Reasons for the failure of collective security. Summary: Collective security. What will we do with the received material?
The collapse of the "collective security" policy
The Moscow trials, the purge in the ranks of the Red Army, convinced both the Germans and the French and the British that the Soviet Union was going through a serious internal crisis (generally poorly understood), which for some time deprives it of the opportunity to play a decisive role in the international arena. Presenting his plans for Austria and Czechoslovakia to the General Staff on September 5, 1937, Hitler categorically rejected any possibility of a military reaction to this by the Soviet Union in view of the chaos reigning in the country caused by the purge of military and political personnel. According to the German charge d'affaires in Paris, the French government also expressed serious doubts about the strength of the Soviet regime and the combat capability of the Red Army. “The military and political circles of France,” he wrote at the beginning of 1938, “are increasingly asking the question of the usefulness of such an ally and the credibility of him.” While the French leadership became increasingly convinced that by signing an agreement with the USSR, it, in the words of P. Haxott, "acquired nothing", the passivity of the West in the face of German aggression further increased the distrust of the Soviet Union in relation to European democracies.
On March 17, 1938, the Soviet government proposed convening an international conference to consider "practical measures against the development of aggression and the danger of a new world slaughter." This proposal was rejected by London as inherently "increasing the tendency to form blocs and undermining the prospects for establishing peace in Europe." Having met such an attitude, the Soviet Union began to seek rapprochement with Germany and in March 1938 signed new economic agreements with it, while recalling the USSR ambassador to Germany, J. Surits, a Jew and therefore objectionable to the Nazis. To the new ambassador, A. Mirekalov, Hitler made the following statement on July 4: "I am pleased to read the declaration setting out the principles by which you will be guided in your efforts to establish normal relations between Germany and the Soviet Union."
After the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany, the Soviet Union parted with the last illusions about the effectiveness of the policy of collective security. In addition, France and Great Britain, whose governments Litvinov tried in vain to convince that the USSR was able to fulfill its obligations, expressed strong doubts about the combat capability of the Red Army, devastated by the purges, and did not see how Soviet troops could participate in the hostilities from -for the refusal of Poland and Romania to let them pass through their territories. The Soviet Union, of course, would have taken part in an international conference, but it was not even invited to sign the Munich Agreements on September 30, 1938. The non-aggression pact concluded by J. Bonnet and I. Ribbentrop on December 6, 1938 in Paris between France and Germany was regarded in Moscow as a step that, to one degree or another, untied Hitler's hands in the East.
By the end of 1938, the foreign policy position of the USSR seemed more fragile than ever, and the feared threat of creating a united "imperialist front" was quite real. In November 1936, this threat became concrete after the signing of the "anti-Comintern Pact" by Germany and Japan, which was later joined by Italy and Spain. In such a situation, the Soviet leadership decided to go for reconciliation with Chiang Kai-shek and convince the Chinese Communists of the need to create a united front with the nationalists to fight against Japanese aggression. In August 1937, the USSR and China signed a non-aggression pact. In the summer of 1938, hostilities began between Japan and the Soviet Union. Fierce battles took place in August 1938 in Eastern Siberia near Lake Khasan, and then in Mongolia, where ground and air battles that lasted several months in the Khalkhin Gol region ended in victory for the Soviet troops commanded by G. Stern and G. Zhukov.
On September 15, 1939, an armistice was signed. In the face of the threat of capitalist encirclement, the Soviet Union decided to move closer to Germany without abandoning negotiations with the Western democracies.
With the coming to power in Germany (1933) of the Nazi government headed by A. Hitler, the rapprochement of the Soviet Union with England and the USA began. The USSR proposed to create a system of collective security in Europe, but due to the opposition of Germany, England and most of the Eastern European countries, it was not possible to create such a system. The reasons were as follows: mutual distrust of the USSR and European powers.
Soviet Union. There was a duality in the foreign policy of the Soviet leadership: on the one hand, a course towards the peaceful coexistence of countries with different state systems, on the other hand, a course towards supporting the world revolution, which was secretly carried out through the structures of the Comintern (communist international), absolutely controlled by Stalin and his entourage.
Western countries. Agreeing with the arguments of Soviet diplomacy about the need for collective security, at the same time they were looking for hidden intentions of Stalin and the Comintern in the foreign policy of the USSR to export communist ideology to them.
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Genoa Conference
By the early 1920s, Soviet Russia was in international isolation. The Soviet government sought to normalize relations with the rest of the world in order to obtain loans and establish farms.
Munich agreement
France, England and the USA could not cope with the aggressive aspirations of fascist Germany and hatched plans to provoke a war between the USSR and Germany. For this purpose, Munich was concluded in 1938
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
In August 1939, negotiations between Britain, France and the Soviet Union on collective security took place in Moscow, but they were sluggish and ended in vain, all responsibility for their failure lies with
After the end of the First World War, the League of Nations was formed - the first World Organization, whose goals included the preservation of peace and the development of international cooperation. Formally, it was founded on January 10, 1920 and ceased to exist on April 18, 1946 with the formation of the UN. The Charter of the League of Nations, worked out by a special commission created at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919-1920, and included in the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919. and other peace treaties that ended the First World War was originally signed with 44 states, including 31 states that took part in the war on the side of the Entente or joined it and 13 states that remained neutral during the war.
Unfortunately, the contradictions of the Treaty of Versailles were reflected in his offspring. The League of Nations failed to become a universal security organization. The great powers occupied a dominant position in it and used it to their advantage. Even then there was a double standard. If an offense was committed by a small state, the League threatened it with all punishments. If the offense was committed by a "great power", such as Italy or Japan, the League turned a blind eye to it. Decisions on important issues required unanimity. This meant that the decisions could not actually take place.
Under cover of the League of Nations in the early 1920s. the division of the former colonies of Germany and some possessions of Turkey between the victorious states was carried out in the form of distribution of mandates. Mandatory territories formally had a different status of subordination, in essence being colonies. Great Britain received Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, part of Cameroon, part of Togo and Tanganyika, France - Syria and Lebanon, part of Cameroon and part of Togo, Belgium - Ruanda-Urundi, South Africa (South Africa) - South-West Africa. The Pacific islands and territories were divided among themselves by Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.
Russia (USSR) did not join the League of Nations. The defeated states - Germany (adopted into the League in 1926), Austria and Turkey - were not allowed there for a long time. The most interesting thing is that the United States, which invented it, did not enter the League of Nations: supporters of the isolationist policy thwarted the ratification (approval) of the decision on the League of Nations in Congress - they were not going to bind themselves to this international organization in resolving European and world conflicts. The center of the "new world" seemed to be Europe, whose countries were supposed to ensure peace and security in the world - without the USSR, without the USA. But that was hardly possible. Dissatisfaction with the Versailles system was widespread, among the most offended, in addition to Germany, Japan and Turkey counted themselves. At the beginning of its existence, the League of Nations was one of the centers for organizing the struggle against the Soviet state. For example, under the guise of the Rhine Pact (Locarno Accords of 1925), Great Britain and France planned to create an anti-Soviet bloc with the participation of Germany, for which they did not secure the eastern German borders with any guarantees. The USSR fought against attempts by the League of Nations to interfere in its internal affairs, and also actively participated in conferences and meetings on disarmament held under the auspices of the League of Nations, making proposals aimed at a real solution to this international problem.
