Prince Oleg Ryazansky - a traitor or a patriot? Relations of the Muscovite State with the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire in the XIV-XVII centuries

By the middle of the 15th century, the Golden Horde was divided into three separate states: the Kazan Khanate (created in 1445), the Crimean Khanate (1449) and the rest of the Golden Horde, which had its center in Sarai on the Lower Volga and was known as the Great Horde.

As V. I. Vernadsky notes, the formal political independence of Muscovy from the Tatar tsars could not and did not ensure the security of the Russian people. The interests of the Muscovite state assumed peaceful relations with the Crimean Khanate in order to ensure the security of the southern Russian lands.

The factors that determined the domestic policy of Crimea in question were completely different.

Since 1478, the Crimean Khanate officially became a vassal of the Ottoman Porte and remained in this capacity until the Peace of Kuchuk-Kaynarji in 1774. The appointment and removal of khans was usually carried out at the will of Istanbul. The social and ethnic composition of the population of the Crimean Khanate was not homogeneous. The process of Tatars settling was especially intensive in the mountainous and southern coastal regions of the Crimea, naturally, there was also a process of assimilation of Tatars with local residents. The steppe Tatars, who were not affected by the processes of assimilation, continued to be engaged mainly in cattle breeding. Farming for them for a long time was considered a troublesome business, and farming techniques remained primitive. It was they who were the main striking force in the fight against the Russian state.

The process of property and social differentiation in the period we are considering affected all the peoples that were part of the Crimean Khanate. Although the bulk of the population of the khanate, as before, were cattle breeders and farmers, who were called "black people". These people were personally free, they kept the tribal organization, which was the old shell, inside which the process of disintegration of the tribal system took place. The main social unit was the patriarchal family. The clan organization served for the ruling class as one of the means of strengthening its influence within the clan and for keeping its population in obedience. Having moved to the Crimea, the Tatars got acquainted with the agricultural community "dzhemaat". The form of land relations used in it was largely accepted by the Tatars. And gradually the community "Jemaat" came to replace the tribal community. There was collective ownership of the land, public hayfields, public wells, collective plowing of land, for the implementation of which several families united. The land in the community was distributed on shares, which eventually became the property of the farmer. This led to the emergence of property inequality among the community members.

The sources indicate that there were no regular troops in the Crimean Khanate, and in fact all men capable of carrying weapons took part in military campaigns.

The power of the khan was limited not only by the will of the sultan, but most importantly - by representatives of the most noble families - beys-karacheys, who were indispensable advisers to the khan. The Gireev family, having received the right to khanate power, failed to get the nobility to make the power hereditary and unlimited.

There were "small" and "big" councils, which played a very important role in the life of the state.

"Small" was called the council ("Small Divan"), if it was attended by a narrow circle of the nobility, who resolved issues that required urgent and specific solutions.

The "Big Sofa" is a meeting of the "whole earth", when all the Murzas and representatives of the "best" black people took part in it. Traditionally, the Karacheis retained the right to sanction the appointment of khans from the Girey clan as a sultan, which was expressed in the rite of placing them on the throne in Bakhchisarai.

In the Crimean Khanate, there was a constant struggle between noble Tatar families. The feudal authorities were often in opposition to the khan. The influence of the Turkish government, which sought to prevent the consolidation of the forces of the Crimean Khanate, affected internal strife. Turkey often created conflict situations within the country, which naturally weakened it. This made it possible to control not only the activities of the khan, but also the restless Crimean nobility, and direct the development of the state in the right direction for the Ottomans.

Incentives for raids, according to Novoselsky, were constantly born within the Crimea itself. “The Crimeans themselves, starting from the kings and ending with ordinary Tatars, have repeatedly stated that their attacks on Russia were caused only by their own internal needs and justified them only for form by some reasons allegedly arising from the Muscovite state.”

We dwelled in sufficient detail on the characteristics of the socio-political structure of the Crimean Khanate precisely because we consider its aggressive, “predatory” policy to be due to purely internal factors. However, Poland could objectively be the object of aggression of the Crimean feudal lords. The fact that Russia bore the brunt of the Tatar raids cannot be explained solely by the peculiarities of the internal socio-political development of Crimea. Nor can it be explained by the correlation of forces at the court of the Crimean Khan. Here, undoubtedly, external factors come into play that determined the (largely) anti-Russian orientation of Crimea's foreign policy.

The main stages in the development of Russian-Crimean relations.

Russia and Crimea at the end of the XV-beginning of the XVII century.

At the end of the 15th century, relations with the Crimean Khanate were generally favorable for Russia. Nikita Beklemishev, on behalf of Ivan III, concluded an alliance with Mengli Giray, the effect of which was to extend to the children and grandchildren of the Grand Duke. Its conditions were very favorable for Russia. The basis of the Russian-Crimean alliance was the struggle against the Great Horde and its heirs.

During the reign of Vasily III (1505-1533), the khans of Crimea went over to the Polish-Lithuanian side. The Crimean Khanate, having defeated at the beginning of the 16th century its main enemy in the Black Sea region - the Great Horde and eliminated the danger from its side, no longer needed, as it was in the second half of the 15th century, to maintain good neighborly relations with the Grand Dukes of Moscow.

During this period, an increasingly noticeable aggravation of Russian-Crimean relations took place, which had both an economic and a political basis. Relying on the support of the Ottoman Empire, the Crimean khans hatched plans for the defeat of Russia, the revival in a new version of the Horde yoke. He saw the achievement of the goal by preventing the growth of the power of the Russian state, organizing devastating raids on its lands, strengthening the Turkish-Crimean influence in the Volga region, creating the widest possible anti-Russian alliance, which, in addition to Crimea and Turkey, would include the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates and the Polish-Lithuanian state . Such a coalition, according to its creators, was supposed not only to nullify the influence of Russia, but also to establish Turkish-Crimean domination in Eastern Europe.

It should be noted that throughout the first half of the 16th century, the Russian-Lithuanian struggle continued for the reunification of the Western Russian lands, which demanded from Russia a huge effort and did not allow it to divert troops from here to other areas, and in particular to the south, troops sufficient to carry out offensive policy against the Crimea. And on the eastern borders, the hostile position of the ruling circles of the Kazan Khanate towards them was fettering the Russian forces, which in itself could not but have a negative impact on Russian-Crimean relations.

A major raid on Russian lands was made in 1515. The Crimean prince Mohammed-Girey with the Kiev governor Andrei Nemirov and the governor Ostafiy Dashkevich attacked Chernigov, Starodub and Novgorod-Seversky. It became clear that without the neutralization of the Crimea, neither an active Kazan policy nor effective resistance to Lithuanian attempts at revenge was possible. This explains the persistence of the Moscow sovereign in establishing strong diplomatic ties with the Porte. The Sultan was by no means going to sacrifice his interests in the Crimea and Kazan for the sake of an alliance with Russia, which in that situation did not promise him any real political benefits.

Moscow was aware of the close Turkish-Crimean ties and sought to use them to create a secure environment on its southern borders by concluding an alliance treaty with the Ottoman Empire. However, the anti-Russian tendencies in the policy of the Turkish ruling circles were so strong that they did not allow Russian diplomacy to solve this problem.

Let us dwell in more detail on the Crimean campaign of 1521. Mohammed Giray failed to attract Turkey and Astrakhan to the anti-Russian coalition, but even without their help he had very impressive forces. On the night of June 28, the Crimean Khan crossed the Oka. It is known that the well-known Lithuanian commander Yevstafiy Dashkevich fought in the troops of Mohammed Giray. Perhaps, there were detachments of Nogais among them.

For the first time in the history of armed clashes with Russia, Crimean troops broke into the deep regions of the Russian state, committing them to robbery and fires. This made a stunning impression on the inhabitants of the southern regions of the country. Already on June 29, many people fled to Moscow, "under siege." The state of siege of the capital lasted two weeks.

The devastation caused by the Crimean raid was enormous. Detachments of the Crimeans approached Moscow at XV km. During the raid, the Crimeans took a huge full. Herberstein gives a clearly inflated figure - 800 thousand prisoners. On August 12, the Crimean Khan hastily left the Russian land, because the Novgorod and Pskov troops were quickly advancing towards him. Herberstein explains the departure of the Crimean Khan by the fact that he received a letter on behalf of the Grand Duke, according to which Vasily III pledged to be "an eternal tributary of the king, just like his father and ancestors were."

The troops of Mohammed Giray and the detachments of Evstafy Dashkevich, moving away from Moscow, laid siege to Ryazan. However, the siege was unsuccessful. Herberstein says that, being unable to take Ryazan, Mohammed Giray sent his man to the fortress, offering the besieged to capitulate. At the same time, he referred to the charter of the Moscow sovereign. Ryazan Governor, Prince Khabar, demanded to see this document. But as soon as it was brought, he destroyed it. Thus ended the campaign of Mohammed Giray against Russia, which had a strong influence on changing the course of foreign policy.

A. A. Zimin characterizes the reasons for his success as follows: “The rapid advance of the Crimean troops into the depths of Russian territory was ... a surprise for Mohammed Giray himself. His detachments were only capable of robbing the defenseless population during short-term raids, after which they returned full to the Crimea. So it was this time".

The events of 1521 showed that Vasily III could not successfully fight in the west, south and east at the same time. From now on, Crimea became one of the most dangerous enemies of Russia, and the fight against its aggressive policy was Moscow's most important task.

After the death of Muhammad Giray, internecine struggle began in the Crimean Khanate, complicated by the attack of the Nogais in 1523, who devastated the Crimea for a month.

During the years 1521-1533. the question of ensuring its security in the south continued to be important for Russia. His place in the system of foreign policy became even greater after the Crimean Khanate, by its actions in 1521, showed that it was openly anti-Russian and was moving to a direct armed struggle against the Russian state.

However, as a result of the campaign against Russia, Mohammed Giray failed to solve his task - to defeat the Russian state by armed force. Moreover, his attempt to strengthen his influence in the Lower Volga region also ended in failure. All this, as well as a sharp intra-clan struggle, forced the ruling circles of Crimea to abandon the active struggle against Russia, which made it possible, firstly, to further intensify their activities in order to create a better defense system for the southern borders of the country and, secondly, to direct their efforts on the weakening of the anti-Russian edge of the foreign policy of the Crimea.

