Groups and clans in the supreme power. Financial-criminal-power groups of the Kremlin. "Reform" of law enforcement agencies

There is no longer a ruling tandem in Russia, experts say. The country is ruled by eight clans competing with each other for access to resources. In fact, the management system returned to the model of the Soviet collective power body - the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Eight clan leaders are part of the main body of the Politburo, which, unlike its Soviet counterpart, never gathers for general meetings. The whole system is tied to Vladimir Putin, without whom its existence is simply impossible.

Such data are contained in the report "Vladimir Putin's Big Government and Politburo 2.0" prepared by Yevgeny Minchenko, President of the Minchenko Consulting Holding, and Kirill Petrov, Head of the Analytical Department of the International Institute of Political Expertise. Their conclusions are the result of a survey of more than 60 representatives of the country's political and business elite.

According to the report, one of the eight close associates is the former president, and now the prime minister. Now he is no longer a member of the tandem. He had to give up independent political ambitions. As the document says, “due to its instrumental position, it will inevitably act as a center of gravity for competing business groups.”

In addition to Medvedev, his clan also includes deputy prime ministers, ministers, regional chiefs, high-ranking lawyers in courts, the State Duma and law enforcement agencies, and businessmen.

Among his allies, experts name Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika, Deputy Prime Ministers and, as well as Roman Abramovich, Alexander Voloshin and Tatyana Dyachenko.

Another influential group in the Politburo is headed by the head of the presidential administration. As noted in the report, he is responsible for the intra-elite balance in the presidential administration. His deputy is referred to in the work as a "newcomer to the Politburo", who, however, is rapidly gaining weight. Its advantages are considered to be influence on some regions and on United Russia through the All-Russian People's Front.

The third clan is headed by the head of Rosneft, which seeks to become "the main player in the fuel and energy complex", and at the same time continues to maintain an informal influence on law enforcement agencies.

The opposition to Sechin is oil trader Gennady Timchenko and co-owner of Rossiya Bank Yuri Kovalchuk. Their union, the document notes, "acts as an alternative pole of influence to Sechin in the fuel and energy complex."

Sergei Chemezov, director general of the Russian Technologies state corporation, with whom Putin worked in the GDR through the KGB in the 1980s, is called the main player in the military-industrial complex. According to the report, "Chemezov's group has recently launched a new political project, successful not so much in terms of influencing public opinion, but in terms of attracting the sympathy of the leader of the state ("Uralvagonzavod Workers for Putin")."

The mayor of Moscow, n. The authors of the report consider him "the leader of the nomenklatura group, which includes several governors concentrated in the Urals." Among his merits, the authors include the ability to "build non-conflict relations with most of the oligarchic structures that have interests in Moscow."

Political scientists note that the goal of all these groups is the conversion of power into property, its legitimization in Russia and abroad, and the transfer by inheritance. The main objects around which the competition unfolded are the development of Siberia and the Far East, the “big Moscow”, a new stage of privatization.

Putin in this construction plays the role of "arbiter and moderator" maintaining a balance between competing clans.

As Minchenko told Kommersant, such a management model is built in such a way that “everyone enters into a clinch, and then the supreme arbiter makes decisions.” Competition allows “to reduce the potential for the possible influence of each of the groups,” Kirill Petrov added.

The report also lists about two dozen people named as candidates for the Politburo. They are divided into five blocks: "Power block", "Political block", "Business", "Technical block" and "Regional leaders". Among the contenders for getting into the Politburo were: Alexander Bastrykin, Roman Abramovich, Alexander Voloshin, Vladimir Kozhin, Georgy Poltavchenko, and even Patriarch Kirill.

According to the report, the new "politburo" was formed in the 2000s, following the redistribution of resources from the oligarchic clans in favor of the security forces, the destruction of media empires and the elimination of most regional regimes. According to Yevgeny Minchenko, the system as a whole is extremely unstable. It has too many contradictions.

Ethnic business in Russia or conflict of interest in the Kremlin

On September 28, 2012 in Moscow, the leaders of Azerbaijani business and representatives of law firms created the Union of Azerbaijani Organizations of Russia under the direct leadership of I. Rahimov, a friend of V. V. Putin from the institute's bench and the most closed lawyer in Azerbaijan. The SAOR is a more surprising collection of ethnic diasporas than the current All-Russian Azerbaijani Congress, established in 2001, supported by G. Aliyev and having at least 73 branches throughout Russia. It must be assumed that the VAK was no longer needed, the number of diasporas increased greatly, as well as the business they patronized, and the leaders of the former organization decided to create a new union with expanded powers and with the support of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin. However, no one says that almost all the founding fathers are members of another diaspora, the Mountain Jews, who own a huge slice of Russian business. Here are immigrants from Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Dagestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya, who received at the mercy of some metallurgical enterprises, markets, hotel business, oil enterprises, and even managed to wedge themselves into the closed structure of Russian Railways V. Yakunin.

The diaspora of Mountain Jews is especially strong in Moscow, because here the largest financial flows and trade turnover are. The most worthy representatives of this diaspora:
I. Mahmudov 8.7 billion dollars, Ural Mining and Metallurgical Plant, FC CSKA
M. Chernoy 5 billion dollars, numerous enterprises in Israel
A. Usmanov 17.6 billion dollars, Sibur, Stroytransgaz
S.Kerimov$7.8 billion, Polymetal, Polyus Gold
A.Alikperov$27.8 billion, Lukoil
M.Gutseriev 3.3 billion dollars, RussNeft, Arsenal (artillery)
G. Nisanov 3.6 billion dollars Evropeisky shopping center, Sadovod market, VVC
Z.Iliev 3.6 billion dollars, Electronic Paradise, hotel Ukraine, Grand, shopping center Moscow
A. Agalarov 1.8 billion dollars, Crocus Expo, related to I. Aliyev
Z. Magomedov$1.2 billion group Amount
F.Ahmedov$1.4 billion
G. Yushvaev 1.7 billion dollars, Polyus Gold

Of course, I. Ragimov, some leaders of Dagestan and Chechnya are missing here, but their business is not open, so it is incorrect to fantasize about this topic. But on the other hand, the above list of mountain oligarchs is in great competition with the Yeltsin oligarchs, such as Deripaska, Abramovich, Potanin, Vekselberg, Fridman, Yevtushenkov, Lisin, Yumashev, Prokhorov and others, who made their fortune in the 90s of the last century thanks to Russian - American privatization with Rothschild funds. The general state of the mountain oligarchs is much less than Yeltsin's, but the dynamics of capital growth exceeds the capabilities of the old-style oligarchs, especially considering the targeted ruin of M. Khodorkovsky, the pressure on V. Yevtushenkov, V. Yumashev and A. Voloshin. That is, there are three competing groups in the Kremlin: the Yeltsin oligarchs, the mountain oligarchs and the inner circle of V.V. Putin, who, except for the brothers Rotenberg and G. Timchenko, are difficult to classify as oligarchs, because their business is not advertised in any way. So, the three groups of oligarchs are far from a homogeneous environment and pull the state budget blanket over themselves, and V.V. Putin skillfully maneuvers between these groups, allowing them not only to compete, but also to eliminate objectionable people, such as mercury on the eve of removal from Olympstroy.

