He leads the communist parties in the countries of Eastern Europe. The political influence of the USSR in the countries of Eastern Europe. years: approval of the new system
How did the communists manage to turn the tide in Eastern Europe in their favor? What was the purpose of the Cominform?
2. How did the coup d'etat take place in Czechoslovakia?
3. How did the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict arise?
4. How did the internal political situation in the USSR after the war affect the international situation?
5. What was the purpose of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance?
1. The diplomatic recognition of Hungary, Poland and Romania by the Western powers, and then the split with the West because of the "Marshall Plan" gave Moscow reason to abandon the containment of the revolutionary spirit of the communist parties of the Eastern European countries. The Soviet leadership, realizing that the United States would not allow the expansion of Soviet influence in Western Europe, decided to contribute to the completion of the Bolshevization of Eastern Europe.
In order to weaken their competitors, the communist parties relied on the commanding positions that they managed to acquire in the internal affairs bodies and other power structures. Multi-party system became a formality. The positions of non-communist parties were undermined by provoking splits in them, as well as fabricating cases accusing the opposition of conspiracies against the state. This happened in Bulgaria (the leader of the opposition wing of the Bulgarian People's Agricultural Union, Nikola Petkov, was convicted and executed), in Romania (the leader of the National Tsarist Party, Iuliu Maniu, was sentenced to life imprisonment, and the party itself was dissolved), in Hungary, Prime Minister F In May 1947, Nagy refused to return to his homeland from Switzerland after the exposure of yet another "conspiracy". The former Deputy Prime Minister of Poland, S. Mikolajczyk, was also forced to emigrate. Groupings of social democrats that did not want to unite with the communists were forced to dissolve themselves, and their leaders were sent into exile.
By the autumn of 1947, in the countries of Eastern Europe, with the exception of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the communists determined the direction of government policy.
On September 22, 1947, in the Polish resort town of Szklarska Poreba, on the initiative of I.V. Stalin and J.B. Tito, a meeting of the leaders of nine communist parties in Europe (USSR, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy), which decided to establish the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties. At the meeting, Yu. A. Zhdanov delivered a report “On the International Situation”, in which he developed the thesis about the confrontation in the international arena of two camps - “the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, on the other.” This thesis was approved by the representatives of the communist parties.
The press release of this meeting was made only in early October. The seat of the Cominform and the editorial office of the newspaper "For a Lasting Peace, for People's Democracy!" became Belgrade. The main function of the Cominform was the effective management of the communist parties, carried out from Moscow. The Cominform was actually a modified version of the Comintern, dissolved in 1943. It was not only a step towards the consolidation of communism in Eastern Europe, but also a tool for projecting Soviet influence into the socialist and communist circles of Western European countries.
2. There was little sympathy for JV Stalin in Eastern Europe. But even the moderate regions that did not trust him believed that after the war he would go for reforms and selective liberalization. The President of Czechoslovakia, E. Benes, reasoned in exactly this way. As an experienced politician who knew the state of affairs in the country and survived the crisis of 1929-1933, he was aware that the "pure" concept of democracy in Czechoslovakia would not work. Benes was inclined to the need to find a reasonable combination of democracy with strong power. It was necessary to choose between democracy and political efficiency. Benes preferred the latter.
The Czechoslovak communists were not the most orthodox. Prime Minister K. Gottwald was a communist, but he allowed the possibility of a path to socialism, bypassing the dictatorship of the proletariat and developing cooperation with both the Soviet Union and the West. By mid-1947, the Czechoslovak cabinet was the most flexible in Eastern Europe in matters of foreign policy orientation.
Moscow began to exert powerful pressure on Prague. Accelerated under the pressure of Moscow, socialist transformations led to a government crisis, complicated by armed and mass actions of the communists. After the death of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk under unclear circumstances, the days of democratic Czechoslovakia were numbered.
In Czechoslovakia, the purge of the state apparatus and the "reorganization" of those parties that tried to oppose the communists began. The Social Democratic Party was forced to unite with the Communist Party. President E. Benes resigned, refusing to put his signature under the country's new constitution adopted by that time under pressure from the left. The place of the President of Czechoslovakia was taken by K. Gottwald.
In Western literature, the point of view is accepted that the February 1948 crisis in Prague was unexpected for the countries of Western Europe and the USA, both in terms of its suddenness and the absence of attempts by the Czechoslovak public to resist the communists. The United States took the news of the coup in Prague painfully, although it was obvious that the United States and Britain could not and would not do anything practical.
3. The location of the headquarters of the Cominform in Belgrade set off the special position that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and J. B. Tito himself occupied among the communist parties and leaders of Eastern Europe. J. B. Tito, who managed independently and with the support of Western countries, and not only the Soviet Union, to form combat-ready armed forces during the war years, was the least of all Eastern European communists who owed his rise to J. V. Stalin. For him, unlike the leaders of other Eastern European governments, there was no problem of diplomatic recognition from the US and Britain.
The leader of the Yugoslav Communist Party shied away from following the semi-vocal agreements on spheres of influence in the Balkans, which were concluded by the USSR and the Western powers during the war years behind the backs of small countries. However, Belgrade did not question the leadership of the Soviet Union in the world communist movement and showed its respect for I. V. Stalin. At the same time, the leadership of Yugoslavia carried out socio-economic reforms - the nationalization of industry and banks, the destruction of the private sector. Yugoslavia, along with the rest of the People's Democracies, refused to take part in the Marshall Plan.
The reason for the open conflict between Belgrade and Moscow was the intention of I. B. Tito and the leader of the Bulgarian communists G. Dimitrov to create a federation of southern Slavs in the Balkans. Given the Bulgarian-Yugoslav conflict over Macedonia, the idea of a federation was a form of dissolving the ethno-territorial conflict between the two countries in their cooperation. The Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation could turn out to be attractive for connecting other Balkan and Danube countries - in the diplomatic circles of Europe, the issues of concluding a multilateral convention on the Danube - the water artery connecting Central Europe with Southeast Europe were discussed. If the federation project had grown to the scale of the Balkan-Danube cooperation, then the center of Eastern European politics would have shifted to Yugoslavia and a semblance of a two-center would have appeared in the "socialist camp". This did not suit Moscow.
At first, the USSR supported the soft, essentially confederal version of the federation proposed by G. Dimitrov, according to which Bulgaria and Yugoslavia turned out to be equal parts of it. IB Tito advocated a tougher project - a single state.
From the middle of 1947, Soviet representatives began to accuse the leaders of Yugoslavia of trying to put themselves in an exceptional position among other communist parties. Friction began between the two countries.
Meanwhile, the initiators of the Balkan federation developed their ideas. G Dimitrov and I. B. Tito should talk about a common Balkan unification, including Romania, Hungary, Albania and Greece (in the event of the victory of the communist system in it). G. Dimitrov even admitted the possibility of including Poland and Czechoslovakia in it. Belgrade and Sofia challenged agreements on the division of spheres of influence in the Balkans between the great powers.
On February 10, 1948, the Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders were invited to Moscow, where they were pointed out the inadmissibility of pursuing a foreign policy that was not coordinated with the USSR, and the conversation between I. V. Stalin and I. B. Tito took place in an insulting tone for the latter. G. Dimitrov yielded to the pressure, but I. B. Tito stood his ground. After a closed exchange of letters that lasted for several months, I. V. Stalin demanded that the issue be submitted to the Cominform for consideration. On June 28, 1948, at a meeting of the Cominform held in Bucharest, a resolution "On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia" was adopted. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, and its leaders addressed the "healthy forces" within the Yugoslav Communist Party with an appeal to depose I. B. Tito. The CPY rejected the resolution. Soviet-Yugoslav relations began to deteriorate. Moscow curtailed trade with Belgrade and withdrew economic advisers from Yugoslavia.
4. During the Great Patriotic War, total control was objectively impossible. The victory over Nazism liberated public consciousness, prepared the conditions for the psychological rejection of the most barbaric features of the Stalinist regime. A certain impact on the minds had a long stay of the army in the states of Central and Eastern Europe.
Signs of fluctuations in public sentiment seem to have been felt in the Kremlin. In an effort to prevent the softening of the "moral-political unity" of Soviet society, the Stalinist leadership in the late 1940s repeatedly resorted to political repression, although their scope did not reach the scale of the terror of the 1930s.
The beginning of the post-war wave of repressions in the USSR is considered to be August 14, 1946, although the first echelons with the arrested military were sent from the front to concentration and labor camps already in May 1945, when the persecution of the satirist writer M. M. Zoshchenko and poetess A. A. Akhmatova. They were expelled from the Writers' Union of the USSR. The persecution of these writers developed into an all-Union campaign, during which everything was obstructed and expelled, in which the slightest hint of deviation from the official party line in matters of culture was seen.
In June 1947, after the adoption of a decree on intensifying the fight against theft of socialist property, hundreds of thousands of people were convicted and sent to camps for theft, which included spikelets picked up by half-starved peasants in the fields, or spools of thread taken out of a garment factory.
But the most unexpected campaign against dissent unfolded in the USSR in 1948. It began with the proclamation of the fight against "servility to the West." It has become dangerous to speak positively about the technical, economic, cultural achievements of Western countries, not to mention the Western state system. This campaign was superimposed by a new one - the struggle against "bourgeois nationalism" and "cosmopolitanism" began. The carriers of these "vices" were named persons of Jewish nationality. In September 1948, after the arrival in the USSR of the first Ambassador of the State of Israel, Golda Meyerson (Golda Meir), spontaneous rallies in support of Israel took place in Moscow, and although they were not anti-Soviet in content, the Soviet leadership began to suspect that the initiative to hold unauthorized rallies might spread. The answer was persecution of the Jews. The famous Soviet publicist I. G. Ehrenburg, who had previously enjoyed the favor of I. V. Stalin, was fired from Pravda. In November 1948, a case was fabricated about the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, created on the initiative of the Soviet government in 1941. The committee was dissolved, and its leaders were arrested, then shot or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.