Skillful diplomatic policy of the Russian state in 1521-1533. has borne fruit. “The anti-Russian edge of the Crimean policy turned out to be somewhat blunted, and the situation on the southern borders of the Russian state was less tense.”

However, Moscow was aware that the most aggressive circles of the Crimean feudal lords only temporarily weakened their anti-Russian activity. The stabilization of the situation in the Crimea and the consolidation of Russia's opponents around the khan were bound to revive tendencies hostile to her in Crimean politics.

In 1533-1545. The most important task of Russian diplomacy was to eliminate the danger that hung over the southern borders of the country, having achieved the maintenance of peaceful relations with the Crimean Khanate. The Crimean Khanate, concerned about the strengthening of Russia's internal political position, was reluctant to normalize relations with it. But despite the unfavorable conditions in which Russian diplomacy often found itself, it, according to A. B. Kuznetsov, "showed great flexibility, perseverance in achieving its goal." She skillfully used any friction in the ruling circles of the Crimean Khanate on issues of Russian-Crimean relations, trying to attract to her side those forces that could influence the khan, to force him to abandon actions hostile to Russia.

The efforts of diplomacy were constantly reinforced by defensive measures. during the years 1533-1545. the Russian government is doing everything possible to secure the southern borders of the country from enemy attacks. The line of defense continues to improve, the concentration of Russian troops in the most dangerous sectors is being carried out. A serious test of the strength of the defensive measures of Russia was the Crimean-Turkish campaign of 1541. Having repulsed it, the Russian troops proved their combat capability and high fighting qualities.

The selfless struggle of Russian soldiers and the skillful actions of diplomats did not allow the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire standing behind it in the mid-30s and the first half of the 40s. XVI century to defeat the Russian state and establish its dominance in Eastern Europe. This was a significant success for Russia.

Russian-Crimean relations in the second half of the 16th century.

Throughout the second half of the 16th century, the Muscovite state and the Crimea confronted each other, as opponents, who were in an open struggle between themselves, which only at times subsided and took on the form of hidden antagonism. Before turning to the consideration of the history of the confrontation between the two states, we will make a few remarks about the reasons that determined the anti-Russian nature of the Crimean foreign policy during this period. The judgment that in relation to their neighbors, the Muscovite state and Poland, the Tatars were guided solely by considerations of greed and entered into an alliance either with Moscow or with Poland, depending on which side paid the commemoration more, comes from the recognition of such a degree of primitiveness of the Crimeans that no political motives could be assumed in it. Meanwhile, the Crimeans had a certain political calculation in their relations with their neighbors. Among their neighbors, they soon and quite correctly singled out, as their most dangerous enemy, not Poland, but the Muscovite state.

This point of view is also supported by the fact that throughout the entire Livonian War, the calculation of the Polish government for the assistance of the Tatars has always remained unchanged. The Polish government during the Livonian War three times (in 1558, 1567 and 1578) renewed its alliance with the Crimea, willingly forgetting about its violation of previously concluded agreements. The benefits of an alliance with the Tatars, according to Novoselsky, in the eyes of the Polish government a hundredfold paid off the damage caused to the Polish possessions by the Tatar raids. It should be noted that the attitude of the Polish and Moscow governments to the damage caused by the Tatar raids differed significantly from each other. The attacks of the Tatars did not threaten the political centers of Poland and almost did not affect the indigenous Polish lands; the disasters of the Ukraine already painfully hurt the Polish government, the attacks of the Tatars had a completely different meaning for the Muscovite state: the Tatars captivated the indigenous Russian population, they penetrated into the central regions and reached Moscow in the 16th century. For these reasons alone, it was easier for gentry Poland to reach an agreement with the Tatars.

Let's try to find out the role of the Crimean Tatars in the Livonian War. The Moscow government foresaw the danger of the Tatars intervening in the Livonian War, and even more so their alliance with Poland. The persistent diplomatic proposals of Ivan the Terrible to Poland for a treaty of peace and alliance against Crimea were intended to separate Poland and Crimea from each other and keep them from interfering in the war. That is how the intentions of the Russian Tsar were understood in Poland and therefore they rejected his proposals. For the same reasons, a little later, the Crimeans rejected Ivan IV's proposal to conclude a peace agreement. Poland and Crimea were equally afraid of the further strengthening of the Muscovite state; their interests coincided, and they preferred an alliance among themselves against Moscow to the peace proposals of Ivan IV.

Based on the indications of chronicles, bit books, Nogai, Crimean and some other documents, A. A. Novoselsky compiled a list of Tatar attacks in the second half of the 16th century. It shows that out of 24 years of the Livonian War, 21 years were marked by Tatar attacks; there is no indication of Tatar attacks only in 1566, 1575 and 1579. Devlet Giray himself made six attacks (1562, 1564, 1565, 1569, 1571, 1572); Crimean princes also made six attacks (1558, 1563, 1568, 1570, 1573, 1581). There is every reason to believe that the leadership of the Tatar campaigns by the king or prince is a direct evidence of the participation of large forces in them. Regardless of how successful the individual attacks of the Tatars ended, in their totality they had to divert a large number of Russian armed forces from operations in Livonia and against Poland. Ivan the Terrible was able to send only part of his troops to the western front. "The calculations of Moscow's opponents were based on just such a diversion of the Russian military forces."

The direct direct connection between the raids of the Tatars on Russian lands and the course of hostilities in Livonia becomes especially noticeable if we take into account the fact that 1575-1578 are the years marked by a break in the attacks of the Crimeans on Russia, became a time of increased activity of Russian troops in Livonia.

After 1578, the last, final period of the Livonian War begins. The Muscovite state defends itself against the united Poland and Sweden and against the Tatars, and with honor comes out of the struggle. It should be noted that during this period the Crimeans were not able to actively fight the Muscovite state, as they suffered (in 1578 and 1579) crushing defeats from the Persian troops.

At the end of the Livonian War, the Crimeans stopped their raids. The reason for the turn of the policy of the Crimea was that in 1593 Turkey began a difficult and long war with Hungary, in which Crimea was to take part. This put the Crimean Khan before the need to renew the peace agreement with the Moscow government. The cessation of the Crimean raids on Muscovy at the end of the 16th century and in the early years of the 17th century was thus primarily due to the international situation.

Participation of the Crimean Tatars in the Time of Troubles at the beginning of the 17th century.

A new round of military confrontation between the Russian state and the Crimea dates back to 1607. The first Tatar attacks coincide in time with the summer campaign of Tsar Vasily Shuisky against Bolotnikov. The Shuisky government tried to prevent the Tatars from interfering in the internal political struggle in the Russian state. For this purpose, a detachment of archers was sent to the Crimea with the most prominent governors and rich gifts. There was no hope that the Tatars could be sent to the Poles. The whole attempt was risky, as its outcome showed, but the position of the Shuisky government was such that it was not necessary to stop at anything.

In the next year, 1608, the Crimean Tatars did not take active actions against the Muscovite state. On the other hand, devastating raids in the Temnikov area were carried out by the Nogai Tatars.

In 1609, the main forces of the Crimeans began to move. Bussov in his "Moscow Chronicle" reports on the attacks of the Tatars, who "in three or four weeks took away many prisoners." If the "arrival" of the Tatars in 1609 coincided with the movement of the Polish king near Smolensk and the beginning of its siege, then the attack of the Tatars on Russia in 1610 coincided with the campaign of the Poles near Moscow. It should be noted that as early as the end of 1609, the Polish king received a “good answer” from the Sultan, containing assurances “of his constant friendship, adding that since it existed with our ancestors, we should also try to maintain it.”

The Tatar attacks were one of the essential circumstances that extremely complicated the situation of Tsar Vasily Shuisky. There was a growing mood of hopelessness and futility in the defense of the "unfortunate" king, "an unworthy reign." Such a mood could also develop in the ranks of the Ryazanians, who until now were loyal supporters of Tsar Vasily, and now they were forced to think about protecting their homes from the Tatars.

The attack of the Crimeans in 1611 coincided with the first attempt to liberate Moscow from the Poles. When, in July 1611, the Poles were finally isolated in Kitai-Gorod and in the Kremlin, and all attempts to help the garrison were repulsed, Crimeans and Nogais attacked the Moscow Ukraine. Subsequent memoirs that have come down to us do not distinguish between individual moments of the attack, do not distinguish between the invasions of the Tatars, the actions of the Lithuanian people, Cossack and other detachments: everything merged into an incessant and continuous “ruin”. On the basis of documentary data, A. A. Novoselsky established that in 1611 the Likhvinsky district was devastated by the Tatars, where Crimean and Lithuanian people came “unknown” and “reconquered” everything. Aleksinsky, Tarussky, Serpukhov counties, as well as Ryazan land, were also devastated.

It is noteworthy that the attack of the Tatars on the Moscow Ukraine coincides with the moment of the especially difficult situation of the Polish garrison in Moscow. This fact confirms Novoselsky's thesis about the random nature of the contradictions between Poland and the Crimea, about the natural one between the Crimea and the Russian state.

There are very few indications in the documents about the Tatar attacks in 1612. It was at this time that the relationship between Turkey and Poland changed and the struggle between them resumed. This distracted the main forces of the Crimean Tatars from attacks on the Moscow Ukraine. Since this year, attacks on Russia have been carried out almost exclusively by the forces of the Nogai hordes.

The restoration of the state administration system destroyed during the Time of Troubles and the election of Mikhail Romanov to the throne in 1613 led to the establishment of more peaceful relations between Moscow and the Crimea.

Crimean Khanate in the system of international relations of the XVI-XVII centuries.

