Korean Navy. Naval forces of the DPRK. small submarines of the Sang-O project

The navies of many states have rare ships. They will never go to sea again, but to exclude them from the lists of the fleet would mean tearing out the heroic pages of the past from memory and forever losing the continuity of traditions for future generations.

That is why the cruiser Avrora stands at the eternal joke at the Petrogradskaya Embankment in St. Petersburg, and the masts of the 104-gun battleship Victory rise in the docks of Portsmouth. The country's naval flag flies over each veteran, a reduced crew of military sailors is on duty, and a special column has been allocated in the Navy budget for their maintenance (note: Aurora was excluded from the Navy in 2010 and transferred to the category of ships museums).

Even the pragmatic United States has its own rare ship - USS Pueblo (AGER-2). Perhaps the most unusual of all warships in the world.

To exclude the Pueblo from the lists of the US Navy would be to raise the white flag and capitulate in the face of the enemy. The little scout is still listed on all Pentagon lists as an active combat unit. And it doesn’t matter that the Pueblo itself has been moored de facto at the embankment in North Korean Pyongyang for almost half a century, and its secret radio-technical “stuffing” has been taken to pieces in the interests of the secret research institutes of the Soviet Union.

... The barrels of the uncovered "Brownings" of the 50th caliber stick out helplessly. The walls of the Pueblo's superstructures are blackened with shrapnel wounds, and the decks show brown bloodstains of American sailors. But how did a Yankee warship end up in such a humiliating position?

Capture of the Pueblo

The Pueblo, an electronic intelligence ship, passed according to official US Navy documents as a Banner-type hydrographic ship (Auxiliary General Environmental Research - AGER). Former cargo-passenger ship FP-344, launched in 1944 and subsequently converted for special operations. Full displacement - 895 tons. Crew - about 80 people. Full speed - 12.5 knots. Armament - 2 machine guns of 12.7 mm caliber.

A typical Cold War spy disguised as a harmless science vessel. But behind the modest appearance was a wolf grin. The interiors of the Pueblo's interior resembled a giant supercomputer - long rows of racks with radios, oscilloscopes, tape recorders, cipher machines, and other specific equipment. The task is to monitor the Soviet Navy, measure the electromagnetic fields of Soviet ships, intercept signals at all frequencies in the interests of the National Security Agency (ANB) and naval intelligence of the fleet.

On January 11, 1968, USS Pueblo (AGER-2) left the port of Sasebo and, having passed the Tsushima Strait, entered the Sea of ​​Japan with the task of monitoring the ships of the Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy. Having circled for several days in the Vladivostok region, the Pueblo moved south along the coast of the Korean Peninsula, simultaneously collecting information about radio emission sources on the territory of the DPRK. The situation was alarming: on January 20, when the scout was at a distance of 15 miles from the naval base on about. Mayan-do watchmen found a warship on the horizon. Poor visibility made it difficult to accurately establish its nationality - the object, which turned out to be a small anti-submarine ship of the DPRK Navy, disappeared without a trace in the evening twilight.

On January 22, two North Korean trawlers appeared near the Pueblo, accompanying the American throughout the day. On the same day, a group of North Korean special forces attempted to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee, but died in a shootout with police.

Bad signs were ignored: "Pueblo" calmly continued its journey along the coast of the DPRK.

On January 23, 1968, X hour struck - at 11:40, a small anti-submarine ship SC-35 of the DPRK Navy approached the Pueblo. With the help of a flag semaphore, the Koreans demanded to indicate the nationality of the ship. The Americans immediately raised the Stars and Stripes from the mast of the Pueblo. This was supposed to cool hot heads and exclude any provocation from the enemy.

Soviet-made small anti-submarine ship

However, from the SC-35 board, an order immediately followed to stop the move, otherwise the Koreans threatened to open fire. The Yankees were playing for time. At this time, three more torpedo boats appeared next to the Pueblo. The situation was taking a dangerous turn. The US flag somehow did not particularly cool the Korean ardor.

The commander of the Pueblo, Lloyd Bucher, checked the map again and checked the navigation radar with his own hand - that's right, the Pueblo is 15 miles from the coast, outside the territorial waters of the DPRK. However, the Koreans did not think to lag behind - the air was filled with the roar of jet fighters. The air force and navy of North Korea were surrounded on all sides by a lone American intelligence officer.

Now Commander Bucher understood what the enemy was up to - to encircle the unarmed Pueblo and force it to follow to one of the North Korean ports. As they left Sasebo, he attended a conference with officers from the crew of the reconnaissance ship Banner. Colleagues confirmed that the Soviet and Chinese navies regularly use this tactic in an attempt to lure American spy ships into a trap. However, unlike the Soviet Navy, the North Korean fleet acted more boldly and decisively. After 2 hours of fruitless pursuit, the first shell flew into the Pueblo superstructure, tearing off the leg of one of the American sailors. Next, the reconnaissance hull rumbled with machine-gun shots.

The Yankees screamed about the attack on all frequencies and rushed to destroy the secret equipment.

Dozens of tons of radio electronics and encryption machines, mountains of secret documentation, reports, orders, magnetic tapes with records of negotiations between the North Korean and Soviet military - too much work for three fire axes and two electric paper shredders. Details, documents and magnetic tapes should be dumped into bags for subsequent dumping overboard - having given the necessary orders, Bucher rushed headlong into the radio room. How does the command of the 7th Fleet promise to help him?

The signal about the attack on the US Navy ship was received by the ships of the aircraft carrier strike group, which was located 500 miles south of the Pueblo. The commander of Task Force 71, Rear Admiral Epes, ordered the Phantoms on duty to be immediately put into the air and to destroy to hell all North Korean tin cans trying to get close to the American reconnaissance ship. To which the commander of the supercarrier Enterprise only shrugged his shoulders - he is unlikely to be able to help in this situation. The Enterprise's air wing has not yet recovered from a long transoceanic transition, half of the aircraft have been damaged by a severe typhoon, and the four combat-ready Phantoms on deck carry no weapons other than air-to-air missiles. It will take his guys at least an hour and a half to change weapons and form a full-fledged strike group - but, alas, by then it will probably be too late ...

The destroyers USS Higbee, USS Collet and USS O'Bannon, stationed in Japanese ports, were too far away to provide any assistance to the attacked scout. The promised F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bombers also did not arrive ...

At this time, the Koreans continued to methodically shoot the bridge and the superstructure of the Pueblo with 57 mm guns, hoping to kill the commander and senior officers of the ship. The "headless" ship must quickly raise the "white flag" and accept the conditions of the Korean sailors.

Finally, Commander Butcher realized that help would not come to them, and the Koreans would shoot them all if the Yankees did not fulfill their conditions. The Pueblo stalled and prepared to take on board the capture team. The Yankees did not even try to take the fight - the Brownings on the upper deck remained uncovered. Later, the commander justified himself that only one person from the crew of the Pueblo knew how to handle these weapons.

From the approaching torpedo boat, 8 Korean sailors landed on the deck of the Pueblo, none of whom spoke English. Commander Butcher tried to explain that he was in charge of the ship. The Korean officer signaled the crew to line up along the side and fired a burst from the Kalashnikov over their heads, obviously showing the frightened Yankees that he was now in charge here. And he does not intend to joke with them.

Having descended with the Koreans into the working quarters of radio technicians and cipher makers, Commander Bucher was dumbfounded: the entire deck was littered with bags of documents, details of secret equipment and fragments of magnetic years. They were collected in bags, but no one bothered to throw them overboard! No less surprise awaited them in the radio room: according to Bucher himself, the narrow eyes of the Koreans widened at the sight of how teletypes continue to knock out secret radio messages - the Yankees not only did not destroy the equipment, but did not even try to turn it off!

Consequences

The captured Pueblo was escorted to Wonsan. In total, in a skirmish with the DPRK Navy, the reconnaissance crew lost one person killed, the remaining 82 sailors were captured. 10 Americans had injuries of varying severity.

The next day, at the Panmunjeong checkpoint of the Korean militarized zone, negotiations began between representatives of the United States and the DPRK. Rear Admiral John Victor Smith read out an American appeal: the Yankees demanded the immediate release of the hostages, the return of the confiscated hydrographic vessel, and an apology. It was emphasized that the seizure took place at a distance of 15.6 miles from the coast of the Korean Peninsula, outside the territorial waters of the DPRK (according to international rules - 12 miles from the coast).

North Korean General Pak Chung Guk simply laughed in the face of the Americans and said that the border of territorial waters runs where Comrade Kim points out. At the moment, this distance is 50 miles from the coast of North Korea. He, on behalf of his country, expresses a resolute protest against the rude aggressive invasion of the DPRK’s terrorist waters by an armed ship with spy equipment on board, and any talk about the release of the Pueblo crew members can only be carried out after an official apology from the United States.

The negotiations stalled.