This process did not have time to be forgotten, when in December 1948 the "Leningrad case" began against the leaders of the Leningrad region and immigrants from Leningrad, who went to work in Moscow. The trial in the case continued until September 1950 and ended with the death sentences for six defendants, including the chairman of the State Planning Commission N. A. Voznesensky, the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR M. I. Rodionov and the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A. A. Kuznetsov. In addition to them, more than 200 people were repressed in the "Leningrad case", including family members of the main defendants. It was a completely fabricated case, the victims of which were rehabilitated after Stalin's death. In January 1953, the “case of killer doctors” began, but it was not completed due to the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953.
What was happening in the USSR set a kind of standard for the internal political situation for the Eastern European countries. After the establishment of one-party communist regimes, political relations between the CEE countries began to be built according to the "party-state model" - relations between the ruling parties and between the states were inseparable. The most important decisions relating to relations between the countries of people's democracy closed personally on JV Stalin. Moscow exercised particularly tight control over the satellite countries in military affairs. At first, a significant part of the new officer corps was made up of Soviet personnel (in particular, the Minister of Defense of Poland - Marshal of the USSR K.K. Rokossovsky). This was explained both by the losses incurred during the war and by the need to purge the armed forces of Eastern European countries from representatives of the old military elite.
An important element in the establishment of communist control in the countries of Eastern Europe was political repression and purges. The Soviet-Yugoslav conflict stimulated this process especially strongly. Party and statesmen such as Lucreciu Patrashcanu (Romania), Laszlo Rajk (Hungary), Traicho Kostov (Bulgaria), Kochi Dzodze (Albania) became victims of the hunt for “Titoists” and supporters of national models of communism. In Poland, Władysław Gomulka, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the ruling Polish Workers' Party (before it merged with the Socialists), was removed from his post and subjected to house arrest for "right-wing nationalist deviation". In Czechoslovakia, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Rudolf Slansky, became a victim of repression. The trial of him, as well as several other defendants (among them Foreign Minister Vladimir Clementis), had anti-Semitic overtones (the main defendants were Jews), and its timing with a similar campaign in the Soviet Union was not accidental. In Romania, Vasile Luca and Anna Pauker were also arrested in 1952. In turn, in Yugoslavia, the break with Stalin and the persecution of the "Titoists" in the USSR and Eastern European countries led to retaliatory persecution of the Cominformists, carried out by the supporters of I. B. Tito.
Repressions in the USSR and Eastern European countries had a negative impact on the reputation of the Soviet Union, confirming the worst fears in the West about the nature of the regimes of the socialist countries. Sympathy for the USSR by the end of the 1940s was replaced by a negative stereotype, according to which the Soviet Union was presented as an "inexplicably aggressive", strong and dangerous state. To talk about partnership with such a country in the West was dangerous for the reputation of anyone who dared to express such an idea. A timidly suspicious and at the same time detached and mocking attitude towards what is happening in the USSR and the proposals of Soviet leaders has become the norm of Western public opinion.
Unable to put pressure directly on Moscow, the Western countries took revenge on its satellites. The relations of the people's democracies with the non-communist world were limited (with the exception of Yugoslavia after its break with the USSR). Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania until 1955 could not join the UN. The West accused them of violating the provisions of the peace treaty in terms of ensuring human rights. Also, until 1955, Albania could not join the UN. Until 1971, the GDR could not achieve full-fledged international recognition: during the reign of K. Adenauer, the Hallstein Doctrine was adopted, according to which Bonn refused to maintain diplomatic relations with countries that recognize the GDR.
In the United States, at the end of 1948, special legislation was adopted restricting American exports to socialist countries, and in 1950, the NATO Coordinating Committee for the Control of Exports to Socialist Countries (COCOM) was created, the purpose of which was to agree on measures to prevent the transfer of strategic goods and technologies.
5. The refusal of the USSR and the countries of people's democracy from the "Marshall Plan" set them the task of finding an economic alternative. The CEE countries suffered huge losses during World War II, which were aggravated by the damage from the radical measures of the new authorities (forced industrialization, forced curtailment of the small-scale commodity sector). The formation of a new economic structure required a transition from bilateral to multilateral cooperation.
This task was called upon to solve the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), established in January 1949. All the socialist countries of Europe except Yugoslavia became its participants (beginning in the 1960s, Belgrade began to participate in the work of some CMEA bodies). In 1950, the GDR joined the CMEA, and subsequently Mongolia, Vietnam and Cuba joined it. The scope of the CMEA's tasks included the exchange of economic experience, technical exchange, and the organization of mutual deliveries of raw materials, machinery and equipment, as well as foodstuffs. In the first decade, foreign trade remained the main sphere of economic cooperation between the CMEA countries. From the mid-1950s, measures began to be taken to develop specialization and cooperation in production. In 1962, the CMEA Executive Committee was formed, and meetings of various bodies and commissions began to be held regularly. It became possible to carry out economic cooperation within the framework of the CMEA on the basis of collectively agreed goals, decisions and programs. Starting with coordinated mutual deliveries of goods, the CMEA participants moved on to higher forms of economic cooperation, embracing entire areas of production, science and technology.
The CMEA then carried out more political than economic tasks - to consolidate Soviet dominance in the region through the formation of the same type of economic mechanisms. Thus, by the early 1950s, the economic and political unification of states in Western Europe was opposed to the unification of states in Eastern Europe, in which the Soviet Union played a leading role.
Minimum knowledge
1. The toughening of Stalin's approaches to building a socialist community, as well as the actual course of the Western allies towards the formation of their own mechanisms for economic interaction, contributed to the transfer of full power in the Eastern European countries to the communists.
To manage the communist movement, the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties (Cominform) was created, which became an analogue of the Comintern.
2. As a result of the aggravation of contradictions in the leadership of Czechoslovakia, under pressure from Moscow, non-communist forces were removed from governing the country. Western countries were not ready to respond adequately
to what happened, and the communist regime established itself in power. After the fall of Beneš's presidency, there were essentially no moderate governments left in Eastern Europe.
3. Belgrade's attempts to pursue an independent line within and outside the socialist community, despite the recognition of the leading role of Moscow, provoked a harsh reaction from the latter. The reason for the break was the desire of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to create a Balkan Federation. After the refusal of the Yugoslav leader Tito to subordinate his actions in the field of foreign policy to Stalin, the Yugoslav Communist Party was expelled from the Cominform. The first serious split occurred in the communist camp.
4. A new wave of repressions and suppression of dissent, to a large extent destroyed the germs of freedom in the sub-Soviet society that arose during the Great Patriotic War. Moreover, repressions similar to the Soviet ones began to be carried out in the countries of Eastern Europe. This harmed the image of the USSR in the eyes of the Western public and widened the gap between East and West.
5. The CMEA was created to reorient the economies of Eastern Europe towards the USSR and form in the region the same type of state-centric economic systems, which in the 1950s were considered effective in the Soviet Union.
THE CRISIS OF COMMUNISM
IN THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE
Introduction
Formation and evolution of the totalitarian
socialism in 1945. - 1988.
Revolutionary transformations
in Eastern European countries
Conclusion
List of used literature
During 1989-1991, the world witnessed a unique phenomenon swept through the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe, an avalanche of revolutionary changes in peacetime caused the decay of the whole empire. The authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes that had developed here over the post-war decades collapsed. The most remarkable thing was that in these regimes everything was aimed at suppressing any speeches by open force and pressure, they had all the means for this: the law, the means of the media, the army, the police, the secret services. Events developed not only with tremendous speed, but also differed radical results. They drew Poland and Hungary, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania into their orbit. If, however, we take into account that Yugoslavia also entered a period of revolutionary changes, then it is not difficult to calculate that 7 countries with a total population of about 140 million people were involved in the processes of social renewal.
Indeed, first of all, the scale of events rushes. Having created a qualitatively new political landscape in these countries, they changed the alignment of forces on the European continent, affected the bloc system of existing relations on the world stage, put the German question on the agenda, influenced the perestroika processes in the Soviet Union, and influenced the state of affairs in the communist movement. All this gives grounds to put the revolutions of 1989 in these countries on a par with the major events of the 20th century. They drew a line under more than 40 years of monopoly power of the Communist Parties in these countries, and also had and will have a great influence on the future fate of Europe and the whole world.
Still too short a period of time has passed to dot all the i's and assess the past. The revolution in the countries of Eastern Europe is a unique event in itself and should not be approached unequivocally - never before in history has there been a transition from socialism to capitalism. Changing the truth is a painful process. After all, not just words change, the whole ladder of motivational and orienting people in public life values becomes different. However, the renewal process itself is still ongoing; some vestiges of the past have not yet become obsolete.
But it cannot be denied that the process of renewal was inevitable, just as the fall of all empires built on tyranny was inevitable in history.
The history of the countries of Eastern Europe has an extensive historiography, both Soviet and foreign. It is easy to see that much of what was written in previous years (especially in the Soviet Union) is not confirmed by today's life. The change of truths is a painful process, because not only the whole ladder of motivational relations is changing, but life itself is changing, so the drastic changes that have taken place in these countries require a new approach to the problem. The policy of democratization of society in the countries of Eastern Europe opened a new era in the process of scientific study of history. History began to get rid of the burden of political and ideological layers. The world in the writings of historians began to look more vivid and clear.
