Overcoming metaphysics by logical analysis of language. (Carnap R.). Below are excerpts from the work

From the Greek skeptics down to the nineteenth century empiricists, there were many opponents of metaphysics. The type of doubts raised was very different. Some declared the doctrine of metaphysics false because it is contrary to experience. Others viewed her as something dubious, as her questioning transcends the boundaries of human knowledge. Many anti-metaphysicians have emphasized barrenness dealing with metaphysical questions; whether it is possible to answer them or not, in any case, one should not grieve about them; one should devote oneself entirely to the practical tasks that are presented to active people every day.

Thanks to the development modern logic it became possible to give a new and sharper answer to the question of the legitimacy and right of metaphysics. Studies of “applied logic” or “theory of knowledge”, which have set themselves the task of logically analyzing the content of scientific proposals to find out the meaning of words (“concepts”) found in sentences, lead to positive and negative results. A positive result is produced in the field of empirical science; separate concepts in various fields of science are explained, their formal-logical and theoretical-cognitive connection is revealed. In the area of metaphysics(including all axiology and the doctrine of norms) logical analysis leads to a negative conclusion, which is that the supposed offerings of this area are completely nonsensical. Thus, a radical overcoming of metaphysics is achieved, which was still impossible from earlier anti-metaphysical positions. True, there are already similar thoughts in some earlier arguments, for example, of the nominalistic type; but their decisive implementation is possible only today, after logic, thanks to its development, which it has received in recent decades, has become an instrument of sufficient sharpness.

If we say that the so-called propositions of metaphysics are senseless then this word is understood in the strict sense.

* Erkermtms/ Hrsg. Carnap R., Reichenbach H. Leipzig, 1930-1931. bd. 1. Translation made by A. V. Kozin and first published in the journal Vestnik MSU, ser. 7 Philosophy, No. 6, 1993, p. 11-26. - Note. ed.

In a non-strict sense, a sentence or question is usually said to be meaningless if its establishment is completely fruitless (for example, the question “what is the average weight of some persons in Vienna whose telephone number ends with the number “3”) or a sentence that is clearly erroneous ( for example, “in 1910 there were six inhabitants in Vienna”), or one that is not only empirically, but also logically false, contradictory (for example, “from persons BUT and B each one is 1 year older than the other”). Propositions of this kind, whether they are fruitless or false, are, however, meaningful, for only meaningful sentences can be generally divided into (theoretically) fruitful and fruitless, true and false. In the strict sense meaningless is a series of words that does not form a sentence at all within a particular language. It happens that such a series of words at first glance looks as if it were a sentence; in this case we call it a pseudo-sentence. We claim that the supposed sentences of metaphysics are exposed as pseudo-sentences by the logical analysis of language.

A language consists of words and syntax, i.e. of available words that have a meaning, and of rules for the formation of sentences, these rules indicate in what way sentences of various kinds can be formed from words. Accordingly, there are two kinds of pseudo-sentences: either a word occurs which is only erroneously thought to have a meaning, or the words used, although they have a meaning, are composed in contradiction with the rules of syntax, so that they do not make sense. We will see by examples that pseudo-sentences of both kinds occur in metaphysics. Then we will have to find out what grounds there are for our assertion that all metaphysics consists of such propositions.

2. MEANING OF THE WORD

If a word (within a certain language) has a meaning, it is usually said to signify a "concept"; but if the word only appears to have a meaning, while in reality it does not, then we speak of a "pseudo-concept." How to explain the occurrence of such? Is not every word introduced into the language only to express something definite, so that, from the first use, it has a definite meaning? How could words without meaning appear in natural language? Initially, however, every word (with rare exceptions, examples of which we will give later) had a meaning. In the course of historical development, a word often changed its meaning. And now it sometimes happens that a word, having lost its old meaning, has not received a new one. As a result, a pseudo-concept arises.

What is the meaning of the word? What requirements must a word meet in order to have a meaning? (Whether these requirements are clearly stated, as is the case with some words and symbols of modern science, or tacitly assumed, as with most words of the traditional language, we do not pay attention here.) First, it must be established syntax words, that is, the way it is included in the simplest form of a sentence in which it can occur; we call this sentence form elementary suggestion. The elementary sentence form for the word "stone" is tx there is a stone”; in sentences of this form, in place of “^” there is some name from the category of things, for example “this diamond”, “this apple”. Secondly, for the elementary sentence of the corresponding word, the following question must be answered, which we can formulate in various ways:

Which proposals derivable S and what suggestions are derived from it?
Under what conditions S true and under what false?
How verify S?
Which meaning It has S?

(1) - correct wording; formulation (2) is a way of expression characteristic of logic, (3) - a manner of expressing the theory of knowledge, (4) - philosophy (phenomenology). As shown Wittgenstein what the philosophers meant by (4) is revealed by (2): the meaning of a proposition lies in its criterion of truth. (1) is a "metalogical" formulation; a detailed description of metalogic as a theory of syntax and meaning, i.e., relations of inference, will be given later, elsewhere.

The meaning of many words, namely the predominant number of all the words of science, can be determined by reduction to other words (“constitution”, definition). For example: "arthropods are invertebrate animals with dissected limbs and having a chitinous shell." By this, for the elementary form of the sentence “thing X is an arthropod”, the answer to the question posed above is given: it is established that a sentence of this form should be deduced from premises of the form: “x is an animal”, “x is an invertebrate”, “x has dissected limbs”, “x has a chitinous shell” and that, on the contrary, each of these propositions must be derivable from the first. By determining the derivability (in other words, by owning the criterion of truth, the method of verification, the meaning) of an elementary sentence about "arthropods", the meaning of the word "arthropods" is established. Thus every word of the language is reduced to other words, and finally to words in so-called "observation sentences" or "protocol sentences." Through such information, the word receives its content.

The question of the content and form of the primary proposals (protocol proposals), to which no final answer has yet been found, we can leave aside. In the theory of knowledge, it is usually said that "primary sentences refer to the given"; however, there is no unity in the interpretation of the given itself. The opinion is sometimes expressed that sentences about the given are statements about the simplest sensible qualities (for example, "warm", "blue", "joy", etc.); others are inclined to believe that the primary sentences speak of common experiences and relations of similarity between them; according to the following opinion, the primary sentences already speak of things. Regardless of the difference of these opinions, we maintain that a series of words only has meaning when it is established how it is derived from protocol sentences, whatever quality they may be.

If the meaning of a word is determined by its criterion (in other words, by the relations of derivation of its elementary sentence, by its criterion of truth, by the method of its verification), then after the establishment of the criterion, it is impossible to add beyond this what is “meant” by this word. You must specify at least one criterion; but no more than a criterion must be given, for that determines everything else. In a criterion, meaning is implicit; it remains only to present it explicitly.

Suppose, for example, that someone forms a new word "babik" and claims that there are things that are babik and those that are not. To find out the meaning of a word, we ask this person about the criterion: how, in a particular case, to determine whether a certain thing is a woman or not? Suppose that the respondent did not answer the question: he said that there are no empirical characteristics for womanizing. In this case, we consider the use of the word unacceptable. If he nevertheless insists on the use of the word, arguing that there are only womanly and non-baby things, but for the wretched, finite human mind it will forever remain an eternal mystery which things are womanly and which are not, then we will consider this as empty chatter. Maybe he will begin to assure that by the word "babik" he means something. From this we learn, however, only the psychological fact that he associates some ideas and feelings with the word. But because of this, the word does not get any meaning. If no criterion is set for a new word, then the sentences in which it occurs do not express anything, they are empty pseudo-sentences.

Suppose another case, that the criterion for the new word "baby" is established; namely, the sentence “this thing is a baby” is true if and only if the thing is quadrangular. (At the same time, it is not important for us whether the criterion is given explicitly, or whether we have established it by observing in which cases the word was used affirmatively and in which negatively). In this case, we will say: the word "baby" has the same meaning as the word "quadrangular". From our point of view, it will be inadmissible if those who use this word tell us that they "meant" something other than "four-cornered"; True, every quadrangular thing is babyish and vice versa, but this is due only to the fact that quadrangularity is a visible expression of babyishness, the latter being a hidden, not directly perceived quality. We will object: after the criterion has been established here, it has thereby been established what the words “baby” and “quadrangular” mean, and now there is no longer any freedom to “mean” anything else under this word. The result of our study can be summarized as follows: let "a" be a word and S(a) - elementary sentence in which it is included. A sufficient and necessary condition for "a" to have a meaning can be given in each of the following formulations, which basically express the same thing:

known empirical evidence"a".
It is established from which protocol sentences can be derived S(a).
Installed truth conditions for S(a).
Known way verification S(a) d.

3. METAPHYSICAL WORDS WITHOUT MEANING

Many words of metaphysics, as is now found, do not meet the requirements just indicated, and therefore have no meaning.

Take as example metaphysical term principle*(namely, as a principle of being, and not as a cognitive principle or axiom). Various metaphysics give an answer to the question, what is the (highest) “principle of the world” (or “things”, “being”, “existent”), for example: water, number, form, movement, life, spirit, idea, unconscious, action , good and the like.

2 The logical and epistemological understanding that underlies our presentation can only be briefly indicated here (cf.: Wittgenstein L. Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, 1922; Camap R. Der logische Aufbau der Welt, 1928; Waismann F. Logik , Sprache, Philosophic (In Vorbereitung.)).

To find the meaning which the word "principle" has in this metaphysical question, we must ask the metaphysician under what conditions a sentence of the form "x is a principle y" is true and under what conditions it is false; in other words: we will ask about the distinguishing features or about the definition of the word "principle". The metaphysician will answer something like this: “x is the principle of y” must mean “y comes from X",“the being of y is based on the being x", "y exists through X" or the like. However, these words are ambiguous and indefinite. Often they have a clear meaning, for example: we are talking about an object or process y, that it "comes" from X, if we observed that an object or process of the form X often or always follows a process of the form y (a causal connection in the sense of regular following). But the metaphysician will tell us that he did not mean this empirically established connection, for in that case his theses would be simple empirical propositions of the same kind as the propositions of physics. The word “occur” here does not have the meaning of a conditional-temporal connection, which is usually inherent in it. For any other meaning, however, no criterion is given by the metaphysician. Consequently, the imaginary “metaphysical” meaning that the word is supposed to have here, in contrast to the empirical meaning, does not exist at all. Referring to the original meaning of the word "principium" (and the corresponding Greek word "arche" - the beginning), we notice that here there is the same course of development. The original meaning "beginning" of the word was withdrawn; it should no longer mean the first in time, but should mean the first in a different, specifically metaphysical sense. But the criteria for this "metaphysical sense" were not specified. In both cases, the word was stripped of its early meaning, without giving it a new one; the word is an empty shell. Then, when it still had meaning, different ideas corresponded to it associatively, they are combined with new ideas and feelings that arise on the basis of the connection in which the word is now used. But thanks to this, the word does not receive any meaning, it remains further meaningless until the path for verification is indicated.

