Plato complete collection

Plato

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The dialogues of Plato included in the 3rd volume belong to the late period of his work, i.e. by the 60-40s of the IV century. BC. (Plato's death, as we know, followed in 347), and they expand as deeply as possible the objective idealism he built in previous dialogues.

What was missing in Plato's previous dialogues? The last three dialogues of the 2nd volume - "Theaetetus", "Sophist" and "Parmenides", which make up the second group of dialogues of the mature period, can rightfully be called a constructive-logical construction of the doctrine of ideas, because abstract logic really plays the first role in them. being and knowledge. For a philosopher who has been writing for more than 50 years, this, of course, was still an insufficient position, undoubtedly requiring a deeper involvement of other sides of the human spirit, not only the logical and cognitive side. Further, none of the previous dialogues gave us objective idealism in his system, but was limited to the study of very important, but still more or less private areas of life and being. All these shortcomings are compensated in those dialogues to which this volume is devoted.

"Phileb" is a very complex dialogue that requires very careful reading and study and a very detailed commentary. But for all the difficulties of this dialogue, we find in it a large number of such synthetic arguments that we did not find in previous dialogues. Thus, in the Philebus, it is directly stated that the mind, taken by itself, is not at all the last path to truth, just like pleasure, taken by itself, without the mind. The Philebus raises an extremely important question about the synthesis of mind and pleasure, for which the philosopher has to analyze in detail the different types of both, discarding the unusable ones and recognizing the most worthy ones. This synthesis of mind and pleasure is carried out here by Plato with the help of a purely dialectical method, affirming the idea of ​​the mind as a kind of "limit", about pleasure - as "unlimited" and, finally, about the synthesis of both as a kind of "number", or , we would now say, as a kind of integral structure.

This synthetic structure, which he abstractly calls "confusion" and for which he requires what he calls the "cause of confusion" (we would now call this the principle of synthesis), Plato depicts in the form of three ideas - truth, beauty and proportion. Here the aesthetic is clearly separated from the ethical in Plato, although the delimitation of the beautiful from the other two principles is still not clearly drawn.

Finally, the "Phileb" is also interesting in that for the first time it draws in a systematic form a hierarchy of five goods that arise on the basis of this dialectical synthesis. And the fact that “measure” occupies the first place among these goods should not surprise us in any way, but, on the contrary, only confirms the beloved Platonic idea of ​​the generative model that we emphasized earlier, which constitutes the very essence of his famous doctrine of ideas.

The extensive "State" of Plato, apparently, was written for many years, since it shows the imprints of the different moods of Plato, characteristic of him throughout his life after the death of Socrates. Most scholars attribute the first book of this dialogue to the early period of Plato's work, when to some extent he was still in contact with the then fashionable sophistic teachings about progress. The second and third books are distinguished by a special rigor in relation to art and artistic education. In the fifth book, Plato draws decisive conclusions from his doctrine of ideas regarding the community of wives and children. Book six is ​​famous for its concept of an unpresupposed beginning, which has received such great popularity in Neoplatonism. In the seventh book, the famous cave allegory is given. In books eight and nine the reader will find a ruthless critique of the then forms of government. Finally, the tenth book is devoted to the traditional Platonic doctrine of the cycle of souls and bodies.

Already this diversity and richness of the content of the dialogue testify to the great generalization of Plato's philosophy, as well as to the length of time required to write the "State". The reader will find an analysis of the socio-political utopia against which all the problems indicated here unfold below, in a special article on the "State".

Plato's Timaeus is the only systematic outline of Plato's cosmology, which has hitherto appeared only in scattered and random form. This created the glory of "Timaeus" for at least one and a half thousand years. Here the concept of a generative model is finally constructed. The "Ti-mei" takes the prototype (paradeigm) of all that exists and its generative, or creative, force (demiurge), so that the "generating model" is the most accurate expression for the joint action of these primary principles.