Why is such an environment created and nourished in the Russian elite? Solely with the aim of creating counterbalances, so that none of the groups takes a dominant position in the Russian economy and politics. However, if as a result of the 2008 crisis O. Deripaska received the necessary funds to support his business, now I. Sechin has not seen the requested trillion rubles, just as V. Yakunin did not wait for investments in Russian Railways. And here Vladimir Putin acts as a real intelligence agent, recruiting and converting his associates and opponents in order to maintain a balance of interests, where there is no place for Russia and the Russian people, but there is a place for targeted robbery and betrayal. These skills were laid down by E.M.Primakov, a master of behind-the-scenes games, where the head of the USSR counterintelligence S.Tsvigun, whose protégé was G.Aliyev, was especially skilled. In fairness, it must be said that the skill of balance and re-recruitment did not save S. Tsvigun's life, but many vectors of foreign and domestic policy of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee converged on him, where the lines of L. Brezhnev, Y. Andropov and M. Gorbachev converged in an irreconcilable battle. A similar situation has occurred in Russia today. It is curious that when the blood of Russian patriots, led by traitors into pre-set traps, was shed in Moscow on October 3, 1993, G. Aliyev won the presidential elections and immediately carried out huge changes in Azerbaijan by signing oil agreements with Rockefeller companies and their branches around the world .

Today in Russia there is a most curious game of V.V. Putin for the restoration of control over the intensified group of Sechin-Rotenbergs, who have begun to change the balance of power in the ruling elite. The annexation of Crimea and the seizure of the enterprises of I. Kolomoisky, R. Akhmetov, P. Poroshenko made the group of I. Sechin very dangerous for V.V. Putin, where even the growth of patriotism and high ratings do not save from the privatization of the Kremlin power by one clan. The sanctions of the United States and the European Union surprisingly came in handy, because the restrictions affected the names of Vladimir Putin's inner circle, including Y. Kovalchuk and K. Malafeev, which prompts some reflections that there is an agreement between Vladimir Putin and the British crown, because the US will not do anything without the consent of London. But at the same time, there is another danger, O. Deripaska, having such devoted associates as S. Shoigu and D. Rogozin, real idealists who are ready to serve the Fatherland, if they are correctly directed, can at any moment carry out a coup d'état, especially having a reserve airfield in in the form of Siberia and the Far East, where they work tirelessly for the government in exile. In his interview with N. Asmolov and the publication "Time of Eurasia" in February 2006, O. Deripaska said:
We are the Russian real power, All those who have consistently united around the first President of Russia, Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin, who have taken the liberty of making difficult economic and social decisions. A group of people exercising power, say, in a state, decides on the form of this power. Now, for example, it is a democracy where the general public is convinced that they are controlled by those they have elected in the voting booths. After the first decision, the bearers of real power decide who will be at the head of the management structure. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin is a man who knows how to listen and memorize, analyze and translate ideas into real action. I appreciate him very much and do not regret that at one time our choice fell on him.

But now not only the clan of O. Deripaska, but also the economic power in Russia, in the person of Chubais-Kudrin, have united to return to their hands all the fullness of power, fragmented into several clans, each of which has its own quotas, but, nevertheless, business is always cosmopolitan and cannot operate within the same framework, within the same agreements. Understanding this, recognizing the inviolability of the Yeltsin Constitution, the results of the privatization of the 90s of the last century, V.V. Putin, nevertheless, creates competing structures, trying to protect himself and his way of life, but not Russia, tormented by the oligarchs as their property. It was precisely for this that the clan of mountain oligarchs was fostered and strengthened, who, not with money, but with the opportunity to bring Caucasian fighters to the streets, keep the Yeltsin oligarchs in suspense. Therefore, interethnic clashes take place, for this the entire center of Moscow is at the mercy of the mountain oligarchs, devoted to V.V. Putin, because he created unprecedented conditions for enrichment for the Azerbaijani, Dagestan and Ingush diasporas, which they could not even dream of ten years ago. The same N. Asmolov, in an interview with the New Russian Word in February 2011, characterizes the new defense of V.V. Putin as follows:
Lenin took Latvian riflemen to guard the Kremlin, then a Chinese regiment. The Vatican uses the Swiss Guard. Paris forms a French legion of foreigners. Chechen fighters for independence invited "white tights" from the Baltics as snipers. If you want dedicated employees who will not become limp, who will not lower their machine guns, looking at grandmothers and children with banners, bring people closer without complexes of “love for your people”. Now the police will prioritize the selection of young people from national minorities - they will work just for fun, bribes - that's right, a side bonus.

What came out of this can be seen in the example of the civil war in Ukraine, where people are divided according to the principle of their attitude towards Russia and the Russian people. Only two weeks were enough to shake the whole country after the victory of the February revolution in Kyiv, dividing it into “Svidomo” and “Colorados”. With this, V.V. Putin keeps O. Deripaska’s clan from trying to rehabilitate the dashing 90s, at the same time weakening and taking control of I. Sechin’s power bloc. Is there enough strength? No, it's not enough anymore, because the external economic situation has changed, the amount of money is declining by leaps and bounds, and the balance of power is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain, especially after the February revolution in Kyiv. The time has come to donate someone, because there is not enough money for everyone, and from the side of three competing groups an appeal to V.V. It is not possible to remove the group of I. Sechin due to the fact that the FSB of A. Bortnikov, the Internal Troops of the former bodyguard of V. V. Putin, Colonel General V. Zolotov, and the SVR M. Fradkov are included in this group. However, one component is enough to close the Kremlin for Vladimir Putin. It is not safe to put pressure on O. Deripaska because the House of Rothschild and Minister of Defense S.K. to Russia, at the same time freeing M. Khodorkovsky. There remains a clan of Mountain Jews, but this is dearer to itself, because their revenge can be double-edged: as by creating artificial confrontations on ethnic grounds, when many Russian people take to the streets, paralyzing the work of the state. And thus creating the danger of Caucasian riots in the national republics.

