Family counseling 

Napoleonic plans. Napoleonic plans

The funny phraseological unit "Napoleonic plans" causes a smile, often pronounced in a joking manner. And meanwhile, there is nothing funny behind these words. Giving them a harmless meaning is at least disrespectful to our ancestors. And this expression can not be called good. To understand the true meaning of the phraseologism "Napoleonic plans", it is enough to turn to history. And, of course, to agree that good deeds are not done by the hand of a tyrant, they cannot be mixed with blood. Wrong ingredients, not at all.

Promising young man

Napoleon Bonaparte - a person who left his bright mark on history, a Corsican (1769, one of thirteen children of a poor family, although his father belonged to a noble family. The young man was easily given studies and military affairs, to which he devoted his whole life. From In his youth, Napoleon's idols were Roman generals and emperors, as well as the legendary Greek - Alexander the Great (Macedonian).

We will not describe his entire path to the top of his career, it has been written about in abundance. It is worth noting that it is difficult to call this path thorny, no matter what the historians of France say, trying to give this portrait a special brilliance and magnificence. Eka is unseen, history knows much more difficult and steep ascents to the heights of Olympus. In 1795, Napoleon - the commander of the rear troops. The next year - the commander of the corps). And it swirled, it started. Countries flashed by, victorious marches in Italy and Venice, the shame of Austria on the battlefield, Egypt ... In Egypt, however, it did not work out.

Live to rule

The young commander did not indulge in despair, he did not think for a long time about what to do next, too. And according to the traditions of the literary genre, he staged a coup d'état in France (1799). Napoleon takes up the reins of power.

It must be admitted that his reign was not mediocre. With a hard fist, he immediately, and not in stages, carries out a number of important state transformations. Austria and Prussia, tremble and bow! The new broom sweeps the feudal foundations. May it be so! Napoleon was able to impose his order on countries under the wing and gaze of the French eagle.

It would seem, live and rejoice. No, it won't be enough. Indefatigable ambitions, enticing Egypt, the desire to subjugate Bengal and India, the desire to do what was beyond the power of the Great Alexander himself, "unwashed" Russia, in no hurry to provide real assistance in achieving what was planned. Personal troubles with a barren lover Josephine. Refusals of Russian princesses (sisters of Alexander the First) with an insulting remark from one of them, Katerina: “Better for a stoker than for this Corsican.”

All this angered and infuriated the islander who ruled France. Napoleon needed an heir, and French society needed blood. In those days, the path from a misdemeanor to a fire or block was measured in one step. It doesn’t even matter what the head is covered with, the royal crown or the filthy cap of a peasant.

The day came when the bright head of Bonaparte settled the idea to visit Russia in order to admire the beauties of the Russian land. This day can be safely designated as a memorable day. Day of the collapse of Napoleon. After all, he decided to do this hike with a large army, and even without issuing visas. Is it a joke, 400 thousand accompanying people? But first things first.

Napoleon modern

Napoleon has become a real brand. His name is actively used by businessmen around the world. Cakes and cognac, fashionable lines of shoes and perfumes, souvenirs and company names - where you just don't meet Napoleon. In every city, in every region, in every country. “They untwisted the peasant to the fullest, promoted it,” as if our Russian satirist Mikhail Zadornov, a special “connoisseur” of everything Western and American, said. This article, of course, is not a pretext for disputes, it is not even about politics. But in order to understand the meaning of the expression "Napoleonic plan", it is useful to make one more digression from the topic.

An indispensable retreat

The personality of Napoleon became for the French a source of pride and adoration. Calling him a compatriot, the Great Frenchman, this warlike nation, at the very least, testifies to ignorance of key moments in history, or to the fact that France has always sought to appropriate all the best and useful, to capture, enslave, plunder and export. By any means and methods. These lines can cause some bewilderment: How so? France? Warlike? These lovely people and appropriate? Somehow it doesn't fit.

Everything fits together and is explained. You just need to take off your rose-colored glasses and turn to history. The modern decent image of France, however, as well as the whole of prosperous Europe, is nothing but the result of endless centuries of aggression, bloody wars and aggressive policies. Numerous colonies covered by the mask of a protectorate, shameless interference in the life of numerous countries, the imposition of their own norms and rules, other less civilized tricks leading to a fire or a chopping block of a column of peaceful and defenseless people. And it would be fine if it only concerned strangers, but also numerous fellow tribesmen, at times, washed themselves with blood and gave their souls to God for insignificant reasons.

The French should learn history. It has all the answers

By the way, Napoleon could just as well become the Great Russian. If not for one but. The ambitious young man initially made plans to join the Russian army. And the occasion was right. In 1788, the Russian commander of the corps (expeditionary) Zaborovsky visited Livorno in order to recruit volunteers for the war with Turkey.

A graduate of the Paris School of Military Affairs, who graduated with honors, volunteered. Acute need pushed the young man to any military deed. By this time, his family was already in poverty, having buried the head of the family.

The Napoleonic plan was not destined to materialize. The reason is all in the same ambitions of Napoleon. The Russian tsarist decree stated that foreign legionnaires could be recruited with a lower rank. The vain future commander could not agree to this.

His subsequent appeal personally to the head of the Russian commission on military affairs had no effect on the situation. The Russian army refused his services. The irritated Corsican with impudent speeches left the office, harboring anger and resentment. And it could be otherwise. The great "Frenchman" is the pride of France. What else can you say?

Ideologists write off everything, that's their job

Modern European ideologists, following the path beaten by their predecessors, have succeeded in creating a mass of myths that have already become an axiom, replacing the concepts of “atrocity” with “good”, justifying before their descendants for centuries to come the atrocities of their former rulers, and why go in circles, and current ones. The ideological machine clatters its wheels, rustles its gears, sparkles its indicators, and releases puffs of steam seven days a week, 24 hours a day. It contrives to find excuses for new facts of aggression, the destruction of entire third world states, the erasure of centuries-old foundations and traditions of small nations, the turning into ruins of historical monuments, the ruined lives of people who did not even care about well-fed Europe.

For lovers of disputes and inquisitive minds

There will always be someone who wants to argue and, by the way, cite horror stories about Ivan the Terrible and Russian bloodsucking emperors, written in old Europe, as arguments. Words are empty if there are no figures and facts. As the Russian president recently said to the American journalist, NBC News host Megyn Kelly: "Where are the addresses, appearances, names?" Nevertheless, we will avoid discussions on this topic, sending inquisitive minds to the historical archives, advising them to delve into the numbers.

In one night, the European queen drowned so many of her subjects in blood that Ivan the Terrible becomes just an innocent baby. And as for the Russian “unwashedness”, at a time when in European states the courtiers openly relieved themselves in all the palace corners, and streams of sewage and feces were seething through the city streets, in Russia people washed themselves in baths and relieved themselves in toilets.

By the way, where did they appear And for what purpose? Doesn't it say anything? That's right, in Mother Europe, in order to protect your head and, if possible, your expensive outfit from the rain of sewage spilled directly from the window of some European house. Europe has long been accustomed to comfort - why burden yourself with a trip to the street, if you can get rid of excess right out of the window?