The generative model creates the world of ideas, or higher gods, and these higher gods create the cosmos with its visible gods (celestial bodies) and all its individual parts. The concept of pure matter is also clearly formulated as an eternal non-existent, which perceives eternal ideas and thereby turns them into real bodies and souls, already subject to the processes of becoming, damage and growth, i.e. real creation and destruction. The combined action of cosmic ideas and matter creates everything that really exists, including, of course, man. Plato speaks in great detail about the cosmic essence of not only man in general, his soul and body, but even each of his individual bodily organs. As a result, for the first time we obtain here a systematic construction of the cosmos as a living whole, never perishing and forever revolving in itself, but with the possibility of all kinds of damage, as well as the death of individual elements and parts that make up the common cosmic whole.

The small dialogue "Critias" is nothing more than the completion of the "Timaeus". This dialogue was left unfinished. It draws a kind of ideal kingdom: Plato, undoubtedly, idealizes here his native Athens, who lived out the last years of his independence by the end of Plato's life. Plato called this ideal kingdom by a name that later became very popular and even famous, namely Atlantis. Already in antiquity, the question of the historical reality of Atlantis often arose. But even in modern times, right up to recent years, there are still enough lovers to discuss this difficult and almost insoluble problem. For our readers of Plato, we will confine ourselves to pointing out that for the philosopher this was an idealization of Athens, which was perishing in his time, and that here he depicted in a concrete and artistic form that social and political ideal of his, on the development of which he worked almost a whole life. Thus, the four dialogues of Plato placed in this part are undoubtedly the end of the mature period of his work, from which we give in the 4th volume only the dialogue "Politician", thematically close not only to the "State", but also to "Laws". Everything else that Plato wrote at the same time or after that not only belongs to the last, senile period of his work, but in many respects also represents the tendencies of his objective idealism, which were insufficiently expressed or even directly absent in the years of maturity.

A. F. Losev

XXV. FILEB

Socrates, Protarch, Philebus

Socrates. Look, Protarchus, what kind of reasoning you are going to adopt from Philebus and what kind of reasoning you are going to challenge if you do not like it. Would you like us to briefly summarize both?

Protarch. I really want to.

Socrates. Philebus states that the good for all living beings is joy, pleasure, enjoyment, and everything else belonging to this kind; but we dispute it, considering that this is not good, but understanding, thinking, memory, and what is akin to them: correct opinion and true judgments. All this is better and preferable to pleasure for all beings capable of partaking of these things,

and for such beings, both living now and those who will live later, nothing can be more useful than this communion. Are not these, Philebus, your speeches and mine?

Philebus. They are, Socrates.

Socrates. So, Protarch, do you accept this reasoning?

Protarch. We have to accept it, because our handsome Philebus has fallen silent for some reason.

Socrates. Should we not make every effort to reach the truth here?

Protarch. Of course, this is necessary.

Socrates. Come on, more than that, let's agree on this...

Protarch. In what?

Socrates. Let each of us now try to imagine such a state and disposition of the soul that would be capable of delivering a happy life to all people. Do you agree?

Protarch. Yes, sure.

Socrates. So you try to show what joy consists in, and we, in turn, will try to show what understanding consists in.

Protarch. Okay.

Socrates. What if something else, better than the two, comes up? If it turns out to be more akin to pleasure, would we not both prefer a life firmly based on this third? And will not a life of pleasures overcome the intelligent life?

Academic edition of Plato's writings in 4 volumes. According to the text below, a full description of each volume. Plato Collected Works in 4 Volumes: Volume 1. M.: Thought, 1990. 860 S. The first volume of the Collected Works of Plato includes early dialogues of the philosopher relating to the period of formation of his teaching. The idea of ​​the volume as a whole is to trace the path of the formation of Platonism. All texts have been re-edited. The publication is equipped with a scientific apparatus. For readers interested in the history of philosophy. Contents:
A.F.Losev. Life and work of Plato.
Introductory Notes to Volume I.
Apology of Socrates (translated by M.S. Solovyov).
Criton (translated by M.S. Solovyov).
Phaedrus (translated by S.Ya. Sheinman-Topshtein).

