The most massive tanks were participants in the Great Patriotic War. Tanks of the Great Patriotic War WWII tank
The history of the creation of two famous WWII tanks is very interesting. It can explain the rather ambiguous assessment of these two vehicles, and gives an explanation for some of the failures of our tankers that took place in the summer of 1941. The whole problem is that not even experimental, but conceptual cars went into the series.
None of these tanks were designed to arm the army. They were only supposed to show what a tank of its class should look like.
Pre-war tanks manufactured by plant No. 183. From left to right: BT-7, A-20, T-34-76 with L-11 gun, T-34-76 with F-34 gun
Let's start with KV. When the leadership of the Soviet country realized that the tanks in service were so outdated that they were no longer tanks at all. Then the decision was made to create a new technology. Certain requirements for this technique were also put forward. So a heavy tank was supposed to have anti-shell armor and several guns in several turrets. Under this technical project, the design of machines named T-100 and SMK was started.
QMS 
T-100 
But the designer of the QMS, Kotin, believed that a heavy tank should have a single turret. And he had the idea to create another car. But all of his design bureau was busy creating the ordered QMS. And then he was lucky, a group of students of the armored academy arrived at the plant for the graduation project. These "students" were entrusted with creating a new tank. Those without hesitation shortened the body of the QMS, leaving room for one tower. A second cannon was stuck into this tower instead of a machine gun. And the machine gun itself was moved to the aft niche of the tower. The armor was strengthened, bringing the mass of the project to that specified in the task. They poked knots, the drawings of which were studied at the academy. They even took components from an American tractor, discontinued in the States, 20 years before. But they did not change the suspension, copying it from the QMS. Despite the fact that the length of the tank has decreased by 1.5 times. And the number of suspension units decreased by the same number. And their workload has increased. The only thing that the “students” themselves did was to install a diesel engine. And according to these drawings, the KV tank was created. Presented for testing along with the T-100 and QMS.
The very first KV, autumn 1939 
But then the Finnish War began and all three tanks were sent to the front. Which revealed the complete superiority of the KV concept over other tanks. And the tank, despite all the objections of the chief designer, was put into service. The Great Patriotic War, which began soon, revealed all the shortcomings in the design of the HF. The tank turned out to be extremely unreliable, especially these tanks suffered from breakdowns of the suspension and components copied from the American tractor. As a result, in 1941, only about 20% of these vehicles were lost to enemy fire. The rest were abandoned due to breakdowns.
QMS in battle 
Blown up on a landmine SMK in the depths of the Finnish positions 
The military is generally a conservative people. If they considered a heavy tank to have many turrets, then they ordered this one. And if the tanks for the raids were wheeled-tracked, then they ordered just such a vehicle. In exchange for tanks of the BT-7 series. But they wanted to get a car protected from anti-tank artillery. Why was it supposed to make sloped armor. It was for such a car that the Koshkin military design bureau in Kharkov issued an order.
A-20 
A-32 
But he saw a completely different car. Therefore, together with the machine ordered by the military, which received the A-20 index, he made almost exactly the same, the A-32. Almost, with 2 exceptions. First, the mechanism of movement on wheels was removed. Secondly, the A-32 had a 76.2 mm gun. Instead of 45 mm on the A-20. At the same time, the A-32 weighed a ton less than the A-20. And in tests, the A-32 proved to be more preferable than the A-20. Especially when the next modification of the A-34 was released, with stronger armor and with the F-32 cannon, the same as on the KV. True, the weight of the tank increased by 6 tons. And inherited from the A-20, the candle suspension began to fail.
Tank A-34 (2nd prototype) 
But the Red Army was in dire need of new tanks. And despite the identified defects, the tank went into production. And even with a more powerful and heavy gun F-34. Koshkin and gun designer Grabin knew each other. Therefore, even before the appearance of this gun in service, he received a set of drawings. And on the basis of them he prepared a place for a cannon. And on the medium T-34, the gun turned out to be more powerful than on the heavy KV. But as a result of design costs, the situation turned out to be close to the situation with HF. T-34s of the first releases were more often abandoned due to breakdown than due to combat damage.
The very first KV, but in the spring of 1940 after it was re-equipped according to the KV-2 project. And the tower from the very first KV, which had the number U-0, was installed on the tank number U-2. 
It cannot be said that the designers did not recognize the shortcomings of their machines. Immediately began the fight against the "childhood diseases" of the structures. As a result, by 1943 we managed to get those famous T-34s and KVs that we know about. But in general, these vehicles were considered only as temporary, until the appearance of new tanks. So Kotin worked on the KV-3 with a 107 mm gun. And the design bureau in Kharkov over the T-34M. The design of the machine, with a transverse engine and vertical sides. The T-34M was even put into production. We made about 50 sets of parts for this type of tank. But before the capture of Kharkov, not a single tank was fully assembled.
T-34M, aka A-43. 
And so it happened that the tanks of victory were tanks, the appearance of which was not envisaged. And their adoption into service was considered a temporary measure and not for long. Tanks that were not intended to be used as main tanks, and which were simply design concepts.
It cannot be said that in 1940, after the shortcomings of our new tanks were clarified, there were no attempts to create new vehicles. I already wrote about the T-34M project. There was an attempt to create a new heavy tank. Received the index KV-3. In the project of this machine, an attempt was made to remove the shortcomings inherent in the KV-1 and KV-2 tanks (the same KV-1, but with a new turret and 152-mm howitzer), the experience of the war with the Finns was also used in the project. It was planned to arm this tank with a 107-mm cannon. However, the tests of the first sample of the gun were not successful. It was difficult and inconvenient for the loader to work with ammunition of this size and weight. Therefore, the tank presented for testing in the summer of 1941 was armed with the same 76-mm cannon. But then the war began and in September 1941 the experimental machine went into battle on the Leningrad front. From which she did not return and is officially listed as missing. But there is a report from one of the commanders of the Red Army, who claimed that a tank that had broken through into the depths of the German defense was fired from 105-mm German howitzers. From the fire of which the ammunition detonated. The turret was torn off, and the tank itself was completely destroyed.
KV-3. Layout. 
Newsreel footage is probably familiar to everyone. They show a seven-roller KV-3 with a turret from the KV-1. 
But neither the T-34M nor the KV-3 were considered before the war as the main tank of the Red Army. They were supposed to be a car with the T-50 index. The prototype of this machine was created in 1940 and outwardly very much resembled the T-34, only it was somewhat smaller in size. But it had the same 45 mm sloping armor, although the vehicle was armed with a 45 mm cannon and 3 machine guns. The project was recognized as not entirely successful, the car turned out to be too high-tech. And it could not be mastered by the factories where it was planned to be produced. Yes, and the tank turned out to be too heavy for its class.
T-126 in Kubinka 
Then it was decided to reduce the thickness of the armor to 37 mm, remove the forward machine gun, and put not a machine gun spork, but one machine gun in the turret. Apply a number of other technical solutions aimed at reducing the weight and manufacturability of production. All this pushed the start of production to June 1941. And serial vehicles appeared in the troops after the start of the war. In total, not many such tanks were produced, several dozen. The plant for their production was evacuated from Leningrad, and in a new place it was decided to start production of other types of machines.
T-50 
His competitor created at the Kirov plant 
But let's continue talking about the unknown Soviet tanks of the 2nd World War. I already wrote about the T-34M project, but the developments of this project turned out to be in demand. In 1943, the T-43 tank was adopted, which was the direct successor to the T-34M project. But the appearance on the battlefields of "Tigers" and "Panthers" did not allow this car to go into a large series. But it served as the basis for the best WWII tank, the T-44. By the middle of 1942, it became clear that the Red Army needed a new medium tank. The design of such a tank, called the T-43, was completed by June 1943. The main requirement of the military, to provide maximum protection with a minimum increase in mass, was fulfilled. Its hull, which inherited the T-34 configuration, already had circular 75 mm armor. The thickness of the frontal part of the tower, in which the 76.2-mm F-34 tank gun was installed, was increased to 90 mm (against 45 mm for the T-34). But the length of the engine compartment could not be reduced, as a result of which the fighting compartment turned out to be smaller. Therefore, in order to provide the crew with the necessary internal space, the designers used a torsion bar suspension, which is more compact than a candle suspension with vertical springs, as on the BT and T-34 tanks. Surpassing the T-34 in terms of armor protection and not inferior in armament to the heavy tank KV-1 and KV-1s, the medium tank T-43, however, approached heavy tanks in terms of ground pressure, which negatively affected the maneuverability and power reserve. And its design came out to the limit, excluding further modernization. And when the serial “thirty-four” was equipped with an 85-mm cannon, the need for the T-43 temporarily disappeared, although it was the tower from the T-43 with minor changes that was used for the T-34-85 tank, so the experience of working on it was not in vain. The fact is that the test run of the T-43 for 3 thousand km. clearly proved the correctness of the choice for a medium tank of a torsion bar suspension and the futility of a phased change in the traditional layout.
