T 90 in the Chechen war. Armament. "cockroach race" - life makes bets

The T-90 tank is the latest modification of the vehicles of the legendary family of T-72 tanks - Soviet tanks of the second post-war generation. Without undergoing significant layout changes, he embodied almost all the best that was created in the domestic tank building by the mid-90s of the ending century.

The T-72 tank itself was developed by the Uralvagonzavod design bureau and was created as one of the options for improving the T-64A tank produced by the Kharkov plant named after. Malyshev. The T-72 tank differed from the T-64A mainly in minor hull changes associated with the installation of a four-stroke diesel engine of the V-2 family (the one that originated for the legendary T-34 tank and developed for the T-54, T-55 and T-62 tanks ) instead of the 5TDF boxer two-stroke diesel engine and a new undercarriage, using a simpler and more reliable electromechanical automatic loader (A3) of a tank gun instead of an electro-hydraulic loading mechanism (MZ).

The creation of the T-64 and T-72 tanks in the late 60s and early 70s was a big step forward. At that time, there were no vehicles in the world that were equal to them in terms of basic combat characteristics, and the possibility of excluding the fourth crew member (loader) by installing the MZ (A3) on a tank with a classic layout on foreign tanks was realized only at the end of the 80s ( on the French tank of the third generation "Leclerc").

From the time it was put into service (1973) to the present, the T-72 tank has been repeatedly modernized and improved in all major areas (firepower, security, mobility). The improvements were aimed at ensuring, to the necessary extent, the ability of the T-72 tank to withstand the tanks adopted by the armies of the strongest foreign countries later than the T-72, as well as the new anti-tank weapons (PTS) being created.

So, for example, the improvement of tank protection was carried out in 5 stages, and if we compare the security of the frontal projection of the T-72 tank, produced in 1973, when its mass production began, and the T-90 tank, the last of the tanks of this family, put into service 20 years later , then it tripled. To the constantly improved multi-layer combined armor protection, first mounted, and then built-in dynamic protection (in the Western press - “reactive armor”) and the Shtora-1 optoelectronic suppression complex, which provides the tank with individual protection against the most armies of the world in service, were added anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) with command semi-automatic guidance systems such as "TOW", "Hot", "Milan", "Dragon" and laser homing heads such as "Maverick", "Hellfiree", "Copper head" by creating active jamming of their guidance. The use of unconventional protection methods provided a slight increase in the mass of the T-90 tank, which, in combination with an increase in engine power from 740 to 840 hp. allowed to maintain an acceptable level of mobility.

During its existence, tanks of the T-72 family were purchased for the armies of many countries, and also began to be licensed produced abroad (for example, in Yugoslavia). The tank has proven itself on the positive side when operating in various climatic conditions - from the harsh Arctic to the Asian deserts and subtropics. The vast majority of domestic tankers who served on other domestic tanks (T-64 and T-80 families), as well as foreign specialists and tankers who had a chance to fight on these vehicles, speak positively about the car. As for the complaints about the tanks of the T-72 family, which appeared at the suggestion of the media during the US-Iraq conflict and during military conflicts in the Transcaucasus, the analysis of the reasons for such complaints reveals mainly the shortcomings of the tank operation system in the troops. Indeed, an analysis of the nature of combat damage to tanks reveals an insufficient level of support for their combat use, and in some cases the wrong tactics for using tanks (for example, most tank damage during urban battles occurred as a result of PTS hits when firing from above into the insufficiently protected upper hemisphere of the tank), and analyzing the claims to tanks coming from the troops, we can conclude that the overwhelming number of failures and malfunctions occurs due to insufficient knowledge of the material part and a poor level of maintenance.

Without a doubt, we can say that the tanks of the T-72 family have a solid level of survivability in combat conditions. So, during the demonstration shelling of the T-90 tank, which took place during the period of euphoria “based on the results of the combat use” of our tanks in Chechnya, 6 shots were fired from another tank from a distance of 200 m, reproducing the conditions of real shelling in combat conditions. After that, the tank being fired under its own power arrived at the show ground and outside looked like a pile of twisted metal. Naturally, there were damages to the material part, but their analysis shows that with the correct organization of the combat use of tanks, with the appropriate provision of their actions, a significant proportion of losses in personnel and equipment in Chechnya could be prevented.

To a large extent, the reasons for such survivability and reliability lie in the painstaking accounting in the Design Bureau of Uralvagonzavod, the General Designer of which for a long time was a talented engineer and leader V. Potkin, the experience of domestic and foreign tank building, the system for monitoring and collecting information on the operation of tanks correctly installed in the Design Bureau in the troops, as well as ongoing tests, especially at the stage of accepting the tank into service with the army. After the death of the General Designer, the T-90 tank received the name "Vladimir". Here is our story about some episodes of state tests of the T-90 tank, which one of the authors had to participate in bringing.

"COARCOAT RUN" - LIFE MAKES BETTING

Conditionally, the position of the test participants can be characterized as follows. When conducting tests of various levels and types (from research to state acceptance tests), those military specialists who represent the interests of the customer of the test sample and who will have to operate the vehicle in the future, and maybe even fight on it, try to identify all its shortcomings in order to eliminate them before adoption and check how the machine meets the requirements that were presented during its design. Representatives of design bureaus try to profitably demonstrate all the advantages of the sample, and if any inconsistencies are identified, they try to justify them with the capabilities of existing technologies, violation of the test program, rules for operating the prototype, etc. In general, this is a normal situation of struggle for the customer's machine and its developer, in which compromise solutions are sought for the design and characteristics of the most diverse component parts of the sample. Sometimes quite funny things happen. So, during the most difficult tests of the tank for patency on a section of the road swollen from bad weather, consisting of a mixture of clay, sand and crushed stone, there was a partial destruction of the crushed stone mixed in clay, rubber bandages of road wheels, which naturally irritated the representatives of the Design Bureau, who were indignant on this occasion, they said that such conditions as at this test site are no longer on the entire continent. Or another case, when a metal fragment accidentally captured by the track lugs pierced the fuel tank on the fender and a dispute arose whether this should be considered a design defect.

The T-90 test program was structured in such a way that from the very beginning, the vehicles that arrived from the factory faced almost the most difficult tests - running along a highway with a hard asphalt concrete surface until they ran out of fuel (in the common people - “cockroach races”). On a concrete track, the cruising range at one gas station was determined. The tank was refueled "to the eyeballs", including two barrels at the stern of the car, which are included in the engine fuel supply system (total 1700 liters). In the early morning, the tank went out onto the track, stopping once at 4 o'clock, for a crew change, for 1.5-2 minutes, without turning off the engine. When it was already the second hour of the night, all the participants in the tests were just waiting for it to stop. And finally, the booming rumbling stops. On the gas station we look for a tank on the highway, look at the speedometer - 728 km (600 km were declared). Of course, in addition to the skill of the drivers, this is the merit of the designers and prototype manufacturers, who have achieved the optimal combination of parameters and adjustments of the engine-transmission unit and the tank's motion control system. Similar results in foreign tank building are unknown.

The resource of the tank before overhaul is 14 thousand km, and the T-90 tanks had to “run” along the concrete road for 3500 km, and how to run: the average speed was 48-50 km / h. It should be noted that tests on concrete are the most difficult for a tank out of all the tests, because hard coating in combination with high speeds has the highest destructive effect on the components and assemblies of the tank.

In general, the task of the tester in any conditions is to “squeeze” everything that it is capable of out of the car, test it in extreme conditions, try to put it in extreme conditions, of course, observing all the rules and regulations of operation. Sometimes we, the testers, felt sorry for the car. But the realization that if it survives in such difficult conditions, it will certainly not let you down in battle, nevertheless prompted further “rape” of the machine.

Somehow, during a 250-kilometer night run, the operating conditions of a tank were simulated with partial damage to the power plant (coolant leak). This situation is quite real both in everyday operation and in a combat situation, where it is especially important to have a tank reliability margin (for helicopters, for example, there is a certain requirement for the duration of “dry”, i.e. without oil, engine operation to enable the crew to choose a place and land the car in case of damage to the engine lubrication system). Testing was entrusted to the driver, experienced tester A. Shopov. 35 liters of antifreeze was poured into the tank engine cooling system instead of the 90 liters prescribed. During the tests, the main parameters of the operation of the power plant were carefully controlled during the task. And it should be noted that the engine of the T-90 tank successfully passed this difficult test for it, having worked out the resource specified by the program at the temperature limit.

This fact made us take a slightly different look at the car, we were even more deeply imbued with respect for its developers, who created this reliable and extremely unpretentious car.

What is an eight-hour non-stop run with the fire control system on? Be sure to choose a difficult route with endless pits and potholes, on which the stabilized gun of the tank from overloads now and then becomes on the hydraulic stop, the loaded squeal of the hydraulics of the gun stabilizer is heard, the mass of which reaches several tons. In addition, the gunner is obliged to make a horizontal turn of the tank turret every 2-3 minutes in the “transfer speed” mode by 360.

