Marry

Missile complex Tochka-U: characteristics, composition and combat use. Tactical missile system "Tochka" - the highest accuracy

Let's try to describe in as much detail as possible each case of using the "Tochka" / "Tochka-U" complex, based on photo and video evidence. And, of course, since I'm privileged to be the map manager for LostArmour, satellite imagery by DigitalGlobe will be an important source.

Some grant-eaters from the “other” side have already tried to bring all the launches together, but we will try to do it more thoroughly. Especially with regard to binding to the terrain, assessing combat effectiveness and damage caused.

About materiel

The operational tactical missile system "Tochka" / "Tochka-U" (hereinafter - the complex) has the designation 9K79 / 9K79-1, its missiles are designated 9M79M / 9M79-1 and have a range of (from 15 to 70) / (from 20 to 120) km.

These modifications differ not only in flight range, but also in layout - the stabilizers in the Tochki-U rocket are located closer to the instrument compartment:

Yes, the rocket structurally consists of separate compartments:

Of all the compartments, only the combat one contains explosives (explosives). The remaining compartments serve the purpose of delivering the warhead and should not / cannot explode. That is why we can observe them in abundance in the fields of Donbass. Therefore, for example, there is no reason to say that the rocket worked abnormally and in general "old trash", pointing a finger at the engines and rudders of the rocket (as is often done by not the most competent "Internet fighters").

In order to avoid confusion, I consider it necessary to clarify the indexes.

The missiles of the complex are designated 9M79M or 9M79-1 - a large number on the side of the hull. But just 9M79 (without the "M" at the end) is the designation engine compartment missiles 9M79M.

A similar technique indicates, for example, shells for the "Hurricane":

But on the more modern 9M79-1, it is already normal, deployed.

Still, for some reason, the same marking - 9M79 - is on the lattice rudders of both 9M79M and 9M79-1 missiles.

You won't get bored with your military comrades.

The missiles used in the complex can carry several types of warheads (warheads).

Which ones can be in the warehouses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and which ones were used in practice? We immediately dismiss chemical, nuclear (such as Allah, that we sweep aside), as well as warheads with an anti-radar homing head (as irrelevant). Two types remain: high-explosive fragmentation (GRAU index 9N123F) and cassette (9N123K).

A missile with a warhead 9N123F, when approaching the target, at a height of 20 meters, makes a turn, then the main charge is detonated. This was done for the most efficient use of the energy of the explosion of the warhead.

9N123K also carries 50 submunitions (subs, for short) 9N24 (316 fragments each, the total number of fragments is 15.8 thousand). At an altitude of 2250 m, the central charge is detonated and the warhead is opened to effectively disperse the combat elements. The explosion is initiated by the 9E326 radar altitude sensor, developed at the Novosibirsk NIIEP (how small the world is, however). After that, the submunitions fall freely and are detonated when they meet the ground with a contact sensor.

Note. Both in the 9N123K and 9N123F warheads (despite the fact that it has the designation "F", i.e. high-explosive), the main factor in hitting the target is the fragments (specialized striking elements). This was done in order to increase the area of damage, because. the complex does not belong to the high-precision class, the airborne inertial homing system of missiles, developed in the 70s, as well as the topographical reference system, are not able to provide a circular deviation of less than 50 meters. Accordingly, there is no point in a purely high-explosive (i.e., simply stuffed with explosive) warhead. Because those 150-200 kg of explosives that she could carry, most likely will not get to the right place and will not cause the required damage.

For the same reason, by the way, the most commonly used ammunition for the BM-30 Smerch MLRS (in the Donbass, for sure) is the 9M55K missile with a cluster warhead; to compensate for a large deviation due to the distance of the target being hit from the launcher and to cover the maximum area.

What am I for? And besides, when they show us like this:

or even like this:

pictures saying what it is, de, funnel from "Point-U", then this is not true. Here, in the first case, there was an arrival of a large-caliber artillery shell set for high-explosive action, in the second - the detonation of an entire warehouse of explosives, which could be caused, strictly speaking, by anything.

And 9K79 / 9K79-1 are light fragments over a large area. Accordingly, the purpose of the complex is to defeat unarmored targets and undigged l / s over a large area. Let's remember this.

In the armed forces of Ukraine, the complex is in service with a single unit: 19 RBR (missile brigade), military unit A4239, Khmelnitsky. It is armed with up to 12 launchers (launchers), divided either into three or four missile divisions.

Launchers (marks indicate the number of combat launches):

The exact number of "live", combat-ready missiles is unknown, if only because all of them are already overdue by at least 10 years, and the factory extension of the resource is not available for Ukraine. I believe that even the Ukrainian generals themselves do not know the exact number and prefer to use products with the smallest age. According to some reports, in 2014, the total number was about 300 units.

It is reliably known about three areas of starting firing positions (OP) of the complex: Kramatorsk airfield, Logvinovo-Kalinovka, Pokrovskoye (a couple of kilometers east of Artemovsk).

In the latter case, the launcher at the OP successfully hit the satellite image dated 08/26/2014:

Launching rockets (Kramatorsk city):

Briefly retelling Wikipedia (crossed out) Having received the minimum necessary information, we can finally consider each application case separately. Carefully, with a magnifying glass in hand.

Pictures are clickable.

List of launches

I will allow myself to show some methodological voluntarism and will not follow a strict chronology of launches (especially since for the most part this is impossible to do), but first I will focus on launches that are important for analysis.

Parts of the rocket that spawned one of the most memetic pictures associated with the war in Donbass

Thanks to conscious citizens, it will not be a problem to determine the place of the fall (caption on the picture: "Beloyarovka").

Let's try to bind using landmarks on the ground. I will not "attach" the reference in detail (i.e. show in which part of the region / region it is located, where the north-south, which are the nearest cities / towns) I will not - below in each case the coordinates of the places of impact will be given, everyone can make sure the correctness of bindings, or vice versa, to criticize them.

Easy. Let's take a closer look at the engine compartment [in fact, here is the engine compartment plus the steering compartment, sometimes the instrument compartment is also preserved, but for brevity I will call all these remnants hereinafter the "engine compartment"] closer against a more contrasting background:

Nothing special. A stick that you will fly past and not notice, considering it to be noise (yes, it will not be easy to look for them in Google Earth ...).

But the most piquant detail is this. As you know, the cluster warhead missile of the complex carries exactly 50 9N24 submunitions.

And you can see them all:

What a beauty! Clear field, ideal for counting and evaluation. It reveals 45+ craters from these same submunitions (a certain percentage of failed submunitions is a common thing for any cluster weapon, especially for an over 20-year-old, as in this case). They are distributed in a circle with a diameter of approximately 300 m.

Note that the engine compartment, separated at an altitude of 2.2 km, fell 400 meters west of the center of the affected area. Moreover, the rocket flew from north to south. Those. compartment went to the right in the direction of fire. Did this happen under the influence of random factors or is this a deviation characteristic of all missiles? The question hung in the air.

Here a fair question may arise, "what makes you think that this" point "left? Yes, these are just funnels from the City!". Fair. Let's take a closer look at the tracks.

Their characteristic feature is the shape - the correct circle. Unlike the cannon (and most rocket-propelled) artillery projectiles, 9N24 submunitions land vertically due to the fabric stabilizing device. And the area of destruction by fragments is equidirectional in all directions, as a result of which one can observe a trace in the form of a regular circle. Whereas fragmentation shells of artillery systems flying at an angle leave a characteristic fan.

These features will be useful for verification of other launches of the complex.

By the way, on the proof above the funnels were taken from the neighboring field. For looking at it, you can see the same picture - circles inscribed in a circle with a diameter of ~ 300 meters. Here, however, it will not be possible to accurately calculate the number of combat elements (bushes and the Krynka River interfere), but the distribution density is similar.

In short, I think that these are traces of another "Point". It is logical, on the video of the launches of the complex, you can usually observe the operation of just a pair of launchers:

Given this assumption, the picture is as follows:

Well, what can be said about the combat effectiveness of the means used?

I think I’m not lying if I say that it doesn’t even strive, but simply EQUALS zero. They launched into milk, as they say. No damage was done, not even civilian homes were hit (which the Armed Forces of Ukraine can do best), and from the point of view of propaganda, the benefit is clearly negative.

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79M, n.d.

b/n: Sh89466, n.d.

MS type: both cassette

n.p.: Beloyarovka

Coordinates: 47.7989949, 38.571732; 47.8027531, 38.5639268

Efficiency: bottom

Another important launch for understanding the overall picture is dated September 4, 2014. Place - Khartsizsk.

There are plenty of photos and videos on it, here are some:

By the way, here is a sub that fell not on soft soil, but on asphalt. The scattering of fragments has acquired a direction. Weird.

Rocket type designations (cassette 9M79K):

The rags lying in the funnels are 9N24 submunition stabilizers.

In fact, the craters turn out to be quite small, no more than a pair of palms (moreover, the distance meter in Google Earth reports 2-2.5 m), everything else is the earth spread out by the explosion.