A stalemate from which there is no way out! A similar thing happened to B.N. Yeltsin in 1999, when he faced the need to make a choice, the time for which had already passed. If the president of great Russia, after being elected for a third term, would take care of fulfilling the election promises set out in seven articles, choosing in favor of the I. Sechin clan and Russian statehood, constantly reducing competing oligarchs and ethnic business, moreover, on an ongoing basis, and not episodically, today's zugzwang could have been avoided. But Vladimir Putin does not know how to work in such conditions, he always needs to have guarantees of his security, which are achieved, according to the old habit of counterintelligence, only by the balance of power. And this is an erroneous choice, explained by the fact that the president expected to wait until the end of his term in office in order to leave with his head held high, leaving the country to be plundered by three competing groups, that is, to certain death. Despite the warning of those who predicted the bifurcation point back in 2013, which V.V. Putin nevertheless managed to shift for several years. But at what cost? At the price of the inevitable resignation and many "Independence Maidan", where everyone will pull the blanket over himself. What can Vladimir Putin oppose to this scenario?

Ipatiev K.F. (GRU major, retired)

Having taken the presidency in May 2012, Vladimir Putin signed a number of decrees on economic and social policy, healthcare, education and science, on providing citizens with affordable housing and improving the quality of housing and communal services. For more information about the May decrees of the head of state, see the infographic.

Exactly three years ago, on May 7, 2012, Vladimir Putin, once again becoming head of state, signed 11 decrees aimed at the economic and social development of the country. Unfortunately, to date, not all presidential decrees have been properly executed.

Experts see the reason for the non-execution of presidential decrees not only in the deterioration of Russia's relations with a number of traditional partners, but also in the growing competition between various "interest groups" within the ruling class.

Clan struggle within Russian elites

After the murder of Boris Nemtsov, Foreign Policy noted that the murder of one of the Kremlin's main critics in the center of Moscow led to an open confrontation in Russia between the two "most influential clans" of Russia.

In fact, there are not two, but three main clans in the power structures of Russia. And the struggle between them in one way or another affects the dynamics of the country's development. After all, where there are clan contradictions, and influential "interest groups" are in opposition to the current government, sabotage and even outright sabotage are not uncommon.

If Vladimir Putin leads the dominant "interest group", then who are the other two groups in the power elites, and what do they achieve in their practical politics?

Formally, political life in Russia is represented by parties and movements, but in reality they not only do not reflect the true alignment of forces in the state, but essentially camouflage it. Political parties and parliament are a kind of quintessence of public sentiments in the federal and regional elites, a kind of television picture transformed into votes.

The vectors of real politics in the post-Soviet space are determined today, first of all, by the interests and goals of global transnational players. As a result, three main political forces emerged in Russia, derived from the three main civilizational vectors: Western liberals, Eastern traditionalists, and the so-called "center", headed by Vladimir Putin and maintaining a balance of power between the two named poles.

I note that Westerners and Easterners are known by name. But it would be wrong to cite any names here: some leaders of these political trends sometimes do not even suspect that they are objectively in the anti-Russian camp - although they emphasize the opposite with all their rhetoric. Therefore, this article is only about trends.

Western liberals

The first domestic political trend is pro-Western, pro-American. (Given the almost total Americanization of the European Union today, any orientation towards Europe is essentially pro-American). Representatives of this "group of interests" have headed the most important ministries and departments since the Yeltsin era, which is why many development projects in modern Russia either stall or cannot be implemented by definition.

In the public space of modern Russia, the Western vector is framed as "democratic" and "liberal", however, anyone who, in the current conditions of the actual war of the West against Russia, takes an anti-state position (namely, this is the policy pursued by many "liberals" in Russia today) is rather , a destructive element in the national system of survival.

Russian liberals (both "systemic" and "non-systemic") do not hide their intentions to come to power. At the same time, non-systemic liberals, by way of the "Western Party" (let's call it that) coming to power in Russia, another "anti-imperial" and "democratic" quasi-revolution, an analogue of the Kiev Maidan. While the liberals are systemic, realizing that the victory of the Western Party in the elections is impossible, and the prospects for the Russian Maidan are very doubtful, they rely on a "staff coup" - the continuation of the infiltration of their adherents into the authorities.

Be that as it may, if this party succeeds, the Russian Federation will most certainly be destroyed in the same way that the collapse of the Soviet Union was carried out, since the monetization of the social sphere, the privatization of state assets and the subsequent flight from Russia of "self-determined" autonomies will be brought to the limit. In Russia, a significant part of the manufacturing economy, including the defense industry, will again be destroyed, national traditions, including the memory of the Great Patriotic War, will again be curtailed and forgotten.

Understanding the full scale of the threat posed by the Western Party, many Russians are increasingly drawn to the "strong hand." Hence the growing popularity in Russia of the second domestic political trend, the anti-Western one.

Eastern clan

It would be more correct to call the consistent anti-Westernists the Eastern Party, since, unlike the Western Party, which seeks to infuse (more precisely, merge) Russia into the "world community", this "interest group" sees Russia as part of the Union of non-Western civilizations. Orientalists themselves, as a rule, call themselves patriots and Eurasians (there are also such self-names as "imperials", "horde", "national patriots", etc.), filling these terms with content that is far from officially accepted.

As of the beginning of 2015, the Eastern clan is still inferior in terms of the degree of influence of the Western Party at the federal level, but at the regional level it has long surpassed it. In particular, almost all of Russian Asia is now consolidating around the Eastern Party, with the possible exception of Chechnya and Ingushetia.

Conspiracy theorists and some economists believe that if the Westernizers in Russia are supported by the US State Department and EU officials dependent on it, then the eastern vector receives more and more support from the conditional "Rothschilds" (world banking) through Hong Kong and Beijing, as well as from the countries of the Muslim South.