There was such a case in the desert of Central Asia. The tank driver, a conscript soldier, one day suddenly and unexpectedly “carefully” began to drive the tank along a well-known route. He did not respond to repeated requests to increase speed. I had to stop, turn off the engine and carry out explanatory work about the need to test the tank in extreme conditions. As it turned out, industry representatives sympathized with the soldier in his “ordeals” over the uneven Turkmen road and convinced him that the soldier would not need a possible repair of the tank due to overloads. What is surprising, after the words that now we are quietly rolling back without checking anything, and in two years the “good” tank put into service, but already in the hands of a younger soldier brother, will fail somewhere in a combat situation, he was under the impression that we did not return to this issue with this soldier until the end of the tests. And the speed performance of this driver was one of the best, even among more experienced testers.

A comprehensive check of the numerous properties of the tank, of course, required a lot of time and even had to replace the driver dismissed from the ranks of the army - a conscript soldier. To replace the troops, they sent an average, not having sufficient experience, driver. It was in Siberia, in the midst of a severe winter. The new driver was eager to start testing and quickly demonstrate his knowledge and skills. After two days of exploring the forty-kilometer route as a passenger in the tank turret, we finally entrusted him with a place behind the levers of the vehicle. The route was quite difficult, combining high-speed sections with bumpy, almost bare, snow-free sections covered with a meter layer of snow. But, nevertheless, the testers always fit into the average speed of 35-41 km / h. Imagine our surprise when the beginner overcame the test route in almost 2 hours at an average speed of 23 km/h. And this despite the fact that before the movement, he asked if it was possible to drive the car "to the full." Mastery is a acquired business, and if you wish, of course, you can achieve everything. Within a week, the newcomer almost completely adapted to the harsh winter conditions, the features of a difficult test track.

When testing for cross-country ability in snow, we were extremely surprised when the T-90 confidently overcame long snow sections with a snow depth of 1.1 to 1.3 m.

IN THE DESERT IT IS NOT EASY EVEN FOR A CAMEL

All stages of testing were difficult for the tank, but what awaited him in the desert of Central Asia cannot be compared with the rest.

The ambient temperature is 45-50°C in the shade. Throughout the hundred-kilometer running track, a layer of forest dust of 10-20 cm. During the movement, the column of dust behind the tank rose several hundred meters, and from the tank itself only a cannon and mud guards were visible. But the trail from him in the desert was visible for tens of kilometers. By the dust tail, we determined where the tank was located, and it was visible for 40 km. However, as we joked, it was certainly visible to American satellites from space, there's no getting around here.

Dust was almost everywhere. When cleaning the internal volume of the tank with a vacuum cleaner from dust that entered through open hatches during marches, 5-6 buckets of it were collected, and this is for every 4-5 marches. We remembered about it even a few months later in the winter in Siberia, when on one of the tracks after the tank flew into a huge hole so that the Turkmen dust that had long settled in the hull rose.

Trying to somehow get rid of the dust, the testers moved away from the field road to the side, where it was smaller, but, a couple of times at high speed, they fell into pits with steep, washed out, spring flood walls, which are not visible among the faded yellow and dried vegetation , returned to the "channel". So we called this monstrous road because when you cross it on foot, it seems that you are walking on water. Moreover, it is possible to cross such a "channel" only in boots, which, of course, no one wore in the heat, in sneakers - it is impossible.

During the day, the tanks covered from 350 to 480 km, they also worked out, like on a concrete road, on all types of fuel. Moreover, in the military district where the tests were carried out, there was no kerosene for the engine of the T-90 tank. There was only RT kerosene (jet fuel), the use of which was not allowed by the tank operating instructions. After discussion together with representatives of the Design Bureau, we made a decision on runs on kerosene of the Republic of Tatarstan at our own peril and risk. We were fulfilling a point in the test program, but the representatives of the design bureau were clearly taking risks, but, obviously, they were confident in their offspring. The risk was also that very heavy loads fell on the tank engine in dusty conditions and high ambient temperatures, even when operating on “native”, diesel, fuel, and then aviation kerosene.

At that time, everything went extremely well and calmly. By the way, for the entire time of testing T-90 tanks in the desert, the average speed ranged from 35 km / h on gasoline to 43 km / h on kerosene and diesel fuel. And in order to put all the dots on this issue, let's add that the average speed of operation of tanks (an indicator obtained by dividing the readings of the mileage meter by the readings of the hour meter under load) in combat units is 8-11 km / h, and in our country for all state tests it was 28 km/h.

And yet, it was not without incident. Somehow, at the end of the working week, we were completing tank runs along the ring route. They told the test leader on the radio that we were going out for the last lap, then we were going to the park on our own, after which we got out of communication. Passing at high speed a checkpoint on the track, we saw one of the testers of the backup group, who was waving his hand at us. We took this gesture for a greeting and, having answered the same, continued to move. After many kilometers of grueling run, we were looking forward to the events of the weekend and were in a wonderful mood.

The section of the road from the ring road to the park was a hilly road with steep ascents and descents, 6 km long. One climb with a steepness of about 300 and a length of 80-100 m was especially impressive. When the car climbed this climb, and we sympathized with it very much, the speed dropped sharply, the dust at the stern dissipated a little and a rather tricky situation was discovered. The tank was burning, burning very strongly, and outside. After all, in the event of a fire from the inside, the PPO system would work and the crew would know about it immediately. We, the commander and gunner on the turret, tried to convince the driver to stop immediately by intercom, without bothering to tell the reason for such a stop in a fever. Naturally, the driver did not understand why he had to stop in such an inconvenient place and continued to climb to the top of the hill.

Only after the tank stopped did the source of the fire become clear. It was a tank with a supply of oil for the engine, mounted on the exhaust manifold of the power plant (so that in winter this oil was heated and always ready for use). Obviously, during a long drive over rough terrain, the tank was loosened, it was destroyed and oil spilled onto the exhaust manifold, where it instantly ignited. During our movement, almost 40 liters of oil spilled onto the port side and the undercarriage, as a result of which the rubber bulwarks and rubber tires of the rear road wheels caught fire. That's what they tried to tell us at the checkpoint. It took a long time to put out the fire. The OU-2 fire extinguisher available in the ZIP was not enough, the forest dust that was in abundance at hand also did not help much. The fire was dealt with only when, burning, it was possible to rip off the tank itself from the bulwark mounts, ready to explode.

Naturally, we arrived at the park in an "unsightly" form and with a great delay, which made the head of the test and our colleagues worry. But we must give them their due - they showed restraint and loyalty to us, considering what happened was not an emergency, but one of the equipment failures, in order to eliminate which it is necessary to make adjustments to the tank operating instructions.

SHOOTING GOOD IS NOT JUST SHOOTING GOOD

When conducting firing tests at one of the training grounds in Siberia, we had such a case. During the execution of firing from two T-90 tanks, a lunch break was announced, and after it the firing director set the task for the crews for the next race. The tanks were already ready for the task, the leader was ready to give the command "forward", as at that moment a moving object appeared in front of the target area. As it turned out, the watchman from the other end of the firing range, considering the shooting over, went on a horse in a sleigh to get food to the village and decided to shorten his path through the firing range. After all, he watched the firing from the tanks, already from the side of the command tower, with horror imagining himself and his horse there, at the level of real targets.

It should be added that learning how to shoot well from this tank is much easier, in our opinion, than how to drive it well. In principle, those simple operations that a gunner performs can be mastered in a few training sessions, and almost everything that is classified as a gunner’s art was taken over by the fire control system (FCS) installed on the tank, which automatically takes into account all the necessary data for firing, including including corrections caused by deviations from normal firing conditions (such as wind direction and speed, barometric pressure and air temperature, charge temperature, wear of the cannon barrel, tank side roll, etc.) The whole task of the gunner is to use the remote control pointing (jokingly called the "joystick" by the soldiers) bring the aiming point to the target, and press the electric trigger button to fire a shot.

During tests to determine the fire capabilities of a tank, sometimes the SLA makes you treat yourself very, very correctly. During the firing, one of the T-90 tanks began to make unjustified misses. Checking the serviceability of the SLA did not reveal any defects, everything functioned normally. Everyone was perplexed. Only a casual glance of the tank commander at the new capacitive wind sensor allowed to explain the unsatisfactory performance of the SLA. It turned out that everything is very simple - the crew made an inattention and a small case was not removed from the wind sensor, and he, naturally, being "in calm", did not work out the required correction for the SLA.

This episode is not given by chance, because the technique, no matter how “smart” it is, still requires a professional, qualified attitude, which allows much wider use of its capabilities.

The firing capabilities of the T-90 have been significantly expanded with the installation of a guided weapon system to ensure a confident superiority over all existing foreign tanks in terms of target engagement range. Heavily armored targets at ranges up to 5 km are hit by the T-90 on the move (up to 30 km/h) with a high probability of being hit by the first shot. During the state tests, 24 missile launches were made at ranges of 4-5 km, and all of them hit the target. Again, I must say thanks to the designers who created this "long arm". It is one thing when, at an exhibition in Abu Dhabi, from a T-80U tank (which has the same guided weapon system), an experienced gunner made 52 launches of a guided missile at a distance of 5 km and all the missiles hit the target, and another thing when the state tests of the tank T-90, all missile launches were carried out by young guys who had undergone preliminary training and had absolutely no practice of firing a guided missile before.