The factor of Turkish military and political power far from unequivocally affected the nature of Russian-Crimean relations. On the one hand, any attempts by the Russian offensive against the Crimea would inevitably lead to a military clash with the Ottoman Empire, which would further complicate the international position of Russia, because its forces were clearly not enough to fight simultaneously on many fronts. That is why it was necessary to abandon plans for the military defeat of the Crimean Khanate and the question was raised of the need to ensure the security of the southern borders of the country by creating the most effective defense system possible, which was systematically developed and improved throughout the first half of the 16th century. But at the same time, one cannot fail to note the fact that during the 16th century there were periods of hostile relations between the Turkish sultan and the ruling elite of Crimea. Of course, this did not mean that Crimea ceased to be a conductor of Turkey's will. However, this significantly complicated the implementation of Turkey's policy towards Russia and created scope for the activities of Russian diplomacy.

Russian diplomacy and the Russian government took advantage of not only those political circles in the Crimea that were inclined to maintain peace with Russia, but also internal contradictions arising in the system of Muslim yurts, trying to prevent the creation of a united anti-Russian front. At the same time, they also searched in the south for those forces that could be opposed to the most implacable opponents of the Russian state. Hence the attempts to support Astrakhan and the Nogai Horde against Crimea.

We can agree with A. A. Novoselsky that the impact of Poland on Russian-Crimean relations was unequivocal, and the measures to consolidate the forces of all Christian states were purely declarative. It is known that in order to justify the agreements with the Crimea during the Livonian War, which discredited the reputation of the Polish kings, King Stefan Batory developed a whole theory of the conquest of the Muscovite state in order to subsequently turn all forces against the Tatars and Turks and, thus, implement the plans of the Pope. Stefan Batory spoke in an upbeat tone about the fact that Muscovy was in danger of being captured by the Turks; if this happens, then woe to Europe. In view of this, all of Europe must support the conquest plans of the king in the Muscovite state. As soon as such statements corresponded to reality, the Polish government had to go to the conclusion of an alliance treaty with Moscow, directed directly against the "Muslim threat". However, all proposals to conclude such an agreement were rejected by the Polish side. All this allows us to say that Poland and Crimea objectively acted as allies in the struggle against the Muscovite state throughout the entire 16th century. The raids of the Crimean Tatars on Poland, as A. A. Novoselsky convincingly shows, did not cause significant harm to the indigenous Polish lands and did not pose a threat to the existence of the Polish statehood. They were largely "spontaneous" in nature and were not sanctioned by the Crimean Khan. All this allows us to speak about the existence of a certain foreign policy course of the Crimean Khanate and draw conclusions about its predominantly anti-Russian orientation.



The history of our Fatherland is full of myths that are firmly rooted in the minds of Russians. For example, we were told from school that the hordes of Batu did not take Novgorod in 1238 only because of the notorious spring thaw. In fact, the bloodless horde already simply did not have the strength to storm this well-fortified city - our ancestors desperately resisted the conquerors and inflicted heavy losses on them.
Or another myth - about the traitorous prince Oleg Ryazansky, who betrayed the all-Russian cause and did not oppose Mamai under the banner of Dmitry Donskoy. This myth will be discussed.

border principality

Ryazan was the first Russian city that in 1237 took upon itself the first - and most terrible - blow of the Mongol horde that poured into Russia. This is told by a remarkable work of Russian medieval literature - "The Tale of the Ruin of Ryazan by Batu". The people of Ryazan rejected the demand of the horde's ambassadors to pay tribute, and the reciprocal Russian embassy, ​​which arrived at Batu with gifts, was killed by the steppes. Batu Khan, excluding any possibility of a peaceful outcome of the negotiations, put forward a brazen demand - to give the Mongols the sisters and daughters of the Ryazan princes as concubines. Moreover, Batu demanded from the head of the embassy, ​​Prince Fyodor: "Give me, prince, to know your wife's beauty." “It is not proper for us Christians,” the Russian prince answered with dignity, “for you, the impious king, to lead your wives to fornication. If you overcome us, then you will rule over our wives.” And the embassy was killed under Tatar sabers... Fyodor's wife Evpraksia, having learned about the death of her husband, threw herself together with her little son from the window of the tower onto the stones of the yard. Ryazan, Pronsk, Murom, Izheslav squads met the enemy in the field. The battle was desperate, but short-lived - it could not have been otherwise due to the multiple numerical superiority of the conquerors. Ryazan fell after a seven-day continuous assault, was burned and destroyed, and the inhabitants of the city were slaughtered clean or taken away to the full. The first Russian partisan noted in history appeared on Ryazan land - the Ryazan governor Yevpaty Kolovrat. With a small detachment, he battered the rear of the Horde army for more than a month, until he fell into a deadly ring and died. The Ryazan land plundered by Batu has since then been systematically subjected to devastating raids. "Dyudenev's army", "Nevryuev's army" - there are no number of ruins. The burnt villages were just being rebuilt and miraculously surviving children were growing up, when the merciless steppe cavalry swooped in again, leaving behind only corpses and ashes. The Ryazan principality lay on the border with the Great Steppe and always became the first victim of the next invasion. Already in something, but in sympathy for the Horde residents of this unfortunate region could not be suspected in any way (as well as their rulers, the Ryazan princes). The Horde was a primordial enemy for the people of Ryazan, and hatred of the steppe robbers was passed down from generation to generation and absorbed with mother's milk. Of course, in the squabble of the feudal lords for power, all means were good - in this respect, the Russian princes were no different from their counterparts, European barons and counts. And yet, it is not very hard to believe that at the moment of the decisive battle, a battle that could put an end to the age-old domination of a predator that sucked all the juices from the entire Russian land, it was the Ryazan prince who turned out to be a traitor. But let us leave ethical considerations and analyze the historical facts.

Hand of Moscow

The XIV century in Russia is the time of the unification of Russian lands under the strong hand of Moscow. It didn't happen all at once, and it didn't happen all of a sudden. There was also a long rivalry between Moscow and Tver for the right to become the leader; the strengthening of the power of the Moscow principality was resisted with weapons in the hands of the Suzdal, Nizhny Novgorod (and Ryazan!) princes. The XIV century in Russia is the time of the most fierce feudal civil strife. As was the case everywhere in the Middle Ages, the parties were not shy in choosing means to achieve their goal. Murders, betrayals, violation of oaths and treaties, neglect of even family ties were the most common things. The coveted prize - a label for a great reign - was issued in the Golden Horde, and the princes struggled with all their might for the right to be called "great". And very often rivals turned to the khans for help and brought the Horde detachments to Russia. The fact that at the same time entire regions of Russia were devastated did not bother the warring princes at all. Firstly, such actions were the norm of that wild era, and secondly, in the course of a fierce struggle for power, the sufferings of the people were never taken into account by anyone, anywhere. According to the princely pedigree of the Rurikids, dating back to the Kiev prince Yaroslav the Wise, the Ryazan prince Oleg Ioannovich was no worse than the Moscow prince, and his principality, according to the labels of the Horde rulers, was considered as Great as Tver and Moscow. And there lived in the memory of generations of Ryazan residents a bloody grudge against their neighbors who did not come to their aid in the terrible year of the Batu invasion. So it seems that the very political situation of that time suggests: yes, the betrayal of the Ryazan prince was more than possible. The interests of the Ryazan principality at the time of Oleg's accession to the prince's throne were severely infringed by Moscow. Some of the original Ryazan lands (Kolomna and Lopasnya) passed to the Moscow princes. Under the father of Dmitry Donskoy, the Ryazan boyars, who played the role of a collegiate mentor under the minor prince Oleg, took advantage of Moscow's misfortune - the "black pestilence" - and recaptured Lopasnya. The Grand Duke of Moscow, John Ioannovich ("meek and quiet", according to the chronicler) resigned himself to the loss of Lopasnya, but the thorn remained. In 1365, the Horde prince Tagai attacked the Ryazan region with another raid. With a sudden attack, he captured, robbed and burned Pereslavl, "laid empty" neighboring volosts and turned back to the Horde. Oleg Ioannovich did not endure evil: together with the squads of the Pronsky and Kozelsky princes, he chased Tagay, overtook him at the Shishevsky forest and utterly defeated him, killing the raiders almost without exception. But now, having dared to raise a hand against such a force, Oleg Ryazansky involuntarily had to look for an ally, which could only be the Grand Duke of Moscow. It is not known (neither treaty letters nor evidence of chroniclers have come down to us) how Oleg Ioannovich managed to enter into an alliance with Moscow after the hostile sortie of his boyars against Lopasnya, however, in 1370, when the Lithuanian prince Olgerd threatened Moscow, the Ryazan army joined the Moscow army. and Pronsky regiments. Assessing the situation, Olgerd did not accept the battle and asked for peace. So, Oleg and Dmitry are allies. However, the dispute between Moscow and Ryazan about priority remained unresolved. In 1371, the Ryazan boyars decided to repeat the "Lopasninsky option" and take away Kolomna from Moscow in the same way. The advisers pushed the Ryazan prince to invade. In the Battle of Skornishchev, not far from Pereslavl, the Ryazan army was defeated by the Moscow governor Dmitry Volynsky (the same Bobrok-Volynets, who nine years later won unfading fame on the Kulikovo field). This battle clearly showed Oleg that he could not compete with Moscow. And over Ryazan, and over all Russian land, the insatiable Golden Horde still hung like a black cloud. And all further actions of both Oleg Ryazansky and Dmitry Moskovsky were dictated by simple historical logic.