Another example is the word "God". Regardless of the ways in which the word is used in different areas, we must distinguish its use in three historical periods, which pass one into the other in time. AT mythological the use of the word has a clear meaning. This word (respectively, similar words in other languages) designate a corporeal being who sits somewhere on Olympus, in heaven or in the underworld, and, to a greater or lesser extent, possesses strength, wisdom, kindness and happiness. Sometimes this word denotes a spiritual-psychic being, which, although it does not have a body similar to a human one, but which somehow manifests itself in things and processes of the visible world and therefore is empirically fixed. AT metaphysical the use of the word "God" means something superempirical. The meaning of a corporeal or corporeal spiritual being was taken away from the word. Since no new meaning was given to the word, it turned out to have no meaning at all. True, it often looks as if the word "God" has a meaning in metaphysical usage as well. But the definitions put forward, on closer examination, are revealed as pseudo-definitions; they lead either to unacceptable phrases (which will be discussed later), or to other metaphysical words (for example: “first cause”, “absolute”, “unconditional”, “independent”, “independent”, etc.), but by no means to the truth conditions of his elementary proposition. This word does not even fulfill the first requirement of logic, namely the requirement to indicate its syntax, i.e., the form of its entry into an elementary sentence. The elementary sentence should have the form "X there is a God”; the metaphysician will either reject this form altogether, not giving another, or, if he accepts it, will not indicate the syntactic category of the variable X.(Categories, for example, are: a body, properties of a body, relations between bodies, numbers, etc.).

Between the mythological and metaphysical use of the word "God" stands his theological usage. Here the word has no meaning of its own; it fluctuates between the other two uses. Some theologians have a distinctly empirical (in our term "mythological") concept of God. In this case, there are no pseudo-sentences; but the disadvantage for theologians is that, under this interpretation, the sentences of theology are empirical sentences and therefore fall within the domain of the empirical sciences. Other theologians have explicit metaphysical usage. For others, the word usage is unclear, whether it is following one or another use of the word, whether it is an unconscious movement on both sides of the iridescent content. Similar to the considered examples of the words “principle” and “God”, most of the other specific metaphysical terms do not matter, for example: “idea”, “absolute”, “unconditional”, “infinite”, “being of being”, “non-existent”, “thing-in-itself”, “absolute spirit”, “objective spirit”, “essence” , “being-in-itself”, “being-in-itself-and-for-itself”, “emanation”, “manifestation”, “singling out”, “I”, “not-I”, etc. with these expressions, the situation is exactly the same as with the word “babik” in the previously considered example. The metaphysician will argue that empirical truth conditions can be omitted; if he adds that by these words something is nevertheless "meaned," then we know that only the accompanying ideas and feelings are indicated by this, but due to this the word does not receive a meaning. Metaphysical imaginary sentences that contain such words have no meaning, do not mean anything, are only pseudo-sentences. We will consider the question of explaining their historical origin later.

· 4. MEANING OF THE OFFER

So far, we have considered pseudo-sentences in which there are words that have no meaning. There is also a second kind of pseudo-sentence. They are made up of words that have meaning, but these words are arranged in such an order that they are meaningless. The syntax of the language specifies which combinations of words are allowed and which are not. The grammatical syntax of a natural language does not everywhere fulfill the task of eliminating meaningless phrases. Take, for example, two rows of words:

"Caesar is and",
"Caesar is a prime number."

A number of words (1) are formed in contradiction with the rules of syntax; the syntax requires that the third place is not a conjunction, but a predicate or an adjective. In accordance with the rules of syntax, for example, the series “Caesar is a commander” is formed, this is a meaningful series of words, a true sentence. But the series of words (2) is also formed according to the rules of syntax, for it has the same grammatical form as the sentence just given. But despite this, series (2) is meaningless. Being a "prime number" is a property of numbers; in relation to personality, this property can neither be attributed nor disputed. Since series (2) looks like a sentence, but is not, does not express anything, does not express either the existing or the non-existent, we call this series of words a “pseudo-sentence”. Due to the fact that the grammatical syntax is not violated, one can, at first glance, come to the erroneous opinion that this series of words is a sentence, albeit a false one. However, the statement "a is a prime number" is false if and only if "a" is divisible by a natural number that is neither "a" nor "/"; it is obvious that instead of "a" here one cannot substitute "Caesar". This example is chosen so that the nonsense can be easily seen; however, many metaphysical sentences are not as easily debunked as pseudo-sentences. The fact that in ordinary language it is possible to form a nonsensical series of words without violating the rules of grammar indicates that grammatical syntax, considered from a logical point of view, is insufficient. If the grammatical syntax corresponded exactly to the logical syntax, then no pseudo-sentence could arise. If grammatical syntax subdivided words not only into nouns, adjectives, verbs, conjunctions, etc., but within each kind also made certain distinctions required by logic, then no sentence could be formed. If, for example, nouns were grammatically divided into several types, according to which they would denote the properties of bodies, numbers, etc., then the words “commander” and “prime number” would refer to grammatically different types and series (2) would be just as grammatically incorrect as row (1). In a well-formed language, all meaningless series of words would look like series (1). In this way they would, to some extent, be automatically excluded by the grammar; i.e., in order to avoid meaninglessness, one must pay attention not to the meaning of individual words, but only to their form (“syntactic categories”, for example: thing, property of a thing, connection of things, number, properties of a number, connection of numbers, etc. ). If our thesis that the sentences of metaphysics are pseudo-sentences is true, then in a logically well-formed language metaphysics could not be expressed at all. Hence follows the great philosophical significance of the task of creating a logical syntax, on which logicians are currently working.

5. METAPHYSICAL PSEUDOSENTATIONS

Now we will analyze several examples of metaphysical pseudo-sentences, in which one can especially clearly see that the logical syntax is violated, although the historical-grammatical syntax is preserved. We have selected several sentences from a single metaphysical teaching which is now strongly influenced by e.

Only the existent should be subject to research, and yet - nothing; being one and beyond - nothing; being is unique and beyond it - nothing. How is it with this nothingness? - There is nothing only because there is no, that is, negation? Or vice versa? Is there negation and not just because there is nothing? - We claim: nothing is more original than no and negation. Where are we looking for nothing?

3 The following quotation (in italics in the original) is from: Heidegger M. Was ist Metaphysik? 1929. We could cite relevant quotations from some other numerous metaphysicians of the present or past; however, the one below most clearly illustrates our understanding.

How do we find nothing? - We know nothing. - Fear reveals nothing. - What and why we were afraid was "actually" - nothing. In reality: nothing itself - as such - was there. - How is it with this nothingness? “Nothing destroys itself.”

In order to show that the possibility of forming pseudo-sentences is based on the logical shortcomings of the language, let us compare the diagram below. The sentences under the number I are both grammatically and logically flawless, and therefore meaningful. The sentences under the number II (excluding B-3) are grammatically completely similar to the corresponding sentences under the number I. The form of the sentences II-A (both the question and the answer) does not, however, correspond to the requirements that are put forward in relation to a logically correct language. But, despite this, these sentences are meaningful, as they are translated into the correct language; this is evident from sentence II1-A, which has the same meaning as II-A. The inexpediency of the sentence form II-A lies in the fact that we can, starting from it, by grammatically perfect operations, go to the meaningless sentence forms П-В, which are taken from the above quotation. These forms cannot be formed at all with the correct language of the third row. However, their meaninglessness is hard to see at first glance, since by analogy they can be confused with meaningful sentences I-B. The mistake of our language here established is that, in contrast to a logically correct language, it allows the same form between meaningful and meaningless series of words. Each offer is accompanied by a corresponding formula in logistics symbols; these formulas especially clearly make clear the inexpediency of the analogy between II-A and I-A and the consequent emergence of meaningless formations II-B.

I. Meaningful Sentences of Ordinary Language	II. The emergence of meaningless from meaningful in ordinary language	III. Logically correct language
A. How is it outside?	A. How is it outside?	A. Not available
		(does not exist, does not exist)
Rain on the street	Nothing on the street (nothing.)	something on the street.
		~($x)st(x)
Q, How is this rain? (i.e.: what does rain do? or: what else should be said about this rain?	Q. "How is it with this nothingness?"	Q. All these forms cannot be formed at all.

1. We know the rain	1. “We are looking for nothing”, "We find nothing" "We know nothing"

2. Rain is raining .	2. “Nothing is nothing”
j(j )
	3. Nothing exists just because...

A closer look reveals some more differences in the P-W pseudo-sentences. The formation of sentences (I) rests simply on the error that the word "nothing" is used as the name of an object, since in ordinary language this form is usually used to formulate a negative sentence of existence (see II-A). In a correct language, this is not a special name, but a specific logical form proposals (see III-A). In sentence II-B-2, the formation of a word without meaning is added - “neglect”; the proposal is thus doubly meaningless.

We said earlier that metaphysical words that have no meaning are formed “because the word that has meaning is deprived of it by metaphorical use in metaphysics. Here, on the contrary, we have a rare case when a new word is introduced, which from the very beginning has no meaning. Proposal II-B-3 is also rejected by us for two reasons. It has the same error (using the word "nothing" as the name of an object) as the above sentences. Moreover, it contains a contradiction. Even if it were permissible to introduce the word “nothing” as the name of an object, then the existence of this object is denied in the definition, and in sentence (3) it is reasserted. So, this sentence, if it were not already meaningless, is contradictory, and therefore doubly meaningless.

In view of the gross logical error which we found in sentence II-B, one might come to the proposition that in the quoted passage the word "nothing" has a completely different meaning than usual. This assumption is further strengthened when we read further that fear reveals nothing, that in fear nothing was itself as such. Here, apparently, the word "nothing" should denote a certain emotional state, maybe of a religious persuasion, or something that underlies such a feeling. In this case, the indicated logical errors in sentence II-B would not have occurred. But the beginning of this quotation shows that such an interpretation is impossible. From the juxtaposition of “only” and “and yet nothing” it clearly follows that the word “nothing” here has the usual meaning of a logical particle that serves to express the negative sentence of existence. To this introduction of the word "nothing" is related the main question of the passage: "How is it with this nothingness?"