Some political experts call the Eastern Party the "sixth column" and believe that it - like the "fifth" - sabotages the implementation of many decisions of the president and, under the pretext of fighting corruption, clears the space of state administration for representatives of its clan.

There is an opinion that the coming to power in Russia of the "Horde" is quite real, as it is perceived by both the elites and the people as the best response to the attempt to implement another "orange revolution" in the Russian Federation. Well, in the West it is profitable to believe that Putin himself is about to make an "authoritarian turn" in Russia.

How competitive is the Center Party?

hardware coups.

It is not easy to get rid of extremes in politics: any attempt to push the authorities to the right or to the left is fraught with a loss of balance. That is why the head of state keeps the political "center" group from taking tough steps against any opposition.

At the same time, besides the tactics of compromises, there is another tactic — strengthening the "center" itself, transforming it from an amorphous space between right-wing radicals into a firm support for the forces of development. Experience shows that when the "centre" is passive, the radicals can occupy the entire political space. But the more active the "center", the less room in society for radical forces.

In the article "" I described a scheme involving the activation of the political "center" - a party that would embody not a European, not an Asian, but its own and independent path of development of the Russian Federation. And, apparently, such a party (in the broad sense of the word) is being formed today, filled with structures and policies aimed at the so-called "civilizational" and sovereign development of Russia and the Russian world.

Sharp changes in the political course of the Russian Federation are mainly associated with the struggle of the elites and with the change in power configurations in the political establishment of Russia.

The main political groupings of the Russian Federation

Conventionally, the political leadership of the Russian Federation is divided into several groups of influence:

1) in relation to the armed conflict on the territory of Ukraine (the concept of " Kremlin towers"):

- "Party of Peace" - a group of politicians and representatives of the economic elite of the Russian Federation, who in foreign policy mainly use the methods of "soft power" ("soft power"): provocations, economic pressure as tools to influence political processes in Ukraine. This group can include Vladislav Surkov and political figures affiliated with him (Alexander Borodai, Sergei Kurginyan, Alexei Chesnakov, Nikolai Starikov, Oleg Govorun, and others); Dmitry Medvedev (a group of so-called "liberals", to which, for example, we can include the figures of Mikhail Zurabov, Sergei Nazarov); a number of Russian oligarchs (Viktor Vekselberg, Gennady Timchenko, Arkady Rotenberg and others).

- "party of war" - representatives of the political sector, law enforcement agencies, far-right groups in Russia, using an aggressive policy, methods of "hard power" as tools to influence political processes in Ukraine. This group relies on the continuation of the armed aggression of the combined Russian-separatist forces against the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the subsequent occupation of southeastern Ukraine, the creation of the neo-fascist terrorist project "Novorossiya", the organization of a coup in Kyiv with the aim of coming to power of the pro-Russian leadership (V. Medvedchuk, representatives of the Party of Regions and etc.). The most famous representatives of this group include: Alexander Bortnikov, Sergei Shoigu, Vyacheslav Volodin, Sergei Markov, Leonid Reshetnikov, Igor Girkin, Alexander Dugin, Nikolai Patrushev, Dmitry Rogozin, Konstantin Malofeev and others.

2) depending on clan affiliation(according to Russian journalists):

- "siloviki" - includes representatives of the elite of the Russian Federation associated with the activities of the KGB, FSB, RF Armed Forces. This clan of the Russian elite can include Alexander Bortnikov, Igor Sechin, Vladimir Kozhin, Sergei Ivanov, Igor Levitin, Mikhail Dmitriev, Yuri Chekhanchin, Andrei Belyaninov, Nikolai Patrushev, Igor Shchegolev, Alexander Sukhorukov, Mikhail Dmitriev, Andrei Kostin, Andrei Akimov, Sergei Chemezov, Anatoly Isaikin and others. It is considered the most influential group;

- "St. Petersburg" ("people without shoulder straps") - representatives of the political elite of the Russian Federation, related to the St. Petersburg regional clan. The following figures can be attributed to him: Dmitry Medvedev, Dmitry Kozak, Viktor Zubkov, Vladimir Churov, German Gref, Arkady Rotenberg, Boris Rotenberg, Vladimir Bogdanov, Alexei Miller, Gennady Timchenko, Igor Romashov, Konstantin Nikolaev, Ilya Klebanov, Vitaly Savelyev, Vladimir Kogan, Sergei Soldatenkov, Vladimir Kiselev, Nikolai Egorov and others. Supporters of the liberal model of government, establishing relations with the West, seeking compromises with the European Union and the United States;

Conventionally named group cooperative "Lake". This group can include the following representatives of the Russian political elite: Andrei Fursenko, Yuri Kovalchuk, Nikolai Shamalov, Sergei Fursenko. Basically, these are representatives of criminal gangs of the 90s, who worked closely with Vladimir Putin. Involved in major corruption scandals, criminal activities of the 90s and the beginning of the "zero" years;

The “own people” group includes close friends, relatives and families of people directly connected with the leadership of the Russian Federation. It can include such figures as Vasily Anisimov, Yuri Shamalov, Vadim Semenov, Boris Kovalchuk, Andrey Murov, Kirill Shamalov, Andrey Patrushev, Alexander Nekipelov, Vera Putina, Alexander Putin, Dmitry Patrushev, Alexander Ivanov, Igor Putin, Mikhail Putin, Mikhail Shelomov, Sergei Roldugin, Denis Bortnikov, Alexei Kozak, Igor Chuyan and others. It is considered the main support of the ruling elite of the Russian leadership.

It is also possible to divide Russian clans into the following groups: 1) Volodin’s group (O. Batalina, Viktor Shkulev, etc.), 2) a group of oligarchs, which can be divided into 2 subgroups - “domestic oligarchs” (Vagit Alekperov, etc.) and the “liberal wing” (A. Rotenberg and others), 3) the “national elite” (R. Kadyrov and others), 4) the security forces (N. Patrushev, A. Bortnikov, etc.), 5) the group Surkov (A. Chesnakov, A. Borodai, N. Starikov, O. Govorun and others), 6) liberals (D. Medvedev, M. Zurabov, etc.), 7) neo-fascists (V. Zhirinovsky, I. Girkin, A. Barkashov, A. Dugin and others), 8) “Petersburg security officers” (S. Ivanov and others), etc. At the same time, the boundaries between groups of security officials and “Petersburg security officers”, as oligarchs and liberals, are actually blurred and conditional.

