The Economist: What does Russia's modernization of Syrian air defenses mean for Israel. The Economist: What does Russia's modernization of Syrian air defense mean for Israel? Air defense of Russian troops in Syria
Syrian air defense systems intercepted 71 missiles out of 103 fired from aircraft and ships of the US-led coalition. Such a result, without exaggeration, can be called fantastic. Although the officially listed air defense systems have high performance, their potential is not so wide. How did the Syrian missilemen manage to show such an impressive result? And what is the role of Russia in this success?
Western countries have used 103 missiles in Syria, including Tomahawk cruise missiles. Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy, Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, announced this on Saturday. According to the General Staff, the Syrian air defense intercepted 71 cruise missiles of the Western coalition, which indicates the high level of training of the local military.
According to Rudskoy, Russian air defense systems at the Khmeimim and Tartus bases monitored cruise missile launches from both sea and air carriers of the United States and Great Britain. “The Russian air defense forces have been transferred to combat mode. Fighter aircraft are on duty in the air,” Rudskoy said, adding that, according to preliminary data, there were no casualties among the civilian population and the Syrian army, now the situation in Damascus and other settlements in Syria is assessed as calm.
According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the S-125, S-200, Buk and Kvadrat air defense systems, produced more than 30 years ago in the USSR, were involved in repelling the strike. However, the effectiveness of the destruction of enemy missiles indicates that the Syrians used more modern means of destruction.
The former deputy commander of the air defense forces of the Russian Ground Forces, Lieutenant General Alexander Luzan, who has repeatedly visited Syria, knows firsthand about the capabilities of local air defense and is well acquainted with its structure. He specifically emphasized that Russian air defense systems as part of the Aerospace Forces did not participate in repelling the night rocket attack, because “the raid did not go through the kill zone of the S-400, S-300V4 and Pantsirs, which are stationed in Khmeimim and Tartus.”
“Syrian air defense participated in repelling the raid. Two types of air attack weapons were used: aeroballistic missiles, which were launched from aircraft, and Tomahawk cruise missiles, which were launched from both aircraft, including B-1B bombers, and ships. Both were shot down, ”Luzan told the VZGLYAD newspaper.
He noted that the Syrian air defense is quite powerful. The main striking force was the latest multi-channel anti-aircraft missile system "Buk-M2", which Syria managed to buy from Russia shortly before the start of the civil war. Before that, Damascus had the Buk-M1 complex.
Also, before the start of the civil war, Syria acquired Pantsiri-S1 from Russia. This complex does not have a highly elevated antenna, but it has a short reaction time, so it manages to effectively fire at a cruise missile at close range. According to the expert, it was Pantsir and Buki-M2 that became the main means of destroying enemy missiles.
Older air defense systems should not be written off either, Luzan believes. “The “great-grandfather” of the Buka-M2, Kvadrat, is the export name of the Soviet anti-aircraft missile system Kub, which works very well on cruise missiles. It was released over 30 years ago. But it was very successfully used in the Middle East, especially in Egypt. During the Arab-Israeli war, it was the "Square", when it was first put there, that 78% of Israeli aircraft were destroyed. The Americans were forced to ferry the Phantoms to Israel with in-flight refueling in order to somehow increase its potential. Therefore, this time the “Square” could be used,” Luzan believes.
In turn, the ex-commander of the 4th Air Force of the Air Force and Air Defense Hero of Russia Lieutenant General Valery Gorbenko agrees that
By the number of intercepted missiles, the Syrian defenders showed not only a high, but a fantastic result.
“The effectiveness of the strike (of the Western coalition) turns out to be low,” Gorbenko told the VZGLYAD newspaper, adding that the Syrian Buks, as well as the S-75 and S-200 complexes, worked on the distant approaches, “and closer to the targets, the Pantsirs were the most effective ".
Luzan emphasized that an air defense system is considered strong if more than 60% of the targets are hit, so the result is commendable. At the same time, Gorbenko noted that such a high rate of efficiency was achieved solely thanks to Russia, which helped Syria restore anti-aircraft missile systems. No less useful have been the training programs for Syrian missilemen. “Or maybe we helped them somewhere during launches. Do not know. But they probably prompted, ”the lieutenant general suggested.
As for the use of the S-200, Luzan recalled that there were two groups of divisions with these weapons in Syria. “But a cruise missile is not a target for the S-200. And the carriers of cruise missiles were not included in the zone of its destruction, so if the S-200 shot down something there, then this is one or two targets, ”said the former deputy commander of the air defense forces of the Russian Ground Forces.
Note that air defense systems were not considered by the Western coalition as a target, although in a real conflict, these systems become the number one goal. According to Alexander Luzan, in this way the US and allies only created a "big noise", and not for the first time. “There was already a strike on the Syrian airfield. Then they launched 58 Tomahawks. Of these, 38 were shot down, and those that flew to the airfield did not cause any tangible damage, because the next day planes began to take off from this airfield. Therefore, this time the propaganda goal is being pursued,” he said.Luzan emphasized that anti-radar missiles of the AGM-88 HARM type with a launch range of about 50-60 kilometers can be hit by air defense systems. “A carrier needs to approach such a range, that is, an F-15 or F-16 aircraft. This means exposing the carrier to an air defense attack. Therefore, they took the simplest path: they used long-range cruise missiles, for launching which it is not necessary to enter the zone of destruction of anti-missile defense systems. And then come what may, ”explained Alexander Luzan.
During the night shelling, the Russian Aerospace Forces also gained invaluable experience. Russian S-300s and S-400s in Syria have detected and escorted Western missiles, collecting information for analysis and study.
“Teachings, and even more so real combat operations, are always of educational benefit. From this we can conclude that it is necessary to improve the system of reconnaissance of air attack weapons. Cruise missiles fly into the combat zone at extremely low altitudes, so the detection range is negligible. There are reconnaissance systems, but they are not united into a single system. It is necessary to create a single information and control space. Then no surprises will be terrible. The means of destruction can always be brought on time to a state of combat readiness, and then - as in that fairy tale: the orchestra is doing its job, ”the lieutenant general urged.
He explained that there was an A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft in Syria, but neither the S-400 nor the S-300V4 have the means to receive information via non-directional communication channels from this flying radar. “And the same Rudskoy should know about this and draw certain conclusions,” Alexander Luzan believes.
Recall that on Saturday night, US President Donald Trump ordered a strike on Syria. He stated this in a special address to the nation. Great Britain and France joined the military operation. The strikes, as French President Emmanuel Macron assured, were carried out on the objects of the Syrian government for the creation of chemical weapons.