On January 28, using the A-12 high-altitude supersonic reconnaissance aircraft (the predecessor of the SR-71), reliable confirmation was received that the Pueblo had been captured by the armed forces of North Korea. The pictures clearly showed that the ship was located at the Wonsan naval base, surrounded by ships of the DPRK Navy.

i> "Pueblo" from a height of 20 km

At the same time, a letter of gratitude from Commander Bucher arrived from North Korea, in which he confessed to espionage and other sins. The text was composed in accordance with the Juche ideology and could not have been written by an American. But the signature was real. As it became known later, the Koreans beat the Pueblo commander, and when this did not help, they threatened that he would witness the execution of the entire crew, and then die himself. Knowing who he was dealing with, Bucher prudently signed the confession.

At home, sailors were greeted as real heroes. However, already in January 1969, a trial was opened - 200 hours of meetings, 140 witnesses. Pentagon officials were outraged that for the first time in 160 years an American ship had been handed over to the enemy. With a full set of secret equipment!

Why did the commander, under the threat of capturing the Pueblo, not dare to sink his ship? Or at least destroy the most valuable equipment? Cryptocurrency machines have fallen into the hands of the North Koreans - a direct threat to US national security, plus everything, the captured ship will most likely be put up somewhere in a conspicuous place, which will damage America's image.

Lloyd Bucher justified himself by the fact that a couple of months before the campaign he turned to the command of the fleet with a request to install explosive devices - to quickly undermine and destroy secret equipment. However, his request remained unsatisfied.

Finally, why didn't the great and invincible American air force come to the aid of the Pueblo? Where was the Enterprise supercarrier clicking its beak at that time?

During the process, all new facts of the mess in the US Navy were revealed. Finally, the Yankees decided to stop the tragicomedy and begin to constructively address the identified problems. By decision of the commander of the Navy, John Chaffee, the case was closed. Commander Bucher was fully justified.

The main mistake in the Pueblo incident was the wrong calculation of the adequacy of the DPRK. The Yankees were sure that they were acting against an ally of the USSR, which meant that there was no one to fear: Soviet sailors always observed the norms of international maritime law and would never touch an American ship outside the 12-mile zone of territorial waters. Even in the open ocean, Soviet reconnaissance (communication ships - SSV) and their American "colleagues" (GER / AGER) - the same miserable unarmed "pelvis", boldly approached the squadrons of the "probable enemy", rightly believing that their security was ensured by military and the political power of their countries, interpreted as a flag flying over them.

American fears about the seizure of secret equipment were not in vain: Soviet specialists immediately dismantled and removed to the USSR a number of secret equipment, incl. cipher machines class KW-7. Using this equipment, coupled with tables, codes, and descriptions of cryptographic schemes obtained by the KGB with the help of warrant officer Johnny Walker, Soviet cryptographers were able to decipher about a million intercepted US Navy messages.

The Capture of the USS Pueblo and Its Effect on SIGINT Operations, Declassified and release by NSA on 12-20-2006
Author Oleg Kaptsov

hufden>> Another successful launch
TT> Why should they? They already have ICBMs that allow them to hit a potential enemy, why waste resources on the naval component of strategic nuclear forces? It is prudent to spend these expenses on something else more important. With aviation, the Kndrovites suck, so they would correct the situation.

ICBMs of the DPRK can be intercepted by US / ROK ground or sea missile defense systems on takeoff. What is the territory then ..

The Sinp'o diesel-electric submarine has an underwater displacement of 1650 tons, a length of 68 m, a width of 6.5 m. The surface speed of the submarine is 16 knots, underwater speed is about 10 knots. Its cruising range is 1500 miles (2800 km), autonomy is approximately 30 days. The armament of the boat includes one launcher in the fencing of retractable devices and in the hull under it for the KN-11 SLBM, as well as 2-4 bow torpedo tubes. This is enough to get close to Guam or the Hawaiian Islands and strike at them.
But, of course, Sinp'o is not a combat boat, but an experimental one, designed to test the KN-11 SLBM. In North Korea, according to foreign sources, the construction of six diesel-electric submarines based on Sinp'o is underway. Obviously, each of them will have two or three launchers for SLBMs. A covered boathouse is being built at the Sinpo Naval Base to assemble the submarines. Two reinforced concrete shelters for missile submarines are also being built there. All these activities require time and a lot of money. Therefore, talking about the adoption of the KN-11-Sinp'o complex in just a year is hardly justified. But in two or three years, he can take up combat duty.

Of particular concern to Seoul is the possibility of the DPRK using ballistic missile submarines to bypass the anti-missile "fence" that the US and South Korea intend to build between the two parts of the country by the end of 2017. "The THAAD missile defense system will have a hard time intercepting submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as they could be fired from anywhere near South Korea," the South Korean Yonhap News agency points out in this regard. Indeed, this task is much more complicated.

And yet, it seems to us, the main goal of Kim Jong-un is not South Korea or Japan. For him, the number one enemy is the United States of America. “In response to the hostile US policy that threatens our sovereignty and right to life,” the DPRK said in a statement, “we will take multi-stage measures to strengthen our nuclear offensive forces.” And if North Korean submarines can break into the Pacific Ocean, they will sneak up on US shores. And then, keeping America at gunpoint, Marshal Kim will be able to talk to Washington on an equal footing.

As of 2008, the strength of the DPRK Navy was 46,000 people, in 2012, 60,000. The service life on conscription is 5-10 years.

The headquarters of the Navy is located in Pyongyang. Most of the Navy is made up of Coast Guard forces. The Navy is capable of carrying out border protection operations in the coastal zone, offensive and defensive operations, mining and conventional raid operations. At the same time, due to the imbalance in the composition of the fleet, it has limited capabilities to control sea spaces, deterrence actions or fight against submarines. Over 60% of North Korean warships are stationed at forward bases.

The main task of the Navy is to support the combat operations of the ground forces against the army of South Korea. The Navy is capable of conducting rocket and artillery shelling of coastal targets.

North Korea is building its own small and medium-sized submarines, mainly at the Nampo and Wonsan shipyards.

The command of the Navy has two fleets under its control, Eastern and Western, consisting of 16 combat groups. Due to the geographical position, there is no exchange of ships between the fleets.

The Western Fleet, consisting of 6 squadrons of about 300 ships, operates in the Yellow Sea. The headquarters of the fleet is located in Nampo, the main base ports are Pipha-got and Sagot, smaller bases are Cho-do and Tasa-ni. The fleet includes a landing craft brigade, two water area guard brigades, four missile boat divisions, four submarine divisions, and a separate water area guard division.

The Eastern Fleet, consisting of 10 squadrons of approximately 470 ships, operates in the Sea of ​​Japan. The headquarters of the fleet is located in Taeydong, the main base ports are Najin and Wonsan, smaller bases are Chaho, Chongjin, Myang Do and Puam-ni. The fleet includes two brigades of landing craft, two brigades of protection of the water area, a brigade of boats, a division of URO frigates, three divisions of missile boats, a separate division of torpedo boats, three divisions of submarines, a separate division of ultra-small submarines (sabotage and reconnaissance forces).

The submarine fleet is decentralized. Submarines are based in Chaho, Mayangdo and Piphagota.

Najin-class frigate of the DPRK Navy

The fleet includes 3 URO frigates (2 Najin, 1 Soho), 2 destroyers, 18 small anti-submarine ships, 4 Soviet submarines of project 613, 23 Chinese and domestic submarines of project 033 (project 633), 29 small submarines boats of the Sang-O project, more than 20 midget submarines, 34 missile boats (10 project 205 Osa, 4 class Huangfen, 10 Sozhu, 12 project 183 Komar; the boats are armed with anti-ship missiles P- 15 Termit or Chinese CSS-N-1 SCRUBBRUSH), 150 torpedo boats (about half of domestic construction), fire support boats (including 62 CHAHO class), 56 large (6 Hainan, 12 Taejong, 13 "Shanghai-2", 6 "Chongju", 19 "SO-1") and more than 100 small patrol boats, 10 small landing ships "Hante" (capable of carrying 3-4 light tanks), up to 120 landing craft (in including about 100 "Nampos", created on the basis of the Soviet P-6 torpedo boat, with a speed of up to 40 knots and a range of up to 335 km and capable of carrying up to 30 number of equipped paratroopers), up to 130 hovercraft, 24 Yukto-1/2 minesweepers, 8 floating bases of ultra-small submarines, a submarine rescue ship, 4 hydrographic vessels, minelayers.

Patrol ship of the Navy of the DPRK

The use of high-speed missile and torpedo boats makes it possible to carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships. Submarines can be used to block sea communications, lay minefields and land special operations troops. Approximately 60% of the ships are based near the demilitarized zone.

The Navy has two sniper brigades on amphibious ships.

The coastal troops include two regiments (thirteen divisions of anti-ship missiles) and sixteen separate artillery divisions of coastal artillery. Coastal batteries are armed with surface-to-sea missiles S-2 Sopka, CSSC-2 SILKWORM (a Chinese copy of the Soviet P-15M), and CSSC-3 SEERSUCKER with a range of up to 95 km, as well as coastal artillery installations of the caliber 122/130/152 mm.

