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This year, the third updated edition of the book about the brave soldiers of the foot reconnaissance platoon G.G. Shubin. We bring to your attention several fragments of the book. You can download the complete book from this link.
Foot reconnaissance platoon
V.N. Alekseev, N.G. Shubin
Foreword
This work is a continuation of the book "Shubin's Top", dedicated to the life path of G.G. Shubin (1912–1973), commander of a foot reconnaissance platoon of the 348th Infantry Regiment of the 51st Infantry Division. The second half of his life was closely intertwined with the Great Patriotic War: first through military operations, then through front-line fellow soldiers, communication with whom did not stop until the death of Georgy Georgievich.
Write about G.G. It was relatively easy for Shubina, since numerous photographs, newspaper clippings, and letters from friends were carefully preserved in his family. The writer V.M., who knew the scout closely. Peskov published some of his memoirs in his book War and People. Finally, many facts from the life of Georgy Georgievich, his stories, memories of fighting friends and comrades are still remembered by his daughter, Nadezhda Georgievna Shubina.
Naturally, many other scouts of the 348th Infantry Regiment were mentioned in the book "Shubin's Top". But since it was about G.G. Shubin, his comrades, indeed, were only mentioned: some with more details, others with less. And there was very little information about them: often only names and surnames. Meanwhile, as the work progressed, interest in these reconnaissance heroes of the war grew more and more and eventually gave rise to a new feeling - to pay tribute to these soldiers of the Great Patriotic War - the entire foot reconnaissance platoon.
All of the above determined the main goal of the book. She is dedicated not so much the events of the Great Patriotic War, but the people of this war. The 1418 days of the war were filled with so many battles and operations that even the main ones can hardly fit into the most extensive military encyclopedias. Under these conditions, the soldiers themselves have to be mentioned only by listing their surnames and initials, and in this case, we are talking mainly about marshals and generals.
We wanted to use the example of just one platoon to mention as many names and patronymics as possible, dates and places of birth, to find at least a few, at least “insignificant” information about the life of each soldier. Strictly speaking, only in this case do we get the moral right to pronounce an extremely lofty and responsible thought. "No one is forgotten!"
The idea to write about heroes-scouts was born after the publication of the second edition of the book "Shubin's Top" and a trip to the Belarusian city of Polotsk on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of its liberation from the Nazis. It was on the Polotsk and Vitebsk lands that the soldiers of the 348th Infantry Regiment fought. It is no coincidence that in 2014 the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Polotsk began with the presentation of this book.
With each passing day, the desire to keep in memory the names of scouts intensified and gradually began to be perceived as a moral duty. We must pray for all those who have ever defended our Fatherland, and if God sent an opportunity to do something else in their memory - say, put up a monument, find a grave, tell contemporaries about them - then this should be taken as a moral duty. And we must fulfill this duty with all our strength.
Collecting information about people who lived many years ago, and even whose children have already retired, is very difficult. It is almost useless to look for the houses where they lived: the former neighbors are gone, and those who remain remember surprisingly little. It is almost unbelievable to find military tickets, work books, letters, awards, photographs. Some of them are just first and last names. No patronymic, no year of birth. With such initial data, no archive can help.
Sometimes you have to look through the files of 500-600 people with the same last name, but you still can't find the one you are looking for. For example, when searching for a Red Army soldier, about whom only the fact that he is “Shurik Andreev” is known, one will have to look through hundreds of Alexandrov Andreevs with patronymics Antonovich, Aleksandrovich, Alekseevich, Anatolyevich, Artemyevich, Arsenyevich, and so on until the end of the alphabet, that is, until Yakovlevich. But even such a multi-day work does not promise that the right name will be found. After all, the year of his birth is not known, therefore, you will have to look at the Andreevs born in 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925. The probability of success is less than when looking for a needle in a haystack. At least it should exist. The required document is not required.
It should be noted that archival documents sometimes contain erroneous information. Many fighters who were not found after the battle at the next verification were included in the lists of the missing, although they could be sent to the medical battalion right at the time of the battle or be wounded and captured. In addition, errors often occur when indicating a patronymic, surname, place of birth of a person. We have to spend additional time in order to at least indirectly find out what the name of the Ossetian Grigory could be: Sakhiev, Sakheev or Sakhnov. Or, for example, three out of four award sheets for Shubin G.G. in the line “whether he has wounds” they report completely different information about the time of the wound: September 3, October 3, November 3, 1941, and in the fourth it says: “has no wounds”.
An even greater difficulty is to write about the war to someone who did not fight. After all, the war is so terrible that only eyewitnesses can imagine it. Those who saw how an explosion tears a person apart, or those who, day after day, for months and years, waking up in the morning, did not know if he would live until noon. There was only one thing left: to include in the text, as necessary, the memoirs of former front-line soldiers, their letters. In this way, one can at least partly avoid turning the narrative into a mere list of dry facts.
The work covers mainly 1943-1944, when the 51st Rifle Division fought in Belarus: in Gorodok, Sirotinsky (now Shumilinsky), Polotsk, Braslav regions. It was during this period that most of the scouts mentioned in the book served in the foot reconnaissance platoon of the 348th Infantry Regiment. But in wartime, it is extremely difficult to talk about the staffing of the unit: today the regiment is in full force, and two days later less than half of it remained. In addition, the best intelligence officers were promoted in rank, transferred to the 30th Separate Divisional Intelligence Company. New teams were formed, but the experience and traditions of the "old men" remained, and in this respect the foot reconnaissance platoon continued to exist.
Two decades after the Victory, the former commander of the 51st Infantry Division, Major General A.Ya. Khvostov wrote to G.G. Shubin:
“Write your short autobiography. Where you were born, your youth, service in the Army and what you are doing now... It would be nice to compile one or two characteristic episodes from your wonderful intelligence service. It would also not hurt to write something characteristic of capturing the language on your worthy comrades ... it would be nice to have photographs of these comrades. And other pictures of the Patriotic War concerning the 51st division.
The same request by A.Ya. Khvostov handed over to two more veterans of his division: the commander of the 23rd Infantry Regiment, M.M. Lopatin and the commander of the 7th company of the 23rd infantry regiment, Lieutenant V.N. Yuzikov.
Even then it was clear how quickly the front-line soldiers pass away, how war memories are erased from the memory. But not everyone can write about themselves and not everyone will find time for this. The scout G.I. tried to fulfill the wish of the former division commander. Nikishin, but the case was limited to only a few newspaper essays. It could hardly have been otherwise in the absence of specialized literature, the possibility of using archives, and sometimes even a typewriter.
We must not forget about human modesty: in peacetime it was not customary to boast of one's heroism. Although the former soldiers of the Great War still wore tunics or breeches, they no longer wore orders and medals: they lay in boxes or children played with them.
As a result, there is a relative paucity of books devoted to army intelligence officers and containing their memories and names. Of the total mass of printed works on the history of Soviet intelligence during the Great Patriotic War, according to our estimates, hardly 10 percent is devoted to regimental or divisional intelligence officers.
For sympathy and help in finding materials, the authors express their gratitude to the director of the Polotsk Museum of Local Lore Irina Petrovna Vodneva, the researchers of the Polotsk Museum of Military Glory, as well as Berta Andreevna Antonova, Zinaida Vladimirovna Blinova (Milichenko), Lyudmila Vladimirovna Surovtseva (Milichenko), O.Sh. Sokolova (Gezina), Evgenia and Georgy Pchelkin, director of the Markov secondary school in the Petushinsky district of the Vladimir region. Yuri Alexandrovich Karpunin, head of the village. Belozersky, Voskresensky district, Moscow region Vladimir Yuryevich Kuznetsov, Chairman of the Council of Veterans of the village. Belozersky Anatoly Vasilyevich Lugovoi, the search engine of the heroes of the Second World War Alekseev Evgeny Vladimirovich (the village of Leonovo, Vladimir region), the director of the Leninogorsk Centralized Library System Khairullina Landysh Khatifovna (Leninogorsk, the Republic of Tatarstan), local historians A.L. Bychkov and F.A. Onoprienko (Shumilinsky district, Vitebsk region), I.N. Vashkel (a researcher at the local history museum in Braslav, Vitebsk region, Belarus).
The authors received special moral support from Nikolai Glebovich Pankrat, the founder of the Polotsk Museum “The Good of the Fatherland is Our Good”, on whose initiative and at whose expense a memorial plaque with the names of scouts of the 348th rifle regiment was installed in the Shumilinsky district of the Vitebsk region.
Military intelligence
War is unthinkable without intelligence. After all, the number of the enemy is great, he can have many fortifications, military bases, communications. Everything is in constant motion, something, on the contrary, is disguised, but it is difficult to see it even from an airplane. Reliable information can only be obtained by obtaining maps or documents, asking for "language" or receiving a message from an observer sent to the location of the enemy. That is, from a scout.
Troop ground reconnaissance differed in terms of service branches and subunits (combined arms, engineering, artillery, battalion, regimental, divisional), types of movement (foot, horseback, motorized) and in their goals.
The main tasks of foot scouts at all times remained unchanged: informing the command about the location of the enemy, his weapons and numbers. And the main means of accomplishing these tasks was the capture of prisoners (“tongues”) or obtaining documents. Sometimes, especially during offensive battles, such a task was set almost daily. At other times, scouts could monitor the enemy's forward line, destroy his snipers, and distract the enemy from their main forces through deceptive attacks. Finally, scouts could also be involved in direct combat operations when other forces were lacking. Then the scouts became infantry.
As a rule, battalion and regimental scouts went only to the front line of the enemy. Such sorties usually managed to be done during the night or one day. Divisional scouts could go not only to the front line, but deep into the enemy’s location, spending several days on this and moving several kilometers away from the front line. There were also military scouts who spoke German well, who, in enemy uniforms, carried out multi-day raids on the rear of the Nazis. This was practiced in times of "calm", when the front line did not change for months.
The main difference between the intelligence service was its independence in the performance of a combat mission. Leaving the location of their units, for a certain time (sometimes for several days) they had to rely only on their own decisions, act depending on the situation, their own ingenuity and experience. Now, not from the team of commanders, but from them, both the success of the case and their own lives depended. From the outside, it might seem that intelligence lives on its own. But this “in itself” was akin to the “freedom” of a tightrope walker under a circus dome.
Of course, having been in the trenches of the enemy and returning in the mud from a night mission (which was kept secret), the scouts could sleep all day, start a laundry or a bath. The scouts had good uniforms, were well armed (besides machine guns, they had pistols, knives, grenades) and could even have their own kitchen. Therefore, in the eyes of the infantry, they could look like "white people" who were showered with awards from the sky. And few people imagined how difficult it is to enter the location of the Germans, to capture an armed enemy who is in combat service and surrounded by other similar soldiers, and even deliver him alive across the front line when a commotion arose in the enemy camp.
