USSR in the 20th century. Foreign policy of the USSR on the eve of the war. The main tasks facing diplomats

USSR in the 20-30s.
Handbook for preparing for the exam in history
The topics covered correspond to the USE codifier in the history of 2010.
Author: Bocharov A.Yu., teacher of history and social studies, Novichihinskaya secondary school p. Novichikha, Altai Territory

NEP (new economic policy) The historical necessity of the NEP

By 1921, a comprehensive
economic and political crisis, the threat of loss of power. To that
time, industrial production in the country decreased by
compared with 1913 by 7 times, agricultural production amounted to
only 2/3 of the pre-war level. The discontent of the people is growing, the most
a vivid expression of which were the uprisings of the peasants (especially
"mutinies" in the Tambov province and Western Siberia) and an uprising
sailors in Kronstadt.
In March 1921, at the X Party Congress, a decision was made to replace
surplus tax in kind. Now the state took
peasants, not all the bread, but a certain, firmly established share.
The peasant could dispose of the remaining products in his own way.
discretion, which naturally revived labor incentives.
Later, free trade was expressly permitted.

The essence of the NEP

Two points of view on the essence of NEP:
NEP - a fundamental change in policy,
long-term course based on
realism, at a compromise with private
sector.
NEP - forced retreat under
maintaining the foundations of the regime, and above all
Communist Party monopoly on power. Such
understanding of NEP is closer to the truth.

Main directions and results of the NEP

Partial privatization of industry. The strongest were
positions of the "private sector" in trade in 1923, it accounted for
80% retail. To attract foreign
capital investments, went to the delivery of some enterprises (formerly
total in the extraction of raw materials) to foreign capitalists ("concessions").
The monetary reform was of great importance. Position is changing
state enterprises: they are transferred to self-sufficiency.
Under NEP, a kind of "mixed" economy developed, an economy in
the hands of the state was combined with the assumption of commodity-money
relations and "private".
The result of the NEP is the restoration of the economy. appeasement of the country
cessation of mass uprisings, accompanied by terror with
both sides.
Measures for the revival of elementary legality: being restored
prosecutor's supervision, advocacy, a new civil
code.

Contradictions of the NEP and its significance

The most important contradiction in the economy - the Bolshevik regime, having made concessions to the "private trader", continued
diktat in relation to the economy, subordinating it to ideological priorities.
The bureaucratic system of industrial management was preserved. All leadership positions were
communists who did not have the necessary competence. Significant expenditures required
the content of this numerous administrative apparatus.
The regime artificially maintained a relatively high level of
wages that do not correspond to real labor productivity - an increase in the cost
products. Private entrepreneurs and traders have not received the necessary social and legal
guarantees. The overcoming of ruin and the economic revival of the countryside led to the stratification of the peasantry.
Larger peasant farms were more efficient and marketable.
In an effort to avoid exorbitant tax pressure, strong farms were split up, artificially
turning into "poor". In the 20s. the rate of fragmentation of peasant farms was 2 times higher than before
revolution, which became one of the most important reasons for the decline in the marketability of agriculture.
Allowed to save the country from a complete catastrophe, to feed it, to overcome devastation. But new ones are accumulating
contradictions, which became an important prerequisite for a change in policy in the late 20s.

Education of the USSR. national question

The national question was of great importance for the country, because. Russia is one of
most multinational states.
After the October Revolution, two main directions in the national
politics. On the one hand, the "principle of self-determination" is put forward. This is
was necessary for the conquest and retention of power, for the acquisition
support among the masses. Moreover, it was an acknowledgment of a real
state of affairs, the actual collapse of the former state territory
(a number of peoples still could not be kept from leaving).
November 2, 1917 - "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia". Its 2nd point: "The right
peoples of Russia to free self-determination up to secession and
formation of independent states". In accordance with this, in December
was recognized as the independence of Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia.
On the other hand, the Bolsheviks carry out the "export of the revolution", under
under the pretext of "help," they seek to establish their power in the outlying districts. This is
concerned, first of all, Ukraine. In January 1918 an attempt was made
"export of the revolution" to Finland. The Bolshevik regime is here
held out until May and was crushed by German troops.

Education of the USSR. Nation-state construction by the beginning of the 20s.

By the end of the civil war - a whole system of nation-states of two types:
autonomy within the RSFSR. The first of them is the Tatar-Bashkir Republic - since March
1918 In addition, various forms of autonomy were granted to the Kirghiz,
Mari, Dagestanis, Buryats, Mongols, Kalmyks, Crimean Tatars, Germans
Volga region, etc.
sovereign Soviet republics. In addition to the RSFSR: in December 1917 proclaimed
Ukrainian Soviet Republic, in January 1919 - Belarusian. In 1920 - early 1921
gg. with the help of Soviet troops "export of revolution" in Transcaucasia. The formation of new
Soviet republics: April 1920 - Azerbaijan, November - Armenia, February 1921 -
Georgia. In March 1922 they were merged into the Transcaucasian Federation (ZSFSR). So 4
"independent" republics. In addition, in 1920, with the help of Soviet troops,
created "people's republics" in Central Asia (Turkestan) Khiva and Bukhara,
which were actually under the protectorate of Russia.
The independence of all these states is very relative. First, the overwhelming
dominance of the RSFSR. Secondly, the concentration of power in the party leadership.
A "military-political" union of republics was formed - in fact, a common military
command, a unified socio-economic policy.
After the end of the civil war - the formation of a system of bilateral treaties
between the republics ("treaty federation"), which significantly limited
independence of the republics. For example, an agreement between the RSFSR and Azerbaijan in
November 1920 provided for the unification of six sectors: defense, economics,
foreign trade, food, transport, post, telegraph, finance.

Education of the USSR. The struggle of opinions about the ways of forming the state

The Party has taken two approaches to this problem. On the one hand, there was
the revival of imperial traditions, the dictates of the center over the outskirts. Lenin called it
"Great Russian chauvinism" and considered it the main danger in the national
question.
On the other hand, the communist elite strove to preserve a large
independence, opposed closer relations, fearing dictate
Moscow. This trend was called "national deviationism" and was especially evident in
Ukraine and Georgia.
The aggravation of the struggle between the two currents was especially sharply manifested in 1922 in
called the "Georgian incident". It showed that postponing the cardinal
solution of the national question was impossible. In August 1922, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)
formed a commission headed by Stalin to prepare a draft of the principles of a new
system of relations between nationalities in Russia. Stalin was determined
supporter of a centralized state.
Having learned about the "plan of autonomy", Lenin resolutely opposed in his work "On the Question of
about nationalities or about "autonomization". Stalin's version - poorly covered
expression of "Great Russian chauvinism". Lenin proposed a project according to which
all the republics, including Russia, were to conclude an "alliance" among themselves on
basis of the principle of equality and federation. With great difficulty, Lenin, in essence,
forced the Politburo to reject Stalin's idea.

Education of the USSR. Its characteristics as a multinational state

On January 31, 1924, the II Congress of Soviets approved the Constitution of the USSR.
Basic moments:
Republics were proclaimed equal, sovereign, having the right to secede.
They transferred the most important powers to the allied bodies: international representation,
defense, border revision, internal security, foreign trade, planning, transport,
budget, communication, money and credit.
Union authorities:
The supreme body of the Congress of Soviets, elected on the basis of indirect, not universal, disproportionate
suffrage. He met once every two years.
Between congresses - the Central Executive Committee. It consisted of two chambers - the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities. three
once a year.
Between sessions of the CEC its Presidium. The post of its chairman was taken in turn by the chairmen of the CEC
four republics (Kalinin, Petrovsky, Chervyakov, Narimanov). The supreme governing body
SNK. The Council of People's Commissars has a number of the most important allied people's commissariats and departments, incl. OGPU.
Experience has shown that the solution of the national question found was not the best of all possible
solutions. On the one hand, the "union" structure of the state was largely a fiction, on the other
On the other hand, the division of the country along national lines inevitably gave rise to the danger of separatism
(the desire to separate from a single state). The implementation of the Leninist project laid a "mine
delayed action" under the created multinational state. While there was
totalitarian regime, he "iron fist" restrained ethnic conflicts. After him
fall, they manifested themselves, as we see now, with all sharpness.

10. Industrialization of the USSR. Historical pattern of industrialization

Was industrialization necessary? At the end of the 20s. in
the leading circles of the USSR all approved the idea
forced (accelerated) industrialization, which
would allow the USSR to "catch up and overtake11 the developed
countries of the West. The novelty was that
tasked with industrialization as soon as possible
and "at any cost". Industrialization justified
factor of external danger, threat from
"world imperialism", the need to create
powerful defense capability. Hostility
capitalist countries to the Soviet Union was
reaction to the Bolshevik policy of "exporting
revolution". A direct threat arises only with
the establishment of the Nazi regime in Germany (1933)

11. The main stages of industrialization. First five-year plan

It begins with the XIV Congress ("Congress of Industrialization") in 1925. The decisive stage of this process is the years of pre-war
five-year plans and, above all, the first of them (1928-1933). Implementation of the first five-year plan began as early as 1928,
although her plan was adopted only in April 1929 at the 16th Party Conference.
The main feature of the first five-year plan was the accelerated construction of heavy industry enterprises. by the most
the most famous of them were the DneproGES, the metallurgical plants Magnitogorsk in the Urals and Kuznetsk in the Western
Siberia; Stalingrad, Chelyabinsk and Kharkov tractor plants, car factories in Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod.
The feat of the people. Carrying out forced industrialization, the country's leadership relied on the mass enthusiasm of the people,
especially the youth. The Stalinist leadership shamelessly exploited this enthusiasm, mercilessly
squandered the forces of the people. In order to obtain the currency necessary to pay for foreign equipment, from
countries exported bread, timber, oil, furs, art treasures from museums. From individuals with the help of the GPU and the network
gold was confiscated from special shops. An important role in the implementation of plans for accelerated industrialization
played a system of forced, essentially slave labor, which takes shape on a large scale precisely at this
period. "Dispossession" and other repressions gave a large amount of cheap labor"
By the end of the five-year plan, the planned targets even in the field of heavy industry, on which the main funds were rushed,
have not been fulfilled. Production of means of production increased by 170% instead of the planned 230%, it was
not 17 million tons of iron and steel were smelted, but only 6 million tons, electricity generation amounted to 1–3.5 billion square meters. h instead of 42
billion
Investments in industry brought 3 billion rubles. The quality of the products has deteriorated drastically. In the economy of the USSR
serious problems arose for years to come, which determined the features of the country's development.
Forced industrial growth was accompanied by further nationalization of the economy, the elimination of various
forms of private economic activity. Collectivization was carried out through exorbitant taxes and various
persecution, private industry and trade were forced out of the economy, many "Nepmen" were
arrested.

12. Industrialization of the USSR. Second Five-Year Plan, 1933–1937

The new five-year plan began in an atmosphere of socio-economic crisis, the failure of adventurous
plans, aggravation of all contradictions. The efficiency of enterprises is very low due to economic
imbalances, low discipline and poor training of managers and workers - for the most part
recent peasants. The situation was also difficult in the village, engulfed in hunger; collective farms and state farms
were on the verge of collapse.
Stalin was forced to withdraw to more sober positions. Growth was announced to be slowing down
heavy industry and the intention to accelerate the development of industry in the near future,
producing consumer goods. More attention has been given to improving the standard of living
in particular, in 1935 the card system was abolished.
Some improvement in the situation of the people made it possible to some extent to raise their labor activity. This is
manifested itself in the deployment of the "Stakhanov movement". In various sectors of the economy,
followers of A. Stakhanov: metallurgist M. Mazai, machinist P. Krivonos, blacksmith A. Busygin, milling machine
I. Gudov, weavers Evdokia and Maria Vinogradov and thousands of others. The records of the "Stakhanovites" could not
compensate for such phenomena typical of our economy as the lack of material
interest among the bulk of the workers, low discipline, poor organization of labor.
Encouraging the "Stakhanov movement", the authorities sought to expand the social support of the regime, to create a layer
privileged workers. "Stakhanovites" turned into a kind of caste, sharply different in
their standard of living from ordinary workers: they received very high wages, good apartments,
sometimes cars. However, soon the period of concessions to realism and policy easing ended. In
the second half of the 30s. the Great Terror begins.