The crisis of the League of Nations occurred in the 1930s, and its peak - in the middle of the pre-war decade, when one after another followed the failures of the League, which was unable to cope with the challenges of that era.
The beginning was the aggression of Japan (the founding state of the League) against China, which seized in 1931. Manchuria, where in 1932. the puppet state of Manchukuo was created, to which the League was able to oppose only the "paper conclusion" of its special commission. Japan frankly ignored this conclusion, and in March 1933. left the League. Germany, which had been a permanent member of the Council of the League since 1926, followed in October of the same year. Then came the takeover by Italy (also a founding member of the League) of the member state of the League of Ethiopia in 1935-1936, which the League of Nations could not prevent. Following Japan and Germany in December 1937. Italy left the League of Nations. Further, the situation developed like an avalanche: violation in 1936. Germany of the Versailles and Locarno treaties (the entry of troops into the Rhine demilitarized zone), the aggression of Germany and Italy against Republican Spain in the same 1936, the new aggression of Japan against China in 1937, the Anschluss of Austria in 1938, the dismemberment and capture of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939 .. After that, "quantity" for the League of Nations turned into "quality". The process of the death of the organization has become irreversible.
On the part of the USSR, active attempts were made to create a system of collective security in Europe. While the USSR was not a member of the League of Nations, he could not trust the objectivity of this organization in the event of a conflict between the USSR and any other country. Therefore, the Soviet Union proposed to a number of European states to conclude non-aggression pacts with the aim of "strengthening the cause of peace and relations between countries" in the conditions of "the deep world crisis now being experienced." Not all countries accepted such proposals for concluding a non-aggression pact and peaceful settlement of conflicts (among the countries that accepted this proposal were Germany, France, Finland, Turkey, the Baltic states, Romania, Persia and Afghanistan). The treaties were identical and guaranteed the mutual inviolability of the borders and territories of both states; an obligation not to participate in any treaties, agreements and conventions that are clearly hostile to the other party, etc.
Evidence of the strengthening of the international prestige of the USSR was its adoption in the fall of 1934. to the League of Nations, at the same time negotiations began on the conclusion of a multilateral regional agreement on mutual assistance ("Eastern Pact"), in which the USSR participated. The refusal of Germany and Poland to participate in this agreement, the unconstructive policy of Great Britain led to the termination of negotiations. Then the Soviet Union signed in 1935. a tripartite mutual assistance treaty with France and Czechoslovakia, which provided for the provision of military assistance to one of the parties in the event of an attack, but on the condition that this assistance would be provided by the other two parties. Subsequently, when Germany in March 1939. captured Czechoslovakia, and France agreed with this, the USSR offered to provide assistance unilaterally, but the government of Czechoslovakia refused to accept it.
The USSR also put forward the idea of concluding a Pacific Collective Security Pact with the participation of China, the USA, Britain and other countries. But this initiative was not supported by Western partners.
Germany was in an unrestricted arms race in preparation for war. In 1935, universal military service was proclaimed in it. In 1935 between Berlin and London, negotiations began on the conclusion of an Anglo-German alliance, the purpose of which was, according to Hitler, "freedom of action for England on the seas and in overseas countries, freedom of action for Germany on the continent and in expansion to the East." An Anglo-German naval agreement was soon signed allowing for an increase in the German navy. In March 1936, German troops occupied the Rhine demilitarized zone, violating the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The Nazis rushed to power in France, Austria, Greece, in the Baltic states. In Spain, after the victory in the elections of the Popular Front in February 1936, the right-wing forces, led by General Franco, revolted. Germany and Italy actively helped the rebels. At the same time, most European states adhered to a policy of non-intervention in Spanish events, since the victory of either side weakened their own positions.
At first, the Soviet Union agreed with this policy and tried to stop the intervention of Italy and Germany in this conflict, but, convinced of the inefficiency of this activity, it began to provide significant economic, political military assistance to the Republicans, including sending regular troops under the guise of volunteers. In addition to Soviet volunteers, international brigades formed by the Comintern from anti-fascists from 54 countries fought on the side of the republican government. However, the forces were still unequal. After the withdrawal of international units from Spain, the republican government fell.
In 1936-1937. the Anti-Comintern Pact, or the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis, was formed. In March 1938 Germany carried out the Anschluss (accession) of Austria. There was a real threat of breaking the balance of power in Europe and a world war. European diplomacy did not oppose this. She pursued a policy of appeasing the aggressor, i.e. tried, through concessions to Germany, to turn it into a reliable partner in international affairs, also sought to use Germany as a counterbalance to the foreign policy of the USSR, hoping that Germany's predatory aspirations would be directed to the East. The policy of appeasement culminated in the agreement in Munich (September 1938), which was attended by the heads of governments of Germany, Italy, England and France. The most significant result of this meeting was the decision to annex the Sudetenland - an industrialized region of Czechoslovakia - to Germany. This was the maximum possible concession from England and France to Germany, but it only whetted Hitler's appetites. After the Western countries not only refused to help Czechoslovakia, but also forced it to refuse military assistance to the USSR, March 15, 1939. Germany took over the rest of Czechoslovakia. At the end of March, as a result of a conspiracy organized by the imperialists, the Spanish Republic fell. On April 7, fascist Italy occupied Albania. The governments of the Western powers essentially resigned themselves to new conquests. On February 27, England and France, and on April 1, the United States also recognized the Franco regime. By and large, diplomats accredited to the Axis countries were unanimous - a trip to the East was not far off. Even the reason that Hitler would apparently choose to open hostilities was named: the "joining" of Soviet Ukraine to Transcarpathian Ukraine. However, Hitler handed over the Transcarpathian Ukraine to Hungary, which caused considerable confusion among the "Munichians". The eastern campaign, obviously, was postponed. In England and France, dissatisfaction was growing even in the ruling circles, who were seriously concerned about the threat to the national security of both countries. Under pressure from the public, on March 31, 1939, England and France granted guarantees of "independence" to Poland, and then to Romania. On April 15, F. Roosevelt sent a message to Hitler, asking him to assure that Germany would not attack its neighbors for 10 years. However, Danzig was omitted from the list of the latter, and its annexation to Germany became the reason for the anti-Polish campaign in Germany.
In the spring of 1939 In connection with the sharp escalation of the aggressive actions of the fascist states, the USSR turned to England and France with specific proposals for concluding an agreement on mutual assistance, including a military convention in the event of aggression in Europe. The Soviet government believed that in order to create a real barrier of peace-loving states against the further deployment of aggression in Europe, at least three conditions were necessary:
1) the conclusion between Britain, France and the USSR of an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression;
2) the guarantee of security by these three great powers to the states of Central and Eastern Europe under the threat of aggression, including here also Latvia, Estonia, Finland;
3) the conclusion of a specific agreement between Britain, France and the USSR on the forms and amounts of assistance provided to each other and to the guaranteed states, without which (without such an agreement) mutual assistance pacts run the risk of hanging in the air, as the experience with Czechoslovakia showed.