Great help in writing the work was provided by the article by V. Volkov-. Although the author, due to the fact that the work was written in 1990, has not yet completely got rid of the influence of communist ideology, the article presents a fairly good analysis, characterization and factualization of events.
Two works - Eastern Europe at a historical turning point. M, 1991 and Eastern Europe. The contours of the post-communist mode of development. M, 1992. help to assess the course of revolutionary events and present new contours of the development of Eastern European countries.
Perhaps the most reliable picture of that time can be gleaned from newspapers (Pravda, Izvestia). Controversy, discussions, sharp articles - you just plunge your head into that time and let history pass through you.
In Western historiography, a large number of works by various historians are known. The author of this work used the work of Crampton, R. Eastern Europe in the twentieth century.NY, 1994, which can even be used as a textbook of the 20th century of Eastern Europe, it is written so simply, intelligibly and clearly.
The new democracies in Eastern Europe.GB.1993- ńįīšķčź ņšóäīā šąēėč÷ķūх Western historians, revealing the problems of the emergence of new democracies in the countries of Eastern Europe.
During the Second World War, the countries of Eastern Europe found themselves in a different position. Poland, Czech Republic, Albania were occupied by German and Italian troops. Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Croatia became allies of Germany and Italy. The liberation of these countries from fascism, as in the west of Europe, meant the restoration of independence where it had been lost, or a change in the political regime where it had been preserved. But the post-war efforts of all governments were directed in the same way towards solving top-priority national tasks: the elimination of the domination of the occupation and local fascist regimes, the revival of the economy destroyed by the war and occupation, and the restoration of democracy. The state apparatus was cleared of pro-fascist elements, the activities of fascist parties were banned. Democratic constitutions, abolished in the 1930s by authoritarian regimes, were restored. Parliaments began to function. Along with the old structures of state power, new ones, born in the course of the liberation struggle, began to operate - national committees and councils. Thus, as a result of liberation from fascism, a new system was established in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which began to be called people's democracy. In the political sphere, its feature was a multi-party system, in which the activities of clearly fascist parties were not allowed. In Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, the institution of the monarchy has been preserved. In the economic sphere, private and cooperative enterprises have been preserved.
The development of the event in the West and in the East of Europe was very similar in the first post-war years. The difference was that Eastern Europe was occupied by the Soviet Army and the role of the communist parties was much more significant there. Firstly, because in some of them (Yugoslavia, Albania) the communist parties led the partisan movement and, relying on it, became the most influential political force. Secondly, because they enjoyed the support of the USSR, under its pressure, the communists became part of all the post-war governments of these countries, occupying, as a rule, "power" ministerial posts. Thirdly, because they put forward anti-fascist democratic slogans that enjoy mass support. On many issues that were resolved by the new government, contradictions constantly arose between the communists and the parties of the National Fronts. The bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties believed that the development of the states of Eastern Europe should follow the path of bourgeois democracy with a foreign policy orientation towards the West and maintaining friendly ties with the USSR. The communist parties, on the other hand, believed that it was necessary to deepen the process of transformation, and use the situation to build socialism.
Relying on the Soviet troops remaining in most countries, the security agencies at their disposal, and also subjugating the Social Democratic movements, the Communist Parties were able to strike at the political positions of the bourgeois parties, which were forced to go into opposition. Members of the opposition were often accused of conspiracy and arrested. In Hungary, at the beginning of 1947, such accusations were brought against a number of leaders Party of small farmers(PMSH) , including against the head of government. N. Petkov, one of the leaders of the BZNS, was executed in Bulgaria ( Bulgarian Agricultural People's Union), and in Romania a number of leaders of the national-tsaranist (peasant) party were put on trial.
Thus in 1947.-1948. years, relying on the positions already won and direct pressure from Moscow, the communists, having removed their political opponents, strengthened their own positions in the leadership of the state and economic life and established their undivided power.
Having come to power, the communist parties set about "building socialism." The ideas of introducing national characteristics, timidly put forward in some communist parties, were rejected in favor of copying the experience of the USSR. The political system has been transformed. The multi-party system was either eliminated (Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania), or parties lost their political independence, becoming part of coalitions and fronts led by communists (GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria). All power was concentrated in the hands of the executive apparatus, which practically merged with the apparatus of the Communist Party. Judicial and representative power lost their independence, the principle of separation of powers was done away with. All rights and freedoms were effectively abolished, although constitutions were formally preserved, universal suffrage was preserved, "elections" were held regularly, and states were proudly called countries of "people's democracy" - democracy was over.
Stalin's "theory" of the aggravation of the class struggle as we move towards socialism, accepted by the leadership of the countries of Eastern Europe, led not only to tense relations with the countries of the West, but also to the development of an internal repressive system. Not only ordinary citizens were repressed, but also prominent party and state figures - V. Gomulka (Poland), L. Raik (Hungary), G. Husak (Czechoslovakia), K. Dzodze (Albania), L. Patrascanu (Romania), T. Kostov (Bulgaria) and others.
In all countries, like the personality cult of Stalin, a cult of their own “leaders” has developed - M. Rakosi (Hungary), K. Gottwald (Czechoslovakia), E. Hoxha (Albania), G. Georgiou-Deja (Romania) and others.
In the field of economics, “building socialism” meant completing the nationalization of industry and finance, carrying out industrialization, and cooperating agriculture. The market economy gave way to the planned one. There was a large-scale breakdown of economic and social structures. Entrepreneurs and independent peasants disappeared. Most of the adult population was employed in the public sector of the economy.
The countries of Eastern Europe, with the exception of Czechoslovakia and the eastern part of Germany, were agrarian. Moreover, agriculture was at a rather backward level. Even before the war, the rates of economic development of these countries were low. There was agrarian resettlement and unemployment. Military action for these countries turned into devastation.
The beginning of the "building of socialism" in these countries led to rapid economic growth, which continued until the mid-1960s. The engine of this economic growth was industrialization. The pace of industrial growth here was unparalleled even against the background of the economic boom in the West. Industrialization here, as in the USSR, took the form of the predominant development of heavy industry. Funds for it were obtained through nationalization. In addition, especially at the initial stage of industrialization, consumption was artificially curtailed. Thus, the state got the opportunity to accumulate funds and direct them to industrial investments. The USSR took over the supply of equipment, training of personnel, it remained the main supplier of mineral raw materials and energy resources. At least until the mid-60s there was no problem with labor resources: agrarian overpopulation, unemployment, and later the opportunity to use female labor favored industrialization. The desire to create a diversified heavy industry, as in the USSR, often outweighed the consideration of real opportunities and led to disproportions in the development of the national economy. The accelerated pace of industrialization, with little investment in agriculture and the production of consumer goods, led to a restriction in consumption and a drop in living standards. This was one of the sources of discontent that led to the crises of the 1950s.
Industrialization led č to the rapid growth of the urban population. In all countries except Albania, it is now the majority.
The social structure of the population has also changed. In these countries, first the layer of large landowners disappeared, then large and medium-sized entrepreneurs. After the implementation of cooperatives everywhere, except for Poland, the independent peasantry disappeared. As a result, the social structure was simplified; two social groups began to play the dominant role: those employed in the state sector and the cooperative peasants. Among the former, manual laborers employed in the manufacturing sector predominate.
Cardinal changes have also taken place in the foreign policy of the countries of Eastern Europe. From a "cordon sanitaire" against the USSR, they turned into its satellites. Economic ties with the creation in 1949 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance(CMEA) began to close on the Soviet Union. The USSR sought monolithic unity and demanded complete subordination of the domestic and foreign policies of the Eastern European countries to the course of the Soviet leadership. Any disobedience to Moscow provoked a harsh reaction. This rigid internal discipline against the backdrop of uncompromising confrontation with the West makes it possible to define this system as a "socialist camp" - the term was then widely used in the documents of the Communist Party.
During 1947.-1948. in the countries of Eastern Europe, totalitarian socialism was established in the image and likeness of the USSR, with the only difference that it was not accompanied by a civil war, and the state system did not fully accept revolutions, the social and political system was radically transformed. These revolutions were socialist, in the sense that they approved public, state property as the leading one, and anti-democratic. They led to the formation in these Soviet forms.
The death of Stalin in 1953 led to major changes in the USSR and in the countries of Eastern Europe. The liberation from the oppressive fear of it exposed the deep contradictions of totalitarian socialism and mass discontent and even resistance to it. In the GDR, and then in Poland and Hungary, political crises arose, the overcoming of which proved impossible without the use of force. It became necessary to modernize the course of the Communist Parties in order to remove the main causes of discontent. Mass repressions were stopped and partial rehabilitation of their victims was carried out.
In the 1960s, in most countries of Eastern Europe, the sources of rapid growth due to the construction of ever new factories and an increase in the number of workers dried up, its pace slowed down. Economic development could now be ensured only by increasing labor productivity; the surplus of labor resources is a thing of the past. The old methods of managing the economy were no longer suitable. In the 1960s, economic reforms were carried out in almost all countries; the first one was held in 1963 by the GDR. Their goal was to create an economic mechanism that stimulates the growth of labor productivity. For this, management was decentralized, enterprises were transferred to economic accounting, and the scope of commodity-money relations was expanded. Restrictions for small business were partially lifted. Changes were made to the envisaged rates of industrialization, the forms of cooperation were softened, and in Poland it was stopped. All this was done without changing the form of ownership and while maintaining central planning. Nevertheless, these reforms managed to stop the downward trend in growth rates and actually increase labor productivity.