13. Industrialization of the USSR. Results

In terms of absolute volumes of industrial production in the USSR in the late 30s. went to 2nd place in the world after the USA (in 1913 - 5th place). In the 30s
gg. The USSR became one of three or four countries capable of producing
any kind of industrial products. Whole new industries have emerged
– production of automobiles, tractors, aircraft, etc.
The value of all these achievements is devalued by the following: high
rates of industrial growth were obtained by excessively expensive
at a price, due to the ruthless exploitation of all the resources of the country; in
country has failed to form a modern economic
structure. Successes mainly in heavy industry: before
all military. All other industries have just begun the transition to
machine production. Social Consequences of Industrialization
- liquidation of "non-socialist structures". meant complete
approval in our country of the system of nationalization, the first steps towards
which were made after October 1917. Stalin named all these
transformations by the "second revolution" (after the "Great October") or
"revolution from above".

14. Collectivization. Historical background

The first attempts to collectivize the peasants - during the civil war, when
Collective farms and state farms began to be planted in every possible way in the countryside. In 1922, along with
other works that made up Lenin's "testament", his article appeared
"On Cooperation", which set the task of a gradual and voluntary
bringing peasants to collective farms through cooperation. It is believed that
subsequent policy in the countryside was the embodiment of the "Leninist
cooperative plan.
At the 15th Party Congress (December 1927), the task of collectivization in
as the main task of the party in the countryside. The subsequent course of events was
largely determined by the "grain procurement crisis" at the end of the 20s.
Industrialization required more and more funds, which could be
get through the export of bread. But the peasants did not want to hand it over
pittance, grain procurement plans were frustrated. 1928–1929 were held in
conditions of "knocking out" bread through various repressions. Conclusion -
accelerated unification of peasants into collective farms.
The sharp turn towards emergency measures has raised concerns among individuals,
more realistically thinking, party leaders (N. Bukharin, A. Rykov,
M. Tomsky). Elimination of the last "doubters" from the party
leadership allowed Stalin and his supporters to freely cross
for forced collectivization.

15. Collectivization. "The Great Break"

In November 1929, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the party, it was concluded that, in the mood
the main masses of the peasantry, there is a "great change" in the direction
collective farms. The Plenum created a special commission of the Politburo, which
developed a concrete plan of collectivization.
On January 5, 1930, a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was adopted, proclaiming
"complete collectivization" and "liquidation of the kulaks as a class."
The main means of forcing peasants to unite in collective farms is the threat
"dispossession". The secret resolution of the Central Committee of the party provided for
"dispossession" of up to 5% of peasant households.
In March 1930, Stalin, in his article "Dizziness from Success", condemned
the words "perversion". But the pressure on the peasants continued towards the end of the first
five-year plans (1932) in collective farms - more than 60% of peasant farms. important
the famine of 193233 played a role in the final victory of the regime over the peasantry. It was caused by the policy of the state, which seized all the grain from the village.
In 1933-34. to restore "order" in the village, emergency
bodies - the political departments of the MTS and state farms (they combined the functions
party leadership and state security). With the help of repression
managed to at least partially overcome the chaos.

16. Collectivization. Results and consequences

Collectivization dealt a severe blow to agricultural production. Gross production
grain decreased in 1932 to 69.9 million tons against 78.3 million in 1928. The number of horses decreased from
36 million to 20, cows - from 68 to 30. But the regime received unlimited opportunities to pump out funds
from the village for the needs of industrialization.
Collectivization is the most important stage in the establishment of a totalitarian system. deprived of the means of production,
completely dependent on the local "bosses", the peasants turned into state serfs.
This was legalized by the introduction of passports in 1932: the rural population does not receive them and could not
"special permission" to leave their place of residence.
The poor (“poor”, “laborers”): they got something from the “kulak” property, they were the first to
accepted into the party (and this opened access to power), sent tractor drivers from among them to study, and
combine operators. In (1933–1937) some stabilization takes place, an increase in production is planned and
improving the condition of the peasants. Stalin allowed collective farmers to run a small farm of their own
under the name of personal utility. Shock workers and Stakhanovites also appear in the village, among them
Tractor driver Pasha Angelina was the most famous.
Mismanagement and low discipline reigned in a significant part of the collective farms. Peasants often
actually worked for free (for "sticks"). Despite harsh measures (such as the 1932 law on
protection of "public property"), the theft of collective farm property flourished. All this doomed
our agriculture is chronically lagging behind.
The largest tragic event in our history, collectivization has become an important topic of national
literature. At one time, one of the most popular books was the novel by M. Sholokhov "Raised
virgin land".

17. Foreign policy of the USSR in the 20s.

The "two-story" nature of the Bolshevik foreign
politicians:
on the one hand, various peace-loving
on the other hand, the policy of "exporting the revolution"
by supporting all "revolutionary
movements", and, if possible, direct
military intervention.
In turn, this line is to some extent
aligned with traditional
foreign policy of Russia.

18. Foreign policy of the USSR in the 20s. Genoa Conference and the "streak of recognition"

Leading countries refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with
Soviets, demanding the payment of pre-revolutionary debts and compensation for losses from
nationalization of the property of foreign states and citizens. Governments
European countries decided to convene an international economic conference and
invite Soviet Russia to it.
The conference was held in Genoa in 1922. At the conference, the parties failed to reach
agreements. However, in the course of its work, a Soviet-German treaty was signed on
renunciation of mutual claims and establishment of diplomatic relations. Germany
became the first major power to recognize Soviet Russia.
In subsequent years, "Rapallo politics" - close ties between Soviet Russia and
Germany became an important factor in international relations. Parties
carried out secret military cooperation (on Soviet territory
trained German pilots and tank crews).
1924 was the year of diplomatic recognition of the USSR. Relationships have been established with
England, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Greece, Mexico, France, China,
in 1925 - with Japan. The term "streak of recognition" appeared in Soviet propaganda.
Only in the mid 20's. The USSR maintained official relations with more than 20
countries of the world. Of the leading countries, only the United States refused to recognize the USSR (until 1933)

19. Foreign policy of the USSR in the 20s. Conflicts of the USSR with other countries

The policy of "exporting the revolution" caused natural opposition
other countries.
The first major conflict - in 1923 was caused by a memorandum
British Foreign Minister. Soviet government:
demanding an end to Soviet interference in Iran and
Afghanistan, persecution of the church in the USSR, liberate the British
trawlers held up in our waters. We have deployed
the strongest propaganda campaign against the "intrigues
imperialism", however, in the end, the USSR made concessions on almost all
points.
Second conflict in 1926–27 British protests against the Soviet
intervention in the strike. In May 1927 England broke
diplomatic relations with the USSR. This has given rise to an unprecedented
propaganda campaign in the USSR about the threat of war.
In 1927, Chiang Kai-shek broke off the alliance with the communists, as a result of which
quarreled with the USSR. At the end of 1929, it came to the military
conflict with China over the CER.

20. Culture of the USSR in the 20-30s. General characteristics of cultural construction

Three different periods of cultural construction:
After the revolution, during the civil war - as in
all other spheres of life were applied; military methods
communism (including the mobilization of specialists, etc.).
The task was to quickly overcome illiteracy,
why were emergency methods of "educational program" used
(up to the arrest of those who did not want to study).
NEP: renunciation of emergency methods, certain
pluralism in cultural policy. At the same time at the beginning
NEP "crisis of culture" - the removal of many institutions from
budget and closing.
Since the end of the 20s. largely a return to emergency
methods.

21. Culture of the USSR in the 20-30s. Education and science

In 1934, a decision was made to resume the teaching of history, which was canceled after the revolution. A whole
a series of history textbooks. Much attention is paid to adult education. A public organization is being created
"Down with illiteracy", at its expense thousands of points for the elimination of illiteracy (literacy programs) are maintained.
In 1919, "workers' faculties" were created in the universities to prepare illiterate youth for higher education.
The teaching of the social sciences in the universities is being reformed and concentrated in the hands of party members. "Purges"
teachers and students: the expulsion of "socially alien" and "hostile" elements.
Introduced universal primary education. Basically, illiteracy of the adult population was eliminated. In 1926
43% aged 9–49 were illiterate. In 1939, the proportion of literate people exceeded 80%.
In the field of training specialists in the early 30s. - Assault methods are spreading. Many universities are becoming
"technical colleges", where narrow "specialists" were trained in a matter of years. Universities are being liquidated for several years. System
"nominations": workers and peasants devoted to the regime without education are put in various positions and only
then they get some training. A striking example is the biography of Khrushchev.
Suppression of dissenters. In 1919, the greatest historian, Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, was shot; in 1921, together
with the poet Gumilyov - a prominent jurist V. Tagantsev. In 1922 - the expulsion of the intellectual elite (philosophers Berdyaev,
Lossky, historian Karsavin, sociologist Sorokin - only about 200 people). Since the end of the 20s. - a series of processes over
engineering and technical intelligentsia: "Shakhty business", "academic business" (most Russians were arrested
historians), the trial of the "Industrial Party" (among those convicted was the famous inventor Ramzin). The intelligentsia is broken.
To strengthen the economic and military power of the country, some areas of science are supported, which have
practical value. For the first time in Russia, a research institute was created to study atomic problems
under the direction of Academician Ioffe. By 1937, there were 867 research institutes in the country with 37,600 researchers.
In the 20-30s, a number of major achievements: Lebedev - obtaining synthetic rubber. Through the works of Tsiolkovsky, Zander,
Kondratyuk created the prerequisites for the creation of rocket and space technology. Work continues successfully
a classic of physiology by academician Pavlov and the famous breeder Michurin. Naturally, the main scientific and design forces are concentrating on strengthening military power. The best samples in the world were designed
military equipment, in particular, the T-34 tank and rocket-propelled mortar (Katyusha).

22. Culture of the USSR in the 20-30s. artistic life

There were many different movements and groups. extremist
current - for a complete break with the "old culture". For example, an organization
Proletcult: "throw Pushkin off the ship of modernity." Among
writers' organizations - RAPP: persecution of "bourgeois" writers,
advocated a purely "proletarian literature".
Decree of the Central Committee of the Party on the Policy in the Field of Fiction in
1925 "Class alien" creators of culture under suspicion. OGPU already in the 20s
gg. carefully followed Mikhail Bulgakov. At the end of the 20s. appear
the first chapters of Sholokhov's epic "Quiet Flows the Don" and this author is subjected to
attacks for "praising the White Guard". The fate of Mayakovsky: he was
the most vehement supporter of the revolution and Bolshevism. His suicide
reflected the disappointment of the poet, his despair at the sight of the growing dominance
bureaucrats and careerists.
Since the late 20's and especially in the 30's. - policy of "unification of culture", suppression
any diversity and dissent. In 1934, the Union of Soviet
writers - an organization that gave its members great privileges."