June 2, 1939 The USSR handed over to the governments of England and France a draft treaty that took into account all the proposals put forward during the negotiations.
The British and French proposals did not provide for guarantees from Estonia, Latvia and Finland, at the same time they demanded guarantees of assistance from the USSR in relation to Poland, Romania, Belgium, Greece and Turkey, then raised the question of extending the guarantees of the three powers to Holland and Switzerland. The stubborn unwillingness of the British and French governments to include the Baltic countries in the general system of collective security in Europe had a very definite meaning - to leave open the gates from the northwest for the invasion of Nazi Germany into the territory of the Soviet Union. Intensive preparations were made for the use of Finland for the war against the USSR. At the expense of England, France, Sweden, the USA and Germany, military construction was carried out on the Karelian Isthmus under the guidance of the largest specialists of these countries. The Finnish government actively cooperated with Germany.
Great Britain was in parallel negotiating with Germany and Japan. July 18, and then again on July 21, 1939. conversations between Chamberlain Wilson's confidant and Hitler's emissary Wohltat, an official for special assignments in Goering's department, took place. Wilson proposed to conclude an Anglo-German non-aggression pact and sign a declaration of non-interference in each other's internal affairs. On July 20, at the initiative of Wilson, Wohltath met with the Minister of Overseas Trade of England, Hudson, who expressed the opinion that “... there are still three large areas in the world in which Germany and England could find wide opportunities for applying their forces, namely: English Empire, China and Russia".
On July 29, during a meeting of representatives of the Labor Party of England with the adviser of the German Embassy in London, proposals were considered for concluding an "agreement on the delimitation of spheres of interest" between England and Germany.
In July 1939 in Tokyo, an agreement was signed under which England recognized Japanese seizures in China and pledged not to hinder Japanese aggression there. It was the "Far Eastern Munich", according to which China was assigned the same role as a victim of aggression in Asia as Czechoslovakia was in Europe. The agreement was signed at the height of the armed conflict unleashed by Japan against the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic near the Khalkhin Gol River.
July 25, 1939 The British government finally accepted the Soviet proposal to begin negotiations on an Anglo-French-Soviet military agreement. On July 26, the French Foreign Minister announced that a French delegation would leave for Moscow.
To conduct military negotiations, the Soviet government appointed a delegation headed by the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Voroshilov. The members of the delegation were Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Shaposhnikov, People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov, Chief of the Air Force of the Red Army Loktionov and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Smorodinov.
The British delegation included Admiral Drax, Marshal of the British Air Force Barnet and Major General Haywood. The delegation was instructed to "negotiate very slowly." The American embassy in London reported to the US State Department on August 8 that the British military mission "has been instructed to do everything possible to ensure that the negotiations continue until October 1."
The head of the British delegation, Drax, declared that he "had no written authority" and that he was "authorized only to negotiate, not to sign a pact (convention)."
The French military delegation included a member of the Supreme Military Council of France, General Doumenc, the commander of the 3rd Air Division, General Valen, a professor at the Vuillaume Naval School, and others. The French delegation had the authority only to negotiate, but not to sign any agreement.
To the question of the head of the Soviet military mission: "Do the missions of England and France have corresponding military plans?" - Drax replied that when he came to Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet government, he "expected that the project would be proposed by the Soviet mission."
The cardinal issue of the negotiations was the question of the passage of Soviet troops through Polish territory, "in order to directly contact the enemy if he attacks Poland", or "through Romanian territory, if the aggressor attacks Romania." These issues were not resolved during the negotiations, since the Polish government, even in the face of immediate danger from Germany, did not change the anti-Soviet course of its foreign policy. As early as May 11, 1939, the Polish ambassador in Moscow declared that Poland did not consider it possible to conclude a mutual assistance pact with the USSR. During negotiations in Moscow on August 20, Polish Foreign Minister J. Beck sent a telegram to his ambassador in France: “Poland is not bound by any military treaties with the Soviets, and the Polish government is not going to conclude such an agreement.”
In Paris, however, anxiety was growing in connection with the growing German aggressiveness.
war europe security fascism
French diplomacy, balancing between the old policy of appeasement and the fear of German aggression, behaved inconsistently during the negotiations, but on August 21 the French government authorized its representatives to sign the tripartite military convention. At the same time, the representatives of France in Warsaw tried to influence the Polish government, agree to the passage of Soviet troops through Polish territory in the event of a war with the aggressor (meaning Germany) and include this agreement in the text of the convention. But the negotiations stalled because of the position of the British government, which did not give its delegation the authority to sign a military convention. “The British Government,” said the statement approved at the meeting of the Defense Committee of England on August 2, 1939. instructions to the delegation at the Moscow talks - does not want to be drawn into any definite obligation that could tie our hands under any circumstances. Therefore, in relation to a military agreement, one should strive to limit oneself to the extent possible with general formulations ... not to negotiate on the issue of the defense of the Baltic states.
Poland and Romania also did not give consent to the passage of Soviet troops through Polish and Romanian territories in order to participate in hostilities against Germany.
In August 1939, the Soviet government received information that the German army was being brought to combat readiness and concentrated near the Polish border. It became known that in the period from 25 to 28 August, military operations of Germany against Poland may begin. Therefore, the Soviet Union had to think about an alternative way out.
Germany was interested in a non-aggression pact with the USSR, as it wanted the USSR to remain neutral after its attack on Poland. According to the documents, it is known that the decision to attack Poland was made when there was no talk of a non-aggression pact. In June, when the Soviet-Anglo-French negotiations were in full swing, Hitler says that the attack will take place regardless of whether an agreement is concluded between England, France and the USSR, that the German-Polish conflict will be resolved as planned in Berlin .
Analysis of the secret correspondence between the German embassy in Moscow and Berlin in June-August 1939. suggests that the Soviet government was cautious about Germany's proposal to conclude a treaty. This is how the German embassy and ambassador assesses the first stage of diplomatic probing in May-June: “We did everything possible, but we cannot drag Molotov and Mikoyan into the Brandenburg Gate.” On July 30, Hitler instructs: "Given the behavior of the Russians, to abandon further actions in Moscow." Later, after a meeting with Molotov, held on August 3 by telegraph from Berlin, Ambassador von Schulenburg reports: "My general impression is that the Soviet government has now decided to conclude an agreement with France - England, if they fulfill all its wishes."
On August 15, Ribbentrop announces through his ambassador in Moscow that he is ready to "make a short trip to Moscow in order to lay the foundation for clarifying German-Soviet relations." But the Soviet leadership replies: "Such a trip will require appropriate preparation."