Doubts about the truth of our interpretation will be completely eliminated when we see that it is absolutely clear to the author of the article that his questions and proposals are contrary to logic. "Question and answer relatively nothing likewise unreasonable. The usual rules of thought, the provision on the inadmissibility of contradictions, the general "logic" - kill that question." So much the worse for logic! We must overthrow her dominance: "If the power reason on the field of questions about nothingness and being is broken, then the fate of the domination of “logic” within philosophy is decided by this. idea of logic removed in the cycle of initial questions”. But will sober science agree with the cycle of questions that contradict logic? This is also answered: "The ostensible prudence and advantage of science will become ridiculous if it does not take anything seriously." So, we find an excellent confirmation of our view: the metaphysician himself comes to the conclusion that his questions and answers are incompatible with the logic and way of thinking of science.

The difference between our thesis and early anti-metaphysicians is now clearer. Metaphysics for us is not a simple "imagination" or "fairy tale". The sentences of the tale do not contradict logic, but only experience; they are meaningful, though false. Metaphysics is not superstition” , you can believe in true and false sentences, but not in a meaningless series of words. Metaphysical propositions cannot be considered as “working hypotheses” either, because for a hypothesis its connection (true or false) with empirical propositions is essential, and this is precisely what metaphysical propositions lack.

Among the references to the so-called limited human cognitive abilities, in order to save metaphysics, the following objection is sometimes put forward: metaphysical propositions cannot, it is true, be verified by man or by any finite being in general; but they matter as a suggestion of what a being of higher or even superior cognitive faculties would answer our questions. Against this objection we would like to say the following. If the meaning of the word is not indicated or the word series is composed without observing the rules of syntax, then there is no question. (Think of pseudo-questions. “Is this table a babik?”; “The number seven is sacred?”, “Which numbers are darker - even or odd?”) Where there is no question, even an omniscient being cannot answer. Perhaps someone who objects to us will say: just as a sighted person can communicate new knowledge to a blind person, so a higher being could communicate metaphysical knowledge to us, for example, the visible world is a manifestation of the spirit. Here we must reflect on what "new knowledge" is. We can imagine that we have met a being who will tell us something new. If this being proves Fermat's theorem to us, or invents a new physical instrument, or establishes a previously unknown natural law, then our knowledge would, of course, expand with his help. For we could check all this, just as a blind person can check and understand all physics (and thus all the sentences of a sighted person). But if this hypothetical being says something that cannot be verified by us, then what is said cannot be understood by us either; for us, what has been said then contains no information at all, but only empty sounds without meaning, although, perhaps, with certain ideas. With the help of another being, therefore, one can learn more or less, or even everything, but our knowledge can be expanded only quantitatively, but knowledge of a fundamentally new kind cannot be obtained. What we do not yet know can be known with the help of another being; but what cannot be represented by us is meaningless, it cannot become meaningful with the help of another, if he knows as much as he likes. Therefore, neither God nor the devil can help us in metaphysics.

6. THE ESSENCE OF ALL METAPHYSICS

The examples of metaphysical sentences we have analyzed are all taken from just one article. However, the results, by analogy and partly literally, extend to other metaphysical systems. For an offer Hegel which the author of the article quotes (“Pure being and pure nothingness are, therefore, the same”), our conclusion is absolutely correct. Metaphysics Hegel from the point of view of logic it has the same character that we have found in modern metaphysics. This also applies to other metaphysical systems, although the way they use words, and therefore the type of logical errors, deviates to a greater or lesser extent from the example we have considered.

Further examples of the analysis of individual metaphysical sentences can no longer be given here. They would point only to the variety of types of errors.

It seems that most of the logical errors that occur in pseudo-sentences rest on logical defects in the use of the word "to be" in our language (and the corresponding words in the rest, at least in most European languages). The first mistake is the ambiguity of the word “to be”: it is used both as a link (“man is a social being”) 4 and as a designation of existence (“man is”). This error is aggravated by the fact that the metaphysician is often not clear about this ambiguity. The second error is rooted in the form of the verb when used in the second meaning - Existence. By means of the verbal form, the predicate is simulated where it does not exist. True, it has long been known that existence is not a sign (cf. Kantian refutation of the ontological proof of the existence of God). But only modern logic is completely consistent here: it introduces the sign of existence in such a syntactic form that it can relate not as a predicate to the sign of an object, but only to a predicate (see, for example, sentence III-A in the table). Most metaphysicians, starting from the deep past, in view of the verbal, and therefore predicative, form of the verb “to be”, came to pseudo-sentences, for example, “I am”, “God is”. We find an example of this error in "cogito, ergo sum" Descartes.

The substantive considerations that are put forward against the premise - whether the sentence "I think" is an adequate expression of common sense, or perhaps contains hypostasis - we would like here to completely abandon and consider both proposals only from a formal point of view. We see two significant logical fallacies here. The first is in the final sentence "I am". The verb "to be" is used here, no doubt, in the sense of existence, since the copula cannot be used without a predicate; in addition, the sentence "I am" Descartes always understood in this sense.

4 The text contains the sentence “ich bin hungrig”, in the Russian translation of which the link “is” drops out: I (are) hungry. - Approx. transl.

But then this sentence contradicts the above logical rule that existence can only be stated in connection with a predicate, but not in connection with a name (subject, proper name). The existence clause is not of the form “but exists” (as here: "I is”, i.e. “I exist”), but “there is something of one kind or another”. The second mistake lies in the transition from 'I think' to 'I am'. If from the sentence " IP(a)” (in which “a” is assigned the property R) a sentence of existence is derived, then this existence can be asserted only in relation to the predicate R, but not in relation to the subject "a". From “I am a European” follows not “I exist”, but “there is a European”, from “I think” follows not “I exist”, but “there is something thinking”.

The fact that our languages express existence with the help of a verb (“to be” or “to exist”) is not yet a logical error, but only an inexpediency, a danger. The verbal form easily leads to the misconception that existence is a predicate; and from this follow such logical perversions, and therefore meaningless expressions, as we have just considered. The same origin has such forms as "existent", "non-existent", which have long played a large role in metaphysics. In a logically correct language, such forms cannot be formed at all. Apparently, in Latin and German, perhaps on the Greek model, the form "ens", respectively "existing", was introduced specifically for use in metaphysics; but, thinking to eliminate the defect, they made the language logically worse.

Another very common violation of logical syntax is the so-called "a confusion of spheres" concepts. If the error just considered was that a sign with a non-predicative meaning was used as a predicate, then here the predicate is used as a predicate, but as a predicate of another "sphere"; i.e., the rule of the so-called “type theory” is violated. A constructed example of this error is the sentence "Caesar is a prime number" that was considered. A personal name and a number belong to different logical spheres, and therefore the predicate of personality (“general”) and the predicate of number (“prime number”) also belong to different spheres. The confusion of spheres, in contrast to the error in the use of the verb "to be" discussed earlier, is not specific to metaphysics; this error occurs, and quite often, in everyday speech. But here it rarely leads to meaninglessness; the ambiguity of words in relation to spheres is here of such a kind that it can be easily eliminated.

Example: 1. "This table is bigger than that one." 2 "The height of this table is greater than the height of that table." Here the word "more" is used in (1) as a relation between objects, in (2) as a relation between numbers, that is, for two different syntactic categories. The error is not significant here; it can be excluded by writing “greater than 1” and “greater than 2”; "greater-1" is established from "greater-2" by virtue of the fact that the form of the sentence (1) is explicable as having the same meaning as (2) (and some others like it).

In view of the fact that the confusion of spheres in spoken language does not lead to great troubles, they generally do not pay attention to it. However, this is expedient only in relation to ordinary word usage; in metaphysics, this leads to disastrous consequences. Here, on the basis of a habit developed in everyday speech, one can come to such a confusion of spheres that it will not allow translation into a logically correct language, as is possible with everyday speech. Pseudo-sentences of this kind are often found in Hegel and Heidegger who, with many features of Hegelian philosophy, also adopted some of its shortcomings (for example, the definitions that should refer to objects of a certain kind refer instead to the definitions of these objects or to "being", or to the relations between these objects).

After we have established that many metaphysical sentences are meaningless, the question arises: are there such meaningful sentences in metaphysics that will remain after we exclude all meaningless ones?

On the basis of our previous conclusions, one can come to the idea that metaphysics contains many dangers of falling into meaninglessness and the metaphysician in his activity should carefully avoid them. But in reality the situation is such that there can be no meaningful metaphysical sentences at all. This follows from the task that metaphysics has set itself: it wants to find and present knowledge that is inaccessible to empirical science.

Earlier we determined that the meaning of a sentence is in the method of its verification. A sentence only means what is verifiable in it. Therefore, a sentence, if it says anything at all, only talks about empirical facts. One can neither say, nor think, nor ask about anything that lies fundamentally on the other side of the experimental.

Sentences (meaningful) are divided into the following types: first of all, there are sentences that are already true in their form alone (“tautologies” according to Wittgenstein; they correspond roughly to Kant's "analytic judgments"); they say nothing about reality. To this species belong the formulas of logic and mathematics; they themselves are not statements about reality, but serve to transform such statements. Secondly, there is the opposite of such statements (“contradictions”); they are contradictory and, according to their form, are false. For all other sentences, the decision about their truth or falsity depends on protocol sentences; they are therefore (true or false) experienced suggestions and belong to the field of empirical science. Wanting to form a sentence that does not belong to these species makes it automatically meaningless. Since the metaphysician does not make analytic propositions, does not want to be in the field of empirical science, he necessarily uses either words for which no criterion is given, and therefore they turn out to be devoid of meaning, or words that have meaning, and compose in such a way that they do not the result is neither an analytic (respectively counter-dictational) nor an empirical proposition. In both cases, pseudo-sentences are necessarily obtained.

Logical analysis pronounces a verdict of meaninglessness on any ostensible knowledge that claims to extend beyond experience. This verdict applies to any speculative metaphysics, to any ostensible knowledge from pure thinking and pure intuition, who wish to do without experience. The verdict also applies to that kind of metaphysics which, from experience, desires by means of a special key to know lying outside or for experience(for example, to the neo-vitalist thesis about the “entelechy” operating in organic processes, which is physically unknowable; to the question of the “essence of causality”, which goes beyond a certain pattern of succession; to speeches about the “thing-in-itself”). The sentence is valid for all philosophy of values and norms, for any ethics or aesthetics as a normative discipline. For the objective significance of a value or norm cannot be (also in the opinion of the representatives of value philosophy) empirically verified or deduced from empirical propositions; they cannot be expressed in meaningful sentences at all. In other words, either for “good” and “beautiful” and other predicates used in normative science, there are empirical characteristics, or they are ineffective. A sentence with such predicates becomes in the first case an empirical factual judgment, but not a value judgment; in the second case, it becomes a pseudo-sentence; a sentence that would be a value judgment cannot be formed at all.