In many countries, the processes were accompanied by a “thaw” in the sphere of ideology and culture.
The nature of the relationship between the countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR has changed: they took the form of a military-political union - the Warsaw Pact Organization (OVD), created in 1955.
The processes of the late 50s and early 60s meant a new era in the historical development of the countries of Eastern Europe. Totalitarian socialism was not eliminated, but was softened, attempts were made to give it features that could make it more acceptable to the masses. But de-Stalinization had its own logic of development. In essence, it was a process of expanding freedom. At a certain stage of development, this naturally raised the question of political freedoms, which directly threatened the monopoly of the Communist Party. At this stage, guardian sentiments take over in the leadership of the communists. The victory of the reformist, renovationist wing in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1968, its announcement of a course towards consistent democratization and market reforms, showed everyone else the danger of further de-Stalinization and caused the consolidation of conservative forces. The entry of troops of 5 ATS countries into Czechoslovakia spoke of the determination of their leaders to prevent the dismantling of totalitarian socialism and became the starting point for the movement back. The post-Stalinism of the 50s-60s gave way to the neo-Stalinism of the 70s.
Economic reforms were halted. Elements of the revived market relations were strictly limited, they began to return to the old methods of managing the economy, and hence to the old problems.
External debt of countries of Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 3.1 Romania 6.5
Hungary 11.7 Czechoslovakia 3.8
GDR 13.9
Poland 29.3
Political regimes became tougher, which immediately led to the appearance of "dissidents" in a number of countries. In relations with the USSR, the emphasis began to be placed not on sovereignty and equality, but on the priority of protecting “socialist gains”. It was this idea that was put forward by L.I. Brezhnev in justifying the intervention in Czechoslovakia and was called the Brezhnev Doctrine.
Birth rate, death rate, natural increase in the countries of Eastern Europe in 1950-1986 (per 1000 people)
fertility Mortality natural growth
The country
1950 1986 1950 1986 1950 1986
Bulgaria 22.2 13.5 13.4 11.4 8.8 2.1
Hungary 20.0 12.1 14.3 13.8 5.7 -1.7
GDR -- 13.3 -- 13.4 -- -0.1
Poland 24.6 17.0 13.9 10.1 10.7 6.9
Romania 26.0 15.8 18.9 10.9 7.1 4.9
Czechoslovakia 20.6 14.2 14.0 11.8 6.6 2.4
In the minds of the peoples of the countries of Eastern Europe, the consciousness of the complexity of reforms was firmly entrenched due to the “vigilant eye” of the eastern neighbor, the USSR (the suppression of speeches in Czechoslovakia and Hungary was a powerful precedent), besides, Soviet troops were everywhere on the territory of the aforementioned countries. However, exhausted by its own economic, political and social problems, bogged down in a useless war in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, which, at the very least, had embarked on the path of reforms, did not prevent changes in the former satellite countries.
Gorbachev declared at the end of the 80s: “Eastern Europe is no longer a strategically necessary territory, it is an expensive economic burden and the key to political inconvenience ... but there is no development model that is the same for everyone” In 1987, Yegor Ligachev, in an interview with Hungarian television, announced: “Every nation has own path of development.”
Such speeches showed all the peoples of Eastern Europe that in the Soviet Union there was a rejection of the “Brezhnev Doctrine” and force would not be used against them, and they can now choose for themselves either social democracy or democratic socialism.
The driving forces of the 1989 revolutions were composed of many factors: political, economic, social. For 45 post-war years, a lot has changed in the minds of people: two generations have changed. The proportion of the middle strata, as well as those employed in infrastructure, has grown. As a result of these changes, a society has developed with a completely different socio-political image than half a century ago. And in all social strata of society, the discontent that has accumulated over the years of domination by authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes has approached a dangerous explosive line. It was based on the crisis phenomena of the economy, the totalitarian alienation of almost all strata (excluding the ruling ones) from power and from property (although the latter was not as total as in the USSR). The lack of flexibility of the political leadership of these countries did not make it possible to transfer the impending explosion into the regime of a controlling reaction.
The chain reaction of revolutionary explosions testified to the close connection that took place in different countries unidirectional processes and the proximity of their position. They saw a general crisis engulfing the authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes in a number of countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. ops.
Revolutions were the work of the masses. Hundreds of thousands daemon stration in the streets and squares of Prague and Berlin, Leipzig and Sofia, the selflessness of the youth who rose to fight in Bucharest e, Temisoare and other cities of Romania, predetermined their outcome. Active participation in the events of student youth, as well as other strata population characteristic of all countries. At the same time, the success of these revolutions can hardly be rightly attributed to some only spontaneous speeches. A certain organization was also present in them. Question about political organization of the revolutions of the end of 1989 needs in vain careful study, because so far it is largely unclear.
The main slogan of the masses during the revolutionary ledge the demands of democracy and the elimination of monopolies were ruling Communist parties to power as the core of authoritarian-bureaucratic modes. And this problem was basically solved. Power passed from the hands of the parties but-state executive office in hand representative governmental bodies, and the forms of such a transition in each country are very diverse. In Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, parliaments became the focus of the new power, which was accompanied by the rapid growth of alternative political organizations, the creation of extra-constitutional civil society structures, which became the guarantors irreversibility the changes that have taken place. Processes similar in form are also characteristic of the GDR, with a slightly greater role for the executive bodies of state administration.
In almost all countries, events began with the coming to power of supporters of the "renewal of socialism" in the communist parties. This was either the result of a sharp intra-party struggle (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria), or it happened under the direct pressure of the mass demonstrations that had begun (Šóģūķč˙, ĆÄŠ). The Renovationists proclaimed a policy of replacing totalitarian socialism with democratic, I borrow this term from the arsenal of social democracy. The very first result of their coming to power was the proclamation of pluralism and coming to power was the proclamation of pluralism and a multi-party system, the emergence of opposition political groups that rapidly expanded their influence by criticizing totalitarian socialism and communist parties. In the very first free elections, supporters of the renewal of socialism, as a rule, received the majority and came to power, pushing the communist parties aside. They have already proposed political programs not of "renewal of socialism", but of "building capitalism", including the privatization of the public sector, the encouragement of business, and the creation of market structures. In the political field, they continued the line of the Renovationists to dismantle the totalitarian society. In foreign policy, the turn was especially sharp: they demanded the liquidation of the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from their territories, and declared their desire to integrate into the European Economic Community.
As democratic and anti-totalitarian revolutions, they are the opposite of the revolutions of the 1940s. Nevertheless, they have common features. The revolutions of the 1940s began with the seizure of power, the formation of a totalitarian regime, and then an appropriate social and economic support was provided for it in the form of "building socialism". The revolutions of 1989 followed the same path. Of course, the events in each country differed in national characteristics.
Hungary
along with Poland, it was the first among the countries of Eastern Europe to embark on the path of reforms. Having started the economic reform in 1968, under the influence of unfavorable internal and external factors, it was forced more than once to slow down its progress, and then again, under even more difficult conditions, to return to the idea of reforms. All this complicated the entire course of the socio-economic and political development of the country.
By the mid-80s, the resources for extensive development were exhausted. The external economic situation has become even more unfavorable. This led to the limitation of capital investments in the national economy, to a reduction in imports, to a decrease in the personal consumption of the population, and to a slowdown in the overall rate of growth. External debt grew rapidly: in 1986 it amounted to 8 billion dollars, and in 1989 it increased to 20 billion. All this created new difficulties in the development of the country's economy. The measures taken (devaluation of the forint, containment of wage growth, etc.) did not give positive results.
Despite the repeated decisions of the Hungarian leadership to overcome the negative trends in the economy, the situation in the economy has not improved. This has led to new measures to curb personal
consumption and income of the population. In 1987, a centralized increase in food prices was carried out, for a number of
industrial goods, for certain types of services. Prices have been raised several times since then. The prices for fuel and gasoline have risen. Increased rent, the cost of travel in transport. Real wages have been declining year by year.
The transformations carried out in the political sphere were completely insufficient. The revitalization of the activities of the National Assembly, the adoption by it of a number of legislative acts on democratic freedoms and the rights of citizens, on the fight against economic crimes and manifestations of corruption could not calm the ever-increasing critical mood of the Hungarian public. Some hope for renewal was generated by the changes made in May 1988 in the leadership of the country. The Politburo and Secretariat of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party were updated. J. Kadar, who headed the party for three decades, gave way to the post of general secretary of the party to K. Gross.
However, the absence of cardinal changes in the system of political administration increasingly undermined the authority of the ruling party and its leadership.
Forces intensified in the country demanding political pluralism, the elimination of the monopoly position of the WSRPE. These demands were also shared by some party leaders, who believed that only on the basis of a multi-party system it was possible to carry out a broad democratization of public life, update the parliamentary system of government, and then complete the reform of economic management. Among the reformers in the HSWP itself were members of the Politburo R. Nyersch and I. Pozhgai, Prime Minister M. Nemeth and Chairman of the State Assembly M. Suresh. It was they who advocated the dissolution of the HSWP and the creation on its basis of a new, left-wing party.
At the end of February 1989, the Hungarian National Assembly adopted a law on the right of citizens to form associations and associations. But even before the adoption of the law, new public organizations launched their activities almost without hindrance, exerting an ever-increasing influence on the political life in the country. The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, which remained in the leadership of the country, had to reckon with this as well.