The DPRK fleet has rich experience in laying minefields. Its fleet has a significant number of surface vessels designed to lay mines against amphibious landings, protect strategic ports and provide ground forces with sea protection. As part of the coastal defense system, minefields are combined with artillery and missile coastal batteries.

Semi-submersible boat DPRK

The Navy of the DPRK uses semi-submersible vessels used by the 137th squadron of the Navy to land special forces soldiers from the sea. Due to their low profile, these vessels are barely visible on radar. The speed on the surface of the water is 45 knots (83 km / h), the speed in a semi-submerged state is 4 knots (7.4 km / h).

In addition to warships, 10 cargo ships are under the direct control of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces.

Rosin Alexander.

Soviet fleet and Navy of North Korea (DPRK).

Creation of the DPRK fleet.

The North Korean Navy was established on June 5, 1946. as the "Marine Security Force" (Maritime Security Force), the headquarters was based in the port of Wonsan and began to operate in July. In December 1946, the naval forces were renamed the "Marine Patrol" (Marine Patrols), the headquarters was transferred to the capital - Pyongyang, for more effective management of naval forces. In June 1947 in Wonsan, the Naval Academy (Marine Patrol Academy) was created to train officers for the fleet. Initially, the naval forces were subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and from August 20, 1949. subordinated to the Department of Homeland Security. After the torpedo boat division was formed on August 29, the patrol force became known as the Naval Forces, and this date was celebrated as Navy Day until it was changed to June 5, 1993.

The USSR assisted the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in creating its national fleet: ships and boats were transferred, and the institution of Soviet naval advisers was introduced. According to Admiral V. M. Grishanov, who in 1947-1950. In 1949-1954 he was deputy chief, and then head of the political department of the 5th Navy, in 1949-1954. The Soviet Union transferred part of the warships and vessels to North Korea (a total of 68 units), including 37 torpedo boats, 9 minesweepers, 8 submarine hunters. Most of them, apparently, were transferred after the armistice of 1953. According to other more reliable data, before 1950 the DPRK fleet was transferred: 1 minesweeper (most likely BTShch pr.53 - T-3 "Explorer" in March 1953), 4 patrol ships (there is evidence that one of them was TFR project 39 - "Zarnitsa" in 1950), 6 transports, 10 torpedo boats (at least five of the G-5 type), 3 small ones (project OD-200) and 1 large hunter. In the naval schools of the USSR and Soviet teachers in the educational institutions of North Korea trained personnel for the new fleet. On March 1, 1950. 612 naval officers and 640 sailors were trained for the Navy. In particular, in Pacific Naval Institute named after S.O. Makarov in Vladivostok North Korean crews of G-5 torpedo boats were trained. Among the Koreans was the future Hero of the DPRK, Kim Gong Ok, who received the title of Hero for the attack on intervention cruisers on July 2, 1950.

All questions of the construction of the Korean fleet were discussed with Kim Il Sung and his assistants. From the Soviet side, the commander of the Soviet operational group, Admiral G. V. Zhukov and V. M. Grishanov, took part in their discussion. According to the memoirs of the latter, "decisions were made quickly, and then actively implemented in practice." In 1948, the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral A. S. Frolov, came to Seishin to discuss the creation of the DPRK navy. He took part in resolving issues related to the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the transfer of a number of Soviet warships under the command of Korean naval officers. Soviet instructors remained in North Korea to assist the North Koreans in mastering Soviet technology.

In the formation of the fleet, the Koreans were assisted by Soviet specialists, headed by the senior naval adviser in the DPRK, Admiral Kapanadze Seyid Avvakumovich. And many command positions in the DPRK Navy were occupied by the so-called Soviet Koreans, these are persons of Korean nationality who were sent from the USSR in the period from August 1945. to January 1949 to build a new state. Here are just some of the Soviet Koreans who were associated with the fleet. The commander-in-chief of the Navy was General Han Il Mu (born in 1905), later the commander-in-chief of the Air Force, the chief of staff of the KPA Navy was Major General Kim Won Mu (1910), the head of the operations department of the headquarters of the Navy was Pak Ding (1920), the head of the naval base in Nampo was Colonel Kim Woo-hyun (1917), the commander of the 25th Coast Guard Brigade was Major General Oh Gi Chen (1904), the head of the Naval School was Kim Gwang Bin (1912) and Major General Lee Se Ho (1920), a teacher Naval Academy was Captain 1st Rank Hwang Geum Cher (1924). A recognized authority in the Navy was the Hero of the DPRK, Rear Admiral Kim Chir Sung. At the end of the Korean War, part of the Soviet Koreans who remained in the DPRK were ousted from leadership positions, many of them were repressed. Only a few remained in power and were forced to faithfully serve the regime of Kim Il Sung. The overwhelming majority returned to the USSR.

By the beginning of the Korean War, the DPRK Navy (Korean People's Navy - KPN) had (approximate data, since there is no exact data on the composition of the DPRK Navy) in its composition four divisions of ships:

1 division of patrol ships (1-st Patrol boats Squadron) - three sea hunters of the OD-200 type;

2nd division of torpedo boats (2-nd PT boats Squadron) - five boats of the G-5 type (including No. 21, No. 22, No. 23, No. 24), based on Wonsan;

3rd Minesweepers Squadron (3-rd Minesweepers Squadron) - two former American minesweepers of the YMS type and one former Japanese;

Division of ships under construction - 7 ships with a displacement of 250 and 800 tons;

In addition, the fleet included - one floating base, one military transport with a displacement of 2000 tons (former American, transferred from South Korea in 1949), six different boats and schooners (with a displacement of 60-80 tons). The total strength of the navy was 10,297, including 3,680 naval personnel, 5,483 marines, and 1,134 coastal defense personnel. In addition, with the outbreak of hostilities, up to 100 ships with a displacement of 60 to 100 tons were mobilized.

At the first stage, the leadership of the DPRK actively used its small fleet. The main tasks that were carried out by the DPRK fleet during the war in Korea were the landing of tactical assault forces on the coast occupied by the enemy, episodic battles with enemy ships on the high seas, and the laying of minefields. By the beginning of September 1950, the DPRK fleet had lost almost all ships as a result of air strikes and battles at sea, the remaining ships took refuge in Soviet and Chinese ports. In the third and fourth stages of the war, only improvised floating means were used for operations at sea - fishing kungas and schooners. More details about the activities of the Korean fleet and Soviet sailors in the Korean War of 1950-1953 are described in the material " »

Three post-war decades.

After the end of the Korean War, the USSR helped North Korea rebuild its naval forces. In September 1953, and then in March 1954, the staff of military, naval advisers and service personnel in the KPA was revised. According to the new list of posts in 1954, the total staffing of the apparatus of military advisers in the KPA was determined at 164 people, including 12 naval advisers. The preservation of such a staff of advisers was due to the need to solve the following tasks: “to ensure the organized deployment of combat training in the KPA and further strengthening the combat readiness of troops and military equipment; to continue studying and summarizing the experience of the Korean War." Beginning in the 1950s, the USSR provided assistance in the training and education of Korean military personnel, including in its military educational institutions. In general, until 1992, 2,614 DPRK servicemen were trained in the USSR/Russia, including 175 people for the DPRK Navy. In exchange for the sunken ones, minesweepers of Project 53 (Fugasse type) were handed over to the DPRK Navy: in December 1953. - "T-2" "Rope" and T-8 "Cheka". Also in the 1950s, they received a project 39 patrol ship, Molniya, and a number of boats - project 123K torpedo boats, anti-submarine boats - sea hunters of the OD-200 and MO-4 types. These ships were supposed to guard the coast. And soon our sailors got to know them closely.

March 5, 1955 The North Korean government unilaterally adopted a resolution in which, along with establishing the width of territorial waters, a significant part of the East Korean Gulf was declared internal waters of the DPRK. Many countries did not agree with this, which, according to international law, considered them international waters. Due to unresolved issues with world countries and neighbors about the width of the territorial water authorities of the DPRK, they reacted nervously to any, as it seemed to them, violation of their borders. Moreover, the North Korean Navy did not always adhere to the generally accepted rules for the behavior of military ships at sea, as they had orders to use weapons against "foreign ships", acting on the principle of "shoot first, and then figure it out." This is at the end of 1959. led to the fact that they literally shot the Soviet ship.