There were no special schools or training schools for regimental and divisional scouts in the reserve regiments. This does not mean that intelligence officers were not trained in the USSR. Even before the start of the war, the Central School for the Training of Headquarters Commanders for Undercover Work existed in the country. Immediately after the declaration of war, this school was reorganized, and it received a different name: first, the Central Intelligence School, and from February 1942, the Central Intelligence School of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). In addition, special intelligence courses of the 2nd division (undercover intelligence) worked. The GRU was faced with the task of preparing sabotage and reconnaissance groups, radio operators and residents to be thrown behind enemy lines into the occupied territories of the USSR. But such schools did not prepare regimental and divisional scouts.
How did a person get into intelligence? Of course, everyone had their own story, but most chose this path quite consciously and by their own decision. True, the real awareness of the danger of the service of a scout came later, but one desire to become a scout was of great importance.
Most often, newcomers to the front were lined up and asked: "Anyone who want to go into reconnaissance?" Here, for example, how cadet G.I. Nikishin, future scout of the 348th Infantry Regiment:
“We were lined up one by one. A major, a captain, and two lieutenants walked slowly along the line, like buyers along a market row.
- Who wants to explore, two steps forward! the captain commanded.
Such a command was unexpected for us, and therefore for some time the line froze. Then, as if someone had pushed us from behind, all one hundred and fifty people took two steps forward.
This caused an approving smile from the officers standing in front of the formation.
- Who smokes, five steps forward! ..
A good half of the formation counted five steps.
- Close ranks!
The line of smokers turned to face us. The major and the captain remained near us, and the lieutenants went to the Kuryak.
- Comrade cadets, - the captain turned to us (as we later found out, it was the commander of a reconnaissance company), - reconnaissance is a dangerous thing, you often have to risk your life here. A scout must be not only brave, but also strong, hardy, and most importantly, cunning and savvy. We do not take smokers into reconnaissance. Whoever feels that he will not succeed, let him fail now.
... During the rewriting, Pashka Brzhestovsky, a temperamental Muscovite, the most cheerful guy in our company, got out of order.
- Comrade Captain, I also want to become a scout.
- Yes, you are a smoker.
“I’m only playing around, not really.
Pashka took out a beautifully embroidered pouch stuffed with shag from the pocket of his greatcoat, poured the shag into the snow and trampled it along with the pouch...
- That's all. I won't put it in my mouth again. I give my word as a Komsomol member.
Brzhestovsky was allowed to stand in our line. Several people followed suit.
By lunchtime, the reconnaissance company was pre-equipped. There was still a thorough documentary check and another check unknown to anyone.
The remaining part of the cadets after staffing went to the rifle battalion.
Commander of the 51st Rifle Division, Major General A.Ya. Khvostov recalled: “When replenishment came to the unit, the intelligence commander was given the right to be the first to choose people. To the question "Who wants to explore?" out of a thousand, a hundred people took a step forward. They were spoken to and left ten. Out of ten, two became scouts. Most often they were hunters who knew how to walk silently, track down, shoot well.
Enlisted in the staff of young intelligence officers, of course, were checked by employees of the "special bodies" of the NKVD - "special officers". This was the name of the employees of the military counterintelligence of the NKVD, which from April 1943 became known as the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" ("Death to spies!"). From the subordination of the NKVD, the special officers passed into the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. Their military ranks were stripped of the "state security" prefix: GB major or GB captain became just a major or captain.
The supervision of the “specialists” continued throughout the war, since the heroic and brave scouts regularly went to the territory of the enemy, which means in theory had many opportunities to surrender and report the most valuable information known only to the scout.
Very rarely, but such cases really happened. In practice, scouts preferred death to captivity more than others. There was an obligatory rule: when leaving on a mission, hand over to the foreman or leave parts of the award, documents, letters and photographs in the location. Instead, they took grenades in order to undermine themselves in an extreme situation. In addition, the scouts had their own "law of friendship": not only the wounded, but also the dead should not be left to the enemy, but carried away with them at all costs. It was also important for the report to the command, otherwise the killed intelligence officer could be considered to have defected to the enemy, and calls to the "special officers" began.
This is exactly what happened with the divisional scouts of the 51st Infantry Division. On August 26, 1944, during a raid behind enemy lines, Alexei Pochernin was seriously wounded. He had no strength left to move and fighting friends Kolya Antonov and Grisha Nikishin carried him to the location of the unit.
Most of the front-line scouts got to the front immediately after graduating from school and short-term training in courses or in reserve regiments. In 1943–1944 in the award documents of these young people, as a rule, the same year of birth - 1924 - was indicated. There were also those born in 1923 (those who were called up in 1942), and by the end of the war, those born in 1925. Whether this was the result of an unspoken instruction to take only the youngest in intelligence, we do not know. But 18-19 year old guys, of course, were distinguished by dexterity, good health, and youthful fearlessness. Yes, and their short biographies - born, graduated from school, was drafted into the army - did not cause unnecessary questions from the "special officers". The only thing that such warriors lacked was military experience. Therefore, in each unit there were experienced "old men" - junior or senior commanders 10-15 years older than the recruits. To these "old men" the youth became indebted not only to the acquired intelligence skills, but also to life itself.
Scouts of the 348th Infantry Regiment. Third from the right - N.T.Antonov
On rest days, young scouts under the guidance of squad or platoon commanders were trained. They were taught to crawl under wire fences, overcome natural and artificial obstacles, navigate in the dark and on a topographic map. Training sessions were organized to remove the sentry, capture a prisoner, throw grenades at a machine-gun nest.
The life of any team is primarily determined by the relationships of its members. In the army, this is doubly important, because in war conditions people are next to each other every day, every hour and even every minute, which means they must be able to endure the character and habits of their neighbors. Moreover, they can even become related to a certain extent, since they are connected by the bonds of life itself: they can both die together and survive together. No wonder there is an expression "combat brotherhood". In those cases when such a brotherhood arises, it is easier to fight and even die, and after the war one wants to continue to live together.
The internal life of intelligence units had its own characteristics. Under paternally kind commanders of platoons or companies, people did not die in vain, they took care of each other, and they completed their tasks successfully. But it happened that the commanders themselves did not go on reconnaissance, and when their scouts returned without a "language", they accused their subordinates of inability, cowardice, that they simply lay in bed in a neutral zone. From here there was one step to accusation of treason.
Cases are described when commanders, in a rage, shot their own scouts on the spot because they did not give them the opportunity to report to the higher authorities: "The task was completed." And some "headquarters" disclosed to the scouts the reasons for their combat awards: "Your exploits are our names." Fortunately, other commanders treated their subordinates in a paternal way, for which they received affectionate nicknames "Dad".
Grigory Nikishin, a reconnaissance officer of the 51st Infantry Division, spoke kindly of such a commander - the head of intelligence: “The Nazis dropped heaps of leaflets from planes. Such a piece of paper, heavily flavored with anti-Sovietism, served as a pass for surrender, which Goebbels' henchmen counted heavily on. Therefore, the “specialists” carefully monitored that fascist leaflets, upon their discovery, were immediately destroyed or handed over to special departments. Those who were found with a leaflet-pass to captivity were dealt with mercilessly, shot on the spot.
A group of scouts found a whole bunch of German leaflets in a clearing in the forest. Who came up with the dangerous idea remained unknown, but the scouts, having fun from the bottom of their hearts, began to stumble on the branches from which the foliage had already flown, the “gifts” of Goebbels and Goering, and then they sat in a circle in this clearing and refueled with dry rations.
This incident became known to the authorities. The head of intelligence called the group commander.
- With this stupidity they called trouble on their own heads, the "specialists" demanded a list, they "sew" the case, they brought it to the tribunal. I don't want to lose you, so let's do it. I order you to take dry rations for five days, go into neutral and hide so that no one can spot you, either from the German or from our side. In five days, let us know about yourself, send a person.
The intelligence chief calculated accurately and saved the desperate guys. Five days later, our offensive began, the scouts went ahead of the infantry, they can no longer be reached with their bare hand ... So dashing and fearless guys survived ... ".
In general, the scouts were respected by both other soldiers and superiors. In the eyes of the first, the scout was a brave warrior, who perfectly mastered any weapon and fighting techniques. Far from everyone dared to threaten or raise a hand against him, especially since his comrades always stood behind the scout. The authorities also understood that the intelligence officer could always fight back, and there was nothing to frighten him with. The offenders from intelligence were not sent to penal companies; on the contrary, intelligence was often replenished at the expense of penal fighters.
Left to right: G.B. Sahakyan, A.Ya. Khvostov, G.G. Shubin. Spring 1944
Military conditions prompted a variety of methods for conducting regimental and divisional reconnaissance. The most bloody of them was reconnaissance in battle, that is, a "false attack" in order to force the enemy to declassify their firing points and general location. To do this, they used a company or battalion under the cover of artillery or mortars. The scouts, on the other hand, should have spotted machine-gun points, pillboxes, mortar positions and everything else that could be useful for command. Losses during reconnaissance in battle were large, which is why the expression "reconnaissance by death" existed.
Other methods of reconnaissance were much more successful, although they required more time: observation of the enemy's front line, eavesdropping on enemy conversations.
In order to “quietly” capture the “language”, a fairly typical algorithm was used: search - raid - capture - retreat. The search was preceded by careful observation of the enemy, the choice of the object of attack, the miscalculation of the ways of movement and retreat. These miscalculations were the right and duty of the chief: the commander of a squad, platoon or company. His previous experience, ability to use unusual methods and concern for the lives of subordinates decided both the success of the mission and the safety of the personnel. Having received the task, the commander could spend many hours and even days in seeming "inactivity", watching the enemy through binoculars or through an optical sight. An attentive eye could notice the peculiarities of the enemy's daily routine, the time of the changing of the guards, the location of observation posts and snipers, the number of officers and motor vehicles, and the features of the terrain.
All this was carefully weighed, and then the theoretically least dangerous and most successful plan of attack was chosen. An example of such a chief in the 51st Infantry Division was the commander of a platoon of foot reconnaissance of the 348th regiment G.G. Shubin, in whose platoon there were the least losses with the largest number of prisoners taken. That is why his scouts were called "Shubins", and they gladly accepted this definition. The commander of the 348th Infantry Regiment of the Guard, Colonel G.B., was just as caring. Sahakyan. In his award sheet, when presented to the Order of the Patriotic War, it was noted: “Comrade. Sahakyan personally prepares reconnaissance groups when they go out to search, takes fatherly care of the fighter, often appears in the trenches at the forefront. His regiment is the leader in the division.