On August 18, a new order to the ambassador: to seek agreement on an “urgent visit”, bearing in mind that “the start of a German-Polish conflict is also possible in the near future ...”. The next day, in response, the German ambassador was handed a Soviet draft non-aggression pact, and with regard to Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow, it was said that it would become possible after the announcement of the signing of an economic agreement, and if this announcement was made today or tomorrow, then the minister could arrive August 26-27.
On August 19, a Soviet-German loan agreement was signed in Berlin. The Soviet Union was given a loan of 200 million German marks for the purchase of industrial products in Germany, including military materials. The signing of this treaty gave a certain guarantee that Germany was not going to attack the USSR in the near future.
On August 20, Berlin fully reveals its cards. In a telegram to Stalin, Hitler announces: Germany "from now on has decided to secure the interests of the Reich by all means" in the conflict with Poland. He proposes to receive Ribbentrop "on Tuesday, August 22, but at the latest on Wednesday, August 23." The visit "should last at most two days, a longer period, taking into account the international situation, is impossible." It was clear that the German war machine was already on and an attack on Poland could happen any day now.
On August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed for a period of ten years.
The agreement was accompanied by a secret protocol that demarcated the spheres of influence of the parties in Eastern Europe: “Agreement was reached as follows:
1. In the event of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania will be the line separating the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR. In this regard, Lithuania's interest in the Vilna region is recognized by both sides.
2. In the event of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR will be delimited approximately along the lines of the Narew, Vistula and San rivers.
The question of whether it is desirable in the interests of the parties to preserve the independence of the Polish state, about the boundaries of such a state, will be finally decided only by the course of future political events.
Regarding South-Eastern Europe, the Soviet side indicated its interest in Bessarabia. The German side has clearly stated its complete political disinterest in these territories.
Thus, the sphere of influence of the USSR included Finland, Estonia, Latvia and the eastern territories of the Polish state - Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, as well as Bessarabia, forcibly torn away from the Soviet Republic after the First World War.
It can, of course, be argued that the conclusion of a secret protocol with Germany drew the Soviet state into the imperialist redistribution of the world as an ally of Hitler, but one cannot help but notice the formation of a bloc of aggressive states on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the signing of the Munich Agreement, tacit and often active encouragement of the aggressor with side of the Western powers. This protocol can be understood in the context of that time. A clash between the Soviet Union and Germany was inevitable. Stalin believed that in the name of final victory in a future war, it would be better if this clash took place on lines 200-300 kilometers away from the former borders of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet-German non-aggression pact cannot be regarded as an isolated phenomenon, as a bare fact in isolation from the events that were then taking place in the world. The treaty was concluded when fascist aggression was already hanging over the European states. The economic and political plans of the aggressor were supported by the very influential forces of England, France, and also the United States. These were circles that hoped to deal with the Soviet Union with Hitler's hands.
But not only in Moscow thought so. Here is an excerpt from a conversation between the Soviet plenipotentiary in London Maisky and Churchill at the end of October 1939, already in the conditions of the outbreak of World War II.
“From the point of view of correctly understood interests of England, the fact that the whole East and South-East of Europe are outside the zone of war,” Churchill said, “is not negative, but positive. For the most part, Britain has no reason to object to the actions of the USSR in the Baltics. Of course, some of the sentimental figures may shed a tear about the Russian protectorate over Estonia or Latvia, but this cannot be taken seriously ... ". “Churchill,” reports Maisky, “understands that the USSR should be the master on the eastern coast of the Baltic world, and is very glad that the Baltic countries are included in our, and not in the German, state system. This is historically normal and at the same time reduces the possible "living space" for Hitler. Churchill at the same time sweepingly drew along the line of the Soviet-German demarcation and declared: "Germany must not be allowed further than this line."
Churchill later wrote of the treaty:
“It is impossible to say who he inspired more disgust - Hitler or Stalin. Both realized that this could only be a temporary measure dictated by circumstances. The antagonism between the two empires and systems was deadly. Stalin no doubt thought that Hitler would be a less dangerous enemy for Russia after a year of war against the Western powers. Hitler followed his "one by one" method. The fact that such an agreement was possible marks the full extent of the failure of British and French policy and diplomacy in a few years.
In favor of the Soviets, it must be said that it was vital for the Soviet Union to move as far to the West as possible the starting positions of the German armies so that the Russians would have time to gather forces from all over their colossal empire. The catastrophes that their armies suffered in 1914, when they rushed to the offensive against the Germans, were imprinted in the minds of the Russians with red-hot iron, had not yet completed their mobilization. And now their borders were much further east than during the first war. They needed to occupy the Baltic states and most of Poland by force or deceit before they were attacked. If their policy was coldly calculating, it was also at that moment highly realistic.
The agreements reached in August 1939 put a limit on the spread of fascist expansion in Eastern Europe, and therefore they can be regarded as directed not against, but in defense of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
At present, the opinions of researchers on the issue of concluding a Soviet-German non-aggression pact drastically differ, but are based, as a rule, on political likes and dislikes, and not on an objective analysis of the facts.
The conclusion of such an agreement allowed the USSR to get away from the danger of being drawn into a war on two fronts and made it possible to win some time to develop and strengthen the country's defense.
On September 1, 1939, Nazi Germany attacked Poland. The allies of the latter - England and France - declared war on Germany. The Second World War began. Attempts to create a system of collective security and prevent war have failed.
29. Foreign policy of the USSR in the 1930s: international situation, collapse of the collective security policy, changes in the foreign policy orientation of the USSR in the late 1930s, foreign policy actions of the USSR in 1939-1941.
The foreign policy of the USSR in the 30s
In the 30s. and especially on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet foreign policy was complex and contradictory.
There are three main phases of foreign policy:
until 1933 - good relations with Germany, but unstable relations with "democratic" countries;
1933-1939: rapprochement of the USSR with England, France and the USA against Germany and Japan; 1939–June 1941: Rapprochement with Germany and Japan.
In the late 1930s, international tension increased. The Western powers pursued a policy of concessions to fascist Germany, trying to direct its aggression against the USSR. The culmination of this policy was the Munich Agreement (September 1938) between Germany, Italy, England and France, which formalized the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.
In the Far East, Japan, having captured most of China, approached the borders of the USSR. In the summer of 1938, an armed conflict took place on the territory of the USSR in the area of Lake Khasan. The Japanese grouping was thrown back. In May 1938 Japanese troops invaded Mongolia. Parts of the Red Army under the command of G.K. Zhukov defeated them in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River.
At the beginning of 1939, the last attempt was made to create a system of collective security between Britain, France and the USSR. The Western powers dragged out negotiations. Therefore, the Soviet leadership went for rapprochement with Germany. On August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was concluded in Moscow for a period of 10 years (Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact). It was accompanied by a secret protocol on the delimitation of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. The interests of the USSR were recognized by Germany in the Baltic and Bessarabia.
The Munich Agreement finally fixed the course of the Western powers to "appease" the fascist aggressors, satisfying Germany's claims to seize the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. The hopes of the USSR for the possibility of creating a system of collective security were finally dispelled after the signing in September 1938 of the Anglo-German, and in December of the same year, the Franco-German declarations, which were, in essence, non-aggression pacts. In these documents, the contracting parties declared their desire "never again to wage war against each other." The Soviet Union, seeking to protect itself from a possible military conflict, began searching for a new foreign policy line.