Each of the political groupings of the elite of the Russian Federation listed in the approaches under consideration has a certain impact on the political processes within Russia within the framework of the opportunities that are assigned to them by the established rules of inter-clan relations. However, it should be noted that the approaches under consideration are conditional, and fragmentarily reflect the real picture that is taking place in modern Russia. At the same time, it is important to note the presence in the Russian leadership of figures in the category of the so-called. "gray cardinals", which are difficult to unilaterally attribute to any particular political group or clan within the political elite of Russia. These figures influence both the domestic and foreign policy of modern Russia.

On the other hand, the leadership of the Russian Federation cannot but include representatives of individual regions that influence the political status quo and block separatist manifestations in the national republics. This group can include Ramzan Kadyrov, Sholban Kara-ool, and others. The Kremlin is forced to reckon with the leaders of these republics, who are the key to political stability in the national regions of the country. Previously, the leaders of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, Mintimer Shaimiev and Murtaza Rakhimov, could be attributed to this group, but through the intervention of the FSB, coordinated by the Kremlin, they were removed from the posts of presidents of the republics. At the moment, the struggle of the Russian special services with representatives of the Shaimiev and Rakhimov clans, which the Russian leadership accuses of supporting latent separatism and "administrative nationalism", continues.

Intra-elite configurations

1. The game of Volodin and Gromov

According to Yevgeny Shabaev, today in the Russian political establishment “completely different games are played” by Vyacheslav Volodin (First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, oversees domestic politics) and Alexei Gromov (First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, oversees information policy).

“At the same time, it is impossible to say that this is a game of good and bad police. The split went live - on February 15, 2016, with the approval of the composition of agreed candidates from all 4 parliamentary parties and a number of non-parliamentary heads of the Presidential Administration - Ivanov, ”says Yevgeny Shabaev.

According to www.compromat.ru, Gromov is the curator of the print media and television, and under Volodin is the direction of the Internet space, which is handled by Timur Prokopenko (department for working with youth organizations, chief of Christina Potupchik, who nurtures the army of "Kremlebots", then there are one-day bloggers writing on assignment). The Gromov group, in addition to a number of media managers and media editors (Margarita Simonyan, Alexandra Kosterina, Konstantin Ernst), includes the head of Rospechat Mikhail Seslavinsky, the head of Roskomnadzor Alexander Zharov, Deputy Minister of Telecom and Mass Communications Alexei Volin and Deputy Mayor of Moscow for Media Alexander Gorbenko. Mikhail Lesin, who headed the country's largest media holding, Gazprom-Media, lost his central positions in the clan. He was the brain, the charisma of this group. Almost all of these people have been in power for more than 15 years.

Vyacheslav Volodin is extremely different from his opponent in the Kremlin. He is considered a lone wolf - systemic, merciless, who plays with enemies without rules. Volodin is considered involved in the persecution by the Investigative Committee of Gorbenko and Seslavinsky in the framework of the “Markvo case”. Stable ties have been preserved between Volodin and Senator from the Penza region Lyubov Glebova, State Duma deputy Olga Batalina, in addition to his allies - several major media people (Maria Komarova, Aram Gambrelyanov, Alexander Mamut, Viktor Shkulev, Oleg Dobrodeev).

At first, Volodin was called “Glory-stroke” behind his back, but they quickly switched to the abbreviation VVV (Vyacheslav Viktorovich Volodin). At the moment when the news came about the resignation of Senkevich and the appointment of Lesin to the post of head of Gazprom-Media, Volodin was holding a meeting with the editors-in-chief. To put it mildly, he was surprised and angry. In December 2013, Svetlana Mironyuk, CEO of RIA Novosti, suddenly lost her post. Her place was taken by Dmitry Kiselev. Mironyuk, although she was Lesin's creature, worked in Dmitry Medvedev's team and showed professional independence. Alexey Gromov, sources say, was going to appoint Margarita Simonyan, head of Russia Today, to her place. The head of the Presidential Administration, Sergei Ivanov, was forced to intervene in the tense situation, and he “brought to the bride”, as Alexei Venediktov put it, Dmitry Kiselev. Mikhail Lesin attacked Ekho Moskvy hard. The monopolization of the media market initiated by Lesin attacked the interests of Volodin, who is in close contact with many well-known media managers. He simply could not allow such a concentration of media resources in the hands of the opposing clan. In this fight, Volodin suddenly found a strong ally in the person of the head of the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, Oleg Dobrodeev. The heads of the three federal TV channels were very dissatisfied with Lesin's idea to create a new committee for television measurements (that is, a committee for ratings).

Lesin's subsequent resignation, according to www.compromat.ru, marked the defeat of the "Gromovites" - this is exactly how it was perceived in the bureaucratic market. It is also supported by the visits of the investigators of the Investigative Committee to representatives of this clan, which was warned by the Izvestia newspaper close to Vyacheslav Volodin.

In fact, after that, the conflict between Gromov and Volodin intensified, periodically falling into the field of view of the media. Against this background, it is important to note the existence of a conflict between Volodin and Surkov, which the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration, who oversees the information policy of the Russian Federation, used in his own interests.

It is important to note that the head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, Sergei Ivanov, prefers to deal with security issues and foreign policy issues, defiantly distancing himself from the conflict between Volodin and Gromov. A similar position is taken by Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov, who has retained his own influence in the Kremlin.

2. Struggle for control of the Duma

As mentioned earlier, another pre-conflict point of bifurcation between the Kremlin clans of the Russian Federation was the preparation for the 2016 election campaign. The result of intra-Kremlin political intrigues is the split that occurred on February 15, 2016, when the composition of agreed candidates from all 4 parliamentary parties and extra-parliamentary forces was approved by the head of the presidential administration, Sergei Ivanov. On the eve of the parliamentary election campaign, the Kremlin clans are actually involved in a behind-the-scenes struggle to push politicians associated with them or figures affiliated with the business interests of this or that political group into the State Duma. Thus, representatives of the groups of Vyacheslav Volodin, the security forces, the so-called. "national elite", "domestic oligarchs" (Igor Sechin, Vagit Alekperov, Mikhail Gutsiraev and others) are trying to get their people into the new State Duma.

