War of 1812 where. Church of the Life-Giving Trinity on Sparrow Hills. Armed forces of opponents
At dawn on June 24 (12 old style) June 1812, Napoleon's troops crossed the Neman River without declaring war and invaded Russia. Napoleon's army, which he himself called the "Grand Army", numbered over 600,000 people and 1,420 guns. In addition to the French, it included the national corps of European countries conquered by Napoleon, as well as the Polish corps of Marshal Y. Poniatowski.
Napoleon's main forces were deployed in two echelons. The first (444,000 people and 940 guns) consisted of three groups: the right wing, led by Jerome Bonaparte (78,000 people, 159 guns) was supposed to move to Grodno, diverting as many Russian forces as possible; the central group under the command of Eugene Beauharnais (82,000 people, 208 guns) was supposed to prevent the connection of the 1st and 2nd Russian armies; The left wing, led by Napoleon himself (218,000 people, 527 guns), moved to Vilna - it was assigned the main role in the entire campaign. In the rear, between the Vistula and Oder, there remained a second echelon - 170,000 people, 432 guns and a reserve (Marshal Augereau's corps and other troops).
The invading enemy was opposed by 220 - 240 thousand Russian soldiers with 942 guns - 3 times less than the enemy had. In addition, the Russian troops were divided: the 1st Western Army under the command of the Minister of War, General of Infantry M.B. Barclay de Tolly (110 - 127 thousand people with 558 guns) stretched over more than 200 kilometers from Lithuania to Grodno in Belarus; The 2nd Western Army, led by Infantry General P.I. Bagration (45 - 48 thousand people with 216 guns) occupied a line up to 100 kilometers east of Bialystok; The 3rd Western Army of cavalry general A.P. Tormasov (46,000 people with 168 guns) was stationed in Volyn near Lutsk. On the right flank of the Russian troops (in Finland) was the corps of Lieutenant General F.F. Steingel, on the left flank - the Danube Army of Admiral P.V. Chichagov.
Considering the enormous size and power of Russia, Napoleon planned to complete the campaign in three years: in 1812, to capture the western provinces from Riga to Lutsk, in 1813 - Moscow, in 1814 - St. Petersburg. Such gradualism would allow him to dismember Russia, providing rear support and communications for the army operating over vast areas. The conqueror of Europe did not count on a blitzkrieg, although he intended to quickly defeat the main forces of the Russian army one by one in the border areas.
But realizing that it was impossible to resist in scattered units, the Russian command began to retreat deeper into the country. And this thwarted Napoleon's strategic plan. Instead of gradually dismembering Russia, Napoleon was forced to follow the fleeing Russian armies deeper into the country, stretching communications and losing superiority in forces.
FIRST STAGE OF THE WAR: RETREAT
Retreating, Russian troops fought rearguard battles, inflicting significant losses on the enemy. The main task was to unite the forces of the 1st and 2nd Western armies. The position of Bagration's 2nd Army, which was threatened by encirclement, was especially difficult. It was not possible to get through to Minsk and connect with Barclay’s army there: the path was cut off. Bagration changed the direction of movement, but the troops of Jerome Bonaparte overtook him. On July 9 (June 27, old style) near the town of Mir, a battle between the rearguard of Russian troops (it was the Cossack cavalry of Ataman M.I. Platov) and the French cavalry took place. The French were defeated and retreated in disorder. The next day there was a new battle, and again the French were defeated. On July 14 (2), near the town of Romanovo, Platov’s Cossacks held back the French for 24 hours to allow army convoys to cross the Pripyat. Platov's successful rearguard battles allowed the 2nd Army to freely reach Bobruisk and concentrate its forces, which had been stretched to that point. All attempts to surround Bagration failed. Npoleon was furious; he accused his brother Jerome of slowness and transferred command of his corps to Marshal Davout.
From Tarutin, Kutuzov launched a “small war” with army partisan detachments. The detachments of D.V. Davydov, A.N. Seslavin, A.S. Figner, I.S. Dorokhov, N.D. Kudashev, I.M. Vadbolsky were especially successful. Kutuzov sought to expand the peasant partisan movement, merging it with the actions of army detachments. Some of the peasant detachments numbered several thousand people. For example, Gerasim Kurin’s detachment consisted of 5,000 people. The detachments of Ermolai Chetvertakov, Fyodor Potapov, and Vasilisa Kozhina were widely known.
The actions of the partisans caused great human and material losses to the enemy and disrupted their communications with the rear. In just six autumn weeks, the partisans destroyed about 30,000 enemy soldiers.
On October 18 (6), on the Chernishna River, Russian troops defeated the strong vanguard of the French army, commanded by Marshal Murat. This victory marked the beginning of a counteroffensive by the Russian army.
On the same days, active operations of the 3rd Western Army began. On October 17 (5), the battle for Polotsk began, in which, in addition to the soldiers of Wittgenstein’s corps, soldiers of the Novgorod and St. Petersburg militia took an active part. By the morning of October 20, Polotsk was liberated. In the southwestern direction, Admiral Chichagov threw back the troops of Schwarzenberg and Rainier beyond the Southern Bug, into the Duchy of Warsaw, and moved towards Minsk.
All this prompted Napoleon to take action. On October 19 (7), the French set out from Moscow to Tarutin, hoping to take Kutuzov by surprise, defeat him and break through to Kaluga. The ancient capital of Russia was burned and plundered. The French tried to blow up the Kremlin, but fortunately the destruction was not too great. Napoleon's new plans were again destroyed. Seslavin's partisan detachment discovered Naoleon's army near the village of Fominskoye and transmitted information about this to Kutuzov's headquarters. The Russian army set out from the Tarutino camp and moved towards the French. On October 24 (12), a fierce battle took place between the advanced units of both armies for Maloyaroslavets. The city changed hands 8 times. And although in the end the French captured the city, Napoleon had to give up hope of breaking through to Kaluga: the main forces of the Russian army that arrived took up strong positions near Maloyaroslavets. Napoleon gave the order to begin a retreat to Mozhaisk and further to the old Smolensk road, devastated by the war.
Having finally wrested the strategic initiative from the enemy’s hands, Kutuzov launched a general counteroffensive. It was active in nature and set as its goal, while preserving the army, not just to expel, but to completely destroy the enemy. A huge role in the pursuit of the French was played by army and peasant partisan detachments, as well as the mobile Cossack units of Ataman Platov.
In the battles near Vyazma and Dorogobuzh, the enemy fleeing to the west lost about 13,000 people killed, wounded and captured. In the battle near Lyakhov, the partisans surrounded and forced to surrender an entire enemy division led by General Augereau. Leaving Moscow, Napoleon had an army of 107,000 people. He managed to bring only about 60,000 people to Smolensk, including reinforcements.
In mid-November, Russian troops surrounded Napoleonic army near the Berezina River. However, due to inconsistency in the actions of the Russian corps, Napoleon managed to cross the Berezina near the village of Studyanki. However, only about 9,000 people crossed to the west bank. The rest either died or were captured. After the Berezina, Napoleon fled to Paris. To the question “What is the situation of the army?” he replied: “There is no more army.”
On November 28, old style, Russian troops occupied Vilna. On December 2, near Kovno, about 1,000 enemy soldiers crossed the Neman. These were the last remnants of Napoleon's main forces. In total, about 30,000 people out of the 600,000-strong “Grand Army” escaped. The war, as Kutuzov wrote, “ended with the complete extermination of the enemy.”
