction of SSHHPP. According to the plan approved by the Russian Ministry of Energy, the hydroelectric power plant should be fully restored in 2014.

In July 2013, the third hydroelectric unit of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was stopped for reconstruction, which is one of the four units that were the least affected in the 2009 man-made accident. By this time, the remaining nine units had already been reconstructed. The third hydraulic unit according to the plan

The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources

On August 17, 2009, a large-scale accident occurred at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP due to the destruction of the turbine cover of the hydroelectric unit. As a result of the tragedy, 75 people died, serious damage was caused to both the premises themselves and the equipment of the station. The operation of the hydroelectric power station had to be temporarily stopped due to the threat of an environmental catastrophe in the region.

Catastrophe

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is one of the largest in the world and the largest hydroelectric power plant in Russia. She began her work in 1978.

On August 17, 2009, at 8:13 local time, the second hydroelectric unit was unexpectedly destroyed, as a result of which huge masses of water began to flow uncontrollably through the hydroelectric unit shaft.

The engine room, the premises under it, as well as all the hydroelectric units of the station, without exception, were flooded very quickly. Moreover, due to flooding, short circuits occurred at the operating hydroelectric units, which put them out of action.

The entire station turned out to be de-energized, the power supply to the alarm system, automation devices, lighting was lost, and there was no operational communication. Since the gates of water intakes did not close due to the lack of electric power, water continued to flow in large quantities to idle turbines, which led to their destruction.

It was possible to manually close the gates of water intakes and open the gates of the spillway dam only by one in the afternoon. After that, all the water through the gates was supplied idly.

Investigation into the causes of the disaster

According to Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation Shmatko, the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was the largest and at the same time the most incomprehensible accident in the history of hydropower. Several departments were involved in the investigation of the disaster. Among other things, a parliamentary commission was created to investigate the disaster.

Due to the fact that initially the causes of the accident were not clear even to specialists, many hypotheses and assumptions arose around the event. Versions of water hammer, sabotage and terrorist attack were considered. However, no traces of explosives were found.

Ultimately, Rostekhnadzor published an act on the website of the department, according to which the cause of the accident was the failure of the turbine cover, which, in turn, happened due to the destruction of the studs. This was attributed to the constant overloads experienced by the station equipment.

The causes of the largest man-made disaster in the history of Russia, it would seem, have been established, and the perpetrators have been brought to justice. However, there is still an opinion that the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was planned.

Multiple factor

As a rule, any man-made disaster consists of trifles in which the human factor is involved, and it does not matter whether it is criminal connivance or elementary negligence. The accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station (SSHHPP), which occurred on the morning of August 17, 2009, was no exception. Due to the escape of thousands of cubic meters of water and subsequent destruction, 75 people died and 13 were injured.

The Rostekhnadzor Commission quickly identified the causes of the accident and published the names of people whose mistakes and miscalculations led to the tragedy. Among them are important officials: Deputy Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation Vyacheslav Sinyugin, General Director of OJSC "TGC-1" Boris Vainzikher, and former head of RAO "UES of Russia" Anatoly Chubais.

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was officially put into operation in 2000: the corresponding document was signed by Anatoly Chubais. The investigation noted that the head of RAO "UES of Russia" approved the Act of the Central Commission for the acceptance into operation of the hydropower complex of the SSHHPP "without a comprehensive assessment of the information available at that time about its functioning."

And then followed a chain of bureaucratic abuses and violations of the norms of exploitation, which ultimately led to disastrous consequences. As the head of Rostechnadzor Nikolai Kutyin noted, the accident occurred due to a combination of various reasons: design, operational and repair.

In particular, it was found that in a matter of hours before the accident, the second hydroelectric unit of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station reached exorbitant capacities six times, and the vibration increased four times during this time. However, no one sounded the alarm.

The main cause of the disaster was stress fatigue of the fasteners (studs) of the design of hydroelectric unit No. 2, which, with increased vibration, led to their rupture and, as a result, to the destruction of the turbine cover and water breakthrough. Summing up the results of the investigation, the chairman of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician Alexander Aseev, said that the fastening studs were made of steel "not capable of withstanding the necessary loads."

Biggest disaster

To date, the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is the largest disaster in Russian history at a hydropower facility. Sergei Shoigu compared this accident in terms of its impact on the economic and sociological aspects of life in Russia with the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The accident at the SSHHPP caused a great public outcry and became, perhaps, the most discussed event of 2009 in the media. In particular, many reviews of witnesses of this disaster were published.