The verdict of meaninglessness also applies to those metaphysical trends that are unfortunately called epistemological, namely realism(because he claims to say more than empirical evidence contains, for example, that processes show a certain regularity and that this implies the possibility of applying the inductive method) and his opponents: the subjective idealism, solipsism, phenomenalism, positivism(in the old sense).

What then remains for philosophy if all sentences that mean something are of empirical origin and belong to real science? What remains is not a proposal, not a theory, not a system, but only method, i.e. logical analysis. We have shown the application of this method in its negative use in the course of the preceding analysis; it serves here to exclude words that have no meaning, meaningless pseudo-sentences. In its positive use, the method serves to explain meaningful concepts and sentences, to provide a logical justification for real science and mathematics. The negative application of the method in the present historical situation is necessary and important. But more fruitful, already in today's practice, is its positive application; however, it is not possible to dwell on it in more detail here. This task of logical analysis, the study of foundations, is what we mean by "scientific philosophy" as opposed to metaphysics.

Concerning the logical nature of the proposals that we have received as a result of logical analysis, for example, the proposals of this article and other articles devoted to logical questions, we can only say here that they are partly analytical, partly empirical. These sentences about sentences and parts of sentences belong partly to pure metalogic (for example, “a series consisting of the sign of existence and the name of an object is not a sentence), partly to descriptive metalogic (for example, “a series of words of this or that place in this or that book is meaningless"). Metalogics will be discussed elsewhere; in doing so, it will be shown that a metalogic that speaks of sentences in a language can itself be formulated in that language.

7. METAPHYSICS AS EXPRESSION OF THE FEELING OF LIFE

If a. we say that the proposals of metaphysics are completely meaningless, then we will not say anything and, although this corresponds to our conclusions, we will be tormented by a feeling of surprise: how could so many people of different times and peoples, among them outstanding minds, engage in metaphysics with such zeal and ardor, if it is just a collection of meaningless words? And how to understand such a strong impact on readers and listeners, if these words are not even delusions, but do not contain anything at all? Such thoughts are in some respects correct, since metaphysics does indeed contain something; however, this is not a theoretical content. The (pseudo-) propositions of metaphysics serve not for statements about the state of affairs, neither existing (then they would be true sentences) nor non-existent (then they would be at least false sentences); they serve for expressions of the feeling of life.

We would probably agree that the origin of metaphysics was myth. The child, faced with the "evil table", is irritated; primitive man tries to appease the formidable demons of the earthquake or honors the deity of fruitful rain. Before us is a personification of natural phenomena, a quasi-poetic expression of a person's emotional relationship to the world. The legacy of myth is, on the one hand, poetry, which consciously develops the achievements of myth for life; on the other hand, a theology in which myth has developed into a system. What is the historical role of metaphysics? Perhaps one can see in it a substitute for theology at the stage of systematic, conceptual thinking. The (supposed) supernatural cognitive source of theology has been replaced here by a natural but (supposed) superempirical cognitive source. Upon closer examination, in the repeatedly changing clothes, the same content is recognized as in the myth: we find that metaphysics also arose from the need to express the feeling of life, the state in which a person lives, the emotional-volitional attitude to the world, to the neighbor, to tasks that he solves, to the fate that he experiences. This feeling of life is expressed in most cases unconsciously, in everything that a person does and says; it is fixed in the features of his face, perhaps also in his walk. Some people, in addition to this, also have a need for a special expression of their feeling of life, more concentrated and more convincingly perceived. If such people are artistically gifted, they find an opportunity for self-expression in the creation of works of art. How the feeling of life is manifested in the style and form of a work of art has already been elucidated by others (for example, Diltheem and his students). (Often, the word "world view" is used here; we refrain from using it because of the ambiguity, as a result of which the distinction between the sense of life and theory is erased, which is decisive for our analysis.) For our study, it is only essential that art is adequate, metaphysics, on the contrary, an inadequate means for expressing the feeling of life. In principle, there is nothing to object to the use of any means of expression. In the case of metaphysics, however, it is the case that the form of its works imitates what it is not. This form is a system of sentences that are in (seemingly) regular connection, that is, in the form of a theory. This imitates theoretical content, although, as we have seen, there is none. Not only the reader, but also the metaphysician himself is mistaken in believing that metaphysical sentences mean something, describe some state of affairs. The metaphysician believes that he is operating in the realm of truth and falsehood. In reality, he does not express anything, but only expresses something as an artist. That the metaphysician is in error does not yet follow from the fact that he takes language as the medium of expression, but declarative sentences as the form of expression; for the lyricist does the same without falling into self-delusion. But the metaphysician gives arguments for his proposals, he demands that they agree with the content of his constructions, he argues with metaphysicians of other directions, he looks for refutation of their proposals in his articles. A lyricist, on the other hand, does not attempt in his poem to refute sentences from another lyricist's poems; he knows that he is in the realm of art and not in the realm of theory.

Perhaps music is the purest medium for expressing the feeling of life, since it is the most liberated from everything objective. The harmonious feeling of life that the metaphysician wants to express in the monistic system is expressed much more clearly in the music of Mozart. And if a metaphysician expresses a dualistic-heroic sense of life in a dualistic system, does he not do so only because he lacks Beethoven's ability to express this sense of life by adequate means? Metaphysicians are musicians without musical ability. Therefore, they have a strong inclination to work in the field of theoretical expression, to link concepts and thoughts. Instead of, on the one hand, fulfilling this tendency in the field of science, and on the other hand, satisfying the need for expression in art, the metaphysician mixes all this and creates works that provide nothing for knowledge and something very insufficient for the feeling of life.

Our assumption that metaphysics is a substitute for art, and not an adequate one, is supported by the fact that some metaphysicians of great artistic talent, such as Nietzsche, are the least likely to fall into the error of confusion. Most of his writings have a predominantly empirical content; we are talking, for example, about the historical analysis of certain phenomena of art or the historical-psychological analysis of morality. In the work in which he expressed most strongly what others expressed in metaphysics and ethics, namely in Zarathustra, he chose not a pseudo-theoretical form, but an explicit art form, poetry.

Adding for proofreading. To my delight, I noticed that on behalf of the other side of logic, an energetic protest was expressed against modern philosophy-nothing. Oskar Kraus in his report (Uber Alles und Nichts // Leipziger Rondmnk, 1930, 1. Mu; Philos. Hefte, 1931, no. 2, S. 140) gave a historical overview of the development of philosophy-nothing and then said about Heidegger: it would be funny if she took it (nothing) seriously. For nothing threatens the authority of all philosophical science more seriously than the revival of this nothing-and-all-philosophy.” Then Gilbert in one report (Die Grundlegung der elientaren Zahlenlehre // Dez. 1930 in der Philos. Ges. Hamburg; Math. Ann., 1931, No. 104, S. 485) made the following remark, without naming Heidegger: “In a recent philosophical report, I found the assertion: "Nothing is the most perfect negation of all that exists." This sentence is instructive because, despite its brevity, it illustrates all the most important violations of the main provisions put forward in my theory of proof.

· Analytical philosophy: formation and development. Anthology. General edition and compilation by A.F. Gryaznov. M. - 1998. С 69-90.

RUDOLF CARNAP. (1891-1970)

R. Carnap (carnap)- a representative of analytical philosophy, logical positivism, taught philosophy in Vienna, Prague, after emigrating to the United States, he worked at the University of Chicago, at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Studies, headed the Department of Philosophy at the University of California. Area of interest - philosophy of science, epistemology and logic. In the monograph "The Logical Construction of the World" (1928) he made an attempt to reduce all concepts to individual sensory experience, defining some concepts through others; in the article "Physical Language as the Universal Language of Science" (1932) he substantiated the idea of a "material language" describing observable physical objects and their properties. In the monograph The Logical Syntax of Language (1934) he considered the emergence of philosophical pseudo-problems, one of the sources of which is the confusion of statements about objects with statements about words. For the development of modern logic, the most significant are Studies in Semantics (1947) and The Logical Foundations of Probability (1950). A number of works have been translated into Russian, including Meaning and Necessity (M., 1959).

L. A. Mikeshina

Below are excerpts from the work:

1. Carnap R.Philosophical foundations of physics. Introduction to the philosophy of science. M., 1971.

2. Carnap R.Overcoming metaphysics by logical analysis of language // Analytical philosophy: formation and development. M., 1998.

Philosophical foundations of physics

Three kinds of concepts in science

The concepts of science, as well as everyday life, can be conditionally divided into three main groups: classification, comparative and quantitative.