Aiming system window 9Sh129 on the side of the instrument compartment.

Parts (engine, pribrny and tail compartments) fell near the stadium (I won’t do a detailed proof, everything is obvious). Submunitions scattered throughout the park. Of course, it is impossible to count all of them because of the bushes and trees (brilliant green is generally the main enemy of the map proofer, I will report to you).

But here you can verify the correctness of the assumptions regarding the previous considered launch (in terms of, for example, the size of the funnels from the subs, and how they look on satellite images). But the deviation of the block is different from the previous one. If there it was 400 m, then the engine fell side by side with the subs.

About efficiency. Whom did they want to get here anyway? no idea. There are no repair bases with DPR equipment either in the vicinity or at a distance, there are no checkpoints and other things either. Although the stadium is probably also quite a goal. "Athletes running on it, due to their physical form, are potential fighters for separatist formations"! After ballistic missile strikes, that's for sure.

By the way, where are the non-Polishers from Informnapalm and Bellingcat? Don't they want to do some analysis with their colored rectangles that exposes #CynicalBanderaWar? Or are they not given grants for this?

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79-1

b/n:Ш915622

MS type: cassette

n.p.: Khartsyzsk

Coordinates: 48.0487135, 38.1514084

Efficiency:"ballistic missile in the park"

The fact that this is a missile of the complex can be understood by the steering assembly (as well as by the color and radius of curvature of the remains of the hull). Interesting in that it has a completely destroyed hull.

In this regard, I assume that she had a high-explosive warhead. An explosion of 162 kg of explosives should do just something similar with the carrier, it seems to me.

In addition, no traces of subs are found in the nearest district.

Launch results

rocket type: n.d.

b/n: n.d.

MS type: explosive(?)

n.p..: Donetsk

Coordinates: 47.949191, 37.7071086

Efficiency: no mention of civilian casualties was found, there are no rembases / checkpoints in that area of Donetsk. We conclude - low efficiency

One of the main areas of application of the complex in 2014. was the barrow Saur-Mogila. Directly on the mound, on the western slope, you can see three engine compartments (appear, according to the pictures, between August 4 and 15).

Counting the funnels here is completely unrealistic. Not only because the height is plowed up by artillery for every taste and caliber, but also because, against the background of other shells, 9H24 subs do not leave any noticeable marks on the rocky ground of the mound.

The effectiveness of these strikes, I think, was not great. Although the equipment of engineering structures was difficult due to the nature of the soil, there were very few militias on Saur-Mogila, and they took refuge in the basement of a more or less capital cafe building (and no trenches). I think that a large number of small fragments of the complex's rocket did not cause significant damage to the personnel. But, on the other hand, it may be objected here that the "Points" were used between August 4 and 15. And the Vostokovites withdrew from their positions on the mound on August 11. Consequently, they retreated due to the blows of the “points”. It's also possible.

In short, nothing definite can be said.

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79M, 9M79M, 9M79M

b/n: Sh89680, n.d., n.d.

MS type: the first is cassette; the rest, apparently, too

Location: kurg. Saur-Tomb

Coordinates: first and second 47.9212314, 38.7363768, third 47.9188156, 38.7380397

Efficiency: controversial

At the foot, parts of missiles from another strike were discovered much later.

They appear between August 15 and September 5. Those. already after the retreat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the height and adjacent villages.

Precise compartment positioning:

Damage area? Do you think you can find 50 treasured funnels here?

You can try to compare the funnels between the images for 08/15 and 09/05.

An area with densely packed ~45 craters in a circle with a diameter of 300 meters stands out. It is located ... 400 meters to the north. Coincidences? I do not think.

And another one from the same place, but without a photo of the rocket itself:

So the final picture is:

Launch results

Missile type: first and second 9M79M, third - unknown

b/n: n.d.

MS type: cassette

A place: kurg. Saur-Tomb

Coordinates: 47.927702, 38.7497771; 47.9238054, 38.7582421; 47.9359544, 38.7396383

Efficiency: null

Most likely, these are far from all the rockets that fell on Saur-Mogila and its environs. Surely they launched a lot more. This is just what got into the camera lenses.

15 km to the east, the village of Dmitrovka:

The missile was then dragged to the border with the Russian Federation:

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79M

b/n: n.a.

MS type: cassette

n.p.: Dmitrovka

Coordinates: 47.9225975, 38.9406323

Engine 9M79M:

This is not far from Torez, at the exit from the village of Manuilovka.

Compare the background of the pictures.

Five dozen craters were not found in this case either. Most likely, they all exploded in greenery (there are none in the fields), leaving no visible traces on the pictures.

There are no militia positions nearby.

Launch results

rocket type: 9M79M

b/n: n.a.

MS type: n.a.

n.p.: Manuylovka

Coordinates: 47.9741367, 38.6730552

Efficiency: apparently none

In addition to Saur-Mogila, in the same area, rockets were actively flying to the town of Snezhnoye.

The first fell there on August 23, 2014 at the exit from the city towards the Russian border. Was photographed from all sides 1000 and 1 times. I will not dwell on it in detail.

By the way, for some reason, there are also no 50 craters anywhere in the district. This is strange. Probably, they are all somewhere in the private sector nearby, where, again, they cannot be found using Google Earth.

And once again, where did they try to get it? At the checkpoint at the exit from Snizhne? But that's stupid. Or catch a column of a military trade? Mystery.

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79M

b/n:Ш89390

MS type: unknown

n.p.: snowy

Coordinates: 48.0153627, 38.7943554

Efficiency: no data for analysis

Also, a couple of rockets fell on the northern part of the city. It was suggested that with these strikes the Armed Forces of Ukraine were trying to hit the repair base of the Snezhnyansky garrison, located either in Khimmash or in the Snezhnyansky machine-building plant. If so, then they have not chosen the best tool for this purpose. Be that as it may, in the end, they hit the houses and gardens of local residents.

One dated 08/29/14 is also very popular among photographers.

However, no one took a picture of the room. And here are the rudders:

Video with consequences. With it, you can mark the funnels and roughly estimate the affected area.

The video with the second rocket is dated September 2nd. She fell, allegedly, a couple of hundred meters from the first. The binding failed.

There are no photo/video effects.

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79M, 9M79-1

b/n: n.d., VG910840

MS type: cassette, unknown

n.p.: Snowy

Coordinates: 48.0584847, 38.7611282; 48.0593452, 38.7588108 (conditionally)

Efficiency: first - past, second - unknown

The photo was provided by a DPR fighter from Snezhnoye.

Let's take a closer look at the rest. You can see parts of the body of the rocket compartments, an easily recognizable part of the steering wheel (this one), as well as fragments characteristic of this warhead.

Photo from the museum for an example of how the fragments of the "Point" with a high-explosive warhead look like.

The assumption about the type of warhead rocket in Donetsk on August 26, 2014 was confirmed - a rocket with a high-explosive part breaks into small pieces (which, in principle, is logical).

According to the description provided, these fragments were found in the following location:

The absence of any distinct traces in the picture is noteworthy: there is neither an explosion crater, nor craters (numerous small craters near the stadium along the landing are traces of the Smerch cassettes), no characteristic traces.

Which leads us to the disappointing conclusion that it is impossible to find the place of the explosion, and, accordingly, to reveal the fact of the use of a rocket with a high-explosive warhead, using satellite images alone.

At the time of the rocket explosion, there was no one around, no damage to the HP. was not applied, so the launch efficiency is zero.

Launch results

Missile type: n.d.

b/n: n.a.

MS type: high explosive

n.p.: snowy

Coordinates: 48.0555589, 38.7614608

Efficiency: zero (over the wasteland).

Launched right through the city, parts fell, as reported, on the territory of the former training ground of the Ministry of Emergencies.

According to the last photo (dragged from the militarizm-a forum), you can become attached.

And again, there were no reports of heavy losses of the LPR militia, significant damage to infrastructure or death of civilians from this particular type of weapon. Let me make an assumption that the point here is not military censorship, but banal low efficiency. Luhansk has been mercilessly shelled from all calibers (from 82 mortars to 152 Genocides, from Grads to Tornadoes) since the end of June. The number of civilian casualties ran into the hundreds (for example, at least 20 people died in Luhansk on July 18 alone). By mid-August, everyone who wanted to live was hiding in basements. Against the backdrop of this hell, the arrival of such a “little thing” as 16 thousand small fragments, leaving no destruction stronger than broken fences and walls, most likely simply went unnoticed.

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79M

b/n:Ш89455

MS type: n.d.

n.p.: Lugansk

Coordinates: 48.5333381, 39.2834026

Efficiency: n.d.

After the failure of the operation to blockade Lugansk, namely, the loss of the villages of Novosvetlovka and Khryashchevatoe located on the Krasnodon-Lugansk highway, the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine used the complex in the village of Novosvetlovka.

A number can be determined from several sources. Sh89816

Positioning of the engine compartment.

A few hundred meters to the southeast (where the Google Earth logo is in the picture above) there is a field with traces of exploding 9H24 subs.