The Extraordinary Congress of the HSWP in October 1989 proclaimed the dissolution of the party and the creation of a new one, Hungarian Socialist Party, which, along with numerous parties, began to fight for seats in the future new parliament. Although a fairly significant part of the members of the HSWP refused to recognize the decisions of the extraordinary congress and announced the continuation of the activities of the former party, the discredited party no longer exerted a significant influence on the political life of the country. And the Hungarian Socialist Party, having lost the support of the broad working masses, was also pushed aside from the forefront of political life.
New political forces came to the fore, openly proclaiming the slogan of transition to the positions of parliamentarism of pre-war Hungary. By the end of 1989, about 20 parties were active in Hungary. But only a few of them were large, numerous. The greatest influence in the country began to enjoy Hungarian Democratic Forum(VDF) and Union of Free Democrats(SSD).
Created in the fall of 1987, the WDF united in its ranks representatives of the intelligentsia - writers, artists, social scientists. The historian became the leader of the new party. Antall. The WDF has attracted many entrepreneurs, a wide range of small private owners. Accordingly, the program of the forum was oriented: a mixed market economy, the return of land to the peasants.
The SDS adhered to approximately the same program, but went even further. He believed that Hungary should follow the same path of economic development that the developed capitalist countries followed, but subject to the social protection of those sections of society that were on the verge of poverty.
The elections to the Hungarian parliament ended a long period of political leadership of the HSWP. A new stage of development has begun. Further transformations of the economic and social life of the country began to be carried out by a bloc of previously opposition parties and groups led by the VDF
Many leaders of the countries of Eastern Europe warily watched the processes of perestroika in the Soviet Union, the events in Poland and Hungary, seeing them as a threat to their position (their reaction in this regard was reminiscent of the attitude of the Brezhnev leadership to the Prague spring of 1968.). The events in China on Tiananmen Square in the summer of 1989 also contributed, despite their geographical remoteness. The leaders of the countries of Eastern Europe had the illusion that it was possible to reverse events. Authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes in some countries, sensing a threat to their position, tried to rally their ranks. As a result, in the spring of 1989, the contours of the so-called anti-perestroika bloc (as the Western press dubbed it) loomed, headed by Honecker, Yakes-Gusak, Zhivkov, Ceausescu. In the popular masses, the reaction to the events taking place in other countries was the opposite. Such a reaction gave rise to reverse actions. And it was in this mentioned group of countries that the most violent events took place.
The situation in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the GDR had much in common. However, a certain uniformity was given to them by the position of the leadership of their ruling parties, either refusing to undertake any reforms at all (such a situation, apart from the GDR, was typical for Romania, in which the existing regime was particularly dogmatic), or imitating actions to carry out the imminent transformations. All of them were characterized by a clearly visible lag of the party from the processes taking place in society. Everywhere, since 1988, informal organizations began to emerge. Common to all these groups was the desire to limit (to varying degrees) the leading role of the party, to change the country's domestic and foreign policy). The leaderships of these countries regarded such groups as anti-communist, anti-socialist and even terrorist and responded with repressive measures (although the latter did not take extreme forms and mass scales.
Czechoslovakia
In Czechoslovakia, after the resignation in December 1987 from the party posts of Husak and the arrival of a new leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, headed by M. Jakes, public life sharply intensified. Discussions began on the new political life of the country, on the new constitution of Czechoslovakia. However, the HRC leadership was in no hurry to implement the reforms. It intended to discuss their concepts at the next party congress. At the same time, the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia refused to revise its previous critical assessments of the events of 1968 and invariably emphasized the leading role of the party in society. Such attitudes ran counter to the rapid politicization of the country.
A characteristic feature of Czechoslovakia was the presence in its public life of political opposition, which included both the majority of the participants in the events of 1968, and other layers that joined it later. She was in a lethargic state, although after the formation of the political group, called "Charter-77", she somewhat revived.
The situation changed in 1988. year. Activated opposition forces have moved to decisive action. Its external manifestation was demonstrations in Prague and other cities in August (in connection with the 20th anniversary of the introduction of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries into Czechoslovakia), at the end of October (in connection with the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the formation of independent Czechoslovakia) and in January 1989. ( 20th anniversary of the burning of Jan Palach). On November 21, mass demonstrations began in Prague. On the same day, the "Civil Forum" was created, bringing together all the opposition forces in the Czech lands, and “ Society Against Violence” in Slovakia. The attempts of the authorities to condemn the demonstrations were unsuccessful. The opposition forces put forward a detailed program for changing the state party leadership, and advocated further social and economic transformation. After an attempt to reorganize the old government on December 10, a new government was created by M. Chalfy.
GDR
Against the background of obvious crisis phenomena in a number of Eastern European countries, the situation in the GDR in 70.-80. years outwardly looked quite favorable. This was evidenced both by a relatively stable production process and a relatively high standard of living compared to other countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. However, by the end of the 1980s, the situation changed dramatically. The economic situation worsened. True, official statistics indicated an annual growth of 4% in national income and 6% in industrial output. However, as it turned out later, these data were falsified for a number of years. In fact, state plans were not systematically implemented, an ill-conceived investment policy led to serious disproportions in the country's economy, the state budget deficit increased and not external debt. The public debt amounted to a huge amount of $20.6 billion.
The outflow of skilled workers who left the GDR increased every year. By 1989, it reached record levels: the number of people who left for Germany reached 350 thousand people. This led to a significant reduction in production volumes. About 250 thousand jobs became unoccupied.
The socio-political crisis in the GDR, which had been maturing latently for a long time, was aggravated by the unwillingness and inability of the leadership, headed by E. Honecker recognize the urgent need to update the entire socio-political life in the country. There was growing distrust of the policy of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, disillusionment with the model of authoritarian-bureaucratic "socialism", which was defended by the party leadership. This was facilitated by an external factor - the impact on the population of the GDR of perestroika, democratization and glasnost in the USSR, as well as cardinal changes in Poland and Hungary, especially the introduction of a multi-party system there and the rejection of the leading role of the Communist parties.
The reaction to all these phenomena was that many people, having lost hope for internal changes in the country, began to link their plans for the future with resettlement in Germany. The wave of refugees increased. In January 1989. ćīäą 400 thousand applications for departure were registered. At the beginning of the summer of 1989, this flight took on a massive character, when the possibility of leaving to the West through Hungarian territory opened up. Facilitation of the regime on Hungarian-Austrian border attracted tens of thousands of tourists from the GDR, who, having arrived in Hungary, then went through Austria to the FRG. In Czechoslovakia and Poland, hundreds of tourists from the GDR entered the embassies of the FRG and asked for political asylum.
At the beginning of September 1989, the problem of migrants and refugees spilled onto the streets of cities. Strict demarches by the government of the GDR, which demanded from Hungary the expulsion of thousands of tourists from the GDR who did not want to return to their homeland, as well as bans on departure h GDG and Czechoslovakia produced no results. On the contrary, in a number of cities in the country, especially in Leipzig (the first unsanctioned demonstration on January 15, 1989.), Dresden and Berlin, rallies demanding political reforms, democracy and freedom are increasingly being held. In response to attempts by the authorities to use force to disperse rallies and mass demonstrations, popular indignation grew. It culminated when more than 70,000 demonstrators in Leipzig on October 9, 1989, demanded that those responsible for dispersing the counter-demonstration in Berlin on the 40th anniversary of the GDR be brought to justice.
The Hungarian government, after negotiations with the authorities of the GDR, decided to open the border with Austria for the “tourists” from the GDR who had accumulated on Hungarian territory and demanded to leave for the FRG. In the first three days alone, more than 15,000 people crossed the border.
Trying to stay in power, part of the leadership of the GDR began to look for a way out of the current situation on the path of political maneuvering. On October 11, a statement was published by the Central Committee of the SED about its readiness to discuss the demands of openness, democracy, freedom to travel abroad and other issues.
However, the tension in the country did not subside. Then another step was taken. On October 18, the plenum of the Central Committee of the SED released E. Honecker from his duties as general secretary and removed his closest supporters G. Mittag and H.-I. Hermann. Honecker was also relieved of the post of chairman of the State Council of the GDR. Egon Krenz, one of the figures close to Honecker, secretary of the SED Central Committee and member of the Politburo, was elected to both positions previously held by Honecker.
The measures announced by the new leadership to renew the administration of the country were completely insufficient. Although a course towards reforms and democratization was proclaimed, nothing really was done. The leadership obviously did not keep up with the course of events, lost control over them.
Another attempt to save themselves was made by the leadership of the SED on November 8th. The Plenum of the Central Committee significantly updated the composition of the Politburo. It included Hans Modrow, the first secretary of the Dresden district committee of the SED, known for his critical attitude towards the old party leadership and who enjoyed authority among the population.
On November 17, the People's Chamber of the GDR approved the composition of the new government of the country. It was headed by X. Modroi. The government was formed on a coalition basis: out of 28 ministers, 12 represented the SED, and the remaining 16 ministers - other parties (Christian Democratic Union , Liberal Democratic Party, National Democratic Party and Democratic Peasant Party).
The government began its activities in a completely new situation. Relations with another German state, the FRG, have changed dramatically. On November 9, 1989, the leadership of the GDR decided to open its western borders for free travel to the FRG and West Berlin. The "Berlin Wall" has ceased to play its role as a formidable obstacle. They began to take it apart for souvenirs.