Well, what a professional can do was demonstrated at the demonstration of the T-90 tank by one of the foreign delegations. A rather experienced gunner, performing a firing exercise, first hit the target with a guided missile at a distance of 4 km from a place, and then, in 54 seconds at a speed of 25 km / h, hit 7 real armored targets located at ranges of 1500-2500 m, and returning to the initial position, handed over fire control to the tank commander, who, in a duplicate mode, fired "from the stern" of the tank, shot 4 more targets.

Shooting from a tank always impresses with its power, it is especially spectacular and visual in mountainous conditions, where the targets seem to be very close at a glance, and the rocks located literally behind them are probably 3 km, no more. However, when measuring the range with a laser rangefinder, it turns out that these rocks are at least 6-7 km away, and at least 2.5 km from the targets. Under such conditions, the trajectory of the projectiles is very clearly visible.

A TANK IS NOT A SUBMARINE AND NOT A HANG Glider, BUT STILL...

It also happened that, in addition to the harsh frosts of Siberia, the unbearable (for humans) heat and dust of Central Asia, the tank had to pass through water barriers 5 m deep and climb 2 times to a height of 8000 m aboard transport aircraft IL-76MD and AN-124 Ruslan.

Difficult were tests under water. The tank entered the reservoir to a depth of 5 m, the engine was turned off, and for 1 hour the crew listened in complete silence through the air supply pipe to what was happening above the water column. Such a long time spent under water was necessary to check the quality of the sealing of the elements of the Shtora-1 optoelectronic suppression complex, which are located on the tank's armor. Although, in principle, there is nothing to be afraid of under water (in case of an emergency abandonment of the tank, the crew was equipped with IP-5 insulating gas masks), we were looking forward to the time to start the engine and return the tank to the surface of the water.

A SWAN SONG...

One of the most important stages of testing prototypes of T-90 tanks - testing for resistance to anti-tank weapons, is usually carried out at the end of the entire test program, since after this stage the sample, as a rule, is not subject to further use.

To test the security characteristics of the program, tests were provided for shelling and mine detonation of one of the prototypes. The beginning was terrible for the car. Under one of the tracks, a landmine was laid, the TNT equivalent of which corresponded to the most powerful mines of foreign states. The machine passed this test, i.е. was brought into working condition by the crew within the time specified by the requirements. Then the tank was subjected to brutal shell fire, with the "enemy" hitting the "weak" places. With each new hit, it became more and more gloomy, and after a fairly decent number of hits, systems and components began to fail, the last, like a person, the "heart" of the tank, its engine, failed.

We were humanly sorry for the tank, which had become our friend in combat over the past year and a half. But his "suffering" will not be in vain, as they have given new food for designers and specialists.

The second T-90 tank had a completely different fate. He traveled 14,000 km, fired a mountain of ammunition, changing two barrels to a tank cannon during the tests, and was sent to his birthplace - the city of Nizhny Tagil, where new components and assemblies were installed on him for further research and testing.

In the 1990s, the Russian army became involved in an endless series of new Caucasian wars, in which tanks played, although not decisive, but still quite a noticeable role, although most often they had to operate in the most unsuitable conditions for tanks - in street battles .

We will not go into the political background of the conflict, but will go straight to the description of military operations. The first significant event was the attempt to storm Grozny, undertaken on November 26, 1994 by the forces of the anti-Dudaev opposition. The decisive role in this operation was played by tanks - 35 T-72A, handed over to the oppositionists from the warehouses of the North Caucasian Military District. If not for these tanks, then the assault could not have taken place at all, so we can say that it was they who became the key factor, although not in the sense that tank troops play in general army operations. This operation failed miserably, because Dudayev and his entourage turned out to be perfectly informed about all the plans of the opposition. The attacking groups were met with concentrated fire, and only 4 tanks managed to escape from the city, the rest were either destroyed or abandoned by the crews.

T-72B1 of the 2nd Tank Company, 276th Infantry Rifle Regiment before going out to support the assault groups fighting on Noya Bauchidze Street (in the foreground, tank 441 of Sergeant E. Lyapustin). For all the time of the fighting in Grozny, the tank was never hit by an RPG. January 1995

The failure of this attempt to fight “with little bloodshed in a foreign land” prompted the Russian leadership to take more active steps, and on November 29 the Russian Security Council approved a plan for a military operation to restore constitutional order in Chechnya. In early December, several military groups were created, which were to enter the territory of Chechnya and, if the Dudaevites refused to lay down, take Grozny by storm. A group of 15 battalions was formed in the Mozdok direction, which had about 230 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, as well as 40 tanks. A group of 11 battalions with 160 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles and 30 tanks advanced from the Vladikavkaz direction. The strongest grouping of 34 battalions, which had about 700 armored vehicles, including more than 100 tanks, advanced from the Kizlyar direction. Already one enumeration of the forces involved shows that a corps-scale operation was carried out.

However, from the very beginning, everything did not go as planned, only it took the troops 16 days instead of 3 according to plan to advance to Grozny. the capture of the city on January 1 at 00.01. As we can see, the rotten tradition of the Russian-Soviet-Russian army to take cities by the red dates of the calendar has not wavered in the last two centuries. Either Plevna is taken from us by the tsar's birthday, then Kyiv - by November 7, Berlin - by May 1, and now a New Year's gift ... "The brother of the people is preparing a birthday cake from the filling for the sovereign brother..." These lines were written in 1877 year, but I'm afraid they are still relevant today.

Combat positions of 324 infantry regiments near the breeding farm at the time of blocking the road to Grozny. The command of the federal troops at the third stage of the assault on the Chechen capital envisaged complete control over the city from the south. February 1995

About 15,000 soldiers of the federal troops were concentrated against the approximately 10,000 militants defending Grozny. They were supported by 230 tanks and 879 light armored vehicles, several hundred guns. However, street battles were coming, where this superiority in technology was largely offset by the positional advantages of the defenders. At the same time, the West continues to remain in unshakable confidence that the Russians have concentrated huge forces to storm Grozny. For example, a study by the Danish Royal Military College categorically states that more than 38,000 soldiers participated in the assault. Of course, everything is seen much better from Copenhagen.

Before the attack on the city, after a heavy battle, the Khankala airport was occupied, but, unfortunately, the command did not draw the proper conclusions based on the results of this battle. It seems that for unknown reasons, the generals counted only on the symbolic resistance of the Dudaevites. The assault on the city was carried out according to an insufficiently developed plan, once again the command did not have reliable communication with its troops, which cost the attackers dearly. In general, in the troops, the plan for a swift throw of mechanized columns to the city center was regarded as a gamble. Subsequent events showed the validity of this assessment.

Spare parts boxes saved the T-72B1 tank from getting a cumulative jet into the engine compartment. Grozny. January 1995

The assault troops were divided into 4 groups according to directions. At 0600, the Sever group launched an offensive. It was in its composition that the 131st Maikop motorized rifle brigade was included. Having lost several tanks and armored personnel carriers, the column nevertheless broke through to the railway station, where the brigade took up all-round defense. The "North-East" group, using a successful diversionary maneuver, broke into the city relatively freely, where they also took up defense. The groups "East" and "West" did not fulfill the tasks assigned to them. At the same time, if the North-East group set up checkpoints along the route, which provided, albeit difficult, but still communication with the rear, then the North and West groups were surrounded.

The worst thing about all this was that it was the Soviet troops who at one time gained a lot of experience in fighting in the city. Königsberg, Breslau, Berlin showed exactly how to act in such cases. But this experience was completely forgotten. And another gross mistake was made - completely unforced, the Russian troops gave the initiative to the enemy. Instead of systematically clearing the city using superior firepower, the assault teams went on the defensive. At one time, a well-known British admiral, who had fought quite a bit himself, said: “Moderation in war is the greatest idiocy. Ruthlessness, tirelessness, perseverance - this is the key to success. All of these principles have been violated.

A grenade from an RPG hitting the T-72B1 commander's cupola from the top floor of the building pierced the armor and hit the tank commander. Grozny. January 1995

As a result, Dudayev got the opportunity to pull his most combat-ready units to the city center and begin to eliminate the encircled groups. The 131st brigade found itself in a particularly difficult situation, which lost all armored vehicles by about 1600 on January 1. At the same time, it should be said that the new generation tanks (T-72 and T-80) showed noticeably better survivability than the tanks that fought in the Middle East in 1973. One hit by an RPG or ATGM projectile was no longer enough to disable it. As a rule, at least 6-7 hits were required, and a record case was recorded when the tank withstood hits of almost 20 shells. The dynamic protection systems worked exceptionally well. But on the other hand, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles turned out to be completely defenseless. The important role played by self-propelled artillery in such battles was again confirmed, since the weight of the 152-mm projectile of the 2SZM Akatsiya self-propelled guns was noticeably larger than that of tank guns, and had a noticeably greater destructive effect when firing at buildings.