In December 1959 The reconnaissance ship of the Pacific Fleet "GS-34", which had the status of a hydrographic vessel and the name "Ungo" for cover, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Alexander Borisovich Kozmin, was on a campaign in the Sea of ​​Japan off the east coast of Korea in the East Korean Gulf. RK "GS-34" - "Ungo", a schooner, built in 1954. at the shipyards of the GDR. May 9, 1955 the state flag of the USSR was raised on the schooner and given the name "Ungo". In 1955 the ship, under the command of Captain 3rd Rank Lazarenko Akim Naumovich, crossed to the Pacific Ocean by the northern sea route and became part of the Pacific Fleet Intelligence as a messenger ship. Since 1956 the schooner was assigned to a subclass of messenger ships and received the name "GS-34", and the name "Ungo" was left as a legend. In 1957 was assigned to ships of the 3rd rank of special purpose. In 1958 Senior Lieutenant Alexander Borisovich Kozmin was appointed commander. This time, the ship was carrying out a routine reconnaissance voyage, carrying out reconnaissance security for the return of repatriates from Japan to North Korea. On the evening of December 28, it was stormy, there was little visibility. At 19:00 the weather improved. The commander of the BS-1, Eduard Shchukin, on the orders of the commander of the ship, began to determine the location of the ship more often. It was getting dark quickly, visual surveillance was intensified on the ship, a watch was kept at the posts of radio and electronic intelligence. In order to ensure the secrecy of reconnaissance, the active radar station was not turned off. The ship was in the area of ​​39° 07" N and 128° 35" E. It was 30 miles to the North Korean coast, and even more than 36 miles to the coast of South Koren (the width of the territorial waters of the DPRK is 12 miles, South Korea - 3 miles). Suddenly, rockets appeared on the starboard side of the "GS-34" - "Ungo", and almost at the same moment a fiery trail traced the sky, rushing towards the ship. The commander of the ship, captain-lieutenant Kozmin A.B. was firmly convinced of the place of his ship and that the ship had not violated the territorial waters of a foreign state, and, therefore, this volley could not even be of a warning character. "GS-34", not having weapons on board, was forced to turn 90 ° and begin to move even further from the coast. On the ship, one of the searchlights was turned on and the helmsman-signalman sailor Grigory Kopanev, using the international code of signals, began to continuously give a signal towards the coast: “What caused the shelling?” Several agonizing tense minutes passed, when suddenly our sailors saw the silhouettes of three ships without navigation lights or any other identification marks. The ships were rapidly approaching the GS-34. One of them went straight to the ship and in a few minutes was identified as a small anti-submarine ship - a "big hunter". The commander of the "GS-34" ordered to send one of the searchlights to the hydrographic flag of the USSR, flying over the reconnaissance ship (the RK Pacific Fleet sailed under this flag from August 3, 1959), and the second searchlight, on which Alexander Shesternin was on duty, to illuminate the foreign ship approaching it . At 20.40 on December 28, the "big hunter" approached the "GS-34" at a distance of 45-50 cables and, without any warning, fired four bursts of 40-mm automatic installations at the unarmed "GS-34". The distance between the ships at that moment was so small that it was impossible not to see the hydrographic flag of the USSR on the GS-34. After that, the boat turned away and went into the darkness. As a result of the fire, the compass was broken, the radio antenna was damaged, the boat was damaged, the pipe and the ship's hull were damaged, the life raft was broken, one of the shells hit the bow cockpit. "GS-34" slowed down and drifted, the boat again approached the ship and opened fire. Shells exploded on the deck, one shell hit the wheelhouse, the ship's commander was thrown back by an explosive wave, and the ship's assistant captain-lieutenant Alexander Pavlovich Novomodny (secretary of the party organization, classmate of the commander at Makarov TOVVMU) and the helmsman-signalman Yuri Fedorov, who was picking up flags for a signal demanding an end to the shelling, they were wounded at the same time. The shells continued to hit the ship. At the time of the explosion of the projectile in the wheelhouse, the helmsman-signalman, sailor Alexander Sergeevich Kazhaev, who was on duty at the helm, managed to rush in the direction where the commander of the ship was, and shielded him with his body. At the same time, A.S. Kazhaev was killed on the spot, having received a direct hit in the stomach by a projectile. Signalman Viktor Kazantsev and helmsman Anatoly Belkin were seriously injured, but neither one nor the other left their posts, continuing to follow the orders of the ship's commander. All this time, the wounded signalman Grigory Kopanev continued to illuminate the flag of his ship, when the "hunter" again came close, our sailors made out his number "205" and the Korean letters. The boat, holding a searchlight beam on the Soviet flag, slowly moved aside and disappeared into the darkness. Gone into the darkness and two other ships, lying in a drift at a distance. During the shelling, the entire crew behaved bravely. The helmsman-signalmen did not leave their posts, the radio operator Yuri Shadrin maintained continuous communication with Vladivostok, and in the engine crew, where at that time it was especially difficult to keep watch, not knowing what was happening above and what threatened the ship, not one of the minders even for a minute did not leave his post. Nikolai Ivanovich Balandin and his subordinates provided the ship with a given course. The ship's boatswain Alexander Sherstinin and many others performed their duties impeccably.

IL-28 planes flew to the area of ​​the incident, on alarm from the naval base Strelok a duty destroyer was sent, which took on board the body of the killed sailor A.S. Kazhaev and wounded sailors to deliver them to the naval hospital. "GS-34" ("Ungo") was taken in tow and delivered to the base. The deceased sailor Kazhaev Alexander Sergeevich was buried at the maritime cemetery in Vladivostok.

A note of protest was sent by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the government of South Korea regarding this incident. TASS stated that from now on, with such actions of the court, "pirates" will be destroyed. The South Korean authorities declared that they were not involved in the incident and were ready to provide film documents that recorded the attack of North Korean boats on a Soviet ship. Later, according to updated data, it was established that the pirate ship was the North Korean small anti-submarine ship "No. 205" of the "BO-1" type, received from the USSR in the early 50s. In the Soviet press, the participation of the DPRK ships in the incident was not written anywhere. In addition to that published in the newspapers on December 31, 1959. there were several publications of protest notes about this incident, December 31, 1959. in the newspaper "Soviet Fleet" and in the magazine "Soviet Seaman" No. 2 for January 1959, but there all the blame was placed on South Korea. In the future, the repaired ship "GS-34" for another 13 years until 1972. did military service. The commander of the ship Kozmin Alexander Borisovich in 1960. received under his command the reconnaissance ship "Izmeritel", then from 1971. - "Transbaikalia". He served as a senior officer in the intelligence department of the Pacific Fleet and in 1982. graduated from the service with the rank of captain 1st rank as deputy head of the school of midshipmen-technicians of the Navy in Kyiv. Lived in Kyiv and died in 2001.

The incident did not affect our relationship. In the 1950s, the leadership of the DPRK and personally Kim Il Sung pursued a foreign policy oriented towards an alliance with the USSR, the PRC and other socialist countries. However, as the nationalist wing in the North Korean leadership gained strength, especially after the elimination of the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions, the Juche ideology and the so-called independence in foreign policy were established, the DPRK moved further and further away from the USSR, although officially the leaders of North Korea, and before In all, Kim Il Sung himself, in conversations with Soviet officials, emphasized the "inviolability" of the policy of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. At that time, the grouping of Kim Il Sung was not yet going to "completely" withdraw from the USSR. Moreover, she persistently sought to conclude an alliance treaty with the Soviet Union. In 1960 between the USSR and the DPRK signed an agreement on trade and navigation. Pyongyang played a complicated game around the treaty. He, as it turned out later, planned to sign almost simultaneously the same document with Beijing. But then in Moscow they were not informed about this. Despite all the ups and downs around the treaty, Kim Il Sung went to Moscow to conclude an alliance treaty, which was signed on July 6, 1961. The obligations assumed by the Soviet Union in the military field in accordance with the treaty, as subsequent events showed, were used by Kim Il Sung in his attempts to overthrow the South Korean regime.

In 1962 6 missile boats of projects 183E were transferred from the USSR, in addition, deliveries of TKA pr. China). In 1963. The Pacific Fleet, after training the North Korean crews, handed over to the North Korean sailors two diesel submarines of Project 613 S-75 and S-90. Previously, these boats were brought to the DPRK, so the "S-90" under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Sukhachov B., in the fall of 1962. made the transition to the North Korean port. And already March 25, 1963. expelled from the USSR Navy in connection with the sale to a foreign customer.

The refusal of N.S. Khrushchev to visit the DPRK (it was assumed that the head of the Soviet government would pay a visit to Pyongyang and sign the Union Treaty). The repeatedly postponed trip of N. S. Khrushchev caused offense, and then indignation of Kim Il Sung. After the removal of N. S. Khrushchev in 1964 from all posts, in conversations with Soviet leaders, Kim Il Sung condemned the behavior of the former leader of the CPSU. A sharp reaction from the North Korean leader was also caused by N. S. Khrushchev's refusal to supply Soviet weapons and military equipment to the DPRK free of charge. The Minister of Defense of the DPRK, Kim Chang-bong, held talks on this issue in Moscow in December 1962. However, when proposals were presented to the North Korean side for the purchase of Soviet weapons, the Korean military delegation broke off negotiations and flew to Pyongyang. Kim Il Sung urgently convened a Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of China, at which the course for parallel economic and defense construction was approved. Since that time, the Juche doctrine has been supplemented by the thesis of "self-defense in defense of the country." At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Labor Party, N. S. Khrushchev personally and the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union were subjected to harsh criticism. There were even voices demanding to break off diplomatic relations with the USSR.