“No matter how critics speak about individual moments of the persecution, one must attribute the energy with which this persecution was carried out to the fact that the French army was completely destroyed, and a greater result cannot be imagined,” wrote the German military theorist and historian Carl Clausewitz. "
As a result of the defeat of Napoleonic army in Russia, the national liberation movement intensified in Europe. The patriotic upsurge of 1812 had a huge impact on the growth of self-awareness of the peoples of Russia.
Russia's war for freedom and independence against the aggression of France and its allies.
It was a consequence of deep political contradictions between the France of Emperor Napoleon I Bonaparte, which sought European dominance, and the Russian Empire, which opposed its political and territorial claims.
On the French side, the war was of a coalition nature. The Confederation of the Rhine alone supplied 150 thousand people to Napoleonic army. Eight army corps were composed of foreign contingents. In the Great Army there were about 72 thousand Poles, over 36 thousand Prussians, about 31 thousand Austrians, and a significant number of representatives of other European states. The total strength of the French army was about 1200 thousand people. More than half of it was intended for the invasion of Russia.
By June 1, 1812, Napoleonic invasion forces included the Imperial Guard, 12 infantry corps, cavalry reserve (4 corps), artillery and engineering parks - a total of 678 thousand people and about 2.8 thousand guns.
Napoleon I used the Duchy of Warsaw as a springboard for the attack. His strategic plan was to quickly defeat the main forces of the Russian army in a general battle, capture Moscow and impose a peace treaty on the Russian Empire on French terms. The enemy invasion forces were deployed in 2 echelons. The 1st echelon consisted of 3 groups (total 444 thousand people, 940 guns), located between the Neman and Vistula rivers. The 1st group (left wing troops, 218 thousand people, 527 guns) under the direct command of Napoleon I concentrated on the line Elbing (now Elblag), Thorn (now Torun) for an offensive through Kovno (now Kaunas) to Vilna (now Vilnius) . The 2nd group (general E. Beauharnais; 82 thousand people, 208 guns) was intended to attack in the zone between Grodno and Kovno with the aim of separating the Russian 1st and 2nd Western armies. The 3rd group (under the command of the brother of Napoleon I - J. Bonaparte; troops of the right wing, 78 thousand people, 159 guns) had the task of moving from Warsaw to Grodno to pull back the Russian 2nd Western Army to facilitate the offensive of the main forces . These troops were supposed to encircle and destroy piece by piece the Russian 1st and 2nd Western armies with sweeping blows. On the left wing, the invasion of the 1st group of troops was supported by the Prussian corps (32 thousand people) of Marshal J. MacDonald. On the right wing, the invasion of the 3rd group of troops was supported by the Austrian corps (34 thousand people) of Field Marshal K. Schwarzenberg. In the rear, between the Vistula and Oder rivers, there remained the troops of the 2nd echelon (170 thousand people, 432 guns) and the reserve (the corps of Marshal P. Augereau and other troops).
After a series of anti-Napoleonic wars, the Russian Empire remained in international isolation by the beginning of the Patriotic War, also experiencing financial and economic difficulties. In the two pre-war years, its expenses for the needs of the army amounted to more than half of the state budget. Russian troops on the western borders had about 220 thousand people and 942 guns. They were deployed in 3 groups: the 1st Ignite Army (infantry general; 6 infantry, 2 cavalry and 1 Cossack corps; about 128 thousand people, 558 guns) constituted the main forces and was located between Rossieny (now Raseiniai, Lithuania) and Lida; The 2nd Western Army (infantry general; 2 infantry, 1 cavalry corps and 9 Cossack regiments; about 49 thousand people, 216 guns) concentrated between the Neman and Bug rivers; The 3rd Western Army (cavalry general A.P. Tormasov; 3 infantry, 1 cavalry corps and 9 Cossack regiments; 43 thousand people, 168 guns) was stationed in the Lutsk area. In the Riga area there was a separate corps (18.5 thousand people) of Lieutenant General I. N. Essen. The nearest reserves (the corps of Lieutenant General P.I. Meller-Zakomelsky and Lieutenant General F.F. Ertel) were located in the areas of the cities of Toropets and Mozyr. In the south, in Podolia, the Danube Army (about 30 thousand people) of Admiral P.V. Chichagov was concentrated. The leadership of all armies was carried out by the emperor, who was with his main apartment at the 1st Western Army. The commander-in-chief was not appointed, but Barclay de Tolly, being the Minister of War, had the right to give orders on behalf of the emperor. The Russian armies stretched out on a front stretching over 600 km, and the main forces of the enemy - 300 km. This put Russian troops in a difficult position. By the beginning of the enemy invasion, Alexander I accepted the plan proposed by his military adviser, the Prussian general K. Fuhl. According to his plan, the 1st Western Army, having retreated from the border, was supposed to take refuge in a fortified camp, and the 2nd Western Army would go to the flank and rear of the enemy.
According to the nature of military events in the Patriotic War, 2 periods are distinguished. The 1st period - from the invasion of French troops on June 12 (24) to October 5 (17) - includes defensive actions, the Tarutino flank march-maneuver of Russian troops, their preparation for the offensive and guerrilla operations on enemy communications. 2nd period - from the transition of the Russian army to a counteroffensive on October 6 (18) to the defeat of the enemy and the complete liberation of Russian land on December 14 (26).
The pretext for the attack on the Russian Empire was Alexander I’s alleged violation of the main, in the opinion of Napoleon I, provision - “to be in an eternal alliance with France and in the war with England,” which manifested itself in the sabotage of the continental blockade by the Russian Empire. On June 10 (22), Napoleon I, through the ambassador in St. Petersburg J. A. Lauriston, officially declared war on Russia, and on June 12 (24), the French army began crossing the Neman across 4 bridges (near Kovno and other cities). Having received news of the invasion of French troops, Alexander I attempted to resolve the conflict peacefully, calling on the French emperor to “withdraw his troops from Russian territory.” However, Napoleon I rejected this proposal.
Under pressure from superior enemy forces, the 1st and 2nd Western armies began to retreat into the interior of the country. The 1st Western Army left Vilna and retreated to the Drissa camp (near the city of Drissa, now Verhnedvinsk, Belarus), increasing the gap with the 2nd Western Army to 200 km. The main enemy forces rushed into it on June 26 (July 8), occupying Minsk and creating the threat of defeating the Russian armies one by one. The 1st and 2nd Western Armies, intending to unite, retreated in converging directions: the 1st Western Army from Drissa through Polotsk to Vitebsk (to cover the St. Petersburg direction, the corps of Lieutenant General, from November General of Infantry P.Kh. Wittgenstein), and the 2nd Western Army from Slonim to Nesvizh, Bobruisk, Mstislavl.
The war shook up the entire Russian society: peasants, merchants, commoners. By mid-summer, self-defense units began to spontaneously form in the occupied territory to protect their villages from French raids. foragers and marauders (see Looting). Having assessed the importance, the Russian military command took measures to expand and organize it. For this purpose, army partisan detachments were created in the 1st and 2nd Western armies on the basis of regular troops. In addition, according to the manifesto of Emperor Alexander I of July 6 (18), recruitment into the people's militia was carried out in Central Russia and the Volga region. Its creation, recruitment, financing and supply were led by the Special Committee. The Orthodox Church made a significant contribution to the fight against foreign invaders, calling on the people to protect their state and religious shrines, collecting about 2.5 million rubles for the needs of the Russian army (from the church treasury and as a result of donations from parishioners).