The first strikes of the coalition began at four o'clock in the morning (Syrian time, coincides with Moscow). They were applied from two US Navy ships from the Red Sea, tactical aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea, as well as American B-1B strategic bombers from the al-Tanf area.
The United States did not notify Russia of this strike, and the NATO countries were informed a few hours before the start of the operation. According to the Pentagon, the United States chose targets in such a way as to minimize the likelihood of involving the Russian military in the situation. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the first strike was directed at a research center where "the Syrian authorities researched, tested and produced chemical and biological weapons technology." The other two sites are a chemical weapons storage facility west of Homs and a chemical weapons equipment storage facility nearby. The objects were seriously damaged.
The political reaction to what is happening in Syria was expected. The Russian ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Antonov, said the strike would not go unnoticed. “The worst fears have come true. Our warnings were not heeded. A pre-planned scenario is being implemented. We are being threatened again. We warned that such actions would not remain without consequences. All responsibility for them lies with Washington, London and Paris,” the diplomat said.
Their disagreement with what happened was expressed in the US Congress. Senator Tim Kaine called Washington's actions illegal because Trump did not receive permission to conduct a military operation. And Senator Jack Reed called Trump in the current situation driven into a corner.
In the field of foreign policy, Moscow has recently continued to be haunted by a series of "fatal and fantastic coincidences," in the words of the tourists Boshirov and Petrov. The defeat of the Russian Il-20 aircraft by the Syrian calculation of the S-200 air defense system of the Russian Il-20 aircraft, as in the case of Salisbury, gave rise to many versions of what happened - ranging from a mistake by the Syrian military to a deliberate provocation by Damascus aimed at disrupting Russian-Israeli cooperation. In any case, experts say, the tragedy indicates the low level of training of the Syrian air defense forces, which is now not in the interests of Moscow to correct.
On September 18, Russian President Vladimir Putin described the crash of an Il-20 aircraft in Syria as the result of a "coincidence of circumstances." The current situation, in his opinion, should not be compared with the attack on the Russian plane of Turkey in 2016, since now we are dealing with a "tragic accident." The head of state promised to take retaliatory actions aimed at additionally ensuring the security of our military facilities in Syria, and these "there will be such steps that everyone will notice."
The Israeli Ministry of Defense made its assessment of the tragedy. The department believes that the calculations of the Syrian anti-aircraft batteries are to blame for the incident, which, responding to an Israeli missile attack, fired indiscriminately, "and did not bother to make sure that there were no Russian aircraft in the air." Also, according to the Israeli Ministry of Defense, when the Syrian army fired missiles, the IDF F-16 fighters were already on Israeli territory. The leadership of the Russian military department, on the contrary, stated that the incident occurred due to the "irresponsible actions" of the Israeli pilots.
Russian experts found many oddities in the actions of the crew of the Syrian S-200 anti-aircraft missile system that shot down the Russian plane. As the site of the former head of the anti-aircraft missile forces of the Russian Air Force, retired lieutenant general Alexander Gorkov, there is at least a strange inconsistency in the control system. The Syrians, according to the expert, decided to use the air defense system, knowing that a Russian plane was landing in this area, and they had to adjust the actions through the control channels.
The modern air defense forces of Syria were created, trained and staffed back in Soviet times. In addition to the S-200 complex mentioned above, the Syrians are armed with Buk-M1 and Buk-M2 medium-range self-propelled anti-aircraft missile systems, Kvadrat self-propelled short-range air defense systems, Strela and Osa self-propelled short-range air defense systems, and others samples of Soviet technology. In 2008-2013, Russia reinforced the Syrian air defense forces by supplying several dozen Pantsir-S1 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun-missile systems. At the same time, experts pointed out that during the years of the civil war, scattered fragments remained from the mixed air defense system of Syria. The quality of management and training of personnel has significantly decreased. In recent years, Russia has supplied Syria with individual types of weapons, provided coordination and advisory assistance during the strike of the pro-American coalition in April 2018. However, the restoration of combat-ready air defense forces in the Arab Republic is still far away. The idea voiced by the Kremlin to supply the Syrian army with S-300 air defense systems ultimately remained unrealized.
Sergey Savostyanov/TASS
The supply of new air defense systems to Syria cannot solve the issue of their chaotic work and poor training, Kirill Semyonov, head of the Center for Islamic Studies of the Institute for Innovative Development, emphasizes in a comment on the website: in particular: after Israel strikes at them, they usually respond with indiscriminate mass missile launches around the entire perimeter - this is their usual tactic. Sometimes they even get somewhere.” In order to change the situation, Semyonov believes, Russia would need to completely retrain the Syrian air defense forces, reform their command and control system: otherwise there would be no point in supplying new weapons.
At the same time, according to the expert, the Russian Federation should not take such steps. In the event that Moscow strengthens the Syrian air defense forces and increases their effectiveness, the Iranians will immediately take advantage of this, which will further increase their already strong presence in Syria. “This will provoke an even more active reaction from Israel, for which the Iranian presence in Syria is unacceptable.”
The situation will be helped by the creation of territories in Syria free from the Iranian presence, the expert believes: “If Russia is not able to get rid of Iran, it is necessary at least to create territories free from Iranian formations and objects.” First of all, it is necessary to make the territories around the Russian military bases free from the Iranian presence. “Russia is not in conflict with Israel, Moscow has not come to Syria to help the Iranians against Israel. Every effort must be made to ensure that the Iranian-Israeli conflict does not concern Russia in Syria, ”concludes Semyonov.
According to the former head of the information and analytical center of the Russian Ministry of Defense, retired Major General Pavel Zolotarev, the Russian Federation needs to think first of all not about how to improve Syrian air defense or supply some new types of weapons to Damascus, but for this more clear agreements are needed with Israel. “The Ministry of Defense rightly pointed out that Israel gave a warning about a strike on Syria with just a minute, and this is simply dishonorable. At the same time, if the message of the head of the Russian military department that Israeli fighters were "covered" by a Russian aircraft is true, in such a situation, with any air defense system, this could not have been avoided, ”the expert points out. Finding a consensus with Israel, Zolotarev believes, will be difficult, but the existence of agreements on Idlib with Turkey, with which Moscow also had many problems earlier, demonstrates that the Kremlin is able to negotiate if desired.
Image copyright Getty Images Image caption IL-20 - electronic intelligence and electronic warfare aircraft
A Russian Il-20 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down by Syrian air defense forces, it was set under fire by Israeli aircraft that attacked the province of Latakia. This was stated by the Russian Ministry of Defense, warning of the right to an adequate response to "hostile actions." In turn, the Israeli military laid the blame on the army of Bashar al-Assad, who conducted "indiscriminate" fire.