Meneksen (translated by S.Ya. Sheinman-Topshtein).
Evtidem (translated by S.Ya. Sheinman-Topshtein).
Hippias the Lesser (translated by S.Ya. Sheinman-Topshtein).
Alcibiades I (translated by S.Ya. Sheinman-Topshtein).
Lahet (translated by S.Ya. Sheinman-Topshtein).
Evtifron (translated by S.Ya. Sheinman-Topshtein).
Lysid (translated by S.Ya. Sheinman-Topshtein).
Charmid (translated by S.Ya. Sheinman-Topshtein).
Ion (translated by Ya.M. Borovsky).
Hippias the Greater (translated by A.V. Boldyrev).
Protagoras (translated by Vl.S. Solovyov).
Gorgias (translated by S.P. Markish).
Menon (translated by S.A. Osherov).
Cratyl (translated by T.V. Vasilyeva).
Notes.
Name index.
Subject index.Plato Collected works in 4 vols. Vol.2. M.: Thought, 1993. 528 S. .
The second volume of the Collected Works of Plato includes six dialogues of the mature period of the philosopher's work (80-60s of IV B. BC); their central issue is the doctrine of ideas. Contents:
introductory remarks.
Phaedo (translated by S.P. Markish).
Feast (translated by S.K.Apta).
Phaedrus (translated by A.N. Egunov).
Theaetetus (translated by T.V. Vasilyeva).
Sophist (translated by S.A. Ananin).
Parmenides (translated by H.H. Tomasov).
Notes.
Name index.
Subject index. Plato Collected works in 4 vols. vol.3. M.: Thought, 1994. 654 p.
This volume of the Collected Works of Plato includes dialogues from the mature period of his work (including the most famous dialogue "The State"), in which the dialectical doctrine of ideas is filled with psychological, aesthetic and socio-political content. The publication is equipped with a scientific apparatus. Contents:
introductory remarks to that.
Fileb (translated by N.V. Samsonov).
State (translated by A.N. Egunov).
Timaeus (translated by S.S. Averintsev).
Critias (translated by S.S. Averintsev).
Notes.
Name index.
Subject index. Plato. Collected works in 4 T. T.4. M.: Thought, 1994. 830 S. .
The fourth volume of the Collected Works of Plato includes works of the later period of his work: the dialogue "Politician", in which the theme of the ideal ruler is developed, the vast "Laws" in which the theme of social utopia continues (started in the State), and "After Law". The volume also includes "Letters", depicting the personality of the philosopher, and an Appendix, which includes two works by Neoplatonic authors and epigrams attributed to Plato. All texts have been re-edited. The publication is equipped with a scientific apparatus.
For readers interested in the history of philosophy. Contents:
Politician (translated by S.Ya. Sheinman-Topshtein).
Laws (translated by A.N. Egunov).
Post-law (translated by A.N. Egunov).
Letters (translated by S.P. Kondratiev).
Works of the Platonic School (translated by S.Ya. Sheinman-Topshtein).
Appendix.
Alkina. Textbook of Platonic philosophy (translated by Yu.A. Shichalin).
Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (translated by T.Yu. Borodai, A.A. Pichkhadze).
Epigrams (translated by L. Vlumenau, M. Gasparov, O. Rumer and others).
Notes.
Name index.
Subject index.

Philosophy and wisdom. Philosopher and sage

Socrates speech

I will try to convey to you a speech about Eros, which I once heard from one Mantinean woman, Diotima, a woman very knowledgeable in this and in many other things, and who once achieved for the Athenians during a sacrifice before the plague a ten-year delay in this disease - and Diotima enlightened me as far as love is concerned - so, I will try to convey her speech, as far as it is in my power, in my own words, starting from what Agathon and I have just agreed on.