After the regrouping and the arrival of reinforcements, the assault continued. There was no mention of any anniversaries. In general, the organized resistance of the militants in Grozny was finally broken only by March 26th. This assault cost the Russian army about 6,000 men killed and wounded. The irretrievable losses of armored vehicles, according to the Main Armored Directorate of the RF Ministry of Defense, amounted to 49 tanks, 132 infantry fighting vehicles, 98 armored personnel carriers. The number of damaged but repaired tanks remains unknown.

The lack of protection for the stern of the tower in the form of a box of spare parts and accessories led to the penetration of the armor and the death of the tank commander in the battle for Grozny. January 1995

One should not think that the battles in Grozny went on continuously for 3 months, they break up into several stages, separated by breaks in official truces and temporary respite. The first phase ended on January 18 after the capture of the presidential palace, when the northern and central parts of the city came under the control of the Russian army. Only after that did the attack on the southern part of Grozny begin, which was carried out with the most powerful artillery support. There were days when our artillery fired up to 30,000 shells at enemy positions. This is how it should have been done from the very beginning.

In August 1996, fighting broke out again in Grozny, although this time it did not last long. On August 6, the militants broke into the city. They did not try to storm the strongholds of the federal troops, but simply isolated them and subjected them to mortar fire, waiting for the surrender of the defenders. However, the energetic actions of the command of the federal troops managed to prevent the worst scenario. Although the fighting was still stubborn, on August 11 a corridor was broken through to the Government House, lifting the siege from this important point. And by August 13, a decisive turning point was reached. Federal troops began to push the enemy in all directions, and the militants began to withdraw from the city. By the time the armistice was signed on August 14, the city was under the control of federal troops. Losses in this case amounted to only 5 tanks, 22 infantry fighting vehicles, 18 armored personnel carriers. We will not even comment on the chatter of some Western newspapers about hundreds of burned tanks.

Captured T-72A tank captured by federal troops from an illegal armed formation during the fighting in Grozny. For the characteristic towers, painted with white lime, these machines were nicknamed "white crows" by the federals. After the repair, the tank was used by the Sever group in the battles on Minutka Square. January 1995

During the Second Chechen War, Grozny had to be stormed once again, but now armored vehicles were used in the minimum required quantities. The assault began on December 11, 1999. This time the main emphasis was placed on artillery and air support for infantry assault groups. As a result, the anti-tank defense system carefully prepared by the militants turned out to be simply useless. The advance of the federal troops was slow, but at the same time they suffered only small losses. A significant role in this operation was played by the TOS-1 multiple rocket launchers. Realizing that they could not oppose anything to such a gradual advance, on January 31, 2000, the militants tried to break out of Grozny under the cover of a snowstorm. They suffered heavy losses, but part of their forces still managed to escape.

T-72B (M) 74 Guards. omsbr, struck by a shot from an RPG in an unprotected gap between the KDZ of the turret shoulder strap and the fender fuel tank (apparently, they tried to hit the tank with a second grenade into the turret shoulder strap already unprotected by the fuel tank). The crew of the tank was killed. January 1995

Panoramic sight broken by a sniper shot. January 1995

The T-80 is a prime example of how heavily armored tanks can hide significant weaknesses. At one time, the T-80 was considered by the Russian military establishment as a premium tank, but a large number of them were lost in battles with partisan formations equipped with light weapons during the first Chechen war. His reputation was lost forever.

However, it was originally assumed that a completely different fate would await him. The T-80 tank was the last main tank developed in the Soviet Union. It was the first Soviet tank to be equipped with a gas turbine engine, and as a result, it was able to move on the roads at a speed of 70 kilometers per hour, and also had an effective power-to-weight ratio of 25.8 horsepower per ton.

This made the standard T-80B the fastest tank produced in the 1980s.

The fighting prowess of the Chechens - and the failed Russian tactics - is more responsible for the loss of T-80 tanks than its own characteristics. However, he had a significant drawback. Ultimately, the T-80 was too expensive and, in addition, it consumed too much fuel. After some time, the Russian military made a choice in favor of the more economical T-72 tank.

The T-80 was a further development of its predecessor, the T-64 tank. As the most modern model of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the T-64 tank represented a departure from the Soviet penchant for making simple armored vehicles like the T-54/55 and T-62.

So, for example, the T-64 was the first Soviet tank in which the functions of the loader were transferred to an automatic system, and as a result, its crew was reduced from four to three people. The second trend-setting innovation of the T-64 was the use of composite armor, which used layers of ceramic and steel, and as a result, protection was improved compared to using steel sheets alone.

In addition, the T-64 was equipped with light steel road wheels of small diameter compared to the large rubber-coated rollers T-55 and T-62.

The first mass-produced T-64A model was produced with the 125 mm 2A46 Rapira cannon, which became so popular that it was installed on all subsequent Russian tanks, up to the T-90. Surprisingly, in the end, the weight of the T-64A was only 37 tons, which is relatively small for a tank of this size.

But as remarkable as these innovations were, it must be admitted that the T-64 had a capricious 5TDF engine and an unusual suspension - and the engine and suspension often broke down. As a result, the Soviet Army deliberately sent these tanks to areas close to the factory in Kharkov where they were made.

But that's not all. There were rumors that the new automatic loading system was capable of drawing in and injuring the hands of crew members who were located too close to it. This is a very likely scenario given the small interior space of the T-64.

Simultaneously with the attempts to cope with the problems of automating the T-64, the Soviets began to think about the development of a new tank with a gas turbine engine. Gas turbine engines are highly responsive and have a good power-to-weight ratio, they are able to start quickly in winter without preheating - this is important in the harsh Russian winters - and, in addition, they are light.

On the downside, they consume a lot of fuel and are more susceptible to dirt and dust, which is a result of their higher air intake compared to conventional diesel engines.

The original basic model of the T-80 tank was adopted only in 1976, much later than planned. The Soviet tank industry was busy fixing the shortcomings of the T-64 tanks and moving towards the production of the T-72, which was a cheaper fallback. At the same time, the Soviets were producing more T-55 and T-62 tanks for their Arab allies, who had lost hundreds of armored vehicles in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Early models of the T-80 also had their problems. In November 1975, Andrey Grechko, then Minister of Defense, stopped further production of these tanks due to their excessive fuel consumption and insignificant increase in firepower compared to the T-64A. And only five months later, Dmitry Ustinov, Grechko's successor, allowed the production of this new tank to begin.

The production of the original T-80 model lasted two years - not so long, since it was surpassed by the T-64B tank, which had a new fire control system that allowed it to fire 9M112 Cobra missiles from the main gun. Even more important was that the T-80 was almost three and a half times more expensive than the T-64A.

The main model was replaced in 1978 by the T-80B tank. It was considered the most modern "premium" tank in the East, and therefore most of the T-80B was sent to the highest-risk garrison - the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

For its high speed, it was nicknamed the "Channel tank". In Soviet war games, it was assumed that T-80s could reach the shores of the Atlantic Ocean in five days - provided they did not experience fuel problems.

The new Soviet tank borrowed something from the T-64. In addition to sub-caliber ammunition, shaped charges and anti-personnel fragmentation shells, its 125 mm 2A46M-1 smoothbore gun was capable of firing the same 9K112 Cobra missiles.

Since guided anti-tank missiles were considered significantly more expensive than conventional tank rounds, this tank's ammunition load included only four missiles and 38 rounds. The missiles were designed to shoot down helicopters and hit installations equipped with ATGM systems outside the firing range of conventional T-80B tank projectiles.

A 7.62-mm PKT machine gun coaxial with a cannon and a 12.7-mm NSVT "Utes" on the commander's turret completed the anti-personnel armament of this tank.

While the T-80 already boasted modern composite armor, it was further protected by the Kontakt-1 dynamic system. Equipped with active armor at the same horizontal levels as the latest T-72A models, the T-80 tanks began to be designated as T-80BV.

In 1987, instead of the T-80B, the T-80U began to be produced, although they did not surpass their predecessors in total numbers.

The T-80U tank was equipped with the Kontakt-5 dynamic protection system. It was an improved version of the Contact-1 system, which consisted of additionally installed containers with explosives. Whereas the Kontakt-5 system had a set of factory-made containers directed outward to maximize the angle of reflection of the projectiles. The "Kontakt-1" system was effective only in the case of the use of cumulative projectiles, while the "Kontakt-5" system also protected against the kinetic energy of sub-caliber ammunition.

Inside the T-80U, instead of the 1A33 fire control system, which was equipped with the T-80B models, a more modern 1A45 system was installed. Engineers have replaced the Cobra missiles with laser-guided 9K119 Reflex missiles, which are more reliable weapons with longer range and greater lethal force. The T-80 was loaded with seven more shells for the 125mm gun than the T-80B.

However, the T-80U tank was not produced for long. His GTD-1250 power plant still consumed too much fuel and was difficult to maintain. Instead, they began to produce a diesel model T-80UD. It was the last version of the T-80 tank produced in the Soviet Union. It was also the first model to be seen in action outside of the training center... if by "in action" we mean the tank gun fire on the Russian Parliament in October 1993 during the constitutional crisis.