The same can be said about the commander of the 51st division, Colonel A.Ya. Khvostov. He could personally come to the scouts, ask them to take care of themselves on a mission, thank them for their success, shake hands. It is no coincidence that many years after the war it was A.Ya. Khvostov was found by G.G. Shubin, and then his other scouts.
From the memoirs of Major General A.Ya. Khvostov: “Reconnaissance was the eyes of the division ... Every day they had to know what was ahead. Intelligence went to find out about the advancement of units, specified fortifications and defenses, and kept score of equipment. Intelligence went in touch with the partisans, led people to the rear of the Germans. Intelligence went to take the "language". Almost every ten days a prisoner was needed. It was like this at the front: for ten days there is no prisoner - the battalion goes into battle, for twenty days there is no "language" - the regiment goes to capture the prisoner in battle. We did not go to take a prisoner in battle. Shubin always cited "language". And for this reason, as many soldiers were in the division, there were so many grateful friends among the scouts.
If the observation was carried out mainly during the day, then the search itself had to be covert, and they tried to do it at night, during fog or other bad weather, when the enemy's attention was scattered. The worst times were windless nights with a full moon, when shadows from walking or crawling people from afar gave them away. The most dangerous was the order to act during the day, in full view of the enemy. Some commanders forced scouts to do just that in order to observe for themselves how conscientiously their subordinates act. In the second half of the war, daytime searches began to be practiced more frequently.
The duties of the commander also included the acquisition of the group leaving for the mission. Even with a small team, a clear distribution of scout responsibilities was required. Some of them made up the attack group, others had to take the "language", others - to cover their retreat and, if necessary, distract the pursuing enemy. Strong, cold-blooded, knife-wielding fighters were more likely to be in the capture group, the most dexterous could be used to make moves in wire barriers, remove sentries. The correct selection of the task for each member of the search group, the capture group and the cover group required the commander to have an excellent knowledge of the personal qualities of each scout.
When performing a mission in the deep rear, when the scouts did their best to “keep quiet”, an ambush method was used to capture languages. "Shubintsy" used it very often. For hours (sometimes many hours), hiding near a road, a bridge, a specially cut communication line, they waited for the moment when, with one throw, they could capture the enemy without a shot and immediately "disappear" with him in the forest. Georgy Shubin taught his “boys” such behavior, characteristic of a hunter-fisherman. He taught me to recognize the alarming cries of birds, to notice the grass trampled down with a boot, to walk silently through the densest forest, without stepping on a single dry branch.
From the memoirs of G.G. Shubin: “We crossed the front without shoulder straps, without insignia, without documents. Food in bags, map, radio station and weapons. Continuous tension. The fire cannot be decomposed. You can’t cough, the knot under your foot shouldn’t crackle, you shouldn’t smoke, you shouldn’t sleep. For eight hours it happened to lie in the snow without moving along the road along which fascist tanks, cars, soldiers were walking ... ".
Of course, the enemy was strong and well-armed. The fulfillment of the plan outlined by the commander did not always depend only on the scouts. Sometimes attacks by reconnaissance groups followed one after another, people died, but it was not possible to take the "language". I had to return to the location of the unit "empty" with a report from the "three O": "discovered, fired upon, withdrew."
Usually scouts tried to bypass villages and villages, as places where Nazi units could be located. However, in some cases, it was required, on the contrary, to enter the village in order to find out the situation from the inhabitants. Such cases were especially dangerous. Even if there were no Germans in the settlement, they could appear here at any moment and in large numbers. And it is almost impossible to leave the village, surrounded by vegetable gardens and fields, unnoticed. The decision to fight or lay low had to be made instantly.
From the memoirs of G.G. Shubin: “Once they froze to the extreme. We decided to crawl towards the village... The first hut. Smoke from the chimney. They quickly climbed up the attic stairs under the roof, listened - they were talking in the hut. Alien speech. From the cold, the tooth does not hit the tooth. Huddled together near the pipe. The guys immediately fell asleep. I was on my knees with grenades and pushed the guys in the side when they started to snore. In the morning they went down and went into the forest. It was a very frosty night, thirty degrees.
A special theme in war is always the attitude towards the enemy. The likelihood of meeting the Germans face to face was, of course, unpredictable. And yet, an artilleryman, tanker or, say, a pilot, most likely, could only see the face of the enemy in battle, when you must, without looking into faces, kill and kill those who appear in front of you. And the infantry did not always grapple with the invaders hand-to-hand.
On the contrary, the scouts not only often saw the hated fascists, but also captured them alive, talked to them, delivered them (dragged when wounded) to the command. They looked into the eyes of their enemies, heard their voices, saw photographs of their wives and children in their documents. Even killing a German with a knife had to be done by looking into his eyes. And this is far from the same as shooting at the enemy with a machine gun or machine gun.
One of the Shubins, intelligence officer G.I. Nikishin wrote about this:
“Having completed their work, two Germans went down to the river. They stood and crossed over to our side. Down there, there was a lonely hut. Look, they went to her, but they themselves had neither a rifle nor a machine gun. An elderly woman, apparently the hostess, was busy in the yard. Seeing the Germans, she ran into the passage, slamming hera door. Here they come to the canopy.
We are on pins and needles.
- Listen, mother, tofai eggs!
- Oh my God! What kind of eggs are you? Who will take them down? The cockerel of the last and then was devoured by your gentlemen, - a woman wailed from the passage.
The Germans apparently did not understand her. They broke the constipation and burst into the canopy ...
The three of us jumped down from the attic and darted towards the river. They just ran up to the passage, and the Germans fell out.
– Hande Hoch! shouted Budanov, and the muzzles of three machine guns blocked their path. Throwing away the loot, the Fritz raised their hands.
Before us are two young healthy guys. Two of our peers. Two people. Two enemies. Enemies! And who only coined such a word?! Why enemies? After all, they are people!!
The German soldier, who was standing opposite me, has a light curly forelock, blue eyes, and on his upper, as if swollen lip, a youthful fluff. Raised hands tremble. Quite a boy. I see drops of sweat appear on his temples from fear, how they swell and roll down the collar. The other, you see, is stronger and older. Red hair. Freckled face. The chest is decorated with the Iron Cross and some stripes. His eyes are darting, like a wolf caught in a trap, looking around like a madman.
- Come on, let's go ... Dortkhin (there), - Alekseev said, nodding his head in the direction of the street, and clicked the shutter of his machine gun.
The redhead was frightened, turned pale, even the freckles melted on his cheeks. He pulled out a Parabellum and fired at Alekseev. Alekseev grabbed his shoulder. Gushing blood seeped through his fingers and a thin stream flowed to the ground.
“What are you doing, red-haired bastard? - I squeezed out angrily and pulled the trigger. But the automatic burst fell on the blue-eyed. He backed away and tipped over against the board fence. And the redhead jumped over the fence in an instant. While I was running around the house to intercept him, he was already near the river. I aimed and fired. The redhead arched his back and, having taken two or three steps forward by inertia, fell into the grass.
“Get the documents,” flashed through my head. In his pocket, the redhead had a soldier's book, several letters and pornographic postcards.
“And give the Iron Cross here,” I say, looking into the glassy eyes of the fascist, “in return you will receive a birch one.”
And one more episode, remembered by G.I. Nikishin:
“Here it is, the farm, at hand. Hiding in the bushes, waiting. The Germans are cautious, they walk in groups, there is nowhere further than the outskirts. They lay all day and all night. Tired scary! And when it was already completely dawn, we look, a lanky German got out of the trench. In his hands - a rifle, behind his back - a backpack. He went to a haystack that stood not far from the farm, sat down under it. He put down his rifle, took bread and some cans from his backpack, looked at his watch and began to eat.
A few minutes later we were at the mound. You can hear how appetizing Fritz champs. Already goosebumps. As soon as he opened his mouth to bite off another piece from a ham sandwich, we pushed a mop on him, instantly twisted his hands and, having stuffed my cap into his mouth instead of a sandwich, dragged him into the forest. And back through the swamp to your side.
Surprisingly, the German did not change at all in his face: he did not turn pale, did not blush. Some kind of stone. He did not react to Russian speech at all. But he refused to eat. I started talking to him as best I could.
- Surname? I asked.
- Venus.
- What's your name?
– Kurt… What is it? Interrogation? I'm tired,” he said, patting his thigh.
“But we will reach Berlin and not get tired,” I told him.
Kurt grimaced, and his already long face fell even further.
- Oh! .. By the time you reach Berlin, you will grow a long beard.
He clearly did not believe that we would reach Berlin. And he said it with some scorn.
I got angry and swung at him.
- Wait! Wait!.. What are you? I am also a translator! Senior Sergeant Milichenko grabbed my hand. - What did he say?
I translated. Everyone was amazed at the arrogance of the enemy.
“Shoot,” Antonov swore and, clicking the bolt of his machine gun, added, “why carry such a bastard with you, and even drink tea ... Use it!”
“No need,” Milichenko said calmly, “let him see what beards we will have in Berlin ...
... And the year was one thousand nine hundred and forty-three.”
It is known that war significantly changes the psyche and outlook of a soldier. In conditions when a person sees every day how others die, when his own death can come today, all previous concepts of morality, duty and the meaning of life are subjected to very serious tests. Suddenly, new assessments appear that justify the changed behavior: “in war, as in war”, “war will write everything off”, “a soldier is obliged to follow any orders” ...
But now the war ends, people return to peaceful life, and hence to the old concepts. And the war has to be forgotten, or at least remembered less often. Of course, when you have to tell a new generation how you “removed” an enemy sentry or “neutralized” a German officer, you can read admiration and even envy in the eyes of the boys. But you yourself know that you killed a man with a strong blow of a knife in the heart or crushed his head with a butt. Perhaps that is why the front-line soldiers even tried to talk less often about the past among themselves, as if protecting the psyche of those who had not seen the war.
But even at the front, not everyone understood the scouts. Cases are described when staff officers called intelligence "thugs" and "gang". Probably for those who have never been on the front line, the scouts with knives really looked like peacetime bandits. And the fact that your compatriot and a fierce enemy are opposite concepts did not occur to everyone.
An extremely sad revelation on this topic was made by a scout from a separate reconnaissance company of the 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division Sh.L. Scopas: “The scouts and saboteurs are the only people in the army who spent the entire war, as they say, face to face with the enemy and with death. Literally... And any horror film will seem like a lyrical comedy to you after an honest story of a military intelligence officer about what he had to see and experience in intelligence. After all, we very, very often had to kill the Germans not from machine guns, but to cut them with knives and strangle them with our hands ... Ask the scouts what nightmares they still have at night ... " .
Next to the scouts was not only the death of the enemy, but also the death of friends and their own death. In late summer - early autumn 1943, the 51st SD participated in fierce offensive battles of the Smolensk operation, during which Smolensk was liberated on September 25th. The division, which suffered heavy losses, was sent to the rear for recovery, and the soldiers got the opportunity to write letters.