I claim that they are, because:

Obviously, these are funnels, and not just any image noise (there are no traces on the previous images until August 31, after they appear and do not disappear anywhere on the next ones).

9H24 subs carry a relatively small explosive charge (compared to conventional artillery shells), which does not leave deep marks in the ground, but they have an equidirectional pattern of destruction by fragments. This is exactly what can be seen ("slaps" and scattered earth) when comparing these traces with artillery craters left earlier.

Finally, both the quantity (as always, 45+), and the density of distribution (inscribed in a circle with a diameter of 350 m), and the distance from the parts of the rocket (400 m from the center of the circle) indicate that these are precisely the submunitions of the complex.

With this in mind, the overall picture can be drawn.

But that is not all.

Half a kilometer to the south, still in the field, fifty more exactly the same craters gape, unequivocally hinting that there was another rocket. There are no options, "our client."

The engine block of this instance did not hit the cameras.

The general plan for the use of the complex for n.p. Novosvetlovka.

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79-1, n.d.

b/n: Sh89816, n.d.

MS type: cassette

n.p.: Novosvetlovka

Coordinates: 48.4840429, 39.524627

Efficiency: all striking elements are in the fields, there are no traces of the destruction of equipment / positions

Then retreating from the Lugansk airport, the Armed Forces of Ukraine used the same technique - they launched at least one rocket of the complex at the object occupied by the forces of the Armed Forces.

Precise binding can be made using a special airfield tractor:

There is no way to determine the affected area and evaluate the effectiveness - there are no suitable satellite images.

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79-1

b/n: VG890343

MS type: n.a.

A place: Lugansk airport

Coordinates: 48.4222732,39.3772209

Efficiency: n.d.

In contrast to the scarce information on the use of the complex in Lugansk, the attack on Rovenki on August 22 was extensively covered and filmed.

The blow fell on the private sector and gas stations on the western outskirts of the city. Three local residents were killed (including a six-year-old boy who was traveling in a car with his family). They died because they were out in the open. Another man died from his wounds (9 people were injured in total).

damaging elements

There are no comments, the moment of breaks subs.

Detailed video review of the consequences.

The map shows all the craters captured on camera and the place where the engine compartment fell. He fell to the east.

Sub, fallen on the asphalt. Fragments of it hit the car with the child.

In contrast to the case in Khartsyzsk, the scattering of fragments is equal in all directions.

One of those that fell next to the gas station.

The total removal of the affected area, its diameter, expansion, the nature of the funnels, in a word, all the characteristic features are similar to the previous cases considered.

Launch results

Rocket type: 9M79-1

b/n: VG810820

MS type: cassette

n.p.: Rovenky

Coordinates: 48.0724715, 39.3484837

Efficiency: exemplary punitive blow

Here the situation is similar to Lugansk. There are no objects of the NM LPR in the nearest few kilometers. Whom did they let go? Go pick them up.

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79-1

b/n:Ш91565

MS type: n.a.

n.p.: Alchevsk

Coordinates: 48.4653099, 38.7717712

The last ones in the LPR are Logvinovo and its environs.

One rocket fell on February 13, 2015 in the area of height 238 (a couple of kilometers southwest of Logvinovo).

Most likely, with this launch they tried to suppress artillery or the positions of the DPR:

There are four missiles in Lohvinovo itself. Most likely, they were used on February 13, 2015 (it is on this day that rocket launches from the Kramatorsk airfield are actively recorded).

Fourth (for some reason, there is practically no photo of her):

It is, of course, impossible to designate the areas of damage, or, as a result, to assess the damage. I think everyone understands why?

Launch results

Missile type: all 9M79-1

b/n: 238 height - Ш91566; Logvinovo - Sh91552, VG910833, n.d.

MS type: n.a.

Start date: 238 height - 02/13/15; Logvinovo - 02.2015

n.p.: Logvinovo

Coordinates: 48.3816693, 38.3388358; 48.381769, 38.3467644; 48.3789846, 38.349908

Efficiency: 238 - sufficient; Logvinovo - n.d. But judging by the fact that the village was held during the counterattacks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and is still under the control of the Naval Forces, then ...

The complex was used even more actively during the Ilovaisk encirclement.

Let's start with Ilovaisk itself.

The specified location is the outskirts of the city. The search for craters on a satellite image in the notorious four hundred meters was not successful. Most likely, this means that the subs fell to the west, on private sector houses.

On the roof of the Ilovaisk hospital, autumn 2014:

There are no signs of defeat.

A whole 5 years after the hostilities in the private sector of Ilovaisk, the engine compartment of another rocket was found:

Information and location:

No traces of defeat can be found either.

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79-1

b/n: n.a.

MS type: cassette

n.p.: Ilovaisk

Coordinates: 47.9358537, 38.2027245; 47.9144581, 38.2062435; 47.9315606, 38.1973869

Efficiency: little data.

The engine that fell in the woods between Novokaterinovka and Osykovo.

On satellite images:

Funnel searching is still a breeze (and why am I the first to do it?). 400 meters to the north, in the field, traces of two "points" at once.

Obviously fan-shaped (mortar, probably) did not distinguish:

The nearest NAF positions were in the village of Novokaterynivka, about a kilometer away. Since August 24, DPR fighters have dug in there along with fighters ... let's say, the north. Or rather, formally, they came from the south ... Well, from the south-north =)

And both missiles, of course, missed. Not offset.

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79-1, n.d.

b/n: Ш89828, n.d.

MS type: cassette

n.p.: Novokaterynivka

Coordinates: 47.7400341, 38.1214428

Efficiency: in field

Closer to the village there is another copy.

It turns out that they applied it in the first days of September, when the winds blew back.

Here they look a bit uncharacteristic. I think this is due to the fact that a month and a half has passed in the pictures since they appeared. During this time, the dust settled, leaving only small holes visible at the site of the explosion of the subs.

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79-1

b/n: n.a.

MS type: cassette

Start date:

n.p.: Novokaterynivka

Coordinates: 47.7292897, 38.1087506

Efficiency: a smaller part into a rock, a large part into vegetable gardens. Nothing in positions. Classic

Next.

Gas generator and steering machine (one of four); rudders

This is Multipole. Thanks to the burnt field, it is clearly visible:

Most of the subs went into landing:

Appears August 26-27. Present in the film "ILOVAYSK-2014. TERRIBLE TRUTH. FULL FILM ( SHOCK! WATCH UNTIL THE END! WITHOUT REGISTRATION AND SMS)"

In the fall of the 14th, this engine showed off at the checkpoint between Khartsyzsk and Makeevka, and then moved to the Donetsk Museum:

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79-1

b/n: n.a.

MS type: cassette

Start date: 27 August 2014

n.p.: Multipole

Coordinates: 47.8486214, 38.2374001

Efficiency: none

Another raet from Mnohopillya at first escaped my sight. But you can't run away from us

The engine fell near the railway tracks:

Launch results

Rocket type: 9M79-1

b/n: n.d.

MS type: cassette

n.p.: Mnogopolie

Coordinates: 47.8618372, 38.2247615

Efficiency: by field and landing

A couple of kilometers to the south, near the village of Chervonoselskoye, you can observe another rocket:

Georeferencing made it possible to take one of the photos from ID636

Launch results

Rocket type: 9M79-1

b/n: n.d.

MS type: cassette

n.p.: Chervonoselskoe

Coordinates: 47.8293415, 38.2512939

Efficiency: on the field

Dilute the story with a moment of humor

It means that Ukrainian intelligence officers are coming out of the encirclement near Ilovaisk. They go through the fields. Look, Russian paratroopers are standing there, firing from artillery. They quickly hid in the bushes. Scout Taras took out his phone and dialed to headquarters.

I call the strike "Point-U"!

Understood, let's shoot! And you look through binoculars and correct.

Taras corrected the missiles with binoculars, the missiles fell, they burned everything, the Russians were in a panic. win.

Taras came out of the bushes, looked, "Yak garno! Mykola, why are you sitting, get out of the bushes!"

He answered "That I would be happy to, but ... Do you happen to have paper?" "What a greedy you are! Yes, why is it for you, high lies to yourself in the bushes!"

"Well, you have a history," the reader will say.

Well, I just recounted the content of one very possible article from one pocreotic site. The article describes the glorious victories of the Ukrainian Tochkars. Link (preferably read with the anthem on your lips). This is how it is written, they called, they said, they called a point and they defeated everyone:

It will be worse than the story about grandfather Taras.

It is clear that this is in the 9th section of LostArmour, without options.

But the fact is that this is not a joke (except, perhaps, a story about paper).

Near the village of Pavlovskoye there were two northern 6-gun batteries of D-30 howitzers (there was a variant that there was one battery, and these were the main and spare OPs). Obviously paratroopers.

And after a couple of days, traces appear, unequivocally identifiable by the above characteristic features as a blow from two "Points".

Namely, two circles of 300 meters in diameter with 45+ funnels in each.

One rocket missed.

But the second hit the right place, hitting the target,

suppressing the battery and destroying at least one piece of equipment.