On July 8 (20), the French occupied Mogilev and did not allow the Russian armies to unite in the Orsha region. Only thanks to persistent rearguard battles and maneuver did the Russian armies unite near Smolensk on July 22 (August 3). By this time, Wittgenstein’s corps had retreated to a line north of Polotsk and, having pinned down the enemy’s forces, weakened his main group. The 3rd Western Army, after the battles on July 15 (27) near Kobrin, and on July 31 (August 12) near Gorodechnaya (now both cities are in the Brest region, Belarus), where it inflicted great damage on the enemy, defended itself on the river. Styr.
The beginning of the war upset the strategic plan of Napoleon I. The Grand Army lost up to 150 thousand people killed, wounded, sick and deserters. Its combat effectiveness and discipline began to decline, and the pace of the offensive slowed down. On July 17 (29), Napoleon I was forced to give the order to stop his army for 7-8 days in the area from Velizh to Mogilev to rest and await the arrival of reserves and rear forces. Submitting to the will of Alexander I, who demanded active action, the military council of the 1st and 2nd Western armies decided to take advantage of the dispersed position of the enemy and break the front of his main forces with a counterattack in the direction of Rudnya and Porechye (now the city of Demidov). On July 26 (August 7), Russian troops launched a counteroffensive, but due to poor organization and lack of coordination, it did not bring the expected results. Napoleon I used the battles that ensued near Rudnya and Porechye to suddenly transport his troops across the Dnieper, threatening to capture Smolensk. The troops of the 1st and 2nd Western armies began to retreat to Smolensk in order to reach the Moscow road before the enemy. During the Battle of Smolensk in 1812, the Russian armies, through active defense and skillful maneuver of reserves, managed to avoid a general battle imposed by Napoleon I in unfavorable conditions and, on the night of August 6 (18), retreat to Dorogobuzh. The enemy continued to advance on Moscow.
The length of the retreat caused grumbling among the soldiers and officers of the Russian army and general discontent in Russian society. The departure from Smolensk exacerbated hostile relations between P. I. Bagration and M. B. Barclay de Tolly. This forced Alexander I to establish the post of commander-in-chief of all active Russian armies and appoint to it the infantry general (from August 19 (31) Field Marshal General) M. I. Kutuzov, the head of the St. Petersburg and Moscow militias. Kutuzov arrived in the army on August 17 (29) and took over the main command.
Having found a position near Tsarev Zaymishcha (now a village in the Vyazemsky district of the Smolensk region), where Barclay de Tolly on August 19 (31) intended to give the enemy a battle that was unfavorable and the army’s forces were insufficient, Kutuzov withdrew his troops to several crossings to the east and stopped in front of Mozhaisk, near the village Borodino, on a field that made it possible to position troops advantageously and block the Old and New Smolensk roads. The arriving reserves under the command of the general from infantry, the Moscow and Smolensk militias made it possible to increase the forces of the Russian army to 132 thousand people and 624 guns. Napoleon I had a force of about 135 thousand people and 587 guns. Neither side achieved its goals: Napoleon I was unable to defeat the Russian army, Kutuzov was unable to block the path of the Great Army to Moscow. The Napoleonic army, having lost about 50 thousand people (according to French data, over 30 thousand people) and most of the cavalry, turned out to be seriously weakened. Kutuzov, having received information about the losses of the Russian army (44 thousand people), refused to continue the battle and gave the order to retreat.
By retreating to Moscow, he hoped to partially make up for the losses suffered and fight a new battle. But the position chosen by cavalry general L.L. Bennigsen near the walls of Moscow turned out to be extremely unfavorable. Taking into account that the first actions of the partisans showed high efficiency, Kutuzov ordered to take them under the control of the General Staff of the field army, entrusting their leadership to the duty general of staff, General-L. P. P. Konovnitsyna. At a military council in the village of Fili (now within the boundaries of Moscow) on September 1 (13), Kutuzov ordered to leave Moscow without a fight. Most of the population left the city along with the troops. On the very first day the French entered Moscow, fires began, lasting until September 8 (20) and devastating the city. While the French were in Moscow, partisan detachments surrounded the city in an almost continuous mobile ring, not allowing enemy foragers to move further than 15-30 km from it. The most active were the actions of the army partisan detachments, I. S. Dorokhov, A. N. Seslavin and A. S. Figner.
Leaving Moscow, Russian troops retreated along the Ryazan road. After walking 30 km, they crossed the Moscow River and turned west. Then, with a forced march, they crossed to the Tula road and on September 6 (18) concentrated in the Podolsk area. After 3 days they were already on the Kaluga road and on September 9 (21) they stopped at a camp near the village of Krasnaya Pakhra (since July 1, 2012, within Moscow). Having completed 2 more transitions, Russian troops concentrated on September 21 (October 3) near the village of Tarutino (now a village in the Zhukovsky district of the Kaluga region). As a result of a skillfully organized and executed marching maneuver, they broke away from the enemy and took up an advantageous position for a counterattack.
The active participation of the population in the partisan movement turned the war from a confrontation between regular armies into a people's war. The main forces of the Great Army and all its communications from Moscow to Smolensk were under the threat of attacks from Russian troops. The French lost their freedom of maneuver and activity. The routes to the provinces south of Moscow that were not devastated by the war were closed to them. The “small war” launched by Kutuzov further complicated the enemy’s position. Bold operations of army and peasant partisan detachments disrupted the supply of French troops. Realizing the critical situation, Napoleon I sent General J. Lauriston to the headquarters of the Russian commander-in-chief with peace proposals addressed to Alexander I. Kutuzov rejected them, saying that the war was just beginning and would not stop until the enemy was completely expelled from Russia.
The Russian army located in the Tarutino camp reliably covered the south of the country: Kaluga with military reserves concentrated there, Tula and Bryansk with weapons and foundries. At the same time, reliable communications were ensured with the 3rd Western and Danube armies. In the Tarutino camp, the troops were reorganized, re-equipped (their number was increased to 120 thousand people), and supplied with weapons, ammunition and food. There was now 2 times more artillery than the enemy, and 3.5 times more cavalry. The provincial militia numbered 100 thousand people. They covered Moscow in a semicircle along the line Klin, Kolomna, Aleksin. Under Tarutin, M.I. Kutuzov developed a plan for encircling and defeating the Great Army in the area between the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers with the main forces of the active army, the Danube Army of P.V. Chichagov and the corps of P.H. Wittgenstein.
The first blow was struck on October 6 (18) against the vanguard of the French army on the Chernishnya River (Battle of Tarutino 1812). The troops of Marshal I. Murat lost 2.5 thousand killed and 2 thousand prisoners in this battle. Napoleon I was forced to leave Moscow on October 7 (19), and advanced detachments of Russian troops entered it on October 10 (22). The French lost about 5 thousand people and began to retreat along the Old Smolensk Road, which they had destroyed. The Tarutino battle and the battle of Maloyaroslavets marked a radical turning point in the war. The strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Russian command. From that time on, the fighting of Russian troops and partisans acquired an active character and included such methods of armed struggle as parallel pursuit and encirclement of enemy troops. The persecution was carried out in several directions: a detachment of Major General P.V. Golenishchev-Kutuzov operated north of the Smolensk road; along the Smolensk road - the Cossack regiments of the cavalry general; south of the Smolensk road - the vanguard of M. A. Miloradovich and the main forces of the Russian army. Having overtaken the enemy's rearguard near Vyazma, Russian troops defeated him on October 22 (November 3) - the French lost about 8.5 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, then in battles near Dorogobuzh, near Dukhovshchina, near the village of Lyakhovo (now Glinsky district of Smolensk region) - more than 10 thousand people.