After N. S. Khrushchev left the political arena, Soviet-North Korean relations normalized. In 1965, a Soviet delegation headed by A. N. Kosygin visited Pyongyang. A number of economic and military agreements are signed between the USSR and the DPRK. Moscow provides Pyongyang with assistance in strengthening the defense capability of the DPRK. In 1966, two secret meetings took place between Leonid Brezhnev and Kim Il Sung. An intergovernmental commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation is being created. The USSR undertakes to build large economic facilities in the DPRK and provides loans for this purpose. Later, the leadership of the DPRK, having established itself in the "inviolability of its independent" foreign policy, repeatedly raised the question of annulling the union treaty before the USSR. However, these visits by Kim Il Sung were rejected by Moscow. The Soviet Union viewed the 1961 Treaty as the most important means of maintaining peace and stability on and around the Korean Peninsula.

But you had to pay for it. By this time, with the help of the Soviet Union to protect the coast, North Korea had created a small coastal fleet, the main tasks of which were to patrol and cover the coast. In 1966 from the Pacific Fleet, the Koreans were given 2 more submarines of project 613 - S-325 and S-326. They were on July 26, 1966. excluded from the USSR Navy in connection with the sale of the DPRK Navy. In addition, in 1968. 12 large missile boats of project 205, 4 large torpedo boats of project 206 were transferred. ships of the "Sariwon" type (Sariwon), built in the DPRK in 1966-1967.

More than once the situation on the Korean Peninsula was on the brink of war - the crisis of 1968 with the capture of the American ship "Pueblo", the aggravation of the situation in 1969. after North Korea shot down an American spy plane. More on this in the post " ". In 1968 the incident with the American ship forced Pyongyang to officially confirm the 12-mile breadth of territorial waters. But the North Korean authorities were not satisfied with this. In an interview with journalists from Peru on June 2, 1974, Kim Il Sung spoke in favor of expanding their territorial waters by developing countries to 200 miles. On July 1, 1977, the DPRK established a 200-mile maritime economic zone, and from August 1, 1977, a coastal military protection zone.

Relations between our countries developed, in 1969. Soviet merchant ships made 159 calls at the ports of the DPRK - Nampo, Sonnim, Hyungnam, Chongzhin.

But in the 1970s, North Korea oriented its policy towards China, with which, however, it quarreled. But during the cooperation, she acquired a lot for herself, especially in the construction of her fleet. In the first half of the 70s in China, at the Wuhan Shipyard for the DPRK, 7 Romeo-class submarines were built (project 031, the Chinese version of the Soviet project 633). Transferred 2 in 1973, 2 in 1974. and 3 in 1975. Since 1975 boats of this project, with the assistance of China, began to be built in the DPRK at the Sinpo u Mayang-do shipyard, in the period from 1976. to 1995 16 submarines of this type were built. One submarine sank on February 20, 1985. 6 Chinese IPC project 037 Hainan ("Hainan", an analogue of the Soviet project 201M) were supplied to the DPRK in 1975. - 2, 1976 - 2, 1978 - 2. In addition, the Chinese handed over 8 artillery boats of the Shantou type (Shantou), 12 patrol boats of the Shanghai II type (Shanghai II). In the 1970s, the DPRK launched the construction of warships, frigates and submarines, landing craft and various boats at its shipyards according to Chinese and Soviet designs revised by the Chinese.

In the eighties, the DPRK tried to establish itself as the leader of the "third world" countries, but also without much success. During this period, cooperation with the USSR continued, although not in the same forms as before. At this time, the Soviet Union handed over to the DPRK a number of ships: in 1972, 2 RCA pr. 4 TKA pr.123K, in the 70s 2 sea tugs pr.733 (used as border guard ships), in January 1979. 2 TKA project 123K, in 1983 2 RCA project 205.

A new round of naval cooperation.

Having tried himself as a "non-alternative leader" of the "third world" countries and the non-aligned movement, Kim Il Sung and his entourage came to the realization that they needed to "rebuild" again. After all, you have to pay for leadership. Juche propaganda, all kinds of conferences, lectures and symposiums in the countries of the "third world", circles for the study of "Kimirsenism" demanded money, and a lot of it. Only the Soviet Union could give them. Of course, Moscow did not allocate funds for the exaltation of the North Korean "leader". It provided interest-free loans for the development of the DPRK economy, for the construction of industrial facilities, metallurgical plants, and for equipping the North Korean army with modern weapons.

For two years 1979-1980. North Korea allowed Soviet merchant ships and tankers to use the year-round ice-free port of Najin and from there to transport oil and other cargo by rail to Vladivostok, whose harbor was ice-covered in those years during the winter. Senior South Korean officials point out that such actions were unthinkable a few years ago and although they are symbolic, they inspire concern.

Further, the North Korean leaders went for a closer rapprochement. Taking advantage of the change of power in the USSR (L. I. Brezhnev died) and the arrival of K. U. Chernenko to the leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet state, Kim Il Sung decided to start a “next stage of friendship” with the USSR. The creation of a "favorable atmosphere" in bilateral relations is beginning. Positive assessments of some Soviet peace initiatives appear in North Korean publications. The DPRK media write about the achievements of the "great Soviet people" in the construction of socialism. Against this background, in May 1984, Kim Il Sung made a visit to Moscow. On May 23-25, negotiations were held with the leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government. The parties stated "successes in important areas of socialist construction." At the same time, KU Chernenko pointed to the additional opportunities that exist in bilateral cooperation. This is not only the economic sphere, but also more "important areas - the exchange of experience in party and state work, interaction in international politics." After a visit to the USSR, Soviet-North Korean relations and cooperation again "went uphill." In December 1985, the Prime Minister of the Administrative Council of the DPRK (head of government) Kang Sen San (the leader's maternal nephew) arrived in Moscow. In development of the agreements that were reached at the talks between Kim Il Sung and the Soviet leaders, Kang Sen San and N. A. Tikhonov signed a number of important agreements: on economic and scientific and technical cooperation, on the construction of a nuclear power plant in the DPRK, as well as a protocol on the results negotiations on the development of trade and economic cooperation for 1986-1990. The USSR provided loans for new industrial facilities. Especially important for the North Koreans was the agreement on nuclear power plants. Pyongyang has long sought assistance from the USSR in the construction of a nuclear power plant. The Soviet side for a long time refused to build a nuclear power plant. The main reason is that the DPRK was not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In December 1985, North Korea acceded to the NPT. This opened up an opportunity for expanding cooperation in the field of peaceful atom (construction of nuclear power plants). Contacts between the foreign ministries have also expanded noticeably. In January 1986, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, E. A. Shevardnadze, paid his first visit to Pyongyang (before that, not a single head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry had visited North Korea). The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the DPRK established regular contacts. Kim Yong Nam was in Moscow three times in the 1980s, E. A. Shevardnadze also visited Pyongyang three times.

Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow intensified bilateral military cooperation. The USSR carried out deliveries of military equipment and military equipment to the DPRK. Thanks to this, in the early 80s, the military aviation of the DPRK embarked on a new stage of modernization: in addition to the previously available 150 MiG-21s, a batch of 60 MiG-23P interceptor fighters and MiG-23ML front-line fighters was received from the USSR, and from China - 150 Q-5 Phanlan attack aircraft. Army aviation, which had only the bottom of a dozen Mi-4 helicopters, received 10 Mi-2s and 50 Mi-24s. In May-June 1988, the first six MiG-29s arrived in the DPRK, and by the end of the year, the transfer of the entire batch of 30 aircraft of this type and another 20 Su-25K attack aircraft was completed.

In 1985 after the visit of a government delegation to Pyongyang, cooperation in the naval field has intensified between our countries. February 20, 1985 sank in the Sea of ​​​​Japan submarine type "Romeo" Project 633, sunk by a fishing seiner. The rescue operation was led by the Deputy Commander of the KVF for military equipment, Rear Admiral A.N. Lutsky. February 20 to 25, 1985 MTShch "Zapal" (Captain - Lieutenant Goncharov A.N.), together with MTShch "Paravan" as part of the KTG of the Primorsky Flotilla, took part in the search for a sunken submarine of the North Korean Navy in the territorial waters of the DPRK. The sunken submarine was discovered on the very first day of the search and covered.