Russia and the Horde

After the defeat at Skornishchev, Oleg fled and lost power: Pronsky Prince Vladimir sat on the Ryazan table. Oleg went to the Horde, where he enlisted the support (most likely, he simply bought this support) of the temnik Salakhmir and returned to Russia with the Horde military force. Vladimir did not resist and lost Ryazan without a fight. Dmitry did not intervene in the disassembly between the Prince of Pronsk and Oleg, although he could have. Salakhmir acted on his own initiative, and if the Moscow prince defeated his detachment, Dmitry had every chance to justify his actions to the khan. However, Dmitry preferred to see Oleg in Ryazan: he reconciled the Ryazan and Pronsk princes and concluded a defensive and offensive alliance with Oleg (there are links to the text of this agreement in Dmitry Ivanovich's contractual letters with Olgerd and Mikhail Tversky). And more in the annals is not mentioned the enmity between Oleg and Dmitry. Moreover, Moscow comes to the defense of Ryazan from the Horde raids. In 1373, the Horde burned and plundered the lands of the Ryazan principality, but immediately retreated as soon as they learned about the Moscow regiments attacking them. In 1377, Prince Arapsha defeated the Muscovite army on the Pyana River and took Nizhny Novgorod. Arapsha did not dare to go to Moscow, but on the way to the steppe he plundered and burned (for the umpteenth time!) the long-suffering Ryazan. Oleg was wounded by arrows and barely escaped. In 1378, Mamai, who by this time had become the de facto ruler of the Golden Horde, sent the temnik Begich to roughly punish the Moscow prince and bring him to complete obedience. And none other than Oleg Ryazansky informed Dmitry about the movement of a strong and numerous Horde army. The Moscow prince realized that this was not just an ordinary predatory raid, but a punitive expedition, and drew the appropriate conclusions. Due to the speed of Begich's movement, there was no time to assemble the all-Russian militia, and Dmitry spoke only with the Moscow regiments, which were joined by the squads of Oleg and Prince Vladimir of Pronsk. On Ryazan land, near the Vozha River, the Horde army suffered a crushing defeat - it was almost completely exterminated, and Begich himself died. Mamai hastily gathered the detachments he had at hand and rushed to Russia. Khan devastated the Ryazan land (Ryazan again!), plundered and burned its best cities, but did not dare to engage in battle with the large Moscow army, which blocked his road to Moscow on the Oka, and retreated to the steppe. So, in two years - two most terrible invasions of Ryazan, invasions comparable in their devastating consequences to Batyev. And after that, Oleg burned with love for the Golden Horde and became a traitor to the Russian land? Or did the tips of the Horde arrows, which left scars on the body of the prince, awaken in him the love for the steppe robbers? Arapsha and Begich (and a little earlier - Tagai) once again showed what the Horde is for Russia, and no prince could not ignore the moods of his subjects. And besides, even from a purely pragmatic point of view, the dilemma that confronted Oleg was extremely simple: either be a vassal of a stronger (as the experience of confrontation proved) Moscow prince, or remain a submissive tributary of the khan (even with a coveted label for a great reign) and meekly endure and further Horde lawlessness. And the prospect of guaranteed possession of the grand-ducal title did not look cloudless at all - the not-too-powerful ruler of the constantly ruined Ryazan lands had enough rivals experienced in internecine squabbles in Russia.

At the decisive hour

Chroniclers (and behind them historians), accusing Oleg of betrayal, refer to the fact that the Ryazan militia did not join Dmitry's army, and Oleg himself entered into an agreement with Mamai. But why, then, before the decisive battle, Dmitry did not devastate the lands of the traitor and crush his squad, but calmly left the enemy in the rear? He could well do it, moreover, he was obliged to do so according to all the rules of warfare. In the epic confrontation on the Kulikovo field, in addition to the two main forces, there was also a third - the Lithuanian army of Jogaila. If it had appeared on the battlefield, the outcome of the Battle of Kulikovo could have been completely different. It is believed that Jogaila was simply late, and therefore did not help Mamai. But this is not so - the Moscow army moved towards the Don very slowly, covering the Moscow lands in case Jagiello suddenly decides to rush directly to Moscow instead of going to connect with Mamai. The Lithuanians moved in parallel, by the beginning of the battle, the army of Jogaila was only one day's march from the Kulikovo field, but did not go further. Why? Yes, because the squad of Prince Ryazansky was located nearby - in full readiness to interfere with this movement. Dmitry knew that Oleg himself would not stab him in the back, and would not allow Jagiello to do this. This is the only way to explain the unforgivable - if we assume that Oleg was a traitor - the mistake of Dmitry, who did not leave any reserves beyond the Don in case of interference in the battle on the side of Mamai by the Lithuanian cavalry or Ryazan regiments. However, let's assume that both Oleg and Jagiello were really late and missed their chance. But if so, then why is Dmitry (already Donskoy), returning with a victory, moving around the lands of the "traitor", specifically ordering none of the Ryazanians "not to blaspheme and not offend." But the forces for the defeat of Ryazan, despite even the heaviest losses in the Battle of Kulikovo, the Grand Duke of Moscow had enough. Is this the punishment for betrayal? Oleg played with both Mamai and Jagaila the subtlest and most dangerous diplomatic game - and won. Mamai accepted the plan proposed to him by Oleg for a simultaneous attack on Dmitry's army by the combined forces of all three allies. Under the terms of the agreement between Oleg and Jagaila, it was stipulated that they would enter the battle only after the connection of the Ryazan and Lithuanian troops. And this, as you know, did not happen. Dmitry, moving from the Oka to the Don, reliably covered the Ryazan lands from the inevitable defeat that could be done by Mamai, who intended to return Russia in the time of Batu. And after the Mamaev massacre, despite the label of a traitor hung on Oleg and dissatisfaction with the actions of the Ryazan traitors among the common people, Dmitry Donskoy does not take any hostile steps towards the apostate prince. But Dmitry did not consider it necessary to explain "who is who" - it is still unknown how everything will go further there, and it is not the time to reveal all your cards to a friend (and therefore to an enemy). The Ryazan boyars themselves came to Dmitry for forgiveness, and he forgave them. In 1381, a new treaty was signed between Moscow and Ryazan, and Oleg recognized Dmitry as his elder brother. Note that in this way the Ryazan prince was equated with Prince Vladimir Serpukhov, who was awarded the nickname "Brave" for his valor on the Kulikovo field. I wonder for what merits the traitor prince was given such an honor?

Double game

Just two years after the Battle of Kulikovo, in 1382, a new khan, Tokhtamysh, invaded Russia, who managed to stop the disintegration of the Golden Horde and even temporarily restore to it a semblance of its former power. Another accusation of Oleg of betrayal is connected with this invasion: the Ryazan prince showed the Khan the way to Moscow and the fords on the Oka. Tokhtamysh advanced swiftly. Dmitry, having received news from Oleg about the approach of the enemy, leaves a garrison in Moscow to defend the capital, and he himself goes to Pereslavl-Zalessky to gather regiments. Oleg informed his "elder brother" in a timely manner, and he himself entered into the same game with Tokhtamysh as with Mamai, removing the threat from his tormented lands. The accusations brought against Oleg Ryazansky by the chroniclers are untenable. Moscow by this time had already existed for more than three hundred years, was the capital of a state that was gaining strength, was repeatedly visited by merchants, and therefore it is very doubtful that no one other than the Ryazan prince knew the roads to it. The same applies to the fords on the Oka - their location was by no means a strategic secret, known only to a narrow circle of people. Oleg really convinced Tokhtamysh to go to Moscow, but who benefited from this? From a military point of view, the Horde army had to bypass Moscow and overtake Dmitry, without giving him time to gather all his forces. And Tokhtamysh ran into the stone walls of the Moscow Kremlin. The first Russian cannons ("mattresses") were installed on the walls of the fortress, and the assault was drowned in the blood of the Horde. Khan lost the advantage of surprise and mobility - time worked for Dmitry Donskoy. A little more, and the matter would simply have ended with the second Battle of Kulikovo - with the same result. Moscow was ruined by the cunning of the Horde, the betrayal of the Nizhny Novgorod princes Vasily and Semyon, who persuaded the townspeople to open the gates and enter into negotiations with the enemy, and the gullibility of the Muscovites. Tokhtamysh broke into the Kremlin and made a wild massacre there, but quickly got away, having learned about the approach of the troops of Vladimir Serpukhov and Dmitry himself. Returning to the steppe, the khan subjected the Ryazan lands to merciless devastation. Is this a reward for Oleg's faithful service? No, the khan realized who (in modern terms) the Ryazan prince was actually working for, and severely took revenge on him. Subsequent events confirm this version. The Moscow prince again showed amazing tolerance towards the "traitor", and in 1386, through the mediation of Sergius of Radonezh, an agreement was signed on the eternal union of Moscow and Ryazan.

And one more stroke testifying in favor of Oleg Ryazansky. In 1387, Prince Dmitry Ioannovich Donskoy gave his daughter Sophia in marriage to Oleg's son, Fedor. Yes, military and political alliances were sealed by dynastic marriages (and not only in the Middle Ages), but for the Grand Duke of Moscow to become related to a multiple traitor to the Russian land, this seems very, very unlikely. In Russian history there were all sorts of figures, there were true traitors in it (for example, the same Nizhny Novgorod princes Vasily and Semyon, who played a fatal role in the plunder of Moscow by Tokhtamysh). However, I would like the shameful stigma of a traitor to decorate no one undeservedly.

TEXTS FOR RESULTS No. 1 in HISTORY Grade 10

Text No. l. From a historical source.

“In the year 6370 they expelled the Varangians across the sea, and did not give them tribute, and began to rule themselves, and there was no truth among them, and clan upon clan stood up, and they had strife, and began to fight with each other. And they said to themselves: "Let's look for a prince who would rule over us and judge by right." And they went across the sea to the Varangians, to Russia ... The Chud, Slavs, Krivichi and all said to the Rus: “Our land is great and plentiful, but there is no order in it. Come reign and rule over us." And three brothers with their clans were elected, and they took all of Russia with them, and the eldest, Rurik, came and sat in Novgorod, and the other, Sineus, on Beloozero, and the third, Truvor, in Izborsk. And from those Varangians the Russian land was nicknamed.

C1. Give the title of the document and the name of its author. What events are mentioned in the document?

C2. What event is referred to in the passage? What caused it? Give at least two reasons.

SZ. What were the consequences of the event described in the historical source? List at least three consequences.

An example of an answer to text No. 1.

C1. Answer:

It may be indicated that

1) the name of the document - "The Tale of Bygone Years";

C2. Answer:

1. It may be indicated that we are talking about the calling of the Varangians.

2. The following reasons can be given:

1) “family to generation arose”;

2) strife and strife began;

3) this prompted the search for a prince who would own and judge by law.