The plane crash killed 15 Russian soldiers, the Russian Defense Ministry said. The agency said that on the eve of about 22:00 hours, four Israeli Air Force F-16 fighters attacked targets in the province of Latakia with guided aerial bombs.
"Hiding behind a Russian aircraft, Israeli pilots exposed it to Syrian air defense fire. As a result, the Il-20, which has an effective reflective surface an order of magnitude larger than that of the F-16, was shot down by a missile of the S-200 complex," Defense Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov said. .
- In Syria, the Russian Il-20 with 14 military on board disappeared from the radar: there are several versions
General Konashenkov stressed that the command of the Russian group of troops in Syria had not been warned in advance about the planned air strikes. "The hotline received a notification less than one minute before the strike, which prevented the Russian aircraft from being taken to the safe zone," he explained.
According to Konashenkov, the F-16 pilots and Israeli Air Force controls “could not fail to see the Russian aircraft, as it was landing from a height of five kilometers,” but nevertheless “deliberately went for this provocation.”
In addition, the general noted that the bombing was carried out not far from the place where the French frigate Auverne was located. Earlier, the Russian Ministry of Defense stated that missile launches were carried out from this ship. The French military said they were not involved in the attack.
"We regard these provocative actions of Israel as hostile, - said the representative of the military department. - We reserve the right to adequate response actions."
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu spoke on the phone with Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman and brought to his attention that as a result of "irresponsible actions of the Israeli Air Force" 15 Russian soldiers were killed, the Defense Ministry said.
Press Secretary of the President of Russia Dmitry Peskov declined to answer the question whether Vladimir Putin is scheduled to talk with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Israeli ambassador was summoned to the Russian Foreign Ministry.
Israeli reaction
On Tuesday afternoon, the Israeli military confirmed that they carried out an airstrike last night on a Syrian military facility where a precision-guided weapon was located. According to Israel, it was intended to attack it and was intended for the Hezbollah group in Lebanon, where it could be delivered on behalf of Iran.
"Israel holds the [Bashar] Assad regime, whose military shot down the Russian plane, fully responsible for this incident," the Israel Defense Forces said in a series of tweets. "Israel also holds Iran and the terrorist organization Hezbollah responsible for the unfortunate incident.
According to the Israeli military, the Syrian air defense fired "randomly" and did not make sure that there were no Russian aircraft in the air.
At the same time, Israel insists that they notified the Russian military about the strikes: “There is a conflict prevention system between the Israel Defense Forces and the Russian army, which was approved at the level of state leaders and which has proved itself many times in recent years. This system has been used now ".
In addition, the statement emphasizes that Israeli aircraft were already in Israeli airspace when the Syrian air defenses shot down the Il-20.
Israel mourns the death of the Russian military and is ready to provide the Russian authorities with all the necessary information to investigate the incident, the statement said.
The United States knew about missile defense
The crash site of the Il-20 was discovered, the plane crashed 27 km west of the village of Banias.
The wreckage of the crashed plane, as well as fragments of the bodies of the crew and their personal belongings, were taken aboard the Russian ships, the Defense Ministry said.
On Tuesday night, the Ministry of Defense reported that an Il-20 reconnaissance aircraft flying over the Mediterranean Sea disappeared from radar during an air strike by Israeli fighters on targets in the province of Latakia. It was reported that there were 14 people on board the Russian plane.
At the same time, Western media sources wrote that the Russian plane could have been accidentally shot down by the Syrian air defense forces.
"US military believes Syrian anti-aircraft guns mistakenly shot down a Russian coastal patrol aircraft as the Syrian regime tried to shoot down Israeli missiles targeting targets in Latakia," CNN national security correspondent Ryan Brown tweeted. .
What is S-200
S-200 is a Soviet long-range anti-aircraft missile system. It was developed in the 1960s to protect areas from the air (as opposed to complexes designed to cover individual objects).
Until the appearance of the more modern S-300 complex in the very late 1970s, it remained the most powerful air defense system in the USSR. In the 1980s, it began to be shipped abroad, including to Syria.
The anti-aircraft missile of the S-200 complex is equipped with a semi-active guidance head, that is, it is aimed at a target that is "highlighted" by the tracking radar.
- Syria fires missiles at Israeli warplanes
The complex has been repeatedly modernized, but is currently outdated. So, during an air strike by the Israeli Air Force on targets in Syria, the S-200 systems opened fire on aircraft, but could not shoot down a single one. Moreover, one of the Syrian anti-missiles was already intercepted by the Israeli missile defense system.
The Russian Ministry of Defense previously reported that in addition to the S-200, the Syrian army is armed with Soviet S-125s, Buks, Squares and Wasps, as well as modern Pantsir-S complexes.
How Russia lost planes in Syria
Il-20 is an electronic reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft, created on the basis of the Il-18 aircraft.
The aircraft is intended for reconnaissance along the border strip and the state border. Considered the first reconnaissance aircraft in the Soviet Union, its first flight took place in 1968.
Earlier, Russia lost fighters, attack aircraft and transport aircraft in Syria.
In early May of this year, a Russian Su-30SM fighter crashed in Syria. He fell after takeoff from the Khmeimim airbase, both pilots died. The Ministry of Defense called a possible cause of the crash hit in the engine of a bird. "There was no fire impact on the aircraft," the military department said.
- Russian fighter jet crashes in Syria, two pilots killed
- 39 Russian soldiers killed in plane crash in Syria What do we know?
- Russian Air Force Su-25 attack aircraft shot down in Syria
Then the total number of Russian aircraft lost in Syria reached seven. At the same time, only two aircraft were combat losses - the Su-24 bomber shot down by the Turkish Air Force in November 2015 and the Su-25 attack aircraft shot down by militants in Idlib in February 2018.
The biggest loss of Russian aviation in Syria was the crash of the An-26 transport aircraft in March this year, when 39 people died. The Ministry of Defense then reported that the plane did not reach the runway of the Khmeimim airfield for about 500 meters and collided with the ground.
During the operation in Syria, the Russian authorities officially recognized the death of more than 90 servicemen.
Russia launched a military operation in Syria in the fall of 2015, supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In three years, with the support of Russian aviation and the Iranian military, Assad managed to take control of almost all territories except the province of Idlib.
On the eve of the talks in Sochi between the presidents of Russia and Turkey, as a result of which Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced their intention to create a demilitarized zone 15-20 kilometers wide along the perimeter of Idlib by October 15.
At the same time, Shoigu announced that there would be no expected offensive operation in Idlib, from which Moscow and Damascus were dissuaded by the United States and other Western countries.