August 13-18, 1985 in Wonsan (DPRK) on an official visit to participate in the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Korea came a detachment under the command of the First Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral N.Ya. . Immediately after anchoring the ships, the commander of the detachment, Vice Admiral Yasakov, with a group of officers went ashore to pay visits to officials. They were greeted with a storm of applause by thousands of workers in the city of Wonsan. banners with the words “Peace”, “Friendship”, “Welcome!” in Russian and Korean, friendly smiles, flowers, handshakes accompanied them all the way. It was a meeting of kind, good friends. Our sailors represented only a part of the Soviet people who arrived at the anniversary celebrations. The envoys of the Land of Soviets - a party-state delegation headed by a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G. Aliyev, members of other delegations of workers - representatives of our republics, territories and regions, veterans of the battles for the liberation of Korea - were warmly and cordially welcomed in Pyongyang. On this day, all the participants of the visit in a solemn atmosphere on the decks of the ships were awarded commemorative medals "40 years of the liberation of Korea." At the BOD "Tallinn" they were handed over by the commander of the DPRK Navy, Senior Vice Admiral Kim Il Cher. Residents of the province, Korean sailors showed great interest in Soviet ships. They eagerly inspected modern weapons, equipment, got acquainted with the living conditions and life of the crews. The welcome guests on the ship were representatives of the Korean-Soviet Friendship Society and its chairman, Comrade Kin Ken Ho. Members of the Society conduct active explanatory work, promote the ideals of socialism, acquaint the working people of the province with the achievements of the Soviet Union. An entry remained in the book of honorary visitors to the ship: “The Korean-Soviet Friendship Society, having visited Tallinn, felt even more warmth and friendship, solidarity between our peoples and fleets. May they be eternal and indestructible." Korean friends emphasized the idea that the visit of Soviet ships played a significant role in the further development and deepening of friendly good neighborly relations. They reminded us of the words of Comrade Kim Il Sung, head of state, during his visit to the USSR in May last year: “Korea and the Soviet Union are friendly neighbors who are connected by the same river. The peoples of Korea and the Soviet Union are brothers in class, and close combat comrades-in-arms who fought together for a long time in the name of common ideals and ideas.

July 4-8, 1986 in Wonsan (DPRK), a detachment under the command of the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral V.V. Sidorov, consisting of the TAKR "Minsk", the BOD "Admiral Spiridonov" and the TFR "Ryany" and the tanker "Argun" came on an official visit. The visit took place within the framework of the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the DPRK. When the ships of the Pacific Fleet were stationed in Wonsan, Korean officers were actively interested in Russian technology, documentation, charters, and instructions. In the future, they used their knowledge during joint military exercises. Among them were many sailors who knew Russian.

A few weeks later on July 25-29, 1986. The first visit of the ships of the DPRK Navy to the USSR in the history of the two states also took place. Under the flag of the commander of the DPRK Navy, Admiral Kim Il Chol, a patrol ship and two patrol boats entered Vladivostok. The commander of the North Korean fleet, in addition to the leadership of the Pacific Fleet, and the leaders of Primorye, met with the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy, Admiral V. Chernavin. A group of Soviet officers and admirals were presented with state awards of the DPRK. Korean sailors took part in the celebration of the Day of the USSR Navy. These days the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was in Vladivostok. On July 28, he delivered a speech at the Gorky Theater in which he outlined the new principles of foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region. The ceremonial meeting was attended by the Charge d'Affaires of the DPRK in the USSR Li Du Rel, Admiral Kim Il Chol.

From 15 to 17 October 1986 the first joint Soviet-Korean exercises of the forces of the KTOF and the Eastern Fleet of the KPA Navy were held on the topic "The defeat of the landing detachment at the sea crossing" under the general supervision of the commander of the KTOF, Admiral V.V. Sidorov. The exercises from the USSR involved BOD "Tashkent" (KU), "Vasily Chapaev", five missile boats "Molniya", three support vessels and 12 missile carriers. The Soviet grouping was based on the port of Najin.

The second joint exercise of the Pacific Fleet and the Naval Fleet of the KPA Navy on the topic "Deployment of submarines in conditions of mine and anti-submarine danger and inflicting joint strikes on enemy ship groups" took place from October 13 to 16, 1987. This exercise was already led by Vice Admiral Kwon San Ho, Commander of the KPA Naval Forces, and Rear Admiral B.F. Prikhodko was the Deputy Head of the Pacific Fleet. The Pacific Fleet took part in the exercise: SSGN pr. 675MK "K-23", BOD "Tallinn" (KU), TFR pr. 1135 "Proud", "Zealous", MTSchpr. 266M "Anchor", "Tral", one support vessel, 10 fleet aircraft; from the VF KPA: 4 DPL pr. 613 and 633; 3 MPK, 4 RKA pr. 183, 6 TKA, 3 boat TSC, patrol boat and 21 aircraft. During the exercise and at its conclusion, the BOD "Tallinn" and a number of other ships visited the port of Najin.

May 12-16, 1988 a detachment of ships under the flag of the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral G.A. Khvatov, came to Wonsance on an official visit as part of the Novorossiysk aircraft carrier, the Admiral Zakharov BOD and the Combat EM. The visit was carried out in accordance with the plan for military-technical cooperation and exchange of visits between the ships of the Navy of the USSR and the DPRK. Head of the marching headquarters - commander of the 10th Opesk of the Pacific Fleet Vice Admiral R.L. Dymov, deputy commander of the detachment for political affairs - first deputy head of the political department of the Pacific Fleet captain 1st rank E.M. Chukhraev, flag navigator of the Pacific Fleet captain 1st rank V.M. Popov, flag communications officer - Captain 1st rank V.I.Shorin, deputy commander of the EMC detachment - deputy commander of the 10th operational squad for EMC Captain 1st rank E.V. M. Levtsov, head of the KGB Department of the Pacific Fleet Rear Admiral N.V. Egorkin. On the pier, the ships of the detachment were met by: Commander of the Navy of the DPRK Kim Il Chol, Commander of the Eastern Fleet Vice Admiral Kwon San Ho, the leadership of the province of Gangwon-do, the city of Wonsan and about 20 thousand inhabitants, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR to the DPRK G. G. Bartoshevich. The official delegation of the detachment of ships was received in Pyongyang by Kim Il Sung. They were struck by the grandiosity of sports facilities in Pyongyang, the powerful West Sea hydro complex, and an excellent hotel by world standards. One day the members of the delegation were up at four o'clock in the morning. Each of them was waiting for a personal car. An hour later, the cortege stopped, everyone was offered tea, coffee, and a light breakfast. We hit the road again after changing cars and drivers. The same procedure was repeated at the next stop: tea, coffee, change cars and drivers. A winding mountain road led to a beautiful residence. Kim Il Sung came down the steps to meet the arrivals. He shook hands with everyone. The sailors brought gifts: peakless caps, vests, models of ships. Kim Il Sung viewed everything with great interest. He offered to take a picture with everyone against the backdrop of a panel that depicted the picturesque nature of North Korea. All the gifts of our sailors are carefully stored in the treasury of world culture in the Myohyangsan Mountains. And every day, thousands of visitors to the International Gift Exhibition in the DPRK can view them.

The second time Vladivostok received military sailors from the DPRK from July 29 to August 2, 1988. The detachment came under the flag of the commander of the DPRK Navy, Admiral Kim Il Chera, consisting of a destroyer (probably meaning a frigate), two patrol ships and an auxiliary vessel. Korean sailors visited the enterprises of the city, and the leadership of the detachment met with the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral G.A. Khvatov.

From October 25 to October 29, 1988, warships as part of the Tallinn BOD, Proud, Zealous TFR and R-76, R-83, R-229, R-230 missile boats took participation in the third joint exercise with the forces of the Eastern Fleet of North Korea under the leadership of the commander of the DPRK Navy, Admiral Kim Il Chol. During the exercise, the ships visited the port of Najin.

In September 1989, the fourth joint exercise of the forces of the Pacific Fleet and the Naval Forces of the KPA of the DPRK was held on the topic "Conducting joint military operations to defeat enemy ship groups while protecting sea lanes." From the Pacific Fleet were involved in the exercise: BOD "Tallinn", EM pr. 956 "Cautious" and "Resistant", TFR pr. 261", 7 aircraft; from the VF KNA: 3 DPL pr. 633, 1 TFR, 2 PKA, 8 RKA, 12 TKA, four support vessels. BOD "Tallinn", TFR "Proud" and "Gusty", RCA "R-230" and "R-261" entered the port of Najin. This joint exercise with the North Korean Navy was the last.

April 1990 China delivered to North Korea 4 RCA project 021 "Huangfeng" (Huangfeng, a copy of the Soviet RCA project 205).

Mutual contacts did not guarantee the parties from the occurrence of incidents, the North Korean side, as before, was jealous of the slightest attempt to violate its waters. June 7, 1990 A North Korean warship rammed the Soviet research vessel Professor Gagarinsky. The ship was supposed to be interned, but at the last moment the authorities changed their mind.

August 14-18, 1990 in Wonsan (DPRK), a detachment of ships under the command of the First Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral A.G. Oleinik, as part of the BOD "Marshal Shaposhnikov" and the TFR "Poryvisty" came on an official visit. The visit was timed to coincide with the celebration of the 45th anniversary of the liberation of Korea.