September 30 G.G. Shubin sent a letter to Moscow to his sister Maria Georgievna Shubina. Sad military letter. Shubin wrote: “After our unit, with stubborn and bloody battles, walked about 200 km in the footsteps of the bloody beast and Smolensk is ours, we got a well-deserved rest ... It’s hard to bear the loss of our friends, it’s hard to write to their loved ones, announcing the death of their friends. But what to do. War ... You can congratulate me - I was awarded the medal "For Courage" by order, but so far they are not in the unit and have not received it yet.
There were also posthumous letters. The fighters wrote them before the fights and passed them on to their friends for safekeeping. One of these letters with the profile of Prince Dm. Donskoy on the front side. came to Shubin's future wife, Vera Vasilievna, who is referred to in it as "sister" and "girlfriend." It is possible that it was sent after one of the wounds of Georgy Georgievich:
Moscow 23 Buzheninovskaya st. d No. 12, apt. 18 Dmitrieva Vera Vasilievna.
Dear Verushka!
I really, really don't want this letter to be sent, and even more I don't want you to receive this letter. But after much deliberation, I decided to write. Let it be cruel, but true.
Tomorrow I go into battle, from which I have little chance of returning. This letter will be sent if I will not be back.
Dear Verushka! Just today I wrote you a letter. But in conclusion of our friendship, I would like to say that you have awakened in my soul - something that never happened to any of the women I knew before. This saved me in difficult moments of fighting. Do not grieve for me, I took your image with me as the brightest.
Your life is all ahead, and it will be joyful and bright. Stay strong, healthy and happy. Kiss you tightly, my sister. Warmly loving your brother Georges.
P. S. Kisses Volodya. Write!
Field mail 18742 Sh.G.G.
However, even the horrors of war could not kill the good memories of a peaceful life in a soldier, tender feelings for abandoned parents, wives, children and lovers. All this was sung in the so-called "front-line songs", which often had no authorship and existed in a variety of versions. So, decades after the end of the war, G.G. Shubin was still humming the well-known front-line song "Lina", apparently stuck in his memory from the once frequent repetition. The last lines of the song were:
“... If, hugging the earth,
I'll lie down with a bullet in my chest -
Don't cry for me, dear
and don't wait for me to come home!
Let another return from the fire
take the straps off your shoulders...
Lina and you him like me
Quietly gently hug "
Since the scouts reported directly to the headquarters of the unit and had to be always "at hand", they, as a rule, were stationed near the command of the regiment or division. Sometimes, when after a difficult task a rest of several days was required, the scouts could rest several kilometers from the front line.
For this and other reasons of its isolation and freedom, the everyday life of reconnaissance aroused a certain envy among the infantry. They did not envy orders and shoulder straps - they paid for them with their lives, but that which was much more significant, i.e. contentment and uniforms. After all, even the great Frederick II taught: "The army, like a snake, moves on its belly."
Very modest norms of daily food allowance for the rank and file and junior officers of the Red Army (for example, 150 g of meat and 100 g of fish) in the first half of the war were often not kept. In some armies, in the spring of 1943, mass consumption of horse corpses thawing out from under the snow began. It was especially difficult with food during the offensives, when the field kitchens could not keep up with the advanced units.
Judging by the memoirs of scouts, they did not complain about food, especially since in the early years they, like pilots, were fed according to increased standards. Subsequently, the allowance of the scouts was equated with the infantry, but even then, during sorties, it was possible to get hold of trophy products, which were sent to the cook in his own kitchen or shared them with the infantry of his regiment.
No one complained about the lack of alcohol, although it was impossible to imagine a scout going on a mission drunk. As you know, 100 grams of front-line (i.e. vodka), according to the order of NPO No. 0320 of 1941, was supposed to be given to each soldier of the front line of the army every day only from September 1, 1941 to May 12, 1942.
On May 12, 1942, order No. 0373 “On the procedure for issuing vodka to the troops of the army in the field” was signed, according to which the previous law No. 0320 was canceled and the exact and steady implementation of GKO resolution No. GOKO-1727s of May 11, 1942 was prescribed. The Regulation stated:
- To stop from May 15, 1942, the mass daily distribution of vodka to the personnel of the troops of the army in the field.
- To keep the daily issuance of vodka only to servicemen of the front line units who have success in combat operations against the German invaders, increasing the rate of issue of vodka to servicemen of these units to 200 gr. per person per day.
For this purpose, to allocate vodka monthly at the disposal of the command of the fronts and individual armies in the amount of 20% of the number of front-army troops located on the front line.
As a result, the rest of the advanced units (those who, by decision of the command, did not have success in hostilities) were given alcohol only 10 times a year, on public holidays. The cutting of the "front-line 100 grams" did not actually affect the scouts. Many recalled that the foreman always had a canister of alcohol on hand, but it was more often used for retribution with other units than for its intended purpose.
As for uniforms, the scouts generally did not complain. In the early years of the war, instead of white camouflage suits, in winter it happened to use ordinary underwear, and those who walked in boots wrapped their shins with strips of fabric (“windings”). But gradually, the reconnaissance got both camouflage coats and boots, and in winter also warm padded jackets.
G.G. Shubin (03.12.1912 - 15.04.1973)
Shubin Georgy Georgievich - sniper, reconnaissance officer, squad leader (in 1943), commander of a foot reconnaissance platoon of the 348th Infantry Regiment, from July 1944 - commander of a divisional reconnaissance company of the 51st Infantry Division, senior lieutenant. Born in Vyatka on December 3, 1912, Russian, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Addresses of relatives: sister - Moscow, st. Small bumps, 7, apt. 247; parents - Kirov, st. Vorovskogo, 33.
In the Red Army from July 1, 1941 Called by the Chkalovsky RVC of the city of Chkalovsk (according to other sources, the Reutov RVC of the Moscow Region). He fought on the Bryansk (07/15/1941-January 1942), Kaliningrad, Western (July 1943-October 1943), 1st Baltic (11/3/1943-1944) fronts. Wounded 3 November 1941
He was awarded the medal "For Courage" (08/28/1943), the orders "Red Star" (12/05/1943), "Glory" 3rd degree (01/06/1944), "Patriotic War" 1st degree (02/22/1944), "Red Banner" - three times (03/25/1944, 04/08/1944 and 07/31/1944). He was presented to the title of "Hero of the Soviet Union".
He spent his entire career in the 348 joint venture: a Red Army soldier (sniper reconnaissance), ml. sergeant ml. lieutenant (squad leader - foot reconnaissance platoon commander), lieutenant - senior. lieutenant (commander of a divisional reconnaissance company of the 51st rifle division).
From the age of 12 he was engaged in hunting, became an excellent shooter and tracker. After graduating from nine classes, Georgy Shubin participated in a number of biological expeditions: he worked in the Kola expedition of the USSR Academy of Sciences, then as an observer in the Lapland State Reserve.
In September 1937, Shubin entered the animal and hunting faculty of the All-Union Zootechnical Institute of Fur Raw Materials Farming, began working in scientific expeditions and programs: he caught wild argali in the mountains of Central Asia, studied Black Sea dolphins in Turkey, traveled to Norway for breeding beavers for acclimatization on the Kola peninsula, was in Finland, helped to make films about animals in practice in the Losinoostrovsky farm.
In July 1941, as part of the Stalinist Volunteer Student Division, Georgy ended up on the Bryansk Front, where students built fortifications. In September, the Shubin brigade, after a 75-kilometer march, was thrown to the front line to evacuate equipment and military materials from station N. For ten days, young patriots performed their assigned work under fire and bombardment by fascist vultures. When fascist tanks appeared, the last platform was shipped and, thus, the most important defense task was completed.
Having completed the task, the students, led by Shubin, were surrounded and were able to get out of it only thanks to the experience of their leader's pathfinder. This is where his hunting caution first came in handy! Hiding through the woods, avoiding open places and busy roads, a group of young unarmed students independently got out of the encirclement without losing a single person.
Like other graduates, Georgy Shubin was sent to the active army, in which he had to stay for three and a half years. Shubin was enrolled in the regiment as a reconnaissance sniper, and soon he showed himself from the best side. An excellent shooter and tracker, who speaks German, became a recognized intelligence officer in the 348th Infantry Regiment, commander of a foot reconnaissance platoon.
August 28, 1943 Georgy Shubin received his first combat award. From the presentation for the award with the medal "For Courage": “... Shubin Georgy Georgievich. For the fact that during the fighting on August 19, 1943 for the village of Semyonovka, being at the forward observation post of the regiment commander, he well recognized the enemy’s observation post, from which the Germans corrected the fire of artillery and mortar batteries. Shubin with a sniper rifle destroyed four enemy observers, which made it easier for the rifle units to move forward to the village of Semyonovka ".
October 30 of the same year G.G. Shubin wrote to his sister Maria Georgievna: “... You can congratulate me - I was awarded the medal “For Courage” by order, but so far they are not in the unit and have not yet received».
From the presentation to the award of the Red Army soldier Shubin with the Order of the Red Star: “... while performing a combat mission on November 25, 1943, being behind enemy lines in order to capture the “tongue”, led by his squad, he attacked three enemy scouts who showed active resistance. T. Shubin, with a bold and decisive action, himself, and heading his squad, managed to capture a non-commissioned officer, chief corporal and corporal, not allowing them to hide in the forest. They provided valuable information. Worthy of a government award.
During the liberation of the Sirotinsky district of the Vitebsk region. “For almost 2 months, the soldiers of the 51st division ate food received from the inhabitants of the Kozyansky and Mishnevichsky village councils, only occasionally food was delivered from the rear by horses in packs, as well as by planes. Despite the difficult conditions, the scouts penetrated behind enemy lines. Particularly distinguished divisional intelligence led by G.G. Shubin".
From the presentation for the award of Junior Sergeant Shubin with the Order of Glory, 3rd degree: “When performing combat missions to capture the German languages, carried out under the most difficult conditions deep behind enemy lines in the areas: the villages of Yameshchie, Savchenki, Starinovichi and Shunki, Comrade Shubin personally performed the following operations. On 11/25/43 he took 3 people prisoner, on 12/5/43 he took 1 person prisoner and killed 4 people, on 12/11/43 he took 1 person prisoner. and killed 2 people and on 12/18/43 killed one person. During this period, Shubin took trophies of the 1st century. machine gun, 6 submachine guns, 4 rifles and 3 binoculars. The captured Germans gave valuable information. For the entire period of reconnaissance operations, the loss of personnel was only one person who was lightly wounded and retired for a while in medical. dignity. company."
Following the awarding of the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree, G.G. Shubin was awarded the first officer rank - junior lieutenant. In March 1944, he was appointed commander of a divisional intelligence company, replacing the former commander, Lieutenant Vikhrov.