The tale is a lie, but there is a hint in it ...

Meanwhile, fine-looking Europe understood and still understands only force. True, we must pay tribute to her well-developed intuition and Martial fervor shyly hides in front of a strong opponent, capable of doing dental repairs and whipping up her hair.

It's time to return to the phraseological unit "Napoleonic plan". Indeed, Napoleon's plans were great, with a long-range view. Before the eyes of the commander was the empire of Alexander, the legendary Greek. He had already seen his triumphal procession through the conquered Egyptian, Bengal and Indian villages. But Bonaparte did not want to limit himself to this. In his cunning plans was the nearest neighbor.

As was usual in good old Europe, the cordial neighborhood was held together by vile adventures, intrigues, conspiracies and bloody skirmishes. Paying tribute to his time, Napoleon wanted to rid the British crown of excess burden, its colonies. He dreamed of bringing the English throne to his feet, undermining and destroying its economy, bled the army and navy of the British. Not a weak desire for a good neighbor.

Initially, Napoleon tried to enlist the support of the Russian emperors. Under Paul the First, there was already an agreement on a joint campaign, but she was upset. Subsequently, Napoleon continued to persuade the already new Russian Tsar, Alexander, to his side. Let's skip all the details. The case ended with Russia independently embarking on the development of the Asian region. Moreover, in completely different ways. Instead of a brutal war, she offered India mutually beneficial cooperation and trade.

Is it worth talking about a fit of rage that happened to Napoleon after receiving such news? It remains to add personal insults to Russian eminent brides, and now the “braga is ripe”, the couples demand an exit. The already grandiose plan of Napoleon was replenished with another item - an “excursion” to Russia. It would be better if he thought of shooting himself. This is the meaning of Napoleon's plans, as unrealizable, losing and dangerous. Voluntarily knocking on a bear's den, shouting threats and provoking a predator, that is still a gamble.

Russia is hospitable

Year 1812. The Russian people welcomed the dear French guests with an open mind. So "pleased" and so "treated" that only ten thousand battered and exhausted Napoleonic warriors returned from the campaign. Almost 400,000 troops found their eternal shelter in the Russian land.

The further fate of Bonaparte left much to be desired. Forced rejection of the "crown", shame and exile to the island of Elba. The islander was once again prepared for an island.

A bright spark in the fading career sky of Napoleon was 1815, when he found the strength and made an attempt to restore his former greatness. Gathering the army, he freely reached Paris itself. But it was not the same Napoleon. The “shark teeth” left in Russia could no longer serve the ambitions of their owner. The celebration was short-lived.

At the very first battle of Waterloo (in the same year 1815), Napoleon was completely defeated by the Duke of Wellington. As if in mockery, the villainous fate prepared Bonaparte's last refuge, a new island. As they say, if you were born a plowman, you will return to the plow. St. Helena was the end of his ambitions. Death was not long in coming. She knocked on Napoleon's door on the 5th of May, 1821.

The moral of that fable is

The meaning of the expression "Napoleonic plan" could be explained in another way. Translate reasoning to modern life. Complain about everyday life, endless troubles and the fact that we are constantly building Napoleonic plans. But isn't it better to turn your eyes to history? The less often people turn their attention to historical events, the more mistakes they make in modern realities.

Man is definitely changing. But what are these changes? Household improvements of existence. It all comes down to this. In general, how has he changed? The same wars, the same intrigues, deceit and meanness, violence and aggressive plans. Other methods? What about others? Other tools. More perfect, sophisticated. Everything else is the same. Can you tell me about international law? A counter question - is it being carried out? The paragraph about the ideological machine was not created by chance.

It's time to answer in one sentence the question - what does Napoleonic plans mean? Building grandiose plans that will never come true.

From greatness to ridicule

One can share the opinion about the greatness of this conceited man, one can dispute it, but it is impossible to call Napoleon an ordinary person. Many literary works and films were created about this man, even poems about Napoleonic plans appeared.

An ambiguous attitude towards this Great "Frenchman". You can love and hate him, but life itself puts everything in its place. The lover of aphorisms and phraseological units himself became the object of these stable sayings. Not in the best light, by the way. Unrealizable plans of the commander became the interpretation of the term "Napoleonic plans".

On the night of June 12 (24), 1812, Napoleon invaded Russia without declaring war. The crossing of the French army across the Neman began. On the first day of the invasion, the city of Kovno was captured.

Upon learning of the enemy invasion, Alexander I sent his Adjutant General Balashov to Napoleon with a peace proposal. This was the first and last appeal of the Russian government to Napoleon with peace proposals; it pursued the goal of demonstrating to Europe Russia's unwillingness to war and emphasized Napoleon's initiative in the attack. Balashov's mission was not crowned with success.

The military forces of Napoleon were far superior to the forces of Russia standing under arms. From the huge total strength of the French military forces (numbering over 1 million people), the so-called “great”, or “large”, army, numbering over half a million people, was allocated to attack Russia. Of these, 420 thousand people crossed the Neman, the rest were in reserve. During July and August 1812, another 155 thousand people were transferred to Russian territory in the order of reinforcements and replenishment. Thus, in total, about 575 thousand people crossed the border - Napoleon threw all his main forces into Russia. Poles, Dutch, Swiss, etc. The hope of plundering a rich country “inspired” a motley army of invaders. In Russia, they talked about the invasion of the country by "twelve languages". Representatives of the enslaved peoples hated Napoleon. However, Napoleon's army, despite the diversity of its national composition, was a powerful fighting force, under the command of experienced and talented marshals and headed by Napoleon, whose name was surrounded by a halo of world glory and invincibility. It seemed that Napoleon's victory was assured.

At the start of the war, Russia could oppose much less to these huge enemy forces - only about 180 thousand people. On the advice of the military consultant of Alexander I, the incompetent Prussian general Ful, a supporter of the outdated Prussian tactics of the 18th century, the Russian military forces were formed into three armies, located at a fairly significant distance from one another. The first army under the command of Minister of War Barclay de Tolly stood along

Neman, the second under the command of Bagration was in southern Lithuania, the third - reserve - under the command of General Tormasov was in Volyn. Later, a special corps was allocated under the command of General Wittgenstein to protect the road to Petersburg. This extremely unfavorable deployment of armies for Russia was associated with the requirements of the outdated Prussian "Friedrich" tactics. Ful designed a fortified camp for the first army in Lithuania near the county town of Drissa, on the Western Dvina; to this camp, according to his plans, troops were to be pulled together for a decisive rebuff to Napoleon. Ful's plan was mediocre and disastrous: the rear of the Drissa camp rested on the shallow Dvina; the opposite bank was devoid of fortifications; Drissa was located between the roads leading from Vilna to St. Petersburg and Moscow, at a certain distance from each of the roads, which made it difficult both to protect them and the direct route of retreat. If this treacherous plan had been implemented, the Russian army would have been in great danger when meeting with an enemy several times stronger.