SZ. Answer.

The following consequences can be named:

1) in response to the call, three Varangian brothers came;

2) the elder Rurik began to reign in Novgorod, Sineus - in Beloozero, and Truvor - in Izborsk;

3) the calling of the Varangians marked the beginning of the first princely dynasty - the Rurik dynasty.

Text No. 2. From the agreement between Prince Igor and the Greeks in 945.

“In the year 6453, Roman, and Constantine, and Stefan sent ambassadors to Igor to restore the former world ... And they brought the Russian ambassadors, and ordered them to speak and write down the speeches of both on the charter:

If one of the Russians plans to destroy this friendship, then the baptized of them may accept revenge from God Almighty for that, and condemnation to eternal death, and the unbaptized may not accept help from God and Perun, may they not defend themselves with their shields and their other weapons and may they be slaves forever in the Hereafter.

And let the Grand Duke of Russia and his boyars send ships to the Greek land to the great kings of Greece, as many as they want, with ambassadors and merchants, as it is established for them ...

If a slave runs away from Russia, then the slave should be caught, since Russia came to the country of our kingdom, if the slave fled from the holy Mama; if the fugitive is not found out, then let our Christians swear an oath to Russia according to their faith, and not Christians according to their own law, and then let Russia take the price of a slave on us (Greeks), as established before, 2 silk per slave ... "

C1. Name the chronological framework of the period of Igor's reign. What was the purpose of the treaty of 945? What was the nature of the terms of the treaty for Russia?

C2. What was the punishment for violating the terms of the document? Name at least two positions. Make a conclusion about the beliefs of the population of Russia in the middle of the X century.

SZ. What conclusions can be drawn from the text of the treaty on the economic development of Russia using knowledge of the course of national history? List at least two conclusions.

Text No. 4. From a historical source.

“Do not forget the poorest of all, but feed as much as you can, and give to the orphan, and justify the widow yourself, and do not let the strong destroy a person. Do not kill the right or the guilty, and do not command to kill him; even if he is guilty of death, then do not destroy any Christian soul ...

And now I will tell you, my children, about my work, how I worked on the road and on the hunt from the age of thirteen. First I went to Rostov through the land of the Vyatichi; my father sent me, and he himself went to Kursk ...

And in the spring, my father put me in Pereyaslavl above all the brethren ... and on the way to Priluk-city, the Polovtsian princes suddenly met us, with eight thousand, and wanted to deal with them, but the weapons were sent forward on wagons, and we entered city...

And then Oleg went to me with all the Polovtsian land to Chernigov, and my squad fought with them for eight days for a small shaft and did not allow them to enter the prison, I took pity on Christian souls, and burning villages, and monasteries and said: “Let them not boast pagans." And he gave his father's table to his brother, and he went to his father's table in Pereyaslavl...

And from Chernigov to Kyiv about a hundred times I went to my father, one day driving before evening. And in total there were eighty campaigns and three great ones, and I won’t mention the rest of the smaller ones. And he concluded worlds with the Polovtsian princes without one twenty, and with a father and without a father ...

Do not condemn me, my children or anyone else who reads: I do not praise myself or my courage, but I praise God and glorify mercy for the fact that he has protected me, a sinner and a bad one, from mortal dangers for so many years, and not lazy He created me, and fit for all kinds of human deeds.

C1. To what century does the work from which this passage is taken belong? What is it called? Who is its author?

C2. Using knowledge from the history course, indicate what the author of the work is famous for. List at least three positions.

SZ. Using the text of the passage, name at least two problems that concern the author. What character traits does he celebrate? List at least two character traits.

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BOARD OF VASILY III AND ELENA GLINSKAYA

The struggle for succession to the throne in the last years of the life of Ivan III. Domestic policy of Basil III. Completion of the struggle of the non-possessors and the Josephites. Moscow is the third Russia. Russian-Lithuanian wars. Family affairs of Vasily III. Elena Glinskaya.

THE FIGHT FOR THE SUCCESSION IN THE LAST YEARS OF IVAN III'S LIFE
After the death of the eldest son of Ivan III from his first marriage, Ivan the Young, his son Dmitry remained, who, as the direct heir, had the legal right to a great reign after the death of his grandfather, but the matter was complicated by that. That Ivan Vasilyevich also had a younger son, Vasily, from his second marriage to Sophia, who had no less right to consider himself an heir than Dmitry. The law governing the succession to the throne did not yet exist. Whom to be the heir was decided only by the Grand Duke, of his own free will. Naturally, both the daughter-in-law of the Grand Duke, Elena, and his wife Sophia, through court intrigues, tried to ensure the Moscow throne in the future, each to her son. Both women had their influential supporters among the court boyars, among whom there was also no unanimity of opinion about which of the two applicants would inherit the princely throne in the future. Dmitry's supporters believed that he naturally inherited his father's right to a great reign, Vasily's supporters objected to this that it was not right to give preference to a grandson over a son, and even descended from the maternal line of the Byzantine emperors. Ivan III himself initially gave preference to his grandson, especially after a conspiracy was uncovered against Dmitry and Elena, behind which stood Vasily and Sophia, who, according to some reports, plotted to poison Elena and Dmitry. After that, Sophia and Vasily fell into disgrace, and many of their supporters were executed. On January 4, 1498, Ivan Vasilievich officially announced Dmitry as his successor. And he solemnly crowned him to the kingdom in the Assumption Cathedral with the cap of Monomakh. Elena triumphed. But her triumph did not last long. A year later, Ivan III, for reasons that are not entirely clear, returned his former location to his wife and son, and in 1499 he proclaimed Vasily the Grand Duke of Novgorod and Pskov, and in 1502 the Grand Duke of All Russia. Elena, now in disgrace, died in 1504 in prison. And Dmitry, who had long lost the favor of his grandfather, immediately after the death of Ivan Vasilyevich, was imprisoned by Vasily in prison, where he died in 1509.

Thus, after the death of Ivan III in 1505, his son from his second marriage, Vasily (1505-15033), became the Grand Duke.

INTERNAL POLICY OF BASILY III
In internal and external affairs, Vasily continued the policy of his father: “In fact, there are few examples in history,” wrote N.I. Kostomarov - when the reign of the sovereign could be called a continuation like this. And although Vasily did not inherit the political talents of his predecessor, but being a zealous supporter of a strong centralized state and unlimited autocratic power, he managed to complete the unification of the Russian lands, which his father did not have time to complete.

Under Vasily, Pskov was annexed to Moscow in 1510, in 1513 Volotsky appanage, in 1514 Smolensk, in 1521 Ryazan, in 1518 the principality of Starodubskoye, and in 1523 the principality of Novgorod Severskoye.

It seems significant that only Smolensk was annexed by military means, which was recaptured from Lithuania as a result of the second Russian-Lithuanian war of Vasily III (1512-1522). The rest of the lands were annexed in a completely peaceful way without unnecessary victims, violence and bloodshed.

The reason for the annexation of Pskov was a quarrel between the Pskovites and the Grand Duke's posadnik Vasily Ivanovich Repnya - Obolensky, who was appointed governor of Pskov, the Grand Duke in 1508. The Pskovites complained to the prince that the posadnik did not observe their Novgorodian customs, judged and ordered without the will of the veche, appointed his own people in the volosts, who robbed and oppressed the inhabitants. The posadnik, in turn, complained that the people of Pskov were interfering with his courts and duties, causing dishonor and violence to his people. Vasily III immediately took advantage of this conflict and declared Pskov his fiefdom. The Pskov veche was abolished, and the veche bell was taken to Novgorod, where the Grand Duke was at that time. The Pskovites, although painfully perceived the loss of their independence, did not dare to resist the Grand Duke. The Pskov Republic ceased to exist.

Naturally, Volotsky appanage was attached to Moscow, since the last Volotsky prince, Fyodor Borisovich, died childless.

Also, due to the childlessness of Prince Vasily Semyonovich, the Starodub principality was annexed.

The Ryazan principality lost its independence after the last Ryazan prince - Ivan Ivanovich, having decided to free himself from the dependence of the Grand Duke and become completely independent, entered into an agreement with the Crimean Khan Mahmed - Girey, and even was going to marry his daughter. Upon learning of this, Vasily ordered Ivan to come to Moscow, and when he arrived with extreme reluctance in 1517, he accused him of treason and imprisoned him, and exiled his mother Agrepin to a monastery. True, in 1521, during the raid of Mahmed-Girey on Moscow, Ivan managed to escape to Lithuania. Where he died in 1534.

During the reign of Vasily III, the Principality of Novgorod-Severskoye was the last to be included in the Moscow lands. His prince Vasily Shemyachich was accused of conspiring with the Polish-Lithuanian king Sigismund and imprisoned.

In his domestic policy, Vasily relied on the clergy, who supported him in the fight against the opposition. Under Vasily III, Metropolitan Varlaam fell into disgrace, the boyars V.V. Shuisky and I.M. Vorotynsky, Maxim Grek and Vassian Patrikeev, Beresten-Beklemeshev was executed.

COMPLETION OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE NON-POSSIBLE AND THE JOSEPHLANES
After the Council of 1503, the dispute between the non-possessors and the Josephites did not stop and continued. After the death of Nil Sorsky in 1507, his ideas were supported and developed in his writings by Nil's student, Prince Vissian Patrikeyev, a man with an interesting fate. Before his monasticism, he was Prince Vasily Ivanovich Patrikeev. In 1499, he fell into disgrace with Ivan III for speaking out against the strengthening of the power of the Grand Duke. He was forcibly tonsured a monk and exiled to the Kirillo-Belozersky Monastery. Vissian was distinguished by a moral way of life, as well as great learning and literary talent. He advocated not only the secularization of monastic lands, but also the independence of the church from state power, called for tolerance for heretics, and drew attention to the plight of the peasants in the monastic estates. Vasily III respected Vissian and in 1509 returned him from exile to Moscow and brought him closer to himself. But under him, Vissian again fell out of favor after he spoke out against the second marriage of the prince.