The trenches are visible, there may have been losses in l / s.

There is something important to say here. Thanks to the excellent combat training of the artillerymen of the north, as well as due to the complete unsuitability of the Ukrainian command, ALL Ukrainian artillery during the Ilovaisk and near-Ilovai events (since August 24) was silent. Firstly, because when you drape it’s hard to fire from self-propelled guns, and secondly, these same self-propelled guns (and not only self-propelled guns, any heavy fire weapons) were frankly not enough. Therefore, it will not be possible to find any craters on the positions of the northerners - anyone from the Armed Forces of Ukraine wishing to show off their counter-battery skills immediately received an invigorating dose of 122/152 mm. Yes, and there were few who wanted to (only one, to tell the truth - two batteries of the 55th OABr, in full force inherited by the militia).

And the positions near Pavlovsky are the only ones that have a response. And "this answer was Einsht ... Tochka-U".

Here it is. And who would have thought? Well, once a year, and the stick shoots, as it seems.

Launch results

Missile type: -, -

b/n: -, -

MS type: cassette

n.p.: Pavlovskoye

Coordinates: 47.707697, 38.326864

Efficiency: we managed for once - the battery was suppressed, at least one piece of equipment was destroyed. L / s losses are unknown.

Fell into the swamp.

These are all screenshots from a single video.

Why give these video titles? How about writing a locality? date. They didn't even take the number. Creators, can you hear me? Do not do like this.

Some kind of swampy hollow with a stream (usually this occurs before the bet).

There are hundreds of such places in Donbass. It's impossible to find.

But I found (don't ask me how).

This is the same Ilovaisky cauldron, not far from the village of Chumaki. As in the case of Novokaterynivka, it is not in the pictures from August 31 (it means that it arrived in early September).

Aimed at the field camp of the NAF. Missed by half a mile.

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79-1

b/n: n.d.

MS type: cassette

Start date: first days of September 2014

n.p.: Chumaki

Coordinates: 47.7801417, 38.0967611

Efficiency: miss

We are talking about a place between the village of Chumaki and the city of Novy Svet. The strike took place between 26 and 29 August 2014.

Funnels available for counting (for better contrast, I added a later picture):

Looks like? Very. Although the deviation of the compartment is quite atypical.

If so, then here are the consequences of this strike (those who want to know whose EOW-3521 excavators are, see photo # 3 in ID14018 of the LostArmour main base. It was taken at this very place).

Pay attention to the minibus badly hit by shrapnel and the front shield of the Rapier.

Photo-video of the missile block (as well as traces of submunitions and their fabric stabilizers) did not appear. But the fuse of this "point" surfaced.

It turns out that the blow to Pavlovsky was not alone in its success.

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79-1

b/n: n.d.

MS type: cassette

n.p.: Chumaki

Coordinates: 47.7912757, 38.0853778

Efficiency: good. We hit the right place, several units of automotive and engineering equipment were destroyed.

Forest plantation in the village Klenovka:

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79-1

b/n: W89851

MS type: cassette

n.p.: Klenovka

Coordinates: 47.7713418, 38.2348144

Efficiency: landing

Concluding on the use of complexes by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Ilovaisk region, I would put forward a small hypothesis. With a high probability, we can talk about the attempts of the north to suppress the starting positions of the complexes. Judge for yourself.

As early as August 26, the fields near Logvinovo-Kalinovka (actually, the base stations of the complexes) were completely "clean" - not a single reply arrived on them.

And on September 13 (that is, when the entire Ilovaisk epic died down, and a good dozen missiles flew away), a large number (hundreds) of explosions of cluster submunitions suddenly appeared on these fields.

How could they be there and who could have left them? I think it was BM-30 "Smerch" (guess whose). Which, in the region of the checkpoint Marinovka, in the same period (September 4-5 - the period of active operation of the complexes), and can be seen.

The size of the holes in the ground, the direction of the exhaust from the missiles and the range (albeit at the limit, 68-70 km), in general, do not contradict this version. In any case, I don't see any contradictions.

This version can also be confirmed by such a hysterical post by a volunteer sapper (what?) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine who worked at that site:

This is how it could look like:

I repeat, this is pure "subjectivity" and an attempt to pull an owl on the globe of Ukraine. But I have no other explanations for what the northern "Smerch" did in early September in the region of the Marinovka checkpoint

The names "Tochka-U" and "Ilovaisk" became relevant again in February 2015.

The blow fell on the railway power supply facility. One person was injured.

Comparison of images from December 2014 and the end of February 2015 reveals the locations of explosions of some submunitions:

The motor block from her (presumably, very likely from her) was discovered a couple of months later ():

Launch results

Missile type: 9M79-1

b/n: n.d.

MS type: cassette

Start date: February 14, 2015

n.p.: Ilovaisk

Coordinates: 47.9126747, 38.1982398

Efficiency: hitting an infrastructure facility.

Finally, it is necessary to highlight the really incomprehensible (mostly, not found by me on satellite images and simply "muddy") specimens.

Another one from Ilovaisk (Lenina st. 207, 08/29/2014):

There are traces of another missile hit near Novy Svet, but there are no photos/videos of the remains of the missile. There is nothing interesting here - a field, cowsheds.

Photo from the press release 02.02.15

It is alleged that she got into the TNT warehouse of the DKZHI, which is why she looks so bad.

This is doubtful. For what purposes could it be necessary to destroy a warehouse of industrial explosives, which a priori could not cause much damage (fortunately, they are located far from residential areas and, moreover, were blown up several times before, which, of course, ruled out the possibility that there could be military property and l / from the DPR)? Yes, and a "point" (the warehouses are located practically on the line of contact and are available for shelling by any artillery).

The rest of the first

In the impromptu museum in Donetsk:

It is alleged that it was found in the Tekstilshchik district on August 28, 2014. The author of the museum, alas, did not make contact.

The parade ground of the military department of DonNTU, a completely incomprehensible copy, obviously dragged (it is very likely that a double of some of the ones already considered):

The remains of a rocket from another strike are found in the vicinity of the village of Artemovka (exactly between Amvrosievka and Saur-Mogila).

One as part of the memorial:

The second as full-scale propaganda material:

Their traces on satellite images could not be found.

December 2017 brought quite strange news: in the forest area near the village of Nizhneteploye (10 km from the town of Shchastya), an instrument compartment and a warhead from a high-explosive "Point" were found. Where did they come from is the question. There were no military actions specifically in this area of the Luhansk region, for whom it would be incomprehensible to work out. Perhaps this product has nothing to do with the war in the Donbass.

In addition to all the above cases, at least one case of an unsuccessful rocket launch is known.

Of course, I'm talking about the famous video (with a title in the best traditions of Goebbels - the more blatantly you lie, the more willingly the pans believe).

It happened on August 24, 2014 at the base camp near Logvinovo. A detailed description of this case in itself draws on a small article.

The fields between Logvinovo and Kalinovka on August 26, 2014 turned out to be extremely rich in artillery of great intensity.

Here you have 2 Msta-S batteries

By the way, these are our old acquaintances - 1 GSADN 26 ABR, who distinguished themselves near Slavyansk. In Slavyansk, by the way, in batteries, instead of the prescribed 6, there were 5 and 6 self-propelled guns each; then, at the end of July, both batteries were already 5-gun. And to the current moment, one of the batteries has recognized another self-propelled guns as subsidized. Those. in 2.5 months from intensive use, three self-propelled guns failed.

Also nearby is a battery of 27 REAPs on a BM-27 with a full tabir TZM-ok:

And even the Smerch battery (15 REAP), leaving some enchanting traces at the launch site (a 5-meter hole and the ground scattered for 50 meters around)

And the Msta-B battery of the 55th OABr is closer to Debaltseve:

But that's not the point.

Attention was drawn to some uncharacteristic "reciprocal" funnel at the positions of the SAUs:

"And now, will we examine every hole in the ground with a microscope?"

You are actually on the LostArmor website, comrade. Get used to it.

And here is a photo from there (the fact that this is exactly the place can be understood by the direction of the shadows, by the characteristic scattered land, and also by the fact that I stole these photos from the gunner’s page from this very Msta-C battery: P)

Um. "Dot"? On the calendar, let me remind you, August 26, i.e. two days of wind blowing. This is what happens, the north crushed the Ukrainian artillery "Tochka-U"? The Kremlin dwarf raised his nuclear bludgeon to peacefully demonstrators-children from 26 separate artillery brigade? #For The Hague?

Do not rush to conclusions, shanovny patriot, everything is not so simple here.

The fact is that upon closer examination, you can see that the fuel compartment is in the ground backwards (the direction of the stabilizers). In addition, the compartments do not stick into the ground (how they look on the ground, we all know well - read the sheet above). Yes, and with the compartment itself, something is clearly "wrong":

And the chest just opens, just rewind the satellite image one day ago:

This is nothing more than a 9P129 launcher. Depressed, from the famous video

The meticulous reader can compare the characteristic landmarks himself.