The surviving part of Napoleon's army retreated to Smolensk, but there were no food supplies or reserves there. Napoleon I hastily began to withdraw his troops further. But in the battles near Krasnoye and then near Molodechno, Russian troops defeated the French. Scattered enemy units retreated to the river along the road to Borisov. The 3rd Western Army was approaching there to join the corps of P.H. Wittgenstein. Her troops occupied Minsk on November 4 (16), and on November 9 (21), P. V. Chichagov’s army approached Borisov and, after a battle with the detachment of General Ya. Kh. Dombrovsky, occupied the city and the right bank of the Berezina. Wittgenstein's corps, after a stubborn battle with the French corps of Marshal L. Saint-Cyr, captured Polotsk on October 8 (20). Having crossed the Western Dvina, Russian troops occupied Lepel (now Vitebsk region, Belarus) and defeated the French at Chashniki. With the approach of Russian troops to the Berezina, a “sack” was formed in the Borisov area, in which the retreating French troops were surrounded. However, Wittgenstein's indecision and Chichagov's mistakes made it possible for Napoleon I to prepare a crossing across the Berezina and avoid the complete destruction of his army. Having reached Smorgon (now Grodno region, Belarus), on November 23 (December 5), Napoleon I left for Paris, and the remnants of his army were almost completely destroyed.
On December 14 (26), Russian troops occupied Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk (now Brest), completing the liberation of the territory of the Russian Empire. On December 21, 1812 (January 2, 1813), M.I. Kutuzov, in an order to the army, congratulated the troops on expelling the enemy from the country and called on “to complete the defeat of the enemy on his own fields.”
The victory in the Patriotic War of 1812 preserved the independence of Russia, and the defeat of the Great Army not only dealt a crushing blow to the military power of Napoleonic France, but also played a decisive role in the liberation of a number of European states from French expansion, strengthened the liberation struggle of the Spanish people, etc. As a result of the Russian army in 1813 -14 and the liberation struggle of the peoples of Europe, the Napoleonic empire collapsed. The victory in the Patriotic War was at the same time used to strengthen autocracy both in the Russian Empire and in Europe. Alexander I headed the Holy Alliance created by European monarchs, whose activities were aimed at suppressing the revolutionary, republican and liberation movements in Europe. The Napoleonic army lost over 500 thousand people in Russia, all the cavalry and almost all the artillery (only the corps of J. MacDonald and K. Schwarzenberg survived); Russian troops - about 300 thousand people.
The Patriotic War of 1812 is distinguished by its large spatial scope, tension, and variety of strategic and tactical forms of armed struggle. The military art of Napoleon I, which surpassed that of all the armies of Europe at that time, collapsed in a clash with the Russian army. Russian strategy surpassed Napoleonic strategy, designed for a short-term campaign. M.I. Kutuzov skillfully used the popular nature of the war and, taking into account political and strategic factors, implemented his plan to fight the Napoleonic army. The experience of the Patriotic War contributed to the consolidation of column and loose formation tactics in the actions of troops, increasing the role of aimed fire, improving the interaction of infantry, cavalry and artillery; The form of organization of military formations - divisions and corps - was firmly established. The reserve became an integral part of the battle formation, and the role of artillery in battle increased.
The Patriotic War of 1812 occupies an important place in the history of Russia. She demonstrated the unity of all classes in the fight against foreigners. aggression, was the most important factor in the formation of Russian self-awareness. people. Under the influence of the victory over Napoleon I, the ideology of the Decembrists began to take shape. The experience of the war was summarized in the works of domestic and foreign military historians; the patriotism of the Russian people and army inspired the creativity of Russian writers, artists, and composers. The victory in the Patriotic War was associated with the construction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow and numerous churches throughout the Russian Empire; military trophies were kept in the Kazan Cathedral. The events of the Patriotic War are captured in numerous monuments on the Borodino field, in Maloyaroslavets and Tarutino, reflected in triumphal arches in Moscow and St. Petersburg, paintings of the Winter Palace, the panorama “Battle of Borodino” in Moscow, etc. A huge amount of memoir literature has been preserved about the Patriotic War.
Additional literature:
Akhsharumov D.I. Description of the War of 1812. St. Petersburg, 1819;
Buturlin D.P. The history of Emperor Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg, 1837-1838. Part 1-2;
Okunev N.A. Discourse on the great military actions, battles and battles that took place during the invasion of Russia in 1812. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg, 1841;
Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky A.I. Description of the Patriotic War of 1812. 3rd ed. St. Petersburg, 1843;
Bogdanovich M.I. History of the Patriotic War of 1812 according to reliable sources. St. Petersburg, 1859-1860. T. 1-3;
Patriotic War of 1812: Materials of the Military Scientific Archive. Dept. 1-2. St. Petersburg, 1900-1914. [Vol. 1-22];
Patriotic War and Russian society, 1812-1912. M., 1911-1912. T. 1-7;
Great Patriotic War: 1812 St. Petersburg, 1912;
Zhilin P.A. Counter-offensive of the Russian army in 1812. 2nd ed. M., 1953;
aka. The death of Napoleonic army in Russia. 2nd ed. M., 1974;
aka. Patriotic War of 1812. 3rd ed. M., 1988;
M.I. Kutuzov: [Documents and materials]. M., 1954-1955. T. 4. Parts 1-2;
1812: Sat. articles. M., 1962;
Babkin V.I. People's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812. M., 1962;
Beskrovny L.G. Patriotic War of 1812. M., 1962;
Korneychik E.I. The Belarusian people in the Patriotic War of 1812. Minsk, 1962;
Sirotkin V.G. Duel of two diplomacy: Russia and France in 1801-1812. M., 1966;
aka. Alexander the First and Napoleon: a duel on the eve of the war. M., 2012;
Tartakovsky A.G. 1812 and Russian memoirs: Experience in source study. M., 1980;
Abalikhin B.S., Dunaevsky V.A. 1812 at the crossroads of the opinions of Soviet historians, 1917-1987. M., 1990;
1812. Memoirs of soldiers of the Russian army: From the collection of the Department of Written Sources of the State Historical Museum. M., 1991;
Tarle E.V. Napoleon's invasion of Russia, 1812. M., 1992;
aka. 1812: El. works. M., 1994;
1812 in the memoirs of contemporaries. M., 1995;
Gulyaev Yu.N., Soglaev V.T. Field Marshal Kutuzov: [Historical and biographical sketch]. M., 1995;
Russian archive: History of the Fatherland in evidence and documents of the 18th-20th centuries. M., 1996. Issue. 7;
Kircheisen F. Napoleon I: In 2 vols. M., 1997;
Chandler D. Napoleon's military campaigns: The triumph and tragedy of the conqueror. M., 1999;
Sokolov O.V. Napoleon's army. St. Petersburg, 1999;
Shein I.A. The War of 1812 in Russian historiography. M., 2002.
Russian mythologists have always and everywhere pointed out that the war of 1812 against Russia was unleashed by Napoleon. Which is actually a lie!