The Russian army in 1812, although much smaller in number than Napoleon's army, had at its disposal martial forces of excellent quality. The soldiers had been tested in the stern battles of the previous wars and had a great deal of combat experience, in particular the experience of encounters with Napoleonic troops. They also included veterans who went on campaigns under the leadership of Suvorov. The morale of the army was extremely high: hatred for the foreign invader who invaded his native country, the desire to liberate his homeland from him seized the mass of soldiers. The personnel of the commanders were also outstanding in talent and combat experience. One of the most talented commanders was Suvorov's student Bagration, the hero of Shengraben, beloved by the soldiers, who played a large role in a number of difficult campaigns, a man of great personal courage, resourceful and decisive. Outstanding in their talent were generals Raevsky, Dokhturov, Tuchkov, Kulnev, Kutaisov and others, who were popular among the troops and had extensive military experience. But the largest of the military leaders of that time, the brilliant commander Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov, a student of Suvorov, was out of work, being in disfavor with Alexander I. (Alexander could not forgive Kutuzov for his far-sighted resistance to the participation of Russian troops in the lost battle of Austerlitz; and the Bucharest peace with Turkey, skillfully and timely concluded by Kutuzov shortly before the start of the war with Napoleon.) The main weakness of the Russian command was the lack of a unified leadership: the armies were separated from one another, their actions were not coordinated, the commander-in-chief was not appointed. Combat operations were also hampered by Alexander I, deprived of military talents, who intervened in military orders; his mediocrity and self-confidence were a serious threat to the successful course of the war.

Napoleon built his strategic plan, taking into account the weaknesses of the enemy: he decided to crash between the armies of Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, prevent them from connecting and, holding them in a vise, defeat each separately. “Now Barclay and Bagration will never see each other,” he declared boastfully.

Napoleon's troops quickly moved inland. Napoleon occupied Vilna, Minsk, Polotsk, Vitebsk, Mogilev. Russian troops retreated under pressure from superior enemy forces. The retreat of the Russian army was the right tactic, which, in the fair words of Marx, was the result of "severe necessity."

Most of all, Napoleon was afraid of a protracted war. He was looking for a general battle, hoping to defeat the Russian troops with one blow, but he did not succeed. Russian troops all the time fought stubborn rearguard battles (near Develtovo, Druya, Mir, Saltanovka, Ostrovno), heroically holding back the onslaught of the enemy and destroying his manpower. These actions of the Russian army were a contribution to the future victory - Napoleon's forces were significantly reduced. Napoleon also had to go deeper and deeper into a hostile country, leaving garrisons in captured fortresses and stretching communication lines. The convoys could not keep up with the advance of the troops, and it became more and more difficult to bring up the stocks collected in large quantities in Prussia and Poland. Already near Vitebsk, the horses of the French army received only green fodder, instead of bread, the soldiers were given flour, which they put in soup. Only the Napoleonic guard was normally supplied. Napoleon's army could only rely on local resources. But it was then that she faced for the first time with a formidable force that played a large role in preparing for victory - with the resistance of the people.

The people fought back the invaders who invaded the country. Lithuania and Belarus were the first arena of the people's struggle against Napoleon. In Belarus and Lithuania, Napoleon defended the exploitative rights of the landowners. Entering Vilna, he formed from among the largest Lithuanian feudal nobility "the provisional government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania." Belarus was occupied by the Prussian corps of the Napoleonic army under the command of General Gravert, who announced that no change was expected in the position of the serfs. The uprisings of the peasants against the landlords were brutally suppressed.

The people went into the forests, hid food, and stole cattle. Popular resistance in Lithuania and Belarus greatly interfered with Napoleon. The chief quartermaster of the "great" army, Count Daru, reported that the soldiers who had gone to the surrounding villages for supplies returned empty-handed or did not return at all.

F. ENGELS

The French government saw fit, through the Parisian newspaper Gonstitutionnel, to once again inform the whole world of how the war would be conducted in the coming months. Similar exposures [statements. Ed.] are now not only fashionable, but also periodic, and although they often contradict each other, they still give a good idea of ​​\u200b\u200bwhat are the chances of success in this moment held by the French government. Taken together, they constitute a collection of all possible plans for Louis Bonaparte's military campaigns against Russia, and as such deserve some attention as they touch upon the fate of the Second Empire and the possibility of a French national rebirth.

So it looks like no "grande guerre" ["big war". Ed.] will not, 500,000 Austrians and 100,000 French will never appear on the Vistula and Dnieper. Nor will there be a general uprising of those "oppressed nationalities" whose eyes are constantly turned to the West. The Hungarian, Italian and Polish armies will not appear at the wave of a magic wand of the man who destroyed the Roman Republic. All this is now in the past. Austria has fulfilled its duty towards the West. Prussia did its duty. The whole world has done its duty. Everyone is happy with each other. The current war is not a big war at all. It does not aim to revive the glory of the former wars of the French against the Russians, although Pelissier, by the way, in one of his reports claims the opposite. French troops are sent to the Crimea not to reap the glory of victories there; they just carry out police service there. The issue that needs to be resolved has a purely local significance - dominance in the Black Sea - and it will be decided there, on the spot. To expand the scope of the war would be madness. The Allies will "respectfully but firmly" repulse any attempt by the Russians to put up resistance on the Black Sea and its coast; and when this is done, then, of course, they are either Russians, or both sides will make peace.

Thus, another Bonapartist illusion was dispelled. Dreams of a French border along the Rhine, of the annexation of Belgium and Savoy, were dispelled, and an unusually sober modesty took their place. We are not at all waging war in order to restore France to her rightful position in Europe. Far from it. We are not fighting for civilization either, as we have said more than once quite recently. We are too modest to claim such an important mission. The war is only being waged over the interpretation of the third paragraph of the Vienna Protocol! This is the language in which His Imperial Majesty Napoleon III now speaks, who, by the grace of the army and thanks to the tolerance of Europe, has become Emperor of the French.



But what does all this mean? We are told that the war is being waged for the purpose of solving a purely local issue and can be successfully brought to an end by purely local means. Deprive only the Russians of actual dominance in the Black Sea, and the goal of the war will be achieved. Having become the masters of the Black Sea and its coasts, hold on to what you have captured, and Russia will very soon give in. This is the latest of the many campaign plans drawn up by the main headquarters in Paris. Let's consider it in more detail.

Let's describe the current situation. The entire sea coast from Constantinople to the Danube, on the one hand, and the Circassian coast, Anapa, Kerch, Balaklava to Evpatoria, on the other, have been taken from the Russians. So far, only Kafa and Sevastopol are holding out, and Kafa is in a difficult position, and Sevastopol is so located that if a serious threat arises, it will have to be abandoned. Moreover, the Allied fleet plows the waters of the inland Sea of ​​Azov; their light ships reached Taganrog and attacked all important coastal points. It can be considered that not a single section of the coast remained in the hands of the Russians, with the exception of the strip from Perekop to the Danube, that is, one fifteenth of what they owned on this coast. Now suppose that Kafa and Sevastopol also fell and the Crimea was in the hands of the allies. What then? Russia, being in such a position, will not conclude peace, it has already declared this publicly. That would be madness on her part. This would mean giving up the fight because the vanguard was thrown back at the very moment when the main body was approaching. What will the allies be able to do, having achieved such success at the cost of huge sacrifices?