The Il-20 incident will not affect the implementation of the agreements on Idlib, Peskov said.
Syrian air defense: salvation or illusion?
Bashar al-Assad needs to work very hard to thwart the West's plans to "reformat" his country
|
In April 2012, National Defense published an article by Anatoly Gavrilov on Iranian air defense. At the beginning of the year, the information war against Iran was at its peak, it seemed that it was about to go into a hot stage. However, passions soon subsided, and the wave of information training was transferred to Syria. The latest statements by Assad's Western opponents indicate that the escalation of events in this country according to the Libyan scenario - with the introduction of a no-fly zone and air support for the rebels' actions is quite likely. Unlike the late Muammar Gaddafi, Bashar al-Assad has made active efforts in recent years to upgrade the weapons of the country's armed forces, in particular, serious attention was paid to air defense equipment. In the new material, the author analyzes Syria's capabilities to counter the aerospace offensive of the NATO and allied coalition. |
Anatoly GAVRILOV
For more than a year, the attention of the whole world has been riveted to the Middle East region, where once again the fate of many peoples of Muslim countries is being decided. Syria with the regime of Bashar al-Assad objectionable to the West was a new object of direct state interests of the United States and its NATO allies. The country is balancing on the brink of a real civil war with numerous human and material losses. The civilian population is dying, the opposing sides, as usual, mutually blame each other for this. Opposition detachments, supported by the West, are acquiring an organized structure, a unified command, receiving support with weapons, ammunition, food, and so on. from the territory of Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, since the land and air borders of Syria are practically open. Government troops hold cities and large towns, while the opposition controls about half of the country's territory, including almost all of the countryside.
The preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria is of great geopolitical importance. The stability and power of Syria are also extremely important for Russia, which is striving to maintain its influence in the Middle East region. It is quite obvious that the military intervention of the West and the overthrow of the legitimate government of Syria will open a direct path to aggression against Iran, which, in the end, will pose a certain threat to Russia itself.
The geopolitical position of Syria is extremely unenviable. The country is in a hostile environment: from the south - Israel, blazing Lebanon, in the east - unstable Palestine, Iraq, from the north - hostile Turkey.
The military doctrine of Syria is based on the principle of defense sufficiency, which determines the development of the armed forces. Israel is seen as the main adversary in Damascus, not excluding the threat of military conflicts with Iraq and Turkey.
The Syrian Armed Forces developed on the basis of these tasks and today they are one of the strongest among the Armed Forces of the countries of the Arab world. Powerful ground forces (3 army corps, 12 divisions, 7 of them tank, 12 separate brigades, 10 special forces regiments, a separate tank regiment) are in dire need of cover from air strikes. The combat capabilities of the aviation of Israel and Turkey are an order of magnitude superior to the capabilities of the Syrian Air Force. Undoubtedly, Syria, like any country, is unable to resist the actions of the joint air force grouping of the coalition of NATO states in the event that they conduct air operations. Therefore, the Syrians have long been concerned about the development of the air defense system, acquiring modern air defense systems in Russia, Belarus, and China. According to experts, the air defense of Syria today is a rather formidable force.
The destruction of a Turkish reconnaissance aircraft on June 22, 2012 by Syrian air defense systems clearly confirms this. According to many political scientists, the downed "Phantom" was almost a guarantee of preventing the upcoming NATO armed intervention, rushing to the aid of the opposition. The effectiveness of the Syrian air defense cannot be compared with the air defense of Libya, which was in no way able to withstand the modern NATO air force grouping.
Let's take a closer look at the state of the heroic air defense, consider some of the features of the construction of its components, and try to give an objective assessment of the combat capabilities of the guarantor of sovereignty and the preservation of Syrian statehood.
What is in the arsenal of the Syrian air defense forces?
The Syrian air defense forces are armed with anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems and complexes of both modern and obsolete types that went through the Arab-Israeli war 40 years ago. At one time, the Soviet Union provided truly invaluable assistance ($13.4 billion of the debt remained unpaid!) in the supply of weapons and training of personnel to the country, so almost all weapons (not only anti-aircraft) are of Soviet and Russian origin. Today, Syrian air defense includes about 900 air defense systems and more than 4,000 anti-aircraft guns of various modifications. The S-200 Angara and S-200V Vega air defense systems (about 50 launchers), S-75 Dvina have the greatest reach in range; S-75M "Volga". Israel is extremely concerned about modern medium-range air defense systems - S-300 early modifications (48 air defense systems), which at the end of 2011 were allegedly supplied by Russia (according to other sources - Belarus and China). The largest representation in the Syrian air defense system is air defense systems and medium-range air defense systems, among which there are modern complexes "Buk-M1-2", "Buk-M2E (36 SOA, 12 PZU), as well as outdated air defense systems C-125" Neva ", S -125M "Pechora" (140 launchers), 200 SPU "Cube" ("Square"), 14 batteries of the Osa air defense system (60 BM). In addition, in 2006, a contract was signed for the supply of Syria with 50 of the most modern Pantsir-S1E air defense systems, some of which are already in service. As part of the ground forces, there are launchers for the Strela-1 air defense system, BM Strela-10 (35 units), about 4000 Strela-2 / 2M) and Strela-3 MANPADS, more than 2000 ZU-23 anti-aircraft artillery systems -2, ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" (400 units). Anti-aircraft artillery guns of 37 mm and 57 mm calibers, as well as 100 mm KS-19 guns are in long-term storage.
As you can see, the bulk of air defense systems and air defense systems (about 80%) are represented by obsolete weapons and military equipment. Nevertheless, over the past years, all complexes have undergone (or are undergoing) a deep modernization and, to one degree or another, meet modern requirements.
Radar reconnaissance means are represented by P-12, P-14, P-15, P-30, P-35, P-80 radars, PRV-13, PRV-16 radio altimeters, the development ideology of which dates back to the second half of the last century. This technique 30-40 years ago in the Arab-Israeli wars could still somehow resist the then air enemy, using the available detuning modes from various types of interference, changing operating frequencies, etc. Today, these samples, firstly, have developed a technical resource, in secondly, they are hopelessly behind the capabilities of a potential adversary in delivering "electronic strikes." In the best case, an air defense group can use these radars in peacetime when on combat duty in order to detect intruder aircraft, open the beginning of a strike by means of air attack (AOS), air traffic control, etc.