23. Socio-political life in the 30s. Formation of the Stalinist regime. Main trends, increasing repression

In the 30s. – strengthening repressive-bureaucratic orders and personal power
Stalin. Subordination of the peasants to the state, repressions against the intelligentsia
and other groups of society have strengthened the atmosphere of fear and submissiveness in the country. At
personnel of the administrative apparatus, the habit of violent
leadership methods
The existence of dissatisfaction with Stalin's policy was revealed at the 17th Congress
party at the beginning of 1934. During the elections on it to the central bodies
party in a number of ballots the name of Stalin was crossed out. Even weak
the shadow of the opposition alarmed Stalin and prompted him to intensify preparations for
destruction of all dissatisfied and "doubtful
On December 1, 1934, Kirov was killed - a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Secretary
Leningrad Regional Committee - used by Stalin to intensify repression. AT
"Trotskyists" were blamed for the murder. (Zinoviev and Kamenev), they
"confessed" to the preparation of the assassination of Stalin and were sentenced to death.
On December 5, 1936, the new Constitution of the USSR was approved. the Soviet Union was
proclaimed a socialist state of workers and peasants. His
The Soviets were declared the political basis, the economic - public
own. The constitution spoke of broad democratic rights
citizens - freedom of the press, speech, assembly, demonstrations, etc.

24. Socio-political life in the 30s. Formation of the Stalinist regime. "Great Terror"

Repression reached its peak in 1937-1938. By this time, Stalin had matured the idea of ​​​​a general purge
leading cadres, "personnel revolution". The executor of the idea is the head of the NKVD N. Yezhov (the period of terror
called "Yezhovism").
In February-March 1937 - the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Stalin's thesis about the continuous "aggravation of the class struggle over
progress towards socialism." He argued that the whole country, the party, including the leading cadres
crowded with "enemies" in disguise, the need for mass repressions was justified.
N. Bukharin and A. Rykov were expelled from the party and arrested. He committed suicide heavy drug addict
industry Ordzhonikidze (possibly - in protest against repression). In June 1937 there were
prominent military leaders of the Red Army, headed by M. Tukhachevsky, were sentenced to death, whom
accused of preparing a "conspiracy" against Stalin. The wave of repressions grew, capturing the party,
economic, military personnel, as well as ordinary people. The prisons were overcrowded. NKVD officially
received permission to torture. Mass terror began to decline only at the end of 1938.
Responsibility for the "excesses" was assigned by Stalin to N. Yezhov, who was removed from his post, and
later arrested and shot. Beria became the new head of the NKVD, under which, to calm the people
some of the repressed were even released.
In the historical literature one can find at least three points of view on the causes and essence of
"great terror"
it made no sense and was generated by Stalin's morbid suspicion
these were repressions against "real Leninists", opponents of Stalinism
it was a struggle against the real enemies of the Soviet regime

25. Socio-political life in the 30s. Formation of the Stalinist regime. The essence of the Stalinist regime

The communists believe that it was socialism, their opponents talk about totalitarianism.
The following approach is possible: the main feature of this system is the maximum domination
states over the whole society. The basis of the system is the nationalization of the economy, -
concentration of all resources in the hands of the state, which in turn was
under the control of the party leadership. Inextricably linked with this is the formation
repressive-bureaucratic orders. Stalin's personal power was the most
concentrated expression: this political regime.
The system was based on a certain social structure. Main
the privileged stratum of Soviet society was the numerous and rapidly
growing "nomenklatura" (leading party, state, economic,
military cadres, the top of the intelligentsia).
In order to strengthen its social base, the regime also sought to form
privileged sections of the working people, a kind of "labor aristocracy", formerly
all from among the "Stakhanovites". The basis of this pyramid was made up of those who did not have
no privileges for the masses of workers and collective farmers, and even lower - prisoners.
As a result of Stalin's modernization, millions of people became literate, some
the poorest received some benefits. For some, this is a time of enthusiasm,
great success for the country. For others - a time of disaster, half-starved
existence, camps.

26. Foreign policy of the USSR in the 30s.

In the 30s. three main stages of foreign policy:
until 1933 - good relations with Germany, but
unstable relationship with
"democratic" countries
1933-1939: rapprochement of the USSR with England, France
and USA vs Germany and Japan
1939-June 1941: rapprochement with Germany and
Japan.

27. Foreign policy of the USSR in the 30s. Relations with Western countries before 1933

The main problems are in the Far East. The best relationship
– with Germany: continuation of the Rapallo policy, incl. help
Germany in the revival of its military potential, including training
its pilots and tankers in the USSR (on this occasion, a
special collection of documents "The Nazi sword was forged in the USSR").
Big trade: in 1931 the USSR received a loan of 300
million marks to finance it. In Soviet imports, the share
Germany has reached nearly 50%, 43% of German machinery exports
belonged to the USSR.
England: in 1929: restoration of diplomatic relations,
torn apart in 1927 1933: - a new conflict due to arrest in the USSR
English experts. France: early 30s. sharp deterioration
relations due to the support of the USSR by the French communists. After
reduction of this support - the improvement of relations and in 1932
signed a non-aggression pact. USA: the only great
a power that did not recognize the USSR because of the problem of royal debts.
However, a big trade is the purchase of machine tools for industrialization. AT
early 30s. - a sharp deterioration in relations: the United States accused the USSR of
interference in their internal affairs and took action against our
exports, while the USSR reduced its imports by 8 times.

28. Foreign policy of the USSR in the 30s. Politics in the Far East

1929 - conflict over the CER, hostilities between the USSR and China.
1931 - the beginning of Japanese aggression in China, the capture of Manchuria by it.
The emergence of a hotbed of war in the Far East and military
bridgehead on the border of the USSR. Deterioration of relations with Japan and
improvement with China. Diplomatic relations restored with China
relations.
1937: Japan goes to war to take over all of China. As a result, immediately
the non-aggression pact between the USSR and China was concluded, he
received a lot of military assistance. Aid has dwindled
after the Soviet-German non-aggression pact (August 23, 1939) and
completely stopped after the Soviet-Japanese treaty (13
April 1941).
At the end of the 30s. - aggravated relations with Japan. July–August 1938
- fighting on the Soviet-Manchurian border near Lake Khasan. August 1939 -
major fighting on the Manchurian-Mongolian border in
result of the Japanese invasion.

29. Foreign policy of the USSR in the 30s. Relations with Western countries after 1933

At the end of 1933, the Comintern, which served as the conductor of Soviet policy, called fascist Germany
chief warmonger in Europe. In 1935, the VII Congress of the Comintern: fascism is the main danger and
the orientation of the communists towards the creation of an anti-fascist popular front (with the participation of representatives
bourgeoisie).
Since 1933 - the rapprochement of the USSR with democratic countries to confront Japan and Germany, -
support for the idea of ​​collective security in Europe and the Far East. In 1933 - the establishment
diplomatic relations with the United States. 1934 - admission of the USSR to the League of Nations. 1935: Soviet-French
and the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Mutual Assistance.
The West began to pursue a policy of "appeasement" towards Germany, hoping to improve
relations with it and direct it against the USSR.
1935: Italian attack on Ethiopia, introduction of conscription in Germany and introduction of
German troops in the demilitarized Rhineland. The West refused to support the Soviet
proposals for collective measures to prevent these actions. 1936–39: Civil war in
Spain and intervention here by Germany and Italy. Soviet aid to the Republicans and at the same time
the desire to put the country under control, to establish a communist regime. The NKVD has already begun
deal with the opposition in Spain (this topic is touched upon in Hemingway's famous novel "For whom
the bell tolls", which is why we did not publish it for a long time). The West has declared a policy of "non-intervention".
By the end of the 30s. cardinal changes in the international situation, in the priorities of the Soviet
foreign policy.

30. Concepts

Tax in kind - food tax in kind, levied on
peasant farms, introduced by decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of March 21, 1921
years instead of surplus appropriation.
Tax in kind was levied "in the form of a percentage or share deduction from
products produced on the farm, based on the account of the harvest, the number
eaters on the farm and the presence of livestock in it. Tax in kind was established
as a progressive tax, with increased severity of taxation for
kulak part of the village. Farms of the poorest peasants
exempted from the tax.
The tax in kind was abolished along with the household tax, civil tax, labor tax and other local taxes that existed with it.
taxes in connection with the strengthening of the monetary system and the introduction
unified agricultural tax on May 10, 1923 according to
the decision of the XII Congress of the RCP (b) on the tax policy in the countryside in order to
to "resolutely put an end to the plurality of taxation" and
so that the peasant could know in advance and firmly the amount
direct tax due to him and deal only with
one tax collector."

31. Concepts

Concession - implies that the grantor
(state) transfers to the concessionaire the right to
exploitation of natural resources, facilities
infrastructure, enterprises, equipment.

This period was one of the most difficult in the life of the state. Having broken the resistance of most of the republics that did not want to join the Union, and unsuccessfully ending the Bolshevik-Polish war, the USSR embarked on the path of becoming its own statehood. Immediately after the founding of the Union, the struggle against dissent began. In the early 1920s, the USSR held a trial of the Social Revolutionaries, carried out active counter-revolutionary propaganda, and ended the fight against the White Guards and the resistance of the rebel armies on the ground.

The socialism under construction showed its failure, because of which the country's top leadership decided to "retreat to capitalism", the New Economic Policy was introduced. At the same time, the pressure of all opposition movements continued, in 1924 the complete suppression of the Mensheviks was completed, they were completely discredited before the public, although Lenin did not dare to exterminate them, preferring a slow total destruction by carrying out "exposures" of members of the Menshevik movement.

During the Civil War, the Bolshevik Party had the highest power in the USSR; in fact, an authoritarian regime reigned here. The key body, completely controlled by the Bolsheviks, was the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). Under Lenin, this body did not have much power, but after his illness, its influence increased. I.V. became the General Secretary of the Central Committee. Dzhugashvili (Comrade Stalin), for whom this was a serious step in achieving absolute personal power, although Lenin tried to prevent him from doing so.
Dzhugashvili abandoned the idea of ​​"exporting the revolution", and submitted a new idea, according to which socialism could be built within the framework of one country. His theses were adopted in 1926, after which the collapse of the NEP began, and a new attempt to build socialism began. Dzhugashvili's main opponent in the political arena, Trotsky, was defeated and expelled from the USSR.

According to Dzhugashvili, small peasant farms could not provide the country with everything necessary, he accused the so-called "kulaks", who produce the bulk of agricultural products in the country, of sabotage. An active transition to industrialization began in the country, the policy of the central government became more stringent - the fulfillment of the set standards was demanded from the center, regardless of any circumstances. Describing the USSR in the 20s briefly, it must be added that towards the end of this period, Dzhugashvili began to promote the idea that the failure of socialism was not to blame for the inept actions of the authorities, but for the so-called "enemies of the people." During this period, the bloody machine of Stalinist repression was just beginning to gain momentum.

NEP and the accelerated construction of socialism
The New Economic Policy proclaimed by the 10th Congress of the RCP (b) was a whole system of measures aimed at creating conditions for the revival of the Russian economy. These measures were developed already in the course of the announced new economic policy, which can be represented as a series of successive stages. The main efforts had to be directed against the growing food crisis, which could only be eliminated by raising agriculture. In the absence of state funds for this, it was necessary to liberate the manufacturer, give him incentives for the development of production. It was precisely for this that the central measure of the NEP was directed - the replacement of the surplus appropriation with the tax in kind. The size of the tax was much less than the apportionment, it was progressive in nature, i.e. decreased in the event that the peasant took care of increasing production, and allowed the peasant to freely dispose of the surplus products that he had left after paying the tax.