We are told that they can destroy Odessa, Kherson, Nikolaev, and even land a large army in Odessa, entrench themselves there to repel any number of Russians, and then act according to circumstances. In addition, they can send troops to the Caucasus and almost destroy the Russian army under the command of Muravyov, which now occupies Georgia and other parts of the Transcaucasus. Well, let's assume that all this has been carried out, but here again the question arises: what will happen if after that Russia refuses to make peace, and she will certainly do so? It must not be forgotten that Russia is in a different position than France and England. England can afford to conclude an unfavorable peace. After all, as soon as John Bull feels that he has had enough of unrest and war taxes, he will make every effort to get out of trouble and leave his respected allies to sort out the mess themselves. The guarantee of England's real might and the sources of her strength must not be sought in this direction. For Louis Bonaparte, too, the moment may come when he will prefer an inglorious peace to a life-and-death war, for we must not forget that when such an adventurer finds himself in a desperate situation, the opportunity to extend his reign for another six months will take precedence over all others. considerations. At the decisive moment, Turkey and Sardinia, with their miserable resources, will be left to their own devices. There is no doubt about this. Russia, like ancient Rome, can not go to peace as long as the enemy is in her territory. Over the past hundred and fifty years, Russia has never concluded a peace, according to which she would have to make territorial concessions. Even the Treaty of Tilsit led to the expansion of its territories, and it was concluded at a time when not a single Frenchman had yet entered Russian soil. The conclusion of peace at a time when a large army is ready on Russian territory, a peace that provides for the loss of territory, or at least the restriction of the power of the tsar within his own dominions, would mean a sharp break with the traditions of the last century and a half. A king who has just ascended the throne and is new to the people, whose actions are followed with concern by a strong national party, cannot take such a step. Such a peace cannot be concluded until all offensive and, above all, all defensive Russian resources. And such a time will certainly come, and Russia will be forced to refrain from interfering in other people's affairs, but this will be done by a completely different adversary than Louis Bonaparte and Palmerston, and as a result of a much more decisive struggle than the "local" punitive measure applied to her in her Black Sea dominions. Suppose, however, that the Crimea is conquered and 50,000 allies are stationed on its territory, the Caucasus and all possessions in the south are cleared of Russian troops, the Allied army holds back the Russians in the Kuban and Terek, Odessa is taken and turned into a fortified camp, in which, say, 100,000 Anglo-French soldiers, and Nikolaev, Kherson and Izmail are destroyed or occupied by the allies. Let us even assume that apart from these "local" operations, some more or less important results have been achieved in the Baltic Sea, although it is difficult to predict from the data at our disposal what achievements there may be. What will follow after this?

Will the allies limit themselves to topics. that they will hold their positions and wear down the Russian forces? Disease will take the Allied soldiers in the Crimea and the Caucasus faster than replacements arrive. Their main forces, for example, in Odessa, will have to be supplied with the help of the fleet, since the lands for hundreds of miles around Odessa are not cultivated. The Russian army, having at its disposal Cossack units, which are especially useful in operations in the steppes, will attack the allies whenever they try to go beyond the limits of their camp, and may even be able to take up permanent positions near the city. Under such conditions, it will not be possible to force the Russians to give battle; they will always have the great advantage of being able to lure the enemy inland. They would respond to every Allied advance with a slow retreat. Meanwhile, it is impossible to keep a large army inactive in a fortified camp for a long time. The gradual increase in indiscipline and demoralization will force the allies to take some decisive action. Diseases will also complicate the situation. In a word, if the Allies occupy the main points on the coast and wait there for the moment when Russia considers it necessary to yield, this will lead nowhere. There are three chances to one that the Allies will tire first and the graves of their soldiers on the shores of the Black Sea will soon number in the hundreds of thousands.

Such a course of action would also be erroneous from a military point of view. In order to dominate the coast, it is not enough to master its main points. Only the possession of the interior guarantees the possession of the coast. As we have seen, the circumstances arising from the very fact that the Allies have seized the coast in southern Russia will force them to move their troops inland. But this is where the difficulties begin. Up to the borders of the Podolsk, Kiev, Poltava and Kharkov provinces, the land is a poorly irrigated, almost uncultivated steppe, on which nothing grows except grass, and the grass dries up in summer from the heat of the sun. Suppose that Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson will be turned into bases of operations, but where is the object of operations against which the Allies could direct their efforts? There are few cities there, they are located far from each other, and among them there is not one so significant that the capture of it would give the operations a decisive character. There are no such significant points to Moscow, and Moscow is 700 miles away. Five hundred thousand people are needed to march on Moscow, but where can they be found? The situation is certainly such that if events unfold in this direction, then a "local" war will by no means yield decisive results. And let Louis Bonaparte, with all the wealth of his strategic imagination, try to find another way!

However, the implementation of all these plans requires not only the strict neutrality of Austria, but also its moral support. And on whose side is this power now? In 1854, Austria and Prussia declared that they would consider the advance of Russian troops to the Balkans as a casus belli [reason for war. Ed.] against Russia. Where is the guarantee that in 1856 they will not consider the French offensive against Moscow or even Kharkov as a pretext for war against the Western powers? It must not be forgotten that any army advancing from the Black Sea into the depths of Russia will have an open flank from Austria no less than a Russian army that is advancing into Turkey from the Danube; therefore, at a certain distance, her communications with the base of operations, that is, her very existence, will be placed at the mercy of Austria. In order to force Austria not to enter the war, at least for a while, it will have to be bribed by giving Bessarabia to the Austrian troops. Having reached the Dniester, the Austrian army will be the same complete master of Odessa, as if this city were occupied by the Austrians. Can the Allied army, under such conditions, rush in an extravagant pursuit of the Russians into the interior of the country? That would be crazy! But this madness, we recall, is a logical consequence of the latest plan of Louis Bonaparte - the plan of "waging a local war."

The first plan of the campaign was "grande guerre", in alliance with Austria. This plan placed the French army in numerical terms as subordinate to the Austrian as the English army now occupies in comparison to the French. This plan provided Russia with a revolutionary initiative. Louis Bonaparte could not go for either the first or the second. Austria refused to participate in the war; the plan was dropped. The second plan was the "war of nationalities". This plan would cause a storm among the Germans, Italians and Hungarians on the one hand, and an uprising of the Slavs on the other, which would immediately reverberate in France and destroy the empire of the decline of Louis Bonaparte in a shorter time than it took to create it. The fake Iron Man pretending to be Napoleon retreated in horror. The third and most modest of all plans is the plan of "local war in the name of local goals." The absurdity of this plan is immediately evident. And again we are forced to ask the question: what next? After all, it is much easier to become emperor of the French when all circumstances favor it than to be this emperor, even when prolonged exercises in front of a mirror have made his majesty an excellent connoisseur of all the external attributes of imperial power.