This circumstance forced Stalin to reconsider relations with England and France, to begin a gradual rapprochement with Germany. Neither Stalin nor Hitler considered the rapprochement that had begun to be strategic and long-term. Along with common political interests, they were united by the rejection of "Western democracies".
The conclusion of the Soviet-German agreements in the summer of 1939 frustrated the attempts of the Western powers to draw the USSR into a war with Germany and, conversely, made it possible to switch the direction of German aggression primarily to the West. The Soviet-German rapprochement introduced a certain discord in relations between Germany and Japan, eliminated the threat of war on two fronts for the USSR
On September 1, Germany attacked Poland. Under these conditions, the leadership of the USSR began to implement the Soviet-German agreements in August 1939. On September 17, the Red Army entered Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. In 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became part of the USSR.
In November 1939, the USSR began a war with Finland in the hope of its quick defeat, in order to move the Soviet-Finnish border from Leningrad in the area of the Karelian Isthmus. At the cost of enormous efforts, the resistance of the Finnish armed forces was broken. In March 1940, the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty was signed, according to which the USSR received the entire Karelian Isthmus.
In the summer of 1940, as a result of political pressure, Romania ceded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR.
As a result, significant territories with a population of 14 million people were included in the USSR. The foreign policy agreements of 1939 delayed the attack on the USSR for almost 2 years.
The formation of the military-political situation in the world, which ultimately led to war, was decisively influenced by the aggressiveness of fascist Germany and militaristic Japan.
This was facilitated by the conciliatory policy of England and France (the policy of "appeasement" of the aggressor) and the isolationism of the United States.
After Hitler came to power, the efforts of the Soviet Union were aimed at creating a system of collective security in Europe. However, it was not possible to create such a system due to the mutual distrust of the future allies in the anti-Hitler coalition.
Guided by the security interests of their country, the Soviet leadership agreed to normalize relations with Germany, signing on August 23, 1939, the "Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact".
The failure of the collective security policy made the unleashing of the Second World War inevitable.
Collective security policy.
Outcome:
Additionally
2. Hotspots of military danger and rapprochement of aggressors.
But in the early 1930s, significant changes took place in international relations. And they were connected with the violation of the terms of the Versailles-Washington system.
Answers: International relations in the 1930s were different from those on the eve of the First World War. In the 1930s, only a small group of countries wanted war, while the majority did not. There was a real opportunity to put out the hotbeds of war, everything depended on the ability of the world community to organize joint actions.
The first test of this ability was the economic crisis. It was global, and it was wiser to deal with its consequences together.
However, the inability to act together was revealed: the US set the highest customs duties, the UK set the exchange rate of the pound, which created the conditions for expanding exports of British goods. Other countries followed suit. A real customs and currency war began, which disorganized world trade and deepened the crisis. Each country tried to shift the burden of the crisis onto others, economic rivalry increased, and the ability to act together was lost. There was no understanding of the integrity and indivisibility of the world.
The growing tension in the world gave rise in the United States to the desire to retire to their "American fortress". The richest country with colossal resources and the ability to influence world events, as it were, fell out of world politics. This dramatically increased the aggressors' chances of success.
Hitler's rise to power was not immediately perceived as a radical change in German policy. For a long time, he was seen only as a strong national leader, striving to restore justice for Germany. The plans of the Nazis to redistribute the world were not taken seriously at first. The death camps had not yet worked, and the peoples of Europe had not experienced the horrors of occupation. All this was ahead. To many politicians, Hitler seemed like a leader to do business with.
4. The policy of appeasement and the policy of collective security: essence, implementation, causes of failures.
Since 1936, two opposite directions in international relations have been formed in Europe: the policy of appeasement and the policy of collective security.
A) The policy of appeasement. An active supporter of this policy was the Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1937-1940, Neville Chamberlain. In his opinion, the main danger was not in the actions of Germany, but in the possibility of losing control over the development of events. He believed that the First World War arose precisely because the great powers temporarily lost control over the development of events. As a result, the local conflict over Serbia escalated into a world war. In order to prevent such a danger, it is necessary not to lose contacts with all participants in the international conflict and try to solve the problems that have arisen on the basis of mutual concessions. In fact, this meant that Hitler put forward more and more new claims, they became the subject of discussion, after which it was necessary to make more and more concessions to Germany. Such a policy required sacrifices and territorial concessions from third countries, i.e. those to whom Germany made claims.
B) Collective security policy.
The policy of collective security was proposed by French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou. This policy was aimed at maintaining the status quo in Europe, the immutability of the existing borders. The states interested in this had to conclude agreements on mutual assistance among themselves. The participation of the USSR in this system Barthou considered vital. The conductor of this policy in our country was the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M. Litvinov. In the course of implementing this course, the Soviet Union managed to consolidate its position:
in 1934 the USSR was admitted to the League of Nations as a member of its Council;
in 1935, a Soviet-French treaty of mutual assistance was signed;
in 1936 an agreement was signed with Czechoslovakia;
in 1935, the 7th Congress of the Comintern set a course for the development of an anti-fascist struggle.
Why did other states not support the policy of collective security?
The USSR did not have a common border with Germany. In order to fulfill their promises under the treaty, its troops must be allowed through the territory of Poland or Romania, but the governments of both sides were more afraid of the USSR than Germany and categorically refused to make promises regarding the possible passage of Soviet troops through their territory.
The military potential of the USSR was estimated extremely low after the mass repressions among the command staff of the Red Army.
Outcome: France in 1938 abandons the policy of collective security and trails behind the British policy of appeasement.
C) Implementation of appeasement policy.
1. Remember what, according to Hitler, was the historical mission of German fascism?
Answer: The conquest of world domination. And for this it is necessary: to eliminate the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, to create a powerful army, to unite all Germans in a single state, to conquer the necessary "living space" in the East.
2. What points of this plan have already been implemented by Hitler?
Answer: Partially liquidated the terms of the Treaty of Versailles regarding the restrictions of Germany, created a powerful army. It was possible to proceed with the implementation of the next stage - the unification of all Germans in a single state.
3. German Field Marshal W. Keitel said after the end of the war: “During the Munich period, Germany was not prepared for an armed conflict. If in March 1938 the Allies had allowed the Czechoslovak Republic to mobilize, Hitler would not have been able to occupy even Austria…” Was the concession to Hitler by the Western powers in Munich due to the clear military superiority of Germany or other circumstances?
The content of the presentation: In 1938, Hitler decided to start implementing his foreign policy program: redistribution of borders in order to include all regions inhabited by Germans in Germany. First on the list was Austria, the birthplace of Hitler. Hitler ultimatum demanded that power in Austria be transferred to the local Nazis. They invited the German troops to help them restore order. On March 12, 1938, the Wehrmacht invaded Austria. Its independence was liquidated, it became a province of Germany. Although the majority of Austrians enthusiastically accepted the accession, seeing only in it the future of the country. But one way or another, a sovereign state ceased to exist in Europe. Nobody could stop it.