In 1922 measures to help the peasantry were intensified. The tax in kind was reduced by 10% compared to the previous year, but most importantly: it was announced that the peasant was free to choose the forms of land use and even hiring labor and renting land was allowed. The peasantry of Russia has already realized the advantage of the new policy, to which were added favorable weather conditions, which made it possible to grow and reap a good harvest. It was the most significant in all the years since the October Revolution. As a result, after the tax was handed over to the state, the peasant had a surplus that he could dispose of freely.

However, it was necessary to create conditions for the free sale of agricultural products. This was to be facilitated by the commercial and financial aspects of the New Economic Policy. The freedom of private trade was announced simultaneously with the transition from allotment to tax in kind. But in the speech of V.I. Lenin at the Tenth Party Congress, free trade was understood only as a product exchange between town and countryside, within the limits of local economic turnover. At the same time, preference was given to exchange through cooperatives, and not through the market. Such an exchange seemed unprofitable to the peasantry, and Lenin already in the autumn of 1921 admitted that the exchange of goods between the city and the countryside had broken down and resulted in buying and selling at "black market" prices. I had to go to the removal of limited free trade, encourage retail trade and put the private trader on an equal footing in trade with the state and cooperatives.

In turn, free trade demanded order in the financial system of the state, which in the early 20s. existed only nominally, because in the concept of the Bolsheviks on the creation of a socialist state, except for the nationalization of banks, no place was given to finance.

Even the introduction of the New Economic Policy did not provide for measures to restore order in the sphere of finance, because the exchange of goods could be carried out without money. The state budget was drawn up formally, the estimates of enterprises and institutions were also formally approved. All expenses were covered by printing unsecured paper money, so inflation was uncontrollable. Already in 1921, the state was forced to take a number of steps aimed at the rehabilitation of money. Individuals and organizations were allowed to keep any amount of money in savings banks and use their deposits without restrictions. Then the state ceased uncontrolled financing of industrial enterprises, some of which were transferred to self-financing, and some were leased. These enterprises had to pay taxes to the state budget, which covered a certain part of state revenues. The status of the State Bank was approved, which also switched to self-supporting principles, was interested in receiving income from lending to industry, agriculture and trade. Finally, measures were taken to stabilize the Russian currency, which were carried out in 1922-1924. and received the name of financial reform. Its creators are considered to be People's Commissar for Finance G. Sokolnikov, the director of the State Bank, the Bolshevik Sheiman, and a member of the board of the bank, the former minister of the tsarist government under S.Yu. Witte N.N. Cutler.

The rapid rise of agriculture, the revival of trade and measures to strengthen the financial system made it possible to move on to measures to stabilize the situation in industry, on the fate of which depended the fate of the working class and the entire Soviet state. Industrial policy was not formulated immediately, since the rise of industry depended on the state of affairs in other sectors of the national economy, primarily in the agricultural sector. In addition, it was beyond the power of the state to raise the entire industry at once, and a number of priorities had to be identified with which to start. They were formulated in a speech by V.I. Lenin at the XI Conference of the RCP (b) in May 1921 and were as follows: support for small and medium-sized enterprises with the participation of private and equity capital; reorientation of the production programs of a part of large enterprises to the production of consumer and peasant products; the transfer of all large-scale industry to self-financing, while expanding the independence and initiative of each enterprise. These provisions formed the basis of industrial policy, which began to be implemented in stages.

The new economic policy came into life gradually, manifested itself in different ways in various sectors of the national economy and provoked sharp criticism both from the part of the working class, concentrated primarily on large industrial enterprises, the fate of which was to be decided last, and from the part of the working class. leadership of the Bolshevik Party, who did not want to "compromise principles." As a result, the new economic policy went through a series of acute socio-political and economic crises that kept the whole country in suspense in the 1920s. The first crisis occurred already in 1922, when successes in stabilizing the national economy were not yet visible, but some negative aspects of the NEP appeared: the role of private capital increased, especially in trade, the term “Nepman” appeared, and a revival of bourgeois ideology was observed. Part of the Bolshevik leadership began to openly express dissatisfaction with the NEP, and its creator V.I. Lenin was forced to declare at the 11th Party Congress that the retreat in the sense of concessions to capitalism was over and private capital had to be placed within the proper limits and regulated.

However, the successes in the agricultural sector in 1922-1923. somewhat reduced the severity of the confrontation in the leadership and gave the NEP internal impulses for development. In 1923, the disproportion in the development of agriculture, which had been accelerating for two years already, and in industry, which had just begun to emerge from the crisis, had its effect. A concrete manifestation of this disproportion was the "price crisis", or "price scissors". In conditions when agricultural production was already 70% of the 1913 level, and large-scale industrial production - only 39%, prices for agricultural products fell sharply, while prices for manufactured goods continued to remain high. On these "scissors" the village lost 500 million rubles, or half of its effective demand.

The discussion of the "price crisis" turned into an open party discussion, and a solution was found as a result of the application of purely economic measures. Prices for manufactured goods fell, and a good harvest in agriculture allowed the industry to find a wide and capacious market for selling their goods.

In 1924 a new "price crisis" began, but for other reasons. The peasants, having gathered a good harvest, decided not to sell it (bread) to the state at fixed prices, but to sell it on the market, where private merchants gave the peasants a good price. By the end of 1924, prices for agricultural products rose sharply and the bulk of the profits went into the hands of the most prosperous peasants - the holders of bread. The discussion about the “crisis of prices” broke out again in the party, which was already more acute, as the leaders of the party split into supporters of continued encouragement of the development of the agrarian sector and further concessions to the peasantry and a very influential force that insisted on increased attention to the development of heavy industry. And although the supporters of the first point of view formally won and also got out of this crisis by economic methods, this was their last victory. In addition, hasty measures were taken to restrict the private trader in the market, which led to its disorganization and discontent of the working masses.

In the mid 20s. NEP's success in reviving the Russian economy was obvious. They were especially affected in the field of agriculture, which practically restored the level of pre-war production. State purchases of grain from the peasants in 1925 amounted to 8.9 million tons. Funds for the development of industry were accumulated in the countryside as a result of overpayments by the peasants for manufactured goods, which continued to be sold at inflated prices. Strengthened the financial system of the Soviet state. The gold chervonets, universally introduced in March 1924, became a stable national currency, quite popular on the world market. The implementation of a strict credit and tax policy, the profitable sale of bread allowed the Soviet state to make big profits. Growth rates of industrial production in 1922 - 1927 averaged 30 - 40%, and agriculture - 12 - 14%.

However, despite the significant pace of development, the situation in industry, and especially in heavy industry, did not look very good. Industrial production by the mid-20s. still far behind the pre-war level. Difficulties in industrial development caused huge unemployment, which in 1923-1924. exceeded 1 million people. Unemployment mainly hit young people, who made up no more than 20% of those employed in production. These distortions in the development of the national economy began to be seen by some of the leadership as undermining the social base of Soviet power.

These two reasons: the euphoria from the real successes in the economy and the difficulties in implementing industrial policy led to the beginning of a turn in the implementation of the NEP, which took place in the second half of the 1920s. Already in 1925-26 households. In 1999, the Soviet government planned a huge export of grain for the purchase of foreign equipment for the re-equipment of domestic industry. In addition, measures were envisaged to strengthen the centralized management of the economy and to strengthen the public sector in the national economy. This policy ran into new economic difficulties. In 1925, the volume of grain procurements was reduced and the government was forced to abandon its plans. Investment in industry declined, imports fell, and the countryside again experienced a shortage of manufactured goods. It was decided to increase the agricultural tax on kulaks and at the same time to think over a system of state measures to regulate prices. These measures were already administrative, not economic in nature.

Despite the measures taken, state grain procurements not only did not grow, but even decreased. In 1926, 11.6 million tons of grain were harvested, in 1927 - 11, and in 1928 - 10.9. Meanwhile, the industry demanded an increase in capital investments. In 1927, the volume of industrial production for the first time exceeded the pre-war level. New industrial construction began. In 1926, 4 large power plants were built in the country and 7 new mines were launched, and in 1927, 14 more power plants, including Dneproges and 16 mines. Money for industry was sought through emission, which in 1926-1928. amounted to 1.3-1.4 billion rubles; by raising prices; through the export of grain, which in 1928 amounted to 89 thousand tons; by seeking funds within industry itself - already in 1925, large-scale industry's own savings covered 41.5% of all its expenses.

However, all these sources could not cover the shortage of funds for financing industry in conditions when the pace of its development began to increase. The fate of industry was in the hands of the peasant, who had to be forced again to give everything he produced to the state. The fate of NEP depended on the methods used to resolve the issue of relations between town and countryside.

Meanwhile, the state of affairs in agriculture and the countryside was not easy. On the one hand, the rise of industry and the introduction of hard currency stimulated the restoration of agriculture. The sown areas began to gradually increase: in 1923 they reached 91.7 million hectares, which was 99.3% of the level of 1913. In 1925, the gross grain harvest exceeded the average annual harvest for 1909-1913 by almost 20.7%. . By 1927, the pre-war level was almost reached in animal husbandry. However, the growth of large commodity peasant farming was restrained by tax policy. In 1922-1923. was exempted from agricultural tax 3%, in 1923-1924. - 14%, in 1925-1926. - 25%, in 1927 - 35% of the poorest peasant farms. Wealthy peasants and kulaks, who made up in 1923-1924. 9.6% of peasant households paid 29.2% of the tax amount. In the future, the share of this group in taxation increased even more. As a result, the rate of fragmentation of peasant farms was in the 20s. twice as high as before the revolution, with all the ensuing negative consequences for the development of production and especially its marketability. By separating the farms, the wealthy sections of the countryside tried to escape from the tax pressure. The low marketability of peasant farms held back, and then led to underestimated exports of agricultural products, and consequently imports, so necessary for the modernization of the country's equipment.

Already at the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) in December 1927, in a speech by I.V. Stalin emphasized the need for a gradual but steady unification of individual peasant farms into large economic collectives. The crisis in grain procurements in the winter of 1928 played an important role in the transition to a different variant of the country's development. After his trip to Siberia in January 1928, I.V. Stalin became a supporter of the use of emergency measures in grain procurement: the application of the relevant articles of the criminal code, the forcible seizure of grain from the peasants.

The results of the new economic policy cannot be assessed unambiguously. On the one hand, its impact on the economy should be recognized as favorable. In the 20s. managed to restore the national economy and even surpass the pre-war level solely at the expense of internal reserves. Successes in the revival of agriculture made it possible to feed the population of the country, and in 1927-28. The USSR overtook pre-revolutionary Russia in terms of food consumption: the townspeople and especially the peasants began to eat better than before the revolution. Thus, the consumption of bread per capita by peasants increased in 1928 to 250 kg (before 1921 - 217), meat - 25 kg (before 1917 - 12 kg). The national income at that time increased by 18% per year and by 1928 it was 10% higher per capita than the level of 1913. And this was not a simple quantitative increase. During 1924 - 1928, when industry was not just recovering, but switched to expanded reproduction, with an increase in the number of labor forces by 10% per year, the growth in industrial output amounted to 30% annually, which indicated a rapid growth in labor productivity. The strong national currency of the Soviet country made it possible to use export-import operations to revive the economy, although their scale was insignificant due to the intransigence of both sides. The material well-being of the population increased. In 1925-1926. the average working day for industrial workers was 7.4 hours. The share of those who worked overtime gradually decreased from 23.1% in 1923 to 18% in 1928. All workers and employees had the right to regular annual leave of at least two weeks. The years of NEP are characterized by an increase in the real wages of workers, which in 1925-1926. the average for industry was 93.7% of the pre-war level.