In order for an air defense system to work effectively, it is necessary that all its components fulfill their functional purpose, contributing to the solution of air defense tasks. It is impossible to judge the power of the air defense system by the fact of the defeat of one aircraft that violated the state border, shot down in peacetime. The situation during the hostilities will be completely different. Mass use of small-sized air targets - elements of the WTO (such as UAVs, cruise missiles, UABs, guided missiles, etc.), the use of intense fire and electronic countermeasures against air defense fire weapons, disabling control and reconnaissance systems, widespread use of false and distracting goals - in such incredibly difficult conditions, the air defense system will function. The repulsion of modern air defense strikes, combined into a complex highly organized system, is possible only if it is opposed by an adequate highly effective air defense system. Here, the state and capabilities of control systems, reconnaissance and warning of an air enemy, a carefully organized and built system of anti-aircraft missile and artillery cover (ZRAP), as well as fighter-air cover (IAP) are of particular importance.
CONTROL SYSTEM
The combat control system of the Syrian air defense force groupings is built according to the usual classical scheme, combining the directorates and headquarters of the air defense zones (Northern and Southern), command posts (control posts) of anti-aircraft missile (artillery) formations, units and subunits, radio engineering units and subunits. The communication system is represented by traditional channels of tropospheric, relay, shortwave radio communication, and wired communication is also widely used.
To control the forces and means of air defense, there are three fully computerized command posts. They allow prior to the start of anti-aircraft combat to ensure the work of command and control agencies in organizing air defense, planning combat operations and exchanging operational-tactical information. The possibilities of centralized automated control of combat operations of the entire air defense grouping are very low due to a number of reasons.
First, the level of equipping air defense formations and units with modern means of automation is extremely low. The anti-aircraft combat control system is represented by automated control systems from anti-aircraft missile systems and systems, moreover, an old fleet. For example, to control the S-75, S-125 and S-200 air defense systems, KSAU ASURK-1M (1MA), Vector-2, Almaz, Senezh-M1E, Proton, Baikal are used, which were adopted in the middle of the last century. The ideology of controlling the combat operations of air defense assets, implemented in these assets, is completely unsuitable for modern conditions and is hopelessly outdated. The available samples of ACS make it possible to solve in an automated way the tasks of collecting, processing, displaying and transmitting radar information in relation to the command posts of individual homogeneous air defense formations (divisions, regiments, brigades). Centralized control of the combat operations of mixed air defense groups both in zones and in formations has not been implemented due to the lack of automated control systems for solving these tasks.
On the one hand, it is known that the decentralization of control significantly reduces the overall effectiveness of the air defense system due to the lack of interaction, misses of air targets, excessive concentration of fire, etc. Although, on the other hand, in conditions of repelling high-density airborne strikes, in strong (overwhelming) interference, powerful fire resistance, independent actions of fire anti-aircraft weapons may be the only effective way to solve air defense problems. The development before the battle of detailed instructions on the conduct of fire and interaction with the distribution of responsible space between firing units in the grouping and between groupings can significantly bring the effectiveness of the air defense system to the potential. Under these conditions, decentralized governance may be preferable. A vivid example of the inadequacy of excessive centralization of control is the impunity landing on Red Square of a light-engine aircraft that took place 25 years ago, which flew through a fairly strong air defense grouping in the west of the USSR, futilely waiting for a command from Moscow to open fire and destroy an air target detected and accompanied by it.
Secondly, the state of affairs with the state of the ACS of combat operations is far from favorable not only at the command post (PU) of air defense groups, but also in the anti-aircraft weapons themselves. For example, the PU-12 battery command post for the Osa air defense system automatically solves only a narrow range of tasks for setting up and tracking routes according to data from its own radar, recalculating radar coordinates from a “digital” source. Moreover, target designation for combat vehicles has to be issued in a non-automated way, by voice with the issuance of target coordinates, which also reduces the effectiveness of control. Given that the Osa complexes currently cover the S-200 brigades, which can be destroyed by cruise missiles, UABs and other small-sized, high-speed targets, the use of PU-12s in conditions of extreme time pressure becomes practically useless.
To control the Kvadrat air defense system, the K-1 (Crab) control complex, created in 1957-1960, is used. The complex allows on the spot and on the move to visually display the air situation on the brigade commander's console according to information from the interfaced radar of the old park. Operators have to manually simultaneously process up to 10 targets, issue target designations on them with forced guidance of antennas of guidance stations. To detect an enemy aircraft and issue target designation to a division, taking into account the distribution of targets and the transfer of fire, it takes 25-30 s, which is unacceptable in the conditions of modern fleeting anti-aircraft combat. The range of radio links is limited and is only 15–20 km.
The automated fire control system of modern air defense systems and air defense systems Buk-M2E, S-300 and Pantsir-S1E (if they are supplied fully equipped with combat control points) have higher capabilities. In these automated control systems, the tasks of automated development of solutions for repelling airborne strikes (firing), setting fire missions, monitoring their implementation, regulating the consumption of missiles (ammunition), organizing interaction, documenting combat work, etc. are solved.
However, along with a high level of automation of fire control processes among the constituent elements of the complex, the problem of interaction with external air defense systems remains unresolved. With such a variety of means of a mixed air defense grouping, the problem of organizing a centralized automated control of it comes to the fore.
Thirdly, the problem is also aggravated due to the impossibility of information and technical interaction between various CACS. The system for collecting and processing radar information with such ACS equipment can only be non-automated using tablets. Radar information obtained using radars of the P-12, P-14, P-15, P-30, P-35, P-80, PRV-13 and PRV-16 types (possibly also the radar of the new fleet) can be processed and used with the use of automated radar information processing posts (PORI-1, PORI-2), but there is no information about their presence in Syria. As a result, the reconnaissance and warning system about an air enemy will operate with a large delay in radar information.
Thus, in conditions of intense fire and electronic countermeasures, the centralized control of air defense systems, when equipped with obsolete ACS models, will undoubtedly be lost, which will reduce the potential capabilities of the group to destroy air targets.
RADIO EQUIPMENT
The combat use of radio engineering troops (RTV) of Syria has a number of characteristic features. The increased role of radio engineering troops in the air defense system in armed conflicts of recent decades is quite obvious, the effectiveness of which mainly determines the quality of control, and hence the success of the fight against enemy aircraft and unmanned vehicles. However, one of the weak points of the Syrian air defense is the radio engineering troops, equipped with obsolete, fully exhausted radar stations. About 50% of the radar stations in service with radio engineering companies, battalions and brigades require major repairs, 20-30% are non-combat ready. Radars P-12, P-14, P-15, P-30, P-35, P-80 are well known to American military specialists and their colleagues from NATO in Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli wars and the wars in the Persian Gulf.