The first war, which in Russia is called the Patriotic War, did not happen in 1941, as many people think. The first war to receive the status of "Patriotic" was the War of 1812.
First, let's figure it out what is "Patriotic War".
A patriotic war is a war when it comes to protecting the country - the fatherland. In the entire history of Russia there have been two such wars: 1812 and 1941.
Russia initiated all other wars itself and waged them on the territory of countries that it subsequently occupied.
Concerning war of 1812, then Russian mythologists always and everywhere pointed out that Napoleon unleashed it against Russia. Which is actually a lie!
In fact, it was the other way around!
To our surprise, it was Russian Emperor Alexander I who started the war with Napoleon, but let's talk about everything in order.
First, let's understand who Napoleon is?
Napoleon was elected and proclaimed Emperor of France by the will of the Senate on March 18, 1804!
I emphasize: Napoleon was elected by popular vote, almost unanimously; only 0.07% voted against his candidacy!
Moreover, on December 2, Napoleon was crowned by the Pope himself!
That is, Napoleon was both the people's favorite and the chosen one, possessing full legal and religious power.
Was Napoleon deservedly considered the leader of the nation?
More than yes! Napoleon was a great reformer, and it is to him that France owes such great transformations as:
The Civil Code, the "Napoleonic Code", by which all of Europe lives today
The French bank that saved France from inflation
Reform of all areas of management
Legal documents of property rights issued to all citizens
Dozens of highways
Improvement of all spheres of life
New administrative system
New system of universal education
He also introduced the Empire style into fashion. Developed a sane numbering system for houses divided into even and odd sides! He abolished internal customs duties, introduced local self-government in backward feudal countries, and abolished the Inquisition! And many many others!
Pushkin formulated the historical role of Napoleon as follows:
... "And he bequeathed to the world eternal freedom from the darkness of exile"!
Who was he Alexander, Tsar of Russia? And is it Russian? The parents of this “Russian soul and Orthodox Tsar Alexander” were: his father Pavel - son of the German Catherine II, nee: Sophia Augusta Frederika von Anhalt-Zerbst-Dornburg and the German Peter the Third, aka: Peter Karl Ulrich Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, mother Maria Feodorovna, maiden name: Sophia Maria Dorothea Augusta Louise von Württemberg.
Even Alexander's wife - Louise Maria Augusta of Baden, was “Russian” until she lost her pulse.
Alexander came to power as a result of a coup d'etat. A coup financed by an enemy state - Great Britain! In particular. It is reliably known that the money for preparing the coup was transferred by Ambassador Lord Whitworth through his mistress, socialite Zherebtsova, a relative of the Zubov conspirators.
Later, the Decembrist Nikita Muravyov wrote bluntly: “In 1801, a conspiracy led by Alexander deprives Paul of the throne and life without benefit for Russia.”
Alexander's achievements are phenomenal:
Drawing Russia into a bloody and useless military conflict,
Complete failure of reforms, Arakcheevshchina,
Causes of the war
In fact, Russia and France could not have, and did not have, any geopolitical, historical, or economic claims against each other.
Alexander I started a war against Napoleon, not even for ideological reasons, but solely based on mercantile considerations. Alexander was well paid for the war with France!
For every 100,000 Continental troops Great Britain paid Russia a huge sum of £1,250,000 or 8,000,000 rubles, which for Russia, incapable of effective economic development due to the slave-feudal regime, was salvation.
England, in turn, waged an active war against France both on land and at sea, and through agents provocateurs in Spain
Great Britain not only paid Russia for the deaths of its sons, but also:
sent 150,000 guns under Lend-Lease (write for nothing) (there was no weapons production in Russia)
sent military specialists
wrote off all Russian loans, including a huge Dutch loan of 87,000,000 guilders!
In many respects, if not entirely, all Russian victories both in the campaign of 1812 and in the foreign campaigns of 1813–1814 were won thanks to the timely supply of military materials: gunpowder, lead and guns, as well as direct British financial assistance.
Russia imported from England:
gunpowder - 1100 tons were imported between 1811 and 1813
lead - only in the summer of 1811, the British, under a special secret agreement, supplied 1000 tons of lead to Russia after a long break in such supplies due to the continental blockade.
This lead should have been enough for six Russian corps to conduct combat operations for several months.
It must be said that the supply of 1000 tons of lead in 1811 saved Russia from defeat in 1812.
In addition to all this, England actually paid for Russia's entire military campaign!
In 1812–1814, England provided Russia with subsidies totaling 165,000,000 rubles, which more than covered all military expenses.
Thus, according to the report of the Minister of Finance Kankrin, the Russian treasury spent 157,000,000 rubles on the war in 1812–1814. Hence the net “income” is 8,000,000 rubles!
And this is all without taking into account British “humanitarian” assistance.
Only for the restoration of burned Moscow:
the English merchants donated 200,000 pounds sterling to Russia, which is approximately 1.8 million rubles
private donations from the English society amounted to about 700,000 pounds, which is more than 6,000,000 rubles
War
In 1804, Alexander persuaded the Austrian Emperor to enter into a coalition with him, and already in 1805 he set out to intervene in France through Austria, but the French drove the Russian army from their borders, and then on December 2, 1805 they defeated the Russians and Austrians at Austerlitz.
The allied army under the overall command of General Kutuzov numbered about 85,000 people, of which 60,000 were the Russian army, the 25,000-strong Austrian army with 278 guns outnumbered Napoleon's army of 73,500 people.
For the first time since the time of Peter the Great, the Russian army lost a general battle, and the victorious fervor of the Russian emperor gave way to complete despair:
“The confusion that gripped the allied Olympus was so great that the entire retinue of Alexander I scattered in different directions and joined him only at night and even the next morning. In the very first hours after the disaster, the tsar rode several miles with only a doctor, a groom, a stable boy and two lifeguards. -hussars, and when the life hussar remained with him, the king, according to the hussar, got off his horse, sat down under a tree and began to cry.”
The shameful defeat did not stop Alexander, and already on November 30, 1806, Alexander announced the convocation of the militia, and he demanded no less than 612,000 people as recruits! The landowners were obliged to allocate peasants beyond the recruitment quota not in order to protect their huts and fields, but for a new campaign across Europe with another intervention in France because of the paranoid ambitions of the tsar!
Also in 1806, he convinced the Prussian king Frederick William III to once again unite in a coalition and declare war on France.
War was declared. Napoleon was again forced to defend his country. Thanks to his genius, the French emperor was able to defeat the outnumbered Prussian and Russian armies.
But this time Napoleon did not pursue the treacherous Russians!
He didn’t even cross the borders of Russia, and in vain! The country was absolutely not protected by anyone.
But Napoleon was not interested in victory over Russia, he pursued another goal - an alliance!
For this purpose, he equipped 6,732 soldiers and 130 generals and staff officers captured by the Russian army at the expense of the French treasury. The same ones that Suvorov brought. And on July 18, 1800, he sent them free of charge and without exchange home to their homeland.
Moreover, for the sake of an alliance with Russia, Napoleon did not demand indemnity in Tilsit from Russia, which he had twice defeated. Moreover, the Bialystok region was donated to Russia from his generosity! Napoleon did everything to stop Russian aggression.
How did Alexander behave?