For example, Oleg Myakishev, an employee of the SSHHPP, recalled how he heard a growing rumble, and then saw how the cover of the hydroelectric unit was rearing and rising. “Then I saw a rotor rise from under it. He was spinning. Myakishev continues. The eyes didn't believe it. He climbed three meters. Stones flew, pieces of reinforcement, we began to dodge them. I figured: water rises, 380 cubic meters per second, and - tear, in the direction of the tenth unit. I thought I wouldn't make it."

Raging streams of water in a matter of seconds flooded the engine room and the rooms below it. All 10 hydraulic units were under water, after which a series of short circuits occurred that disabled the machines. Hydro units No. 7 and No. 9 were completely destroyed, under the streams of water and flying fragments of structures, the walls and ceilings of the turbine hall in the area of ​​hydro units No. 2, No. 3 and No. 4 also collapsed. The area of ​​destruction reached 1200 square meters.

Effects

The accident at the SSHHPP led to a large power shortage in the entire energy system of Siberia. The supply of electricity to a number of Kuzbass enterprises was limited, temporary restrictions affected the largest metallurgical enterprises, including the Novokuznetsk Metallurgical Plant and the West Siberian Metallurgical Plant, as well as a number of coal mines and cuts.

Power engineers seriously reduced the load on the Krasnoyarsk aluminum plant and the Kemerovo ferroalloy plant and completely de-energized the Sayan and Khakas aluminum plants. Less than a day after the accident, as in several fishing farms located downstream of the Yenisei, a massive sea trout began.

All property of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was insured by ROSNO for the amount of $200 million. In addition, each employee of the complex was insured by ROSNO for 500,000 rubles. 18 dead and 1 injured were insured by Rosgosstrakh LLC, the total amount of payments exceeded 800 thousand rubles.

Property risks were also reinsured on the international market, mostly with the Munich Re Group. With the German company, all disputes were settled without any problems, but with the Swiss insurer Infrassure Ltd, litigation over the payment of more than 800 million rubles dragged on for as much as 3 years.

The catastrophe at the SSHHPP forced the authorities to monitor the state of other water power complexes. Thus, in an analytical note of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, which dealt with the problems of JSC RusHydro, it was noted that at many stations of the company “there is an operation of obsolete and physically worn equipment that has developed a standard park resource of 25-30 years, the wear of which amounted to almost 50% ", and "the degree of wear of certain types of hydraulic equipment - hydraulic turbines and hydro generators, hydraulic structures - exceeded 60% or reached a critical level."

Cyber ​​attack?

Far from all the conclusions of the commissions investigating the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP satisfied Gennady Rassokhin, a power engineer by profession. According to the documents of Rostekhnadzor and the parliamentary commission, the main cause of the accident was metal fatigue of the studs securing the turbine cover on hydroelectric unit No. 2.

However, Rassokhin wonders why there are traces of the so-called “temper colors” on the fracture surfaces of the studs, which are characteristic only for “fresh” surfaces of metal fractures, and not for surfaces with a long fracture? Such a discrepancy may suggest a planned disaster.

At one time, Edward Snowden published materials confirming that the United States National Security Agency is in full swing preparing for future digital wars, the goal of which is complete control over the world via the Internet. There, in particular, it was noted that the Politerain project, run by the NSA, is creating a team of so-called "digital snipers", whose task is to disable computers that control the operation of water supply systems, power plants, factories, airports, as well as the interception of cash flows.

A blogger, programmer and physicist by training, who introduces himself as Mr. Andrey, put forward an alternative version of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. In his opinion, the root cause of the disaster was the Stuxnet virus, which, as an element of cyber weapons, was previously used to undermine the Russian economy.

Indeed, military analysts recognize that Stuxnet is a new milestone in the development of cyber weapons. Today, he confidently stepped over the threshold of virtual space and began to threaten not only informational, but also real-life objects.

Mr. Andrey describes his scenario that happened at the SSHGES. At that moment, when an accident occurred at the second hydraulic unit due to resonance, the equipment was controlled by automation, the blogger claims. The manual control for outputting constant power was disabled and the unit operated in the load ripple compensation mode in the energy systems of Western Siberia.

The programmer also draws attention to the fact that in March 2009, Ukrainian specialists worked at the facility, who, in the process of checking the equipment (during a scheduled repair), took the parameters of resonant frequencies from the second unit. Where and in what hands this data fell is unknown, but it can be assumed, comments Mr. Andrey.

Possessing these data, according to the expert, it was not difficult to swing the system of the unit through the control microcontroller so that it would gradually, over several hours, "drive a turbine unit with an electric generator on one shaft into the resonance zone." Naturally, they didn’t think about any information security then, despite the fact that this system had direct access to the Internet, the blogger concludes.