At the same time, a significant qualitative breakthrough has taken place in the development and combat use of Western AOS over the past few decades. It is quite obvious that the Syrian (read, still Soviet) RTV systems are not able to effectively counteract modern air attack weapons for a number of reasons:
1. Low noise immunity of the RTV group. Radar models designed in the middle of the last century, as well as the RTV group created on their basis, were able to ensure the performance of combat missions in the conditions of the use of active noise interference of low intensity (up to 5-10 W / MHz), and in certain sectors (in certain directions ) – under conditions of active noise interference of medium intensity (30–40 W/MHz). In the 2003 operation "Shock and Awe" against Iraq, the forces and means of electronic warfare of the coalition of NATO countries created interference densities two orders of magnitude higher - up to 2-3 kW / MHz in the barrage mode and up to 30-75 kW / MHz - in the aiming mode. At the same time, the RES RTV and S-75 and S-125 air defense systems, which are in service with the Iraqi air defense, were suppressed at 10-25 W / MHz.
2. Low level of automation of control of forces and means of radar reconnaissance. The radar reconnaissance means available in the RTV of Syria are not capable of functioning in a single information space due to the lack of a single automated center for collecting and processing information. The collection and processing of information in a non-automated way leads to large inaccuracies, delays in the transmission of data on air targets up to 4–10 minutes.
3. The impossibility of creating a radar field with the required parameters. A fragmented radar field makes it possible to assess only a particular air situation and make individual decisions on it for the conduct of hostilities. When creating a RTV grouping, it is necessary to take into account the geographical features of the area of upcoming military operations, its limited size, the presence of large areas of airspace uncontrolled by the radio engineering troops grouping. Mountainous areas are not very suitable for the deployment of RTV units, therefore the creation of a continuous radar field is extremely problematic. The ability to maneuver subunits and units of the RTV is also extremely limited.
Features of complex terrain make it possible to create a three-band radar field with the following parameters:
The height of the lower border of the continuous radar field: over the territory of Syria, in the coastal region and along the line of withdrawal of troops from Israel - 500 m; along the border with Lebanon - 500m; over the territory of Lebanon - 2000 m;
Along the border with Turkey - 1000 - 3000 m; along the border with Iraq - 3000 m;
The height of the upper border of the continuous radar field over the territory of Syria is 25,000 m;
The depth of the radar field (removal of detection lines) beyond the Syrian-Israeli border can be 50-150 km;
Overlap of the radar field - two-three times;
At altitudes of 100–200 m, the radar field has only a focal character in almost all important directions.
Of course, the ongoing modernization of obsolete Soviet-made radars in service contributes to increasing the effectiveness of the Syrian RTV grouping. Thus, at the beginning of 2012, the Russian radar station deployed on Mount Jabal al-Harra south of Damascus and the Syrian radar station located in Lebanon on Mount Sanin were upgraded. This led to the ability to quickly receive warning information about possible Israeli air attacks. However, to solve the problem, it is necessary to radically re-equip the RTV with modern, efficient radars. Partially, this happens during the supply of air defense systems and air defense systems, which include modern radars with high energy and noise immunity.
Taking into account the peculiarities of RTV equipment, the terrain, the experience of the combat use of forces and means of reconnaissance of the Syrian air enemy, a number of basic organizational and tactical recommendations can be proposed.
It is expedient to introduce into the structure of radar reconnaissance units corner reflectors and simulators of the radar radiation of stations (IRIS) of a portable type as standard elements of the battle order. Install corner reflectors on false and combat (reserve) positions in groups or singly at a distance of up to 300 m from the radar (SURN, SOC BM). Portable IRIS should be installed at a distance from several hundred meters to several kilometers from the antenna post or ADMS.
Use radars disabled, but with serviceable transmitting systems, as false (distracting). The deployment of such radars should be carried out at combat positions at a distance of 300-500 m from command posts (control posts), switching on to radiation should be carried out with the start of an enemy airborne attack.
Deploy a network of air observation posts at all command posts (CPs) and in the areas of probable actions of the enemy's AOS, equipping them with means of observation, communication and data transmission. For prompt notification of overflights of AOS, organize special operational channels for the transmission of particularly important information.
A set of organizational measures is of great importance for increasing the secrecy of elements of an air enemy reconnaissance system. Careful camouflage and engineering equipment should be carried out at each radar position immediately after deployment. Trenches for reconnaissance stations should be torn off in such a way that the lower antenna emitter is at ground level. All cable facilities should be carefully covered to a depth of 30-60 cm. Near each radar, trenches and slots should be equipped to shelter personnel. The change of positions of radar reconnaissance units should be carried out immediately after the overflights of reconnaissance aircraft, after working on radiation, even for a short time, while staying in position for more than four hours.
To reduce the visibility of the radar in the visible and IR ranges against the surrounding background, carry out camouflage and deforming painting, create false thermal targets from improvised means (by making fires, lighting torches, etc.). False thermal targets must be placed on the ground at real distances corresponding to the distances between the elements of combat formations. It is advisable to use false thermal targets in combination with corner reflectors, covering them with camouflage nets.
In the conditions of the use of the WTO by the enemy, create radar fields of standby and combat modes. To create a standby radar field on the basis of the standby mode radar station of the meter range of waves, which should be deployed at temporary positions. To create a combat mode radar field covertly on the basis of modern combat mode radars from the composition of the ADMS (SAM) entering service. In missile-prone areas, create warning lanes based on low-altitude radars, as well as visual observation posts. When choosing positions for their deployment, ensure that the closing angles in the sectors of probable detection of cruise missiles do not exceed 4-6 minutes. Reconnaissance of an air enemy before the start of active operations of the AOS should be carried out with radars predominantly of the meter wave range from temporary positions. Turning off these radars and maneuvering to alternate positions should be carried out immediately after turning on the combat mode radar in combat positions.
In order to organize the protection of the radar from attacks by anti-radar missiles (PRR), the following measures must be taken in the radar intelligence units:
Purposefully conduct psychological training of personnel and training of combat crews in combat work when the enemy uses PRR;
Carry out an advance and thorough analysis of the expected directions, areas, hidden routes for the exit of PRR carriers to the missile launch lines;
To carry out timely opening of the beginning of an enemy air strike and detection of the approach of its carrier aircraft to the launch lines of the PRR;
Implement strict regulation of the operation of radio electronic equipment for radiation (mainly use meter-wave radar and PRV for detecting and tracking targets);
At the stage of organizing hostilities, carry out the maximum separation of frequencies of the same type of radio electronic equipment in subdivisions, provide for periodic frequency maneuvers;
Immediately turn off the radar of the centimeter and decimeter wave ranges after launches of the PRR.