On the other hand, the implementation of the NEP was difficult and was accompanied by a number of negative aspects. The main one was associated with the disproportionate development of the main sectors of the country's economy. Successes in the restoration of agriculture and a clear lag in the pace of the revival of industry led the New Economic Policy through a period of economic crises, which were extremely difficult to resolve by economic methods alone. In the countryside, there was a social and property differentiation of the peasantry, which led to an increase in tension between the various poles. in the city throughout the 1920s. unemployment increased, which by the end of the NEP amounted to more than 2 million people. Unemployment created an unhealthy climate in the city. The financial system got stronger only for a while. Already in the second half of the 20s. in connection with the active financing of heavy industry, the market equilibrium was disturbed, inflation began, which undermined the financial and credit system. However, the main contradiction that led to the collapse of the New Economic Policy lay not in the sphere of the economy, which could develop further on the principles of the NEP, but between the economy and the political system, designed to use administrative-command methods of management. This contradiction became irreconcilable in the late 1920s, and the political system resolved it by curtailing the NEP.

It must be emphasized that in the specific conditions of the existence of the USSR at the turn of the 20s - 30s, in a situation where the country was surrounded by a ring of hostile states, when, in order to solve a qualitatively new and super-difficult task of modernizing the country with the aim of decisive, and most importantly, quickly overcoming backwardness, the USSR could not count on an influx of foreign capital (a prerequisite for industrialization is the example of France, the USA, tsarist Russia and other countries), and the possibilities of the NEP were very limited.

At the same time, it should be noted that the Leninist NEP, as the famous American historian W. Davis wrote, gave the world three elements of the economy of the future: government regulation, a mixed economy, and private enterprise. The example of today's China, which successfully solves the problems of its economic development on the principles of neo-nep, testifies to the great historical significance of the economic policy of the Bolsheviks in the 1920s.

Intra-party struggle
As already noted, the new economic policy gave rise to a number of serious contradictions. A large proportion of them were of a political nature, because the "private revival of capitalism" was carried out by the party, the formation of which took place not on the path of compromise with capital, but in a tough and merciless struggle against it. A significant part of the communists, as well as significant segments of the population, perceived the NEP as a return to private property, and with it - to social injustice and inequality. The “Workers' Opposition”, which had a fairly broad base in the party and the working class, practically did not accept the new course. Its leaders A. Shlyapnikov and V. Medvedev openly declared that the NEP was incompatible with the principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat and contrary to the spirit and letter of the party program. They believed that the peasantry, the bourgeoisie and the urban philistinism took advantage of the fruits of the victory of the working class, while the proletarians again turned into exploited sections of society. The "Working Group" headed by A. Myasnikov opposed NEP, deciphering this abbreviation as "new exploitation of the proletariat." The party leadership could not disregard the forecasts of the Russian emigration about the development of the Soviet state along the paths of the New Economic Policy. In the early 20s. “Smenovekhovism” appeared, the ideologists of which, in particular N. Ustryalov, called on the emigration to make peace with Soviet power and abandon active struggle against it, because “revolutionary Russia is turning in its social essence into a “bourgeois”, proprietary country”. Such assessments echoed the assessments of the NEP within the Bolshevik Party, in which significant sections of the communists associated the possibility of restoring capitalism with the private-proprietary psychology of the peasantry, which, under favorable conditions, could become the mass support of the counter-revolution. Many party members believed that the NEP did not advance, but threw back, conserving the routine and backwardness of the country.

If the party leaders managed to relatively easily remove the leaders of the "workers' opposition" from active political life, then with the oppositions that were already taking shape within the framework of the NEP course, the situation was much more complicated. Among the party elite, heated discussions are unfolding on the key problems of the country's socio-economic development, which have become, to a large extent, a kind of ideological veil of the struggle for power, characteristic of the internal party life of the 1920s.

L. Trotsky was the first to attack the Politburo. In the conditions of the crisis of 1923, he accused the "dictatorship of the party apparatus" of unsystematic economic decisions and of imposing in the RCP (b) orders incompatible with party democracy. Trotsky insisted on the "dictatorship of industry" in the national economy, which ultimately did not fit into the framework adopted at the Tenth Congress of the course towards an equal economic union of the working class and the peasantry. Simultaneously with Trotsky, 46 prominent members of the party addressed the Politburo with a letter (“Statement of the 46”, signed by E. Preobrazhensky, V. Serebryakov, A. Bubnov, G. Pyatakov and others), in which the majority faction in the Politburo was accused of inconsistent politics. The triumvirate formed on the basis of the struggle against Trotsky - Stalin - Zinoviev - Kamenev - managed at the XIII Party Conference (January 1924) to pass a resolution that characterized the views of Trotsky and his supporters as a "direct departure from Leninism" and as a "petty-bourgeois" deviation in the party. The XIII Congress of the RCP (b) supported the decisions of the party conference. Trotsky soon loses leading positions in the party and the army, but continues to be an authoritative leader, to claim leading roles in the party and the state.

Since the mid 20s. The question of the possibility of building socialism in one country became the center of attention of intra-party discussions. Back in 1916, V.I. Lenin theoretically substantiated the possibility of the victory of the socialist revolution in one country, and then later, in his last articles, gave a positive answer to this question. After the death of Lenin, I. Stalin firmly defended the Leninist course of building socialism in one country. It was obvious to Stalin that the industrial potential inherited from old Russia did not provide acceptable rates of economic development, since the main production assets of factories and plants were obsolete and hopelessly lagged behind modern requirements.

Foreign policy factors also played a role. In the mid 20s. relations between the USSR and Great Britain and China worsened. In August 1924, the "Dawes Plan" was adopted, and foreign, mainly American, loans went to Germany in a wide stream. The party leadership has repeatedly stressed that the country is in a hostile imperialist environment and lives under the constant threat of war. The agrarian country had no chance to survive in the event of a military confrontation with the industrialized powers. The need to modernize the country was increasingly evident. Finally, the problem of locating the economic potential, which was mainly concentrated in the European part of the country, had to be solved. A new location of production facilities was required.

Under conditions of changing international conditions, primarily the stabilization of capitalism in America and Europe, which made the possibility of a world revolution unrealistic, Stalin abandoned the concept of world revolution and world socialism and transferred the problem of building socialism in one country from an abstract theoretical area to the area of ​​party practice. In the autumn of 1925, G. Zinoviev spoke out against the theory of "socialism in one country". He criticized Stalin's "nationally limited" views, linking the possibilities of socialist construction in the USSR only with the victory of revolutions in Europe and the USA. At the same time, Zinoviev took a step towards Trotsky, supporting his conclusions about the impossibility of the victory of socialism in the USSR without the support of the world revolution. A "new opposition" has arisen. At the Fourteenth Party Congress, the "new opposition" tried to give battle to Stalin and Bukharin. At the center of criticism of the party leadership by the opposition were Stalin's ideas about the possibility of building socialism in the USSR, as well as the thesis about underestimating the danger of strengthening capitalist elements under the NEP. However, Stalin managed to carry out his decisions at the congress. The XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks went down in history as an industrialization congress: it made an extremely important decision to take a course towards achieving the economic independence of the USSR. In the field of the development of the national economy, the congress set the following tasks: "To ensure economic independence for the USSR, protecting the USSR from becoming an appendage of the capitalist world economy, for which purpose to head for the industrialization of the country, the development of production, the means of production and the formation of reserves for economic maneuvering."

After the Fourteenth Congress, the struggle in the party unfolded over the methods, rates and sources of accumulation for industrialization. Two approaches emerged: the left, led by L. Trotsky, called for super-industrialization, while the right, led by N. Bukharin, advocated softer transformations. Bukharin emphasized that the policy of over-industrialization, the transfer of funds from the agrarian sector of the economy to the industrial sector, would destroy the alliance between the working class and peasants. Stalin supported Bukharin's point of view until 1928. Speaking at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (April 1926), Stalin defended the thesis of "the minimum rate of development of industry, which is necessary for the victory of socialist construction." The 15th Party Congress in December 1927 adopted directives for drawing up the first five-year plan. This document formulated planning principles based on strict observance of proportions between accumulation and consumption, industry and agriculture, heavy and light industry, resources, and so on. The congress proceeded from the correct orientation towards the balanced development of the national economy. At the suggestion of the chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR Krzhizhanovsky, two versions of the five-year plan were developed - the starting (minimum) and optimal. The tasks of the optimal variant were about 20% higher than the minimum. The Central Committee of the party took as a basis the best version of the plan, which in May 1929 the All-Union Congress of Soviets adopted as a law. Historians, when evaluating the first five-year plan, unanimously note the balance of its tasks, which, despite their scale, were quite real.

However, at the end of 1929, I. Stalin switched to the point of view of the policy of a super-industrial leap. Speaking in December 1929 at the congress of shock workers, he put forward the slogan "Five-year plan - in four years!". At the same time, planned targets were revised in the direction of their increase. The task was set to double capital investments and increase production by 30% annually. A course is taken for the implementation of an industrial breakthrough in the shortest possible historical period. The course towards super-industrialization was largely due to the impatience of the party leadership, as well as of the general population, to put an end to acute socio-economic problems at once and ensure the victory of socialism in the USSR by revolutionary methods of radically breaking the existing economic structure and national economic proportions. The bet on the industrial breakthrough was also closely connected with the course towards the complete collectivization of agriculture, which subordinated this vast sector of the economy to the state and created favorable conditions for the transfer of financial, raw materials and labor resources from the agricultural sector of the economy to the industrial one.

Speaking about the reasons for the turn to an industrial leap, one should also keep in mind foreign policy aspects. In the second half of 1929, the Western countries from the period of stabilization enter a period of severe economic crisis, and hopes reappear in the Soviet leadership and conviction grows stronger in the approaching collapse of the bourgeois world. Under these conditions, as the Kremlin believed, a favorable moment had come for an industrial breakthrough into the advanced powers, thus the historical dispute with capitalism could be resolved in favor of socialism. Therefore, it is no coincidence that, justifying the turn to forced industrialization, Stalin especially emphasized: “... to slow down the pace means to lag behind. And the retards are beaten. But we don't want to be beaten... We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or we will be crushed.” Such an appeal seemed to many to be the only right decision and found a response in the general population.

From the point of view of the country's internal development, accelerated industrialization was dictated, in Stalin's opinion, as already noted, by the need to create the prerequisites for the speedy collectivization of the peasantry. Stalin and his supporters believed that it was impossible to somehow base Soviet power on both large-scale state industry and individual small-scale production, since the growth and aggravation of the class struggle on a scale dangerous for the existence of the Soviet system is inevitable.

The Stalinist model of development was a variant of stepwise modernization, based on the maximum concentration of resources in the main direction due to the tension of the entire economic system. In this strategy, everything was aimed at increasing the pace of industrial development, so that in the shortest possible historical period not only to overcome backwardness, but also to bring the country to the rank of the great powers of the world. For the sake of high rates and their constant maintenance, it is proposed to expand investment in industry in every possible way, including through a reduction in the consumption fund and the most severe savings in funds that determine the standard of living of the masses, the transfer of funds from the area of ​​\u200b\u200bproduction of group B to group A, although this inevitably led to acute shortage of consumer goods, to commodity hunger. It was proclaimed acceptable to use not quite balanced, tense plans, which, in conditions of a shortage of goods, inevitably led to an inflationary rise in prices.

A detailed justification for the option of forced construction of socialism was given in the documents of the XVI-XVII congresses of the CPSU (b), in the reports and speeches of I.V. Stalin 1928-1934 A natural continuation of the adoption of the maximum rate of industrialization as the most important means of achieving it is the line of restructuring the methods, the very style of managing the national economy. Neither the rapid "transfer" of funds from consumption funds to the accumulation fund, nor the widespread use of non-economic measures of pressure on the peasantry are possible in the context of the NEP and the development of commodity market relations. Therefore, the abolition of the main provisions of the NEP was a necessary condition for the implementation of the development option that Stalin advocated. Instead of economic in the Stalinist version, the main place was to be occupied by administrative-command forms of managing the national economy.