The Orthodox Tsar behaved like a politician; during numerous dates in Tilsit, he kissed and hugged the “Antichrist” Napoleon, and then for five years he regularly wrote letters to him, beginning with the words: “Sovereign, my brother”…. Not forgetting to simultaneously send letters to his mother, Maria Feodorovna, whose maiden name was Sophia Maria Dorothea Augusta Louise von Württemberg, with the following content: “Tilsit is a temporary respite in order to gather an even larger army and start the war again!”
After the conclusion of peace, Alexander took an unprecedented step in meanness; only the next year he doubled spending on the military industry: from 63,400,000 rubles in 1807 to 118,500,000 rubles in 1808! After this, the military budget increased more than once, which gave Alexander the opportunity to deploy an even larger army in 1810.
In 1810, Alexander's armies had already deployed on the borders of the Duchy of Warsaw.
Intelligence reported to Napoleon about the unusual activity of the Russians, but he stubbornly refused to believe in Alexander’s treachery and did not listen to his advisers, who argued that he could not be trusted.
And all because Napoleon lived by logic: if an alliance is beneficial to both powers, then both powers will preserve it!
Moreover, to show his loyalty to Russia, the French commander began to withdraw his troops from German lands!
We must pay tribute to Alexander, again with British money, putting together a sixth anti-French coalition, and by mid-1811 he was persuading the Prussian and Swedish rulers to start a war with France!
On October 27 and 29, 1811, a series of “highest orders” were signed to the corps commanders, which ordered them to prepare for an operation right on the Vistula River!
But after the Emperor of Austria, with whom secret negotiations were held, did not enter the coalition, the King of Prussia left it, who refused to openly fight Napoleon and agreed only to the conditions that in the event of war they would not seriously act against Russia.
It must be said that his former marshal J.B. played against Napoleon. Bernadotte, who advised Alexander, in view of his inability to fight the French, to use space and climate.
On April 26, 1812, Napoleon was still in Paris, and Alexander was already prancing with the army in Vilna, having left St. Petersburg on the 20th.
Napoleon sent a parliamentarian with a proposal not to enter the war, Alexander did not agree.
The diplomatic declaration of war took place, and according to all the rules.
On June 16, 1812, the head of the French Foreign Ministry, the Duke de Bassano, certified a note on the cessation of diplomatic relations with Russia, officially notifying European governments of this.
On June 22, 1812, the French ambassador J. A. Lauriston informed the head of the Russian foreign policy department about the following: “My mission ended, since Prince A. B. Kurakin’s request to issue him passports meant a break, and his imperial and royal majesty from now on considers himself in a state of war with Russia."
In other words: Russia was the first to declare war on France, Napoleon accepted the challenge.
You can easily find a huge amount of indisputable evidence that Napoleon not only did not intend to cross the border, moreover, he was even preparing to defend against Alexander’s aggression, as he had done in all previous years.
Moreover, Napoleon did not declare war on Russia, and therefore Napoleon did not and could not have had any plans for either the capture or invasion of Russia.
And the French crossed the Neman only because they could no longer stand opposite each other and wait “by the sea for weather.” They couldn’t because such a repetition of standing on the Ugra did not play into the hands of France, which had Austria and Prussia in the rear, undecided about their position.
This change of position in his memoirs was quite interestingly outlined by the Polish general Desidery Khlapovsky:
“So late the march and the entire disposition of the troops clearly showed that Napoleon only wanted to intimidate Emperor Alexander.”
That is, the French military campaign of 1812 is a classic example of self-defense, and the whole genius of the plan collapsed solely due to poor intelligence.
Napoleon largely counted on the psychological effect that his advancing army would produce, but he simply was not ready for such a turn of events!
As soon as the French army went on the offensive, the “Orthodox Emperor”’s nerves gave way and he fled! And as soon as Alexander left the army, it began to retreat chaotically, if not to say “scrape”!
Napoleon simply could not even imagine that the Russians who attacked him, at the time of the outbreak of hostilities, had neither a strategic plan nor even a commander in chief!
The French were simply following on the heels, one cannot raise one’s hand to write about the retreating, fleeing Russian army! This is precisely what explains the fact why Napoleon did not go to the capital, to St. Petersburg.
Napoleon was a master of counterattack, he masterfully learned to fight off the aggressions coming against France one after another, in this he was an unsurpassed master.
That is why in 1805 Napoleon did not wait for the Russians and Austrians in Paris, but defeated the coalition aggressors in Austria!
That is why Napoleon did not expect Russians, Prussians, Swedes, British and Austrians in Paris in 1812!
At the same time, all this time Napoleon was building France! Carry out reforms that have never been equaled in importance by anyone else! He managed to make France a new, most advanced country in the world!
Napoleon did everything right. But he could not imagine the hellish, inhuman conditions in which the Russian people lived, he simply did not even mean that eternal hunger and endless poverty, and not frost, could save Russia!
Entering its territory, Napoleon was faced with the fact that he could not provide his soldiers with food, because he was not going to pull up the carts, thinking that he could buy food from the local peasants for money! It is to buy, and not to take away, since robbing peasants is a truly Russian - Moscow tradition.
So, on the territory of Russia, Napoleon was opposed not by the army or the weather, but by the poverty of the people, unable to feed even themselves!
Poverty in alliance with devastation became terrible enemies that stopped the most powerful army in the world at that time!
The unwillingness to understand that people in Russia live in bestial conditions has prevailed. Napoleon was forced to retreat. His troops were simply not ready to eat bark from trees, and what general (unlike the Russian ones) does not love his soldiers, whom, let me remind you, Napoleon knew by name!
So the myth about the victory of Russian weapons, about partisan resistance, about the fact that Russians can or know how to fight remains a myth. The Russians lost all the battles with Napoleon, and the root of their “strength” lies not at all in tactics or strategy, much less in the noble spirit of the Orthodox army, but in poverty, hunger, devastation and destroyed roads, which the French army did not encounter, lost Britain would have its most efficient servant.
For those who doubt the validity of my statements, I recommend listening to Evgeniy Ponasenkov, who told a lot of interesting things about Napoleon himself, and about the shameful war of 1812 for Russia.
Causes and nature of the war. The outbreak of the Patriotic War of 1812 was caused by Napoleon's desire for world domination. In Europe, only Russia and England maintained their independence. Despite the Treaty of Tilsit, Russia continued to oppose the expansion of Napoleonic aggression. Napoleon was especially irritated by her systematic violation of the continental blockade. Since 1810, both sides, realizing the inevitability of a new clash, were preparing for war. Napoleon flooded the Duchy of Warsaw with his troops and created military warehouses there. The threat of invasion looms over Russia's borders. In turn, the Russian government increased the number of troops in the western provinces.
Napoleon became the aggressor. He began military operations and invaded Russian territory. In this regard, for the Russian people the war became a liberation and Patriotic war, since not only the regular army, but also the broad masses of the people took part in it.
Correlation of forces. In preparation for the war against Russia, Napoleon gathered a significant army - up to 678 thousand soldiers. These were perfectly armed and trained troops, seasoned in previous wars. They were led by a galaxy of brilliant marshals and generals - L. Davout, L. Berthier, M. Ney, I. Murat and others. They were commanded by the most famous commander of that time - Napoleon Bonaparte. The weak point of his army was its motley national composition. The aggressive plans of the French emperor were deeply alien to the German and Spanish, Polish and Portuguese, Austrian and Italian soldiers.