T-43 
T-34 and T-43 
It became clear that a fundamentally different machine was needed. It was her who began to design in the Morozov Design Bureau. As a result of the work, the T-44 tank turned out. The creation of the T-44 tank began at the end of 1943. The new tank received the designation "Object 136" and in the series - the designation T-44. The new machine not only used a transverse engine, but also a number of other technical innovations. Being introduced separately, on different tanks, they would not have given a tangible effect, but together they made the design of the T-44 one that determined the development of domestic armored vehicles for decades. The height of the engine compartment was reduced by moving a new type of air cleaner from the collapse of the cylinders of the Y-shaped engine to the side. By the way, the V-44 diesel itself was equipped with improved fuel equipment, which made it possible to increase power from 500 to 520 hp. from. with the same volume of cylinders as on the previous B-34. In place of the fan, which protruded beyond the dimensions of the crankcase, a compact flywheel was installed. This made it possible to mount the diesel engine on a low, rigid, but light motor frame, and as a result, the body height decreased by 300 mm.
Two experimental samples of the T-44 
The medium T-44 and its German counterpart, the heavy T-V Panther. 
They also introduced other design developments that could not be implemented on serial T-34s. So the new layout of the engine compartment made it possible to shift the new design turret with the 85-mm ZIS-S-53 cannon to the center of the hull, where the tankers were less affected by the tiring angular vibrations of the vehicle, and the long-barreled gun could not stick into the ground when moving over rough terrain. Increased and accuracy of shooting. And most importantly, such alignment allowed the designers to bring the thickness of the frontal armor plate to 120 mm without overloading the front rollers. We add that the increase in the strength of the frontal sheet was also facilitated by the transfer of the driver's hatch to the roof of the hull, and the rejection of the ball mount of the course machine gun, since combat experience revealed its insufficient effectiveness. In the new tank, the course machine gun was rigidly fixed in the bow of the hull, and a fuel tank was placed in the vacated place next to the driver. On the prototype T-44-85, there was a small gap between the second and third road wheels. On serial machines, the gap was between the first and second rollers. In this form, the T-44 successfully passed state tests and was adopted in 1944 by the Red Army. T-44 tanks were mass-produced in Kharkov.
T-44 
From the end of 1944 to 1945, 965 tanks were manufactured. T-44s did not take part in hostilities. Although they began to enter the troops in the spring of 1945. So until May 9, 1945, 160 tanks of this type entered service with individual guards tank brigades. Which were in the 2nd echelon of the army. And which should have been an unpleasant surprise for the Germans, if they had new types of tanks. For example, the Panther-2 being developed. But there was no need for this type of tank. And the T-44 did not take part in the fighting. Even against Japan. Thus falling out of the field of view of military historians. It's a pity. Because this tank was the best tank of the 2nd World War. 
During the Second World War, tanks played a decisive role in battles and operations, it is very difficult to single out the top ten from the many tanks, for this reason, the order in the list is rather arbitrary and the place of the tank is tied to the time of its active participation in battles and significance for that period.
10. Tank Panzerkampfwagen III (PzKpfw III)
The PzKpfw III, better known as the T-III, is a light tank with a 37 mm gun. Booking from all angles - 30 mm. The main quality is Speed (40 km / h on the highway). Thanks to the perfect Carl Zeiss optics, ergonomic crew jobs and the presence of a radio station, the “troikas” could successfully fight with much heavier vehicles. But with the advent of new opponents, the shortcomings of the T-III manifested themselves more clearly. The Germans replaced the 37 mm guns with 50 mm guns and covered the tank with hinged screens - temporary measures gave their results, the T-III fought for several more years. By 1943, the release of the T-III was discontinued due to the complete exhaustion of its resource for modernization. In total, German industry produced 5,000 triples.
9. Tank Panzerkampfwagen IV (PzKpfw IV)
The PzKpfw IV, which became the most massive Panzerwaffe tank, looked much more serious - the Germans managed to build 8700 vehicles. Combining all the advantages of the lighter T-III, the "four" had high firepower and security - the thickness of the frontal plate was gradually increased to 80 mm, and the shells of its 75 mm long-barreled gun pierced the armor of enemy tanks like foil (by the way, it was fired 1133 early modifications with a short-barreled gun).
The weak points of the machine are too thin sides and feed (only 30 mm on the first modifications), the designers neglected the slope of the armor plates for the sake of manufacturability and the convenience of the crew.
Panzer IV - the only German tank that was in mass production throughout the Second World War and became the most massive tank of the Wehrmacht. Its popularity among German tankers was comparable to the popularity of the T-34 among ours and the Sherman among the Americans. Well-designed and extremely reliable in operation, this combat vehicle was in the full sense of the word the “workhorse” of the Panzerwaffe.
8. Tank KV-1 (Klim Voroshilov)
“... from three sides we fired at the iron monsters of the Russians, but everything was in vain. Russian giants came closer and closer. One of them approached our tank, hopelessly bogged down in a swampy pond, and without any hesitation drove over it, pressing its tracks into the mud ... "
- General Reinhard, commander of the 41st tank corps of the Wehrmacht.
In the summer of 1941, the KV tank smashed the elite units of the Wehrmacht with impunity as if it had rolled out onto the Borodino field in 1812. Invincible, invincible and extremely powerful. Until the end of 1941, in all the armies of the world, there was generally no weapon capable of stopping the Russian 45-ton monster. The KV was twice as heavy as the largest Wehrmacht tank.
Bronya KV is a wonderful song of steel and technology. 75 millimeters of steel firmament from all angles! The frontal armor plates had an optimal angle of inclination, which further increased the projectile resistance of the KV armor - German 37 mm anti-tank guns did not take it even at close range, and 50 mm guns - no further than 500 meters. At the same time, the long-barreled 76 mm F-34 (ZIS-5) gun made it possible to hit any German tank of that period from a distance of 1.5 kilometers from any direction.
The crews of the KV were staffed exclusively by officers, only driver-mechanics could be foremen. The level of their training was much higher than the level of the crews who fought on tanks of other types. They fought more skillfully, and therefore the Germans remembered ...
7. Tank T-34 (thirty-four)
“... There is nothing worse than a tank battle against superior enemy forces. Not in terms of numbers - it was not important for us, we were used to it. But against better vehicles, it's terrible... Russian tanks are so nimble, at close range they'll climb a slope or cross a swamp faster than you can turn a turret. And through the noise and roar, you hear the clang of shells on the armor all the time. When they hit our tank, you often hear a deafening explosion and the roar of burning fuel, too loud to hear the death cries of the crew ... "
- the opinion of a German tanker from the 4th Panzer Division, destroyed by T-34 tanks in the battle near Mtsensk on October 11, 1941.
Obviously, the Russian monster had no analogues in 1941: a 500-horsepower diesel engine, unique armor, a 76 mm F-34 gun (generally similar to the KV tank) and wide tracks - all these technical solutions provided the T-34 with an optimal ratio of mobility, fire power and protection. Even individually, these parameters for the T-34 were higher than for any Panzerwaffe tank.
When the Wehrmacht soldiers first met the T-34s on the battlefield, they were, to put it mildly, shocked. The cross-country ability of our vehicle was impressive - where the German tanks did not even think to meddle, the T-34s passed without much difficulty. The Germans even nicknamed their 37mm anti-tank gun the "tuk-tuk mallet" because when its shells hit the "thirty-four", they simply hit it and bounced off.