Against this background, the role of ultra-right and neo-fascist groups in the political process, which increased their influence after participating in hostilities in the territory of eastern Ukraine, is growing. On the one hand, attempts are being made by Vladislav Surkov to take control of these extremist groups that have recognized themselves as part of the political process of the Russian Federation. The result of this combination of Surkov was the formation of the "Union of Donbass Volunteers" headed by the Kremlin political strategist Alexander Borodai (former "Prime Minister" of the so-called "DPR"), seeking to take control of the disparate extremist groups of militants who went through the war in the Donbass. On the other hand, the neo-fascist group of Igor Girkin significantly increased its influence, which, after the promotion of the “January 25 Committee” project, in May 2016 announced the creation of the “All-Russian National Movement”. The inclusion of ultra-radicals in the political space of the Russian Federation threatens both the internal political stability of the Russian Federation itself and the countries neighboring Russia in the event that neo-fascists from the Novorossiya group come to power. It still remains a question who is really behind the Strelkov project, which is aimed at the gradual inclusion of Igor Girkin in the political field. There are several points of view regarding this issue: 1) Igor Girkin is a FSB project for the future, 2) behind the promotion of the Strelkov project is a group of “St. 3) Igor Girkin may be a project of foreign special services that made an effort to unhindered exit of militants from the encirclement near Slovyansk in July 2014.

3. "Reform" of law enforcement agencies

An important element of the transformational events in the leadership of the Russian leadership is the start of the process of "reforming" the power structures. In addition to the struggle of the elites to push representatives of their clans into the State Duma of the new convocation, behind-the-scenes battles unfolded for influence on the special services. Volodin's group, security forces, "domestic oligarchs", "national elite" are actively lobbying for the promotion of their people to law enforcement agencies, contrary to the conditionally called liberal wing A. Gromov, V. Surkov, A. Kudrin, M. Shalomov, G. Timchenko, A. Rotenberg.

Today, there is a “shaking up” of the FSO, and after the creation of the National Guard, the Russian leadership is actively talking about the possible unification of the FSB, FSO, SVR under the wing of the people of Alexei Kudrin. Against this background, the potential of the group of liberals is consistently increasing, and the strengthening of Kudrin's positions causes opposition from the security forces and the "St. Petersburg Chekists".

The analysis of the political process in Russia also emphasizes the weakening of positions in the power bloc of Sergei Shoigu due to the personnel of Dmitry Rogozin, who periodically appears in the media space of the Russian Federation. As Yevgeny Shabaev notes, all this is happening against the backdrop of the transfer of troops to the western borders in the newly built units by the "restaurateur" Yevgeny Prigozhin.

4. Fight for government orders

Deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of the 6th convocation from the Samara region Alexander Khinshtein, whose positions in the region have remained quite strong over the past few years, decided to withdraw from the primaries of United Russia in the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, choosing a career as an adviser to the Secretary of the General Council of the party on the media - Sergei Neverov. In fact, the “leakage” of Hinsheitn in Samara led to a “repartition” of the entire agreed list in the Volga Federal District. At the same time, representatives of both one and the other wing of United Russia were "leaked".

“Khinshtein did not have relations with the regional elites of the regions from which he was previously elected, but he did a lot for United Russia. And if he fails to remove the claims against him, he may receive an alternative proposal from the party, ”Vedomosti wrote, citing a source in the party leadership.

At the same time, the team of A. Khinshtein actually continues to master the funds allocated under the Samara Arena project, as well as for the development of infrastructure in Samara in preparation for the 2018 World Cup.

In fact, this is a reflection of the intensified struggle for the "development of the last deposits and government orders." On the other hand, the process of pushing out the "old" and introducing "new" people for control over the budget in the regions and the country is recorded. At the same time, the size of the state budget is decreasing exponentially, and the process of fighting for the “cutting” of budget funds will only intensify after the parliamentary elections are held this fall.

March 12 2015 10:56

Modern Russia consists of three main groups. The first is a liberal-family one, the leaders of which, conditionally, are Voloshin, Yumashev, Chubais and Kudrin, and the basis is the oligarchs of the first draft, who received the main benefits from privatization, tax evasion, corruption and raiding. Their conditional name is “liberals”. Their main problem is that their business, as such, is unprofitable, it is becoming more and more difficult to receive budget preferences, the fight for the resources that have remained in the country is intensifying, the level of legalization of capital in the West is falling all the time. Options for action: fight with Putin and return the situation to the 90s, become the "Gauleiters" of the "Western" project; try to “squeeze out” alternative groups; spit and run to the West. The probability of the latter option is falling all the time, since they have already been repeatedly explained that they will no longer be oligarchs and, in general, at least any significant figures. And since they, with rare exceptions, cannot engage in business, emigration can also end in begging.

This group almost completely controls the economic and financial policy of the country, and its bureaucratic part is almost directly "supported" by the world financial elite (through the IMF). I note that the global financial elite is only a part of the overall elite of the “Western” global project, however, it is this part that has dominated the last 100 years (after the creation of the Fed) in terms of determining financial and economic policy. “Liberals” in Russia are fundamentally opposed to any development (because this is contrary to the interests of the elite of the “Western” project and will almost certainly lead to the “washing out” of representatives of this group from the management elite), and for quite a long time they have not had their own political agenda. This was very clearly seen at the next Krasnoyarsk Economic Forum.

The second group is the security forces and oligarchs of the second generation, the 2000s. They do not have such outspoken leaders, rather, there is a complex collective leadership. They also have several options. It is possible to “squeeze out” “liberal” oligarchs and businessmen for some time, transferring them to the role of political emigrants, which gives them some protection in the West. True, relative, and only for political activity (Khodorkovsky). But this path is clearly limited in time.

Option two, the establishment of a rigid autarky and the transformation of Russia into a total dictatorship. In a sense, this is an accelerated previous version, the meaning of which is that if the West expects a total crisis, then the main thing is to survive before it happens. Since the representatives of the "liberals" are quite reasonably suspected of representing the interests of the West, they need to be removed from power as soon as possible, since they are weakening Russia on the eve of the crisis - carrying out the IMF's program to support the dollar economy.

The positive part of the program consists in intercepting financial flows from the “liberals” (which approximately doubles the resource of this group) within the framework of group interests and the forceful modernization of the economy along the lines of pre-war industrialization. Where to get the necessary resources and who will implement the relevant programs is not very clear. One thing is clear - the "siloviki" themselves will not be able to implement the relevant programs, they will have to significantly increase their support group, first of all, creating, practically from scratch, the country's administrative elite at all levels. Actually, as it was done in the 30s.