Note the unnaturally acidic particles on the field - traces of aluminum oxidized by ammonium perchlorate (burnt rocket fuel).

Yes, now it is better not to use bread from these fields. Although, what kind of bread is there, just here at the moment there is a line of contact.

And it turned out not to be a funnel at all, but the earth dug up with shovels.

In general, these are the very starting positions of the complex mentioned at the beginning of the article.

A soldier of the 19th RBR, who directly observed the explosion, confirmed both these guesses and the fact that the launcher was lost (it was not repaired and went for spare parts):

upd: And here is another video of the same incident, but from a different angle.

Total in the fields can be observed: 152mm - 15 units. (a whole division! Plus 6 more units at that moment were near Popasna, which is nearby); 220mm MLRS - 6 units; 300mm MLRS - 5 units;

The radii of destruction of this entire economy:

I want to emphasize that this is far from all the artillery that was in this sector (sector "Tse"). However, the forces described above, unlike the brigade ADNs, GSADNs and READNs, were directly subordinate to the sector headquarters (suffice it to say that they received target designation directly from the headquarters). That's why they are separate artillery brigades and regiments. Those. these are the forces that the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine could dispose of and quickly maneuver them - in contrast to the artillery groups of brigades involved in battles.

And if everything is clear about the "Points" and "Tornados", then looking at everything else, a question is brewing. In a day and a half, the "heat" will go with the exit from the Ilovai encirclement, and the command of the so-called. ATO keeps some unprecedented forces in a CLEARLY secondary direction.

What is it all about? The unprecedented stupidity of the Ukrainian generals, who do not understand where these forces are most needed at the moment? The impotence of intelligence that failed to "detect" a couple of enemy BTGs that crossed the ribbon, and, as a result, a misunderstanding of the operational situation? The desire to mince brainless Nazi patriots from various volunteer battalions, sending them on a suicidal exit with a fight without proper fire support? An unbridled desire to shell the residential areas of Gorlovka, without being distracted by some kind of invasion? Or maybe the most ordinary, classic, her majesty's zrada?

Most likely all together.

After all, as one of the consequences of Murphy's theorem for Ukraine says, even if the evils mutually exclude each other, they will all happen anyway.

Launch results

Rocket type: 9M79M

b/n: n.d.

MS type: n.a.

n.p.: Kalinovka

Coordinates: 48.3743114, 38.3019876

Efficiency: SPENT

All of the above parts of the missiles, along with the areas of destruction (those that were found, of course), as well as the alleged parts, are combined into a Google map:

Summary plate (sorted by conditional dates):

It can be seen from the table that if at the beginning 9M79M missiles were mainly used, then from some point on, most launches are more "fresh" 9M79-1. Is this related to the explosion during the launch of the 9M79M rocket on August 24? It may very well be.

Total:

The vast majority of missiles captured in the photo / video are found on the map.
Found (analytically calculated) traces of previously unknown strikes.
The topographic patterns of strikes left by the complex were revealed (in the variant of the cluster warhead, the rocket unit falls 400 meters from the center of the affected area, the affected area has a diameter of 300-350 meters, has characteristic funnels. The variant with a high-explosive warhead has no characteristic features on satellite images).

The facts show that the combat effectiveness of the complex in the hands of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is low. Individual cases (case) of successful application do not affect the overall picture.

Inept peasant propaganda inflated this weapon in the eyes of pots to the scale of a child prodigy, capable, in which case, "to punch the aggressor in the teeth" and other nonsense. However, this is the same type of weapon, the effectiveness of which is directly proportional to the level of combat training of the crew (of course, this is inherent in any type of weapon, but here it is especially acute). But, since Ukraine does not have the opportunity to either produce or capitalize missiles of the complex (and it is not expected in the near future), then the possibility of improving the quality of combat training with the help of target practice will be extremely limited (if not reduced to zero, to save scarce missiles). And this means that with the next serious aggravation, the rocket men from the 19th RBR will again take up the old ways and, most likely, they will not be able to issue anything other than launching missiles at the residential sectors of cities.

Unless, of course, by that time this problem does not disappear by itself due to the emergence of anti-aircraft missile systems in the armed forces of the DPR / LPR capable of coping with these missiles. Mine-based;)

In the meantime, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation is procedurally fixing the evidence on the use of the complex (I hope that the materials, or part of them, will be made publicly available, because interesting details are mentioned there), we can say that it did not work out:

It was not possible to find clear classifying features that allow recognizing the use of rockets with a high-explosive warhead. At the moment, it is not even possible to say for sure whether high-explosive warheads were used at all. Those. an attempt to determine the type of warhead from rocket debris and satellite images was unsuccessful. The case of August 16, 2014 in the city of Snezhnoye showed that it was impossible to identify the use of a rocket with a high-explosive warhead from satellite images. Only the cassette HF is reliably determined, when 45-50 craters are clearly observed in the images.
No clear logic was found for the direction of deflection of the block and subs during the fall in the variant with the cassette warhead (the deviation of the block to the right of the area relative to the direction of the rocket flight is implicitly dominant). Probably, this is still a random process and it should not be.
Well, the task is not completed. "Dark spots" in the application of the complex still remain (although they have become an order of magnitude smaller).

Therefore, I urge all honest and decent people, democratic journalists, gays and subscribers of the public "Tisk" to throw off in the comments on the site the photo and video information that could help in systematizing the use of the "Tochka" / "Tochka-U" complex in Donbass. This is especially true for poorly lit use cases (not found on the map in this review, with a small number of photos, etc.) and photos of missile numbers.

I hope that as new materials appear, the article will be supplemented.

Updated:

05/21/2017: added Ilovaiskaya (February 2015), one more with Chumakov district;
05/28/2017: two incomprehensible ones were added (one from Donetsk, one completely incomprehensible), one more from Mnohopillya;
06/12/2017: one was added from the district of the Debaltsevsky boiler, from Chervonoselsky, Novoazovsk, Snezhny on 08/16/14;
07/02/2017: the fifth rocket from Saur-Mogila was added, one more incomprehensible one (possibly the second one from Beloyarovka);
09/09/2017: two from Ilovaisk were added;
01/21/2018: Added information about the OP near Artemovsk.

According to the Interfax news agency, citing a source in the power structures of the Southern Federal District, the Russian military base in South Ossetia has received a division of the Tochka-U operational-tactical missile system. Georgian special services have already received an official notification of the deployment of missile weapons in South Ossetia.
In December 2010, it became known that a Russian military base stationed near Tskhinvali received a division of the Smerch multiple launch rocket system. The decision to deploy missile weapons on the territory of South Ossetia was made " to prevent possible aggression from Georgia».

A Russian military base was deployed in South Ossetia after the August 2008 five-day war and Russia's recognition of the republic. The Russian contingent is deployed in the garrisons of Tskhinvali and Java. By agreement with the local authorities, the base is located for 49 years with the possibility of extension.

QUICK REFERENCE

Upgraded tactical (divisional) missile system "Tochka-U"(NATO designation - Scarab B "Scarab") began to enter the troops in 1989. Organizationally, the missile system is represented as part of a brigade, which includes 2-3 divisions. Each missile division has 2-3 launch batteries with 2-3 launchers in each battery.

The missile complex includes:
- 9M79M missile with various types of warheads;
— launcher 9P129-1M;
- transport-loading machine;
- transport vehicle;
- automated control and testing machine;
- maintenance vehicle;
- a set of arsenal equipment.

Launcher mounted on a three-axle amphibious vehicle chassis BAZ-5921. The front and rear pairs of wheels are steerable, which provides a relatively small turning radius - 7 meters. The composition of the launcher equipment provides the possibility of its absolutely autonomous use.

Tactical and technical characteristics of the Tochka-U complex:
Firing range - 15 ... 120 km
Rocket speed - 1000 m / s
Starting weight - 2010 kg
Warhead weight - 482 kg
Warheads (warheads) missiles:
- special;
- cassette - 50 combat elements weighing 7.45 kg each;
- high-explosive fragmentation;
- high-explosive fragmentation with a radar homing head.
Launch preparation time:
- from readiness No. 1 - 2 min.
- from the march - 16 min.
Launcher weight (with rocket and crew) - 18145 kg
Maximum movement speed of PU:
- on the highway - 60 km / h
- afloat - 8 km / h
Cruising range of combat vehicles in terms of fuel (with a full load) - 650 km
The technical resource of combat vehicles is 15,000 km.
Crew - 4 people.

Ballistic missile 9M79M differs from the rockets of previous tactical missile systems in that the flight control of the rocket is carried out not by controlling the engine operating time and not by setting the initial launch angle, but by using aerodynamic controls - wings and having an original lattice design of rudders.

In addition, the aerodynamic rudders are duplicated by gas-dynamic ones installed at the exit of the jet engine nozzle. In this case, not only the ballistic trajectory is corrected, but guidance is also carried out in its final section (including the commands of the radar homing head). Gas-dynamic rudders provide control in the initial part of the trajectory, when aerodynamic rudders are not effective enough at low flight speeds.