The main thing is that the Soviet designers managed to create the tank exactly the way the Red Army needed it. The T-34 was ideally suited to the conditions of the Eastern Front. The extreme simplicity and manufacturability of the design made it possible to establish mass production of these combat vehicles as soon as possible, as a result, the T-34s were easy to operate, numerous and ubiquitous.
6. Tank Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger I" Ausf E, "Tiger"
“... we went around through the beam and ran into the Tiger. Having lost several T-34s, our battalion returned back ... "
- a frequent description of meetings with PzKPfw VI from the memoirs of tankers.
According to a number of Western historians, the main task of the Tiger tank was to fight enemy tanks, and its design corresponded to the solution of this particular task:
If in the initial period of the Second World War the German military doctrine was mainly offensive, then later, when the strategic situation changed to the opposite, tanks began to play the role of a means of eliminating German defense breakthroughs.
Thus, the Tiger tank was conceived primarily as a means of fighting enemy tanks, whether in defense or offensive. Accounting for this fact is necessary to understand the design features and tactics of using the "Tigers".
On July 21, 1943, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Corps, Herman Bright, issued the following instructions for the combat use of the Tiger-I tank:
... Taking into account the strength of the armor and the strength of the weapon, the "Tiger" should be used mainly against enemy tanks and anti-tank weapons, and only secondarily - as an exception - against infantry units.
As battle experience has shown, the Tiger's weapons allow it to fight enemy tanks at distances of 2000 meters or more, which especially affects enemy morale. Strong armor allows the "Tiger" to move closer to the enemy without the risk of serious damage from hits. However, you should try to start a battle with enemy tanks at distances of more than 1000 meters.
5. Tank "Panther" (PzKpfw V "Panther")
Realizing that the "Tiger" is a rare and exotic weapon for professionals, German tank builders created a simpler and cheaper tank, with the intention of turning it into a mass-produced Wehrmacht medium tank.
Panzerkampfwagen V "Panther" is still the subject of heated debate. The technical capabilities of the car do not cause any complaints - with a mass of 44 tons, the Panther was superior in mobility to the T-34, developing 55-60 km / h on a good highway. The tank was armed with a 75 mm KwK 42 cannon with a barrel length of 70 calibers! An armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile fired from its infernal vent flew 1 kilometer in the first second - with such performance characteristics, the Panther's cannon could pierce any Allied tank at a distance of more than 2 kilometers. Reservation "Panther" by most sources is also recognized as worthy - the thickness of the forehead varied from 60 to 80 mm, while the angles of the armor reached 55 °. The board was weaker protected - at the level of the T-34, so it was easily hit by Soviet anti-tank weapons. The lower part of the side was additionally protected by two rows of rollers on each side.
4. Tank IS-2 (Joseph Stalin)
The IS-2 was the most powerful and most heavily armored of the Soviet mass-produced tanks of the war period, and one of the strongest tanks in the world at that time. Tanks of this type played a big role in the battles of 1944-1945, especially distinguishing themselves during the storming of cities.
The armor thickness of the IS-2 reached 120 mm. One of the main achievements of Soviet engineers is the cost-effectiveness and low metal consumption of the IS-2 design. With a mass comparable to the mass of the Panther, the Soviet tank was much more seriously protected. But too tight layout required the placement of fuel tanks in the control compartment - when the armor was broken, the crew of the Is-2 had little chance of surviving. The driver, who did not have his own hatch, was especially at risk.
Storms of cities:
Together with self-propelled guns based on it, the IS-2 was actively used for assault operations on fortified cities such as Budapest, Breslau, and Berlin. The tactics of operations in such conditions included the actions of the OGvTTP by assault groups of 1-2 tanks, accompanied by an infantry squad of several submachine gunners, a sniper or a well-aimed marksman from a rifle, and sometimes a knapsack flamethrower. In the event of weak resistance, tanks with assault groups planted on them at full speed broke through along the streets to squares, squares, parks, where it was possible to take up all-round defense.
3. Tank M4 Sherman (Sherman)
Sherman is the pinnacle of rationality and pragmatism. It is all the more surprising that the United States, which had 50 tanks by the beginning of the war, managed to create such a balanced combat vehicle and rivet 49,000 Shermans of various modifications by 1945. For example, the Sherman with a gasoline engine was used in the ground forces, and the M4A2 modification equipped with a diesel engine entered the Marine Corps. American engineers rightly believed that this would greatly simplify the operation of tanks - diesel fuel could be easily found among sailors, unlike high-octane gasoline. By the way, it was this modification of the M4A2 that entered the Soviet Union.
Why did the Emcha (as our soldiers called the M4) so pleased the command of the Red Army that they were completely transferred to elite units, for example, the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps and the 9th Guards Tank Corps? The answer is simple: "Sherman" had the optimal ratio of armor, firepower, mobility and ... reliability. In addition, the Sherman was the first tank with a hydraulic turret drive (this provided special aiming accuracy) and a gun stabilizer in a vertical plane - the tankers admitted that in a duel situation their shot was always the first.
Combat use:
After the landing in Normandy, the Allies had to come close to the German tank divisions that were thrown into the defense of Fortress Europe, and it turned out that the Allies underestimated the degree of saturation of the German troops with heavy types of armored vehicles, especially Panther tanks. In direct clashes with German heavy tanks, the Shermans had very little chance. The British, to a certain extent, could count on their Sherman Firefly, whose excellent gun made a great impression on the Germans (so much so that the crews of German tanks tried to hit the Firefly first of all, and then deal with the rest). The Americans, who were counting on their new gun, quickly found out that the power of its armor-piercing shells was still not enough to confidently defeat the Panther in the forehead.
2. Panzerkampfwagen VI Ausf. B "Tiger II", "Tiger II"
The combat debut of the Royal Tigers took place on July 18, 1944 in Normandy, where the 503rd heavy tank battalion managed to knock out 12 Sherman tanks in the first battle.
And already on August 12, the Tiger II appeared on the Eastern Front: the 501st heavy tank battalion tried to interfere with the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive operation. The bridgehead was an uneven semicircle, resting at the ends against the Vistula. Approximately in the middle of this semicircle, covering the direction to Staszow, the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade was defending.
At 07:00 on August 13, the enemy, under cover of fog, went on the offensive with the forces of the 16th Panzer Division, with the participation of 14 King Tigers of the 501st Heavy Tank Battalion. But as soon as the new Tigers crawled out to their original positions, three of them were shot from an ambush by the crew of the T-34-85 tank under the command of junior lieutenant Alexander Oskin, which, in addition to Oskin himself, included the driver Stetsenko, gun commander Merkhaidarov, radio operator Grushin and loader Khalychev . In total, the tankers of the brigade knocked out 11 tanks, and the remaining three, abandoned by the crews, were captured in good condition. One of these tanks, number 502, is still in Kubinka.
Currently, the Royal Tigers are on display at Saumur Musee des Blindes in France, RAC Tank Museum Bovington (the only surviving copy with a Porsche turret) and the Royal Military College of Science Shrivenham in the UK, Munster Lager Kampftruppen Schule in Germany (transferred by the Americans in 1961) , Ordnance Museum Aberdeen Proving Ground in the USA, Switzerlands Panzer Museum Thun in Switzerland and the Military Historical Museum of armored weapons and equipment in Kubinka near Moscow.
1. Tank T-34-85
The medium tank T-34-85, in essence, is a major modernization of the T-34 tank, as a result of which a very important drawback of the latter was eliminated - the tightness of the fighting compartment and the impossibility of a complete division of labor of the crew members associated with it. This was achieved by increasing the diameter of the turret ring, as well as by installing a new triple turret much larger than that of the T-34. At the same time, the design of the hull and the layout of components and assemblies in it did not undergo any significant changes. Consequently, there were also disadvantages inherent in machines with aft engine and transmission.
As you know, the most widespread in tank building are two layout schemes with a bow and aft transmission. Moreover, the disadvantages of one scheme are the advantages of another.