Basil III, like his father, was tempted by the idea of ​​secularization of church lands, but the Josephites were also sympathetic to him, as supporters of strong grand ducal power, and after long hesitation, he supported the money-grubbers. As a result, the church council of 1531 condemned nonpossessors. Vissian Patrikeyev was again exiled to the Volokolamsk Monastery. Where he lived until his death in 1545. Other non-acquirers were also sentenced, some to imprisonment in a monastery, and some to death. This time, the Josephites won the final victory.

MOSCOW THIRD ROME
In the first years of Vasily's reign, the first national socio-religious theory "Moscow the Third Rome" appeared, the author of which was the rector of the Elizarovsky monastery Filofey. In his message addressed to the clerk of the embassy order Misyur Munekhin, and in fact Vasily III, in 1510 Filofei wrote the following: and this is the Russian kingdom: for two Romes have fallen, a third stands, and there will be no fourth.” From the explanations of Philotheus it follows that after the fall of the first Rome, in which Christianity was born and became the state religion, its successor Byzantium became the new center of Christianity. And after the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1553, the third Rome, Moscow, became the last stronghold of Christianity.

Filofey's theory is often accused of being reactionary, attributing to it imperial ambitions, the ideas of God's chosenness and national exclusivity of the Russian people. Which is actually not true. Philotheus invested in his theory a purely religious content. He only meant that after the fall of Rome and Byzantium, the Muscovite state remained the only Orthodox state, which imposed on the Grand Duke the responsibility and duty to protect, protect and preserve the last refuge of Orthodoxy.

RUSSIAN-LITHUANIAN WARS
Relations between Russia and the Lithuanian state under Vasily III continued to be tense. Vasily pursued a policy towards Lithuania initiated by his father and sought to annex the Russian lands that remained in its composition. Lithuania, on the other hand, could not come to terms with the loss of land in the previous two wars, and was preparing to take revenge. These contradictions between the two states on the territorial issue eventually led to two more Russian-Lithuanian wars.

RUSSIAN-LITHUANIAN WAR 1507-1508
The war was started by the younger brother and successor of Alexander-Sigismund I, who died in 1506, who, through his ambassadors in Moscow, presented Vasil III with an ultimatum on the return of all the lands that had seceded to Russia under the Annunciation Truce. However, this ultimatum was resolutely rejected in Moscow. The boyars told the ambassadors that the Grand Duke only owned his own lands and that he had nothing to return. Having received a refusal from the demands stated in the ultimatum, Sigismund, counting on the support of Kazan, the Crimea and the Livonian Order, began military operations against Moscow in 1507. Thus violating the conditions of the Annunciation truce, before the expiration of which there were still two years left.

The fighting began in the summer of 1507, with the simultaneous attack of the Lithuanians on the Bryansk and Chernihiv lands, and the Crimean Tatars on the Upper Oka principalities. On August 9, Russian troops under the leadership of the governor Kholmsky defeated the Tatar troops on the Oka and began to advance deep into the Lithuanian state.

In September 1507, Russian troops besieged Mstislavl, but could not take it. At the same time, the foreign policy situation of Lithuania was deteriorating, the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray, after the defeat on the Oka, was in no hurry to resume hostilities against Moscow, despite generous gifts from Sigismund. With Kazan, Vasily managed to make peace, which gave Moscow the opportunity to use the troops gathered for the war with Kazan against Lithuania. The master of the Livonian Order Plettenberg also refused to participate in the war and spoke in favor of making peace with Moscow. Thus, Sigismund was left without allies and military support from their side. Sigismund's situation became even more complicated when the noble and influential nobleman Mikhail Lvovich Glinsky raised a military rebellion against him and went over to the service of Vasily.

In the spring of 1508, Russian troops again launched an offensive against Lithuanian lands. It is a Russian army under the command of V.I. Shemyachich and M.L. Glinsky besieged Minsk and Slutsk, and another Moscow army led by governor Ya.Z. Koshkin and D.V. Shcheni besieged Orsha, but this siege did not bring them success. Having learned about the approach of a strong Lithuanian army sent by Sigismund to help Orsha, the Russian troops retreated across the Dnieper. The only major success of the Russian troops in 1508 was the capture of Drutsk. In the summer, Sigismund's troops managed to capture the cities of Dorogobuzh, Belaya and Toropets, but already in September, D.V. Shchenya, on the orders of Vasily, managed to recapture these cities back.
The preponderance of forces was clearly on the side of Moscow. Having no chance of winning this war, Sigismund asked Basil for peace. As a result, in the autumn of October 8, 1508, a peace treaty was signed between Moscow and Lithuania, according to which Lithuania recognized for Moscow all its previous acquisitions made in previous wars, but retained the Glinsky lands, and Glinsky himself, with all his property, had to move to Moscow principality.

RUSSIAN-LITHUANIAN WAR 1512-1522
The peace concluded between Russia and Lithuania could not be long and lasting. Both sides were dissatisfied with its results. A new war was inevitable. It began four years after the armistice, in 1512, and became a natural continuation of a series of previous Russo-Lithuanian wars. The official reason for the war was the arrest and detention in Vilna of Vasily's sister Elena, accused on a false denunciation by her butler of intending to flee from Lithuania to Moscow. Basil's request to Sigismund to release his sister was not the last to be fulfilled. As a result, the unfortunate woman died a year later in captivity. Another serious pretext for war was the conclusion between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Crimean Khanate of a military treaty, a direct result of which was the raids of the Crimean Tatars in May-October on Russian lands. The true reason was the continuation of the struggle for disputed territories.

In November 1512, Vasily III sent a folding letter to Sigismund, in which, listing all his crimes: violation of the peace treaty, insulting Elena, inciting the Crimean Khan to war with Russia; announced that he was giving up the kiss of the cross and starting a war. Russian troops moved to Smolensk, the annexation of which to Russia was the main goal of Vasily in this war. This goal was achieved on the third attempt.

The first siege of Smolensk lasted from January to February 1513. At the very beginning, Russian troops tried to take the fortress by storm. But the Smolensk garrison managed to beat off the assault. The attackers, having suffered heavy casualties, and realizing that the fortress could not be taken by storm, proceeded to lay siege to it. But the siege, which lasted a month and a half, did not bring success. The situation of the Moscow troops was complicated by the winter conditions of the siege, as well as the difficulties associated with supplying the army with food and fodder. As a result, after six weeks of the siege, it was decided to retreat.

In the summer of 1513, Vasily Ivanovich III went on a campaign for the second time, he himself stopped in Borovsk, and sent a voivode to Smolensk - the boyar Prince Repnya-Obolensky and the roundabout Andrei Saburov. The governor of Smolensk, Yuri Sologub, gave the Moscow army a battle behind the city rampart. But he was defeated and locked himself in the city. Having received the news of the victory, Vasily III arrived near Smolensk personally. But this time the siege was unsuccessful. The gunners of the besiegers tried to punch holes in the Smolensk walls so that they could go on the assault, but everything that the besiegers destroyed during the day, the besieged managed to restore at night. Several times the Moscow troops attacked the fortress, but all their attacks were repulsed. As a result, having stood under the city until November, Vasily was forced to retreat, and returned to Moscow.

Vasily III began the third siege after thorough preparation, on July 29, 1514, having previously strengthened the artillery and ordered military specialists from abroad. In addition, before embarking on a new siege, intensive engineering preparations went on for two weeks: a palisade was built around Smolensk, slingshots were built opposite the gate to prevent garrison sorties, and guns were installed in positions. This siege was successful. Already on August 1, unable to withstand the powerful shelling, the garrison of the fortress surrendered the city at the request of the inhabitants and the clergy.
The capture of Smolensk in 1514 was the biggest success of the Russian army in this war. After the fall of Smolensk, Dubrovka, Krichev and Mstislavl recognized the power of the Grand Duke of Moscow without a fight.

Everyone who was in Smolensk in the service of Sigismund, Vasily made an offer to go to his service. Many agreed and received two rubles of money and gifts from the prince. Those who refused received a ruble of money each and were released to the king.

Vasily also offered the service to the royal governor Yuri Sologub, telling him: “If you want to serve me, I will take pity on you, but if you don’t want, I am free on all sides.” Sologub refused and went to Lithuania, where he was executed by Sigismund as a traitor for the surrender of Smolensk.

Inspired by the capture of Smolensk, Vasily III decided to continue the offensive and sent an army under the leadership of the governor Mikhail Golitsa and Ivan Chelyadin to Orsha. The Lithuanian army, headed by the governor Konstantin Ostrozhsky, also approached here, and on September 8, 1514, the famous Orsha battle took place between the Lithuanian and Russian troops. The battle began with an attack by the cavalry of the governor Golitsa on the left flank of the Polish-Lithuanian troops. With this attack, Mikhail Golitsa expected to crush the enemy flank and go to the rear. The attack developed successfully, but was not supported by the regiments of Chelyadin, who, being at enmity with Golitsa, did not specifically begin to bring them into battle. As a result, the blow of the Russian troops was repulsed by the Lithuanian cavalry and the Polish infantry. Golitsa was forced to retreat. Ostrozhsky managed to lure the Russian cavalry attacking the right flank of the Polish-Lithuanian troops by feigned retreat of his troops under the fire of cannons, the volleys of which caused significant damage to the attackers and upset their ranks. Then the Russian cavalry detachment was thrown back by the Polish men-at-arms to the swamp and almost completely destroyed there. When the Lithuanians attacked Chelyadin's positions, he cowardly fled from the battlefield. The battle was lost. Both governors were taken prisoner. However, the military significance of this battle is not great. The defeat near Orsha did not lead to the loss of Smolensk, nor to a turning point in the course of the war in favor of Lithuania, remaining just a single defeat of the Russian troops in this war.