The third group, the importance of which should not be underestimated, is the regional elites, primarily the national ones. They no longer want the program of the 80s to divide the country (because they see the results of reforms in the former republics of the USSR), and in this sense they are ready to support any strong government in Moscow. Theoretically, they are more inclined to support the "siloviki" (since the "liberals" threaten the collapse of the country and increase the level of instability), but will desperately fight for privileges and access to budgetary funds. In any case, this is a serious resource of the country's leader in the process of building a system of checks and balances.

All other forces in Russia (“leftists”, monarchists, Russian nationalists, etc.) are highly marginalized and do not have any resources to strengthen their position. The only exception is the patriotic forces, which have greatly increased following the events in Ukraine. True, they have not yet put forward generally recognized leaders, but at the middle level of the "siloviki" (and even in the youth section of the "liberals") they have sharply increased. If the economic situation in the country deteriorates strongly and rapidly, it is possible that this group will present a new discourse, within which the political configuration in the country will be determined.

In the world the situation is even more complicated. After the "Strauss-Kahn case" there was a split in the global financial elite, which jeopardized the entire fate of the "Western" global project. The fact is that, as follows from our theory, the resource for the development of capitalism has been exhausted, as a result, the Western project lacks a positive program supported by resources. This leads to a sharp increase in anti-American sentiment in the world and the gradual coming to power in various countries of counter-elites who are a priori rigidly against the United States. And although, theoretically, they are not ready to completely destroy the existing system, however, since the United States does not have the resources to redistribute financial flows, it will be difficult for them. Especially after the acceleration of the economic crisis.

In reality, the elite of the "Western" project is divided into several groups that compete quite fiercely with each other, because, given the consequences of the crisis, there is no place "at the trough" for everyone. Roughly speaking, there are three such groups. The first is that part of the elite that cannot abandon the modern financial system based on emission. These are the largest banks and financial institutions, the world bureaucracy, both financial and political, part of the elite of nation states (not the USA). Their situation is very bad, especially after they failed to get their man (Summers) to the post of head of the Fed. I note that it is this group that manages the Russian “liberal” management group. All officials of the government, the Central Bank, expert groups close to the HSE, NES, the Gaidar Institute are representatives of this group. Of course, having an extremely low weight in it.

The second group is the part that is tied to the US national elite. They have two positive projects, so to speak, "maximum program" and "minimum program". The first is an attempt to implement a program to create a free trade zone between the US and the European Union, bringing down the rest of the world into total chaos. This program (conditionally it can be called "City on the Hill"), theoretically, will allow maintaining the standard of living of the "golden" half a billion (the USA and several countries of Western Europe) and the dominance of the elite of the "Western" project in the world.

The main advantage of this scenario is that, at the expense of the resource of rather wealthy EU residents, it will allow preserving the “middle class” in the United States, that is, it will allow not changing the socio-political model of the United States. But if events take a turn for the worse, there is a fallback option.

If this project is not implemented (I have my own opinion on this matter, but it is not entirely correct to discuss it here), then there remains the option of breaking up the world into currency zones, including the dollar zone, led by the United States, and the euro zone, which will include Western Europe. At the same time, serious technological degradation and a colossal drop in the living standards of the population are inevitable, so, of course, we would like to avoid this scenario.

The third group is that part of the global financial elite (let me remind you, the largest and richest, but, nevertheless, part of the elite of the "Western" global project), which is not directly connected with the United States. Its basis is the financial part of the former British Empire, which is usually associated with the name of the Rothschilds. Indirect data show that the main positive project of this group is precisely the disintegration of the world into currency emission zones, and it plans to take the place of the settlement system between these zones. She is not satisfied with the “hail on the hill” option, since in this case her positions are sharply weakened. It is for this reason that this group seeks contacts among the "siloviki" in Russia, actively supporting actions aimed at creating a ruble financial system and Eurasian integration - that is, the creation of a conditionally ruble regional financial system.

Proceeding from the described alignment, it is already possible to explain almost all the trends taking place in Russia. The "liberals" brought the Russian economy to a crisis, the recession began even at the end of 2012. However, the global financial system needs resources (the American bureaucrats gradually “closed” the issue), for this reason the Central Bank and the Russian government (the Ministry of Finance, in the first place) continue to actively stimulate the withdrawal of capital, the placement of our reserves in dollar assets (realizing that there is a serious chance of not getting this money back). At the same time, they are terribly afraid that they will be removed from power, since they have no alternative budgetary and administrative resources - in this case, they will lose all their assets in Russia within a year or two, and in the West, in the absence of Russia's support, they will be dispossessed in for several years.

From the point of view of the interests of the country (and the position of a man with a mandate from the people), Putin should have purged the liberals a long time ago. Their attitude to the "May" decrees alone is worth something! However, there is also a political expediency - since there are only two active groups in power, the liquidation of the "liberals" automatically makes Putin completely dependent on the "siloviki". Which, almost automatically, deprives him of any freedom whatsoever, including in terms of fulfilling his mandate to the people.

I think that it is this reason that stops Putin from punishing "liberal" officials for their outright sabotage. In addition, the dismissal of the "liberals" actually means a sharp strengthening of the anti-American line, the coming to power of the counter-elite, an open confrontation with the United States. We are clearly not ready for this - first of all, economically. The threat of real sanctions hangs quite seriously - and we have terrible weaknesses in the economy, for example, we have no seed grain, no breeding farms, not even eggs from which broilers hatch ... In such a situation, sudden movements can lead to extremely serious problems.

Actually, in recent years, the situation has been precisely expressed in the fact that the “liberals” and “siloviki” fought for administrative powers, the latter won in small things, the former fought back, in general, life went more or less calmly. At the same time, the level of conflict was constantly growing, both for reasons of external pressure (Ukraine), and because of the reduction of the “pie” that could be divided within the framework of an elite consensus. I note that this consensus was created just by the "liberals" in the 90s in the process of privatization and the destruction of the Soviet system of government (including the judicial and security systems). But the "siloviki" fit into it perfectly and fully support the corruption system. Actually, in this sense, the task of modernization facing society (and, perhaps, Putin) differs little from the problems of Ivan the Terrible, Peter I or Stalin.

Ukraine's problems of the past year sharply exacerbated these contradictions and brought the situation out of the sluggish process in which it had been for several years (which, in fact, is why I did not write forecasts for Russia). And today there are several options for the development of events, which it makes sense to talk about.