The missiles are equipped with a single-mode solid fuel jet engine., which ensures the high readiness of the complex for combat use, in contrast to complexes with non-ampulized liquid-fuel rockets, where rocket refueling operations took a lot of time, while fueled rockets could only be stored for a very limited time.

Initially, the complex was developed for the use of a special (nuclear) warhead. In addition to them, high-explosive fragmentation and cluster warheads, as well as warheads with a passive radar homing head, were developed. The warhead is inseparable.

Undermining a high-explosive fragmentation warhead for greater efficiency is carried out at altitudes of the order of 10-20 meters. At the same time, the warhead is designed in such a way that, when detonated, a focused blast wave and a directed jet of fragments are formed. At the same time, the rocket itself rotates to a position close to vertical with respect to the earth's surface.
All this together increases the effectiveness of the warhead in destroying buried command posts or enemy infrastructure depots. The maximum area of the zone of complete destruction for this warhead is 3 hectares.

Disclosure of a cluster warhead equipped with 50 fragmentation submunitions takes place at an altitude of 2 kilometers. Such a warhead is intended to destroy manpower and unarmored vehicles located in open areas. The maximum area of the zone of complete destruction for this warhead is 7 hectares.

Missiles with warheads equipped with a passive radar seeker, designed to hit targets equipped with radar stations. In particular, such missiles were used in stationary coastal anti-ship systems.

/Based on materials lenta.ru And en.wikipedia.org /

The mid-60s was marked by a real boom in rocket science, and often rockets were introduced even into those areas that were traditionally occupied by conventional cannon artillery. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev especially distinguished himself in this field. However, there were some bright sides in such innovation. For example, it was during this period that the USSR laid a solid scientific base for the development of a huge number of missile systems.

Tochka-U also belongs to these: this installation significantly surpassed all its foreign counterparts (and at first there were none at all). Today we will tell about the history of the creation of this weapon.

Prerequisites for creation

Around the mid-60s, the Department of Defense initiated work on a project for a completely new limited-range ballistic system. For the first time in the history of the domestic weapons complex, the focus was not on the power of the warhead, but on the accuracy of the rocket. All the previous ones absolutely clearly testified that this approach should become prevailing in the new, changed world. In particular, it was possible to inflict painful blows on enemy territory without tearing the entire neighborhood to shreds.

The development was instructed to deal with the ICB Fakel. The work was not carried out from scratch: they took missiles from the M-11 Storm complex, which was originally installed exclusively on ships, as a basis. The first result was the complex "Hawk". It was assumed that it would use an electronic guidance system. Simply put, in this case, it would be necessary to “lead” the rocket from the ground, constantly adjusting the accuracy of its flight.

Already in 1965, the Hawk turned into the Tochka project. The missile part was left the same, but the engineers completely redesigned the guidance system. So, they completely abandoned the electronic circuit, proposing to use a relatively simple inertial option. It was well tested and tested on a number of previous Soviet missile systems. But this is not "Point-U" yet. The installation went through a rather difficult path of development, as new technical obstacles constantly arose before the developers.

Further work

All Fakel projects did not go beyond drawings and sketches. Approximately in 1966, all developments were transferred to the Kolomna Design Bureau, and the project was immediately supervised by S.P. Invincible. However, Kolomna engineers fully agreed with the point of view of their colleagues from Fakel: indeed, an inertial guidance system would be optimal. In fairness, it is worth noting that in the future the project was completely redesigned. In fact, only the name remained from it - "Point-U". The installation has been greatly improved, its design has been reduced in cost.

In general, the active stage of work started only in 1968. This time the project was supported by about 120 various scientific and technical enterprises, which created Tochka-U. This approach was dictated by the fact that in the shortest possible time it was necessary to create not only the rocket itself, but also a mechanical chassis, as well as a launch installation and a huge amount of electronic "stuffing". A huge contribution was made by the Volgograd Barricades, which created a launcher from scratch, as well as the Bryansk Automobile Plant, at whose facilities all elements of the new chassis were developed and created.

Work on the launcher

In general, initially two variants of the launcher were considered at once, from which the Tochka-U ballistic missile would launch. The first of them was created by engineers from Kolomna, but it was used exclusively for field tests. In particular, it was this launcher that was demonstrated during the tests of 1971, which took place in Kapustin Yar. Almost immediately, the design developed by the Barrikady plant began to play the main role.

The main characteristics of the missile part

In 1973, the assembly of missiles began at the Votkinsk plant in Udmurtia. At the same time, the first stages of state tests started, according to the results of which the Tochka-U was put into service. Installation in the army is better known under the index 9K79.

The basis of the entire complex is a single-stage solid-fuel rocket 9M79. The total length of the ammunition was 6.4 meters, the diameter was 650 mm. To adjust the course, lattice rudders with a span of 1350-1400 mm were used. A rocket with a combat weight of about two tons is launched, of which at least one and a half tons accounted for directly on the rocket part. The remaining 482 kilograms were shared between themselves and the electronic control system.

A lot of difficulties were caused by the correct solid recipe, which was responsible for accelerating the rocket and bringing it to the target. In the end, they settled on a composition that included rubber, aluminum powder, and a large part of ammonium perchlorate. The fuel supply burned out in approximately 18-28 seconds. The rocket received an inertial impulse, which was enough for a flight of 235 seconds. Because of this, the Tochka-U missile system turned out to be relatively cheap, since the minimum amount of fuel and explosive was used in the design.

Characteristics of the guidance system

The complex includes a large number of electronic and mechanical equipment responsible for aiming at the target: a command gyroscopic device, an analog course computer, many speed sensors, etc. The basis of the system was a 9B64 command gyroscopic device. He was responsible for stabilizing the platform during the flight. In general, the Tochka-U missile system ensured that a projectile hit a target at a distance of 50 kilometers and with a dispersion of no more than 30-40 meters already during tests, which at that time bordered on fantasy.

Data from all instruments was promptly transmitted to the 9B65 computer, which was responsible for automatic plotting of the flight course. This was done quite simply: the device compared the information received with the reference indicators that were put into it at launch, and, if necessary, corrected the flight. As we already mentioned, this was done with the help of lattice rudders located at the end of the projectile. If at the time of the correction the fuel supply had not yet burned out, gas-dynamic rudders were also used, using the energy of the gases released by the burning composition.

In this way, the Tochka-U missile system also differed significantly from its few foreign counterparts, in which the control and course correction system was many times more complex.

Work on the creation of a self-propelled chassis

At the first stage, the engineers believed that the chassis would be made on the basis of some machine developed at the Kharkov plant. However, after comparing the characteristics of all the proposed samples, preference was given to an instance created on the basis of this floating chassis, the 9P129 machine was created. Oddly enough, but according to the documents, work on the Tochka-U complex project was supervised by the Volgograd plant Barrikady. Serial launchers and many other important elements of the chassis were generally produced by the Petropavlovsk Plant.

Chassis specifications

The car was equipped with a diesel engine that developed power up to 300. The powerful engine allowed the installation, completely ready for launch, to drive along the highway at speeds up to 60 km / h. Off-road limited the pace of movement to 10-15 km / h. If necessary, the Tochka-U complex could overcome water obstacles under its own power, while developing a speed of up to 10 km / h. Since the total mass of the chassis did not exceed 18 tons, it could be transported using almost all military transport aircraft.

The rocket compartment was quite original. So, in front of it, a massive heat-insulating casing was mounted, which reliably protected the warhead of the projectile from exposure to excessively high or too low temperatures. What else is remarkable about "Point-U"? The characteristics of the pre-launch preparatory work clearly distinguish it from the background of all other missile systems due to the simplicity and high speed of all operations.

Preparation for combat use, pre-launch work

The standard for preparing for launch from the move assumed full combat readiness for a maximum of 20 minutes. At the same time, the lion's share of the time was spent on ensuring maximum stability of the chassis itself. All other procedures were performed by the trained calculation many times faster. Thus, only the Tochka-U installation (the photo is available in the article) is a real difficulty.

It took literally a couple of seconds to transfer commands to the control system, lifting the launcher to a vertical position took exactly 15 seconds, after which it was immediately possible to launch. The elevation of the launching stocks could reach 78 °. Thus, the Tochka-U complex is a formidable weapon, the deployment of which, under favorable conditions, takes less than two minutes.

In the horizontal plane, the guidance mechanics made it possible to turn the launcher 15 ° to the right and left relative to the central axis of the self-propelled chassis. When firing at a maximum range of 70 kilometers, the rocket flew this distance in just a couple of minutes. During this time, the Tochka-U launcher was supposed to be transferred to the traveling position and start retreating from the “illuminated” position. Recharging the complex took about 19-20 minutes.

Transport-loading vehicle

What else is included in the Tochka-U complex? The specifications of her rocket, if you haven't forgotten, assume a projectile weight of two tons. So it is impossible to do without a transport-loading vehicle, which was created on the basis of the BAZ-5922 chassis. In its body there is room for two missiles, the warheads of which are covered with a heat-insulating casing. The installation of shells on the guides is carried out using a cargo crane, which is included in the design of 9T128.