Following this, Hitler put forward claims to Czechoslovakia, demanding that the Sudetenland, populated mainly by Germans, be annexed to Germany. But Czechoslovakia proved to be a hard nut to crack. She had one of the best armies in Europe and was not going to give in. Hitler decided to achieve the secession of the Sudetenland, frightening the great powers with the prospect of starting a new war. September 30, 1938 in Munich, with the participation of England, Germany, Italy and France, it was decided to satisfy Hitler's claims. Czechoslovakia, which was not even invited to the conference, lost 1/5 of its territory, the border was 40 km from Prague.
4. What are the results of the policy of appeasement by the end of 1938?
Answer: Germany has become the strongest state in Europe. Hitler believed in his impunity. This hastened the start of the war. The West was blind: the assessment of the collusion is enthusiastic: “Peace to this generation!”
D) The collapse of the policy of appeasement.
What actions of England and France indicated that their policy of appeasement had suffered a complete collapse?
Answer: March-April 1939 England and France provide guarantees of military assistance to all states bordering Germany in the event of a German attack on them.
5. Foreign policy of the USSR in the 30s.
A) Causes of rapprochement between the USSR and Germany ..
1. What conclusions did the Soviet leadership make for itself after the signing of the Munich Agreement?
Answer: They are trying to push the USSR away from active participation in European affairs. An attempt to direct German aggression to the East, against the USSR.
2. How did Soviet-Japanese relations develop in 1938-1939?
Answer: In the summer of 1938, Japanese troops invaded the territory of the USSR near Lake Khasan. In the summer of 1939, the Japanese army provoked a conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region, in Mongolia, which was connected with the USSR by a military treaty. The USSR could find itself in a state of war on two fronts.
3. Why did Germany begin to look for ways of rapprochement with the USSR in 1939?
Answer: Poland was now the main object of claims for Hitler. But England and France provided Poland with guarantees of military assistance. By attacking it, Germany risked being at war with England and France. The capture of Poland brought Germany to the border with the USSR, and if the USSR continues its anti-German policy, then Germany will be in a state of war on two fronts. Having learned about the guarantees to Poland and the firm intention of England and France to comply with them, he banged his fists on the marble of his desk, promising to brew England's "devil's potion". This potion was the rapprochement with the USSR.
Why did England and France, realizing the military danger posed by fascist Germany, nevertheless avoid entering into an alliance with the USSR?
Why did the USSR begin to move away from the policy of collective security in August 1939?
Answer: The USSR insisted on granting it the right to send its troops to the territory of Poland and Romania to repel the aggression of Germany, establishing its control over Eastern Europe. The Soviet side saw in the position of Poland and Romania a pretext for dragging out the negotiations and proof that Britain and France did not want to really cooperate with the USSR, but used the negotiations as a means of putting pressure on Hitler in an attempt to negotiate with him.
In mid-August 1939, the USSR found itself at the center of world politics. His favor was actively sought by both Germany and her military opponents. The Soviet Union was faced with the problem of choosing between opposing opponents. The fate of the world depended on this choice. The turnaround took place on August 21, 1939. Stalin received a telegram from Hitler, in which he stated that he was striving to conclude a non-aggression pact with the USSR and was ready to sign any additional agreement regarding the settlement of all controversial issues. It became clear to Stalin that the USSR could gain control of Eastern Europe, not in exchange for agreeing to participate in the war, but as a price for not participating in it. On the same day, negotiations with England and France were interrupted for an indefinite period. On August 23, a non-aggression pact was signed.
D) non-aggression pact. Secret protocols.
The documents signed in Moscow completed the reorientation of the foreign policy of the USSR. The meaning of this turn cannot be unequivocally assessed - an attempt to ensure the country's security through a direct agreement with Germany. The USSR was turning into a non-belligerent ally of Germany. The image of a country that consistently opposed fascism and its aggressive policies was being destroyed, which in the historical perspective far outweighed the temporary advantages provided by the pact.
The immediate result of the signing of these documents was Hitler's final decision to launch aggression against Poland.
On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. On September 3, 1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany. The Second World War began - the bloodiest, most cruel, engulfing 61 states of the world, where 80% of the world's population lived. The death toll was 65-66 million people.
After the end of the First World War, the issues of peaceful coexistence worried many countries, primarily the European powers, which suffered incalculable victims and losses as a result of the war. In order to prevent the threat of a new similar war and create a system of international law that regulates relations between states on
on a fundamentally different level than it was before, and the first international organization in the history of Europe, the League of Nations, was created.
In the early 1930s The USSR was not a member of the League and had no reason to trust the objectivity of the Council of the League in the event of this or that conflict between the USSR and any other country. Proceeding from these considerations, already during this period the Soviet Union put forward proposals to a number of European states for the conclusion of non-aggression pacts, with the aim of
"strengthening the cause of peace and relations between countries" in the conditions of "the deep world crisis now being experienced."
For the first time, the Soviet delegation raised the issue of the need to conclude a special convention to determine the attacking side at the disarmament conference in December 1932. On February 6, 1933, the Soviet draft convention was formally submitted to the Conference Bureau.
However, at this time there is an increasing destabilization of the situation and the growth of aggressive tendencies in international relations. It takes very little time for totalitarian fascist regimes to be established in Italy and Germany. Under these conditions, the topic of creating a new system of international security, which could prevent the already quite real threat of war, acquires particular relevance.
For the first time, a proposal on the need to fight for collective security was put forward in a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in December 1933. The collective security project was based on the equality of all participants in the proposed regional agreement and on universalism, which consisted in the fact that the system being created included all the states of the covered region without exception. The parties to the pact were to enjoy equal rights and guarantees, while rejecting the idea of any opposition of some countries to others, the exclusion of anyone from the collective security system, or the receipt by any of the participating countries of advantages over other states at their expense.
Thus, the period 1933–1938. passed under the sign of the desire of the Soviet Union to implement a collective security system as a whole or for individual elements in order to prevent the outbreak of war.
The policy of appeasing the fascist government of the aggressor countries, pursued by the governments of England and France, their fears and unwillingness to reach an agreement with a country based on a fundamentally different system of government, an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust led to the failure of plans to create a collective security system in Europe. As a result, fascist Germany, together with its allies, plunged the world into a terrible and devastating World War II.
In general, the proposals for the creation of a collective security system were a significant contribution to the development of the theory and to the establishment in practice of the principles of peaceful coexistence, because the very essence of collective security is conditioned and determined by the principles of peaceful coexistence, involves the collective cooperation of states with different social systems in the name of preventing war and the preservation of the world.
The development and adoption of joint collective measures to ensure security turned out to be a much deeper and more complex element of peaceful coexistence than the establishment of diplomatic relations between countries with different social systems and even the development of trade and economic ties between them.
20. The main stages in the formation of a bloc of aggressive states. Axis "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo".