These and a number of other measures are undoubtedly known to the combat crews of the radar station, who have studied the experience of military operations and are preparing for modern warfare. Despite the seeming simplicity and accessibility, their implementation, as practice shows, can significantly increase the survivability of elements of the reconnaissance system of an air enemy in conditions of strong fire and electronic countermeasures.
THE POTENTIAL IS, BUT IT IS INSUFFICIENT
With the available number of air defense systems and air defense systems, as well as numerous anti-aircraft artillery systems, the system of anti-aircraft missile and artillery cover (ZRAP) of Syrian air defense is capable of creating fairly high fire densities over the country's main objects and military groups.
The presence in the air defense system of different types of air defense systems, air defense systems and air defense systems makes it possible to build a multilayer fire system for anti-aircraft weapons with the concentration of their efforts on covering the most important objects. Thus, the S-200 system will make it possible to destroy the most important targets at ranges of 140-150 km from the borders of the sea coast, at ranges of up to 100 km from large industrial centers and in mountainous areas on the adjacent territory with Lebanon and Turkey. The S-75, S-300 systems have a reach of up to 50-70 km over covered objects (taking into account the closing angles and the effects of interference). The fire capabilities of modern air defense systems and air defense systems "Buk-M1-2, 2E" and "Pantsir-S1E" will provide a high density of fire at medium altitudes and ranges up to 20-25 km. The ZRAP system at low and extremely low altitudes is complemented by the fire of numerous ZAKs of the Shilka, S-60, KS-19 types.
An analysis of the fire system shows that between the Northern and Southern air defense zones of Syria there is a gap in the integral zone of destruction, primarily at extremely low, low and medium altitudes. Although the gap in the affected area is covered by two or three S-200 air defense systems from the side of each zone, however, it is likely that the position of their starting positions has long been reconnoitered and known to the enemy. With the start of active hostilities, these launch positions will be primarily attacked by cruise missiles, therefore it is advisable to keep the S-300P air defense system and the Buk-M2E air defense system in a hidden reserve in this direction in the Northern and Southern air defense groups to restore the disturbed fire system.
In addition, there is a covert approach from the northwest at extremely low and low altitudes in the Northern Air Defense Zone, covered by three S-200 battalions, three S-75 battalions and two S-125 battalions, whose positions are also undoubtedly reconnoitered. These positions will be attacked by cruise missiles with the start of active operations by enemy aircraft, the air defense systems will be exposed to active interference, from which these types of systems are actually not protected. In this case, in this direction, it is necessary to keep S-300P air defense systems, Buk-M2E air defense systems in a hidden reserve to strengthen the fire system and restore it.
To repel air strikes from the Ar-Rakan (northern), Al-Khasan (north-eastern), Daur-Azzavr directions, which remain uncovered in the general air defense system, it is advisable to organize several air defense groups for operations from ambushes and as nomads. Such groups should include the Buk-M2E air defense missile system, the Pantsir-S1E air defense missile system, MANPADS, 23-mm and 57-mm anti-aircraft guns.
A preliminary, superficial assessment of the fire system shows that the main efforts of the air defense forces are concentrated on covering two directions: the southwestern (border with Lebanon and Israel) and the northwestern (border with Turkey). The strongest air defense "umbrella" was created over the cities of Damascus, Hama, Idlib, Aleppo (the capital, large industrial and administrative centers). In addition, these cities host the main airfields for both civil and military aviation, as well as large groupings of government troops. It is positive that long-range air defense systems cover the main territory of the country, while ensuring the removal of the affected area far to the approaches to the main administrative and industrial centers, seaports, airfields, and groupings of troops. The exception is an uncovered section of territory in the northeast of Syria, bordering on Iraq.
The stationary air defense system is the basis for covering ground forces groupings, which is complemented by the fire of cannon anti-aircraft mobile air defense systems. As already noted, there are up to 4000 units of these funds in the regular structures of tank (mechanized) divisions and brigades (there are about 400 Shilka ZSUs alone). These means are quite effective in the fight against low-flying aircraft, helicopters, are mobile, mobile and, in combination with other means, are quite a formidable force.
The air defense grouping is capable of combating all types of air targets over the entire range of altitudes, the potential capabilities of the air defense grouping make it possible to destroy up to 800 air defense systems of a potential enemy before the missile and ammunition load is used up in simple interference-free conditions. The multiplicity of overlapping zones of destruction is 8 - 12 and allows: to concentrate the fire of several complexes (mainly of different types) to destroy the most dangerous and important targets, to keep a sufficient number of air defense forces and means in reserve, if necessary, to maneuver to restore the disturbed fire system of the air defense group, to carry out fire maneuver in the course of repelling enemy air strikes.
As you can see, the potential capabilities of the Syrian air defense system are quite high. With greater reliability, air defense systems cover the coastal Mediterranean zone of Syria, especially in the area of the seaports of Tartus, Baniyas, Latakia. In addition to the existing stationary air defense systems, the Buk-M2E air defense system, which has recently entered service with the Syrian air defense system, is presumably deployed in these areas. A Turkish reconnaissance aircraft shot down in this area flew along the coast of Syria, undoubtedly, in order to open its national air defense system, “get acquainted” with the new weapons that have appeared, provoke air defense locators to work in active mode, identify their location, detect uncovered areas in air defense zones, assess the capabilities of the entire system. Well, to some extent, the reconnaissance aircraft succeeded. The destruction of the Turkish intelligence officer demonstrated that Syria has an air defense system and is capable of performing combat missions.
However, talking about its effectiveness in excellent colors is very premature. The air defense system, like other components of the Syrian air defense system, is far from perfect. The optimistic picture is overshadowed by the fact that the bulk of anti-aircraft missile weapons are outdated and do not meet today's high requirements. Armament and equipment - ideas and productions of the middle of the last century - are unable to withstand a highly organized, technically equipped air enemy, which has the most modern reconnaissance, control, fire and electronic countermeasures systems in its arsenal.
The main types of air defense systems of the old fleet (S-200, S-75, S-125, Osa, Kvadrat air defense systems) are poorly protected from passive interference, practically not protected from active interference, do not have special operating modes in the conditions of the use of WTO elements (PRR, UR, UAB). The experience of local wars and conflicts indicates that the enemy will make every effort to reduce the fire capabilities of an air defense group, counteract the firing of air defense systems and reduce their effectiveness to a minimum. Practice shows that the air defense system will be the primary target of destruction when powerful fire strikes of cruise missiles, "electronic strike" will suppress and destroy reconnaissance, control systems, fire weapons of the air defense system within 3-4 days. There are plenty of examples. In conditions of strong fire and electronic countermeasures from an air enemy, the capabilities of the Syrian air defense grouping in the initial period of the war can be reduced by 85-95%.