In principle, missiles can be stored in a transport-loading vehicle for a relatively long time, but it is much better to use specially designed metal containers for this purpose. What is it connected with? If the Tochka-U installation (the photo of which is repeatedly found in the article) was stored in inappropriate conditions, the rocket can fly anywhere, but not at the target.

To transport installations over long distances, special vehicles 9T222 or 9T238 are used, which are almost standard tractors. On one such machine, two containers / missiles or four warheads can be transported. No matter how good Tochka-U was, its characteristics began to deteriorate more and more noticeably over time. Of course, work began on the modernization of equipment.

Modifications and upgrades

The result of the work was the adoption in 1983 of the Tochka-R complex. In principle, it differs from the old system only in a new way of aiming a missile at a target. More precisely, the designers again returned to the idea of a radar guidance system. The new complex can automatically capture a target at a distance of 15 kilometers, after which the standard control mechanisms inherited from the old Tochka are used. However, the new installation may well use the entire range of missiles that have been released in past years.

Starting in 1984, a new round of work began, since even the characteristics of the new generation Tochka-U installation did not satisfy the military too much. Tests took place already in 1986. Three years later, the updated complex was put into service and its mass production began. As in the previous case, the main changes affected the missile part directly. As a result, the mass of the "Point" has grown by about 250 kilograms.

But not only this characterizes the new Tochka-U installation. The damage radius has also been increased. The new rocket received a solid-propellant engine weighing one ton. The flight range after that immediately increased to 120 kilometers, which also made it possible to create nuclear versions of the projectiles.

New variants of ballistic missiles

Before modernization, the complexes received new types of warheads. In general, today there are the following types of shells for "Points":

9M79. This rocket model is the very first, it appeared along with the installation itself.

9M79M. First upgrade option. In this case, the production technology itself has been seriously changed. In addition, full compatibility with the new automatic targeting system was ensured. The upgraded missile has the index 9M79R.

9M79-1. A projectile with this name is characterized by a significantly increased flight range.

9M79-GVM. This is a training model of a combat missile, which is used in training. In appearance, they almost perfectly reproduce their combat "ancestors".

Types of combat units

The warheads of the missiles themselves are no less diverse. Here we present the most common ones.

9H123. High-explosive fragmentation projectile. The development was completed in the late 60s. Its design contains almost 163 kilograms of explosives and 14.5 thousand semi-finished fragments. They can cover an area of up to three hectares. It should be noted here that during the design a huge number of calculations were made, according to the results of which the TNT mass is located at an angle to the central axis of the rocket, which ensures the most uniform distribution of the fragmentation mass over the area.

It is for this projectile that Tochka-U is unloved among the infantry. The defeat of manpower when using it approaches 100%. You can hide from heavy damaging elements only in a very good shelter.

This is what the Tochka-U missile system is characterized by. Photos, which are presented in due quantity in the article, will allow you to create your own idea of \u200b\u200bhim.

"Tochka-U" is a tactical missile system (TRK) for targeted destruction of small-sized military and strategically significant objects at the distant echelons of enemy defense.

The history of the Tochka U missile system

Along with the increase in the military potential of the armies of the mock enemy in the proposed theaters of operations, the approach to the tactics of conducting combined arms combat has changed. The destruction of control centers, headquarters, storage facilities, airfields in the deep rear could bleed the front line of the enemy, disrupt command communications.

The result of these actions can disorganize the units and, as a result, bring victory over the enemy with less time and effort on our part. These tasks became the main ones in the formation of the performance characteristics of Point U.

It was for such purposes that high-precision long-range weapons were needed. Survey work was carried out in the Soviet period of the country's history. The main dates and accompanying events are presented as follows:

date of	Event
1968	The leadership of the Soviet Union set the task of developing the latest tactical missile system Tochka U for tactical purposes to destroy enemy targets. In addition to the main contractor (Kolomenskoye Design Bureau, General Designer - Invincible S.P.), the following were involved: Bryansk AZ - development of the transport part, Central Research Institute AG - control and aiming equipment, Barricades software - launch system
1971	Factory tests of the initial version were carried out. The declared characteristics of the Tochka U missile system have been confirmed
1973	Organized large-scale industrial production
1976	"Tochka-U" entered service with the USSR Armed Forces. She had the ability to hit targets of a mock enemy at distances up to 70.0 km. The deviation from the aiming point did not exceed 250.0 meters
1983	Survey work has begun on the creation of Tochka-R. The terms of reference provided for the creation of a passive radar homing warhead
1989	The modernization of Tochka-U has been completed. Technical innovations have been introduced into the launch control system, and the 9M79M and 9M79-1 missiles have also been adopted by the army. The combat capabilities of hitting targets have increased to 120.0 km, with a maximum deviation from the aiming object of no more than 100.0 meters
1993	The fuel dispenser is presented at the international forum "IDEX-93". Five training launches were made. The deviation from the aiming point was maximum - 50.0, minimum - 7.0 meters, which was the undisputed leader in this area

To date, "Points U" are in service with the armies of Russia, the countries of the former Soviet Union and partners of the Russian Federation in the international arena. The exclusivity is confirmed by the results of the application in existing military conflicts in many countries of the world.

Tactical and technical characteristics of the Point U (TTX)

performance characteristics	Meaning
Missile flight range, km	15.0/70.0-120.0
Warhead flight, m/s	1100.0
Weight at start, kg	2010.0
Power unit, power, k.g.s.	9788.0
Operating time of the power unit, s	18.0-28.0
Achievement of the goal at maximum distances, s	136.0
Warhead, kg	482.0
warhead - charge	standard, nuclear, other
Readiness deployed / from the march, min	1.0-2.0/16.0
Gross weight of the installation (platform, rocket, crew), kg	18145.0
Delivery to the launch site (highway/ground/off-road/water), km/h	60.0/40.0/15.0/8.0
Travel without refueling, km	650.0
Motor resource, km	15000.0
Calculation, people	4.0

What is included in the tactical system

The Tochka-U tactical system consists of the following technical means, special equipment and training supplies:

A photo	Facilities
Missiles:
		9M-79-B (nuclear warhead AA-60); 9M-79-B-1 (nuclear warhead AA-86); 9M-79-B-2 (nuclear warhead AA-92); 9M-79-F (OFZ BCh 9N123F); 9M-79-K (cassette warhead 9N123K); 9M-79-FR (OF warhead radar GOS 9N123F-R)
Launchers:
		9P-129; 9P-129-M; 9P-129M-1
		Transport-loading self-propelled gun 9T-218
		Transport vehicle 9T-238

		9Ya-234 (carrier); 9YA-236 (BCH)
Mobile service complexes:
		AKIM 9V-819 (control and test)
		MTO 9V-844 (maintenance of console equipment)
		MTO-4OS (vehicle maintenance)
		R-145-BM (command and staff vehicle)
Educational complexes:
		9M-79F-UT (Tochka U training ballistic missile); 9N-39-UT (training warhead); 9M-79-GVM (full layout)
Training Equipment:
Gyro-compass		9F-625 (complex simulator); 2U-43 (driving driver's starting console); 2U-420 (training launcher operator); 2U-41 (training device for taking readings from a gyrocompass); 2U-413 stand showing the interaction of rocket parts

Ballistic Missile Damage Radius

The tactical missile system launches missiles with an inseparable warhead, which can carry various charges - nuclear, high-explosive, in cluster design. Its features are as follows:

solid fuel power unit;
autonomous control;
flight correction is calculated by the onboard computer system;
the actuating mechanism is represented by tail section engines that drive lattice aerodynamic rudders;
in the first phases of flight, the trajectory is changed by gas-dynamic rudders;
the power supply of the control systems and the actuating mechanism is carried out by the block of gas generators.

Precise aiming at the target by the rocket operator is ensured by the reliable functioning of all components and assemblies of the rocket. When entering the coordinates of targets, modern versions of maps are used, compiled based on the results of space monitoring of the locations of enemy targets.

Modifications of the tactical missile system

The accelerated development of technology has made it possible to significantly improve the first Tochka model. Changes in the basic design have increased the combat capabilities of the complex.

A photo	Peculiarities
	The Tochka installation is the first version of a tactical missile system for the destruction of small-sized enemy targets. in service since 1975; radius of destruction of targets at a range of max. / min. – 15.0/70.0 km; error - 50.0 m; PU 9P-129.
	TRK "Point R" is a modification with a passive homing warhead, the operation of which is based on radar technologies. in service since 1983; hitting targets at a range of max. / min. – 15.0/70.0 km; error - 45.0 m; PU 9P-129.
	Complex "Tochka-U" - a modernized version of the fuel dispenser, with an increased range of aimed fire and destruction of small targets: in service since 1989; Y-point firing range: max./min. – 20.0/120.0 km; error - 15.0 m; PU 9P-129-M1.

It should be noted that the developers provide for the possibility of using rockets from previous versions of the complex for launches from the Tochka U TRK.