Published in the New-York Daily Tribune No. 4431, July 2, 1855, as an editorial

Printed according to the text of the newspaper

Translation from English

Published in Russian for the first time

The Patriotic War of 1812 began on June 12 - on this day, Napoleon's troops crossed the Neman River, unleashing wars between the two crowns of France and Russia. This war continued until December 14, 1812, ending with the complete and unconditional victory of the Russian and allied troops. This is a glorious page in Russian history, which we will consider, referring to the official textbooks of the history of Russia and France, as well as to the books of bibliographers Napoleon, Alexander 1 and Kutuzov, who describe in great detail the events taking place at that moment.

➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤

The beginning of the war

Causes of the War of 1812

The causes of the Patriotic War of 1812, like all other wars in the history of mankind, must be considered in two aspects - the reasons from France and the reasons from Russia.

Reasons from France

In just a few years, Napoleon radically changed his own view of Russia. If, having come to power, he wrote that Russia was his only ally, then by 1812 Russia had become a threat to France (consider the emperor). In many ways, this was provoked by Alexander 1 himself. So, this is why France attacked Russia in June 1812:

  1. Breaking the Tilsit Accords: Relaxing the Continental Blockade. As you know, the main enemy of France at that time was England, against which the blockade was organized. Russia also participated in this, but in 1810 the government passed a law allowing trade with England through intermediaries. In fact, this made the entire blockade ineffective, which completely undermined the plans of France.
  2. Refusals in dynastic marriage. Napoleon sought to marry the imperial court of Russia in order to become "God's anointed". However, in 1808 he was denied marriage to Princess Catherine. In 1810 he was denied marriage to Princess Anna. As a result, in 1811 the French emperor married an Austrian princess.
  3. The transfer of Russian troops to the border with Poland in 1811. In the first half of 1811, Alexander 1 ordered the transfer of 3 divisions to the Polish borders, fearing an uprising in Poland, which could be transferred to Russian lands. This step was regarded by Napoleon as aggression and preparation for a war for Polish territories, which by that time were already subordinate to France.

Soldiers! A new, second in a row, Polish war begins! The first ended in Tilsit. There Russia promised to be an eternal ally for France in the war with England, but she broke her promise. The Russian emperor does not want to give explanations for his actions until the French eagles cross the Rhine. Do they think that we have become different? Are we not the winners of Austerlitz? Russia put France before a choice - shame or war. The choice is obvious! Let's go ahead, cross the Neman! The second Polish howl will be glorious for French weapons. It will bring a messenger to the destructive influence of Russia on the affairs of Europe.

Thus began a war of conquest for France.

Reasons from Russia

On the part of Russia, there were also weighty reasons for participating in the war, which turned out to be a liberation state. Among the main reasons are the following:

  1. Great losses of all segments of the population from the break in trade with England. The opinions of historians on this point differ, since it is believed that the blockade did not affect the state as a whole, but only its elite, which, as a result of the lack of the possibility of trade with England, was losing money.
  2. The intention of France to recreate the Commonwealth. In 1807, Napoleon created the Duchy of Warsaw and sought to recreate the ancient state in its true size. Perhaps this was only in the case of the seizure of Russia's western lands.
  3. Violation of the Treaty of Tilsit by Napoleon. One of the main criteria for signing this agreement was that Prussia should be cleared of French troops, but this was never done, although Alexander 1 constantly reminded of this.

For a long time, France has been trying to encroach on the independence of Russia. Always we tried to be meek, thinking so to deflect her attempts at capture. With all our desire to keep the peace, we are forced to gather troops to defend the Motherland. There are no possibilities for a peaceful solution to the conflict with France, which means that only one thing remains - to defend the truth, to defend Russia from the invaders. I do not need to remind commanders and soldiers of courage, it is in our hearts. In our veins flows the blood of the victors, the blood of the Slavs. Soldiers! You are defending the country, defending the religion, defending the fatherland. I'm with you. God is with us.

The balance of forces and means at the beginning of the war

Napoleon's crossing of the Neman took place on June 12, with 450 thousand people at his disposal. Around the end of the month, another 200,000 people joined him. If we take into account that by that time there were no large losses on the part of both sides, then the total number of the French army at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in 1812 was 650 thousand soldiers. It is impossible to say that the French made up 100% of the army, since the combined army of almost all European countries (France, Austria, Poland, Switzerland, Italy, Prussia, Spain, Holland) fought on the side of France. However, it was the French who formed the basis of the army. These were proven soldiers who won many victories with their emperor.

Russia after mobilization had 590 thousand soldiers. Initially, the size of the army was 227 thousand people, and they were divided along three fronts:

  • Northern - First Army. Commander - Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Toli. The population is 120 thousand people. They were located in the north of Lithuania and covered St. Petersburg.
  • Central - Second Army. Commander - Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. Number - 49 thousand people. They were located in the south of Lithuania, covering Moscow.
  • Southern - Third Army. Commander - Alexander Petrovich Tormasov. The number is 58 thousand people. They were located in Volhynia, covering the attack on Kyiv.

Also in Russia, partisan detachments were actively operating, the number of which reached 400 thousand people.

The first stage of the war - the offensive of Napoleon's troops (June-September)

At 6 am on June 12, 1812, the Patriotic War with Napoleonic France began for Russia. Napoleon's troops crossed the Neman and headed inland. The main direction of the strike was supposed to be in Moscow. The commander himself said that “if I capture Kyiv, I will lift the Russians by the legs, I will capture St. Petersburg, I will take it by the throat, if I take Moscow, I will strike the heart of Russia.”


The French army, commanded by brilliant commanders, was looking for a general battle, and the fact that Alexander 1 divided the army into 3 fronts was very helpful to the aggressors. However, at the initial stage, Barclay de Toli played a decisive role, who gave the order not to engage in battle with the enemy and retreat inland. This was necessary in order to combine forces, as well as to pull up reserves. Retreating, the Russians destroyed everything - they killed cattle, poisoned water, burned fields. In the literal sense of the word, the French moved forward through the ashes. Later, Napoleon complained that the Russian people were carrying out a vile war and were not behaving according to the rules.

North direction

32 thousand people, led by General MacDonald, Napoleon sent to St. Petersburg. The first city on this path was Riga. According to the French plan, MacDonald was to capture the city. Connect with General Oudinot (he had 28 thousand people at his disposal) and go further.

The defense of Riga was commanded by General Essen with 18,000 soldiers. He burned everything around the city, and the city itself was very well fortified. MacDonald by this time captured Dinaburg (the Russians left the city with the outbreak of war) and did not conduct further active operations. He understood the absurdity of the assault on Riga and was waiting for the arrival of artillery.