So, following your example, Agathon, you must first find out what Eros is and what are its properties, and then what are its deeds. The easiest way, I think, is to figure it out in the same way as that foreign woman once, and she asked me question after question. I then told her about the same thing that Agathon told me now: Eros is a great god, this is love for beauty. And she proved to me by the same arguments that I am now to Agathon that, contrary to my assertions, he is not at all beautiful and not at all kind. And then I asked her:

“What are you talking about, Diotima? So Eros is ugly and vile?

And she answered:

- Do not blaspheme! Is it possible that what is not beautiful must necessarily be, in your opinion, ugly?

- Certainly.

“So that which is not wise is necessarily ignorant?” Haven't you noticed that there is something in between wisdom and ignorance?

- What?

“So you don’t know that a correct opinion, but not supported by an explanation, cannot be called knowledge?” If there is no explanation, what is knowledge? But this is not ignorance either. After all, if this corresponds to what really is, what kind of ignorance is this? Apparently, the right idea is somewhere between understanding and ignorance.

“You're right,” I said.

“And in that case, don’t stand on the premise that everything that is not beautiful is ugly, and everything that is not good is evil.” And recognizing that Eros is not beautiful and also not kind, do not think that he must be ugly and angry, but consider that he is somewhere in the middle between these extremes.

“And yet,” I objected, “everyone recognizes him as a great god.

“Do you mean all the ignorant, or also the knowledgeable?” she asked.

- Everyone in general.

“How can they, Socrates,” she laughed, “recognize him as a great god by those people who don’t even consider him a god?”

– Who are they? I asked.

“You are the first,” she answered, “I am the second.”

- How can you say that? I asked.

“Very simple,” she replied. "Tell me, don't you say that all the gods are blessed and beautiful?" Or maybe you dare to say about one of the gods that he is not beautiful and not blessed?

“No, I swear by Zeus, I won’t dare,” I replied.

“But don’t you call blessed those who are beautiful and kind?”

- Yes exactly.

“But you admitted about Eros that, not distinguished by either kindness or beauty, he lusts for what he does not have.

Yes, I admitted it.

- So how can he be a god if he is deprived of kindness and beauty?

“It doesn’t seem like he really can be.

“You see,” she said, “you don’t consider Eros a god either.

- So what is Eros? I asked. - Mortal?

– No, in no way.

- Then who?

- As we have already found out, something in between immortal and mortal.

Who is Diotima?

“Great genius, Socrates. After all, all geniuses are something between a god and a mortal.

- What is their purpose?

– To be interpreters and mediators between people and gods, conveying to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of people, and to people the orders of the gods and rewards for sacrifices. Being in the middle, they fill the gap between the one and the other, so that the Universe is connected by an internal connection. Thanks to them, all kinds of divination, priestly art, and in general everything related to sacrifices, sacraments, spells, prophecy and sorcery are possible. Not in contact with people, the gods communicate and talk with them only through the medium of geniuses - both in reality and in a dream. And whoever is versed in such matters, that person is divine, and who is versed in everything else, whether it be any art or craft, is simply an artisan. These geniuses are numerous and varied, and Eros is one of them.

Who are his father and mother? I asked.

“It’s a long story to tell about it,” she answered, “but I’ll tell you all the same.

When Aphrodite was born, the gods gathered for a feast, and among them was Poros, the son of Metis. As soon as they dined - and they had plenty of food - when Penia came to beg and stood at the door. And now Poros, tipsy from nectar - there was no wine then - went out into the garden of Zeus and, heavy, fell asleep. And then Penia, thinking in her poverty to give birth to a child from Poros, lay down to him and conceived Eros. That is why Eros is the companion and servant of Aphrodite: after all, he was conceived at the celebration of the birth of this goddess; besides, he, by his very nature, loves the beautiful: after all, Aphrodite is beautiful. Since he is the son of Poros and Penia, the situation with him is this: first of all, he is always poor and, contrary to popular belief, not at all handsome and not gentle, but rude, untidy, not shod and homeless; he wallows on the bare ground, in the open air, at doors, in the streets, and, like a true son of his mother, does not come out of need. But on the other hand, he is paternally drawn to the beautiful and perfect, he is brave, bold and strong, he is a skillful catcher, constantly plotting intrigues, he longs for rationality and achieves it, he has been busy with philosophy all his life, he is a skilled sorcerer, sorcerer and sophist . By nature, he is neither immortal nor mortal: on the same day he either lives and flourishes, if his deeds are good, then he dies, but, having inherited the nature of his father, comes to life again. Everything that he does not acquire goes to dust, which is why Eros is never rich or poor.