By "classification concept" I mean that concept which relates an object to a certain class. All concepts of taxonomy in botany and zoology - various species, families, genera, etc. are classifiers. They vary considerably in the amount of information they give us about the subject.<...>By placing an item in a narrower class, we increase the information about it, although this information remains rather moderate. The statement that an object is a living organism says much more about it than the statement that it is warm. The statement "this is an animal" says a little more, and "this is a vertebrate" says even more.<...>

More effective for expressing information are "comparative concepts". They occupy an intermediate position between classification and quantitative concepts. I I think it is desirable to pay attention to them, because even among scientists the significance and effectiveness of such concepts are often underestimated. The scientist often says: “It would be desirable, of course, to introduce quantitative concepts - concepts that can be measured on an appropriate scale in my field. Unfortunately, this cannot be done yet, as the field of study is in its infancy. We have not yet developed a measurement technique and therefore must confine ourselves to non-quantitative, qualitative language. It is possible that in the future, as the field of research develops more, we will be able to develop a quantitative language.” The scientist may be perfectly right in making such a statement, but he will be mistaken if he concludes from this that, since he must speak in qualitative terms, he must confine his language to classificatory concepts. It often happens that before quantitative concepts can be introduced into the field of science, they are preceded by comparative concepts, which are a much more effective tool for description, prediction and explanation than cruder classificatory concepts. (1, pp. 97-98)<...>

We must never underestimate the usefulness of comparative concepts, especially in those areas where the scientific method and quantitative concepts have not yet been developed. Psychology makes more and more use of quantitative concepts, but still there are still such vast areas of psychology in which only comparative concepts can be applied. There are almost no quantitative concepts in anthropology. It mainly operates with classificatory concepts and therefore needs an empirical criterion much more in order to develop comparative concepts. In such areas, it is important to develop concepts that are much stronger than classificatory ones, even if it is not yet possible to make quantitative measurements in them. (1, p. 99).<...>

The difference between qualitative and quantitative is not a difference in nature, but a difference in our conceptual system, we can say in language, if by language we mean a system of concepts. I I use the term "language" here in the sense in which logicians use it, and not in the sense of English or Chinese. We have the language of physics, the language of anthropology, the language of set theory, and so on. In this sense, the language is established with the help of rules for compiling a dictionary, rules for constructing sentences, rules for logical inference from these sentences, and other rules. The kinds of concepts that occur in a scientific language are extremely important. That is why I want to make it clear that the difference between qualitative and quantitative is the difference between languages. (1, p. 106)<...>

Conventions play a very important role in introducing quantitative concepts. We should not underestimate this role. On the other hand, we must also take care not to overestimate this conventional side. This is not often done, but some philosophers do. An example is Hugo Dingler in Germany. He came to a completely conventionalist point of view, which I consider to be erroneous. He says that all concepts and even laws of science are a matter of conventions. In my opinion, he goes too far. Poincaré has also been accused of conventionalism in this radical sense, but I think this is due to a misunderstanding of his writings. He did often emphasize the important role that conventions play in science, but he was also well aware of the role of empirical components. He knew that we are not always free to make an arbitrary choice in the construction of a system of science; we must adjust our system to the facts of nature when we discover them. Nature provides factors in situations that are beyond our control. Poincaré can only be called a conventionalist if by this it is meant solely that he was a philosopher who, more than the previous ones, emphasized the enormous role of conventions. But he was not a radical conventionalist. (1, p. 108)<...>

Overcoming metaphysics by the logical analysis of language From the Greek skeptics to the nineteenth century empiricists, there opponents of metaphysics. The type of doubts raised was very different. Some declared the doctrine of metaphysics false because it is contrary to experience. Others viewed her as something dubious, as her questioning transcends the boundaries of human knowledge. Many angimetaphysicians have emphasized barrenness dealing with metaphysical questions; whether it is possible to answer them or not, in any case, one should not grieve about them; one should devote oneself entirely to the practical tasks that are presented to active people every day.

Thanks to the development modern logic it became possible to give a new and sharper answer to the question of the legitimacy and right of metaphysics. Studies of "applied logic" or "theory of knowledge", which set themselves the task of logical analysis of the content of scientific proposals to find out the meaning of the words ("concepts") found in sentences, lead to positive and negative results. A positive result is produced in the field of empirical science; separate concepts in various fields of science are explained, their formal-logical and theoretical-cognitive connection is revealed. In the area of metaphysics(including all axiology and the doctrine of norms) logical analysis leads to a negative conclusion, which is that the supposed offerings of this area are completely nonsensical. Thus, a radical overcoming of metaphysics is achieved, which was still impossible from earlier anti-metaphysical positions. (2, p. 69)

Language consists of words and syntax, i.e., of available words that have a meaning, and of the rules for the formation of sentences; these rules indicate in what way sentences of various kinds can be formed from words. Accordingly, there are two kinds of pseudo-sentences: either a word occurs which is only erroneously thought to have a meaning, or the words used, although they have a meaning, are composed in contradiction with the rules of syntax, so that they do not make sense. We will see by examples that pseudo-sentences of both kinds occur in metaphysics. Then we will have to find out what grounds there are for our assertion that all metaphysics consists of such propositions.<...>

Take as example metaphysical term " principle"(namely, as a principle of being, and not as a cognitive principle or axiom). Various metaphysics answer the question what is the (highest) "principle of the world" (or "things", "being", "existent"), for example: water, number, form, movement, life, spirit, idea, unconscious, action , good and the like. To find the meaning that the word "principle" has in this metaphysical question, we must ask the metaphysician under what conditions a sentence of the form "X there is a principle at" true and under what false; in other words: we will ask about the distinguishing features or about the definition of the word "principle".<...>But the metaphysician will tell us that he did not mean this empirically established connection, for in that case his theses would be simple empirical propositions of the same kind as the propositions of physics. The word "occur" here does not have the meaning of a conditional-temporal connection, which is usually inherent in it. For any other meaning, however, no criterion is given by the metaphysician. Consequently, the imaginary "metaphysical" meaning that the word is supposed to have here in contrast to the empirical meaning does not exist at all. Referring to the original meaning of the word "principium" (and the corresponding Greek word "arche" - the beginning), we notice that here there is the same course of development. The original meaning "beginning" of the word was withdrawn; it should no longer mean the first in time, but should mean the first in a different, specifically metaphysical sense. But the criteria for this "metaphysical sense" were not specified. In both cases, the word was stripped of its early meaning, without giving it a new one; the word is an empty shell. Then, when it still had meaning, different ideas corresponded to it associatively, they are combined with new ideas and feelings that arise on the basis of the connection in which the word is now used. But thanks to this, the word does not receive any meaning, it remains further meaningless until the path for verification is indicated.

Another example is the word "God". Regardless of the ways in which the word is used in different areas, we must distinguish its use in three historical periods, which pass one into the other in time. AT mythological the use of the word has a clear meaning. This word (correspondingly to similar words in other languages) denotes a bodily being who sits somewhere on Olympus, in heaven or in the underworld, and, to a greater or lesser extent, possesses strength, wisdom, kindness and happiness. Sometimes this word denotes a spiritual-psychic being, which, although it does not have a body, like a human, but which somehow manifests itself in things and processes of the visible world and therefore is empirically fixed. AT metaphysical the use of the word "God" means something superempirical. The meaning of a corporeal or corporeal spiritual being was taken away from the word. Since no new meaning was given to the word, it turned out to have no meaning at all. True, it often looks as if the word "God" has a meaning in metaphysical usage as well. But the definitions put forward, on closer examination, are revealed as pseudo-definitions; they lead either to invalid phrases<...>or to other metaphysical words (for example: "original cause", "absolute", "unconditional", "independent", "independent", etc.), but in no case to the truth conditions of his elementary sentence. This word does not even fulfill the first requirement of logic, namely the requirement to indicate its syntax, i.e., the form of its entry into an elementary sentence.<...>between the mythological and metaphysical use of the word "God" is its theological use.<...>

Similar to the considered examples of the words "principle" and "God", most of the other specific metaphysical terms do not matter, for example: “idea”, “absolute”, “unconditional”, “infinite”, “being of being”, “non-existent”, “thing in itself”, “absolute spirit”, “objective spirit”, “essence”, “Being-in-itself”, “in-itself-and-for-itself-being”, “emanation”, “manifestation”, “singling out”, “I”, “not-I”, etc.<...>Metaphysical imaginary sentences that contain such words have no meaning, do not mean anything, are only pseudo-sentences. (2, pp. 74-76)<...>

Sentences (meaningful) are subdivided into the following types: first of all, there are sentences that, in their form alone, are already true (“tautologies” according to Wittgenstein; they correspond roughly to Kant's "analytic judgments"); they say nothing about reality. To this species belong the formulas of logic and mathematics; they themselves are not statements about reality, but serve to transform such statements. Secondly, there is the opposite of such statements ("counterdiction"); they are contradictory and, according to their form, are false. For all other sentences, the decision about their truth or falsity depends on protocol sentences; they are therefore (true or false) experienced suggestions and belongs to the field of empirical science. Desiring to form a sentence that does not belong to these species, makes it automatically meaningless. Since the metaphysician does not make analytic propositions, does not want to be in the field of empirical science, he necessarily uses either words for which no criterion is given, and therefore they turn out to be devoid of meaning, or words that have meaning, and compose in such a way that they do not the result is neither an analytic (respectively counter-dictational) nor an empirical proposition. In both cases, pseudo-sentences are necessarily obtained.

Logical analysis renders the verdict of meaninglessness on any imaginary knowledge that claims to extend beyond experience. This verdict applies to any speculative metaphysics, to any imaginary knowledge from pure thinking and pure intuition, who wish to do without experience. The sentence also applies to that kind of metaphysics which, on the basis of experience, desires through a special key to know lying outside or for experience(for example, to the neo-vitalist thesis about the “entilechy” operating in organic processes, which is physically unknowable; to the question of the “essence of causality”, which goes beyond a certain pattern of succession; to speeches about the “thing-in-itself”). The sentence is valid for all philosophy of values and norms, for any ethics or aesthetics as a normative discipline. For the objective significance of a value or norm cannot be (also in the opinion of the representatives of value philosophy) empirically verified or deduced from empirical propositions; they cannot be expressed in meaningful sentences at all. In other words: either for "good" and "beautiful" and other predicates used in normative science, there are empirical characteristics, or they are ineffective. A sentence with such predicates becomes in the first case an empirical factual judgment; but not a value judgment; in the second case, it becomes a pseudo-sentence; a sentence that would be a value judgment cannot be formed at all.