First of all, the Ukrainian events have seriously changed the position of the “siloviki”. If earlier they did not have any position in relation to the outside world - that is, in general, they agreed to the discourse that the "liberals" offered, the only question was on what positions to negotiate with the elite of the "Western" project, now it is enough several "parties" were clearly formed. And this gives a serious chance that instead of stretching the "siloviki" - "liberals", balanced by the position of the "regionals", another system of checks and balances can be built. Among the security forces, the party of patriotic monarchists clearly stood out, the party of the “new liberals” is somewhat less obvious, and, finally, the almost invisible, but existing party for the restoration of socialism. The latter is practically not formalized organizationally, however, against the background of the strengthening of the group, which is seriously trying to restore the monarchy in the country (and even drag the Romanovs), it can seriously strengthen.

As is often the case, consolidation within these proto-political parties comes at the expense of an external factor. The "monarchist patriots" are guided by the old continental elites of Western Europe, who are clearly trying to take revenge on the "Western" project for the defeats in World Wars I and II. In some places they even achieved local political success (Hungary) and the behavior of this country clearly shows who they see as a strategic ally. At the same time, for the Russian economy, “patriotic monarchists” nevertheless consider rigidly autarkic models. Far from always, they support strong integration with non-Slavic countries; Russian nationalists play an important role in this group, which, however, is natural, given who is the partner in Western Europe.

The "new liberals", who are even less clearly defined than the "patriots", have the same "Rothschilds" that I wrote about above as their main partner. Their policy is the widest possible Eurasian integration (a full-fledged currency zone, a self-sufficient system of division of labor must have at least 500 million consumers), the creation of a nominally ruble currency-issuing zone, close interaction with the leaders of other alternative zones, including with the American "isolationists" who may come to power in the United States following the 2016 elections. Note that for both the first and second groups oppose the "Western" global project, the "City on the Hill" project.

They also have significant differences. The first group is for a sharp strengthening of the role of Orthodoxy, limiting (but not stopping!) Eurasian integration beyond the borders of purely Slavic countries, and relatively limiting interaction with the current leaders of the "Western" project. And yet - for limiting interaction with China. The second group is much more pragmatic, it actively interacts with a part of the elite of the "Western" project and China (so far, however, more to its interest), does not really "love" the ROC, considering it too conservative and not flexible as a force, although it does not deny it consolidating role. Clearly focuses on non-Slavic countries within the framework of Eurasian integration (Turkey, Central Asia). is seriously considering the possibility of working with a number of Islamic countries.

But both of these groups have a very serious problem, which in the very near future, as they adapt and form an internal political position, will become basic. They have nothing to present to society as a constructive policy of combating the model of social order that was built in Russia in the 1990s. Society clearly does not accept it, hence the frantic ratings of Stalin (who is associated here with the idea of the government's responsibility to society) and Putin. However, in the latter case, there are also serious mistakes by the West, which, having built a dichotomy “Either Khodorkovsky and Navalny, as the “fathers of Russian democracy”, or “bloody executioner Putin”, joyfully pushed 90 percent of the people towards Putin.

In addition, not only Russia has economic problems, but also other countries that should be part of the "Eurasian zone", and some new slogans are needed that can compensate for economic competition within the framework of integration processes. It seems to me that the ideas of socialism could become a key element here, moreover, as the standard of living of the population falls, these ideas will inevitably manifest themselves, but so far there is practically no political group that could develop the corresponding idea.

It remains only to complete the general description of those groups that will interact with each other in 2015. It seems to me that it is precisely the consolidation of these groups that will be the main process determining the situation in the country in the coming year. In doing so, several important points can be noted.

First of all, Putin will not remove the “liberal” government and the leadership of the Central Bank until the mentioned proto-parties among the “siloviki” are clearly formed. The first, however, has already practically formed, if the Ministry of Defense is even more strengthened, it will become the coordinating center of this group, although representatives of other law enforcement agencies will also be included in it. The second group should form a purely political group. It must develop its electoral potential through harsh criticism of privatization and corruption from liberal positions and seek cooperation with the notorious Rothschilds and American isolationists. There are serious reasons that their efforts will be accepted by these groups, which, by the way, may become the basis for lifting sanctions against Russia.

I repeat once again: I believe that the possibilities for removing the "liberal" government will appear only after such a party, the "new liberals", will be more or less clearly formed and will be able to present their claim to form the economic course of the country.

As for the socialist course, it must be presented to society personally by Putin. I believe that it is foolish to abandon the Byzantine tradition of interaction between the leader of the country and society (everything else, in general, was not successful in the historically foreseeable period of time). Actually, the "May" decrees were just a movement in this direction - but having taken the first step, Putin did not take the second. At the same time, it is this direction that allows him to get real support from society, not in public opinion polls, but in the implementation of development programs. Serious support for this course (within some limited limits) will be provided by the regional elites. But the main thing is that only this direction will make it possible to sharply strengthen Russia's role in the world, including in the Islamic world. I note that the current processes of strengthening the authority of Russia and Putin personally (which causes a wild op in the controlled media) in Western society are connected precisely with the phantom image of the USSR as a carrier of alternative values to the “Western” global project.

As I already wrote, the Western project does not have a positive program today, but we do not have it either. And if there are no programs, then there is a banal struggle of resources, in which we have practically no chance. But if we are talking about the fact that we have a system of values and a positive program, but they do not, then the role of resources drops sharply ... And here we have not just a serious, but a very serious resource.

On this, in fact, I end. The forecast turned out to be rather relative: I consider the emergence of a “new liberal” party with the subsequent liquidation of the “liberal” party in Russia to be the key moments, but I don’t know yet when this will happen. It is not even certain that this will happen this year. As long as the "liberals" are in power, the crisis will continue, as will the sanctions against us. In addition, it is not very clear when Putin will begin to build the logic of socialist governance (at least partially). It seems to me that if he does not do this, then his very fragile interaction will be destroyed quite quickly at some point and he will have to leave. In this case, it is quite naive to talk about the forecast - the situation will go out of whack.

In general, for those who wanted accurate data on budget expenditures, the ruble exchange rate, and so on, I apologize. The degree of uncertainty is too great, we can only talk about the basic processes and groups, which I tried to describe.

M. Khazin, January-March 2015, Moscow