General Oudinot occupied Polotsk and from there tried to separate Wittenstein's corps from the army of Barclay de Toli. However, on July 18, Wittenstein delivered an unexpected blow to Oudinot, who was saved from defeat only by the corps of Saint-Cyr who came to the rescue. As a result, a balance came and no more active offensive operations were carried out in the northern direction.

South direction

General Ranier with an army of 22 thousand people was supposed to act in the young direction, blocking the army of General Tormasov, preventing it from connecting with the rest of the Russian army.

On July 27, Tormasov surrounded the city of Kobrin, where the main forces of Ranier gathered. The French suffered a terrible defeat - 5 thousand people were killed in the battle in 1 day, which forced the French to retreat. Napoleon realized that the southern direction in the Patriotic War of 1812 was in danger of failure. Therefore, he transferred the troops of General Schwarzenberg there, numbering 30 thousand people. As a result, on August 12, Tormasov was forced to retreat to Lutsk and take up defense there. In the future, the French did not undertake active offensive operations in the southern direction. The main events took place in the Moscow direction.

The course of events of the offensive company

On June 26, the army of General Bagration advanced from Vitebsk, tasked by Alexander 1 to engage in battle with the main enemy forces in order to wear them out. Everyone was aware of the absurdity of this idea, but only by July 17 the emperor was finally dissuaded from this undertaking. The troops began to retreat to Smolensk.

On July 6, the large number of Napoleon's troops became clear. To prevent the Patriotic War from dragging on for a long time, Alexander 1 signs a decree on the creation of a militia. Literally all the inhabitants of the country are recorded in it - in total, there were about 400 thousand volunteers.

On July 22, the armies of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly united near Smolensk. The command of the united army was taken over by Barclay de Tolly, who had 130 thousand soldiers at his disposal, while the front line of the French army consisted of 150 thousand soldiers.


On July 25, a military council was held in Smolensk, at which the issue of accepting the battle was discussed in order to go on the counteroffensive and defeat Napoleon with one blow. But Barclay spoke out against this idea, realizing that an open battle with the enemy, a brilliant strategist and tactician, could lead to a grand failure. As a result, the offensive idea was not implemented. It was decided to retreat further - to Moscow.

On July 26, the retreat of the troops began, which General Neverovsky was supposed to cover, occupying the village of Krasnoe, thereby closing the bypass of Smolensk for Napoleon.

On August 2, Murat with a cavalry corps tried to break through the defenses of Neverovsky, but to no avail. In total, more than 40 attacks were made with the help of cavalry, but it was not possible to achieve the desired.

August 5 is one of the important dates in the Patriotic War of 1812. Napoleon began the assault on Smolensk, capturing the suburbs by evening. However, at night he was driven out of the city, and the Russian army continued its mass retreat from the city. This caused a storm of discontent among the soldiers. They believed that if they managed to drive the French out of Smolensk, then it was necessary to destroy it there. They accused Barclay of cowardice, but the general implemented only 1 plan - to wear down the enemy and take the decisive battle when the balance of power was on the side of Russia. By this time, the French had the advantage.

On August 17, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov arrived in the army, who took command. This candidacy did not raise any questions, since Kutuzov (a student of Suvorov) enjoyed great respect and was considered the best Russian commander after the death of Suvorov. Arriving in the army, the new commander-in-chief wrote that he had not yet decided what to do next: "The question has not yet been resolved - either lose the army or give up Moscow."

On August 26, the Battle of Borodino took place. Its outcome still raises many questions and disputes, but there were no losers then. Each commander solved his own problems: Napoleon opened his way to Moscow (the heart of Russia, as the emperor of France himself wrote), and Kutuzov was able to inflict heavy damage on the enemy, thereby introducing an initial turning point in the battle of 1812.

September 1 is a significant day, which is described in all history books. A military council was held in Fili, near Moscow. Kutuzov gathered his generals to decide what to do next. There were only two options: retreat and surrender Moscow, or organize a second general battle after Borodino. Most of the generals, on the wave of success, demanded a battle in order to defeat Napoleon as soon as possible. Opponents of such a development of events were Kutuzov himself and Barclay de Tolly. The military council in Fili ended with the phrase Kutuzov “As long as there is an army, there is hope. If we lose the army near Moscow, we will lose not only the ancient capital, but the whole of Russia.”

September 2 - following the results of the military council of the generals, which took place in Fili, it was decided that it was necessary to leave the ancient capital. The Russian army retreated, and Moscow itself, before the arrival of Napoleon, according to many sources, was subjected to terrible looting. However, even this is not the main thing. Retreating, the Russian army set fire to the city. Wooden Moscow burned down almost three-quarters. Most importantly, literally all food depots were destroyed. The reasons for the Moscow fire lie in the fact that the French did not get anything from what the enemies could use for food, movement, or in other aspects. As a result, the aggressor troops found themselves in a very precarious position.

The second stage of the war - the retreat of Napoleon (October - December)

Having occupied Moscow, Napoleon considered the mission accomplished. The commander's bibliographers later wrote that he was faithful - the loss of the historical center of Russia would break the victorious spirit, and the leaders of the country had to come to him with a request for peace. But this did not happen. Kutuzov stationed himself with an army 80 kilometers from Moscow near Tarutin and waited until the enemy army, deprived of normal supplies, weakened and itself introduced a radical change in the Patriotic War. Without waiting for an offer of peace from Russia, the French emperor himself took the initiative.


Napoleon's Desire for Peace

According to Napoleon's original plan, the capture of Moscow was to play a decisive role. Here it was possible to deploy a convenient bridgehead, including for a trip to St. Petersburg, the capital of Russia. However, the delay in moving around Russia and the heroism of the people, who literally fought for every piece of land, practically thwarted this plan. After all, a trip to the north of Russia in winter for the French army with irregular food supplies was actually equal to death. This became clear by the end of September, when it started to get colder. Subsequently, Napoleon wrote in his autobiography that his biggest mistake was a trip to Moscow and a month spent there.

Understanding the severity of his position, the French emperor and commander decided to end the Patriotic War of Russia by signing a peace treaty with her. Three such attempts have been made:

  1. September 18th. Through General Tutolmin, a message was sent to Alexander 1, which said that Napoleon honored the Russian emperor and offered him peace. Russia is only required to give up the territory of Lithuania and return to the continental blockade again.
  2. September 20th. Alexander 1 was delivered a second letter from Napoleon with an offer of peace. The conditions were the same as before. The Russian emperor did not answer these messages.
  3. The 4th of October. The hopelessness of the situation led to the fact that Napoleon literally begged for peace. Here is what he writes to Alexander 1 (according to the prominent French historian F. Segur): “I need peace, I need it, no matter what, just save the honor.” This proposal was delivered to Kutuzov, but the emperor of France did not wait for an answer.

The retreat of the French army in autumn-winter 1812

For Napoleon, it became obvious that he would not be able to sign a peace treaty with Russia, and to stay for the winter in Moscow, which the Russians, retreating, burned down, was recklessness. Moreover, it was impossible to stay here, since the constant raids of the militias caused great damage to the army. So, for a month, while the French army was in Moscow, its number was reduced by 30 thousand people. As a result, the decision was made to retreat.