What then remains for philosophy if all sentences that mean something are of empirical origin and belong to real science? What remains is not a proposal, not a theory, not a system, but only method, those. logical analysis. We have shown the application of this method in its negative use in the course of the preceding analysis; it serves here to exclude words that have no meaning, meaningless pseudo-sentences. In its positive use, the method serves to explain meaningful concepts and sentences, to provide a logical justification for real science and mathematics. The negative application of the method in the present historical situation is necessary and important. But more fruitful, already in today's practice, is its positive application. (2, pp. 84-86)<...>

If we say that the propositions of metaphysics are completely meaningless, then we will say nothing and, although this corresponds to our conclusions, we will be tormented by a feeling of surprise; how could so many people of different times and peoples, among them outstanding minds, engage in metaphysics with such zeal and ardor if it is just a collection of meaningless words? And how to understand such a strong impact on readers and listeners, if these words are not even delusions, but do not contain anything at all? Such thoughts are in some respects correct, since metaphysics does indeed contain something; however, this is not a theoretical content. The (pseudo-)propositions of metaphysics serve not for statements about the state of affairs, nor existing (then they would be true sentences); nor non-existent (then they would be at least false sentences); they serve for expressions of the feeling of life. <...>

What is the historical role of metaphysics? Perhaps one can see in it a substitute for theology at the stage of systematic, conceptual thinking. The (supposed) supernatural cognitive source of theology has been replaced here by a natural but (supposed) superempirical cognitive source. Upon closer examination, in the repeatedly changing clothes, the same content is recognized as in the myth: we find that metaphysics also arose from the need to express the feeling of life, the state in which a person lives, the emotional-volitional attitude to the world, to the neighbor, to tasks that he solves, to the fate that he experiences. This feeling of life is expressed in most cases unconsciously, in everything that a person does and says; it is fixed in the features of his face, perhaps also in his walk. Some people, in addition to this, also have a need for a special expression of their feeling of life, more concentrated and more convincingly perceived. If such people are artistically gifted, they find an opportunity for self-expression in the creation of works of art. How the feeling of life is manifested in the style and form of a work of art has already been elucidated by others (for example, Diltheem and his students). (Often, the word "world view" is used in this connection; we refrain from using it because of the ambiguity, as a result of which the distinction between the sense of life and theory is erased, which is decisive for our analysis.) For our study, it is only essential that art is adequate, metaphysics, on the contrary, an inadequate means for expressing the feeling of life. In principle, there is nothing to object to the use of any means of expression. In the case of metaphysics, however, it is the case that the form of its works imitates what it is not. This form is a system of sentences that are in (seemingly) regular connection, i.e. in the form of a theory. This imitates theoretical content, although, as we have seen, there is none. Not only the reader, but also the metaphysician himself is mistaken in believing that metaphysical sentences mean something, describe some state of affairs. The metaphysician believes that he is operating in the realm of truth and falsehood. In reality, he does not express anything, but only expresses something as an artist. That the metaphysician is in error does not yet follow from the fact that he takes language as the medium of expression, but declarative sentences as the form of expression; for the lyricist does the same without falling into self-delusion. But the metaphysician gives arguments for his proposals, he demands that they agree with the content of his constructions, he argues with metaphysicians of other directions, he looks for refutation of their proposals in his articles. A lyricist, on the other hand, does not attempt in his poem to refute sentences from another lyricist's poems; he knows that he is in the realm of art and not in the realm of theory. (2, pp. 86-88)

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CARNAP (Carnar) Rudolf (1891-1970) - German-American philosopher and logician, taught philosophy at the University of Vienna and Prague, professor at the University of Chicago and California (after emigrating to the USA in 1936), a leading representative of logical positivism and philosophy

From the author's book

Rudolf Rudolf (1858–1889) - Crown Prince, son of Emperor Franz Joseph I, heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Crown Prince Rudolf was married to the Belgian Princess Stephanie, but at the same time had a love affair with the seventeen-year-old daughter of Baroness Evenings

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The Birdseller (1891) Austrian operetta, music. Karl Zeller (1842–1898), lib. Moritz Vesta and Ludwig Held 872 My beloved old grandfather. Finale II d., Adam's song ("Wie mein Ahnl zwanzig Jahr'"), Russian. text by G. A. Arbenin