Combat use

The combat use of Tochka U during local operations in Chechnya and during the Ossetian-Georgian conflict showed undeniable advantages and superior characteristics in comparison with foreign counterparts. Some of them are presented as follows:

range Points U. The maximum radius of destruction of an enemy object is one hundred and twenty kilometers;
guided missile flight. Throughout the flight, the warhead carrier is in autonomous control mode;
accuracy. The combat launches of the TRC missiles showed that the error from the aiming point is represented by fifteen meters. Under special conditions - does not exceed thirty meters;
unique characteristics missiles Point U. Vertical trajectory of hitting the target. On approaching the object being destroyed, the rocket makes a turn in a vertical plane. When attacking from above, the effectiveness of the strike is increased significantly;
service and support. A number of special off-road vehicles have been developed, capable of diagnosing and repairing fuel dispensers in any combat conditions;
mobility. The launcher can overcome tactical distances on the road and rough terrain, as well as easily overcome water obstacles;
deployment speed. Transfer from marching to combat position of readiness for launch does not exceed sixteen minutes;
secrecy of preparation for launch. Raising the missile into combat position occurs just before the launch, and already a minute and a half after the launch, the complex can change its location, which corresponds to the maximum level of concealment of the combat position;
warhead modifications. Depending on the tasks set, ammunition can be used, the warhead of which is equipped with both nuclear charges and filling for the targeted destruction of objects;
staff training. Training places have been developed for training the crew of the missile system. Models allow you to study the work of parts and mechanisms in the shortest possible time.

To date, the Tochka-U tactical missile system has been one of the most effective means of solving operational combat missions. Despite the serious age of the complex, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation does not plan to remove it from service in the near future. But, the development and implementation of the Iskander operational-tactical complexes in the army units can change the situation dramatically.

The Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of March 4, 1968 required the creation of a new tactical missile system for hitting point targets in the depths of enemy defenses. The required accuracy of hitting the target was reflected in the title of the topic: "Point". The Kolomna Design Bureau of Mechanical Engineering was made the lead executor of the project, and S.P. Invincible. Other enterprises involved in the project were also identified: the Bryansk Automobile Plant was supposed to make the chassis for the machines of the complex, the Central Research Institute of Automation and Hydraulics - the missile control system, and the Volgograd software "Barricades" was responsible for the launcher. Serial production of the missiles themselves was planned to be deployed in Votkinsk.

Factory testing of the first version of the "Point" began in 1971, and two years later launched mass production. But for a number of reasons, "Point" was put into service only in 1976. The missile launch range was 70 kilometers, and the deviation from the target was no more than 250 meters. Immediately after the Tochka was released for testing, the Central Research Institute of Ag began work on new electronics for modifying the rocket called Tochka-R. This missile was supposed to have a passive radar homing head, but in the end it was decided to give the anti-radar niche to lighter missiles. Since 1989, the updated Tochka-U complex, which included new 9M79M and 9M79-1 missiles, went to the troops. In addition, part of the ground equipment was also replaced with a new one.

As a result of the replacement of the missile, the maximum target engagement range increased to 120 km, and the minimum remained at the level of 15. Accuracy has also improved significantly - the deviation now does not exceed one hundred meters, although in general it has much lower values. So, at the international exhibition IDEX-93, five Tochki-U missiles did not miss more than 50 meters. The minimum error was within 5-7 meters. Such high accuracy was achieved by using new guidance equipment available in the 9M79M and 9M79-1 missiles themselves. Unlike previous tactical missiles, the Tochka guidance system of all modifications provides course correction throughout the flight, right up to hitting the target. The inertial automatic control of the rocket consists of a command-gyroscopic device, a discrete analog computer, hydraulic drive automatics and a set of sensors. In the first few seconds of the flight, until a certain speed is reached, the rocket is controlled using gas rudders, and then, throughout the flight, the course is corrected using lattice aerodynamic rudders. The 9M79 engine runs on solid fuel and has only one mode. A cylindrical block of fuel with longitudinal grooves is launched using an igniter (briquettes of a special composition and black powder). The combustion of the fuel mixture goes on until the missile meets the target - Tochka is the first Soviet tactical complex where the engine does not turn off before the last stage of the flight.

In addition to the four lattice rudders, the tail of the rocket includes four trapezoidal wings. In the stowed position, all protruding parts are folded, turning relative to the rocket body. For 9M79M and 9M79-1 missiles, several types of warheads for various purposes have been developed:
- 9N39 - nuclear warhead with an AA-60 charge with a capacity of 10-100 kilotons in TNT equivalent;
- 9N64 - nuclear warhead with an AA-86 charge. Power up to 100 kt.
- 9N123F - high-explosive fragmentation warhead with 162.5 kg of explosive and 14,500 ready-made fragments. In an explosion at a height of 20 meters, fragments affect objects on an area of up to 3 hectares;
- 9N123K - cluster warhead. Contains 50 fragmentation elements with 1.5 kg of explosive and 316 fragments each. At an altitude of 2250 meters above the surface, the automation opens the cassette, as a result of which up to seven hectares are sown with fragments;
- 9N123G and 9N123G2-1 - combat units equipped with 65 elements with toxic substances. In total, 60 and 50 kg of substances fit in the warhead, respectively. There is information on the development of these warheads, but no data on production or applications. Most likely, they did not begin to bring them up and launch them into a series.

It is also sometimes claimed that there are propaganda and anti-radar warheads, but there is no official data on them. The head part is attached to the rocket with six bolts. A letter corresponding to the type of warhead is added to the alphanumeric index of the rocket - 9M79-1F for high-explosive fragmentation, 9M79-1K for cluster, etc. When assembled, a missile with a non-nuclear warhead can be stored for up to 10 years. According to calculations, to destroy a battery of MLRS or tactical missiles, it is required to spend 2 missiles with a cluster warhead or four with a high-explosive one. To destroy an artillery battery, half the ammunition consumption is required. For seeding with fragments and destruction of manpower and light equipment on an area of up to 100 hectares, four cluster or eight high-explosive rockets should go.

The rocket is launched from the 9P129M-1 machine, made on the BAZ-5921 chassis. The launcher equipment allows you to independently carry out all the necessary preparations for launch and calculations related to the aiming and flight mission of the rocket. The launch can be made from almost any platform of sufficient size, and it takes about 16 minutes to prepare for it in the case of firing from the march, or 2 minutes from the state of readiness No. 1. The only requirements for the placement of the launcher relate to the condition of the surface of the site and the placement of the machine - the target must be in a sector of ± 15 ° from its longitudinal axis. It takes no more than one and a half to two minutes to collapse the installation and leave the launch site. An interesting fact is that the rocket (in the stowed position is placed in the cargo compartment of the launch vehicle on a lifting rail) is transferred to a launch elevation angle of 78 ° only 15 seconds before launch. This helps to complicate the work of enemy reconnaissance. The crew of the launch vehicle is four people: the head of the calculation, the driver, the senior operator (he is also the deputy head of the calculation) and the operator.

The missiles are placed on the launcher using the 9T218-1 transport-loading vehicle (made on the BAZ-5922 chassis). Its pressurized cargo compartment can accommodate two missiles with docked warheads. For loading missiles into the launch vehicle, there is a crane and a number of related equipment on the transport-loading vehicle. Loading operations can be carried out on any site, including an unprepared site, on which a launcher and a charging machine can stand side by side. It takes about twenty minutes to reload one rocket.

The complex also includes the 9T238 transport vehicle, which differs from the transport-loading vehicle only in the absence of loading equipment. 9T238 can simultaneously transport up to two missiles or four warheads in shipping containers.

For more than twenty years of its service, Tochka-U had a chance to participate in hostilities only a few times. General G. Troshev in his book "The Chechen Break" wrote that thanks to the use of this missile system, it was possible to prevent the terrorists from leaving the village of Komsomolskoye. The militants tried to pass between the positions of the army and the fighters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but the missilemen covered them with an accurate salvo. At the same time, the federal forces, despite the short distances, did not suffer losses from the Tochka strike. Also in the press there was information about the use of "Points" in the warehouses and camps of terrorists. During the war in South Ossetia in August 2008, information appeared about the use of Tochek-U by the Russian side.

Despite its already advanced age, the Tochka-U tactical missile system is not yet planned to be withdrawn from service. There is a version that this will happen no earlier than the time when the Russian army will have a sufficient number of operational-tactical Iskanders.

Missile complex Tochka-U: characteristics, composition and combat use. Tactical missile system "Tochka" - the highest accuracy

QUICK REFERENCE

Prerequisites for creation

Further work

Work on the launcher

The main characteristics of the missile part

Characteristics of the guidance system

Other technical solutions

Work on the creation of a self-propelled chassis

Chassis specifications

Preparation for combat use, pre-launch work

Transport-loading vehicle

Modifications and upgrades

New variants of ballistic missiles

Types of combat units

The history of the Tochka U missile system

Tactical and technical characteristics of the Point U (TTX)

What is included in the tactical system

Ballistic Missile Damage Radius

Modifications of the tactical missile system

Combat use