On October 7, preparations began for the retreat of the French army. One of the orders on this occasion was to blow up the Kremlin. Luckily, he didn't succeed. Russian historians attribute this to the fact that due to the high humidity, the wicks got wet and failed.

On October 19, the retreat of Napoleon's army from Moscow began. The purpose of this retreat was to get to Smolensk, since it was the only major nearby city that had significant food supplies. The road went through Kaluga, but this direction was blocked by Kutuzov. Now the advantage was on the side of the Russian army, so Napoleon decided to get around. However, Kutuzov foresaw this maneuver and met the enemy army at Maloyaroslavets.

On October 24, a battle took place near Maloyaroslavets. During the day, this small town passed 8 times from one side to the other. In the final stage of the battle, Kutuzov managed to take up fortified positions, and Napoleon did not dare to storm them, since the numerical superiority was already on the side of the Russian army. As a result, the plans of the French were frustrated, and they had to retreat to Smolensk along the same road along which they went to Moscow. It was already scorched earth - without food and without water.

Napoleon's retreat was accompanied by heavy losses. Indeed, in addition to clashes with the army of Kutuzov, we also had to deal with partisan detachments that daily attacked the enemy, especially its trailing units. Napoleon's losses were terrible. On November 9, he managed to capture Smolensk, but this did not make a radical change in the course of the war. There was practically no food in the city, and it was not possible to organize a reliable defense. As a result, the army was subjected to almost continuous attacks by militias and local patriots. Therefore, Napoleon stayed in Smolensk for 4 days and decided to retreat further.

Crossing the Berezina River


The French were heading to the Berezina River (in modern Belarus) in order to force the river and go to the Neman. But on November 16, General Chichagov captured the city of Borisov, which is located on the Berezina. Napoleon's situation became catastrophic - for the first time, the possibility of being captured actively loomed for him, since he was surrounded.

On November 25, by order of Napoleon, the French army began to simulate a crossing south of Borisov. Chichagov bought into this maneuver and began the transfer of troops. At that moment, the French built two bridges across the Berezina and began crossing on November 26-27. Only on November 28, Chichagov realized his mistake and tried to give battle to the French army, but it was too late - the crossing was completed, albeit with the loss of a huge number of human lives. When crossing the Berezina, 21,000 Frenchmen died! The "Great Army" now consisted of only 9 thousand soldiers, most of whom were already unfit for combat.

It was during this crossing that unusually severe frosts set in, to which the French emperor referred, justifying the huge losses. In the 29th bulletin, which was published in one of the French newspapers, it was said that until November 10 the weather was normal, but after that very severe cold came, for which no one was ready.

Crossing the Neman (from Russia to France)

The crossing of the Berezina showed that Napoleon's Russian campaign was over - he lost the Patriotic War in Russia in 1812. Then the emperor decided that his further stay with the army did not make sense and on December 5 he left his troops and headed for Paris.

On December 16, in Kovno, the French army crossed the Neman and left the territory of Russia. Its number was only 1600 people. The invincible army, which inspired fear throughout Europe, was almost completely destroyed by Kutuzov's army in less than 6 months.

Below is a graphical representation of Napoleon's retreat on a map.

Results of the Patriotic War of 1812

The Patriotic War between Russia and Napoleon was of great importance for all the countries involved in the conflict. Largely due to these events, the undivided dominance of England in Europe became possible. Such a development was foreseen by Kutuzov, who, after the flight of the French army in December, sent a report to Alexander 1, where he explained to the ruler that the war must be ended immediately, and the pursuit of the enemy and the liberation of Europe would be beneficial for strengthening the power of England. But Alexander did not heed the advice of his commander and soon began a campaign abroad.

Reasons for Napoleon's defeat in the war

Determining the main reasons for the defeat of the Napoleonic army, it is necessary to focus on the most important ones that historians most often use:

  • The strategic mistake of the emperor of France, who sat in Moscow for 30 days and waited for the representatives of Alexander 1 with pleas for peace. As a result, it began to get colder and to run out of provisions, and the constant raids of partisan movements made a turning point in the war.
  • Unity of the Russian people. As usual, in the face of a great danger, the Slavs rally. So it was this time. For example, the historian Lieven writes that the main reason for the defeat of France lies in the mass nature of the war. Everyone fought for the Russians - both women and children. And all this was ideologically justified, which made the morale of the army very strong. The emperor of France did not break him.
  • The unwillingness of the Russian generals to accept a decisive battle. Most historians forget about this, but what would have happened to Bagration's army if he had accepted a general battle at the beginning of the war, as Alexander 1 really wanted? 60 thousand army of Bagration against 400 thousand army of aggressors. It would be an unconditional victory, and after it they would hardly have had time to recover. Therefore, the Russian people must express their gratitude to Barclay de Tolly, who, by his decision, gave the order to retreat and unite the armies.
  • Genius Kutuzov. The Russian general, who learned well from Suvorov, did not make a single tactical miscalculation. It is noteworthy that Kutuzov never managed to defeat his enemy, but he managed to win the Patriotic War tactically and strategically.
  • General Frost is used as an excuse. In fairness, it must be said that the frost did not have any significant effect on the final result, since at the time of the start of abnormal frosts (mid-November), the outcome of the confrontation was decided - the great army was destroyed.

The painting "In the Petrovsky Palace. In anticipation of peace" by the artist V.V. Vereshchagin (1895), Photo: Wise Alexandra / TASS

On June 12/24, 1812, the Great Army crossed the Neman and invaded the Russian Empire, and already on June 25/July 9, Napoleon announced to his closest circle that "he intends to attack Moscow and St. Petersburg"

It would seem that Napoleon's plans for Russia have been known for a long time: to defeat the Russian army, capture Moscow and St. Petersburg, force the Tsar to peace, cut off vast territories from Russia, and, as stated in the Proclamation of the French Emperor to the the end of fifty years of Russia's arrogant influence on the affairs of Europe".

However, the historian O. Sokolov considers the above plans to be later inventions. Having declared that Russia was preparing an attack on the French empire, Sokolov must also explain Napoleon's retaliatory plan, that is, explain why the "defending" French emperor ended up not at the walls of Paris, but at the walls of Moscow.

Sokolov reveals Napoleon's plan in the following passage: " After the defeat of the main forces of the Russian army, occupy the territory of the former Commonwealth, and if Alexander persists and does not wish to make peace, wait until he is forced to make peace. Napoleon was not going to move to the original Russian lands, and even more so to go to Moscow".

So, it turns out that Napoleon strained the forces of all of Europe, gathered a huge army, incurred colossal financial costs just to recreate the Commonwealth? Napoleon was not stupid. Count Langeron, who was in the Russian service, recalled that when capturing enemy prisoners in the winter of 1812 " we came across actresses from the troupe of the French Comedy, which played in Moscow and was at Napoleon's main apartment, and Italian singers from Murat's choir. A crowd of French artists and artisans followed the army and returned with it. There were corporations of locksmiths, masons, diamond makers, carriage workers, watchmakers. Was Napoleon going to entertain the absurd Polish gentry in Minsk with all this?