From the presentation to the award ml. Sergeant Shubin Order of the Patriotic War 1st degree: “Commanding a platoon of foot reconnaissance ml. Sergeant Shubin, thanks to his organizational skills, managed to rally a strong team of intelligence officers who perform important responsible tasks of the command. ml. Sergeant Shubin is a model for his subordinates. He is brave, energetic and instilled these qualities in his fighters. Commanding a platoon of foot reconnaissance for the period from 11/25/43 to 22/2/44, he captured 10 control prisoners and destroyed 32 Nazis, and ml. Sergeant Shubin personally destroyed 10 Nazis with fire from a sniper rifle. During this time, trophies were taken: 2 machine guns, 9 machine guns, 5 rifles, 6 pistols, 4 binoculars. Performing the task of capturing a captured enemy, he captured a prisoner and personally destroyed a non-commissioned officer. Despite the difficulties, the task was completed. The prisoner was sent to the headquarters division and gave valuable information ... "
From the presentation for the award of Junior Lieutenant Shubin with the Order of the Red Banner: “Fulfilling the combat mission of the command on March 22, 1944 in the Gorodeshnoye area to capture a control prisoner, the reconnaissance group under the command of Comrade Shubin, consisting of 20 people, met with enemy reconnaissance of 55 people. Despite the numerical superiority of the enemy in people and weapons, Comrade Shubin entered the battle, during which up to 10 enemy soldiers and officers were exterminated and three prisoners were taken, the rest were dispersed by the fire of our scouts. During the time he commanded a platoon, Comrade Shubin captured 21 control prisoners and during this time up to 30 German soldiers and officers were exterminated.
The above presentation of the regiment commander G.B. Sahakyan was supposed to be awarded G.G. Shubin with the Order of the Patriotic War, 2nd degree, but by the decision of the division commander A.Ya. The tail award was upgraded to the Order of the Red Banner.
The most tragic case in the military biography of G.G. Shubin happened a year before the end of the war. He had to hear his own death sentence. And this verdict was made not by the Germans, but by their own, Russians.
In the winter of 1944, in the vicinity of Nevel and Vitebsk, Shubin's group received the task of establishing contact with the partisans. However, the Nazis surrounded the partisan forests with such a dense ring of their troops that it was impossible to break through it after completing the task. It was decided to go out by a detour.
Shubin led scouts through the German rear for almost a month and a half. On the forty-third day, they finally reached the front line, but ended up in the location not of their own, but of the neighboring army. And then something terrible happened. The captain on duty did not believe that he was facing Soviet intelligence officers. In the hungry, unshaven, dirty, without epaulettes and documents, the soldiers dreamed of Vlasov deserters.
Twenty-six Shubins were disarmed, left in their underwear and locked in a barn, promising to be shot the next morning. The Vlasovites at the front were treated in the same way as the traitor policemen. Most often, they were shot on the spot without trial or investigation: during the four years of the war, about 150 thousand soldiers and officers died this way. And if they weren’t shot, they were sent to camps, from where they didn’t return anyway and where they died a slow death from exhaustion, tuberculosis, incredible work or criminals’ knives.
In such a situation, believing scouts could only pray before inevitable death, and unbelievers curse fate for such a stupid end.
The fact that the tragedy did not happen was due to the Shubins to their commander. Twice Georgy Georgievich begged the sentry to violate the order and call the headquarters of his division or army. The matter could be resolved in a matter of minutes. To the sentry's credit, he actually called the headquarters twice: apparently Shubin asked him with such words that it was impossible not to believe. Finally, in the very morning, the head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 4th Shock Army, Lieutenant Colonel A.M., came to them. Bykov. It was he who saved the heroes from death. Shubin demanded to return to him the captured fifteen-shot Browning with a ruby on the handle, which had been taken away during the arrest. The scouts considered him their talisman. Lieutenant Colonel Bykov threatened to shoot the captain if he did not return the weapon. The threat worked. Leaving, Shubin angrily threw to the young officer who arrested him: “Keep in mind, captain, if we meet again, I won’t wait until morning.”
Merits of G.G. Shubin are very serious. It can be argued that in his 348th regiment, the so-called "reconnaissance in force" was reduced to a minimum, when for the sake of taking the "language" the command ordered to go into battle. The losses in this case were considerable. Shubin saved the lives of hundreds of his brother-soldiers and at the same time saved his scouts. Everyone knew that when leaving for reconnaissance, "Georgich" asked and ordered: "Get a prisoner, but also return all alive!"
At the front, it was tacitly believed that up to five of their soldiers could be "put" behind the "tongue". The people of Shubin did not know such a "norm". Only once did they bring the bodies of five of their friends with you. But that time twenty-seven prisoners were also brought!
Fellow soldier G.G. Shubin, Sergeant V. Malgin wrote to a friend the following lines:
Scout Shubin. Who doesn't know
And not proud in part of him?
Don't all of us dream
To be such a glorious warrior!
Through uncharted swamps
Where no foot has gone
He went boldly on the "hunt"
With a rifle true to the enemy.
That in the darkness merging with white snow,
That turned into a dark bush,
That freezing stump from a running start,
Extinguishing snow sonorous crunch; -
That, hiding the habit of a cat,
In a snowdrift loose it is quiet, -
He knew how to deceive
Patrol of German sentries.
He grew up with a vision of white,
Born by death from a blizzard,
And in front of a stunned German
The muzzle was sticking out... Run away!
With friends brave happened
He went into battle - one on three;
From the point of his dagger
Not the first German has already died.
Enemies are not cheap,
More than once "tongues" trembled
Seeing our hero
Rotating round countersinks.
Like an aspen leaf fluttered
(Where did the arrogance go!)
- Oh, this is Shubin! We are gone
"Kaput" ourselves, "kaput" our honor ...
And glory to those whose name is Fritz
Worse than cholera and plague
Who is their nightmare at night -
We write songs about that.
Not without reason, it can be seen, the chest of the hero
Shines with glory in orders.
Be healthy, brave warrior,
To our glory, to the fear of our enemies!
Military awards G.G. Shubin
Georgy Georgievich Shubin was wounded three times, twice his relatives received messages: "missing."
Just before the end of the war, Georgy Georgievich married Vera Vasilievna Dmitrieva, a graduate of the Faculty of Physics of Moscow University, the sister of his classmate Vladimir Dmitriev. Her maternal grandfather, Priest Mikhail Kasimov, was a Moscow priest.
Two children were born in the Shubin family: first, son Vladimir (1946–1985), and five years later, daughter Nadezhda. Both followed in the footsteps of their father, became biologists. Vladimir graduated from the Moscow Forestry Institute, worked as the director of the Kandalaksha Reserve. Nadezhda studied at the biological faculty of the Vladimir State Pedagogical Institute and became a virologist, candidate of biological sciences.
After demobilization, Georgy Georgievich Shubin worked as an animal trainer at the Voentekhfilm film studio, where he met with the famous film director Alexander Mikhailovich Zguridi (1904-1998), later the creator and host of the TV show "In the World of Animals" (1968-1975).
In joint dreams, the idea was born to form a special unit at the film studio - a “zoobase”, where animals accustomed to filming would be kept. It was assumed that highly qualified trainers would teach animals not to be afraid of humans, perform the necessary tasks and even spectacular tricks. However, it was impossible to turn animals into completely tame ones, taking food from the hands of everyone they met. They should have retained natural caution and all natural habits.
In 1946, at the request of A.M. Zguridi Georgy Georgievich was looking for a place for such a zoo base and chose the vicinity of the village of Leonovo, which is near the town of Petushki, almost on the border of the Moscow and Vladimir regions. Initially, people got to the zoo from Petushki, but thanks to the efforts of G.G. Shubin, the management of the Gorky Railway approved a stopping point for electric trains at the zoo base itself. After the name of the neighboring village, the stop was named “Leonovo platform”, and the new organization was named “Zoobase of the Moscow film studio of popular science films”.
From 1949 to 1950, Shubin acted as head of the zoo base, formally being in the position of a trainer of the first category: he trained "artists" from bears, wolves, lynxes, and elks.
Zoobase in Leonov was the first in the world: all domestic and many foreign film studios filmed their films here. Only a few years later similar organizations appeared in Europe and the United States.
Vladimir Shubin and writer V.M. Sands on the White Sea
However, the zoobase soon had to be parted for a while. By order of the Main Directorate for Reserves dated December 31, 1949, Georgy Georgievich was appointed director of the Pechoro-Ilychsky Reserve. The reserve was founded in the 1920s. and was located in the interfluve of the Pechora and Ilych rivers. In the late 1930s, work began in the reserve on the reacclimatization of the beaver, which once inhabited the Pechora basin, but was completely exterminated at the end of the last century. By the time Shubin arrived, the beavers in the reserve had already been captured for resettlement in other regions of the Komi ASSR.
G.G. Shubin at the zoo in Leonov
In 1956, a moose-trading economy was established at the reserve. At the same time, a unique mass material on the biology of the Pechora elk population was collected. In addition to organizing the economy, on the initiative of G.G. Shubin and the remarkable biologist Evgeny Pavlovich Knorre (1902–1986) in 1950 in the reserve, in the village of Yaksha, the world's first experimental moose farm was created, which became its main attraction. The main goal of the organization of the moose farm was the domestication of the elk as a meat, dairy and riding animal.
From July 1958 to the end of October 1960, G.G. Shubin worked as the director of the Voronezh Reserve, and from November 1960 he participated in the organization of the Volga-Kama Reserve, where he also served as director for some time. In connection with the policy of a sharp reduction in the number of reserves in 1961, this work had to be abandoned.
The last (from August 1971 to February 1973) reserve G.G. Shubin was the Mari Reserve (now the Bolshaya Kokshaga Reserve), where he worked as deputy director for scientific work.
With wolf cubs on the set of the film "At the Steep Yar". Far left G.G. Shubin,
far right - his son Volodya. Photo 1961
In 1961 G.G. Shubin returned to the Moscow region, where in May he again became the head of the zoo base and the main trainer at the Moscow Order of the Red Star film studio of popular science films. (In 1966 the film studio was renamed Tsentrnauchfilm). Since that time, the Shubin family finally settled in the Vladimir region: first at the zoo in Leonov, and then in the city of Petushki.
From 1961 to 1969 about 200 films were shot with the participation of zoological animals. Particularly memorable were the shootings of such feature films by A. Zguridi himself - “Forest Story” (1949) and “Forest Symphony” (1967), as well as “At a steep ravine” (1961), “Believe me, people” (1964), “ War and Peace” by S. Bondarchuk (1965–1967), “Dersu Uzala” (1975).