After the Battle of Orsha, Ostrozhsky tried to build on his success and moved his troops to Smolensk. At this time, in Smolensk itself, an anti-Moscow conspiracy was formed, headed by Bishop Varsophony. Supporters of Sigismund were ready to open the gates of the city to the Ostrozhsky army, but the governor of Smolensk V.V. Shuisky managed to intercept Ostrozhsky's letters to the traitors. Thus, the conspiracy was revealed. All the conspirators except the bishop were hung from the outside on the city walls so that the Lithuanian army could see them. Vladyka Barsophony was arrested and imprisoned for life in the Kamensky Monastery on Lake Kubenskoye. Without the support of the separatists, Ostrozhsky did not have enough forces to take Smolensk. The garrison of the fortress and the townspeople loyal to Vasily III, led by the bold and energetic Shuisky, managed to repel all the attacks. Ostrozhsky had to retreat.

After that, the activity of hostilities decreased significantly. After the Orshinsky defeat, Moscow needed a respite, and Sigismund was gathering strength for the offensive. Therefore, in 1515-1517 there were no large-scale hostilities, only mutual predatory raids took place. Russian troops made raids on Mstislavl and Vitebsk, Polotsk, Roslavl, and Lithuanian troops, in turn, attacked Toropets, Gomel, Velikiye Luki and Pskov.

In 1517, the forces of the warring parties were exhausted, and they began peace negotiations, mediated by the German ambassador Sigismund Herberstein. However, these negotiations failed. Since Sigismund demanded from Vasily III the transfer of half of Novgorod the Great, Tver, Vyazma, Dorogobuzh, Putivl and the return of Smolensk to Lithuania. Vasily categorically rejected all land claims of Sigismund and, in turn, demanded from him the return of Kyiv, Polotsk, Vitebsk and other Russian cities that still remained for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in addition to punishing the nobles guilty of insulting and humiliating Elena. Since neither side wanted to concede to the other, the negotiations quickly reached an impasse and in the same 1517 hostilities resumed.

Peace negotiations were formally still underway when, in the autumn of 1517, Sigismund sent a large Lithuanian army to Pskov, which Sigismund reinforced with mercenaries from Poland and the Czech Republic. The hero of the battle of Orsha, Konstantin Ostrozhsky, led this army on behalf of the king. However, an unexpected and insurmountable obstacle on the way to Pskov was the small but well-fortified Opochka fortress, which covered the road to Pskov from the south. The governor of the fortress was Vasily Mikhailovich Saltykov. The siege of Opochka lasted almost two weeks from 6 to 18 October. Ostrozhsky frivolously counted on an easy capture of the fortress, and on October 6, after preliminary shelling, he stormed the fortress. The assault lasted all day. The defenders of the fortress put up extremely fierce and stubborn resistance: they fired back from squeakers and cannons, threw logs and stones on the heads of the attackers, and engaged in hand-to-hand combat. As a result, the assault was repulsed. Ostrozhsky's army suffered heavy losses. The chronicler reports that there were so many dead that their rivers flooded the Velikaya River.

Ostrozhsky did not dare to re-assault and proceeded to the siege, waiting for reinforcements. However, the Russian governors Lyatsky, Shuisky and Telepnev were in time to help Opochka, who defeated the fourteen thousandth army sent by Sigismund to help Ostrozhsky. Konstantin Ostrozhsky did not wait for the approach of the Russian troops and, having lifted the siege, fled to Polotsk. Leaving all siege artillery under the walls of Opochka.

After the failure at Opochka, the mercenary troops refused to fight against the Russians. As a result, Lithuania was unable to wage an offensive war against Russia.

In the next 1518, the Russian regiments under the leadership of the governor Shuisky made an attempt to take Polotsk by storm, but it ended in failure for them. The raid in 1519 turned out to be more successful, when Russian troops managed to reach the capital of Lithuania, Vilna. This success of the Russian troops, as well as the war with Livonia that began in 1521, forced Sigismund to start peace negotiations again. Moscow, which in 1521 was raided by the Crimean Khan Magmet Giray, was also interested in peace. Therefore, on September 9, 1522, a truce was signed in Moscow between a period of five years, according to which the Moscow principality retained Smolensk with volosts, but renounced claims to other Lithuanian lands. Although Lithuania did not recognize the loss of Smolensk, it announced that it was temporarily ceasing the armed struggle for it. Basil III was forced to abandon his demand for the return of prisoners of war, although it was agreed that they would be removed from their shackles and allowed to live in settlements.

FAMILY MATTERS OF VASILY III
With his first wife, Solomonia Soburova, Vasily had been married for twenty years. He had no children from this marriage. Realizing that the absence of a legitimate direct heir would inevitably lead to a struggle for power and strife in the future, Vasily decided to divorce Solomonia. Consulting with the boyars on this matter, he said: “Who will reign after me on Russian soil and in all cities and borders? Shall I give them to my brothers? But they don’t know how to arrange their own destinies!” The boyars, approving Vasily's decision to divorce, answered as follows: "The sovereign cuts off the barren fig tree and throws it out of the grapes." Although the overwhelming majority of the boyars and clergy, including Metropolitan Daniel, there were those who were not afraid to oppose divorce. Among them were the former prince Patrikeyev - Vassian Kosoy, Maxim Grek, boyar Semyon Fedorovich Kurbsky. The Grand Duke did not listen to their opinion, and in 1525 Solomonia Soburova was forcibly tonsured to a monastery, and then sent under the name of Sophia to the Intercession Suzdal Monastery. Solomonia lived in this monastery for 17 years until her death in 1542. She outlived her husband by nine years. And Vasily, who was already forty-seven years old, in 1526 married the beautiful and young niece of Mikhail Glinsky - Elena, who at that time was no more than eighteen - twenty years old. Vasily loved his young wife, trying to please her, he began to take better care of himself, dress smartly, and even shaved his beard, which was unheard of in those days. Four years later, Vasily and Elena had a son, Ivan, who entered Russian history as Ivan the Terrible.

ELENA GLINSKAYA
Vasily III died when his son, the future sovereign - Ivan IV was only three years old. His mother Elena Glinskaya (1533-1538) was declared regent under the young Ivan.

As a woman, Elena was very beautiful. The reconstruction of Elena's appearance based on the remains that have come down to us made it possible to establish that for women of her time Elena was tall (approximately 165 cm), had a slender proportional figure, her hair was red like copper, and her facial features were thin, regular and soft. By her nature, Elena was not an evil, cheerful, sociable woman, she was engaged in charity work. In addition, she was very smart and educated in a European way, knew Polish and German, spoke and wrote Latin. However, despite the many attractive features of her character, Elena was not popular among the people, due to her European origin and an extramarital love affair with Prince Ivan Fedorovich Ovchin-Telepnev-Obolensky.

DI. Ilovaisky believed that the reign of Elena Glinskaya was not marked by any important events in domestic and foreign policy. This opinion of a respected historian seems to me not entirely correct. Elena ruled for not a full five years, but managed to do a lot during this time. Continuing the policy of her husband, Elena led a successful struggle against the separatism of the specific princes and boyars. In 1533, Elena Glinskaya liquidated the inheritance of Dmitrovsky Prince Andrei Yurievich, and in 1537 the Staritsky inheritance of Andrei Shuisky. Thus, the last two independent large principalities, Dmitrov and Starodub, became part of the Muscovite state.

Of the state events held at the initiative of Elena Glinskaya, the main ones were the lip and monetary reforms.

The monetary reform was carried out in 1535. Numerous cut and counterfeit silver coins were poured into new ones. The basis of the monetary system was the silver ruble, and the main payment unit was the kopeck, which got its name from the horseman with a spear depicted on it. The reform unified the monetary systems of economically weakly interconnected regions, primarily Moscow and Novgorod. The right to walk on the territory of Russia received only a penny, money and half a penny. For the first time in the history of Russia, a unified monetary system was introduced, which looked like this: 1 ruble was 100 kopecks, half a ruble was 50 kopecks, half a half was 25 kopecks, hryvnia was 10 kopecks. Altyn 3 kopecks. 1 kopeck 2 money or 4 pennies.

The lip reform consisted in the reorganization of local self-government. Receiving numerous reports of the abuse of governors and volostels, Elena began to withdraw from their jurisdiction the most important criminal cases of robbery and theft, and transfer them to the labial elders, elected from representatives of the nobility and boyars. Having concentrated the main part of criminal cases in their hands, the labial elders received the status of district judges.

Also noteworthy is the town-planning activity of Elena, which was carried out by her in order to protect the western and eastern borders of the Moscow state. When it was built, the proud Buigorod, Mokshan, Pronsk, the fortresses of Balakhna, Velizh, Sebezh, Temnikov and Zavolochye, Vladimir, Tver, Yaroslavl, burned out by fires, were rebuilt. Vologda, Novgorod and Ustyug were fortified. In 1535, on the orders of Glinskaya, in Moscow, the Italian Pyotr Fryazin was built, China is proud, defending bargaining and settlements.

Built proudly Elena strengthened and populated by Russian immigrants from Lithuania.

The foreign policy of the Grand Duchess was also distinguished by firmness, activity, consistency, and at the same time was very successful. The main foreign policy event of the reign of Elena Glinskaya was the Starodub War (1534-1537). In 1534, the great Lithuanian prince Sigismund I, having decided to take advantage of the infancy of Ivan IV, presented Moscow with an ultimatum demanding to return to the borders of 1508. The ultimatum was decisively rejected and Sigismund began hostilities. The war continued with varying success. In its course, neither side was able to achieve decisive success. As a result, Lithuania and Russia February 18, 1537. signed an armistice, according to which Russia ceded the Gomel volost to Lithuania, but retained Zavolochye and Sebezh. Of other foreign policy agreements relating to the reign of Helen, it should be noted the truce concluded in 1535 with Livonia for a period of seventeen years, as well as the signing for a period of sixty years with Sweden, also signed in 1537, according to which Sweden pledged not to help any Lithuania or the Livonian Order in the event of their war with Russia. Under Elena, diplomatic relations were established with the Moldavian ruler Peter Stefanovich, the Astrakhan king Abdyl-Rahman and the Nogai princes. Noteworthy is the fact that Elena Glinskaya herself negotiated and made decisions on her own.