How vital was Bukharin's model? In those specific political, socio-economic and foreign policy conditions in which the USSR found itself, the idea of ​​a balanced development of the industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy, its implementation was significantly limited due to the lack of an influx of foreign capital. In addition, the USSR did not have and could not have colonies. Also, our country could not use such a traditional source of "capitalist" industrialization as indemnity as a result of a victorious war of conquest. The complete absence of an influx of foreign capital and other traditional sources of Western modernization began to be compensated by minimizing non-production costs, the labor enthusiasm of the people, the transfer of funds from the agrarian sector to the industrial sector, and the widespread use of non-economic coercion.

Collectivization became an integral part of the Bolshevik modernization of the country. Collectivization had several main goals. First of all, this is the official goal, fixed in party and state documents, in speeches, etc., to carry out socialist transformations in the countryside: to create, instead of unprofitable small-scale peasant farms, large mechanized collective farms capable of providing the country with products and raw materials. However, this goal did not justify the often crude methods and extremely short deadlines for collectivization. In many ways, the forms, methods and timing of collectivization were explained by its second goal - to ensure at any cost an uninterrupted supply of cities that were growing rapidly in the course of industrial construction. The main features of collectivization, as it were, were projected from the strategy of forced industrialization. The frantic pace of industrial growth, urbanization required a sharp increase in extremely short periods of food supplies to the city, for export. This, in turn, determined the appropriate pace of collectivization and the methods of its implementation: the lack of capital, the shortage of goods inevitably led to the growth of non-economic coercion in the agrarian sector; bread, other products, the further, the more they did not buy from the peasants, but "took". This led to a reduction in production by prosperous households, to open actions of kulaks against local authorities and village activists.

By 1927 collectivization was completed. Instead of 25 million small peasant farms, 400,000 collective farms began to operate.

Based on the subordinate position of collectivization in relation to industrialization, it fulfilled the tasks assigned to it: 1) reduced the number of people employed in agriculture; 2) supported with a smaller number of employed food production at a level that does not allow hunger; 3) provided the industry with irreplaceable technical raw materials. After the severe upheavals of the early 30s. in the middle of the decade the situation in the agrarian sector stabilized: in 1935 the card system was abolished, labor productivity increased, the country gained cotton independence; during the 30s. 20 million people were released from agriculture, which made it possible to increase the size of the working class from 9 to 24 million.

The main result of collectivization was that it ensured the solution of the main strategic task - the implementation of an industrial breakthrough. As a result, the transition of the entire economy to a single state track was ensured. The state approved its ownership not only of the land, but also of the products produced on it. It got the opportunity to plan the development of agriculture, to strengthen its material and technical base. An important result of collectivization was the increase in the marketability of agriculture. This led not only to the stabilization of the supply of grain to cities, workers, employees and the army, but also made it possible to increase the state stocks of grain, which was extremely important in case of war. It should also be noted that the policy of collectivization, despite all its shortcomings and difficulties, was supported by the poorest peasantry and significant sections of the middle peasants, who hoped to improve their position in the collective farms.

So, the Bolshevik modernization of the Soviet state had its own characteristics. It was carried out without an injection of foreign capital. Its tasks were solved at the expense of the country's internal resources. It was carried out directly in heavy industry without preliminary development of light industry. The primary tasks of industrialization were solved in the first and second five-year plans. The first five-year plan developed the GOELRO plan. It was designed to ensure that in 1929-1933. turn the USSR into an industrial power. It was a top priority. In the course of its implementation, the initial indicators increased, measures were taken to spur the pace of construction. The country's leadership stated that the targets set by the five-year plan were achieved ahead of schedule. The data show that this was not the case. But they cannot belittle the progress made. History cannot forget the commissioning of the Dneproges, the creation of the 2nd coal and metallurgical base in the east (Uralo-Kuznetsk Combine), the construction of the Kuznetsk and Magnitogorsk metallurgical plants, coal mines in the Donbass, Kuzbass and Karaganda, the Stalingrad and Kharkov tractor plants, Moscow and Gorky automobile plants and many other enterprises, the total number of which was 1500.

The second five-year plan, covering 1933-1937, set itself the task of completing the creation of a technical base in all sectors. As a result, 4,500 large state-owned enterprises were put into operation. Among the largest are the Ural and Kramatorsk Heavy Engineering Plants, the Ural Carriage Building and Chelyabinsk Tractor Plants, the Azovstal and Zaporizhstal metallurgical plants and many other plants and industrial enterprises. These were labor exploits of the Soviet industry. They included the Stakhanov movement and other labor initiatives. The organizer of mass labor enthusiasm was the established party-administrative system, the activities of trade union and Komsomol organizations. Labor enthusiasm was also born under the powerful ideological influence propagated by political slogans. A certain material interest in production and construction was also manifested in this. The system of moral encouragement for those who distinguished themselves in work was also important. An important driver of the labor enthusiasm of many heroes of industrialization was their belief that they were really building a bright future for themselves and their Motherland. An important source of labor exploits of the 30s. there was, of course, Russian patriotism, which always rescued the country in difficult and responsible times for it, the awareness of the historical necessity of the industrial breakthrough of their homeland.

The results of the pre-war five-year plans
The enormous efforts of many millions of people made it possible to make a grandiose shift in the Soviet state. For 1928-1941 Almost 9,000 large and medium-sized enterprises were built in the USSR. During this period, the growth rates of industrial production in the USSR exceeded the corresponding indicators in Russia in 1900-1913 by about 2 times. and amounted to almost 11% per year. In the 30s. The USSR became one of the four countries in the world capable of producing any kind of industrial product. In terms of absolute indicators of the volume of industrial production, the USSR came out on the 2nd place in the world after the USA (Russia in 1913 - 5th place). In 1940, the USSR surpassed Britain in electricity production by 21%, France - by 45%, Germany - by 32%; for the extraction of the main types of fuel, respectively, England - by 32%, France - more than 4 times, Germany - by 33%; in terms of steel production, the USSR during this period surpassed England by 39%, France - four times, Germany - by 8%. The backlog of the USSR from the advanced countries of the world in terms of industrial output per capita has also decreased.

In the 20s. this gap was 5 - 10 times, and in 1940 - from 1.5 to 4 times. Finally, the Soviet Union eliminated its stage gap from the West: from a pre-industrial country, the USSR turned into a powerful industrial power.

Major changes in the socio-economic sphere in the 30s. in the USSR were also accompanied by the implementation of the policy of the cultural revolution. The purpose of such a revolution from above was to create a new socialist culture. Clearly organized state measures during this period actively solved the problem of eliminating the illiteracy of the population. On the eve of the implementation of the industrialization policy in the USSR, there were practically no own cadres of industry managers, their own engineering and technical staff, there were even no qualified workers. In 1940, there were almost 200,000 general education schools in the USSR with 35 million students. Over 600,000 studied at vocational schools. Almost 4,600 universities and technical schools worked. The USSR came out on top in the world in terms of the number of pupils and students. Significant progress was also made in the development of science and technology. More than 1800 scientific institutions operated. The largest were the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (VASKhNIL), Scientific Research Physical Institute. P.N.Lebedeva, institutes of organic chemistry, physical problems, geophysics and others. Such scientists as N.I. Vavilov, S.V. Lebedev, D.V. Skobeltsin, D.D. Ivanenko, A.F. Ioffe, N.N. Semenov, K.E. Tsiolkovsky, F.A. Zander and others. New phenomena appeared in the development of fiction, various branches of art, and the formation of Soviet cinematography took place.

In the 30s. The political system of the Soviet society has undergone major changes. The core of this system - the CPSU (b) - increasingly grew into state structures. The old Bolsheviks were replaced by young cadres, who differed little from managers in the proper sense of the word. From January 1934 to March 1939, more than 500,000 new workers were promoted to leading party and government posts. Real political power was concentrated in the party organs. The Soviets only formally, according to the Constitution, were the political basis of Soviet society. In the 30s. their activities are mainly focused on solving economic, cultural and educational problems. Legally, the supreme body of state power in the USSR, according to the Constitution of 1936, was the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the highest body of state administration was the Council of People's Commissars. However, in reality, the highest power was concentrated in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Summing up the qualitative political, socio-economic and cultural transformations, the party-state leadership announced at the end of the 30s. about the victory of socialism mainly in the USSR. This conclusion was justified by the fact that private ownership of the means of production was eliminated in the country, free enterprise disappeared, and a transition was made from a market economy to a state-planned economy. The social structure of society has also changed. The exploiting classes have left the stage, the exploitation of man by man has been overcome, unemployment is gone. Other qualitative changes were noted in Soviet society. On this basis, the 18th Congress of the Bolshevik Party in 1939 set as the main political task in the Third Five-Year Plan the completion of the building of socialism in the USSR and the subsequent gradual transition to communism.

The level of human consumption remained low. Nevertheless, the country has achieved impressive economic results. Millions of Soviet people received an education, significantly improved their social status, joined the industrial culture; tens of thousands, having risen from the very bottom, took key positions in the economic, military, and political elite. For millions of Soviet people, the construction of a new society opened up a perspective, the meaning of life. Obviously, all these circumstances formed the basis of the cheerful attitude of a significant part of the Soviet people of that time that struck Western cultural figures and surprises us today. The writer Henri Gide, who visited the USSR in 1936 and noticed the “negative” in the then Soviet reality (poverty, the suppression of dissent, etc.), nevertheless notes: “However, there is a fact: the Russian people seem happy. Here I have no differences with Wildrac and Jean Pons, and I read their essays with a feeling similar to nostalgia. Because I also argued: in no other country, except for the USSR, the people - met on the street (at least young people), factory workers relaxing in cultural parks - do not look so joyful and smiling.

Ultimately, the 20s. entered the history of the country as a stage when, in an extremely short historical period, a leap was made from an agrarian to an industrial society, thanks to which a powerful socio-economic and military potential of the Soviet Union was created and without which victory over Nazi Germany was impossible. This is the historical significance of the labor feat of millions of Soviet people.

The history of homeland. Edited by M.V. Zotova. - 2nd ed., corrected. and additional
M.: Publishing House of MGUP, 2001. 208 p. 1000 copies

Introduction

By the end of the 1920s, thanks to the policy of the NEP, it was possible to overcome the devastation and restore the national economy. According to the main indicators, it is in 1925-27. reached the pre-war level, or approached it. But at the same time, Russia's economic lag behind the advanced Western countries has not only not decreased, but, on the contrary, has increased.

Fuel and commodity hunger is aggravated. The urban population is growing. Significant external sources of financing before the revolution were practically absent. The volume of exports, on the income from which the import of equipment was based, was two times lower than before the war - and all this happened against the backdrop of the stagnation of the grain economy. Industrialization based on the NEP comes to a standstill.

Due to the lack of industrial goods for exchange for grain, crop failure in a number of areas by January 1928, grain procurement fell by 128 million poods compared to the previous year, which aggravated the problem of supplying urban residents and military personnel.

The state resorted to emergency measures - the forcible seizure of grain from the wealthy sections of the village, the restriction of the market trade in grain, which was perceived by the village as the abolition of the NEP. In the autumn of 1928, winter crops were reduced, and mass slaughter of livestock began. At the end of 1928 - beginning of 1929, card distribution of basic products was reintroduced in the cities. This provided the cities with grain, but at the cost of undermining market relations in the countryside.