In December 1994, the war against the separatists in Chechnya was the first time the T-80 was used in a situation where shells were flying in both directions ... and this was a disaster of epic proportions for the T-80.

When rebels in Chechnya declared independence, Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered troops to return the former Soviet republic to Russia by force. The created group included T-80B and T-80 BV. The crews had no special training on T-80 tanks. They did not know about his gluttony and sometimes completely burned the fuel supply at idle.

The advance of the Russian armed forces towards the Chechen capital city of Grozny was more like a bloody massacre organized for the interventionists - about a thousand soldiers died and 200 pieces of equipment were destroyed between December 31, 1994 and the evening of the next day. The most modern Russian tanks T-80B and T-80BV in the Russian strike force suffered terrible losses.

Although the T-80s are protected from direct frontal hits, many tanks were destroyed in catastrophic explosions, and their turrets flew off after numerous volleys fired by Chechen rebels from RPG-7V and RPG-18 grenade launchers.

It turned out that the loading system of the T-80 "Basket" had a fatal flaw in the design. In the automatic loading system, the finished projectiles were in a vertical arrangement, and only the road wheels partially protected them. An RPG shot fired from the side and directed above the road wheels caused detonation of the ammunition and led to the collapse of the tower.

In this regard, the T-72A and T-72B were similarly punished, but they had a slightly higher chance of surviving a flank attack because their autoloader system used a horizontal arrangement of ammunition that was below the level of the road wheels.

The second main drawback of the T-80, like previous Russian tanks, was associated with the minimum levels of vertical guidance of the gun. It was impossible to fire a cannon at the rebels who fired from the upper floors of buildings or from basements.

In fairness, it should be said that, most likely, poor crew training, insufficient training and disastrous tactics were the cause of large losses. Russia was in such a hurry to start hostilities that T-80BV tanks entered Grozny without filling the containers of dynamic protection with explosives, which made it useless. It was even said that the soldiers were selling explosives in order to increase their salaries in this way.

The Soviet army had long forgotten the hard lessons of urban fighting during World War II. During the Cold War, only special forces units and the Berlin garrison were trained for urban combat. Without expecting significant resistance, Russian troops entered Grozny, while the soldiers were in infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. Their commanders were losing their bearings because they didn't have the right maps.

Since Russian soldiers were reluctant to step out of their armored personnel carriers and clear buildings room by room, their Chechen adversaries - who knew the weaknesses of Russian armor from their military service during the Soviet Union - were able to turn tanks and armored vehicles into crematoria.

It is easy for the Russian command to blame the Chechen disaster on design errors in the creation of the T-80 and not pay attention to rough operational planning and tactical miscalculations. But ultimately, it was the lack of money that caused the cheaper T-72s to replace the T-80s, becoming the preferred choice for Russian exports and for the post-Chechen war effort.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia lost the plant in Kharkov, which became the property of Ukraine. The plant in Omsk, where the T-80U was produced, turned out to be bankrupt, while the Leningrad LKZ no longer produced the earlier T-80BV model.

It no longer made financial or logistical sense for Russia to have three types of tanks - T-72 (A and B), T-80 (BV. U and UD) and T-90. All these models had one 125-millimeter 2A46M gun and missiles of the same characteristics, launched through the gun barrel. But they all had different engines, fire control systems and chassis.

To put it simply, these tanks had common capabilities, but differed in spare parts, instead of having common spare parts and different capabilities. Since the T-80U was much more expensive than the T-72B, it was logical that cash-strapped Russia chose the T-72.

However, Moscow continued to experiment with the T-80 by adding an active defense system that used millimeter-wave radar to track incoming missiles before the active defense system went off. As a result, the T-80UM-1 Bars appeared in 1997, but it was not put into production, probably due to budgetary constraints.

Russia did not use T-80s in the second Chechen war in 1999-2000, nor did they use them in a brief conflict with Georgia in 2008, to the best of our knowledge. So far, T-80 tanks have not participated in the war in Ukraine.

Many are interested in the question of the combat effectiveness of the latest Russian tanks in comparison with foreign counterparts. In particular, what are the capabilities of the tank T-90 vs American?

It should be understood that the situation when two tanks converge on the battlefield, like two knights clad in armor, in a fair duel, is becoming less and less common in modern hostilities. Today, in order to survive, a tank must be ready to fight a variety of opponents - from infantry armed with anti-tank missiles to combat aircraft and helicopters. However, some tanks are constantly compared with others.

Some experts believe that a general theoretical comparison of tanks is impossible, and even actual combat does not provide a definitive answer. It is necessary to take into account the tactics of use, crew training, maintenance of equipment, the interaction of units - all this is often more important than the technical properties of the tank itself.

As for, there is no reliable data on their participation in hostilities. Despite the statements of some authors, most likely there were no T-90s during both the First and Second Chechen campaigns on the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan. It is believed that in August 2008, T-90 tanks took part in the fighting in South Ossetia as part of the 58th Army during the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. In particular, T-90s were seen during the withdrawal of Russian troops from Gori (Georgia). But in the absence of documentary evidence, this cannot be categorically asserted, because. outwardly, the T-90 is very similar to the T-72B with dynamic protection "Contact", which can cause an error in their "identification".

Not so long ago, the NTV television company aired a program comparing the T-90S and the main tank of the US armed forces, the M1 Abrams. After analyzing the main characteristics of the two combat vehicles, the authors of the program came to the conclusion that the T-90S is clearly superior to the Abrams. Naturally, Western analysts have a completely opposite opinion. For example, Dean Lockwood, weapons systems analyst at Forecast International, notes: “Speaking of the T-90 family, we are actually talking about the chassis from the T-72 and the updated turret and artillery system from the T-80. The T-72 tank was produced in large numbers, the results of its combat use are not particularly impressive, and the T-80 has very limited combat experience. To call the T-90S the best tank in the world is a clear exaggeration. The T-72 was used by Iraqi forces in 1991 and 2003, when it was also considered one of the best examples of armored vehicles. But the war showed that it could not stand comparison with the American M1 Abrams and the British Challenger. "Abrams" and "Challenger" could destroy the T-72, remaining out of reach for him. The T-90 has a number of improvements, but it is definitely not a technological breakthrough.”

Let's also try to make some generalizations based on the known characteristics of the Russian T-90 and the American Abrams.

T-90 VS ABRAMS: COMPARISON OF DESIGN AND PROTECTION

First of all, it should be taken into account that the T-90 tank, developed by UKBTM more than 20 years ago and essentially being a deep modernization of the T-72, itself has many modifications: T-90 (model 1992) T-90 "Bhishma", T-90SA , T-90A (sample 2004), T-90AM, T-90SM, which differ significantly from each other both constructively and in terms of combat effectiveness.

The same applies to the American "Abrams", which entered service in 1980. There were its modifications: M1 (with a 105-mm cannon), M1A1, M1A1NE (with "heavy armor"), M1A2, M1A2 SEP (System Enhancement Program), M1A1 / A2 TUSK (Tank Urban Survival Kit). Moreover, for example, the innovations introduced on the modification of the M1A2 tank increased its combat effectiveness compared to the M1A1 modification in the offensive by 54%, in defense - by 100%.

M1A2 "Abrams" SEP TUSKII

For this reason, meticulously comparing millimeters and kilograms makes at least some sense only for very specific modifications released in the same period of time. Therefore, we immediately “bracket” the frankly weaker M1 with a 105-mm cannon, which so far exists only in prototypes of the T-90AM / SM.

First of all, it should be noted that the US and the USSR, and later Russia, took two different approaches to the design of their tanks. It can be seen with the naked eye that the T-90 is significantly smaller than the M1. This was achieved thanks to the refusal of the T-90 from the loader, which requires about 1.7 m of the height of the fighting compartment to work. As a result, restrictions on reducing the height of the tank were removed, and the use of a dense layout made it possible to create a highly protected vehicle with a low silhouette and a small area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe longitudinal and cross section with a relatively low mass. As a result, the booked volume of the T-90 is only 12 cubic meters, and the Abrams is 21. True, you have to pay for everything - and the back side of the dense layout was the crampedness of the crew members, as well as the difficulty of replacing each other's crew members if necessary.

Many will say that since the Abrams is heavier, then it is better protected. But not everything is so clear. The reduction in the internal armored volume on the T-90 called for a reduction in the mass of armor to provide the required level of protection. Due to the smaller dimensions, the frontal projection, which is most likely to be hit, is only 5 sq.m for the T-90, and 6 sq.m for the Abrams. This alone makes the T-90 potentially less vulnerable.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the real security of the T-90 and Abrams due to the high level of secrecy on this issue. However, it is known that the armor of the front of the towers was made according to a similar principle - packages of "reflective sheets" were installed in the pockets of the frontal armor. They provide an increase in anti-cumulative resistance, while resistance against kinetic ammunition deteriorates due to a decrease in the density of the barrier (air gaps between packages).

For the T-90, the "reflective sheets" are made of steel, while for the Abrams, starting with the M1A1HA modification, they were made of depleted uranium. Due to the high density of uranium (19.03 g/cm3), these plates, with an extremely small thickness, ensured the “explosive” nature of the destruction of the cumulative jet.