Of course, the full realization of the potential fire capabilities of an air defense grouping is very problematic and practically impossible. However, by applying a set of measures of an organizational and tactical nature, it is possible to significantly increase the survivability of the system, and with it, the effectiveness of air defense.
First of all, it is necessary to carry out organizational measures:
1. Particular attention should be paid to the development of advance instructions for the conduct of fire and interaction, which is extremely important in the absence of centralized control of combat operations in the course of repelling air strikes. The distribution of responsible space, the determination of the order and sequence of destroying air targets will make it possible to effectively implement the interaction between various independent air defense groupings in the course of repelling an attack.
2. Create mixed air defense groupings with different types of air defense systems and air defense systems (brigades, regiments, divisions, air defense groups), using them to solve specific tasks of covering important objects in various directions. At the same time, it is important to carefully build a fire system without failures (taking into account the mountainous terrain) in all altitude ranges, especially at low and extremely low altitudes.
3. For self-cover, use not only MANPADS, ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 Shilka, but also Osa, Kvadrat, Pantsir-S1E, 37-mm AZP, 57-mm AZP, 100-mm ZP, especially for self-covering S-200 air defense systems, S-300P air defense systems.
4. To create an air defense duty group, contained in temporary positions and conducting reconnaissance of an air enemy at peacetime frequencies.
5. Build a false fire system with a demonstration of its functioning by the work of mobile, mobile air defense systems.
6. Starting and firing positions should be carefully equipped in engineering terms, they should be camouflaged; equip false ones, prepare 2-3 spare positions.
7. On probable covert approaches of enemy aviation, provide for and plan the use of mobile air defense groups for operations as nomads and from ambushes.
With the beginning of active operations by enemy aviation, it is advisable to apply the following recommendations:
1. The S-200, S-300P divisions should only be used to destroy the most dangerous and most important targets, taking into account the possibility of their shelling.
2. To concentrate fire, use different types of air defense systems.
3. To restore the broken fire system, use the Buk-M2E mobile air defense systems and S-300P air defense systems.
4. Restrict the operation of the ADMC RES for radiation, turn on the ADMC for radiation only if there is a control center with a VKP.
5. Shoot at targets with a minimum parameter and in the depth of the affected area, limiting the broadcast time as much as possible.
Thus, the potential capabilities of the air defense system are quite high, but their implementation in the fight against a modern air enemy requires some effort. The air defense system will show its strength only with the organized use of its components, one of which is the fighter air cover system (SIAP).
The Syrian fighter air cover system has the same problems as all the country's armed forces. Fighter aviation of the Air Force consists of four squadrons on the MiG-25, four on the MiG-23MLD, four squadrons are armed with the MiG-29A.
The basis of fighter aviation is 48 MiG-29A fighters, modernized at the turn of the century. 30 MiG-25 interceptors and 80 (according to other sources 50) MiG-23MLD fighters are already outdated and have limited combat capabilities. Even the most modern of the presented fleet - the MiG-29 needs to be improved. In addition, there are more than 150 MiG-21 fighters in the Air Force, but their combat value is very low.
The weak point of the SIAP is aerial reconnaissance. Syrian aviation does not have airborne radars - AWACS and therefore, in the event of an armed conflict, Syrian pilots will have to rely only on ground reconnaissance and guidance stations, also represented by an outdated fleet.
The effectiveness of fighter aviation cover depends on the number and combat capabilities of fighters, the presence of the number of fighters in various degrees of readiness, the capabilities of reconnaissance and control systems in terms of the detection range of AOS, the number of guidance, their stability in electronic warfare conditions, the nature of enemy aircraft actions (altitude, speed, depth of impact , types of aircraft, etc.), the level of preparedness of the flight crew, time of day, weather conditions and other factors.
The estimated effectiveness of fighter air cover (as the ratio of the number of AOS destroyed by fighter aircraft to the total number of AOS involved in the raid in the zone (area) of responsibility) will be about 6-8%. Of course, this is clearly not enough, especially since even this low efficiency can be achieved only with a high level of preparedness of the flight crew.
Thus, the capabilities of the SIAP to disrupt the combat mission of enemy aviation are extremely insignificant. The countries of the potential enemy (Israel, Turkey) have a general military-technical superiority over Syria and overwhelming in military aviation, command and control systems, communications, and intelligence. The air forces of these countries are more numerous, more maneuverable, the fleet of military equipment is constantly replenished with modern weapons.
In general, the assessment of the state of the Syrian air defense is dual and ambiguous.
On the one hand, air defense groups have a large number of samples of the most diverse anti-aircraft weapons and military equipment. The mixed principle of manning military formations makes it possible to create a multi-layered fire system in all altitude ranges, which ensures the shelling and destruction of the entire variety of modern AOS. The air defense zone over important objects (the capital, large industrial centers, seaports, groupings of troops, airfields) can have a 10-12-fold overlap of the zones of destruction and shelling of various types of air defense systems, air defense systems and air defense systems. The presence of long-range air defense systems in groupings makes it possible to carry out the removal of the affected area to distant approaches to covered objects. The fighter air cover system increases the air defense capabilities to intercept the most dangerous air targets over areas that are hard to reach for ground air defense systems, in important directions, etc.
The air defense system is strong enough and capable of performing combat missions both in peacetime and in wartime. The destruction of single air targets, intruder aircraft, the reflection of low-density airborne strikes in medium-intensity interference are quite feasible tasks for the Syrian air defense.
On the other hand, having only 12-15% of modern weapons in its composition, it is difficult for an air defense system to count on success in countering a strong, highly organized, equipped with the most modern weapons, weapon control and guidance systems (primarily high-precision) air enemy. Applying a complex of organizational, operational-tactical and technical measures, some success can be achieved in the difficult task of combating a modern air enemy. However, in its current state, the Syrian air defense system will not be able to withstand the combined air forces of the coalition of Western states conducting air offensive operations using several thousand cruise missiles, fighters, bombers, combat helicopters with mandatory preliminary fire and electronic suppression of air defense systems.
Syrian air defense urgently needs a radical re-equipment with modern military equipment, a deep modernization of existing models of weapons and military equipment. High-quality training of military personnel, preparing them for conducting anti-aircraft battles with a technically superior enemy, training in anti-aircraft fire (missile launches) with all types of anti-aircraft weapons, both modern and equipment of the last century, are extremely important. Only under these conditions can one count on success in protecting airspace.
Anatoly Dmitrievich GAVRILOV - Lieutenant General of the Reserve, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor, Honored Military Specialist