The disadvantage of the layout with the aft location of the transmission is the increased length of the tank due to the placement in its hull of four compartments that are not aligned along the length or the reduction in the volume of the fighting compartment with a constant length of the vehicle. Due to the large length of the engine and transmission compartments, the combat with a heavy turret shifts to the nose, overloading the front rollers, leaving no room on the turret sheet for the central and even lateral placement of the driver's hatch. There is a danger of "sticking" the protruding gun into the ground when the tank moves through natural and artificial obstacles. The control drive is becoming more complicated, connecting the driver with the transmission located in the stern.
The layout of the tank T-34-85
There are two ways out of this situation: either increase the length of the control compartment (or combat), which will inevitably lead to an increase in the overall length of the tank and a deterioration in its maneuverability due to an increase in the ratio L / B - the length of the supporting surface to the track width (for the T-34 - 85, it is close to optimal - 1.5), or radically change the layout of the engine and transmission compartments. What this could lead to can be judged by the results of the work of Soviet designers in the design of new medium tanks T-44 and T-54, created during the war years and put into service, respectively, in 1944 and 1945.
The layout of the T-54 tank
On these combat vehicles, a layout was used with a transverse (and not with a longitudinal, as in the T-34-85) placement of a 12-cylinder V-2 diesel engine (in the V-44 and V-54 variants) and a combined significantly shortened (by 650 mm ) engine compartment. This made it possible to lengthen the fighting compartment up to 30% of the hull length (24.3% for the T-34-85), increase the turret ring diameter by almost 250 mm, and install a powerful 100-mm cannon on the T-54 medium tank. At the same time, it was possible to shift the turret to the stern, allocating space on the turret plate for the driver's hatch. The exclusion of the fifth crew member (shooter from the course machine gun), the removal of the ammunition rack from the floor of the fighting compartment, the transfer of the fan from the engine crankshaft to the stern bracket and the reduction in the overall height of the engine ensured a decrease in the height of the T-54 tank hull (compared to the T-34- tank hull). 85) by about 200 mm, as well as a reduction in the booked volume by about 2 cubic meters. and increased armor protection by more than two times (with an increase in mass by only 12%).
Such a radical re-arrangement of the T-34 tank was not done during the war, and, probably, this was the right decision. At the same time, the diameter of the turret ring, while maintaining the same shape of the hull, was almost limiting for the T-34-85, which did not allow placing a larger-caliber artillery system in the turret. The possibilities of upgrading the tank in terms of armament were completely exhausted, unlike, for example, the American Sherman and the German Pz.lV.
By the way, the problem of increasing the caliber of the main armament of the tank was of paramount importance. Sometimes you can hear the question: why did you need to switch to an 85-mm cannon, could it be possible to improve the ballistic characteristics of the F-34 by increasing the barrel length? After all, the Germans did the same with their 75-mm gun on the Pz.lV.
The fact is that German guns have traditionally been distinguished by better internal ballistics (ours are just as traditionally external). The Germans achieved high armor penetration by increasing the initial speed and better working out of ammunition. We could adequately answer only by increasing the caliber. Although the S-53 cannon significantly improved the firing capabilities of the T-34-85, but, as Yu.E. Maksarev noted: “In the future, the T-34 could no longer directly, duel hit new German tanks.” All attempts to create 85-mm guns with an initial speed of over 1000 m / s, the so-called high-power guns, ended in failure due to rapid wear and destruction of the barrel even at the testing stage. For the "duel" defeat of German tanks, a transition to 100-mm caliber was required, which was carried out only in the T-54 tank with a turret ring diameter of 1815 mm. But in the battles of the Second World War, this combat vehicle did not take part.
As for the placement of the driver's hatch in the frontal hull sheet, one could try to follow the path of the Americans. Recall that on the Sherman, the driver's and machine gunner's hatches, originally also made in an inclined front hull plate, were subsequently transferred to the turret plate. This was achieved by reducing the angle of inclination of the front plate from 56° to 47° to the vertical. The T-34-85 had a 60° frontal hull plate. By reducing this angle also to 47 ° and compensating for this by some increase in the thickness of the frontal armor, it would be possible to increase the area of the turret sheet and place the driver's hatch on it. This would not require a radical redesign of the hull design and would not entail a significant increase in the mass of the tank.
The suspension has not changed on the T-34-85 either. And if the use of better quality steel for the manufacture of springs helped to avoid their rapid subsidence and, as a result, a decrease in clearance, then it was not possible to get rid of significant longitudinal vibrations of the tank hull in motion. It was an organic defect of the spring suspension. The location of the habitable compartments in front of the tank only exacerbated the negative impact of these fluctuations on the crew and weapons.
A consequence of the layout scheme of the T-34-85 was the absence of a rotating tower poly in the fighting compartment. In battle, the loader worked, standing on the covers of the cassette boxes with shells laid on the bottom of the tank. When turning the tower, he had to move after the breech, while he was prevented by spent cartridges that fell right here on the floor. When conducting intense fire, the accumulated cartridge cases also made it difficult to access the shots placed in the ammunition rack on the bottom.
Summarizing all these points, we can conclude that, unlike the same "Sherman", the possibilities for modernizing the hull and suspension of the T-34-85 were not fully used.
Considering the advantages and disadvantages of the T-34-85, one more very important circumstance must be taken into account. The crew of any tank, as a rule, in everyday reality does not care at all at what angle of inclination the frontal or any other sheet of the hull or turret is located. It is much more important that the tank as a machine, that is, as a combination of mechanical and electrical mechanisms, works accurately, reliably and does not create problems during operation. Including problems associated with the repair or replacement of any parts, assemblies and assemblies. Here, the T-34-85 (like the T-34) was all right. The tank was exceptionally maintainable! It is paradoxical, but true - and the layout is “to blame” for this!
There is a rule: to arrange not to ensure convenient installation - dismantling of units, but based on the fact that the units do not need to be repaired until they completely fail. The required high reliability and non-failure operation are achieved when designing a tank based on ready-made, structurally proven units. Since, when creating the T-34, practically none of the tank units met this requirement, its layout was also carried out contrary to the rule. The roof of the engine compartment was easily removable; All this was of tremendous importance in the first half of the war, when more tanks went out of action due to technical malfunctions than from the enemy’s impact (as of April 1, 1942, for example, in the active army there were 1642 serviceable and 2409 serviceable tanks of all types, while while our combat losses in March amounted to 467 tanks). As the quality of the units improved, which reached the highest level for the T-34-85, the value of the maintainable layout decreased, but the language does not dare to call this a disadvantage. Moreover, good maintainability turned out to be very useful during the post-war operation of the tank abroad, primarily in Asia and Africa, sometimes in extreme climatic conditions and with personnel who had a very mediocre, if not more, level of training.
Despite all the shortcomings in the design of the "thirty-four", a certain balance of compromises was observed, which favorably distinguished this combat vehicle from other tanks of the Second World War. Simplicity, ease of operation and maintenance, combined with good armor protection, maneuverability and powerful enough weapons, became the reason for the success and popularity of the T-34-85 among tankers.
to favorites to favorites from favorites 2
I will say right away that the article is old and not the deepest. But still I decided to raise it, since the article gets good traffic. So I propose to read the publication of the distant 2012.
In the process of searching for information on rare modifications of tanks, I set out to compare the tanks of the USSR and Germany during WWII. There is no lack of information on the Internet, so it is not difficult to conduct a comparative analysis of tanks Red Army and Wehrmacht in June 1941. I conditionally divide all tanks into 4 categories: tankettes, light tanks, artillery tanks, medium tanks.
So at the beginning of the war in the Wehrmacht there were such tanks:
— T-I (Pz I)(two 7.92 mm machine guns)
— T-II ( PzII) (20 mm cannon, machine gun 7.92 mm);
— 38(t) ( PzKpfw 38(t)) (37 mm cannon, 2 machine guns 7.92 mm), letter t means Czech tank;
— T III(37 mm or 50 mm cannon, 3 machine guns);
— T-IV(75 mm short-barreled gun, two 7.92 mm machine guns);
The Red Army is represented by the following tanks:
— T-35(76 mm cannon, 2 cannons 45 mm, 5 machine guns 7.62 mm)
—
- (152 mm howitzer, 4 machine guns 7.62 mm)
— T-28(76 mm cannon, 4 machine guns 7.62 mm)
— T-34(76 mm cannon, 2 machine guns 7.62 mm)
—
- (45 mm cannon, 1 machine gun 7.62 mm)
- (37 mm cannon, 1 machine gun 7.62 mm)
— T-26(45 mm cannon, 2 machine guns 7.62 mm)
— T-40(2 machine guns 12.7 mm and 7.62 mm) floating
— T-38(1 machine gun 7.62 mm)
— T-37(1 machine gun 7.62 mm)
Comparison of wedges in Germany and the USSR
To "wedges" let's take the German tanks T-I and T-II and Soviet T-26, T-37, T-38. For comparison, let's take the German "cannon" T-II tank and our outdated T-26, which was discontinued by the beginning of the war.