The new leadership of the SED could not contain the disintegration of their party. In the last two months of 1989, about half of its members (900 thousand out of 2 million people) left it. The People’s Chamber of the GDR decided to remove the provision on the “leading role of the SED” from the country’s constitution
The complete incapacity of the leaders of the SED under the new conditions led on December 3 to the collective resignation of the Politburo and the Central Committee of the party, headed by E. Krenz, and three days later Krenz was forced to leave the post of chairman of the State Council. In mid-December 1989, an emergency congress of the SED elected a new leadership of the party. From the former composition of the Central Committee to the new board steam group (101 people) included only three people. The name of the art has also changed. She began to be called Socialist Unity Party of Germany - the consignment democratic socialism". However, soon the first part of the name ceased to appear. Chairman the party was a young lawyer G. Gizi, announced its radical restructuring.
Following the reorganization of the SED, other important changes took place in the political life of the GDR. New parties and organizations were created, declaring their intention to fight for seats in the future parliament of the country. They showed great activity. Social Democratic Party, as well as organizations “New Forum”, “Democratic Awakening”, “Unification of the Left”, “Initiative for Peace and Human Rights” and etc.
In the ongoing election campaign, four former allies of the SED- Christian Democratic Union, Liberal Democratic Party, National Democratic Party and Democratic Peasant Party- announced their withdrawal from the traditional bloc with the Communists.
These four parties, as well as new political associations, declared their rejection of the socialist path of development of the GDR. They saw the prospect of immediate development in "saving the country through the reunification of Germany." The slogan of the unification of Germany became the main program point of all political currents. On this wave, right-wing extremist forces also rose in the country. All parties opposed to the SED-PDS enjoyed active support from the political and state institutions of the FRG and West Berlin. Leading figures of the FRG, including Chancellor G. Kohl, took a direct part in rallies and demonstrations held on the territory of the GDR.
The question of the unification of the two German states became the center of attention of the entire political life of the country. Supported by the leadership of the FRG, many political forces in the GDR came out in favor of immediate measures to create a unified German state. Without denying the very prospect of unification, some bo More moderate figures considered that the government of H. Modrov also announced a change in its attitude to the German question. The official concept of the existence of two German nations - socialist and capitalist - was recognized as erroneous. The GDR government declared its desire to develop broad cooperation with the FRG and West Berlin and expressed its interest in receiving economic assistance from the FRG. At the same time, the loyalty of the GDR to its allied obligations was proclaimed. The inviolability of European borders was recognized.
The further fate of the country, the course of its economic and political development, its foreign policy were to be decided by the elections to the People's Chamber of the GDR, scheduled for March 18, 1990. The entire course of the election campaign testified to the ousting of the SED - PDS from the leadership of the country. This was also shown by the results of the parliamentary elections. Party of Democratic Socialism became opposition.
received the majority of votes in the elections Christian Democratic Union(40.9%), followed by the Social Democrats (21.8%). Party of Democratic Socialism won 16.3% of the vote. Accordingly, the distribution of seats received by various parties in the People's Chamber was determined. The right bloc parties led by the CDU secured 193 seats out of a total of 400 seats, the SPD 87 and the PDS 65 seats. task facing the two German states, but also as a most complex international problem. The fate of Europe and the new system of ensuring international security began to be directly dependent on its decision. The German problem became a subject of discussion between the four great powers participating in the peace settlement after the end of the Second World War - the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France.
The heaviest burden for the Romanian people was the ever-increasing financial debt to the Western powers. By the beginning of the 1980s, it amounted to 10.2 billion dollars. The increase in debt with the naive goal of improving the economic situation, the completely inefficient use of the loans received, led to an increase in the number of industrial facilities without taking into account the need for structural adjustment and modernization of the economy.
And without this, it was impossible to ensure the repayment of the loans received. The payment of debts led to a reduction in imports and an increase in exports of goods urgently needed for domestic consumption, primarily food and oil products. Between 1975 and 1989, Romania repaid about $21 billion to Western creditors, including more than $7 billion in interest on loans.
The need to pay debts, the country's leadership explained the policy of "belt tightening" and the most difficult living conditions of the majority of the Romanian population. From year to year, the food supply of the working people steadily deteriorated. But not only unsustainable debt, but also all other miscalculations in economic policy were ultimately determined by the administrative-command system that dominated the country, the totalitarian regime, hiding behind socialist slogans and relying on the Communist Party, which N. Ceausescu turned into an instrument of power for his family clan. But there were about 4 million people in the party, that is, every fifth inhabitant and every third employed in production was a member of it.
Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu categorically denied the very possibility of any changes in the management of the economy, and indeed in the life of the country. He stated that reforms had allegedly been carried out in Romania long ago, which were started in the 1980s by other Eastern European countries. In an attempt to increase the efficiency of agriculture, Ceausescu further tightened the system of directive management of state farms and state-owned cooperatives, launched a campaign to “systematize” villages, which included the liquidation of 7,000 villages and the resettlement of their inhabitants in “agro-industrial centers”. The forced assimilation of the Hungarian population living in Transylvania was systematically carried out.
The totalitarian system of power, the low standard of living, the situation on the verge of starvation - all this caused an increase in social tension in the country, sharp dissatisfaction with the methods of building "comprehensively developed socialism" proclaimed by the ruling clan. This was also evidenced by the mass flight of citizens of the Hungarian and Romanian nationalities outside the country: by March 1989, approximately 30 thousand people had accumulated on the territory of Hungary and approximately the same number of refugees proceeded to other European countries. Actions by workers in the coal mines of Resita, factories in Brasov and elsewhere were brutally suppressed. The timid protests of the representatives of the Romanian intelligentsia were ignored or led to severe repression.
There was no organized opposition in the country, but even here the speech of a number of former political figures - the “letter of six”, published in early 1989 and containing sharp criticism of the state of affairs in the country, showed the tension of the situation. But still, the overwhelming majority of the population was ready to oppose the hated regime . However, blinded by power, the dictator, although rather frightened by radical changes in neighboring countries, continued to believe in the inviolability of the system he had established.
Even against the backdrop of the beginning of changes in Eastern Europe, Ceausescu showed an absolute unwillingness to follow the example of his neighbors, referring to the right of Romania to go its own way. On November 20, 1989, when the Berlin Wall had already collapsed and the "Velvet Revolution" had already taken place in Czechoslovakia, the XIV Congress of the Romanian Communist Party was held in Bucharest. Ceausescu in his report did not say a word about what happened in neighboring countries. The congress was proclaimed "a congress of great victories and the triumph of socialism." Unrestrainedly praised at the congress as a “hero of heroes”, “beloved son of the nation”, “titan of thought”, N. Ceausescu announced the country's transition to a “new stage” - the completion of the construction of a “comprehensively developed socialist state”. The Congress adopted new plans for the development of the socialist society until 2010.
A truly new stage in the development of Romania really began three weeks after the end of the congress. But he was no longer connected with the program of the congress, not with the party itself, and not with its leader. It was started by the people who rebelled against the dictatorship.
In mid-December, Ceausescu went on an official visit to Iran. At this time 16.-17. December in the Transylvanian city of Temişoara, after the security service tried to evict local priest Laszlo Tekeshi. The events in Timisoara shook the whole country. Spontaneous demonstrations began in his support. The army and security forces brutally suppressed them. Returning from Iran, Ceausescu declared these events the result of the intrigue of external enemies and scheduled a rally for the next day in support of the actions of the authorities. The people gathered in the square, after listening to the speech, however, began to shout anti-government slogans. There were first clashes with the police. Spontaneous demonstrations began.
Special forces and personal guards of the dictator were sent against the rebels. Fierce street fighting broke out in Bucharest. The popular uprising was supported by the army. But forces loyal to Ceausescu continued to fight for several days. Armed clashes unfolded in Timisoara, Bucharest, Brasov, Sibiu.
Power in the country passed to the one created in the first hours of the uprising Council of the National Salvation Front(FTS), which proclaimed the overthrow of the authoritarian regime of N. Ceausescu. Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu, who fled from Bucharest, were soon captured and, by the verdict of a special military tribunal, were executed for crimes against the people. The military explained such hasty and inconsistent with the elementary norms of law by the danger from the security service. In any case, this fact testified to the degree of bitterness of morals. The victory of the revolution was worth many sacrifices.
The Council of the Front announced the dissolution of all former state bodies, including the Communist Party. A political platform was promulgated, providing for the rejection of the leading role of one party, the creation of a pluralistic system, the rejection of command and administrative methods of managing the economy, the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual, the rights of national minorities. The Front began drafting a new constitution for the country and announced free elections to be held in the spring of 1990. Preparations for agrarian reform began.
The leadership of the Front Council was very heterogeneous. It included in the past disgraced party and government officials, students, workers, representatives of the creative and scientific intelligentsia. The Soviet was headed by Ion Iliescu, who in the 1970s was secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and was then persecuted for criticizing official policy. The government was headed by Professor Petre Roman of the Bucharest Polytechnic Institute. The Front Council formed an executive bureau consisting of 11 people. In the counties, municipalities, towns and communes (villages) local councils of the Front and self-government bodies were formed.
The acuteness of the political tension was felt everywhere, both in the Front Council and in local authorities. The completely discredited Communist Party not only could not play any role in society, but was also subjected to mass pressure. Anti-communist sentiments rose sharply in the country.