Active preparations for the war that Russia had been waging since 1810 brought results. She managed to create modern armed forces for that time, powerful artillery, which, as it turned out during the war, was superior to the French. The troops were led by talented military leaders - M. I. Kutuzov, M. B. Barclay de Tolly, P. I. Bagration, A. P. Ermolov, N. N. Raevsky, M. A. Miloradovich and others. They were distinguished by extensive military experience and personal courage. The advantage of the Russian army was determined by the patriotic enthusiasm of all segments of the population, large human resources, food and fodder reserves.
However, at the initial stage of the war, the French army outnumbered the Russian one. The first echelon of troops that entered Russia numbered 450 thousand people, while the Russians on the western border were about 210 thousand people, divided into three armies. The 1st - under the command of M.B. Barclay de Tolly - covered the St. Petersburg direction, the 2nd - led by P.I. Bagration - defended the center of Russia, the 3rd - under General A.P. Tormasov - was located in the southern direction .
Plans of the parties. Napoleon planned to seize a significant part of Russian territory up to Moscow and sign a new treaty with Alexander to subjugate Russia. Napoleon's strategic plan was based on his military experience acquired during the wars in Europe. He intended to prevent the dispersed Russian forces from uniting and deciding the outcome of the war in one or more border battles.
Even on the eve of the war, the Russian emperor and his entourage decided not to make any compromises with Napoleon. If the clash was successful, they intended to transfer hostilities to the territory of Western Europe. In case of defeat, Alexander was ready to retreat to Siberia (all the way to Kamchatka, according to him) to continue the fight from there. Russia had several strategic military plans. One of them was developed by the Prussian General Fuhl. It provided for the concentration of most of the Russian army in a fortified camp near the city of Drissa on the Western Dvina. According to Fuhl, this gave an advantage in the first border battle. The project remained unrealized, since the position on Drissa was unfavorable and the fortifications were weak. In addition, the balance of forces forced the Russian command to initially choose a strategy of active defense. As the course of the war showed, this was the most correct decision.
Stages of war. The history of the Patriotic War of 1812 is divided into two stages. First: from June 12 to mid-October - the retreat of the Russian army with rearguard battles in order to lure the enemy deep into Russian territory and disrupt his strategic plan. Second: from mid-October to December 25 - a counter-offensive of the Russian army with the goal of completely expelling the enemy from Russia.
The beginning of the war. On the morning of June 12, 1812, French troops crossed the Neman and invaded Russia by forced march.
The 1st and 2nd Russian armies retreated, avoiding a general battle. They fought stubborn rearguard battles with individual units of the French, exhausting and weakening the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him.
Two main tasks faced the Russian troops - to eliminate disunity (not allow themselves to be defeated one by one) and to establish unity of command in the army. The first task was solved on July 22, when the 1st and 2nd armies united near Smolensk. Thus, Napoleon's original plan was thwarted. On August 8, Alexander appointed M.I. Kutuzov Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. This meant solving the second problem. M.I. Kutuzov took command of the combined Russian forces on August 17. He did not change his retreat tactics. However, the army and the whole country expected a decisive battle from him. Therefore, he gave the order to look for a position for a general battle. She was found near the village of Borodino, 124 km from Moscow.
battle of Borodino. M.I. Kutuzov chose defensive tactics and deployed his troops in accordance with this. The left flank was defended by the army of P.I. Bagration, covered by artificial earthen fortifications - flushes. In the center there was an earthen mound where the artillery and troops of General N.N. Raevsky were located. The army of M.B. Barclay de Tolly was on the right flank.
Napoleon adhered to offensive tactics. He intended to break through the defenses of the Russian army on the flanks, encircle it and completely defeat it.
The balance of forces was almost equal: the French had 130 thousand people with 587 guns, the Russians had 110 thousand regular forces, about 40 thousand militias and Cossacks with 640 guns.
Early in the morning of August 26, the French launched an offensive on the left flank. The fight for flushes lasted until 12 noon. Both sides suffered huge losses. General P.I. Bagration was seriously wounded. (He died from his wounds a few days later.) Taking the flushes did not bring any particular advantages to the French, since they were unable to break through the left flank. The Russians retreated in an orderly manner and took up a position near the Semenovsky ravine.
At the same time, the situation in the center, where Napoleon directed the main attack, became more complicated. To help the troops of General N.N. Raevsky, M.I. Kutuzov ordered the Cossacks of M.I. Platov and the cavalry corps of F.P. Uvarov to carry out a raid behind French lines. The sabotage, which was not very successful in itself, forced Napoleon to interrupt the assault on the battery for almost 2 hours. This allowed M.I. Kutuzov to bring fresh forces to the center. The battery of N.N. Raevsky changed hands several times and was captured by the French only at 16:00.
The capture of Russian fortifications did not mean Napoleon's victory. On the contrary, the offensive impulse of the French army dried up. She needed fresh forces, but Napoleon did not dare to use his last reserve - the imperial guard. The battle, which lasted more than 12 hours, gradually subsided. The losses on both sides were enormous. Borodino was a moral and political victory for the Russians: the combat potential of the Russian army was preserved, while Napoleonic's was significantly weakened. Far from France, in the vast Russian expanses, it was difficult to restore it.
From Moscow to Maloyaroslavets. After Borodino, Russian troops began to retreat to Moscow. Napoleon followed, but did not strive for a new battle. On September 1, a military council of the Russian command took place in the village of Fili. M.I. Kutuzov, contrary to the general opinion of the generals, decided to leave Moscow. The French army entered it on September 2, 1812.
M.I. Kutuzov, withdrawing troops from Moscow, carried out an original plan - the Tarutino march-maneuver. Retreating from Moscow along the Ryazan road, the army turned sharply to the south and in the Krasnaya Pakhra area reached the old Kaluga road. This maneuver, firstly, prevented the French from seizing the Kaluga and Tula provinces, where ammunition and food were collected. Secondly, M.I. Kutuzov managed to break away from Napoleon’s army. He set up a camp in Tarutino, where the Russian troops rested and were replenished with fresh regular units, militia, weapons and food supplies.
The occupation of Moscow did not benefit Napoleon. Abandoned by the inhabitants (an unprecedented case in history), it burned in the fire. There was no food or other supplies in it. The French army was completely demoralized and turned into a bunch of robbers and marauders. Its decomposition was so strong that Napoleon had only two options - either immediately make peace or begin a retreat. But all the peace proposals of the French emperor were unconditionally rejected by M. I. Kutuzov and Alexander I.
On October 7, the French left Moscow. Napoleon still hoped to defeat the Russians or at least break into the unravaged southern regions, since the issue of providing the army with food and fodder was very acute. He moved his troops to Kaluga. On October 12, another bloody battle took place near the town of Maloyaroslavets. Once again, neither side achieved a decisive victory. However, the French were stopped and forced to retreat along the Smolensk road they had destroyed.
Expulsion of Napoleon from Russia. The retreat of the French army looked like a disorderly flight. It was accelerated by the unfolding partisan movement and the offensive actions of the Russians.
The patriotic upsurge began literally immediately after Napoleon entered Russia. Robbery and looting French. The Russian soldiers provoked resistance from local residents. But this was not the main thing - the Russian people could not put up with the presence of invaders on their native land. History includes the names of ordinary people (G. M. Kurin, E. V. Chetvertakov, V. Kozhina) who organized partisan detachments. “Flying detachments” of regular army soldiers led by career officers (A.S. Figner, D.V. Davydov, A.N. Seslavin, etc.) were also sent to the French rear.