The policy pursued by Elena Glinskaya was of great progressive importance, since it contributed to the centralization and strengthening of the Russian state. In 1558, Elena Glinskaya died unexpectedly at a very young age. It is not known exactly how old she was at the time of her death. Anthropologists studying the remains of Elena in the female necropolis of the Moscow Kremlin determined that the princess was approximately 25-27 years old. They believe that Elena Glinskaya was born around 1510. There were rumors that Elena was poisoned by the boyars. The Austrian diplomat Sigismund von Herberstein wrote about this in his "Notes on Muscovy". This version was confirmed four hundred years later, after the head of the spectral laboratory of the forensic medical examination of the city of Moscow, Tamara Makarenko, in 1999, having made a spectral analysis of Elena Glinskaya's hair, found that the concentration of mercury salts in them exceeded the permissible norm by a thousand times! So the version of the poisoning of Elena Glinskaya received its practical confirmation.

Solovyov S.M. Decree op. Book IIIT. V. C. 273.

Historians do not know exactly when Ivan Viskovaty was born. The first mention of him refers to 1542, when this clerk wrote a letter of conciliation with the Kingdom of Poland. Viskovaty was quite thin, he belonged to a noble family that had little to no reputation. He built his career thanks to his own diligence, natural talents and the intercession of patrons. Contemporaries described him as an extremely eloquent person. The ability of a speaker was very important for a diplomat, so it is not surprising that over time, Ivan Viskovaty headed the Ambassadorial Order (the prototype of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Elevation

Until the middle of the 16th century, the entire diplomatic system of the Russian state was built around the Grand Duke. He could delegate some powers on an individual basis, but no state institution existed.

The state of affairs in the Moscow diplomacy of that time can be judged from the entries in the embassy books. They say that, starting in 1549, he recently ordered Viskovaty to accept official letters brought by foreign delegations. At the same time, the official's first foreign trips began. In the same 1549, he went to the Nogais and the ruler of Astrakhan, Derbysh.

At the head of the Ambassadorial order

Compared with his colleagues, Ivan Viskovaty was also distinguished by his low rank. He was just a pick up. appreciating Viskovaty's abilities, he equated him with other more eminent diplomats - Fedor Mishurin and Menshik Putyanin. So the nobleman became a deacon. In the same 1549, Ivan Viskovaty was suddenly appointed head of the diplomatic department. He became the first official of this kind in national history.

From that moment on, Viskovaty began active work, which for the most part amounted to meetings with numerous foreign delegations. Ambassadors from Lithuania, Poland, Kazan, Denmark, Germany, etc. came to the clerk. The unique status of Viskovaty was emphasized by the fact that he received high-ranking guests in person. For such meetings there was a special deacon's hut. Ivan the Terrible himself mentioned it in his letters.

Duties of a diplomat

In addition to meetings with ambassadors, Ivan Viskovaty was in charge of their correspondence with the tsar and the Boyar Duma. The clerk was present at all preliminary negotiations. In addition, he was involved in the organization of Russian embassies abroad.

During the meetings of the tsar with the delegations, Viskovaty Ivan Mikhailovich kept the minutes of the negotiations, and his notes were later included in the official annals. In addition, the sovereign entrusted him with the management of his own archive. This fount contained unique documents: all kinds of decrees of Moscow and other specific princes, genealogies, papers of a foreign policy nature, investigative materials, government office work.

Keeper of the State Archives

The person who kept track of the tsarist archive had to have a huge responsibility. It was under Viskovat that this repository was reorganized into a separate institution. The head had to work a lot with papers from the archive, because without them it was impossible to make inquiries about relations with other states and organize meetings with foreign delegates.

In 1547, Moscow experienced a terrible fire, which contemporaries called "great". The archive was also damaged in the fire. Taking care of him and restoring valuable documents became Viskovaty's primary task from the very beginning of his tenure as head of the diplomatic department.

Under the protection of the Zakharins

The prosperous bureaucratic fate of Ivan Viskovaty was successful not only thanks to his own zeal. Behind him were powerful patrons who took care of and helped their protégé. These were the Zakharyins, relatives of the first Anastasia. Their rapprochement was facilitated by the conflict that broke out in the Kremlin in 1553. The young king became seriously ill, and his entourage was seriously afraid for the life of the sovereign. Viskovaty Ivan Mikhailovich suggested that the crown bearer draw up a spiritual testament. According to this document, power in the event of the death of Ivan Vasilyevich was to pass to his six-month-old son Dmitry.

In a situation of uncertainty about the future, Grozny's relatives, the Staritskys (including his cousin Vladimir Andreevich, who claimed power), fearing an excessive strengthening of the enemy boyar clan, began to intrigue against the Zakharyins. As a result, half of the court did not swear allegiance to the young Dmitry. Even the closest adviser to the tsar hesitated to the last. But Viskovaty remained on the side of Dmitry (that is, the Zakharyins), for which they were always grateful to him. After some time, the king recovered. On all the boyars who did not want to support the claims of Dmitry, there was a black mark.

Eye of the Sovereign

In the middle of the 16th century, the east was the main direction of Russia's foreign policy. In 1552 Grozny annexed Kazan, and in 1556 Astrakhan. At court, Alexei Adashev was the main supporter of the advance to the east. Viskovaty, although he accompanied the king in his time, was engaged in Western affairs with much greater zeal. It was he who stood at the origins of the emergence of diplomatic contacts between Russia and England. Muscovy (as it was called in Europe at that time) did not have access to the Baltic, so sea trade with the Old World was carried out through Arkhangelsk, which freezes in winter. In 1553, the English navigator Richard Chancellor arrived there.

In the future, the merchant visited Russia several more times. Each of his visits was accompanied by a traditional meeting with Ivan Viskovaty. The head of the Posolsky Prikaz met with Chancellor in the company of the most influential and wealthy Russian merchants. It was, of course, about trade. The British sought to become monopolists in the Russian market, full of goods unique to Europeans. Important negotiations, where these issues were discussed, were carried out by Ivan Viskovaty. In the history of relations between the two countries, their first trade agreement played a fundamentally important and long-term role.

Viskovaty and England

Merchants from Foggy Albion received a preferential letter full of all sorts of privileges. They opened their own representative offices in several Russian cities. Moscow merchants also received the unique right to trade in Britain without duties.

Free entry into Russia was open to English craftsmen, artisans, artists and physicians. It was Ivan Viskovaty who made a huge contribution to the emergence of such beneficial relations between the two powers. The fate of his agreements with the British turned out to be extremely successful: they lasted until the second half of the 17th century.

Supporter of the Livonian War

The lack of own Baltic ports and the desire to enter Western European markets pushed Ivan the Terrible to start a war against the Livonian Order, located on the territory of modern Estonia and Latvia. By that time, the best era of the knights was left behind. Their military organization was in serious decline, and the Russian Tsar, not without reason, believed that he would be able to conquer the important Baltic cities with relative ease: Riga, Derpt, Revel, Yuryev, Pernava. In addition, the knights themselves provoked the conflict by not letting European merchants, craftsmen and goods into Russia. The regular war began in 1558 and dragged on for as much as 25 years.

The Livonian question split the tsar's close associates into two parties. The first circle was headed by Adashev. His supporters believed that it was necessary first of all to increase their pressure on the southern Tatar khanates and the Ottoman Empire. Ivan Viskovaty and other boyars took the opposite view. They advocated the continuation of the war in the Baltic States to a victorious end.

Fiasco in the Baltics

At the first stage of the conflict with the knights, everything went exactly as Ivan Viskovaty wanted. The biography of this diplomat is an example of a politician who made the right decisions every time. And now the head of the Ambassadorial order guessed right. The Livonian Order was quickly defeated. The castles of the knights surrendered one by one. It seemed that the Baltics were already in your pocket.

However, the successes of Russian weapons seriously alarmed neighboring Western states. Poland, Lithuania, Denmark and Sweden also claimed the Livonian inheritance and were not going to give the entire Baltic to Grozny. At first, the European powers tried to stop the war, which was unprofitable for them, through diplomacy. Embassies rushed to Moscow. Met them, as expected, Ivan Viskovaty. The photo of this diplomat has not been preserved, but even without knowing his appearance and habits, we can safely assume that he skillfully defended the interests of his sovereign. The head of the Posolsky Prikaz consistently refused Western crafty mediation in the conflict with the Livonian Order. Further victories of the Russian army in the Baltics led to the fact that the frightened Poland and Lithuania united into one state - the Commonwealth. A new player in the international arena openly opposed Russia. Soon, Sweden also declared war on Grozny. The Livonian war dragged on, and all the successes of Russian weapons were nullified. True, the second half of the conflict passed without the participation of Viskovaty. By this time, he had already become a victim of repression by his own king.

Opala

Grozny's conflict with the boyars began in 1560, when his first wife Anastasia suddenly died. Evil tongues spread rumors about her poisoning. Gradually, the king became suspicious, paranoid and fearful of betrayal seized him. These phobias intensified when Andrei Kurbsky, the closest adviser to the monarch, fled abroad. In Moscow, the first heads flew.

The boyars were imprisoned or executed on the most dubious denunciations and slanders. Ivan Viskovaty, who caused envy of many competitors, was also in the queue for reprisal. A brief biography of the diplomat, however, suggests that he managed to avoid the wrath of his sovereign for a relatively long time.

Doom

In 1570, against the backdrop of defeats in Livonia, Grozny and his guardsmen decided to go on a campaign against Novgorod, whose inhabitants they suspected of treason and sympathy for foreign enemies. After that bloodshed, the sad fate of Ivan Viskovaty was also decided. In short, the repressive machine could not stop on its own. Having begun terror against his own boyars, Grozny needed more and more traitors and traitors. And although no documents have been preserved to our time that would explain how the decision about Viskovaty was made, it can be assumed that he was slandered by the new favorites of the tsar: guardsmen Malyuta Skuratov and Vasily Gryaznoy.

Shortly before that, the nobleman was removed from the leadership of the Ambassadorial order. In addition, once Ivan Viskovaty openly tried to stand up for the terrorized boyars. In response to the exhortations of the diplomat, Grozny burst into an angry tirade. Viskovaty was executed on July 25, 1570. He was accused of treacherous ties with the Crimean Khan and the Polish king.