On the wave of political upsurge in Romania, political parties arose one after another. By mid-January 1990, there were about ten of them. First of all, two old "historical" parties announced themselves - National Tsaranist and National Liberal I. The first of them, taking the name National Peasant Christian Democratic Party,. it had its main social base in the countryside, and also attracted part of the intelligentsia and many believers. The main program provisions of this party were the unconditional rejection of communism, the return to private land use, and "the purification of society on the basis of Christian values." The party was headed by one of the former leaders of the nationalists, K. Kopos.
was rebuilt and National Liberal Party, which, according to one of its leaders, "has experience in leading society, as it was intermittently in power in Romania from 1859 to 1937." The party hoped to rely on the intelligentsia, student youth, part of the workers. It set as its goal the liberalization of economic and political structures, the use of Western European (in particular, Swedish) experience of democratic governance.
Created at the same time Ecological Party considered the struggle for a clean environment, observance of human rights, for disarmament and peace as the main task. National Democratic Party proclaimed its goal a return to private enterprise, a market economy. Representatives of the Hungarian population of Romania united in Hungarian Democratic Union, who declared the right to restore the individual and collective rights of the Hungarian minority, the regional and cultural autonomy of the Hungarians within the Romanian state. The students, the most active force in the democratic revolution, united within the framework of Democratic Front of Students of Romania.
Free trade unions also formed in Romania , “Public Dialogue Group”, which included representatives of the creative and scientific intelligentsia.
The Council of the National Salvation Front proclaimed the main task of the revolution to overcome the difficult socio-economic legacy of the totalitarian system. The program of the Front provided for the reform of economic management, the rejection of bureaucratic command methods, and the encouragement of initiative and competence. It was supposed to carry out a restructuring of industry, to normalize the supply of the population with consumer goods and energy. In agriculture, purchase prices were increased, members of agricultural cooperatives were allocated 0.5 hectares of land for free family use, household plots of cooperative members (up to 0.6 hectares) were declared private property with the right to inherit.
The December Revolution of 1989 swept away the totalitarian regime in Romania. It tried to secure a path of genuine democratic development. But after such a long political stagnation, the process of democratic transformation of society advanced with great difficulty. In addition, on the wave of the democratic revolution, conservative forces also rose up, trying to take revenge for past defeats. A complex and lengthy struggle lay ahead for the preservation and development of the democratic gains of the revolution.
In May 1990, elections were held in Romania, in which the National Salvation Front won. The leader of the Federal Tax Service, I. Iliescu, was elected president of the country. The government of Romania was headed by P. Roman. A sharp struggle over the question of how to further develop the Romanian society continued after the elections.
The socialist system that arose in the mid-1940s failed to win the minds and hearts of the people. The hopes that socialism, with its dominance of public ownership of the means of production, would become a society of social justice, lead to the abolition of the exploitation of man by man and the general welfare, did not come true. In practice, the elimination of private property and the absolute dominance of state property has led to the fact that people have lost interest in the results of their labor. State property belonged essentially to bureaucratic structures that appropriated the results of social labor. As a result, an economy was established that was unable to meet the urgent needs of the population. The monopoly nature of the power of the communist parties led to the creation of an undemocratic political system that deprives the masses of the right to freely express their opinion and elect the ruling structures of their own free will.
With such an existing situation, the system calling itself the "socialist camp" could not exist forever. Its fall was only a matter of time, necessary for the maturation of internal forces that could begin fundamental changes. What we witnessed in 1989.-90. years.
¨ Dawisha, K. Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge. Cambridge, 1990.
¨ Die kommunistische Bewegung am Scheideweg. wien. 1982.
¨ Crampton, R. Eastern Europe in the twentieth century. NY, 1994.
¨ Csikos-Nagy B. Ungarische Wirtschaftsreform und Sowjeetische Perestrojka.- Österreichische.Osthefte, 1989, N 1.
¨ Ionescu,G. The Break-up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe.1965.
¨ The new democracies in Eastern Europe.GB.1993.
¨ The twentieth century world. NY, 1992.
¨ Vee, G. History of the world economy. M, 1993.
¨ Eastern Europe. Contours of the post-communist mode of development. M, 1992.
¨ Eastern Europe at a historical turning point. M, 1991.
¨ The history of the newest time of the countries of Europe and America 1945-1990.M, 1993.
¨ Kreder, A. Recent history. M, 1993.
Creder, A. Recent history. M, 1993. P. 124 Ķīāåéųą˙ čńņīšč˙. C.31. Recent history.S.27.
COMMUNISTS IN EASTERN EUROPE
The establishment of the communist regime in Romania may have been brutal, but it was not the only one of its kind. Historians of different countries tend to focus on the methods used by the communists in their homeland and which distinguished them from the methods of other countries. Post-war events in France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Finland, for example, are largely associated with the democratic communist movement, whose leaders sought to win power through the ballot box. The Greek, Albanian and Yugoslav communists, by contrast, were members of a violently revolutionary movement dedicated to overthrowing traditional power structures by violent means. In other countries, the communists sought to achieve power by combining both approaches - the appearance of democracy with a revolutionary trend. In the words of Walter Ulbricht, leader of the East German communists, "everything must look democratic, but we must keep everything under control."
After the war, it seemed that there were many paths to communism, but the similarities outweighed the differences between countries. The first and most important moment that united the countries of the Eastern bloc was the almost universal occupation by the Red Army. Despite the claims of the Soviets that their army was there only to keep the peace, there were certain political motives hidden in these actions. In this respect, their policy was a mirror image of the participation of the British army in the events in Greece. Thus, the leader of the communists in Hungary, Matthias Rakosi, begged Moscow not to withdraw the Red Army from the country, fearing that without it, communism in the country would “hang in the air.” Klement Gottwald, who was at the head of the Czech communists, also asked the Soviet military command to concentrate units of the Red Army closer to the border of Czechoslovakia during the February 1948 coup - just for psychological impact. Even if parts of the Red Army did not participate in the planting of socialism in the countries of Eastern Europe, the threat was implied.
The Red Army acted in conjunction with the NKVD units. The presence of the Soviet military was regarded more as a threat than an immediate reality, the NKVD took a more active position in this regard, especially while the war was still going on. It was the responsibility of the NKVD to ensure political stability behind the front lines, this organization was given carte blanche to arrest, imprison and execute any person they saw as a potential threat. At first glance, they pursued the same goal as the British and American administration in Western Europe - to prevent any civil conflict in the interior of the country that could divert resources from the front. But the unfailing brutality with which the NKVD and local henchmen rounded up and got rid of everyone they considered “politically unreliable” reveals true, albeit hidden, motives.
The example of Poland is especially indicative, where fighters of the Home Army (AK) were tracked down, disarmed, arrested, imprisoned and deported. The AK became a potentially valuable fighting force, but as an alternative power base in Poland, it posed a threat to the future influence of the Soviets in that country. Despite all their declarations, the Soviets never limited themselves to winning a war: they were always interested in the political future of the countries they occupied.
Another way to ensure communist supremacy is through the use of Allied Control Commissions (ACC). At the end of the war, the Allies established these temporary commissions in all the countries of the former Axis to oversee the actions of local administration. The ACC in Germany and Austria was more or less divided between the American, British, French and Soviet representatives, their disputes often reaching a dead end and eventually leading to the division of Germany. In Italy, representatives of the Western Allies played the main role in the ACC. In Finland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, on the contrary, it was the Soviets who closely controlled the situation, while the British and American participants acted as political observers.
According to the ceasefire treaties in these countries, the Allied Control Commissions had the power to approve the political decisions made by the national government, as well as authorize or prohibit the appointment of people to certain government posts. The reason for this was to enforce democratic principles so that former enemies could not return to their pro-fascist activities. However, it was the ACC members who determined which principles were democratic and which were not. In Finland and Eastern Europe, the Soviets routinely abused their powers to secure support for communist party policies and appoint communists to key positions in government. The ACC is the trump card played by the communists whenever other politicians interfere with their plans.
An excellent example in 1945 was provided by Hungary, where the Allied Control Commission, which consisted of almost a thousand people, formed a parallel government. It was the ACC that insisted on holding elections early that year, believing that this would help the communists. When, surprisingly, the smallholders' party won a majority (57.5%) of the vote, the ACC prevented it from freely deciding how to form its government, supporting the communists' demands to give them control of the all-important interior ministry. The Soviet-dominated ASS also intervened in land reform, censorship, propaganda, and the purge of wartime officials, and even prevented the Hungarian government from forming some ministries without coordinating with the Soviet plans for that country.
Wherever the Communists came to power after the war, their modus operandi followed a general pattern. The most important thing is to get positions that give power. And when coalition governments first began to emerge in Eastern Europe, they were very often led by non-communists. However, for posts giving real power, such as the post of Minister of the Interior, was almost always appointed by the Communists. Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy called the post of interior minister an "omnipotent position", a kind of think tank that controlled the police and security forces, issued identity documents, including passports, entry/exit visas and newspaper licenses. It was in connection with this that the ministry had the greatest influence on public opinion and the daily life of the people. Therefore, the use of the Ministry of the Interior to suppress anti-communist sentiment in Romania is not the only phenomenon of its kind - in the post-war period, this happened throughout Eastern Europe. The February 1948 crisis in Czechoslovakia was provoked by complaints about the Czech Minister of the Interior, Vaclav Nosek, using the police for the purposes of the Communist Party. The Minister of the Interior of Finland, Irjo Leino, openly admitted that during the purge of the ranks of the police, “naturally, as far as possible, communists will be the new faces in it.” By December 1945, the communists made up 45 to 60% of the Finnish police.