Overcoming metaphysics by the logical analysis of language Rudolph Carnap Rudolph Carnap is an American philosopher * Translated by A.V. Kezina. Published with significant abridgements. The full translation was first published in the journal "Bulletin of Moscow State University", ser. 7 "Philosophy", No. 6, 1993, p. 11–26. See also http://www.rsuh.ru/article.html?id=2672; http://orel.rsl.ru/nettext/foreign/carnap/01.html. Overcoming metaphysics by the logical analysis of language* From the Greek skeptics up to the empiricists of the nineteenth century, there were many opponents of metaphysics. The type of doubts raised was very different. Some declared the doctrine of metaphysics to be false, since it contradicts empirical knowledge. Others viewed her as something dubious, as her questioning transcends the boundaries of human knowledge. Many anti-metaphysicians have stressed the futility of engaging in metaphysical questions; whether it is possible to answer them or not, in any case, one should not grieve about them; one should devote oneself entirely to the practical tasks that are presented to active people every day. Thanks to the development of modern logic, it has become possible to give a new and sharper answer to the question of the legitimacy and right of metaphysics. Studies of “applied logic” or “theory of knowledge”, which have set themselves the task of logically analyzing the content of scientific proposals to find out the meaning of words (“concepts”) found in sentences, lead to positive and negative results. A positive result is produced in the field of empirical science; separate concepts in various fields of science are explained, their formal-logical and theoretical-cognitive connection is revealed. In the field of metaphysics (including the whole About the author of the article Rudolf Carnap (Carnap, Rudolf) (1891–1970), an American philosopher of German origin, a prominent representative of logical positivism, who made a significant contribution to the development of the logic and philosophy of science. Born in Wuppertal on May 18, 1891. Received education at the Universities of Jena and Freiburg.In Jena, he attended lectures by G. Frege, where he defended his doctoral dissertation in 1921. Carnap taught first at the University of Vienna (1926-1931), and then at the German University in Prague (1931-1935). During the years he was one of the most active members of the group of philosophers and mathematicians known as the Vienna Circle, and was interested in logic and problems of the scientific method.Together with Reichenbach, he founded the journal Erkenntnis (Erkenntnis, 1930-1940).He is also one of the founders of the famous series "International Encyclopedia of Unified Science" ("International Encyclopedia of Unified Science"). In 1936 he emigrated to the USA. He was a professor at the University of Chicago (1936–1952) and at the University of California, Los Angeles (1954–1970). From 1952-1954 he worked at Princeton University. Died in Santa Monica, California, September 14, 1970. Researcher/Researcher 1/2009 89 Society, culture, science, education Methodology of knowledge ; but if the word only appears to have a meaning, while in reality it does not, then we speak of a "pseudo-concept." axiology and the doctrine of norms), logical analysis leads to a negative conclusion, which is that the imaginary sentences of this area are completely meaningless. Thus, a radical overcoming of metaphysics is achieved, which was still impossible from earlier anti-metaphysical positions. If we say that the so-called propositions of metaphysics are meaningless, then the word is taken in the strict sense. In a non-strict sense, a sentence or question is usually said to be meaningless if its establishment is completely fruitless (for example, the question "what is the average weight of some persons in Vienna whose telephone number ends in the figure "Z") or a sentence that is clearly erroneous ( for example, “in 1910 there were six inhabitants in Vienna”), or one that is not only empirically, but also logically false, contradictory (for example, “of persons A and B, each is 1 year older than the other”). Propositions of this kind, whether they are fruitless or false, are, however, meaningful, for only meaningful sentences can be generally divided into (theoretically) fruitful and fruitless, true and false. In the strict sense, meaningless is a series of words that does not form a sentence at all within a particular language. It happens that such a series of words at first glance looks as if it were a sentence; in this case we call it a pseudo-sentence. We claim that the supposed sentences of metaphysics are exposed as pseudo-sentences by the logical analysis of language. If a word (within a particular language) has a meaning, it is usually said to signify a "concept"; but if the word only appears to have a meaning, while in reality it does not, then we speak of a "pseudo-concept." How to explain the occurrence of such? Is not every word introduced into the language only to express something definite, so that, from the first use, it has a definite meaning? How could words without meaning appear in natural language? Initially, however, every word (with rare exceptions, examples of which we will give later) had a meaning. In the course of historical development, the word often changed its meaning. And now it sometimes happens that a word, having lost its old meaning, has not received a new one. As a result, a pseudo-concept arises. Suppose, for example, that someone forms a new word "babik" and asserts that there are things that are babik and those that are not. To find out the meaning of a word, we ask this person about the criterion: how, in a particular case, to determine whether a certain thing is a woman or not? Suppose that the person being asked did not answer the question: he said that there are no empirical characteristics for womanizing. In this case, we consider the use of the word unacceptable. If he still insists on the use of the word, 90 Researcher/Researcher 1/2009 Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) Overcoming metaphysics by the logical analysis of language Rudolf Carnap argues that there are only babbling and non-baby things, but for the poor, finite human reason forever will remain an eternal mystery, what things are womanly and what are not, then we will consider this as empty chatter. Maybe he will begin to assure that by the word "babik" he means something. From this we learn, however, only the psychological fact that he associates some ideas and feelings with the word. But because of this, the word does not get any meaning. If no criterion is set for a new word, then the sentences in which it occurs do not express anything, they are empty pseudo-sentences. Metaphysical words without meaning. Let us take as an example the metaphysical term "principle" (namely, as a principle of being, and not as a cognitive principle or axiom). Various metaphysics answer the question what is the (highest) "principle of the world" (or "things", "being", "existent"), for example: water, number, form, movement, life, spirit, idea, unconscious, action , good and the like. To find the meaning which the word "principle" has in this metaphysical question, we must ask the metaphysician under what conditions a sentence of the form "x is a principle y" is true and under what conditions it is false; in other words: we will ask about the distinguishing features or about the definition of the word "principle". The metaphysician will answer something like this: "x is the principle of y" must mean "y comes from x", "the being of y is based on the being of x", "y exists through x", or the like. However, these words are ambiguous and indefinite. Often they have a clear meaning, for example: we say about an object or process y, that it "comes" from x, if we observed that an object or process of the form x is often or always followed by a process of the form y (causal connection in the sense of the regular following ). But the metaphysician will tell us that he did not mean this empirically established connection, for in that case his theses would be simple empirical propositions of the same kind as the propositions of physics. The word "occur" here does not have the meaning of a conditional-temporal connection, which is usually inherent in it. For any other meaning, however, no criterion is given by the metaphysician. Consequently, the imaginary "metaphysical" meaning that the word is supposed to have here in contrast to the empirical meaning does not exist at all. Referring to the original meaning of the word "principium" (and the corresponding Greek word "arche" - the beginning), we notice that here there is the same course of development. The original meaning "beginning" of the word was withdrawn; it should no longer mean the first in time, but should mean the first in a different, specifically metaphysical sense. But the criteria for this "metaphysical sense" were not specified. In both cases, the word was stripped of its early meaning, without giving it a new one; the word is an empty shell. Then, when it still had meaning, it was associatively matched Researcher/Researcher 1/2009 Symbolic designation of the birthplace of Jesus Christ in Bethlehem - a sign of the beginning of Christian civilization (photo by A. S. Obukhov) 91 Society, culture, science, education . The following is a fragment of the work of one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century Martin Heidegger "What is metaphysics?" different ideas, they are combined with new ideas and feelings that arise on the basis of the connection in which the word is now used. But thanks to this, the word does not receive any meaning, it remains further meaningless until the path for verification is indicated. So far, we have considered pseudo-sentences in which there are words that have no meaning. There is also a second kind of pseudo-sentence. They are made up of words that have meaning, but these words are arranged in such an order that they are meaningless. The syntax of the language specifies which combinations of words are allowed and which are not. The grammatical syntax of a natural language does not everywhere fulfill the task of eliminating meaningless phrases. Take, for example, two sets of words: 1. "Caesar is and." 2. "Caesar is a prime number." A number of words (1) are formed in contradiction with the rules of syntax; the syntax requires that the third place is not a conjunction, but a predicate or an adjective. In accordance with the rules of syntax, for example, the series “Caesar is a commander” is formed, this is a meaningful series of words, a true sentence. But the series of words (2) is also formed according to the rules of syntax, for it has the same grammatical form as the sentence just given. But despite this, series (2) is meaningless. Being a "prime number" is a property of numbers; in relation to personality, this property can neither be attributed nor disputed. Since series (2) looks like a sentence, but is not, does not express anything, does not express either the existing or the non-existent, we call this series of words a “pseudo-sentence”. Due to the fact that the grammatical syntax is not violated, one can, at first glance, come to the erroneous opinion that this series of words is a sentence, albeit a false one. However, the statement "a is a prime number" is false if and only if "a" is divisible by a natural number which is neither "a" nor "l"; it is obvious that instead of "a" here one cannot substitute "Caesar". This example is chosen so that the nonsense can be easily seen; however, many metaphysical sentences are not as easily debunked as pseudo-sentences. Let us analyze several examples of metaphysical pseudo-sentences, in which one can especially clearly see that the logical syntax is violated, although the historical-grammatical syntax is preserved. We have selected a few sentences from a metaphysical doctrine1 which is currently very influential in Germany: “Only beings should be investigated, and nothing else; the existent is one and further is nothing; being is unique and beyond it is nothing. How is it with this nothingness? - There is nothing only because there is no, that is, negation? Or vice versa? 92 Researcher/Researcher 1/2009 In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God [Gen. 1:1] » 1 We are talking about existential- Overcoming metaphysics by the logical analysis of language Rudolf Carnapzanie and is not just because there is nothing? - We affirm: nothing is more original than nothing and negation. Where are we looking for nothing? How do we find nothing? - We know nothing. - Fear reveals nothing. - What and why we were afraid was "actually" - nothing. In reality: nothing itself - as such - was there. - How is it with this nothingness? “Nothing destroys itself.” One might come to the conclusion that in the quoted passage the word "nothing" has a completely different meaning than usual. This assumption is further strengthened when we read that fear reveals nothing, that in fear nothing was itself as such. Here, apparently, the word "nothing" should denote a certain emotional state, maybe of a religious persuasion, or something that underlies such a feeling. But the beginning of this quotation shows that such an interpretation is impossible. From the juxtaposition of "only" and "and still nothing" it clearly follows that the word "nothing" here has the usual meaning of a logical particle, which serves to express the negative sentence of existence. To this introduction of the word "nothing" belongs the main question of the passage: "How is it with this nothingness?" Further examples of the analysis of individual metaphysical sentences can no longer be given here. They would point only to the variety of types of errors. Logical analysis renders the verdict of meaninglessness on any imaginary knowledge that claims to extend beyond experience. This verdict applies to any speculative metaphysics, to any ostensible knowledge from pure thought and pure intuition that wishes to dispense with experience. The verdict also applies to that kind of metaphysics which, on the basis of their experience, wishes to know by means of a special key what lies outside or behind experience (for example, to the neovitalist thesis about the "entelechy" operating in organic processes, which is physically unknowable; to the question of the "essence of causality" that goes beyond a certain pattern of succession; to speeches about the "thing-in-itself"). The verdict is valid for all philosophy of values and norms, for any ethics or aesthetics as a normative discipline. For the objective significance of a value or norm cannot be (also in the opinion of the representatives of value philosophy) empirically verified or deduced from empirical propositions; they cannot be expressed in meaningful sentences at all. In other words: either for "good" and "beautiful" and other predicates used in normative science, there are empirical characteristics, or they are ineffective. If we say that the propositions of metaphysics are completely meaningless, then we will say nothing, and although this corresponds to our conclusions, we will be tormented by a sense of wonder: how could so many people of different times and peoples, among whom were Researcher / Researcher 1/2009 « Earth but it was formless and empty, and darkness was over the deep, and the Spirit of God hovered over the waters [Gen. 1:2] "Japanese hieroglyph "Intuition" 93 Society, culture, science, education Methodology of knowledge Petroglyphs in the vicinity of the village of Kuyus in Altai (photo by A. S. Obukhov) 94 outstanding minds, with such zeal and ardor to engage in metaphysics, if it represents is just a collection of meaningless words? And how to understand such a strong impact on readers and listeners, if these words are not even delusions, but do not contain anything at all? Such thoughts are in some respects correct, since metaphysics does indeed contain something; however, this is not a theoretical content. (Pseudo-) propositions of metaphysics do not serve for statements about a state of affairs, neither existing (then they would be true propositions) nor non-existent (then they would be at least false propositions); they serve to express a sense of life. We can perhaps agree that the origin of metaphysics was myth. The child, faced with the "evil table", is irritated; primitive man tries to appease the formidable demons of the earthquake or honors the deity of fruitful rain. Before us is a personification of natural phenomena, a quasi-poetic expression of a person's emotional relationship to the world. The legacy of myth is, on the one hand, poetry, which consciously develops the achievements of myth for life; on the other hand, a theology in which myth has developed into a system. What is the historical role of metaphysics? Perhaps one can see in it a substitute for theology at the stage of systematic, conceptual thinking. The (supposed) supernatural cognitive source of theology has been replaced here by a natural but (supposed) superempirical cognitive source. Upon closer examination, in the repeatedly changing clothes, the same content is recognized as in the myth: we find that metaphysics also arose from the need to express the feeling of life, the state in which a person lives, the emotional-volitional attitude to the world, to the neighbor, to tasks that he solves, to the fate that he experiences. This feeling of life is expressed in most cases unconsciously, in everything that a person does and says; it is fixed in the features of his face, perhaps also in his walk. Some people, in addition to this, also have a need for a special expression of their feeling of life, more concentrated and more convincingly perceived. If such people are artistically gifted, they find an opportunity for self-expression in the creation of works of art. How the feeling of life is manifested in the style and form of a work of art has already been clarified by others (for example, Dilthey and his students). (Often, the word "world view" is used in this connection; we refrain from using it because of the ambiguity, as a result of which the distinction between the sense of life and theory is erased, which is decisive for our analysis.) For our study, it is only essential that art is adequate, metaphysics, on the contrary, an inadequate means for expressing the feeling of life. In principle, there is nothing to object to the use of any means of expression. In the case of metaphysics, Researcher/Researcher 1/2009 Overcoming metaphysics by the logical analysis of language Rudolf Carnap however, it is the case that the form of her works imitates what she is not. This form is a system of sentences that are in (seemingly) regular connection, that is, in the form of a theory. This imitates theoretical content, although, as we have seen, there is none. Not only the reader, but also the metaphysician himself is mistaken in believing that metaphysical sentences mean something, describe some state of affairs. The metaphysician believes that he is operating in the realm of truth and falsehood. In reality, he does not express anything, but only expresses something as an artist. That the metaphysician is in error does not yet follow from the fact that he takes language as the medium of expression, but declarative sentences as the form of expression; for the lyricist does the same without falling into self-delusion. But the metaphysician gives arguments for his proposals, he demands that they agree with the content of his constructions, he argues with metaphysicians of other directions, he looks for refutation of their proposals in his articles. A lyricist, on the other hand, does not attempt in his poem to refute sentences from another lyricist's poems; he knows that he is in the realm of art and not in the realm of theory. Perhaps music is the purest medium for expressing the feeling of life, since it is the most liberated from everything objective. The harmonious feeling of life that the metaphysician wants to express in the monistic system is expressed much more clearly in the music of Mozart. And if a metaphysician expresses a dualistically heroic sense of life in a dualistic system, does he not do so only because he lacks Beethoven's ability to express this sense of life by adequate means? Metaphysicians are musicians without musical ability. Therefore, they have a strong inclination to work in the field of theoretical expression, to link concepts and thoughts. Instead of, on the one hand, fulfilling this tendency in the field of science, and, on the other hand, satisfying the need for expression in art, the metaphysician mixes all this and creates works that do not provide anything for knowledge. Our assumption that metaphysics is a substitute for art, and not an adequate one, is supported by the fact that some metaphysicians of great artistic talent, such as Nietzsche, are the least likely to fall into the error of confusion. Most of his writings have a predominantly empirical content; we are talking, for example, about the historical analysis of certain phenomena of art or the historical-psychological analysis of morality. In the work in which he expressed most of all what others expressed in metaphysics and ethics, namely in Zarathustra, he chose not a pseudo-theoretical form, but a clearly expressed form of art - poetry. And | R Researcher/Researcher 1/2009 Metaphysics of Music (photo by G. Smirnova) 95

Overcoming Metaphysics by the Logical Analysis of Language \ n \

I Rudolph Carnap I¡.l"

Overcoming metaphysics

logical analysis

From the Greek skeptics down to the nineteenth century empiricists, there were many opponents of metaphysics. The type of doubts raised was very different. Some declared the doctrine of metaphysics to be false, since it contradicts empirical knowledge. Others viewed her as something dubious, as her questioning transcends the boundaries of human knowledge. Many anti-metaphysicians have stressed the futility of engaging in metaphysical questions; whether it is possible to answer them or not, in any case, one should not grieve about them; one should devote oneself entirely to the practical tasks that are presented to active people every day.

Thanks to the development of modern logic, it has become possible to give a new and sharper answer to the question of the legitimacy and right of metaphysics. Studies of “applied logic” or “theory of knowledge”, which have set themselves the task of logically analyzing the content of scientific proposals to find out the meaning of words (“concepts”) found in sentences, lead to positive and negative results. A positive result is produced in the field of empirical science; separate concepts in various fields of science are explained, their formal-logical and theoretical-cognitive connection is revealed. In the field of metaphysics (including all

Carnap Rudolph

(Carnap, Rudolf) (1891-1970), an American philosopher of German origin, a prominent representative of logical positivism, who made a significant contribution to the development of the logic and philosophy of science. Born in Wuppertal May 18, 1891. He was educated at Jena and Freiburg universities. In Jena he attended lectures by H. Frege, and in 1921 he defended his doctoral dissertation there. Carnap taught first at the University of Vienna (1926-1931) and then at the German University in Prague (1931-1935). During these years he was one of the most active members of the group of philosophers and mathematicians known as the Vienna Circle, and was interested in logic and problems of the scientific method. Together with Reichenbach, he founded the magazine "Erkentnis" ("Erkenntnis", 1930-1940). He is also one of the founders of the famous International Encyclopedia of Unified Science series. In 1936 he emigrated to the USA. He was a professor at the University of Chicago (1936-1952) and the University of California, Los Angeles (1954-1970). From 1952-1954 he worked at Princeton University. Died in Santa Monica, California, September 14, 1970.