Particularly distinguished were films where animals became central figures, films about people and animals: "The Tale of the Forest Giant" (1954), "Hello, Brass" (1964), "Enchanted Islands" (1965), "King of the arena" (1969 .), “King of the Mountains” (about a giant bear, 1969), etc. One of these films was called “The Path of Selfless Love”. It was filmed in 1969-1970. based on the stories of the wonderful writer V.V. Bianchi. The scriptwriter and director of the film was A.A. Babayan. The film told about the touching love of a forest watchman and a lynx that the watchman fed, went out, and was stolen and given to the menagerie. The role of the lynx in the film was played by Shubin's favorite named "Kunak".
Each film became unique not only in terms of the script or the performance of the actors, but also because of the participation of animals in it. The film "War and Peace" required scenes of the Rostovs' canine hunting for wolves, and in the film "Believe me, people", the wolves were supposed to attack prisoners who had escaped from the camp.
Georgy Georgievich was a wonderful animal trainer, skillfully taming his most beloved animals - wolves. Many films were shot with his participation, in ten of them he acted as an understudy in scenes with wolves, lynxes, bears.
In 1973 G.G. Shubin's health deteriorated sharply. Friends placed him in a Moscow clinic, but the disease turned out to be neglected. April 15, 1973 Georgy Georgievich died.
The commander of the regimental and divisional reconnaissance was buried in the cemetery of the ancient graveyard of Krutets (now the village of Leonovo), one and a half kilometers from the zoo base he created. The funeral was held with military honors, and his friends - scouts, employees of the zoo base and film studio, hunters, professors - while they were alive, wrote letters to the family and came to the cemetery.
Many telegrams with condolences to the Shubin family, which came from all the "Shubin" reserves, were supplemented by a telegram from distant Yerevan. Guard Colonel G.B. Sahakyan, the former commander of the 348th Infantry Regiment, expressed his deep sadness on the occasion of the death of "a good combat friend, the best scout and an experienced commander."
Already after the death of Georgy Georgievich, his friend Mikhail Shilov sent very touching poems about his comrade to the Shubin family in Petushki:
How did others live their lives?
Having passed the front roads,
Sometimes from beginning to end
Wars of the victorious crown?
We will start with Zhora Shubin,
He is an award-winning champion
And Zhukov himself noticed
And in his memoirs he is noted
Rogue scout! For him
Nothing came across
Before what he could save.
In the element of combat, he is like a god!
Three "Red Banners" in a row
Burning over his heart
And a number of other awards,
I don't remember exactly which ones.
Then, already on a peaceful field,
Zhora worked in Petushki
There he is for cinematography
He kept every fear in the enclosures:
From elk, lynx to wolf.
There was a lot of value in that.
The wolf bit Zhora badly,
He chose the path to the reserve.
Fate wasn't fair
To the hero of the world war.
He would live and live happily,
Yes, the years were numbered.
So, the German army group "Center" against the Soviet Central Front.
Field Marshal Hans Gunther Adolf Ferdinand von Kluge against General of the Army Rokossovsky Konstantin Konstantinovich.
To break through the front, it is necessary to concentrate titanic power on a very narrow sector. The Germans concentrated such power - on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge, in a section less than 30 kilometers long, three tank corps struck simultaneously - the 41st, 46th and 47th. The flanks of the strike force were provided by two army corps - the 20th and 23rd. In the event of the success of the tank corps, the army corps had to expand the breakthrough area.
But it was not possible to crack the Soviet defense. The German offensive was clearly fizzling out. If the pace of the breakthrough slows down, if the front of the offensive narrows, it means that fresh reserves must be urgently brought into battle. But the Germans do not introduce them. From this it followed that they had already completely exhausted and squandered all their reserves. At Olkhovatka, the German tank wedge was stopped. The German commanders make a desperate decision to change the direction of the offensive. They are now attacking Ponyri with not three, but only one 41st Panzer Corps, pretty battered in four days of bloody battles.
The 41st corps is rushing forward with the last of its strength, the direction of its strike has become quite clear. The offensive front was reduced to six kilometers. There are no other directions of the German offensive, otherwise they would have been identified on the second, maximum on the third day.
And then the commander of the Central Front, General of the Army Rokossovsky, receives an urgent message about the noticed fresh hillocks of the earth.
The meaning of the appearance of parapets is quite clear, and it consists in the fact that the enemy has been stopped on the northern face of the Kursk salient! And this, in turn, means that there will be no encirclement of the two Soviet fronts in the Kursk region.
On the southern face the enemy is still rushing forward. There, on July 12, two armored avalanches will clash in a grandiose tank battle on the Prokhorovsky field. The enemy will be stopped there too. But already on July 10, when the Germans were stopped on the northern flank, their movement on the southern flank lost its meaning: anyway, the encirclement attempt was thwarted.
It was about this that General of the Army Rokossovsky reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. And it became clear to both that for two summers the enemy had been successfully advancing, and for the third summer it was stopped. It followed from this that the enemy would never again attack on the Soviet-German front.
It was a turning point in the war. Complete and final.
The merit of military intelligence in the Battle of Kursk was that it did not miss the moment when the enemy went on the defensive and correctly interpreted the meaning of what was happening. This allowed the troops of the Red Army, almost without any pause, to go on the offensive, which lasted a month and a half and ended with access to the Dnieper and forcing it.
The conclusion from all that has been said is this. The GRU is by no means all military intelligence, but only the topmost part of a gigantic pyramid. There were situations in the war when information from tactical intelligence and from operational intelligence was sometimes more important than information received by military strategic intelligence.
The reports received during the war that the Americans were making some kind of cunning bomb, of course, were very unpleasant to Comrade Stalin. However, in the summer of 1943, at the moment when it was a question of victory or defeat in the Soviet-German war, reports of a bomb were not the most important for him.
The time will come - Soviet military intelligence will deal with the atomic bomb.
tactical intelligence
Tactical reconnaissance in the Soviet Army included agencies and reconnaissance units (regular and non-regular) of companies, battalions, regiments and divisions.
Each commander from the battalion and above has his own headquarters. Headquarters is a think tank. The chief of staff is the second person after the commander in a battalion, regiment, division, and further to the very top. So that no one would doubt this, the chiefs of staff of all ranks were given the rank of deputy commanders and commanders. So they write through a dash: Major Ivanov I. I., Chief of Staff of the Battalion - Deputy Battalion Commander. Or: Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces - First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR.
Service in the headquarters only from the outside seems easy, and only to those who did not serve there. The head of any headquarters has many responsibilities. The most important thing for him:
Plan combat.
Obtain and process information about the enemy.
Organize interaction and communication with subordinate troops.
The lowest level at which there are headquarters - battalion. The headquarters of motorized rifle and tank battalions are quite small - four people:
1. chief of staff,
2. assistant chief of staff (PNSH),
3. the head of communications of the battalion (he is also the commander of the communications platoon),
4. Sergeant, who was responsible for all documentation, especially secret.
The military operations were planned by the chief of staff himself, information about the enemy was collected and analyzed by the PNSh. It is clear that when one of them was absent, the other worked for two. And the head of communications passed their decisions to the performers.
At all levels of the Soviet Army, communication was established from higher to lower; in addition, each headquarters was responsible for communication with a neighbor who was to the left. This principle is easy to remember - this is how the Orthodox are baptized: from top to bottom, from right to left.
Motorized rifle battalions had practically no regular reconnaissance equipment. The exception was the artillery reconnaissance section of the battalion's mortar battery control platoon. This section performed its specific tasks of detecting targets and adjusting battery fire.
Tank battalions did not have this either. However, all companies that were part of the motorized rifle and tank battalions were required to continuously reconnoiter the enemy. They carried out reconnaissance tasks by observing, eavesdropping, sending out patrols and patrols, capturing prisoners, and in other ways that all the armies of the world have used for millennia. The company commander reported the received information about the enemy to the battalion headquarters. In turn, the battalion headquarters informed the company and battery commanders about the situation.
In addition, the second companies of motorized rifle and tank battalions had additional reconnaissance training. If it is necessary to send a combat reconnaissance patrol (BRD), head or side marching outpost (GPZ, BPZ) from the battalion, they were usually appointed from the second company, although other companies were also ready for this.
The PNSh sent the most important intelligence information to the regimental headquarters.
Next level - regiment. The headquarters of the regiment included:
1. Chief of Staff.
2. Deputy chief of staff.
3. Chief of Intelligence (aka Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence).
4. Head of communications.
5. Topographic service, secret part, etc.
The deputy chief of staff of the regiment carried out the most important work - he planned military operations. The head of intelligence of the regiment supplied him with information. He directed, coordinated and controlled the intelligence activities of the battalions, analyzed the information received from them. In addition, under his command was the reconnaissance company of the regiment, which included:
Tank platoon on three PT-76 amphibious tanks,
Two reconnaissance platoons for 6 BRDM (another BRDM was with the company commander),
A platoon of motorcyclists (10 motorcycles with sidecars).
And enemy control points. Therefore, revealing the areas of their location (firing positions) is one of the main tasks of tactical reconnaissance. Tactical reconnaissance is also responsible for determining the nature and degree of engineering equipment for enemy positions and areas of location of enemy subunits and units, the system of his obstacles, and the degree of terrain passability. The most important task facing tactical reconnaissance has always been the identification of new means of armed struggle, methods and methods of conducting combat operations.
Intelligence information is obtained by interviewing local residents, interrogating prisoners and defectors, radio interception, studying documents, equipment and weapons captured from the enemy, ground and air reconnaissance.
Ground tactical reconnaissance is carried out by reconnaissance, motorized rifle, paratrooper and air assault, regimental units. Observers, observation posts, patrol squads (tanks), reconnaissance, combat reconnaissance, separate reconnaissance, officer reconnaissance patrols, reconnaissance detachments, reconnaissance groups, groups for conducting searches, ambushes, units for conducting reconnaissance in force are used.
Intelligence methods
Methods of conducting ground tactical reconnaissance are: observation, eavesdropping, search, raid, ambush, interrogation, reconnaissance in force.
Reconnaissance in combat is an extreme but effective measure in obtaining data on the strength and armament of the enemy. It is carried out by attacking the alleged camouflaged positions of the enemy, who has gone on the defensive, in cases where other means and methods of reconnaissance fail to obtain the necessary data about the enemy and his intentions. In military practice, reconnaissance in combat is most often used if the operational situation requires the speedy advance of troops.
Time for a thorough analysis of the information obtained by tactical intelligence is limited, and they quickly become outdated. At the same time, inaccurate or unreliable information can lead to heavy losses, and even to the defeat of the troops who used them.
In October 1984, full-time reconnaissance platoons were formed in motorized rifle and airborne battalions ...