On the T-90, in addition to the usual armor, a built-in dynamic protection complex was also used, which most of the Abrams modifications do not have, with the exception of the M1 TUSK (Tank Urban Survival Kit) with increased security, designed for operations in urban environments.

The dynamic protection "Kontakt-5", installed on the T-90, works both against cumulative weapons and against armor-piercing feathered sub-caliber projectiles. The complex provides a powerful lateral impulse that allows you to destabilize or destroy the BPO core before it begins to interact with the main armor.

Now, according to the manufacturer, the frontal armor of the T-90A tanks can withstand hits by the most massive Western BOPS-M829A1, MS29A2, DM-33, DM-43. In 1995, as part of a special display in Kubinka, the T-90 was fired upon by 6 shells from another tank from a distance of 150-200 m. They fired modern Russian HEAT shells. The frontal armor was not pierced, moreover, after the shelling, the car was able to return to the observation deck under its own power.

On the other hand, according to US officials, the frontal armor of the M1A1 also withstood the shelling of 125-mm guns from Iraqi T-72 tanks, although they fired outdated ZBM9 and ZBM12 BOPS, decommissioned in the USSR back in 1973.

WEAPONS COMPARISONAND AMMUNITION

As for the main armament - a tank gun, the Russian T-90 is armed with a 125 mm 2A46M / 2A46M5 smoothbore tank gun, and the American Abrams is armed with a 120 mm (NATO standard) M256 smoothbore tank gun. Despite the difference in caliber, they are close in their characteristics, and the effectiveness of their fire depends significantly on the ammunition used. The T-90 is capable of firing four types of ammunition - armor-piercing sub-caliber, cumulative, high-explosive fragmentation shells, as well as guided missiles. The standard ammunition load of the Abrams includes only two types of ammunition - armor-piercing sub-caliber and cumulative.

BOPS is mainly used to combat tanks. Since the 1990s, Russian tanks have been armed with obsolete Soviet BOPS ZBM-32 and ZBM-44 with a core of uranium and tungsten alloy, respectively. True, more powerful Russian BOPS have recently been developed, which have better characteristics and can fight the frontal armor of almost any Western tank. These include ZBM-44M and ZBM-48 "Lead". However, for their use on the T-90, it is necessary to replace the automatic loader, since the existing conveyor trays of the rotating conveyor are not designed for the use of projectiles with a length of 740 mm.

The main ammunition of the "Abrams" is a 120-mm M829A3 round with a sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile, which was put into service in early 2003 and has high performance.

It is very significant that the T-90 has a "long arm" - the 9K199 "Reflex-M" guided weapon system with an effective firing range of up to 5000 m. This is 2-2.5 times higher than the return fire range of the BPS of any modern tanks, to In addition, unlike BOPS, guided missiles retain unchanged armor penetration at any distance. As a result, the T-90 gets fundamentally new combat capabilities - to win the battle before entering the zone of effective fire of enemy tanks. Simulation of the oncoming battle of tank companies (10 T-90 tanks against 10 M1A1 tanks) showed that, starting firing guided missiles from a range of 5000 m, T-90s manage to hit up to 50-60% of enemy tanks by a range of 2000-2500 m. True, opponents note that this advantage can not be realized on any terrain - for example, in the European theater, the average probable detection range of a tank-type target is only 2.5 km.

In some publications, there is a statement that the T-90 guided weapon system can at the same time perform the functions of an air defense tank. However, this is an exaggeration. The developer declared only the technical feasibility of hitting non-maneuvering low-speed (up to 70 km/h) air targets. Agree, it would be strange to expect an enemy combat helicopter to helpfully hover in one place, waiting for the T-90 to hit it with a guided missile.

"Abrams" does not have a guided weapon system at all.

The disadvantages of the Abrams also include the fact that its standard ammunition load does not contain a high-explosive fragmentation projectile (and this reduces its ability to destroy area targets), while the T-90 ammunition load has an HE shell with the Ainet remote detonation system. But if necessary, Abrams can use the M83DA1 shotgun projectile or its M908 concrete-piercing version. Also, to combat helicopters, an M830A1 shot with an air blast is provided.

The gun on the T-90 works with an automatic loader. This allows you to shoot at a constant high rate of 6-8 shots. per minute (minimum loading cycle - 6.5-7 s) under any driving conditions, while on the Abrams a high rate of fire with a loading cycle of up to 7 seconds (8 rounds / min) is provided only from a standstill or when driving on level ground and largely depends on the physical condition of the loader.

The disadvantages of the A3 scheme include the fact that the ammunition is located directly in the fighting compartment next to the crew, which is not separated from it by anything. On the T-90, the ammunition load of 42 rounds is placed partially in a rotating conveyor A3 under the floor of the fighting compartment - 22 shots, and the remaining 20 are located almost throughout the entire habitable volume of the tank, including the turret. Therefore, when the ammunition detonates, the crew dies, and the tank fails and cannot be restored.

Ammunition tank "Abrame" is also 42 shots, but in accordance with modern Western fashion, it is placed in a fundamentally different way - in separate compartments, equipped with special ejection panels, which are knocked out in the event of a detonation of shells, and the energy of the explosion goes up. In the aft niche of the tower, separated from the fighting compartments by an armored partition, there are 36 shots. Another six shots are in the armored enclosure, between the fighting compartment and the MTO. In the event of a defeat of the ammunition rack, the Abrams remains mobile and, according to the instructions, must immediately leave the danger zone, and then move to the rear for repairs.

POWER PLANTS COMPARISON

T-90 and Abrams are equipped with fundamentally different power plants. T-90A, T-90CA - a 1000-horsepower diesel engine, and "Abrams" - a 1500-horsepower gas turbine, made in one block with an automatic hydromechanical transmission. The engines provide the T-90 and Abrams with a specific power of 21 hp / t and 24 hp / t, respectively. Due to the higher efficiency of a diesel engine compared to a voracious gas turbine, the T-90 has a significantly larger cruising range - 550 km, compared to 350 km for the Abrams.

On the serial T-90, a mechanical transmission with an outdated scheme of the turning mechanism is installed (the role of which is performed by onboard stepped gearboxes). The Abrams has a hydrostatic transmission and turning mechanisms with digital automatic control systems. Accordingly, the maneuverability of the Russian T-90 is lower than that of the Abrams. The disadvantages of the transmission of the T-90 tank include a low reverse speed - 4.8 km / h, while on the Abrams, due to the hydrostatic transmission, reverse movement up to 30 km / h is provided.

The undoubted advantage of the T-90 power plant is its unpretentiousness and high reliability. In any case, during tests in the Indian Thar Desert, no failure of the T-90 engines was noted, while, for example, a brigade of M1A1 tanks (58 units) lost 16 tanks in three days of movement on the sands during Operation Desert Drill. due to engine failure.

When replacing the engine, the T-90 is characterized by a high labor intensity of work, a team of qualified technicians takes 6 hours to do this, and on the American Abrams it takes only 2 hours.

T-90 VS. ABRAMS - OVERALL ASSESSMENT

So, we can conclude that the undoubted advantages of the T-90 compared to the Abrams include: the ability to fire guided missiles at a distance of up to 5 km; a wide range of ammunition, including HE shells (including those with remote detonation and ready-made submunitions); excellent protection, including dynamic protection "Contact-5" and KOEP "Shtora-1"; high rate of fire throughout the battle due to the use of A3; good mobility, high power reserve, great depth of overcome water obstacles; small dimensions; exceptional unpretentiousness and reliability in operation; good combination of "price-quality".

The Abrams also has its own merits: it organizes full-fledged isolation of the crew from the ammunition load; there is an automated combat control system that provides real-time information; reliable protection; high specific power; good maneuverability (including reverse speed up to 30 km/h).

In conclusion, we present the data of the article by VNIItransmash General Director, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences V. Stepanov, which was published in 2012 and is devoted to the analysis of methods for the comparative evaluation of tanks. It estimates the WTU (military-technical level) indicator of the best modern tanks, including the T-90A, T-90MS, M1A2 and M1A2 SEP. The calculation of the WTU is carried out in terms of firepower, security, mobility and operational capabilities and is a comparative assessment of the effectiveness of a given tank relative to some reference tank. The T-90A was chosen as the standard (i.e. its WTU = 1.0). The WTU indicators of the American M1A2 and M1A2 SEP tanks were 1.0 and 1.32, respectively. For the new T-90MS, the WTU indicator was determined as 1.42. Thus, according to the author, the comparative assessment, taking into account a possible calculation error of 10%, indicates the closeness of the levels of the best modern foreign tanks and the T-90A.

Tank T-90MS.
Photos provided by Uralvagonzavod Corporation

In recent years, domestic armored vehicles have somehow had no luck with advertising. Still, the top leaders of the military department have repeatedly spoken out with public criticism of the main battle tank (MBT) T-90A. It was called either "a good, deep modernization of the T-34 tank", or "the 17th modification of the Soviet T-72".

The first case does not need to be refuted: the “thirty-four” and the T-90A are separated not only by more than half a century, but also by fundamentally different concepts. As for components and assemblies, only a diesel engine can claim continuity. But during this time he more than doubled his power. On the topic of the T-72, we will talk later.