August 24 - 28, 1990 A detachment of the DPRK Navy arrived in Vladivostok on an official visit under the flag of the commander of the Eastern Fleet of the DPRK Navy, Vice Admiral Gwon San Ho, consisting of a destroyer (probably meaning a frigate), a patrol ship and a rescue ship. This ended the naval cooperation between our countries.

Since 1986 to 1990 exercises of the USSR Navy and the DPRK Navy were held annually, after which Soviet ships visited Wonsan and Najin. In total, 20 visits were made in 5 years.

As of mid 1992 in the Navy of the DPRK, there were 30 warships - 24 submarines (20 type "Romeo" Chinese and Korean, according to the Chinese project 031, an analogue of the Soviet 633, and 4 Soviet project 613), 3 frigates (1 type "Soho", and 2 types Najin), 3 corvettes (MPK, Sarivon type), almost 600 boats, including 39 missile boats (11 Sozhu type, 12 Chinese Huangfen project, analogue of the Soviet project 205, 16 Soviet project 183R), 168 torpedo (15 Yvon type, 27 R-6 type, 125 Kusong-Sinhung type), 142 patrol (19 Co-1 type, 6 Hainan type, 10 Taejong type, 13 "Shanghai", 52 "Chongjin" type, 80 "Sinpo" type), more than 180 landing boats (7 "Hangcheon", 100 "Nampo" type) and 62 fire support boats (Jaho type) and 29 minesweepers ( 23 type "Yukto").

New century .

Then came the era of the collapse of the Soviet Union and our country was losing its positions in the Asia-Pacific region. The Pacific Fleet has undergone cuts, and the remaining ships have landed. Naturally, this could not but affect the attitude towards us, although during the 90s the main suppliers of weapons and military equipment to North Korea were the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan. Such data are provided by the Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI). Its experts claim that in 1992-1996, 35 anti-ship missiles of the Styx type were sent from Russia to the DPRK. In 1993-2002, the DPRK imported arms worth $308 million, of which $176 million came from Kazakhstan, $103 million from Russia, and $29 million from China. During the same period, the DPRK purchased 550 SAMs and equipment for 15 Romeo-class submarines from China, and Astana supplied Pyongyang with 34 MiG-21 fighter jets, 24 KS-19 anti-aircraft guns, and 4 fire control radars. Until 2002, Russia sold 4 reconnaissance radars, 6 fire control radars, and 32 armored vehicles to the DPRK. North Korea has also independently produced a number of weapons under Russian license: 1,100 AT-4 anti-tank missiles, 550 SA-16 anti-aircraft missiles and 500 SA-17 anti-aircraft missiles.

In an effort to gain access to previously unattainable technologies, the North Koreans took unusual steps. At the end of 1993 The DPRK, through the Japanese company "To en-trade Inc", concluded an agreement with Russia on cutting in North Korea for metal 12 decommissioned diesel submarines, missile class "Golf II" - project 629A and torpedo class "Foxtrot" - project 641, which were previously part of the Pacific Fleet . And although the weapons and electronic fire control equipment were removed from the submarines, however, missile launchers, stabilization subsystems and many other things that the DPRK engineers had not encountered before remained on the boats. In addition, Soviet specialists were involved in the work. Jane's Defense Weekly notes that in 1992, a group of Russian missile specialists from Chelyabinsk was detained at the moment when it was about to fly to North Korea, but other groups flew there later.In August 1998, Pyongyang conducted missile flight tests "Taepodong-1", which flew over Japan. And in 2004. according to the authoritative weekly "Jane's Defense Weekly", North Korea is deploying new land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and, possibly, having sufficient firing range to hit targets on the continental United States. The Jane's Defense Weekly article, without reference to sources, indicates that of the two new North Korean missile systems, the sea-based missile is potentially more dangerous.

But cooperation, as before, did not guarantee Russia from incidents with the North Korean authorities. On the night of 4 to 5 December 2005. dry cargo vessel "Terney" of "river-sea" class was going from Busan to Vladivostok with a load of buses. A strong storm and a threat to the safety of the ship and crew forced the captain to seek shelter near the nearest shore. The captain of the ship, Pyotr Kostusev, requested permission from the North Korean coast guard to enter the territorial waters. “The coastal border guards gave us permission, and the guard ship of the sea guard ordered to stop, and we were detained. We were in touch with the coast guard all the time and did not try to hide, ”captain Pyotr Kostusev said upon his return. As it turned out, "Terney" went into a closed area in the north of the DPRK, where the Musan-ri missile range is located. It was from this range in 1998 that the Taekhodong-2 rocket was launched. Since the area where the Terney ended up is closed even to citizens of the DPRK, Russian diplomats did not immediately manage to get on board the ship. Russian Ambassador Andrey Karlov spent two days on the ship, he was even given a separate cabin. Allowing to leave the territorial waters of the DPRK, the authorities of this country noted that they did it out of "friendly disposition." On December 21, the ship returned to Vladivostok. The shipowner of the Terney, the Ardis company, decided not to aggravate the conflict and did not refute the version of the North Korean authorities. The shipowner still considers the delay of the ship for two weeks as a misunderstanding. The deputies of the Legislative Assembly of the Primorsky Territory decided not to leave the incident with "Terney" and at the next session will consider an appeal to the State Duma regarding the attitude towards the authorities of the DPRK. “This is complete disrespect for our country, its citizens,” says deputy Nikolai Markovtsev. If we now forgive the DPRK authorities for the detention of the vessel, our neighbors in the region will not respect us. But the words of the deputies remained words.

As you can see, the North Korean authorities were still sensitive to any violations of their waters. At the same time, when in October 2006. searched for sailors from the sunken in the Sea of ​​​​Japan motor ship "Sinegorye" The North Korean authorities have given official permission to search for Russian sailors in their territorial waters.

In turn, Russian sailors have repeatedly rescued North Korean fishermen at sea. February 19, 2007 in the Sea of ​​Japan, the crew of the ship "Muostakh" lifted 4 citizens of North Korea on board, removing them from a faulty motorboat, and delivered them to Vladivostok. January 2, 2008 the crew of the ship "Captain Kiriy" of the Sakhalin Shipping Company at 16.15 local time (9.15 Moscow time) noticed a boat with people 180 miles from Vladivostok. A North Korean fisherman and the bodies of two of his comrades who died of hypothermia were found alive in the boat. The rescued fisherman and the bodies of the dead were taken to the port of Wonsan (DPRK). On the same day, about seven hours earlier, at the same point in the Sea of ​​Japan, another Russian motor ship Pioneer of Russia also discovered a boat with North Korean fishermen. There were two people on the boat. The health of the rescued people is normal. The ship delivered them to the port of Nakhodka, where the DPRK Consulate General is located.

Three years after the incident with the detention of the ship "Terney" new ones followed. February 23, 2008 The Russian ship "Lydia Demesh" assigned to the Kamchatka Shipping Company, followed from the Japanese port of Hamata to Vladivostok with a cargo of cars. Off the coast of the Sea of ​​Japan at Cape Musudan, about three to five miles from the coast of the DPRK, a North Korean border ship detained a Russian ship. The border guards ordered to follow to the port of North Korea. One of the crew members managed to barricade himself in the wheelhouse and transmit a message to the Vladivostok rescue and coordination center that an armed officer and two border guards boarded the Russian ship, who ordered the captain to head for the coast of the DPRK. The ship was brought to the port of Kimchek. As it turned out, on the way from Japan to Vladivostok, the ship got into a strong storm and was forced to take shelter from bad weather in an area closed to navigation. For several days, the DPRK authorities held the ship on charges of violating the state border. So far, on the morning of February 27, after stubborn diplomatic negotiations, the ship was not released.

The next incident occurred on November 9, 2008, the Russian dredging vessel "Stepan Demeshev" assigned to the port of St. Petersburg and owned by LLC "Northern Dredging Company" was detained by North Korean border guards 3.6 miles from the coast of the DPRK. "Stepan Demeshev" left Nakhodka and headed to the port of registry. Phuket (Thailand) was supposed to be the next port on the way home, but one of the main engines on the ship failed near the Korean Peninsula. The captain decided to approach the DPRK for repairs, but did not warn the North Korean authorities of his intentions. The Russian ship, carrying 14 sailors, was escorted to the port of Chongjin for investigation. However, a day later, after the trial, he was released.

The fourth incident with the detention of Russian ships by North Korean border guards occurred in February 2009. February 17, 2009 The ship "Omsky-122" belonging to the Amur Shipping Company was detained by the border service of the DPRK near Cape Musudan, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bwhich the DPRK missile test site is located. "Omsky-122" operated a flight from the South Korean port of Busan to Vladivostok with a cargo of building materials, automotive equipment, food products. In a storm, the ship's captain Vladimir Biryukov decided to move closer to the coastline, where the wave height is lower and navigation is safer, said Yury Kudryavtsev, director of the Amur Shipping Company's shipping department. According to him, the captain managed to send a radiogram to the shipping company, in which he said that he was "forced to obey the demands of the North Korean border guards." A group of military men boarded the Omsky-122 from a coast guard boat and, under threat of weapons, demanded to proceed to the North Korean port. The crew was forbidden to use means of communication. On February 20, North Korean authorities allowed Russian diplomats to board the ship. The Consul General of the Russian Federation in Chongjin, who arrived at the port where the ship is located, met with the crew members. On February 27, the ship was released and set off for Vladivostok.