Another important government post was that of the Minister of Justice, who appointed and dismissed judges, and also purged "fascist elements" in the administration. It was the first ministry to come under communist control in Romania and also a key ministry for the communist takeover in Bulgaria. From the moment the Fatherland Front seized power in Sofia in September 1944, the Communists used the Ministry of Justice and the police to purge the country of any possible opposition. In three months, about 30,000 Bulgarian officials were fired from their jobs - not only police officers and civil servants, but also clergy, doctors and teachers. By the end of the war, "people's courts", which emerged with the authorization of the Ministry of Justice, convicted 11,122 people and almost a quarter of them (2,618 people) were sentenced to death. Of these, 1,046 people were executed, but estimates of the number of unofficial executions vary from 3,000 to 18,000. In proportion to population, this is one of the fastest, most comprehensive and brutal "official" purges in Europe, despite the fact that Bulgaria was never fully occupied and involved in the epidemic of mass brutality that has engulfed other countries in the region. The reason is simple: while the Gestapo or local equivalent organizations had already exterminated the intelligentsia of other countries, in Bulgaria the communists had to do it themselves.
In other countries other ministries, the Ministry of Information in Czechoslovakia and the Ministry of Propaganda in Poland, were targeted by the communists because they controlled the flow of information to the masses. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, as well as in Romania, the position of Minister of Agriculture was also highly valued, since the communists immediately realized the importance of land reform in attracting new members to their ranks. It has already been shown how quickly the communists gained support in southern Italy in advocating land reforms. In Eastern Europe, they went much further - not only changed the law, but also directly began to distribute land allocated from large estates or confiscated from German families expelled from the country. They literally bought the support of millions of peasants.
If the Communists sought power at the state level, they did the same locally, always with a long-term view: this power can be used to advance their cause on a state scale. The most important task of the government of every European country after the war was to keep the economy afloat. This meant keeping factories and coal mines running, as well as ensuring the distribution of goods throughout Europe. Therefore, the communists set themselves the goal of seizing a stranglehold on industry and transport by infiltrating the trade unions and workers' committees at the factories. Thus, the communist parties were able to organize mass strikes whenever the leadership needed a "spontaneous" show of popular support against their rivals in the government. In Czechoslovakia, such demonstrations were deliberately used to give the February 1948 coup d'etat the status of a genuine revolution. Throughout the Eastern Bloc, as well as in France, Italy, and Finland, workers were regularly on strike for overtly political purposes: in a continent that constantly teetered on the brink of starvation, labor control was an extremely powerful weapon.
It was the desire to mobilize large groups of people that led to the next main goal of the Communist Party - to attract as many members as possible and as quickly as possible into its ranks. In the very first days after the war, no communist party particularly found fault with those who joined its ranks. They recruited hooligans and petty criminals, thus replenishing the ranks of the new security service. Likewise, they received supporters of the former regime, who were only too happy to do whatever was necessary to avoid prosecution for war crimes. Bankers, businessmen, policemen, politicians and even clerics were in a hurry to join the Communist Party, which was the best insurance policy against accusations of collaborationism. The French called it devenir rouge pour se faire blanchir (become red to whitewash yourself). There were also many "fellow travelers" who joined the Communist Party simply because they kept their nose to the wind. However, even taking into account these people, it is impossible to fully explain the rapid growth of the communist population in Central and Southern Europe. When Soviet tanks approached the borders of Romania in 1944, there were only about eighty communists in Bucharest and less than a thousand throughout the country. Four years later, the membership of the Communist Party reached a million, a thousandfold increase. In Hungary, the number of communists grew from about three thousand to half a million in one year (1945). In Czechoslovakia, in May 1945, the Communist Party had 50,000 members; in three years their number had grown to 1.4 million. Most of the new members of the Communist Party were probably really inspired supporters of it.
At the same time, while strengthening the foundation of their own power, the communists stubbornly sought to weaken the power of their opponents, in part by defamation of their political rivals in the press, which they controlled both through Soviet censorship and through the ever-increasing presence of mass media in trade unions. For example, during the February 1948 crisis in Czechoslovakia, communist control of radio stations contributed to the fact that the speeches and calls for mass demonstrations by Klement Gottwald received wide publicity. Conversely, other parties' appeals to the country were hushed up, and trade unionists at paper mills and printers prevented them from even printing their newspapers. Similar "spontaneous" censorship by union members took place in almost all Eastern European countries.
Realizing that it was impossible to discredit all opponents at once, the communist parties in each country began a policy of "cutting off the edges". The Hungarians called this tactic "salami tactics" - eliminating rivals one cut at a time. Each cut eliminated one group that could presumably be accused of collaborationism or some other crime. Some of these people were indeed traitors, but many were arrested on trumped-up charges, as was the case with sixteen leaders of the Polish Home Army (arrested in March 1945), the leader of the Bulgarian Social Democrats Krusta Pastukhov (arrested in March 1946) or the head of Yugoslav farmers Dragoljub Jovanovic (arrested in October 1947).
The communists then began to provoke splits among their rivals. They tried to discredit certain factions of other parties by forcing their leaders to abdicate. Sometimes they offered their rivals to unite in one "front", sowing discord between those who trusted the communists and those who did not. This tactic paid off against the communists' strongest rivals on the left, the socialists and social democrats. In the end, arranging split after split, the communists absorbed what was left of these parties. Socialists in East Germany, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland officially joined the communist parties.
Despite such clever manoeuvres, no communist party in Europe has managed to achieve enough popularity to win absolute power in elections. Even in Czechoslovakia, where they legally won an impressive 38% of the vote in 1946, they still ruled by compulsion with their opponents. In other countries, the lack of confidence on the part of the voting public often took the Communists by surprise. The heavy defeat in the municipal elections in Budapest in October 1945, for example, was viewed by them as nothing less than a "catastrophe", having learned about which the communist leader Matthias Rakosi collapsed into a chair "pale as death". He made the mistake of believing his propagandists' reports of the Communist Party's popularity.
In the face of such widespread skepticism, the Communists inevitably resorted to force, at first covertly, later through open terror. Threatened, intimidated or arrested on false charges of "fascism" popular opponents from other parties. Some of them died under unclear circumstances, as happened with Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, who fell out of the ministry window in March 1948. Others, such as the representative of the most powerful opposition in Bulgaria and the leader of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, Nikola Petkov, were convicted trials and executed. Many, like the Hungarian Ferenc Nagy and the Romanian Nicolae Rădescu, eventually fled to the West. It was not only opposition leaders who suffered. The full power of state terror fell upon anyone who stood in the way of the communists. Thus, in Yugoslavia, the chief of the secret police, Aleksandar Ranković, later recognized 47% of the arrests made in 1945 as illegal.
During the repressions, elections in the region were rigged. "Unwanted" candidates were simply struck off the electoral lists. Alternative parties were on the list in a single bloc with the communists, the voters had little choice between parties. Voters themselves were subjected to direct threats from state security agencies at polling stations. The lack of anonymity also posed a threat. When the measures taken failed, they resorted to deception in the counting of votes. As a result, the communists and their allies were "elected" with some frankly incredible advantage: 70% in Bulgaria (October 1946), 70% in Romania (November 1946), 80% in Poland (January 1947) and absurd 96% in Hungary (May 1949).
Once having gained undisputed control of the government, as happened in Romania, the communists at last began to put into practice a true program of reform. Until then, their official policy in much of Europe had always been rather conservative: land reform, vague promises of "equality" for all, and punishment for those who misbehaved during the war. Beginning in 1948 (and even earlier in Yugoslavia) they began to implement their more radical goals, such as, say, the nationalization of private business, collectivization, which took place in the communist part of Europe in much the same way as in Romania. Around the same time, they began to justify all their previous actions by passing empty laws against the people and institutions that they had already destroyed.
The final piece of the jigsaw puzzle was to embark on a daunting internal purge that would eradicate any potential threat within the party structure itself. In this way the last traces of diversity disappeared. Independent-minded communists like Władysław Gomułka in Poland and Lucretiu Patrescanu in Romania were either removed from power or imprisoned and executed. In the wake of the split between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, former Tito supporters were arrested, convicted, and executed. In the same way, the former Minister of the Interior of Albania, Koçi Dzodze, and the former leader of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, Traicho Kostov, were eliminated. In the late 1940s - early 1950s. all of Eastern Europe was plunged into a horrendous political purge in which anyone could be under suspicion. In Hungary alone, a country of less than 9.5 million people, about 1.3 million were put on trial between 1948 and 1953. Nearly 700,000 people - more than 7% of the total population - received some form of punishment.
This is not a coincidence: similar events took place in Soviet Russia in the pre-war decades. After being published in the 1990s Russian archives, it became clear that it was the Soviets who "pulled the strings." The evidence of the extent to which the Soviets interfered in the internal affairs of Eastern European countries is irrefutable, it is enough to read the post-war correspondence between Moscow and the future Bulgarian Prime Minister Georgy Dimitrov, from which it is clear how the Soviet foreign minister actually dictates the composition of the Bulgarian cabinet of ministers.
From the moment the Red Army entered Eastern Europe, Stalin was determined to achieve the establishment of a political system that would prevent any of these countries from being a threat to the Soviet Union again, as many of them had been during the war. In a conversation with Tito's deputy Milovan Djilas, he famously stated that the Second World War was different from past wars. "He who occupies the territory establishes his social order, extending as far as his army is able to reach." The threat from the Red Army was certainly an effective means of securing communism in Eastern Europe, but it was the ruthlessness of communist politicians, Soviet and otherwise, that brought this policy to its logical conclusion. Through terror and zero tolerance for opposition of any kind, they created not only a strategic buffer between the Soviet Union and the West, but also a series of replicas of the Soviet Union itself.
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