BIRTH OF THE T-90

Nevertheless, there is indeed something in common between the best tank of the Second World War, the T-34-85, and the modern T-90. They did not just appear in the same Ural Design Bureau of Transport Engineering (UKBTM) and were produced at Uralvagonzavod. Both machines were initially “sharpened” not for a demonstration of power, but for highly maneuverable combat with an equal or even stronger enemy in vast theaters of war.

The entire line of tanks that appeared in Nizhny Tagil - from the T-34-85 to the T-90 - did not shine with passport data, especially against the backdrop of the "bells and whistles" of overseas or German products. Innovations in Tagil technology were introduced carefully and only as they reached an almost absolute level of reliability. And vice versa: the number of old-fashioned, albeit fail-safe nodes often caused dissatisfaction with "advanced" users.

So in terms of talents to operate in vast areas with poor infrastructure or in the absence of it, the T-90 tank is indeed a direct descendant of the T-34-85. This general line UKBTM maintains regardless of personalities. Recall that the development of the "ninetieth" began under the chief designer Valery Venediktov. The adoption of the machine into service, the start of mass production, the entry into the world arms market is the merit of Vladimir Potkin, who headed the design bureau in 1987. The conquest of market positions and the new deployment of supplies to the Russian army took place in 1999-2011 under the chief designer Vladimir Domnin. The presentation to the country and the world of the latest modification of the "ninetieth" - the T-90MS tank - was made by Andrey Terlikov, who was appointed chief designer in 2011. We note in particular that, until recently, the direct supervisor of the T-90 project was Deputy Chief Designer Nikolai Molodnyakov.

Officially, the UKBTM specialists began to create the tank "object 188" in accordance with the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 741-208 dated June 19, 1986. In fact, it all started back in the first half of the 1980s, and not only on paper. The fact is that the tank builders of Nizhny Tagil did not enjoy special support from the USSR Ministry of Defense Industry and especially its chief curator Dmitry Ustinov. The latter gave all his love first to the Kharkov T-64, and then to the gas turbine T-80 created in Leningrad. And Tagil residents, introducing the T-72, and then the T-72A and T-72B, each time had to prove the possibility of their further modernization.

The first buildings of the new machine were laid down in April 1988. The designers, according to Vladimir Potkin, invested in it all the experience of testing and military operation of the "seventy-two". And also the best of what the country's defense institutions offered: reinforced combined armor in combination with built-in dynamic protection, the 1A45T Irtysh fire control complex, the commander's PNK-4S sighting and observation system, and even, as an option, a domestic thermal imaging sight. The 9K119 Reflex guided weapon system made it possible to increase the range of fire up to 5000 m against targets moving at speeds up to 70 km/h. Unlike the T-72B, the "object 188" could fire a rocket on the move at speeds up to 30 km/h. For the first time in the world, the TSHU-1 optical-electronic suppression complex was installed on the machine. Defense developers came to the conclusion that the best way to repel "smart" ammunition is to prevent it from hitting at all.

In January 1989, four tanks entered the state field tests. For a year and a half, they were tested in the Moscow, Kemerovo and Dzhambul regions of the USSR, as well as at the training ground of Uralvagonzavod. In 1999, participants in the epic, tank officers Dmitry Mikhailov and Anatoly Bakhmetov, published interesting memories of these events in No. 4 of the Tankmaster magazine. We will note only one significant fact: the “passports” recorded those indicators that the tanks gave out not in average, but in the worst conditions. In a normal situation, much more was squeezed out of them. For example, the cruising range on the highway at one gas station reached 728 km instead of 600 according to the documents.

On March 27, 1991, by a joint decision of the ministries of defense and the defense industry of the USSR, "object 188" was recommended for adoption. However, political confusion delayed the final decision. Things got off the ground after the arrival at Uralvagonzavod in July 1992 of the first president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin. He inspected the tank, and already on October 5, the government of the Russian Federation issued a decree No. 759-58 on its acceptance into service under the name "T-90" and on the permission to sell the export version of the T-90S abroad.

In fact, the tank was supposed to become the "T-72BM", that is, the "T-72B modernized." Most often, the appearance of the T-90 is attributed to Yeltsin's desire to have the "first Russian tank", which neither the leadership of the UKBTM nor the chairman of the state commission, Nikolai Shabalin, objected to. In the end, a new car is more prestigious than another upgrade.

However, this gave rise to the ongoing discussion - whether the T-90 is a modernization of the T-72, or is it really a new tank. Their genetic relationship is obvious. On the other hand, the accumulated quantitative changes led to the creation of a new quality. Recall that the American MBT M60A1 and M1 share 18 years - the first was born in 1962, and the second - in 1980. In terms of military-technical level (VTU), the Abrams was 2.65 times superior to its predecessor and is rightly regarded as a representative of a new generation of combat vehicles. The T-90 was put into service 19 years after the T-72 and its VTU coefficient is 2.3 times higher. Too much for a normal upgrade, isn't it?

Until the end of 1992, Uralvagonzavod produced 13 tanks of the installation series, while the main production began in 1993. Tagil residents closely followed the service of their "pets"; The news was only encouraging. Russian tankers who were lucky enough to deal with T-90 tanks gave the highest reviews. Senior warrant officer S. Shklyaruk, who had previously dealt with many Soviet and Russian tanks: “This is the most reliable vehicle I know. How many problems my colleagues experienced with a gas turbine engine! Especially in sandy areas. And this car at least that! Neither cold nor heat are terrible. Serve it correctly in time, adjust it - you will not know grief for years. Here we are with this machine for the fifth year together. About 5000 km passed. The only thing that had to be changed was the injectors. Junior Sergeant D. Dombrovan: “She is so smart that she even corrects the mistakes of an inexperienced driver. It won’t allow you to switch the gear in inconsistency, if you forgot that your heater is working, it will turn it off, if the level of lubrication is insufficient, it will remind you with a buzzer in your headset.”

In 1995, several T-90 tanks took part in the fighting in Chechnya and turned out to be practically invulnerable to separatist anti-tank weapons. The gunner Sergei Gorbunov recalls: “The shells got stuck in the built-in protection, but were not included in the armor. The active protection system reacts with lightning speed: the T-90 turns the gun in the direction of danger and closes itself with a smoke and aerosol cloud.

In total, up to 1995, according to the open press, about 250 vehicles were built, including several that were put into service two years after the main version of the commander. On this, the money and desire to buy new weapons from the Russian state dried up, despite the war in Chechnya.

INDIAN VARIANT

The only way to maintain the potential of tank building in Nizhny Tagil was export. Unfortunately, the main merit in its organization belongs not to specialized institutions, but to manufacturers - Uralvagonzavod and UKBTM. Moreover, Moscow officials actively prevented the T-90S from entering international arms exhibitions. Tagil residents were ready to show it already in 1993 in the UAE, but the Department of Defense Industry allowed only the T-72S to be taken out. And so it went on for five years. And when, in 1997, the go-ahead was received for the demonstration of the T-90S in Abu Dhabi, someone “forgot” to provide information to the organizers of the event. As a result, the tank that actually participated in the shows at the IDEX "97 exhibition was never included in its official program.

But it was here that the Indian military delegation first met the T-90S. I liked the machine as a whole, although it was clear that the newly manufactured equipment should not only meet current ideas, but also remain competitive throughout the entire life cycle. The Indian military demanded additional refinement of the tank and after it - the most thorough tests in India with local crews.

Fortunately, UKBTM already had worked out units and ideas. Having collected scarce financial resources, UKBTM, Uralvagonzavod and ChTZ hastily produced three prototypes in 1998 - early 1999. They were equipped with new V-92S2 diesel engines with a capacity of 1000 hp, an improved undercarriage, a fire control system with various options for thermal imaging sights. One of the machines was equipped with a welded turret. It, with a larger internal volume, had better protection compared to the cast one and a height lower by 35 mm.

In the spring of 1999, the cars were run in and tested at the Tagil training grounds. The chief designer Vladimir Potkin felt bad, but braced himself and waved it off: "If we send the products, I'll go to the doctor." On May 11, 1999, factory checks were completed, and on May 13, Vladimir Ivanovich died. On May 17, three T-90S tanks drove on trailers to the Koltsovo airport.

Tests in India took place in the Thar Desert. The ambient temperature reached 55 degrees Celsius, the tanks were barely visible in the clouds of dust. But the declared parameters managed to withstand and even surpass. The maximum speed was 65 km / h instead of 60 km / h according to the documents. And the Indians, replacing Russian oil with British oil, estimated the engine power at 1100 hp. Impressed by the tests, the military attache at the Indian Embassy in Moscow, Brigadier General D. Singh, said: "In terms of the effectiveness of the T-90S, it can be called the second deterrent after nuclear weapons."

In the second half of the 1990s, the new T-90S underwent an even more severe test - the war in Russian Dagestan. At the beginning of the second Chechen war, our army faced an acute shortage of serviceable armored vehicles. Therefore, about a dozen cars from the batch prepared for India were transported to Dagestan. Later, the Arms Export magazine (No. 3, 2002) reported the results: “During the fighting in the Kadar zone, one T-90 received seven RPG grenade hits during the battle, but remained in service. This shows that, being equipped according to the standard scheme, the T-90S is the most protected of all Russian tanks.