Although the thickness of the armor of the T-II tank is 2 times greater than that of the T-26 tank, this did not turn it into a tank with anti-ballistic armor. The gun of the Soviet T-26 tank type 20K 45-mm caliber confidently penetrated such armor at a distance of 1200 m, while the projectile of the 20-mm KwK-30 gun retained the necessary penetration only at a distance of 300–500 m. This combination of armor and armament parameters allowed the Soviet tank, with its proper use, to shoot German tanks with virtually impunity, which was confirmed in the battles in Spain. The T-II tank was also unsuitable for the main task - the destruction of enemy firepower and manpower, since the 20-mm cannon projectile was completely ineffective for this task. To hit the target, a direct hit was required, as from a rifle bullet. At the same time, a “normal” high-explosive fragmentation projectile weighing 1.4 kg was developed for our gun. Such a projectile hit targets such as a machine-gun nest, a mortar battery, a log dugout, etc.
Comparison of light tanks
Next, consider the comparative combat characteristics of the second category - "light tanks". These include all Wehrmacht tanks armed with a 37 mm cannon and machine guns. These are German-made T-III tanks of the D, E, F series and Czech-made tanks 35 (t) and 38 (t). On the Soviet side, we will take for comparative analysis the light tanks BT-7 and BT-7 M.
In terms of “armor, mobility and armament”, our “light tanks” BT-7, at least two are not inferior to the German “troikas”, and Czech tanks are significantly superior in all respects. Frontal armor with a thickness of 30 mm for the T-III tanks of these series, as well as for the T-II tanks, did not provide projectile protection. Our tank with a 45 mm cannon could hit a German tank at a kilometer range, while remaining relatively safe. In terms of mobility and power reserve, the BT-7 (7M) tanks were the best in the world. The fragmentation projectile (610 g) of the 37-mm Skoda tank gun was 2 times smaller than the Soviet 20K gun projectile, which led to a significantly lower damaging effect on infantry. As for the action against armored targets, the 37-mm caliber guns were ineffective (they were nicknamed "army door knockers" in the German troops).
medium tanks
Infantry artillery support tanks were not originally intended to deal with similar targets. A distinctive feature of tanks in this category were short-barreled guns (the T-IV tank has a barrel length in calibers L equal to 24), the initial velocity of the projectile of which and, consequently, the penetration of these guns was very low (the 45-mm Soviet 20K gun was superior in armor penetration to 75-mm German gun of the T-IV tank at all distances). To fight the infantry, our T-28 tank (due to the presence of two separate machine-gun turrets) was better armed. In addition, some of the T-28 tanks of the last years of production were armed with longer-barreled guns and shielded with additional armor plates 20-30 mm thick. A similar modernization in terms of strengthening the armor took place with German tanks (T-IV tanks of the first series A, B, C, etc. had forehead armor - 30 mm, side - 20 mm). As for the short-barreled gun, it was replaced by a long-barreled gun (L 43) only in April 1942. The wide tracks of the Soviet T-28 tank provided it with better maneuverability. In general, in terms of the entire set of tactical and technical characteristics, these tanks were equivalent.
Finally, consider the best that was in service with the tank divisions of the Wehrmacht and the tank divisions of the Red Army on June 22, 1941, conditionally included in the category of "medium tanks".
"The best" this is not my opinion, and the opinion of the state commission (of fifty engineers, designers and intelligence officers), which, under the leadership of People's Commissar Tevosyan, three times in 1939-1941, got acquainted in detail with the state of German tank production and, from all that he saw, selected for purchase only a single T-III tank. The T-III of the H and J series became the best tank due to two circumstances: the new 50-mm KwK-38 cannon and the frontal armor of the hull with a thickness of 50 mm. All other types of tanks were not of interest to our specialists.
This tank was thoroughly studied and tested by shooting at armored targets at the Soviet training ground. Therefore, our military-political leadership was well aware of the level of German tanks and the state of the German tank industry as a whole.
In the Red Army, the "best" of the "medium tanks" category was the T-34 tank.
In all respects - mobility, armor protection, armament, the T-34 tank surpassed the best German T-III tank of the H and J series in June 1941. The long-barreled 76-mm gun T-34 pierced any armor of the most protected German tanks at a distance of 1000-1200 meters. At the same time, not a single Wehrmacht tank could hit the "thirty-four" even from 500 meters.
A powerful diesel engine provided not only high speed and relative fire safety, but also allowed to travel more than 300 km at one gas station.
The most complete and qualified assessment of the Soviet T-34 tank was given by German General B. Müller-Gillebrand:
“The appearance of the T-34 tank was an unpleasant surprise, because due to its speed, high cross-country ability, enhanced armor protection, armament and, mainly, the presence of an elongated 76-mm cannon, which had increased shooting accuracy and penetrating ability of shells at large, until now considered unattainable distance, was a completely new type of tank weapon. Although the German infantry divisions each had a total of 60-80 anti-tank guns and had a sufficient number of other anti-tank weapons, with a caliber of 37 mm guns, they had almost no damaging effect on the thirty-fours. The 50-mm anti-tank gun introduced into service with the German troops at that time was also not an effective means ... "
“The appearance of T-34 tanks radically changed the tactics of tank troops. If until now certain requirements were imposed on the design of the tank and its armament, in particular, to suppress infantry and infantry-supporting means, now the main task was to hit enemy tanks at the maximum range in order to create the prerequisites for subsequent success in battle.
Other generals of the Wehrmacht make similar reviews.
Artillery is the god of war!
Infantry - the queen of the fields !!
Tanks - an iron fist !!!.
Dear colleagues, I bring to your attention information on the state and balance of forces of tank armies at the start of the Great Patriotic War.
How could you lose in 41g. with 26,000 tanks?!
Notes (hereinafter simply, - Note). Once again, a person, investigating the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in 1941, tries on the Wehrmacht the same methods (and the same shirts) that were in the USSR. No more than the number of tanks. And the quality indicators of tanks (both the USSR and Germany) are generally being replaced. We will single out these places and analyze them separately.
Long and slender columns of armored vehicles are immediately drawn - like the Parade on Red Square ...
Well, let's compare the tanks on 06/22/41. QUANTITATIVELY and QUALITATIVELY….
SO - NUMBER
On 22.06.41 The USSR had 12,780 tanks and tankettes in the Western districts ...
The Wehrmacht had 3987 armored vehicles on the border of the USSR + German satellites advanced 347 tanks to the borders of the USSR.
Total - 3987+347= 4334
Note. The number 4334 also includes tanks and tankettes. We will really understand and count. Nothing secret, official network data.
1. Tank Pz I (no more than a tankette), all modifications (Ausf A and B), including command ones, on June 22, 1941, serviceable - 877 units (78%), not serviceable (under repair) - 245 (22% ).
In total, there are 1122 tankettes. This tankette had no cannon armament at all. The main armament is two MG-34 machine guns with a caliber of 7.92 mm. The maximum armor thickness is 13 mm.
2. Tank Pz II. Directly on June 22, 1941, a series of releases from Ausf A to G4 took part (last version April 1941). A total of 1074 tanks. Directly serviceable - 909 (85%), under repair - 165 pieces (15%). The maximum armor thickness is 30 mm.
3. Tank Pz III. Directly on June 22, 1941, a series of releases from Ausf A to J took part. A total of 1000 tanks. Directly serviceable - 825 (82%), under repair - 174 pieces (17%). The maximum armor thickness is 30 mm.
4. Tank Pz IV. Directly on June 22, 1941, a series of releases from Ausf A to E took part. A total of 480 tanks. Directly serviceable - 439 (91%), under repair - 41 pieces (9%). The maximum armor thickness, only on the E series, and for 223 tanks, is 50 mm frontal.