Francoist support was the first instance of Italian partnership with Germany. It helped bring them closer. However, complete reconciliation was not possible apart from a compromise on the question of Austria. The situation was made easier when, in July 1936, Germany and Austria signed a treaty under which Berlin promised to respect Austrian sovereignty and the Austrian government confirmed that Austria recognized itself as a German state. The Italian government expressed satisfaction with the found formula. The German-Austrian agreement removed an important obstacle to the Italo-German rapprochement.
Two days after the USSR refused to comply with the arms embargo against the Madrid government, on October 25, 1936, Mussolini's son-in-law, Count Galeazzo Ciano, who had just been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Berlin. On the same day, a German-Italian protocol of understanding was signed. Germany recognized the existing situation in Ethiopia, the parties agreed on the lines of demarcation of their economic interests in the Danube basin, and, most importantly, Germany and Italy agreed to draw an agreed line in the Spanish question - in fact, it was a agreed military intervention. The Berlin Protocol formalized the partnership between Germany and Italy without establishing a formal union between them. The Berlin-Rome Axis was created.
In November 1936, Italian and German military contingents began to arrive in Spain. These were not regular troops, but the so-called legionnaires. At the same time, international brigades were formed from among the volunteers of different nationalities who sympathized with him to assist the Madrid government, which also took part in the civil war.
In November 1936, Germany and Italy, and in December - Japan recognized the government of Franco (Spanish statesman). With the advent of Italian and German soldiers in Spain, the balance of power began to change in favor of the Francoists. Neither the USSR nor the Euro-Atlantic powers were prepared to take the risk of countering the Italo-German intervention by force. By the end of 1937, Franco had a clear military predominance. Republican forces continued to resist. But they were split. In Madrid, the situation was kept by the communists, who were helped by the USSR. In Barcelona and throughout Catalonia, the Francoists were held back by anarchists and Trotskyists, who themselves called for the overthrow of the government in Madrid. In March 1939, the anti-Franco forces suffered a final defeat in Spain. Dictatorship was restored in the country.
The countries of the Nazi bloc, the countries (powers) of the "axis", the Nazi coalition is an aggressive military alliance of Germany, Italy, Japan and other states, which was opposed during the Second World War by the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.
The Axis Union was originally based on the German-Japanese-Italian-Spanish Anti-Comintern Pact and the German-Italian Steel Pact, and fully took shape on September 27, 1940, when Germany, Italy and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact on the delimitation of zones of influence when establishing "new order" and mutual military assistance.
This is an alliance before the 2nd World War of fascist Italy with Nazi Germany, which was subsequently joined by militaristic Japan. It was created in opposition to the Soviet Comintern, which sought to destroy the capitalist countries from within through the subversive activities of the communist parties.
21. The development of German aggression in Europe and the policy of "appeasement" of Germany. Anschluss of Austria. Munich agreement and its consequences.
Germany began preparing for war immediately after Hitler came to power. The Hitler regime was created by the German monopoly circles with the full approval of the ruling camp of England, France and the United States.
It is known that the post-Versailles period was marked for Germany by a whole system of measures aimed at restoring German heavy industry, in particular, the German military-industrial potential. An enormous role in this matter was played by the so-called Dawes reparations plan for Germany, with the help of which the USA and Britain hoped to make German industry dependent on American and British monopolies. The Dawes Plan cleared the way for an increased influx and introduction of foreign, predominantly American, capital into German industry.
The first and most important prerequisite for Hitler's aggression was the revival and renewal of heavy industry and the military industry in Germany, which became possible only due to the direct and broad financial support of the ruling circles of the United States of America.
Another decisive circumstance that contributed to the unleashing of Hitler's aggression was the policy of the ruling circles of Britain and France, which is known as the policy of "appeasement" of Nazi Germany, the policy of renouncing collective security. It was precisely this policy of the Anglo-French ruling circles, which was expressed in the rejection of collective security, in the rejection of rebuffing German aggression, in indulging the aggressive demands of Nazi Germany, that led to the Second World War.
Soon after Hitler came to power, as a result of the efforts of the British and French Governments, in 1933, the "Pact of Consent and Cooperation" of the four powers - Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy - was signed in Rome. This pact signified the collusion of the British and French Governments with German and Italian fascism, which even then made no secret of its aggressive intentions. At the same time, this pact with the fascist states meant a rejection of the policy of strengthening the united front of the peace-loving powers against the aggressive states. By conspiring with Germany and Italy, bypassing the other powers - participants in the then ongoing disarmament conference, which discussed the Soviet proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact and a pact on determining the attacking side - Great Britain and France dealt a blow to the cause of ensuring the peace and security of peoples.
Following that, in 1934, England and France helped Hitler to use the hostile position of the allied panorama of Poland against the USSR, as a result of which the German-Polish non-aggression pact was concluded, which was one of the most important stages in the preparation of German aggression. Hitler needed this pact in order to upset the ranks of the supporters of collective security and to show by this example that Europe does not need collective security, but bilateral agreements. This made it possible for German aggression to decide for itself with whom and when to conclude an agreement, against whom and when to attack. There is no doubt that the German-Polish pact was the first serious breach in the building of collective security.
Emboldened, Hitler took a number of measures to openly restore the armed forces of Germany, which did not cause any opposition from the British and French rulers.
The Soviet Union did everything possible to block the path of the fascist aggressors. The Soviet Union acted as the initiator and champion of collective security.
Anschluss (German Anschluss (inf.) - accession, union) - the inclusion of Austria into Germany, which took place on March 12-13, 1938. The independence of Austria was restored in April 1945, after its occupation by the Allied forces during the Second World War, and legalized by the State Treaty of 1955, prohibiting the Anschluss.
Hitler decided to act. He started in Austria. Ethnically and culturally close to Germany, independent Austria seemed to the Fuhrer, who was born and spent his youth there, an integral part of Greater Germany. The Nazi movement flourished in Austria, and this guaranteed the ease of transferring the German order to Austrian soil. Already in the secret annex to the German-Austrian agreement of July 11, 1936, the Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg agreed to concessions to the Nazi movement in Austria, although formally Germany pledged not to interfere in the affairs of Austria.
Hitler demanded that Schuschnigg immediately sign a new agreement with Germany. Schuschnigg's two-page document instructed Austria to lift the ban on the activities of the Austrian Nazi Party, grant amnesty to imprisoned Nazis (who were largely arrested for terrorist activities), appoint Seyss-Inquart, one of the leaders of the Austrian Nazis, as Minister of the Interior, and another Nazi, Gleiss-Horstenau, Minister of War. It was not an agreement, but an ultimatum, and, in fact, it meant the Nazisification of Austria and its imminent and imminent absorption by the Reich.
Under pressure from Hitler, Ribbentrop, and the German ambassador to Vienna, Franz von Papen, Schuschnigg surrendered. He made only one reservation: according to the Austrian constitution, only the president of the republic could approve such an agreement. Hitler, pretending that his patience had run out, flung open the doors and shouted: "General Keitel!" (Wilhelm Keitel was the chief of the general staff of the German troops). Winking at Keitel and leaving Schuschnigg, who suspected that he was about to be shot, for thirty minutes, Hitler again called on the Austrian chancellor and said that he was ready for the only concession - to delay the execution of the "agreement" for three days. Austria's death warrant was signed.