In the party in 1928-1929. two lines collide. The Bukharin group of the "right" (leader of the Comintern Bukharin N.I., chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Rykov A.I., trade union leader M.P. Tomskoy, secretary of the Moscow Party organization N.A. Uglanov and others) explained the crisis by miscalculations of the party-state leadership (incorrect tax, price, investment policy), opposed the use of emergency measures in the spring of 1929, for the stabilization of the situation in agriculture on the basis of market methods, the gradual deployment of large collective grain farms, a relatively moderate pace of industrialization based on a balanced rise in heavy and light industry, maneuvering, etc.

The Stalinist group, which was formed in the leadership of the party and the country (General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I.V. Stalin, Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR V.V. Kuibyshev, People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov, Chairman of the Central Control Commission G.K. Ordzhonikidze and others. ), considered the crisis an inevitable result of accelerated industrialization in the absence of external sources of financing, the reduction of production in the agricultural sector. Its programs included the maximum concentration of resources in heavy industry by transferring funds from the light food industry, agriculture, and the consolidation of agricultural production along the lines of collectivization. The joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission (April 1929) came out in support of the Stalinist group, and in November 1929 the Bukharin group was withdrawn from the Politburo.

The policy of the great leap at the turn of the 20s - 30s. Transition to forced industrialization and complete collectivization of agriculture

The year 1929 in the history of our country is considered to be a turning point, because this year there were fundamental changes in the socio-economic policy of the Stalinist leadership. Having dealt with his opponents, Stalin takes a course to speed up socialist construction, to increase the pace of industrialization and carry out the complete collectivization of agriculture. The theoretical substantiation of the turn in social and economic policy was Stalin's article "The Year of the Great Turn", published on November 7, 1929 on the day of the twelfth anniversary of October in the newspaper Pravda. In it, he stated that the prerequisites had been created in the USSR "for an accelerated rate of development of the production of means of production for the transformation of our country," through the development of collective farms and state farms, in some three years into one of the most grain-producing countries, if not the most grain-producing country in the world. “We are advancing,” Stalin summed up, “at full speed along the path of industrialization—to socialism, leaving behind our great “Russian” backwardness.

Developing these thoughts, Stalin, in the "Political Report" of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks at the 27th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on June 27, 1930, stated that we have every reason to fulfill the first five-year plan "in a number of industries in three and even in two and a half years" (Stalin I.V. op. vol. 12 p. 270).

Stalin motivated the need for accelerated development of the Soviet economy by saying that: 1) "we are devilishly behind the advanced capitalist countries in terms of the level of development of our industry" (vol. 12. p. 273); 2) the task of planting state farms and collective farms "is the only way to solve the problem of agriculture in general, the grain problem in particular (p. 279); 3) the world economic crisis of 1929, which engulfed all capitalist countries, created the danger of unleashing a new intervention against the USSR.

In the light of Stalin's guidelines, a large-scale revision of the first five-year plan began in the direction of a significant increase in industrial production. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Molotov V.M., speaking to the economic asset, said that in 10-15 years of rapid development of the USSR it can ensure the growth of industrial production by 8-10-15 times and that in the next 2-3 five-year plans the Soviet country will economic indicators can overtake the entire capitalist world.

In the aggravated situation of 1928, generated to a large extent by the grain procurement crisis in the winter of 1927-1928. the first five-year plan was formed. It was mainly about the development of certain branches of heavy industry - metallurgy, energy and engineering. Moreover, the issue of accelerated construction of military enterprises and the entire industrial infrastructure that ensures the operation of the defense complex became more and more acute. The implementation of the first five-year plan began on October 1, 1928.

Already in the course of industrialization, the Bolshevik leadership not only abandoned the starting one, but actually distorted the optimal plan for the development of the national economy for 1928-1933, inflating the pace of industrial construction unreasonably. At the XVI Congress of the CPSU (b), held in the summer of 1930, Kuibyshev put forward the slogan "Tempos decide everything!". Such "spurring" led to the opposite results. The first five-year plan was the time for the construction of pits as monuments of administrative self-will.

The acceleration of industrialization in the conditions of unbalanced market relations, the growing budget deficit and inflation led to the strengthening of administrative methods of economic management. In 1930, commercial credit was liquidated, a transition to centralized (through the State Bank) lending was carried out. In 1930-31. the plurality of taxes is replaced by one - the turnover tax. The industry was divided between sectoral monopolies, whose production programs were coordinated by the State Planning Commission and the Council of People's Commissars by strengthening directive planning.

With the further progress of industrialization, the government faced a number of serious difficulties, and, above all, in the field of financing. With a shortage of working capital and galloping inflation, the leadership repeatedly resorted to seizing valuables from the so-called remnants of the bourgeois classes. During the period of industrialization, a huge number of works of art were exported abroad. Proceeds from the sale of bread, timber, furs and gold were used as sources of financing.

The ultra-fast pace of industrial development led in a number of cases to violations of technological requirements, a drop in the quality of work and products, an increase in the issue of money and inflationary processes, the self-supporting mechanism of economic development was curtailed and replaced by an administrative-distribution system for managing the national economy.

Despite the difficulties, the first five-year plan was completed, the political leadership of the country announced that the economic foundation of socialism had been built in the country.

Despite all the costs in the course of industrialization during the first five-year plan, its results can and should be assessed as positive. 1500 largest enterprises were built, new branches of the national economy appeared, which were absent in tsarist Russia, and the foundations of the defense industry were laid. Dneproges, Turksib, Stalingrad and Kharkov tractor plants, Moscow and Gorky automobile plants, Uralo-Kuzbass, etc. became symbols of the first five-year plan. Industry in Kazakhstan and Central Asia developed dynamically.

During the years of the first five-year plan, industrial output was 2.3 times higher than in 1928, which must be regarded as an indisputable achievement. In fulfilling the First Five-Year Plan, the Soviet working class showed examples of heroic labor. No capitalist country has demonstrated such rates of industrialization. The achievements of the USSR made a stunning impression against the background of the economic crisis and the great depression in the rest of the world.

One of the most important social achievements of the first five-year plan was the elimination of unemployment in 1930.

Since 1933, the implementation of the second five-year plan (1933 - 1937) began. It was a major step in the industrial development of the country. Its main task was to complete the technical reconstruction of the national economy.

It should be noted that the lessons of the first five-year plan did not go unnoticed, and the second five-year plan took place in a more normal environment. However, in the course of its implementation, a new problem emerged - the problem of mastering new technology. To the slogan of the first five-year plan "Technology decides everything!" added a new slogan "Cadres decide everything!" In a country where more than half of the adult population was illiterate, this problem became decisive. Together with the nationwide program of general education, a network of industrial and technical schools and various courses was developed, where workers improved their skills and mastered complex equipment.

A movement began for the development of new technology and the revision of old technical standards. In 1935, it received the name of the Stakhanov movement - after the name of the miner A. Stakhanov, who, using new equipment and a new organization of labor, exceeded the usual rate by 14 times.

The new form of socialist competition embraced practically all branches of the national economy. The initiators of the Stakhanov movement in the textile industry were the weavers E. and M. Vinogradov.

Successes in the development of new technology made it possible to bring the largest enterprises that were built during the years of the first five-year plan to their design capacity. In addition, 4,500 new large enterprises were put into operation. Labor productivity has doubled and has become a decisive factor in the growth of production. Gross output increased 2.2 times. At the beginning of the Third Five-Year Plan, industry as a whole became profitable. In 1938, the third five-year plan began. The factor of the threat of war began to influence the development of the economy and the life of Soviet society more and more tangibly. During these years, special attention is paid to the development of metallurgy, the construction of backup plants in the East of the country, and funds for the defense of the state are increasing.

The fundamentally important results of the implementation of industrialization were the overcoming of the country's technical and economic backwardness, the acquisition of the economic independence of the USSR, and the creation of guarantees of defense capability. In terms of industrial output, the country came out on top in Europe and second in the world, second only to the United States. The workers, engineers and specialists who grew up in this complex and contradictory era ultimately ensured the success of the country's industrialization.

The party organs give the direction of "complete collectivization." The resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted on January 5, 1930 "On the rate of collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective farm construction" regulated the deadlines for the completion of collectivization and the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class."

For the purpose of gradual collectivization, the country was previously divided into three large land-climatic zones. The agricultural artel was ultimately chosen as the basis for collective farm construction. In the first zone of the grain regions, where the North Caucasus, the Lower and Middle Volga were assigned, collectivization was ordered to be completed already "in the autumn of 1930, or in any case in the spring of 1931", in the second zone, where all the other grain regions of the country were assigned - "in the autumn of 1931 year, or at any rate in the spring of 1932.

Such a short period of collectivization, due to their unreality, led to administration, brute pressure, threats, "dispossession" of not only the "kulaks", but also the middle peasants, and sometimes even the poor, which was subsequently forced to admit the CPSU (b) in a decree of March 14, 1930 " On the fight against Party distortions in collective-farm construction.

During 1930-31, about 2 million people were sent to special settlements only in remote areas of the country. The expulsion continued in the future, but on a smaller scale.

Collectivization was carried out with gross violations of the principles of voluntariness and gradualism. Violent methods of carrying it out met with resistance from the peasantry. Mass slaughter of livestock has become a serious problem. A significant part of the middle peasants sold their animals and equipment, not wanting to hand them over to the collective farm.

Under these conditions, in March 1930, Stalin's article "Dizziness from Success" and a Central Committee resolution appeared, condemning excesses and advocating observance of the principles of voluntariness. All responsibility was shifted to local workers, but there was no real revision of the policy. After a short break, "dispossession" and forced collectivization continued.

The consequences of collectivization were very heavy for the countryside. First of all, as a result of the creation of the collective farm system, the peasantry as a class underwent a serious economic, economic and social transformation. It ceased to exist as an economically independent business entity. The individual peasantry was replaced by the “collective-farm peasantry”, which formally had certain economic rights, but in reality could not manage anything on its own. Collective farmers were attached to the land and until the mid-1950s did not have the right to freely choose or change their place of residence.

Having created collective farms, the Bolsheviks practically returned to the policy of surplus appropriation, which made it possible for the state to pump out everything necessary for industrial construction from the countryside.

At the second stage of collectivization, which began in the autumn of 1930, adjustments were made to its implementation. Economic methods of organizing collective farms began to be applied more widely. The scale of the technical reconstruction of agriculture through the MTS has increased. The level of mechanization has risen. Collective farms were granted significant tax benefits. And by the autumn of 1932, the collective farms already united 62.4% of the peasant farms. Large-scale collective production in the countryside has become one of the foundations of the country's economy and the entire social system.

The third stage of collectivization coincided with the beginning of the second five-year plan. It was this time that became the most tragic for the village. As a result of extremely unfavorable weather conditions, crop failure, famine broke out in the winter of 1932-1933, and in grain-producing areas. The government was forced to significantly reduce grain exports.

In agriculture, a crisis situation has developed, overcoming which took time and effort. The harvest of grain fell, the number of livestock decreased by 50%. The restoration of the efficiency of collective farms in the grain regions of the country was slow. The growth of agricultural production began in 1935-1937.

At the same time, collectivization was completed. By 1937, there were 243.7 thousand collective farms in the country, which united 93% of peasant farms.

As a result of the completion of collectivization in the agrarian sector, the tasks of providing growing cities and factories with food were solved, agriculture switched to a planned system, and equipment of the village with machinery increased significantly.

Despite objective difficulties and excesses in collective-farm construction, the peasantry eventually accepted the collective-farm system. The whole life of the peasantry changed in a qualitative way; working conditions, social relations, thoughts, moods, habits.

It should also be noted and emphasized that the collective farm peasantry did a lot for the country, to strengthen its economic and defense power, which manifested itself during the Great Patriotic War and in subsequent periods.