At the same time, tanks with an armor thickness of 50 mm - 223 (7%) (the maximum number, excluding faulty tanks) pieces.
Tanks with armor thickness from 13 to 30 mm - 2827 (93%) pieces. And the most massive tank of the Wehrmacht is the Pz I tankette - 1122 pieces.
Now we begin to deal with the tanks of the satellites.
347 tanks are generally all the tanks in a bunch of all the countries of Germany's allies, in World War II. This includes Romanian tanks, Renault FT-17 and French B-1bis and Italian Vickers 6 tons. As of June 22, 1941, these may have been modern and serviceable tanks, but nothing more than that, if only there is a desire to laugh. In our article, we will not take them into account. Because we will not follow Gareev's methods.
Superiority exactly 3 times….
Note. So far, the superiority is exactly 4 times.
However, there is such an English proverb: (the devil is in the details).
Let's see DETAILS
FIRST
Sometimes those who say that, lo and behold, we had, there, 3 times more tanks than the Germans, forget that the Germans, in principle, 4334 are serviceable tank equipment, combat-ready.
Note. With what fright did ALL 4334 BECOME SERVICEABLE AND COMBAT READY? Here they are where the details start to emerge. Everything is correct. Yes, but we won't believe it.
In our country, only tanks of the first two categories (out of 4 available) could be ready for combat ... The first category is a completely new technique.
The second category is serviceable military equipment, used and faulty military equipment requiring current repair.
The third and fourth categories - there are already various types of repairs - medium repairs, major repairs that cannot be restored, and so on. That is, this third or fourth category - it can actually be discarded. As for the border districts, there were about 8,000 tanks of the first two categories (excluding those requiring ongoing repairs).
2. Categorization of equipment is nothing more than bureaucratic correspondence only for repair departments. Categorization is intended to show the value of the service of the tank (or other equipment) in the troops. To the practice of using tanks, categorization is irrelevant.
3. Medium repairs were carried out in the subdivisions by the forces of the subdivisions with the involvement of specialists from the repair authorities. In an average repair, tanks can be not only category III or IV, but also II and even I. A tank is transferred to the fourth category only before it is decommissioned. Prior to this, the tank is in category III. And it will be repaired.
Pay attention to the logic of the author, who is trying to prove that the USSR had as many tanks as in Germany. First, ALL TANKS that GERMANY COULD have are calculated. Including tanks with bulletproof armor, as well as tanks produced in 1917. And with regard to the USSR, a note is used that only tanks of the first two categories, that is, new tanks, will be counted. That's just not how things are done. If you want to count, count, only apply the same methods to everyone. Because if we start counting only new German tanks, produced in 1940 and 1941, then our number of German tanks will be reduced to 1124 units and no more.
Where did the number of 8000 tanks come from?
Very simple. This is such arithmetic (Pupkin, without pictures). It's just that 4780 tanks are stupidly equated with old, obsolete and out-of-service tanks. What was it for? In order to try to prove that there were about 8000 serviceable types.
Pay attention once again. When counting German tanks, the words " about" not used. Everything is accurate. There are so many of these. Plus, these have so much more. And all are correct.
And the USSR (poor) has about 8000. There is no accuracy. And it can't be.
Let's really look at the details. And let's compare.
As of June 22, the Western Special Military District alone had 1,136 T-26 tanks. It was customary to laugh at this tank in the USSR. But by the way. Captured T-26s were used by the Wehrmacht in both 1941 and 1942. And in Finland, the T-26 was in service until 1961.
October 1941. The German infantry is advancing under cover ... of the Soviet T-26 tank (already in other hands).
October 1941. BT-7M, on the other side.
German armored car Ba-20.
Another Ba-20 in other hands.
And this is the T-34, on the other side.
This is a modernized (by the Germans) KV-1 tank
August 1941, apparently - these are not serviceable tanks?
November 1941. Modernized and brought to mind (by the Germans) thirty-four.
September 1941. The Germans did not pass by the KV-2 either, they also brought it to mind. The finish is visible to the naked eye.
March 1945. Soviet tankers did not disdain German tanks.
Armor - 15 mm (since 1939 20 mm), in 1940 the T-26 received shielded armor. But, let's not T-26, armor is the only thing inferior to the T-26 to German tanks on June 22, 1941.
But in terms of weapons, he surpassed them. Because the T-26 had a 45-mm 20-K tank gun. The initial speed of an armor-piercing projectile is 760 m/s. In the flesh until December 1941, this was quite enough to knock out any German tank at a distance of 300 meters.
Little of. The latest modifications of the T-26, produced in 1938 and 1939, had a stabilizer in the vertical plane of the gun and sight. Because this type of tank (in total, the last modification consisted of 2567 vehicles) it was easier to fire on the move, without short stops.
The ratio is 1 to 2 ... It seems to be not bad .. However, there is such a sad thing: 95% of Soviet tanks had bulletproof armor and could be hit by any anti-tank gun ...
Note. And 93% of German tanks (we have already proven this above) were tanks with bulletproof armor.
PAK 35/36 pierced 40-50 mm armor from 300 meters with a sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile. With a conventional projectile, she pierced the armor of 95% of Soviet tanks from half a kilometer.
Note. And the Soviet 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K pierced 40-50 mm armor from 300 meters with a sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile. With a conventional projectile, she pierced the armor of 100% of German tanks from half a kilometer.
Speed - firing 10-15 rounds per minute ...
Note. The Soviet cannon has the same rate of fire of 10-15 rounds per minute.
Both the Wehrmacht in 41-42 and the Red Army in 43-45 sought to avoid an oncoming tank battle in the offensive: what's the point of spending a bunch of ammunition, people and equipment forming a breakthrough, and introducing a tank corps / division into it, in order to through 20-30 km., exchange your tanks in battle for enemy tanks? - It is much more reasonable to put your anti-tank weapons under the counterattack of enemy tanks ...
Note. And here is the stop. Dear! You are a blacksmith who jumps from topic to topic. We are not interested in what happened in 1942 and 1943. We are specifically looking at 1941.
The attacker expends his infantry formations, which are the majority in the army, to strike at a pre-selected sector of defense. The defender can only cover this blow to a limited extent with the same infantry formations - he could muster for " sealing» breaking through only those of them that were in close proximity to the site that was hit. The defender is forced to use valuable motorized formations to parry the blow, pulling them to the hacked section of the front .... where he stumbles upon anti-tank defenses on the flanks of the enemy offensive ....
THEN. all the numerous Soviet tanks were devalued by their bulletproof armor ....
Note. All the same applied to German tanks, even in defense, even in the offensive. However, this is not an answer to the question why". This is nothing more than speculation on the topic. Combat is organized and coordinated action. And not rides, in order to " pulling, bumping". Any anti-tank unit is not without a finite. And even more vulnerable than the tank itself. Therefore, in the USSR, the 45-mm anti-tank gun (PTP) was called - " goodbye motherland"(there was another option" death to the enemy ..... calculation”), and in the Wehrmacht the 37-mm PTP Pak 35/36 was called “ mallet».
Now let's look at the QUALITY side ...
We had the best T-34-76 and KV tank in the world .... They could have rolled out " in the open field» - « crowd to crowd all German tanks...
Hmm... an anecdote immediately comes to mind...
There is a tour of the zoo. He comes to a cage with a huge elephant. And then one person asks:
- And what does he eat?
- Well, - the guide answers him, - cabbage, hay, carrots, vegetables, total - 100 kilograms.
- And what - he will eat it all? - the curious sightseer is surprised.
- He will eat something, - the guide answers, - but who will give him ?!
Note. And who, one wonders, is to blame for the fact that Soviet tanks (elephants) were not given 100 kilograms of something a day? And the anecdote cited is somewhat inappropriate. Need an example? Please. In August 1941, a tank platoon of Senior Lieutenant Klobanov Zinovy Konstantinovich in only one battle disabled 22 enemy tanks. If we approach the example of Kolobanov in August 1941, then the question is, who limited the elephants of Kolobanov? None. That is, when no one interfered with the tankers of the Red Army in battle (from elephant breeders, in the form of senior authorities), the tankers achieved not only results, but also performed real feats.