He is also in the middle between wisdom and ignorance, and here's why. Of the gods, no one studies philosophy and does not want to become wise, since the gods are already wise; and in general, he who is wise does not strive for wisdom. But they do not engage in philosophy and do not want to become wise, again, and the ignoramuses. After all, that's what ignorance is bad for, that a person is not beautiful, and not perfect, and not smart is completely satisfied with himself. And whoever does not believe that he needs something, he does not want what, in his opinion, he does not need.

“So who, Diotima,” I asked, “strives for wisdom, since neither the wise nor the ignorant are engaged in philosophy?”

“It is clear even to a child,” she answered, “that those who are in the middle between the wise and the ignorant are engaged in it, and Eros belongs to them. After all, wisdom is one of the most beautiful blessings in the world, and Eros is love for beauty, so Eros cannot but be a philosopher, i.e. lover of wisdom, and the philosopher is intermediate between the sage and the ignoramus. He owes this, again, to his origin: after all, his father is wise and rich, and his mother has neither wisdom nor wealth. Such, dear Socrates, is the nature of this genius. As for your opinion of Eros, there is nothing surprising in it. Judging by your words, you believed that Eros is an object of love, and not a loving principle. That is why, I think, Eros seemed so beautiful to you. After all, the object of love is indeed beautiful, and tender, and full of perfection, and worthy of envy. And the loving beginning has a different appearance, such, approximately, as I have just described.

Questions to the text:

1. What is the meaning of Diotima's distinction between the sage and the lover of wisdom (that is, the philosopher)?

2. What do you think supports the love of wisdom in a philosopher?

Great Soviet Encyclopedia: Plato (Platon) (428 or 427 BC, Athens, - 348 or 347, ibid.), ancient Greek philosopher. Born into a family of aristocratic origin. Around 407 he met Socrates and became one of his most enthusiastic students. After the death of Socrates, he left for Megara. According to legend, he visited Cyrene and Egypt. In 389 he went to southern Italy and Sicily, where he communicated with the Pythagoreans. In Athens, P. founded his own school - the Platonic Academy. In 367 and 361 he again visited Sicily (in 361 at the invitation of the ruler of Syracuse, Dionysius the Younger, who expressed his intention to carry out the ideas of P. in his state); this trip, like P.'s previous attempts to make contact with those in power, ended in complete failure. The rest of his life P. spent in Athens, wrote a lot, lectured.
Almost all of P.'s works are written in the form of dialogues (most of the conversation is conducted by Socrates), the language and composition of which are distinguished by high artistic merit. The early period (approximately the 90s of the 4th century BC) includes the dialogues: “The Apology of Socrates”, “Crito”, “Eutyphro”, “Lazet”, “Fox”, “Charmides”, “Protagoras” , 1st book of the "State" (Socratic method of analyzing individual concepts, the predominance of moral issues); to the transitional period (80s) - Gorgias, Menon, Euthydemus, Cratylus, Hippias the Lesser, etc. (the birth of the doctrine of ideas, criticism of the relativism of the sophists); to the mature period (70-60s) - "Phaedo", "Feast", "Phaedrus", II-X books of "States" (the doctrine of ideas), "Theaetetus", "Parmenides", "Sophist", "Politician", "Phileb", "Timaeus" and "Critius" (interest in problems of a constructive-logical nature, theory of knowledge, dialectics of categories and space, etc.); to the late period - "Laws" (50s).
P.'s philosophy is not set out systematically in his works, which seem to the modern researcher rather as an extensive laboratory of thought; P.'s system has to be reconstructed. Its most important part is the doctrine of the three main ontological substances (triad): "one", "mind" and "soul"; the doctrine of "cosmos" adjoins it. The basis of all being is, according to P., the “one”, which in itself is devoid of any signs, has no parts, i.e. neither beginning nor end, does not occupy any space, cannot move, because movement requires change, i.e. plurality; signs of identity, difference, similarity, etc., are inapplicable to it. Nothing can be said about it at all, it is higher than any being, sensation and thinking. This source hides not only the “ideas” or “eidoses” of things (i.e., their substantial spiritual prototypes and principles, to which P. ascribes timeless reality), but also the things themselves, their formation.
The second substance - “mind” (nus) is, according to P., the existential-light product of the “single” - “good”. Mind has a pure and unmixed nature; P. carefully delimits it from everything material, material and becoming: the “mind” is intuitive and has as its subject the essence of things, but not their formation. Finally, the dialectical concept of "mind" ends with the cosmological concept. "Mind" is a mental generic generalization of all living beings, a living being, or life itself, given in the ultimate generalization, orderliness, perfection and beauty. This "mind" is embodied in the "cosmos", namely in the correct and eternal movement of the sky.
The third substance - the "world soul" - combines the "mind" and the corporeal world in P.. Receiving from the "mind" the laws of its movement, the "soul" differs from it in its eternal mobility; this is the principle of self-propulsion. "Mind" is incorporeal and immortal; "soul" unites it with the corporeal world with something beautiful, proportional and harmonious, being itself immortal, and also involved in truth and eternal ideas. The individual soul is the image and outflow of the "world soul". P. spoke of immortality, or rather, of the eternal origin of the body as well, along with the "soul". The death of the body is its transition to another state.
"Ideas" is the ultimate generalization, meaning, semantic essence of things and the very principle of their comprehension. They have not only a logical, but also a certain artistic structure; they have their own, ideal matter, the design of which makes it possible to understand them aesthetically. The beautiful also exists in an ideal world, it is such an embodiment of an idea that is the limit and semantic anticipation of all its possible partial incarnations; it is a kind of organism of the idea, or, more precisely, the idea as an organism. Further dialectical development of the prototype leads to the mind, soul and body of the "cosmos", which for the first time creates beauty in its final form. "Cosmos", which perfectly reproduces the eternal prototype or pattern ("paradigm"), is the most beautiful of all. To this adjoins the Platonic doctrine of cosmic proportions.
Matter for P. is only the principle of the partial functioning of an idea, its reduction, reduction, obscuration, as it were, the “successor” and “nurse” of ideas. In itself, it is absolutely formless, it is neither earth, nor water, nor air, nor any physical element at all; matter is not being, and being is only an idea. P. sharply criticized the gap between ideas and things and formulated the very arguments that Aristotle later directed against the alleged Platonic dualism. True being for P. is the ideal being, which exists in itself, and is only “present” in matter. Matter, on the other hand, first obtains its existence by imitating it, partaking in it, or "participating" in it.