American philosopher,

Translation by A.V. Kezina. Published with significant abridgements. The full translation was first published in the journal "Bulletin of Moscow State University", ser. 7 "Philosophy", No. 6, 1993, p. 11-26.

Overcoming metaphysics by the logical analysis of language

Per. A.V. Kezina

1. INTRODUCTION

From the Greek skeptics down to the nineteenth century empiricists, there were many opponents of metaphysics. The type of doubts raised was very different. Some declared the doctrine of metaphysics false because it is contrary to experience. Others viewed her as something dubious, as her questioning transcends the boundaries of human knowledge. Many anti-metaphysicians have emphasized barrenness dealing with metaphysical questions; whether it is possible to answer them or not, in any case, one should not grieve about them; one should devote oneself entirely to the practical tasks that are presented to active people every day.

If we say that the so-called propositions of metaphysics are senseless then this word is understood in the strict sense. In a non-strict sense, a sentence or question is usually said to be meaningless if its establishment is completely fruitless (for example, the question "what is the average weight of some persons in Vienna whose telephone number ends in the figure "Z") or a sentence that is clearly erroneous ( for example, “in 1910 there were six inhabitants in Vienna”), or one that is not only empirically, but also logically false, contradictory (for example, “of persons BUT and B each one is 1 year older than the other). Propositions of this kind, whether they are fruitless or false, are, however, meaningful, for only meaningful sentences can be generally divided into (theoretically) fruitful and fruitless, true and false. In the strict sense meaningless is a series of words that does not form a sentence at all within a particular language. It happens that such a series of words at first glance looks as if it were a sentence; in this case we call it a pseudo-sentence. We claim that the supposed sentences of metaphysics are exposed as pseudo-sentences by the logical analysis of language.

^ 2. MEANING OF THE WORD

What is the meaning of the word? What requirements must a word meet in order to have a meaning? (Whether these requirements are clearly stated, as is the case with some words and symbols of modern science, or tacitly assumed, as with most words of the traditional language, we do not pay attention here.) First, it must be established syntax words, i.e., the way it is included in the simplest form of a sentence in which it can occur; we call this sentence form elementary suggestion. The elementary sentence form for the word "stone" is "x is a stone"; in sentences of this form, in place of "x" there is some name from the category of things, for example "this diamond", "this apple". Secondly, for the elementary sentence of the corresponding word, the following question must be answered, which we can formulate in various ways:

Which proposals derivable S and what suggestions are derived from it?
Under what conditions S true and under what false?
How verify S?
Which meaning It has S?

(1) - correct wording; formulation (2) is a way of expression characteristic of logic, (3) - a manner of expressing the theory of knowledge, (4) - philosophy (phenomenology). As shown by Wittgenstein, what philosophers meant by (4) is revealed by (2): the meaning of a proposition lies in its criterion of truth. (1) is a "metalogical" formulation; a detailed description of metalogic as a theory of syntax and meaning, i.e., relations of inference, will be given later, elsewhere.

The meaning of many words, namely the predominant number of all the words of science, can be determined by reduction to other words ("constitution", definition). For example: "arthropods are invertebrate animals, with dissected limbs and having a chitinous shell." By this, for the elementary form of the sentence "thing X is an arthropod”, the answer to the above question is given: it is established that the sentence of this form should be deduced from premises of the form: “x is an animal”, "X there is an invertebrate, "X has dismembered limbs", "x has a chitinous shell", and that, conversely, each of these sentences must be deducible from the first. By determining the derivability (in other words, by owning the criterion of truth, the method of verification, the meaning) of the elementary sentence about "arthropods", the meaning of the word "arthropods" is established. Thus every word of the language is reduced to other words, and finally to words in so-called "observation sentences" or "protocol sentences." Through such information, the word receives its content.

The question of the content and form of the primary proposals (protocol proposals), to which no final answer has yet been found, we can leave aside. In the theory of knowledge it is usually said that "primary sentences refer to the given"; however, there is no unity in the interpretation of the given itself. The opinion is sometimes expressed that sentences about the given are statements about the simplest sensible qualities (for example, "warm", "blue", "joy", etc.); others are inclined to believe that the primary sentences speak of common experiences and relations of similarity between them; according to the following opinion, the primary sentences already speak of things. Regardless of the difference of these opinions, we maintain that a series of words only has meaning when it is established how it is derived from protocol sentences, whatever quality they may be.

If the meaning of a word is determined by its criterion (in other words, by the relations of derivation of its elementary sentence, by its criterion of truth, by the method of its verification), then after the establishment of the criterion, it is impossible to add beyond that what is "meant" by this word. You must specify at least one criterion; but no more than a criterion must be given, for that determines everything else. In a criterion, meaning is implicit; it remains only to present it explicitly.

Suppose, for example, that someone forms a new word "babik" and asserts that there are things that are babik and those that are not. To find out the meaning of a word, we ask this person about the criterion: how, in a particular case, to determine whether a certain thing is a woman or not? Suppose that the person being asked did not answer the question: he said that there are no empirical characteristics for womanizing. In this case, we consider the use of the word unacceptable. If he nevertheless insists on the use of the word, arguing that there are only womanly and non-baby things, but for the wretched, finite human mind it will forever remain an eternal mystery which things are womanly and which are not, then we will consider this as empty chatter. Maybe he will begin to assure that by the word "babik" he means something. From this we learn, however, only the psychological fact that he associates some ideas and feelings with the word. But because of this, the word does not get any meaning. If no criterion is set for a new word, then the sentences in which it occurs do not express anything, they are empty pseudo-sentences.

Suppose another case, that the criterion for the new word "baby" is established; namely, the sentence "this thing is a baby" is true if and only if the thing is quadrangular. (At the same time, it is not important for us whether the criterion is given explicitly, or whether we have established it by observing in which cases the word was used affirmatively and in which negatively). In this case, we will say: the word "baby" has the same meaning as the word "quadrangular". From our point of view, it will be inadmissible if those who use this word tell us that they "meant" something other than "four-cornered"; True, every quadrangular thing is babyish and vice versa, but this is due only to the fact that quadrangularity is a visible expression of babyishness, the latter being a hidden, not directly perceived quality. We will object: after the criterion has been established here, it has thereby been established what the words "baby" and "quadrangular" mean, and now there is no longer any freedom to "mean" anything else under this word. The result of our study can be summarized as follows: let "a" be a word and S(a) - elementary sentence in which it is included. A sufficient and necessary condition for "a" to have a meaning can be given in each of the following formulations, which basically express the same thing:

known empirical evidence"a".
It is established from which protocol sentences can be derived S(a).
Installed truth conditions for S(a).
Known way verification S(a) .

^ 3. METAPHYSICAL WORDS WITHOUT MEANING

Many words of metaphysics, as is now found, do not meet the requirements just indicated, and therefore have no meaning.

Take as example metaphysical term " principle(namely, as a principle of being, and not as a cognitive principle or axiom). Various metaphysicians answer the question of what is the (highest) "principle of the world" (or "thing", "being", "existent"), for example: water, number, form, movement, life, spirit, idea, unconscious, action, good, etc. To find the meaning that the word "principle" has in this metaphysical question, we must ask the metaphysician under what conditions a sentence of the form " x there is a principle y" is true and under which it is false; in other words: we will ask about the distinguishing features or about the definition of the word "principle". The metaphysician will answer something like this: “x is the principle at" must mean "y comes from x", "being at is based on being x", - "at exists through x" or the like. However, these words are ambiguous and indefinite. Often they have a clear meaning, for example: we are talking about an object or process y, that it "comes from" X, if we observed that an object or process of the form X often or always follows a process of the form at(causal connection in the sense of regular following). But the metaphysician will tell us that he did not mean this empirically established connection, for in that case his theses would be simple empirical propositions of the same kind as the propositions of physics. The word "occur" here does not have the meaning of a conditional-temporal connection, which is usually inherent in it. For any other meaning, however, no criterion is given by the metaphysician. Consequently, the imaginary "metaphysical" meaning that the word is supposed to have here in contrast to the empirical meaning does not exist at all. Referring to the original meaning of the word "principium" (and the corresponding Greek word "arche" - the beginning), we notice that here there is the same course of development. The original meaning "beginning" of the word was withdrawn; it should no longer mean the first in time, but should mean the first in a different, specifically metaphysical sense. But the criteria for this "metaphysical sense" were not specified. In both cases, the word was stripped of its early meaning, without giving it a new one; the word is an empty shell. Then, when it still had meaning, different ideas corresponded to it associatively, they are combined with new ideas and feelings that arise on the basis of the connection in which the word is now used. But thanks to this, the word does not receive any meaning, it remains further meaningless until the path for verification is indicated.

Another example is the word "God". Regardless of the ways in which the word is used in different areas, we must distinguish its use in three historical periods, which pass one into the other in time. AT mythological the use of the word has a clear meaning. This word (respectively, similar words in other languages) designate a corporeal being who sits somewhere on Olympus, in heaven or in the underworld, and, to a greater or lesser extent, possesses strength, wisdom, kindness and happiness. Sometimes this word denotes a spiritual-psychic being, which, although it does not have a body similar to a human one, but which somehow manifests itself in things and processes of the visible world and therefore is empirically fixed. AT metaphysical the use of the word "God" means something superempirical. The meaning of a corporeal or corporeal spiritual being was taken away from the word. Since no new meaning was given to the word, it turned out to have no meaning at all. True, it often looks as if the word "God" has a meaning in metaphysical usage as well. But the definitions put forward, on closer examination, are revealed as pseudo-definitions; they lead either to unacceptable phrases (which will be discussed later) or to other metaphysical words (for example: “first cause”, “absolute”, “unconditional”, “independent”, “independent”, etc.), but by no means to the truth conditions of his elementary proposition. This word does not even fulfill the first requirement of logic, namely the requirement to indicate its syntax, i.e., the form of its entry into an elementary sentence. The elementary sentence should have the form "X there is a God"; the metaphysician will either reject this form altogether, not giving another, or, if he accepts it, will not indicate the syntactic category of the variable