If there were idiots in the Wehrmacht who only dreamed of clashing in a head-on tank battle with enemy tanks, then it’s clear what we would ask them ... But here’s the trouble, the vile nemchura near Prokhorovka, and near Lepel, and wherever she could - she substituted her anti-tank weapons under the counterattack of Soviet tanks .. about which tank attacks were safely broken ... and if the T-34 or KV had a chance, then other tankers burned even at the distant approaches ...
Note. It's not that there were idiots in the Wehrmacht or not. And the point is that, I repeat, the battle is organized and coordinated actions. Success in battle is achieved not by a single tank, but only as a result of joint active actions. And if the intelligence of the Germans worked at the proper level and revealed Soviet tanks: without infantry, without artillery and air support, then why nod at the Germans. Idiots, it turns out, were not the Germans, but the Soviet command. Which is not clear what he was thinking when he sent his tanks into battle.
BUT! It seemed to be about 1941. How to return the author to 1941, is it not clear? Prokhorovka is still flowers. But the berries appear further. It's really a joke.
Such a trifle - the proportion of tanks with normal armor (i.e. medium and heavy), capable of withstanding anti-tank artillery was:
- in the Red Army - about 5%;
- in the tank troops of the Wehrmacht on the eastern front - about 50%.
Note. Here they are berries appeared. It turns out that in 1941 the Germans had medium and heavy tanks, in percentage terms as much as 50%. Whereas in the USSR - they are only 5%. This is an anecdote, it would be nice if they compared it with the tank fleet of Italy, there would be no problems. But with the tanks of the USSR - it's ridiculous. Did the Germans have something equal to the T-35? Or maybe it was something equal to the T-28? Why these tanks were lost - the answer will be below.
We will name the Soviet heavy tanks of 1941 without any problems. But, just let the respected author call " heavy» German tanks on June 22, 1941?
Once again, pay attention to what words are used to describe German tanks - " medium and heavy". And for the Soviet faulty and outdated". This is the method of NLP (Neuro-Linguistic Programming). The key to this method is the union " And". This was always done in the USSR when it was necessary to denigrate something. With this method, you can denigrate anything at all, for example: “ astronauts and sadomites". We didn’t say anything bad about the astronauts, but the negative is already on the face. The result will be if this is repeated constantly. This was proven back in the 19th century by Gustave Lebonne.
But our medium tanks were better than the German ones! Is it true!?
Note. In some ways yes, and in some ways no.
I will disappoint, but the best tank of the Red Army T-34-76 in 41. still inferior to his German " opponent».
Note. The key word in the sentence above, the word " still". Therefore, we will answer the Aftor with the same word (and method): T-34-76 in 1941 was not inferior to any German tank. And therefore we will disappoint the respected author.
ARMOR - as an opportunity to resist enemy anti-tank weapons:
T-34-76 - 40 - 45 mm.
PZ-3-J - 50 mm.
Note. PzIII Ausf. J is a March 1941 issue tank. This is the only thing that the author seized on. But there is one small but. From March to December 1941, the Pz III Ausf J was produced with a 50 mm KwK 38 L/42 gun (a 50 mm tank gun, model 1938, with a barrel length of 42 calibers, or 2100 mm).
From December 1941, Pz III Ausf J began to be produced with a 50 mm KwK 39 L / 60 gun (50 mm tank gun, model 1939, with a barrel length of 60 calibers, or 3000 mm).
Since March 1941, the 76.2 mm F-34 gun with a barrel length of 41.5 calibers, which is 3162 mm, was installed on all T-34s.
There are two clarifications to be made here:
- the strength of the German armor was about 1.5 times higher than the Soviet one (in 1941, where did this come from?)
- the T-34 armor plates have a rational angle of inclination.
But the slope of the armor plates makes sense when the caliber of the projectile is equal to the thickness of the armor. Therefore, for example, the gunner of a 50-mm gun was " purple"at what angle are the armor plates of the tank bent .... the main thing is to hit.
Note. It turns out that rational angles of inclination are garbage? And why, then, all the countries in the world subsequently switched to rational angles? But! On a German tank in June 1941, a 50 mm cannon, with a short barrel. A very wonderful tool. But to cause harm, the T-34 of the release of March 1941, this gun could only from a distance of 300 meters, and to the side or to the back. Everything. In all other cases, it couldn't. But even this is not the main thing. Not every hit in a tank and penetration of armor means the defeat of the tank.
And the T-34 could harm the Pz III Ausf J with its 76-mm cannon at least from 500 meters, at least from 1000. Not just because the gun is more powerful, but in addition to the gun, the Pz III Ausf J lacked rational armor slope angles. On which they hit everything not with a 50-mm cannon, but with a 76-mm one.
In the same example with Klobanov, the KV-1 tank during the battle received more than 40 hits in the armor of German shells. And not only was it not damaged, but also capable of further battles. It is very surprising, but after the battle on August 22, Kolobanov's tank did not fall into the IV category. This was for the Soviet tankers " purple"Will a German shell hit them or not. Because they knew perfectly well that the Germans had short-barreled tank guns that were not intended to fight armored targets.
By December 1941, the Wehrmacht command had just revised its attitude towards its tanks. Because the tankers of the Wehrmacht were far from " purple"A Soviet 76-mm armor-piercing projectile will hit them or not.
ENGINE:
T-34-76 - engine " V-2» « was dying» after 40-60 hours of operation. This is an indicator of the quality of production.
Pz-III Ausf. J - engine " maybach"had a reserve of motor resources of 400 hours. This is also an indicator of the quality of production.
SPEED (highway/cross country):
T-34-76 - 54/25 km / h
Pz-III Ausf. J - 67/15 km/h
But! On the gravel highway Kubinka Pz-III Ausf. H and J accelerated on a measured kilometer to a speed of 69.7 km / h, while the best indicator for the T-34 was 48.2 km / h. The BT-7 on wheels, selected as a standard, developed only 68.1 km / h!
At the same time: the German car surpassed the T-34 in terms of smoothness, it turned out to be less noisy - at maximum speed, the Pz.III was heard for 150-200 m, and the T-34 - for 450 m. Even in this case, you can add the author that the Soviet tankers, sadly, were very fond of the Pz-III Ausf. J and not only, but even version H. Why? Because the tank was of high quality. He did not whistle, did not fall off and did not turn around by itself.
BENEFITS FOR THE CREW:
Pz-III Ausf. J - had a three-man tower, in which there were quite comfortable conditions for the combat work of the crew members. The commander had a convenient turret that provided him with excellent visibility, all crew members had their own intercom devices.
In the T-34 turret, two tankmen could hardly be accommodated, one of whom served not only as a gunner, but also as a tank commander, and in some cases as a unit commander. Only two of the four crew members were provided with internal communication - the tank commander and the driver. All of the above is absolutely correct. But this does not apply directly to the tank itself. This is the problem - the Soviet tank generals. Who ordered the T-34, while the tank commander was not a gunner, but a loader. This applied in general to all Soviet tanks produced before 1943. And we emphasize - this is not a problem for the T-34, this is a problem for the Soviet tank school.
"ARMOR PIERCING" of the tank in 41:
- T-37-76 - limited by the lack of armor-piercing shells. At the end of 1941 resolved.
- Pz-III Ausf. J - limited by a relatively weak gun. At the end of 1941 solved by introducing a new gun…
Note. The absence of an armor-piercing projectile is not an indicator that a tank cannot fight against a tank. German Pz-III Ausf. J behind the eyes and behind the ears, a 76-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectile would be enough. And one. After the battle, the crew would have to be removed from a completely intact tank and replaced with another one.
After reading, the answer to the question does not come. So what's the reason? Why did the USSR, having even 8000 serviceable tanks, manage to blow dry 3050 tanks in the initial phase of the war, of which the vast majority are tankettes?
After all, it is very simple to calculate everything. For every German tank, there are 2 Soviet ones, and another 1900 can be left in reserve. Just in case. You never know what.
But they didn't do that. And they didn't.
As of October 28, 1941, there were 441 tanks on the Western Front, of which: 33 KV-1, 175 T-34, 43 BT, 50 T-26, 113 T-40 and 32 T-60. This is from 3852 of the original composition, on June 22, 1941.