This was followed by "four weeks of agony" lasting until March 11, during which the Nazis prepared for the Anschluss with little effort from the Austrian Social Democrats to resist it. On March 11, under the threat of a German military invasion, Schuschnigg resigned. Berlin (the operation was led by Hermann Goering) presented an ultimatum to the Austrian President Miklas: appoint Seyss-Inquart chancellor or German troops will enter Austria. Seyss-Inquart, the "head of the provisional government" of Austria, under dictation from Berlin, sent a desperate telegram to Berlin with a request to send German troops to Austria to prevent bloodshed. Already on March 12, Hitler was in Austrian Linz (where he spent his school years), and on March 13, 1938, he signed a document on the complete Anschluss of Austria. Austria became a "province of the German Reich".
Munich agreement. From the spring of 1938, the Nazis launched a campaign of unprecedented blackmail and provocation against Czechoslovakia, demanding the transfer of the original Czech lands to Germany. The ruling circles of the West “went open with the Nazis, they decided to betray Czechoslovakia in the interests of unleashing a war between Germany and the USSR. Under these conditions, only aid from the East could save Czechoslovakia. But the Czech bourgeoisie committed an unheard-of national betrayal: on December 16, 1937, President Benes assured the German envoy in Prague that the mutual assistance treaty with the USSR was “a product of a bygone era, but it cannot be so easily thrown into the trash.”
Meanwhile, the Soviet government during this critical period for Czechoslovakia firmly declared its readiness to come to its aid.
All international reaction did not want a war in defense of Czechoslovakia, in which the Soviet Union would inevitably take part. According to N. Chamberlain's trusted adviser, G. Wilson, “only Bolshevism would profit from this. This should be prevented. It is necessary to recognize the right of the Germans to expand to the South-East.
On September 29 - 30, 1938, a meeting of the heads of governments of England, France, Germany and Italy was held in Munich, convened with the active support of the United States. Representatives of Czechoslovakia and the USSR were excluded from participation in the meeting. It decided the fate of Czechoslovakia. The Sudetenland was transferred to Germany within ten days, in the near future some areas were captured by Poland and Hungary.
On September 30, a declaration of mutual non-aggression was signed between Britain and Germany; a similar declaration by Germany and France was signed a little later.
22. Political crisis in Europe in 1939. Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations and the reasons for their failure. The development of the international situation in Europe at the end of the 1930s led inexorably to a new armed clash between the great powers. By the end of 1938, the Versailles system in Europe practically ceased to exist, and the Munich Agreement significantly strengthened Germany. Under these conditions, the German leadership set itself a new foreign policy goal - to achieve hegemony in Europe, securing the role of a great world power. As a result of the aggressive actions of Germany and Italy in March-April 1939, a pre-war political crisis began in Europe - a period of direct alignment of military-political forces in anticipation of a probable war.
Although the Munich Agreement created a new political environment in Europe, it was seen by all the great powers as the next stage in their relationship. Situation in autumn 1938 - summer 1939 in Europe was a tangled tangle of diplomatic activities of the great powers, each of which sought to achieve its own goals.
Germany did not yet set as its goal a war with the USSR, but, preparing for the capture of Czecho-Slovakia, was interested in the neutralization of Poland and the non-intervention of England and France. To this end, Germany offered Poland to settle the problems of Danzig and the "Polish Corridor" on the basis of cooperation within the framework of the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Polish leadership agreed to certain concessions on the issue of Danzig only in exchange for Germany's retaliatory steps. The intransigence of Poland led to the fact that the German leadership began to incline to the idea of the need for a military solution to the Polish problem under certain conditions.
Anglo-German and Franco-German relations were somewhat overshadowed by the November pogroms in Germany and the rumors that appeared in January 1939 about the preparation of a German attack on Holland. All this forced Britain and France to coordinate their policies, speed up the modernization of their armed forces, maintain contacts with the USSR and at the same time seek a comprehensive agreement with Germany in the spirit of Munich.
From the autumn of 1938, the German leadership began to gradually seek the normalization of relations with the USSR. On December 19, 1938, without any delay, it was extended for 1939. Soviet-German trade agreement.
In mid-March 1939, the USA, the USSR, England and France had information about Germany's preparations for the occupation of Czecho-Slovakia, but the powers - guarantors of the Munich Agreement did not provide for any countermeasures. In addition, formally, the Munich guarantees of the Czechoslovak borders were not violated by Germany's actions. On March 14, under pressure from Germany, Slovakia declared independence, and the president of Czechoslovakia left for Berlin, where, during "negotiations", he agreed to the political reorganization of his country. On March 15, German troops entered the Czech Republic, on whose territory the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was created. Initially, the reaction of England and France was rather restrained, but as public opinion aroused, London and Paris toughened their position and on March 18, like the USSR, they protested the actions of Germany, and the English and French ambassadors were recalled from Berlin "for consultations".
On April 17, 1939, the Soviet government proposed to the Western powers that they conclude a tripartite mutual assistance treaty based on equality of obligations and a military convention.
This provided for the provision of assistance to the states located between the Baltic and Black Seas in the event of aggression against them. England, however, had no intention of concluding a mutual assistance pact and tried to enlist unilateral commitments from the USSR to Poland and Rumania. Only after Hitler and Mussolini signed the Steel Pact in May on a military-political alliance did tripartite negotiations begin in Moscow.
Negotiations progressed extremely slowly. England and France, having accepted the principle of mutual assistance in words, in fact did not want to observe the reciprocity of obligations. And although the text of the treaty was basically worked out by the end of July, the British government instructed its diplomats not to allow an agreement to be reached with Moscow. Proceeding from narrowly selfish considerations and distrust of Stalin's policy, it preferred to give Germany the opportunity to develop aggression in the East, and to put pressure on Germany through tripartite negotiations and at the same time hinder Soviet-German rapprochement. At the same time, from May 1939, England was conducting secret negotiations with Germany, probing the ground for a deal on the division of the world into spheres of influence and cooperation in the markets.
At the end of July, the Western powers accepted the Soviet proposal to start negotiations on military issues, but did not show promptness. Delegations were instructed to drag out negotiations. Only towards the end of their stay in Moscow did the English mission receive the authority to conduct them. Both delegations were not authorized to sign the military convention.
In an effort to achieve cooperation with Britain and France, the Soviet side put forward lethal proposals developed by the General Staff of the Red Army on the number of troops and weapons put up by the USSR, and on their participation in repelling aggression in Europe, taking into account three options for the possible development of military events. The British and French missions shied away from discussing specific issues and led the negotiations to an impasse. The Polish government rejected a proposal to allow Soviet troops to pass through its territory in the event of German aggression. England and France were unable to exert the necessary influence on Warsaw, devaluing the Moscow negotiations as a result.