The Napoleonic marshal Segur claimed that Napoleon, " having in mind a grandiose goal, he never made a definite plan and preferred to be guided by circumstances, as this was more in line with the speed of his genius ". This phrase only means that none of even those close to Napoleon knew about his true intentions.

Sokolov claims that the emperor did not have a plan to go to Moscow, since the emperor did not say anything about it, and almost every infantryman knew about the coming restoration of Poland in the Great Army. But it is precisely this common knowledge of the target that indicates that it was disinformation. The best proof of this is that, having captured Vilna, and Minsk, and Vitebsk, and Smolensk, Napoleon did not stop, did not create any Poland, but continued to move forward. No wonder Segur recalled that in Vitebsk Bonaparte, at the sight of the positions left by the Russians " turned abruptly to the generals, hearing that they rejoiced at the victory, and exclaimed: "Don't you think that I came so far to conquer this shack? .."

Meanwhile, historical facts testify that Moscow was the main goal of Napoleon. On December 20, 1811, the emperor wrote to Mara: " Report in cipher to Binyon(French commissioner, something like a consul, in Vilna - P.M.), that if there is a war, I plan to establish a secret police at the main headquarters.[…] She needs to pick up two military Poles, smart, fluent in Russian, who can be trusted. These three officers will have to interrogate the prisoners. They must speak fluent Polish, Russian and German, and also have at their disposal a dozen well-selected agents on the St. Petersburg-Vilna, St. Petersburg-Riga, Riga-Memel roads, on the road to Kyiv and on the roads leading to Moscow ". Obviously, Napoleon was interested in those areas in which he was going to attack. Moscow, as we see, was in this direction.

On June 12/24, 1812, the Great Army crossed the Neman and invaded the Russian Empire, and already on June 25/July 9, Napoleon announced to his closest circle that " intends to advance on Moscow and Petersburg". Note that by this time even Vitebsk was not occupied by the enemy.

A. Caulaincourt recalled the words of Napoleon, spoken by him in Vilna after a meeting with the envoy of the Tsar, General Balashov: " I have come to put an end to the northern barbarian colossus once and for all. Peace I will sign in Moscow".

Napoleon rushed to Moscow. Sokolov, who denies this fact, is perplexed: why did the emperor have to rush to this "provincial city"? These arguments of Sokolov demonstrate that Napoleon understood Russian history better than he did. The conqueror was clearly aware that Moscow was not a "provincial city", but the sacred heart of Russia.

In June - early July 1812, it was much easier for Napoleon to go to St. Petersburg than to Moscow: the distance was shorter, and the forces defending the capital consisted of one corps of Lieutenant General P.Kh. Wittgenstein with only 20 thousand people. Nevertheless, Napoleon chose a long and dangerous path to Moscow. Why?

We can answer this question only when we understand the main strategic plan of Napoleon. Napoleon was not just a head of state and not even just a conqueror. He was the bearer of a certain ideology. Napoleon never hid that his goal was to create a unified world state. Russia clearly did not fit into it, so it had to be destroyed. By the time of the attack on Russia, Napoleon had reached enormous power: all of Europe was subjugated by him. But it was not only in Europe. Bonaparte had the closest contact with the ruling circles of the USA, who in every possible way contributed to his success.

After Napoleon's invasion of Spain, US troops seize its territories on the American continent. On the very eve of the war, the United States starts a war with England, attacking British possessions in Canada and Florida. With this, the United States actually opened a "second front" to assist Napoleon. While battles are going on in Europe near Borodino, Leipzig and Waterloo, the Americans pin down the British in the battles of Queenstown Heights (1812), Chatoge (1813) and New Orleans.

Almost simultaneously with North America, Napoleon's supporters also marched in South America, which was quickly engulfed in the flames of the so-called wars of independence.

In 1810, S. Bolivar raised an uprising against the Spaniards in New Grenada (present-day Colombia and Venezuela), which lasted intermittently until 1817. Bolivar was in the service of revolutionary France, and after 1800 he became an employee of Napoleon for special assignments. As Bolivar recalled, Napoleon sent him to Latin America, mainly through the United States, money, weapons and military advisers.

In the same period, large-scale mutinies were going on against the Spaniards in Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Chile. There is no doubt that the "liberated" republics of Latin America were intended to be included in the world empire of Napoleon, especially considering that all these countries were former Spanish colonies, and the new "king" Joseph Bonaparte was sitting in Madrid.

There is no doubt that Napoleon was preparing the same fate for Russia. However, the French emperor understood that it was impossible to conquer it like Austria or Prussia. He did not aspire to this. Napoleon's plan was simple and at the same time completely optimal: to defeat the Russian army, enter Moscow and be crowned there as the new Russian Tsar. After that, having agreed with a part of the Russian elite, he could distribute the territories of the Russian Empire to his vassals and create "independent2 states within the framework of a world empire. It was for the" coronation celebrations "that the Comédie Francaise, the Italian opera, and two statues of Napoleon himself were brought to Moscow sculptor A.D. Shode, one of which was placed on Red Square, and the other was intended for the Palace in St. Petersburg. For the coronation in Moscow, jewelers, cooks, waiters, expensive dishes were brought from all over Europe. For the same, coronation clothes were brought to the ancient capital and the crown of Napoleon.Alexander was well aware of these plans of Napoleon, so Moscow was burned: on the ashes, the coronation of Bonaparte lost all meaning.

The Swedish king and Napoleonic marshal Bernadotte, who secretly worked for Alexander I, reported that Napoleon plans, after defeating the Russian army, to oblige Alexander to go against the Turks and drive them out of Europe, and then proclaim himself the eastern and western emperor.

Thus, the campaign in Russia and the capture of Constantinople were to be the final stage in the formation of the worldwide Napoleonic empire.

sp-force-hide ( display: none;).sp-form ( display: block; background: #ffffff; padding: 15px; width: 630px; max-width: 100%; border-radius: 8px; -moz-border -radius: 8px; -webkit-border-radius: 8px; font-family: inherit;).sp-form input ( display: inline-block; opacity: 1; visibility: visible;).sp-form .sp-form -fields-wrapper ( margin: 0 auto; width: 600px;).sp-form .sp-form-control ( background: #ffffff; border-color: #30374a; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px; font-size: 15px; padding-left: 8.75px; padding-right: 8.75px; border-radius: 3px; -moz-border-radius: 3px; -webkit-border-radius: 3px; height: 35px; width: 100%;).sp-form .sp-field label ( color: #444444; font-size: 13px; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;).sp-form .sp-button ( border-radius : 4px; -moz-border-radius: 4px; -webkit-border-radius: 4px; background-color: #002da5; color: #ffffff; width: auto; font-weight: 700; font-style: normal; font -family: Arial, sans-serif; box-shadow: none; -moz-box-shadow: none; -webk it-box-shadow: none;).sp-form .sp-button-container ( text-align: center;)