On February 15, 2001, a contract was signed for the supply of 310 T-90S tanks to India. According to Nikolai Molodnyakov, a participant in the events, he "brought the Russian tank industry out of a dead end, allowed it to breathe new life into the industry's enterprises." 124 tanks were assembled in Nizhny Tagil, and the rest went to India in the form of vehicle kits. According to media reports, the first T-90S rolled off the production line at the Avadi plant in early 2004.

The operating experience and, according to some reports, the combat use of Russian equipment justified all the expectations placed on it. The Indian leadership decided to re-equip 21 tank regiments with the "nineties". Therefore, at the end of 2007, a second contract was signed - for 347 vehicles (124 Tagil assembly and 223 vehicle sets). In May 2009, it was supplemented by an agreement to supply another 50 vehicle kits. And even earlier, in 2006, an intergovernmental agreement appeared on licensed production in India until 2019 of 1,000 T-90S tanks. By the end of 2008, the Russian side completed the transfer of technology, and in August 2009, the first 10 vehicles completely built in India entered the troops.

Following India, T-90S tanks were acquired by other countries - Algeria, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Uganda. As a result, the Tagil product turned out to be the best-selling newly manufactured MBT in the world in 2001-2010. More than a thousand cars went abroad! The market niche of the T-90S is unique. It is incomparably better than the low-cost obsolete tanks offered for sale, but many times cheaper than the latest American, German, French or British-made MBTs - with a VTU comparable to them. The sales figures are the best refutation of the arguments about the inflated price of Tagil products that flicker in the domestic media every now and then.

The T-90S of the 1999 model created a precedent that was previously unthinkable in domestic tank building: the export vehicle became the basis of MBT for the Russian army. In 2004, UKBTM and Uralvagonzavod again received a state defense order. On April 15, 2005, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the T-90A tank was adopted and put into mass production - with a welded turret, a 1000-horsepower engine, and starting from 2006 - with a thermal imaging sight. In total, until 2010, according to the open press, the armed forces received about 290 vehicles. Not much, but it must be taken into account that in the same years a much larger number of old T-72B tanks returned to Uralvagonzavod and were upgraded to the T-72BA level. This machine, unified with the T-90A and approaching it along the VTU, also shows the influence of the "Indian" T-90S.

The general public learned about another important consequence of the massive sales of the T-90S abroad in 2011. The income received allowed the UKBTM, Uralvagonzavod, ChTZ and Artillery Plant No. 9, now united into the research and production corporation, to create a new modification of the "ninetieth" in cooperation with other enterprises and institutions of Russia and Belarus: the T-90MS tank. Its detailed characteristics are presented in the Arsenal magazine (No. 5, 2011). We will not repeat them and limit ourselves to the parameters that favorably distinguish the modernized product.

An improved package of frontal multi-layer armor, coupled with a removable dynamic protection module "Relikt", guarantees against being hit by the most powerful modern anti-tank weapons.

The regular protection of the sides and stern is not penetrated by hand-held anti-tank grenades. Western tanks reach this level only on special "urban" modifications, which are not capable of operating on rough terrain due to excess weight.

A unique electromagnetic protection system protects the tank from mines with magnetic fuses.

The design of the turret and the volume of the fighting compartment make it possible to install both a serial 125-mm high-precision gun 2A46M-5, and a gun of the same caliber newly developed by plant No. 9, which surpasses all modern tank systems in muzzle energy.

For the first time in the history of domestic tank building, the T-90MS is at least as good as the most advanced tanks in the world in search and targeting speed, in the ability to hit it with the first shot, and even in command controllability. Here are some systems that provide this:

- a highly automated all-weather FCS consisting of a gunner's multi-spectral sight, a commander's panoramic sight with a digital ballistic computer and a set of firing conditions sensors, and the combat information and control system of the tactical level is integrated into the FCS;

- automatic target tracking;

– navigation aids with GLONASS/GPS receiver-indicator equipment;

– modern means of communication with encryption equipment, etc.

But the most important thing is that equipped with this ultra-modern electronics and an improved automatic loader, the fighting compartment, together with a new turret and an upgraded gun, form a module that can be installed on any Tagil MBT. In other words, in the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of Russia, with the help of this module, the WTU of the entire available fleet will be sharply increased - from the first "seventy-two" to the T-90A, and in a relatively short time and at moderate costs. Any potential adversaries of our country should remember this today.

The market prospects of the T-90MS tank, as shown by the 2012 arms exhibitions DefExpo in Delhi and Eurosatory in Paris, do not raise the slightest doubt. With the option for the Russian army, there is no complete clarity. The "tower" (that is, the combat module), according to the chief of the general staff of the RF Armed Forces, General of the Army Nikolai Makarov, is completely satisfied with the military. But everything below - the engine, transmission, suspension - does not meet the latest requirements.

Indeed, the V-92S2F diesel engine with a power of 1130 hp. and the mechanical planetary transmission of the T-90MS tank, even ennobled by the automatic gearshift and the information and control system of the chassis, look somewhat old-fashioned against the backdrop of a gas turbine engine of 1500 hp. and hydromechanical transmission of the American Abrams. There are also more advanced systems. For example, the French "Leclerc" uses a small-sized diesel engine with a "Hyperbar" pressurization system with a capacity of the same 1500 hp, a transmission with hydrostatic transmission and a hydropneumatic suspension.

ROAD CHECK

All this complex machinery was introduced to increase the mobility of tanks. The latter is made up of many indicators, but the brilliant Soviet designer Alexander Morozov managed to reduce them to one short phrase: "The ability to be at the right time in the right place."

And here it turns out that free cheese is only in mousetraps. At arms exhibitions and maneuvers in the benign European climate, Western MBTs really look great. But with the current level of technology, the hydromechanical transmission is still larger than the mechanical one in terms of its weight and size characteristics. So, the mass of the tank will increase. Therefore, 1500 hp engines. become not an advantage, but an urgent need. And their installation together with service systems also gives additional weight. As a result, the combat weight of NATO tanks far exceeded 60 tons. Only Leclercs managed to stay in the 50-ton category.

British and American tank crews had to pay for their commitment to modern technology. After the first (1991) and second (2003) wars of the US and allies against Iraq, the Western media broadcast about the "Abrams" and "Challengers" only in superlatives. However, the memoirs of the participants in the events have recently been published and it turned out that their work was hard, and the results were not so unambiguous. Western researchers Chris McNab and Kevin Hunter have collected and summarized this information.

To begin with, it turned out that Western tanks were unable to move around the terrain, which was not difficult for the "seventy-two". McNab and Hunter report: "The driver of a 68-ton Abrams tank ... will diligently avoid soft and marshy ground, very deep snow, or steep layers of moving soil."

To transport one (we emphasize once again - one!) Abrams tank by rail in Latvia, it was necessary to carry out an entire engineering operation to load and unload onto the platform and create a complex fastening system.

During two military campaigns in Iraq on marches in the desert, columns of American and British armored vehicles had to be stopped every two hours to flush the air cleaners. In Europe, the same tanks managed one operation per day or even two. And still, the technical reliability of engines and transmissions in Iraq was not up to par. Serious malfunctions appeared on average after every 250–300 km of travel. In combat conditions, up to half of the tanks went out of order from mechanical breakdowns in a day or two! But most of all, the mobility of American tank units limited the gluttony of the engines. To quote McNab and Hunter again: “Nearly 2,000 Abrams deployed by the ground forces filled 500-gallon fuel tanks almost daily. Apart from everything else, this one circumstance made it much more difficult to end the war with a complete victory for the coalition troops, which would be expressed in blocking the retreat of the Republican Guard divisions from Kuwait. In short, the US Army was unable to carry out the encirclement of the Republican Guard planned by the command because the American units (quite literally) were left without fuel. Moreover, this happened despite the gigantic efforts of the suppliers to establish adequate supplies of fuel to the ground forces of the coalition.

It turns out that the Americans could not catch up with the units of the Iraqi Republican Guard armed with T-72 tanks due to lack of fuel! But the US Army's logistics system is considered the best in the world, and it operated in almost sterile conditions - no partisans, no long-range artillery shelling, no bombing. The Iraqis had no supplies at all.

The consequences of the lack of mobility of the US armored forces were sad. As President George W. Bush Sr. later admitted, when preparing Operation Desert Storm, the allies proceeded from the fact that Saddam Hussein, deprived of support in the form of the Republican guard, would be overthrown by the Iraqis themselves. The uprisings did take place, but were suppressed by troops escaping from Kuwait. It took the Americans more than a decade of blockade of Iraq and another large-scale military campaign to complete the job.

And now open the map of the former USSR, or even better - the scheme of transport communications and try to answer the question yourself: what tanks will dominate the expanses of Eurasia in the event of a hypothetical military conflict? Western heavyweights or all-terrain, reliable and unpretentious T-90s, along with the T-72s modernized according to their model?