In the last years of his life, P. reworked the doctrine of ideas in the spirit of Pythagoreanism, now seeing their source in "ideal numbers", which played an exceptional role in the development of Neoplatonism. The theory of knowledge of P. is based on the delight of love for the idea, so that delight and knowledge turned out to be an inseparable whole, and P. in a vivid artistic form painted the ascent from bodily love to love in the field of souls, and from the latter to the field of pure ideas. He understood this synthesis of love ("eros") and knowledge as a special kind of frenzy and ecstasy, erotic enthusiasm. In mythological form, this knowledge was interpreted by P. as the recollection of souls about their heavenly homeland, where they directly perceived any idea.
The main science that defines all the others is for P. dialectics - the method of dividing the one into many, reducing the many to one and the structural representation of the whole as a single-divided plurality. Dialectics, entering the realm of confused things, dismembers them in such a way that each thing gets its own meaning, its own idea. This meaning, or the idea of ​​a thing, is taken as the principle of a thing, as its “hypothesis”, the law (“nomos”), leading in P. from scattered sensibility to an ordered idea and vice versa; this is how P. understands logos. Dialectics is therefore the establishment of mental foundations for things, a kind of objective a priori categories or sense forms. These logos - idea - hypothesis - foundation are also interpreted as the limit ("goal") of sensual formation. Such a universal goal is the good in the "State", "Phileb", "Gorgias" or beauty in the "Feast". This limit of the becoming of a thing contains in itself in a compressed form the whole becoming of a thing and is, as it were, its plan, its structure. In this regard, P.'s dialectics is the doctrine of indivisible wholes; as such it is both discursive and intuitive; producing all sorts of logical divisions, it also knows how to merge everything together. The dialectician, according to P., has a "cumulative vision" of the sciences, "sees everything at once."
The individual soul has three faculties: mental, volitional, and affective, with the primacy of the first of these. In ethics, three virtues correspond to this - wisdom, courage and an enlightened state of affects, which are combined into one whole virtue that represents their balance - "justice".
P. carried out the same triple division in politics, in the theory of three estates: philosophers, who, on the basis of the contemplation of ideas, govern the entire state; warriors, whose main goal is to protect the state from internal and external enemies, and workers, i.e. peasants and artisans who support the state financially, providing it with vital resources. P. identified three main forms of government - the monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. Each of them, in turn, is divided into two forms. Monarchy can be legal (king) or violent (tyrant); aristocracy can be the dominion of the best or the worst (oligarchy); democracy can be legal or lawless, violent. P. subjected all six forms of state power to sharp criticism, putting forward a utopian ideal of the state and social structure. According to P., kings should philosophize, and philosophers should reign, and only a few contemplators of truth can be such. Having developed a detailed theory of societies. and personal education of philosophers and warriors, P. did not classify her as a "worker". P. preached the destruction of private property, the community of wives and children, the state regulation of marriages, the public education of children who should not know their parents. K. Marx characterized P.'s utopia in The State as "... the Athenian idealization of the Egyptian caste system" (K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch., 2nd edition, vol. 23, p. 379).
In the aesthetics of P., beauty is understood as the absolute interpenetration of the body, soul and mind, the fusion of ideas and matter, rationality and pleasure, and the principle of this fusion is the measure. Knowledge is not separated from P. from love, and love from beauty (“Feast”, “Phaedrus”). Everything beautiful, therefore, is visible and audible, externally or bodily, it is animated by its inner life and contains one or another meaning. Such beauty turned out to be the ruler of P. and, in general, the source of life for all living things.
The beauty of life and real being for P. is higher than the beauty of art. Being and life are the imitation of eternal ideas, and art is the imitation of being and life, i.e. imitation imitation. Therefore, P. expelled Homer (although he placed him above all the poets of Greece) from his ideal state, since it is the creativity of life, and not fiction, even beautiful ones. P. expelled from his state sad, softening or drinking music, leaving only military or generally courageous and peacefully active music. Good manners and decency are a necessary condition of beauty.
Without rejecting the gods of traditional mythology, P. demanded their philosophical cleansing of everything gross, immoral, and fantastic. He considered it unacceptable for a susceptible child to get acquainted with most myths. Myth, according to P., is a symbol; in mythological form, he expounded the periods and ages of the cosmos, the cosmic movement of gods and souls in general, and so on.
The historical significance of P.'s philosophy is determined by the fact that he consistently thought through the basic principles of objective idealism, on the basis of which V.I. Lenin called the entire idealist line in philosophy the “Plato line” (see Poln. sobr. soch., 5th edition, vol. 18, p. 131). P.'s ideas served as the starting point for the centuries-old tradition of Platonism and Neoplatonism.