Consequences of the Great Leap Forward Policy

The tasks of the first and second five-year plans were not realized in many respects, although it was officially announced that they were completed ahead of schedule. So, according to the economist B.P. Orlov and historian V.S. Lelchuk, the first five-year plan was fulfilled only in two indicators: in terms of capital investments in industry and in group "A" of production. As for the entire industry, the fulfillment of the plan amounted to only 93.7%, the gross agricultural output, instead of increasing by 55% according to the plan, actually decreased by 14%.

At the same time, it would be wrong not to see the positive results achieved in the industrial development of the USSR during the years of the pre-war five-year plans. During this period, 9 thousand industrial enterprises were built. The growth rates of heavy industry were 2-3 times higher than in the 13 years of Russia's development before the First World War. According to L.A. Gordon and E.V. Klopov, authors of several works on 20-30 years (Thirties - forties // Knowledge is power. 1998, No. 2-5; Forced breakthrough of the late 20-30s: historical roots and results // Political education. 1988. No. 15), In the late 1930s, in terms of absolute volumes of industrial production, the USSR took second place after the United States (in 1913, Russia ranked only fifth in the world).

But the industrial breakthrough in the USSR was achieved, first of all, at the expense of the agrarian sector of the economy, due to the total impoverishment and destruction of the productive forces of the countryside. Its main tasks were: providing industrial buildings with labor, technical raw materials and food. Number of cattle for 1929-32. decreased by 20 million, horses - by 11 million heads, pigs - 2 times, sheep and goats - 2.5 times.

During the years of the pre-war five-year plans, certain changes took place in the social sphere: unemployment was eliminated, the literacy rate of the population increased from 43% in 1926 to 81.2% in 1939. The Soviet Union came out on top in the world in terms of the number of students, the pace and volume of training of specialists.

However, the impressive growth of heavy industry, the spread of elements of culture and health care was carried out on the basis of stagnation and even a fall in the standard of living both in the city and in the countryside. In terms of consumption of meat, lard, milk and dairy products, the USSR in 1940 did not even reach the level of 1913 (see M.N. Zuev. History of Russia. M., 1998. P. 353).

The political consequences of the "Great Leap Forward" were: the tightening of the political regime, accompanied by mass repressions, increased ideological pressure, the establishment of a dictatorial form of government, the formation of an administrative-command control system. The most important features of the administrative-command system: the centralization of the management system: the economy, the merging of the party apparatus with the state, the strengthening of authoritarian principles in the leadership of social and political life. The result of the political development of the country was the formation of a totalitarian state.

On December 5, 1936, according to the report of Stalin, the VIII Extraordinary Congress of Soviets approved the new Constitution of the USSR. It announced the victory of socialism in the USSR and the proclamation of the Soviet country as a socialist state.

Conclusion

The abrupt upheaval in socio-economic policy at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s is qualified by historians and publicists (V.S. Lelchuk, V.M. Ustinov, I.V. Bestuzhev-Lada, and others) as a "big leap". The "Great Leap Forward" policy provided for the transfer of the economy and society to a new qualitative state in a short time. It was based on Stalin's conceptual approach to the construction of socialism as a short-term phase of development, which was to be followed by communism. A number of party workers believed that Stalin, in his practical steps, departed from the Leninist concept of socialism and, having usurped political power, carried out a counter-revolutionary coup. This is evidenced by the facts of the acute inner-party struggle in the 20-30s, during which Stalinism was seriously resisted.

What are the modern assessments of Stalin's conclusions about the socio-political development of the USSR by the end of the second five-year plan? The first approach is that no socialism was built in our country, because the Soviet society, in terms of its qualitative characteristics, did not correspond to the Marxist-Leninist criteria of socialism. The second approach is that socialism was built in our country in the Stalinist interpretation. Supporters of this approach (Butenko, Maslov, Gordon, Klopov, and others) call it Stalinist, state-administrative, barracks, deformed, and even feudal.

Used Books

Werth N. History of the Soviet state. 1900-1991. M., 1997.

Gordon L.A., Klopov E.P. Forced breakthrough of the late 20-30s: historical roots and results. // Pages of the history of Soviet society. M., 1989.

Gordon L.A., Klopov E.V. What was it? Reflections on the preconditions and results of what happened to us in the 1930s and 1940s. - M., 1989.

Danilov V., Ilyin A., Teptsov N. Collectivization: how it was. // The lesson is taught by history. M., 1989 (or: Pages of the history of the CPSU: Facts, problems, lessons. M., 1988).

Industrialization of the Soviet Union: new documents. New facts. New approaches. - M., 1997.

Ivnitsky N.A. Collectivization and dispossession (early 1930s). - M., 1996.

History of the fatherland: people, ideas of solution. Essays on the history of the Soviet state. M. 1991

Russian history. From ancient times to the end of the 20th century: In 3 volumes. Vol. 3. History of Russia in the 20th century. Ed. V.P. Dmitrienko. M., 1996.

History of Russia: Textbook (edited by S.V. Leonov). T 2. M. 1995

Kolchanov A.I. The path to socialism: tragedy and feat (20-30s). M., 1990.

Conquest R. Great terror.T. 1-2. - Riga, 1991.

Lelchuk V.S. 1921-1940: Complete industrialization or industrial breakthrough? // History of the USSR, 1990, No. 4. - S. 3-25.

Lelchuk V.S. Industrialization of the USSR - M., 1984

Lelchuk V., Ilyin A., Kosheleva L. Industrialization: strategy and practice. // The lesson is taught by history. M., 1989 (or: Pages of the history of the CPSU: Facts, problems, lessons. M., 1988).

Our fatherland, Experience of political history. T.2. M., 1991.

Rogalina L.N. Collectivization: Lessons from the Path Traveled. - M., 1989.

Rogovin V. Stalin's Neo-Nep. - M., 1994.

Teptsov N.V. Agrarian policy: on the sharp turns of the 20-30s. - M., 1990.

Shmelev G.I. Collectivization: at a sharp turning point in history. // Origins: questions of the history of the national economy and economic thought. Issue. 1 and 2. - M., 1989-1990.

The formation of the young Soviet state was quite difficult and long. This was largely due to the fact that the international community was not too in a hurry to recognize it. In such circumstances, the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s of the 20th century was distinguished by rigidity and consistency, since it was necessary to solve many problems.

The main tasks facing diplomats

As we said, the main task was to normalize relations with other countries. But the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s also assumed the export of revolutionary ideas to other states. However, the romantic ideals of the revolution were quickly cooled by reality. Realizing the unreality of some ideas, the government of the newly minted country quickly switched to more realistic tasks.

First achievements

At the very beginning of the 20th century, a truly significant event took place: the USSR achieved the complete lifting of the trade blockade, which had a very painful impact on the country's economy, which was already greatly weakened. A very important role was played by the Decree on Concessions, which was issued on November 23, 1920.

In principle, immediately after the signing of all trade agreements with Great Britain, Kaiser's Germany and other countries, diplomats actually achieved unofficial recognition of the USSR throughout the world. The official one dragged on from 1924 to 1924. It was 1924 that turned out to be particularly successful, when it was possible to resume relations with more than three dozen foreign states.

This was the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s. In short, it was possible to reorient the economy to the industrial direction, as the country began to receive a sufficient amount of raw materials and technologies.

Chicherin and Litvinov were the first foreign ministers who made this breakthrough possible. These brilliant diplomats, who received their education in Tsarist Russia, became a real "guiding bridge" between the young USSR and the rest of the world. They conducted the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s of the 20th century.

It was they who achieved the signing of a trade agreement with England, as well as other European powers. Accordingly, it is to them that the Soviet Union owes the lifting of the trade and economic blockade, which impeded the normal development of the country.

New deterioration in relations

But the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s knew not only victories. Approximately at the beginning of the thirties, a new round of deterioration in relations with the Western world began. This time, the pretext was the fact that the government of the USSR officially supported the national movement in China. Relations with England were practically broken due to the fact that the country was sympathetic to the striking British workers. It got to the point that the leaders of the Vatican openly began to call for a "Crusade" against the Soviet Union.

It is not surprising that in the 20-30s. 20th century was distinguished by extreme caution: it was impossible to give the slightest reason for aggression.

Relations with Nazi Germany

It should not be assumed that the Soviet leadership pursued some kind of inadequate, disproportionate policy. Just the same, the government of the USSR was distinguished in those years by rare sanity. So, immediately after 1933, when the National Socialist Party came to sole power in Germany, it was the Soviet Union that began to actively insist on the creation of a collective European security system. All the efforts of diplomats were traditionally ignored by the leaders of the European powers.

An attempt to stop Hitler's aggression

In 1934, another event occurred that the country had long been waiting for. The USSR was finally admitted to the League of Nations, which was the ancestor of the UN. Already in 1935, an allied treaty was concluded with France, which provided for friendly mutual assistance in the event of an attack on one of the allies. Hitler immediately responded by seizing the Rhineland. Already in 1936, the process of the actual aggression of the Reich against Italy and Spain began.

Of course, the political forces in the country understood what all this threatened, and therefore the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s began to undergo serious changes again. The sending of equipment and specialists for confrontation with the Nazis began. This marked the march of fascism across Europe, and the leaders of the European powers practically did not oppose this.

Further aggravation of the situation

The fears of Soviet politicians were fully confirmed when, in 1938, Hitler carried out the "Anschluss" of Austria. In September of the same year, the Munich Conference was held, which was attended by representatives of Germany, Great Britain and other countries.

No one was surprised that, following its results, the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia was unanimously given over to the power of the Soviet Union, which turned out to be almost the only country that openly condemned the fact of Hitler's undisguised aggression. In just a year, not only the whole of Czechoslovakia, but also Poland, is under his rule.

The situation was complicated by the fact that in the Far East the situation was continuously deteriorating. In 1938 and 1939, units of the Red Army came into fire contact with the Japanese. These were the famous Khasan and Khalkin-Gol battles. Also, hostilities were conducted on Mongolian territory. Mikado believed that the heir to tsarist Russia in the face of the USSR retained all the weaknesses of his predecessor, but he miscalculated: Japan was defeated, being forced to make significant territorial concessions.

Diplomatic relations with Germany

After Stalin tried no less than three times to negotiate the creation of the ill-fated European security system, the leadership of the USSR was forced to establish diplomatic relations with Nazi Germany. At present, Western historians are vying with each other to convince the world of the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union, but its true goal was simple. The country tried to secure its borders from attack, forced to negotiate with a potential adversary.

Treaties with the Reich

In mid-1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed. Under the terms of the secret part of the document, Germany received Western Poland, and the USSR got Finland, the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, most of present-day Ukraine. Normalized before the relationship with England and France were completely spoiled.

At the end of September, the politicians of the USSR and Germany signed an agreement on friendship and borders. How can we better understand the goals pursued by the foreign policy of the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s? The table below will help you with this.

Stage name, years	Main characteristic
Primary stage, 1922-1933. Constant attempts to break the international blockade.	Basically, all policy was focused on raising the prestige of the USSR in the eyes of Western countries. Relations with Germany at that time were rather friendly, since with its help the country's leadership hoped to resist England and France.
"The era of pacifism", 1933-1939.	Soviet foreign policy began a large-scale reorientation, heading towards the establishment of normal relations with the leaders of the Western powers. Attitude towards Hitler - wary, repeated attempts to create a European security system.
The third stage, the crisis of international relations, 1939-1940.	Having failed in their attempts to negotiate normally with France and England, the politicians of the USSR began a new rapprochement with Germany. International relations deteriorated sharply after the 1939 Winter War in Finland.

This is what characterized the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s.