Machine guns and assault rifles in service with scouts had a version with folding butts and straps for attaching night sights. In the 80s, these were the AKS-74N and RPKS-74N. Regular weapons of commanders branches there was an AKMSN assault rifle with a silent firing device PBS (at the end of the 80s, PBS and subsonic cartridges for the AKS-74N began to enter the troops, which made it possible to switch to a single caliber of small arms in the department). Commander reconnaissance platoon He had a PB pistol as an additional service weapon. In addition, the scouts were equipped with night sights, night vision devices, periscopes (reconnaissance tube), mine detectors, climbing equipment, camouflage robes and masks.
The collection of information about the tactical situation necessary to solve the combat missions assigned to the regiment / brigade was engaged in Intelligence Company (RR). RR consisted of two (for a regiment) or three (for a brigade) Reconnaissance Platoons And Company Directorates- consisted of personnel of 50-80 fighters (the number depended on regular cars or armored vehicles).
Starting from level shelf(or separate battalion) and in all higher formations, there was a full-time position Head of Intelligence- the officer responsible for the collection and analysis of intelligence data.
At the level motorized rifle/tank division collected intelligence data Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (ORB) which was a separate military unit at the Headquarters of the Division. ORB consisted of the Headquarters, individual platoons at the Headquarters and 4 companies - (RR), (DDR) And 4th Radio Intercept Company (RRP). Fighters 3rd RDR underwent mandatory airborne training. It was supposed in the event of a full-scale war to collect information about the deep rear of the enemy (the original name is Deep Intelligence Company), disembarkation DDR by parachute in parts Military Transport Aviation (BTA) assigned to the division. 4th Radio Intercept Company was intended for constant listening to enemy radio communications, in connection with which officers and soldiers with knowledge of foreign languages were selected for the personnel of the company, depending on the proposed Theater of Military Operations. For example, personnel 4th Radio Intercept Company 781st ORB 108th Motorized Rifle Division participated in the Afghan War, consisted of 80% of conscripts - ethnic Tajiks.
The ORB included separate platoons at the Battalion Headquarters - the Supply Platoon, the Communications Platoon and the Reconnaissance Surveillance Platoon (VRN). The tasks of the VRN were to monitor the enemy on the line of contact of the troops, through powerful optical systems and with the help of portable ground reconnaissance radar stations (for example, product 1RL133 PSNR-5).
1st and 2nd Reconnaissance Company as part of the ORB consisted of two Reconnaissance Platoons And tank platoon. Tank Platoon was intended for fire support during reconnaissance in force and was armed with light amphibious tanks PT-76 (for ORB as part of OKSVA - T-55/62) in the amount of 3 units.
3rd Airborne Reconnaissance Company consisted of two Reconnaissance Platoons and one Special Intelligence Platoon(This platoon was intended to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage activities). In each Reconnaissance Company in service was one multifunctional combat reconnaissance vehicle BRM-1K, assigned to the company commander.
Regardless of which division ( tank or motorized rifle) belonged to the ORB - its conscripts wore combined arms emblems (on buttonholes and a sleeve chevron). ORB fighters as part of OKSVA wore emblems of tank troops. . Fighters 3rd RDR- wore the emblems of the airborne troops on the buttonholes of red (motorized rifle division) or black (tank division) colors.
see also
Notes
Literature
Links
- Website of the 1071th Separate Training Regiment of the Special Forces of the GRU of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense. Formed as part of a separate company in 1965. in the village of Chuchkovo, Tambov region, relocated in 1969. in the city of Pechory, Pskov region. Disbanded there in 1999.
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See what "Military Intelligence" is in other dictionaries:
Military intelligence- a set of measures taken by the commanders and headquarters of the active troops, and the actions of reconnaissance subunits (units) to obtain information about the enemy, terrain, weather, and the area of upcoming operations. Conducted by reconnaissance ... ... Brief dictionary of operational-tactical and general military terms
Textbook for the survival of military scouts [Combat experience] Ardashev Alexey Nikolaevich
Tactical intelligence in the Soviet army
In the Soviet Army, as was customary in world military practice, tactical reconnaissance in the Ground Forces, in the Airborne Forces and in the Marine Corps was carried out by special reconnaissance units. A duplicative structure of tactical reconnaissance units was typical - starting with reconnaissance units in the state of the battalion (as in the smallest basic independent tactical unit), for the level of each higher military formation (regiment / brigade / division / corps / army / district) in the state there was a separate reconnaissance unit or a separate military unit. For a motorized rifle / airborne / tank battalion / marine battalion, a reconnaissance platoon (RV) was a similar unit. The task of the RV was to collect intelligence data necessary to solve the combat missions assigned to the battalion. The personnel of the RV consisted of 16-21 fighters and consisted of three sections - two reconnaissance sections and one engineering intelligence section. In the post-war period, reconnaissance platoons were introduced into the composition of battalions in the Soviet army on the basis of the experience of the Afghan war.
The machine guns and machine guns that were in service with the scouts had a version with folding stocks and slats for attaching night sights. In the 80s. these were AKS-74N and RPKS-74N. The standard weapon of the squad commanders was the AKMSN assault rifle with the PBS silent firing device (at the end of the 80s, PBS and subsonic cartridges for the AKS-74N began to enter the troops, which made it possible to switch to a single caliber of small arms in the squad). The reconnaissance platoon commander had a PB pistol as an additional service weapon. In addition, the scouts were equipped with night sights, night vision devices, periscopes (reconnaissance tube), mine detectors, climbing equipment, camouflage robes and masks.
The reconnaissance company (RR) was engaged in collecting information about the tactical situation necessary to solve the combat missions assigned to the regiment / brigade. The RR consisted of two (for a regiment) or three (for a brigade) reconnaissance platoons and company management - it consisted of 50-80 fighters (the number depended on standard vehicles or armored vehicles). Starting from the level of a regiment (or a separate battalion) and in all higher formations, there was a full-time position of head of intelligence - an officer responsible for collecting and analyzing intelligence data.
At the level of a motorized rifle / tank division, intelligence was collected by a separate reconnaissance battalion (ORB), which was a separate military unit at the division headquarters. The ORB consisted of a headquarters, separate platoons at the headquarters and 4 companies - the 1st and 2nd reconnaissance companies (RR), the 3rd reconnaissance and airborne company (RDR) and the 4th radio interception company (RRP). Soldiers of the 3rd RDR underwent mandatory airborne training. It was assumed in the event of a full-scale war to collect information deep behind enemy lines (the original name was a deep reconnaissance company), the landing of the RDR by parachute by units of military transport aviation (VTA) attached to the division. The 4th radio interception company was intended to constantly listen to enemy radio communications, in connection with which officers and soldiers with knowledge of foreign languages were selected for the personnel of the company, depending on the proposed theater of operations. For example, the personnel of the 4th company of radio interception of the 781st ORB of the 108th motorized rifle division, which participated in the Afghan war, consisted of 80% of conscripts - ethnic Tajiks. The ORB included separate platoons at the battalion headquarters - a supply platoon, a communications platoon and a reconnaissance surveillance platoon (VRN). The tasks of the VRN were to monitor the enemy on the line of contact of the troops, through powerful optical systems and with the help of portable ground reconnaissance radar stations (for example, product 1RL 133 PSNR-5). The 1st and 2nd reconnaissance companies as part of the ORB consisted of two reconnaissance platoons and a tank platoon. The tank platoon was intended for fire support during reconnaissance in combat and was armed with light amphibious tanks PT-76 (for ORB as part of OKSVA - T-55/62) in the amount of 3 units. The 3rd Airborne Reconnaissance Company consisted of two reconnaissance platoons and one special reconnaissance platoon (this platoon was intended to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage activities). Each reconnaissance company was armed with one BRM-1K multifunctional combat reconnaissance vehicle assigned to the company commander. Regardless of which division (tank or motorized rifle) the ORB belonged to, its conscripts wore combined arms emblems on their buttonholes, while the color of epaulettes and sleeve chevrons, as well as the emblem of the military branch on the chevron, were set according to belonging to the branch of service of the formation (division) . The servicemen of the 3rd RDR were unofficially allowed to wear the emblems of the airborne troops on the buttonholes of red (motorized rifle division) or black (tank division). The servicemen of the ORB as part of the OKSVA wore the emblems of the tank troops.
Due to the fact that the airborne troops were supposed to be used behind enemy lines, unlike the division of the ground forces, a separate reconnaissance company (ORR) was engaged in providing intelligence data at the level of the airborne division (VDD), similar in state to the RR in the state of the regiment . In this case, the ORR was a separate military unit at the division headquarters. An example is the 80th ORR (military unit 48121) with the 103rd Guards. VDD.
In the tactical intelligence of the Soviet army, unique technical means of reconnaissance were tested. These are complexes of reconnaissance and signaling equipment (anti-personnel seismic sounders with an automatic data radio transmitter) Realiya-U 1K18 and Tabun 1K124, which were successfully used during the Afghan war.
In artillery, the concept of "tactical reconnaissance" is somewhat broader than in other branches of the armed forces. In addition to collecting information about the location of enemy forces, artillery reconnaissance also includes a detailed topographic and geodetic study of the terrain (topographic and geodetic support of the battle), monitoring of meteorological conditions in the combat zone and adjusting the fire of own artillery. At the level of an artillery battalion (depending on the state), reconnaissance is carried out by an artillery reconnaissance platoon (AR) in the staff of a control battery (BU) or a separate control platoon (VU) at the headquarters of an artillery battalion. At the level of an artillery regiment, intelligence was collected (depending on the state of the military unit) by an artillery reconnaissance battery (BAR) or a command and control and artillery reconnaissance battery (BUiAR). BAR / BUiAR consisted of a control and intelligence platoon (VUR), a meteorological platoon (MV), a sound reconnaissance platoon (VZR) and a radar reconnaissance platoon (VRLR). At the level of an artillery brigade, this was done by an artillery reconnaissance battalion (ARDn), consisting of a sound reconnaissance battery (SZR), a radar reconnaissance battery (RRR) and a topographic and geodetic battery (TB). For artillery units of a motorized rifle/tank division, in addition to the ORB, intelligence was also collected by the BUiAR at the division headquarters, which was a separate military unit. An example is the 469th command and artillery reconnaissance battery (military unit 84397) at the 201st MSD. For the artillery units of the combined arms armies of some military districts, the reconnaissance army artillery regiment (RAAP) was engaged in the collection of intelligence data. An example is the 1451st RAAP (Leningrad Military District) or the 2323rd RAAP (Transcaucasian Military District). Junior commanders (for sergeant positions) for artillery reconnaissance units were trained by the 932nd training reconnaissance artillery regiment (Moscow Military District, Mulinsky garrison).
At the army/district level, additional information about the tactical situation was collected by aviation units of the army/district subordination - reconnaissance aviation regiments (RAP). They were assigned the function of operational aerial photography.