On October 28, 1941, there were 8.7 (almost 9) times fewer tanks on the Western Front than there were on June 22 of the same year!
But if it is already necessary to answer the question, then there is no problem.
REASONS for the loss of tanks in the USSR from 22.61941 to 28.10.1941:
1. any Wehrmacht tank is not just an armored wagon. Each tank had appropriate means of communication. Not only did he have something. These means of communication were tested, there was a certain experience in their use. And if a person did not understand or did not want to understand: how the means of communication works, why it is needed and what they achieve with the help of means of communication in battle, then this person WOULD NEVER BE POSTED TO THE POSITION OF A TANK COMMANDER;
2. Wehrmacht command tank is not just the same tank as the rest, just a little different. This is a control vehicle that could take part in battle on an equal footing with all the tanks of the platoon. But at the same time, with everything, she not only controlled, but had a connection with each participating tank. And among other things, the commander of a tank platoon of the Wehrmacht in his command tank had: communications equipment for interacting with infantry, communications for interacting with artillery, communications for interacting with aviation and a means of communication with senior authorities. And if the commander of a tank platoon COULD NOT CORRECT ARTILLERY FIRE, DIRECTION OF OWN AVIATION AND COULD NOT INTERACT WITH INFANTRY, then such a person would never have been appointed to the position of commander of a tank platoon.
At the time of 2013, in the Russian army, the commander of a tank platoon not only does not have (but does not even dream of having) means of communication for interacting with aviation, he has no connection with his own artillery. Has a very infrequent and very unstable connection with his tanks, as well as (by no means always) with the infantry;
3 . a tank platoon of the Wehrmacht is not three tanks, as was customary in the USSR and now in Russia. The tank platoon of the Wehrmacht is 7 tanks. Two in each section, plus the commander's own, the 7th tank. Because the tank company of the Wehrmacht could be involved in operational tasks. And attracted. But why? In the USSR and in Russia, it is still not clear. Because the organization is not just different. And completely different. Not even close to Soviet.
There were two tanks in each squad for a reason. The essence of the application is simple: the first performs a maneuver (any), and the second covers it at this time. The options for actions are generally darkness;
4 . the term for coordinating the tank crew of the Wehrmacht is two years (the figure is still wild for the army of the USSR, and even more so for Russians). People did not just learn from the practical experience of their predecessors, but the crews literally got used to each of their people. In order to achieve understanding in battle without words at all, with one half-glance. At the same time, special attention was paid to which crew supports, which one operates. And therefore they did not arrange a hodgepodge in people.
The Wehrmacht tank commander was not a loader. He was only a gunner in the Pz I tank. On all other Wehrmacht tanks, the tank commander controlled the crew in battle.
And the last. The specific customer of the tanks in Germany were not the generals, but those who fought in the tanks. That is, when the German Minister of Armaments sent his representatives to the troops so that they would give a clear and clear picture of what and how to modernize, then representatives of the Ministry of Armaments talked with drivers, gunners and tank commanders. And not with the commanders of tank divisions. The commander of a tank division could only facilitate the delivery of a representative of the Ministry of Armaments to each unit and its protection.
Because the Germans did not have flying tanks”, but that is why the Wehrmacht managed to get to Moscow on wedges Pz I Ausf A.
And everything that was slapped in the USSR before 1941, into which the resource was simply colossal (factories have been drowning space for almost 20 years, it turns out just like that), it was either stupidly thrown (and accordingly went to the Germans) or lost - because not intended at all for warfare. For travel during parades on Red Square, and nothing more.
Gareev's methods are still alive today. Not only are they rewriting history. To this day, only a quantitative indicator is estimated in the Russian army. And not all quality. The training of those who will fight at all is not taken into account. So not so long ago, the chief of the general staff of the Russians, Gerasimov, stated that: “ The troops are poorly trained, and the headquarters are very well trained.».
Just now, " highly professional staffs"they can't prepare in any way (even before their" nearly"level) of those who will bring victories or defeats to these headquarters in the war.
In 1941, the headquarters were also prepared for so much " Okay”, that this did not prevent the Red Army from retreating to Moscow itself.
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Soviet vehicles, but the role of the main tank still belonged to the "troika". The defeat of the Soviet tank divisions and mechanized corps deployed along the western border was so swift that later it gave rise to many rumors that the German tanks "many times outnumbered and were much better than the Soviet ones." The last statement is incorrect only because the KV and T-34 were listed as part of the Soviet tank group, which had no equal in 1941, and as for numerical superiority, on the contrary, it was the USSR that outnumbered Germany in the number of tanks, but if we take into account not all the equipment dispersed throughout the vast territory of the USSR, but only the tank forces of the troops of the western border districts, then it turns out that this is not a "multiple", but only a twofold superiority. Scattered along the entire border, Soviet tank units, which, moreover, did not have such impressive infantry support as the German tank forces, were forced to meet an avalanche of well-directed and concentrated strikes of large masses of German armored vehicles in narrow sections of the front. The formal numerical superiority of Soviet tanks in such conditions no longer mattered. The Germans quickly broke through the weak front line of the Soviet defense and occupied huge areas in the deep Soviet rear and held them with their motorized infantry, disorganizing the entire Soviet defense system. Our tanks in the first weeks of the war most often attacked the enemy without aviation, artillery and infantry support. Even if they managed to carry out a successful counterattack, they could not hold the captured positions without the help of the infantry. The superiority in manpower of Germany over the troops of the western border districts made itself felt. In addition, Germany, as already mentioned, at the beginning of the war clearly surpassed the USSR in mastery of tank units, in organizing interaction between tanks and other branches of the armed forces, and in good operational leadership of mobile formations. This is not even surprising, given that the German command had the experience of two large and swift military operations (the defeat of Poland and France), in which effective methods of tank groups, the interaction of tanks with infantry, aviation and artillery were worked out. The Soviet command did not have such experience, therefore, at the beginning of the war, it was obviously weaker in terms of the art of managing tank formations. Add to this the lack of combat experience of many tank crews, superimposed on the mistakes and miscalculations of the Soviet command. As the war progresses, experience, knowledge and skills will be acquired, and Soviet combat vehicles will become a truly formidable weapon in the capable hands of tankers and commanders of tank units. The prediction of the German tank commander Melentin, who predicted that the Russians, who created such a wonderful instrument as tanks, would never learn to play it, would not come true. They learned to play very well - and the brilliant operations of the Red Army against the Wehrmacht in the second half of the war are vivid and indisputable confirmation of this. The technical superiority of the USSR in the prewar years and during the war
Soviet tanks at the initial stage of the Second World War were superior in combat characteristics to all their potential opponents. In the arsenal of the Soviet tank forces at the beginning of the war there were such vehicles, which at that time had no analogues. These were medium tanks "T-34", as well as heavy tanks "KV-1" and "KV-2". They had sufficiently powerful weapons and were able to hit any German tank of that period at a long distance of fire combat, while remaining invulnerable to the fire of the bulk of the German guns of that period. German tankers
they could not oppose the good armor of Soviet combat vehicles. The main regular 37mm cannon of the Germans did not allow to confidently hit the "T-34" or "KV" in the frontal projection from medium and long distances, and this forced the Germans to often use heavy anti-aircraft guns FlaK caliber 88mm in the early stages of the war to fight Soviet tanks. In addition to the T-34 and KV, the USSR possessed a large number of light combat vehicles, especially in the Soviet army there were T-26 tanks. The armor of the T-26 and BT-7 tanks, which were common in the Soviet army in the early 40s, left much to be desired, but many of them carried a 45mm gun that could successfully hit all German tanks at the beginning of the war, which means under certain conditions and competent use, this technique could withstand German tanks. In the second half of the war, Soviet designers carried out a comprehensive modernization of the "thirty-four", the T-34-85 tank appeared, as well as new heavy tanks "IS". Excellent vehicle dynamics and powerful weapons did their job: "IS" successfully hit its main opponents at long distances, while remaining slightly vulnerable to enemy return fire. Thus, Soviet tanks during the Second World War somehow surpassed their German opponents in the quality of combat vehicles, and at the final stage of the war they also had a decisive numerical superiority over a demoralized enemy.