Literature:

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· "The People's Army in the Making"

1

The article presents the history of development and the current state of the submarine forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Information is given to submarines purchased and delivered abroad.

Submarine

small submarine

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

1. The Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy. June 2013 p. 216.

2. McWilliam. V.Bollman Joint Vision 2010 and Anti-Submarine Warfare. The Mission Doctrinal Link. May 19, 1997 25 p.

3. Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2012 A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.

4. The Fortnightly e-News Brief of the National Maritime Foundation. Volume 8, Number 11.2 30 November 2013. P.47

5. Weiss K.G. The Enemy Below – The Global Diffusion of Submarines and Related Technology. Preprint UCRL- JC-149877 This article was submitted to Center for Global Security Research in Cooperation with the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA May 30,2002 – May 31,2002 September 5,2002 Approved p.21.

6. Romanov A.D., Chernyshov E.A., Romanova E.A. Modern small submarines // Modern science-intensive technologies - 2014. - No. 3. – S. 68-72.

7. Carlyle A. Thayer Vietnam People’s Army: Development and Modernization Research Monograph April 30, 2009 p. 42.

Submarines (submarines) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) belong to 3 classes: Diesel submarine (Patrol), Diesel submarine (Coastal), Midget submarine. Currently, North Korea is armed with about 70 submarines of the following projects: 613, 633/033, Yugo (Yono and R-4), Sang-O. Also in 2005, an elongated version of Sang-O was discovered, which is referred to in various sources as Sang-O II or K-300. Small submarines make up the majority of the DPRK's naval forces, with about 50 units produced in total. They are used for crew training, reconnaissance and sabotage operations. About 80% of the North Korean submarine fleet is located on the east coast at the bases of Chhaho and Mayanto. The latter is also a technical center for the maintenance of submarines, anti-submarine aircraft and patrol ships. The location of the bases of the DPRK Navy is shown in the work, in fact, the fleet is divided into two parts and inter-theater maneuver is limited.

Submarines of the DPRK are interesting because they are created in a country in which Western countries have blocked access to modern technologies, but the DPRK not only produces submarines for its own Navy, but also exports them. Submarines of the DPRK are not publicly displayed, except for the Sang-O captured in 1997 by the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Information on the device, tactics, features of crew training, etc. is limited and often contradictory. She is mainly known from the testimony of captured crew member Lee Kwang Soo (Yi Kwang-su).

Rice. 1. Coaxial screw and stern plumage of the DPRK submarine. Photo from http://forums.airbase.ru

Rice. 2. Submarine at the Gangneung Unification Park Museum (South Korea) Bow rudders are visible
by type pr. 205

Rice. 3. From top to bottom: PL pr. R-4, Yono and Sang-O

The first submarines in the DPRK appeared in 1955-1956, 4 submarines, project 613, were delivered from the USSR. Later, design documentation for the construction of submarines, project 633, was transferred, about 20 units were built, some are still in operation. The DPRK's own developments of submarines lead from mini-submarines, pr. Uno, developed by the Yugoslav company Brodogradilište specijalnih objekata (BSO Split). Therefore, in Western publications they are all referred to as the “Yogo class”, although this is a collective designation, since the DPRK submarines built on the basis of Uno and having a displacement of up to 190 tons have large differences in design.

Yugoslav submarines were designed to operate in the Adriatic Sea. In particular, these were the Heroj-class submarines commissioned in the 1960s, at least six Una-class submarines (a model that was sold to North Korea), and more modern Sava-class boats launched in the 70s. Sava had a displacement of over 950 tons, a length of 65 meters and carried six 533 mm torpedo tubes.

However, the bow rudders and stern plumage of the DPRK submarines are closer to those used on the German submarines pr. 205/206. The Yugoslav project Uno used an X-shaped plumage and "classic" nose rudders. And in general, Yono and R-4 are closer to the submarines of Project 202 than to Uno. To reduce noise, the DPRK submarine propeller has a characteristic feature of an unusual coaxial propeller (an unusual co-axle twin propeller), consisting of a large and much smaller propeller on the same axis (Fig. 1).

One of the features of the DPRK submarines is that within the same type of submarines they were manufactured and are being manufactured in various versions, for example:

1) with two internal torpedo tubes, caliber 533 mm;

2) without torpedo tubes, but equipped with an airlock for disembarking divers;

3) with external torpedo tubes or a mine-dropping complex.

A number of sources mention that the third option can be used to increase the strike force on the first two types of submarines. However, for this they must have a system of transit communications "carrier-weapon" in the form of diagnostic systems, data entry, telecontrol, etc. and requires appropriate energy supply from the ship (VVD, hydraulics, power supply). What takes up space inside the ship, and accordingly reduces the free space for divers.

Table 1

Characteristics of the DPRK submarine

		Displacement, surface / underwater, t.	Power plant *
Una (Yugoslavia)			ED Speed ​​up to 6 knots. ICE on submarine Velebit	Mines, tugs, swimmers
Etc. 202 (Germany)			2x330 diesel Mercedes-Benz surface 6 knots, range 450 miles, underwater 12 knots, range 150 miles at 4 knots.	2x533 mm torpedo tubes
			ICE + ED surface speed 10 knots, underwater knot.
MS-29 Yono (Yeoneo)			ICE + ED surface speed 10 knots, range 550 miles, underwater 8 knots, range 50 miles.	2x533 mm torpedo tubes, mines or swimmers or external torpedo tubes, mines
			ICE + ED, surface speed 7.2 knots, underwater 8.8 knots. Range 1500 miles	4x533 mm torpedo tubes, mines, swimmers.

* ICE - internal combustion engine, ED - electric motor

The P-4 type SSM is the smallest of the Yogo class, an older model, currently probably only used for training purposes. In 1997, Vietnam purchased two P-4s from North Korea, with the agreement including torpedoes, batteries and mines. Subsequently, the submarines were re-equipped in cooperation with India, including the training of submariners. Then in 2008 Vietnam tried to buy used submarines from Serbia. This opportunity arose when Serbia and Montenegro split in 2006 and Serbia lost its coastline. At present, Vietnam has concluded an agreement with Russia for the supply of 6 submarines pr. 636.1 and the construction of related infrastructure and a coastal base.

MS-29 Yono class SSM (sometimes transliterated as Yeono), a larger displacement Yogo class submarine. It uses serial commercial German diesels, not specifically designed for underwater use. A civilian Japanese radar and other commercial electronics are also installed. Since the end of 2010, at least ten of these submarines have been in operation by the North Korean navy. Presumably, the submarines were built by the Yukdaeso-ri shipyard and are part of the Western Fleet. Several submarines of this project were delivered to Iran and served as a prototype for the creation of the Ghadir submarine.

Rice. 4. Photo of the submarine of Cuba

Rice. 5. Top Sang-O,
bottom K 300 SSC/ Sang-O II

These submarines are relatively small, which allows them to successfully operate against South Korea, however, for more remote actions, for example against Japan, they require transportation and launch from a carrier ship. For example, over long distances they are delivered in tow behind a converted trawler (mothership). According to some reports, 2 submarines of the Yono project were sold to Myanmar.

Presumably, the Cuban submarine Delfin was built according to the revised Yono project. This submarine can be completely built in Cuba.

In the early 1980s, North Korea developed a much larger coastal submarine known as the "Ave. 41 m.

Etc. By 300 SSC, the further development of the Sang-O submarine is referred to in some sources as Sang-O II. Discovered in October 2005 by Digital Globe satellite in the drydock of Chunghung-msn Navy Base in Mayang-do next to 2 submarines of Sang-O Ave. The length is about 39 m. Perhaps this is a further development of project 41 m.

Conclusion

As the March 2010 incident in the Yellow Sea, when a torpedo fired by one of the North Korean submarines sank a South Korean Pohang-class corvette with anti-submarine weapons, showed, the potential of small submarines has not been exhausted. Small, rapidly built and economical to operate submarines make it possible for even a small navy to destroy an anti-submarine ship and invade national waters.

This case was the first documented use of torpedo weapons in a submarine combat situation in the 21st century.

Bibliographic link

Romanov A.D., Chernyshov E.A., Romanova E.A. SUBMARINES OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA // Modern science-intensive technologies. - 2014. - No. 6. - P. 25-28;
URL: http://top-technologies.ru/ru/article/view?id=34643 (date of access: 12/17/2019). We bring to your attention the journals published by the publishing house "Academy of Natural History"