At the final stage of the war, M.I. Kutuzov chose the tactics of parallel pursuit. He took care of every Russian soldier and understood that the enemy’s forces were melting every day. The final defeat of Napoleon was planned near the city of Borisov. For this purpose, troops were brought up from the south and north-west. Serious damage was inflicted on the French near the city of Krasny in early November, when more than half of the 50 thousand people of the retreating army were captured or died in battle. Fearing encirclement, Napoleon hastened to transport his troops across the Berezina River on November 14-17. The battle at the crossing completed the defeat of the French army. Napoleon abandoned her and secretly left for Paris. M.I. Kutuzov’s order to the army of December 21 and the Tsar’s Manifesto of December 25, 1812 marked the end of the Patriotic War.
The meaning of war. The Patriotic War of 1812 is the greatest event in Russian history. During its course, heroism, courage, patriotism and selfless love of all layers of society and especially ordinary people for their Motherland were clearly demonstrated. However, the war caused significant damage to the Russian economy, which was estimated at 1 billion rubles. During the hostilities, about 300 thousand people died. Many western regions were devastated. All this had a huge impact on the further internal development of Russia.
46. Internal policy of Russia 1812 – 1825. Decembrist movement
The fire of European wars increasingly engulfed Europe. At the beginning of the 19th century, Russia was also involved in this struggle. The result of this intervention was the unsuccessful foreign wars with Napoleon and the Patriotic War of 1812.
Causes of the war
After the defeat of the Fourth Anti-French Coalition by Napoleon on June 25, 1807, the Treaty of Tilsit was concluded between France and Russia. The conclusion of peace forced Russia to join the participants in the continental blockade of England. However, neither country was going to comply with the terms of the treaty.
The main causes of the War of 1812:
- The Peace of Tilsit was economically unprofitable for Russia, so the government of Alexander I decided to trade with England through neutral countries.
- The policy pursued by Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte towards Prussia was to the detriment of Russian interests; French troops concentrated on the border with Russia, also contrary to the provisions of the Tilsit Treaty.
- After Alexander I did not agree to give his consent to the marriage of his sister Anna Pavlovna with Napoleon, relations between Russia and France deteriorated sharply.
At the end of 1811, the bulk of the Russian army was deployed against the war with Turkey. By May 1812, thanks to the genius of M.I. Kutuzov, the military conflict was resolved. Türkiye curtailed its military expansion in the East, and Serbia gained independence.
Beginning of the war
By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War of 1812-1814, Napoleon managed to concentrate up to 645 thousand troops on the border with Russia. His army included Prussian, Spanish, Italian, Dutch and Polish units.
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The Russian troops, despite all the objections of the generals, were divided into three armies and located far from each other. The first army under the command of Barclay de Tolly numbered 127 thousand people, the second army, led by Bagration, had 49 thousand bayonets and sabers. And finally, in the third army of General Tormasov, there were about 45 thousand soldiers.
Napoleon decided to immediately take advantage of the mistake of the Russian emperor, namely, with a sudden blow to defeat the two main armies of Barclay de Toll and Bagration in border battles, preventing them from uniting and moving at an accelerated march to defenseless Moscow.
At five in the morning on June 12, 1821, the French army (about 647 thousand) began to cross the Russian border.
Rice. 1. Crossing of Napoleonic troops across the Neman.
The numerical superiority of the French army allowed Napoleon to immediately take the military initiative into his own hands. The Russian army did not yet have universal conscription and the army was replenished using outdated recruitment kits. Alexander I, who was in Polotsk, issued a Manifesto on July 6, 1812 calling for the collection of a general people's militia. As a result of the timely implementation of such internal policy by Alexander I, different layers of the Russian population began to rapidly flock to the ranks of the militia. Nobles were allowed to arm their serfs and join the ranks of the regular army with them. The war immediately began to be called “Patriotic”. The manifesto also regulated the partisan movement.
Progress of military operations. Main events
The strategic situation required the immediate merging of the two Russian armies into a single whole under a common command. Napoleon’s task was the opposite - to prevent Russian forces from uniting and to defeat them as quickly as possible in two or three border battles.
The following table shows the course of the main chronological events of the Patriotic War of 1812:
| date | Event | Content |
| June 12, 1812 | Invasion of Napoleon's troops into the Russian Empire |
|
| June 27-28, 1812 | Clashes near the town of Mir |
|
| July 11, 1812 | Battle of Saltanovka |
|
| July 25-28, 1812 | Battle near Vitebsk |
|
| July 27, 1812 | Battle of Kovrin |
|
| July 29-August 1, 1812 | Battle of Klyastitsy |
|
| August 16-18, 1812 | Battle for Smolensk |
|
| August 18, 1812 | Kutuzov arrived in the village of Tsarevo-Zaimishche |
|
| August 19, 1812 | Battle at Valutina Mountain |
|
| August 24-26 | battle of Borodino |
|
| September 13, 1812 | Council in Fili |
|
| September 14-October 20, 1812 | Occupation of Moscow by the French |
|
| October 18, 1812 | Tarutino fight |
|
| October 24, 1812 | Battle of Maloyaroslavets |
|
| November 9, 1812 | Battle of Lyakhov |
|
| November 15, 1812 | Battle of Krasny |
|
| November 26-29, 1812 | Crossing at the Berezina |
|
Rice. 2. Crossing of French troops across the Berezina. Januariy Zlatopolsky...
Napoleon's invasion caused enormous damage to the Russian Empire - many cities were burned, tens of thousands of villages were reduced to ashes. But a common misfortune brings people together. An unprecedented scale of patriotism united the central provinces; tens of thousands of peasants signed up for the militia, went into the forest, becoming partisans. Not only men, but also women fought the French, one of them was Vasilisa Kozhina.
The defeat of France and the results of the War of 1812
After the victory over Napoleon, Russia continued to liberate European countries from the yoke of the French invaders. In 1813, a military alliance was concluded between Prussia and Russia. The first stage of the foreign campaigns of Russian troops against Napoleon ended in failure due to the sudden death of Kutuzov and the lack of coordination in the actions of the allies.
- However, France was extremely exhausted by continuous wars and asked for peace. However, Napoleon lost the fight on the diplomatic front. Another coalition of powers grew up against France: Russia, Prussia, England, Austria and Sweden.
- In October 1813, the famous Battle of Leipzig took place. At the beginning of 1814, Russian troops and allies entered PARIS. Napoleon was deposed and at the beginning of 1814 exiled to the island of Elba.
Rice. 3. Entry of Russian and allied troops into Paris. HELL. Kivshenko.
- In 1814, a Congress was held in Vienna, where the victorious countries discussed questions about the post-war structure of Europe.
- In June 1815, Napoleon fled the island of Elba and retook the French throne, but after just 100 days of rule, the French were defeated at the Battle of Waterloo. Napoleon was exiled to Saint Helena.
Summing up the results of the Patriotic War of 1812, it should be noted that the influence it had on the leading people of Russian society was limitless. Many great works were written by great writers and poets based on this war. The post-war peace was short-lived, although the Congress of Vienna gave Europe several years of peace. Russia acted as the savior of occupied Europe, but Western historians tend to underestimate the historical significance of the Patriotic War.
What have we learned?
The beginning of the 19th century in the history of Russia, studied in grade 4, was marked by a bloody war with Napoleon. A detailed report and table “Patriotic War of 1812” tells briefly about the Patriotic War of 1812, what the nature of this war was, the main periods of military operations.
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