For the Armed Forces of the USSR (with the exception of artillery and the Air Force), such a military formation as a reconnaissance regiment was uncharacteristic. The current 45th Separate Reconnaissance Regiment of the Airborne Forces (45th ORP - from 1.05.1998 to 2.08.2005), which is at the disposal of the commander of the Airborne Forces, was formed after 1991. At the military district level, in the event of a full-scale war, tactical intelligence functions (except reconnaissance and sabotage activities deep behind enemy lines) were also assigned to separate special-purpose brigades (OBrSpN - a total of 14 brigades), partially subordinate to the GRU of the General Staff. For reconnaissance units, the brigade was the largest military formation.
It should be noted about a rare exception in the structure of reconnaissance formations. For 16 years, the USSR Armed Forces had reconnaissance brigades that were unique in composition and had nothing to do with the GRU of the General Staff. These are the 20th and 25th separate reconnaissance brigades as part of the Soviet troops in Mongolia. These brigades consisted of four separate reconnaissance battalions, a separate artillery and a separate anti-aircraft missile and artillery battalion, a helicopter squadron and combat and logistics support units. A feature of the reconnaissance battalions was the presence of a tank company and a mortar battery in their composition. Such an unusual state for reconnaissance units was due to the vast desert-steppe territory on which the brigades had to conduct possible military operations, which required them to have sufficient autonomy and the necessary firepower. Both brigades were in fact formations that included separate military units with their own battle colors.
Great importance was attached to the recruitment of personnel of reconnaissance units. Among the conscripts, the most physically prepared and hardy were selected. Priority in the selection was mainly made for recruits with sports ranks in martial arts and athletics, and therefore situations often arose when almost the entire recruiting staff of a separate reconnaissance company in a regiment / brigade consisted of persons who received the rank of first-class, candidate before military service. in the master of sports or master of sports. For this reason, reconnaissance companies in the Soviet army were unofficially called "sports companies" (not to be confused with the officially named sports companies at the sports district clubs of the Soviet army - SKA). A major role in this was played by the desire of the command of the military unit to be noted by their own subordinates at all kinds of army sports competitions systematically held in the USSR Armed Forces at the level of division / district / type of troops / Armed Forces of the USSR.
Modern Russian military intelligence is part of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. Military intelligence (separate reconnaissance battalions, companies, regimental companies and platoons) is structurally part of the military intelligence of the RF Armed Forces. If the General Staff is the "brain of the army", then intelligence is the "eyes and ears" of the armed forces, the main means of obtaining information. Defense, armed struggle - this is the sphere of human activity that at all times they tried to hide with a dense cover of mystery, and therefore all information about the enemy, his plans and intentions, forces and means had to be not only obtained, but obtained ... Most often, this was done at risk for life, at the full limit of all forces and possibilities. It can be said without a doubt that the military intelligence officer is one of the most romantic and respected army specialties. Moreover, regardless of the specific “specialization”: an ordinary soldier who goes behind enemy lines for “language” causes no less admiration than a colonel working “under cover” in some distant country. After all, it is not for nothing that it is affirmed in the song, which exists, as it were, “for official use”: “As long as intelligence lives, the country will not disappear.”
Features of conducting military intelligence in the course of the counter-terrorist operation(according to the experience of military operations in the Chechen Republic).
Reconnaissance during the conduct of hostilities in armed conflicts is a set of activities carried out by commanders, headquarters and troops in order to obtain information about illegal armed formations, the attitude of the local population towards federal troops, the nature of the terrain in the conflict area, necessary for high-quality training and successful combat tasks in the zone of armed conflict. Intelligence in the conflict area is carried out taking into account the socio-political situation, interethnic relations in the region. Reconnaissance activities on their territory in the conflict zone should, if possible, cause minimal damage to economic and other facilities, property of civilians, and pose a minimal threat to the lives of civilians.
Reconnaissance during the preparation for and during the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus region was organized and conducted in accordance with the orders of the Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, the instructions of the commander of the joint group, taking into account the evolving situation and the available forces and means in order to exclude surprise actions of militants and ensure command of intelligence data for effective defeat of illegal armed groups. The main tasks of all types of reconnaissance in preparation for and during the operation were:
Identification of areas of concentration of illegal armed formations, their composition, numbers, weapons and intentions, as well as training camps and training centers for militants;
Detection of fortified areas, strongholds and their engineering equipment, the location of militant command posts, warehouses for various purposes;
Establishment of routes for the movement of militants, routes for the supply of weapons, ammunition and other material and technical means;
Opening the control and communication system of illegal armed formations;
Determination of the condition of roads, passes, bridges, crossings, barrier lines on possible routes for the movement of troops;
Determination of areas and settlements under permanent and temporary control of militants;
Establishing the participation of the population in hostilities on the side of illegal armed formations, in reconnaissance and sabotage activities against federal troops, their connection with bandit formations, the nature and content of assistance provided by the population (underground centers, groups) to illegal armed formations;
Determining the results of fire and bomb-assault strikes inflicted on the bases and areas of illegal armed formations;
Determination of the political and moral state and moods of the local population.
To solve these problems, intelligence planning in the North Caucasus region was carried out by the head of intelligence with the participation of the heads of departments of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District, representatives of the intelligence management bodies of the armed forces and services, ministries and departments. In addition, the intelligence plans of the interacting ministries and departments were coordinated with the intelligence chief of the joint group.
When performing tasks, the main objects of reconnaissance were:
Illegal armed formations, gangster and terrorist groups, regardless of their number;
Areas of concentration of illegal armed formations, base camps, transshipment bases and training centers for militants;
Fortified areas and strongholds;
Control points of militants, communication centers, stationary and mobile repeaters, television and radio broadcasting facilities;
Armored vehicles, artillery systems and mortars;
Means of combating aircraft and helicopters;
Warehouses with weapons, ammunition, food, fuel and lubricants and other MTS;
Caravans of pack animals and individual vehicles carrying weapons and ammunition.
The report on the results of intelligence by subordinate and cooperating intelligence agencies was carried out by authority after 4 hours, and information on the city of Grozny was received every 2 hours. In addition, during the day, the exchange of incoming information, interaction and management of intelligence agencies was carried out through specially dedicated communication channels, which made it possible to constantly monitor the situation in the entire area of responsibility and respond to its changes in a time scale close to real. In the performance of combat missions by combined-arms subunits, an important role was assigned to military intelligence agencies, which acted ahead of battalions and companies and, as a rule, performed tasks on foot. Unfortunately, individual commanders of motorized rifle subunits, neglecting the requirements for planning and organizing reconnaissance, used reconnaissance units and subunits for other than their intended purpose, set vague tasks, as a result of which reconnaissance agencies suffered unjustified losses. So, on October 8, 1999, as a result of violation of all requirements, the reconnaissance patrol (RD) of the 245th SME suffered unjustified losses, falling into an ambush, and lost six people killed, six wounded and three pieces of equipment. The main reasons for this were:
1. Self-removal of the command staff of the regiment from the issues of planning, organization of intelligence and leadership in the preparation of reconnaissance units for the performance of combat missions, as a result of which the RD departed to perform a combat mission in a mixed composition (the crews of combat vehicles were completed before leaving at the expense of the personnel of the crews of other units) .
2. The readiness of the RD to perform a combat mission was not checked by officials, as a result of which PKT machine guns were absent on the BRDM-2 combat vehicles due to the loss of beds for their fastening. On combat vehicles BRM-1K there were no regular high-explosive fragmentation ammunition for guns.
3. The reconnaissance patrol for operations at night was not prepared due to the lack of a sufficient number of night vision devices, and there were no batteries for the existing devices.
4. The available information about the enemy in the reconnaissance area was not brought to the attention of the RD commander.
5. In violation of the requirements of the chief of the General Staff and the commander of the OGV (C), the RD acted at a distance that did not provide visual communication with him and the possibility of supporting him with fire.
6. As part of the taxiway there was no aircraft controller, therefore, during the battle, aircraft guidance was carried out from the command post of the regiment, which did not ensure the arrival of aviation in the area to support the taxiway. In addition, the regiment had only one radio station for communication with helicopters, and the helicopter crews and the regiment's aircraft controller had topographic maps of different scales and different coding, which led to mutual misunderstanding during target designation and guidance of helicopters to support the taxiway.
It should be noted that this lesson was not in vain, and in the future, when planning the actions of combined arms units (subunits), special attention was paid to the organization of tactical reconnaissance with the involvement of both regular forces and means (military, artillery, electronic, engineering) reconnaissance, and non-staff reconnaissance bodies, who, in accordance with the Directive of the NGSH and the Order of the commander of the OGV (C) No. 012 dated 10.10.99, were assigned to line units: in companies - a reconnaissance squad, in battalions - a reconnaissance platoon.
Commanders of all levels were instructed to check the readiness of regular and non-standard forces and reconnaissance equipment for the performance of combat missions, paying special attention to their staffing and material support. The combat use of reconnaissance units (bodies) was prohibited without comprehensive training and verification of their readiness to perform combat missions by officials of the unit, for which a form was drawn up for each reconnaissance body before it went to perform a combat mission, which reflected the questions of checking its readiness to perform combat missions signed by officials. The preparation of forces and means of military intelligence for the performance of combat missions consisted of general training and direct training, which was carried out for a specific task. If we talk about general training, it should be noted that in peacetime commanders and staffs paid insufficient attention to the training of reconnaissance units and subunits, placing all responsibility on the intelligence chief. This alone explains the fact that individual units were understaffed literally before leaving for the area of combat missions. So, out of 67 people of the reconnaissance company of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 47 people arrived for resupply three days before departure, because in October 1999, 80% of the company’s personnel retired to the reserve, and to sign a contract to extend service for the period of conducting fighting agreed only 8 people. In the same company, out of 5 full-time BRM-1Ks, only one was taken to perform combat missions due to the lack of specialists for their operation, as well as "the desire to preserve equipment." In addition, out of 7 officers of the company, 3 people had reconnaissance training, and the company commander was in office for 4 months. It should be noted that the command of the brigade organized the training of scouts during the movement to the conflict area and was able to quickly prepare the company for combat missions. As a rule, in the course of preparation for combat operations, combat coordination of subunits (bodies) was constantly carried out. When conducting tactical training with reconnaissance units and reconnaissance training with combined arms units, special attention was paid to training soldiers and officers in actions as part of the NP, RD, during ambushes. In the course of the training, the issues of targeting by reconnaissance bodies of assault and army aviation on uncovered objects (targets), issuing target designations to fire weapons using technical reconnaissance equipment (optical, radar, laser, thermal imaging, SAR, etc.) ), while they included an artillery spotter and an aircraft gunner. In the course of training, the commanders of combined arms units learned how to organize reconnaissance with the available reconnaissance forces and means, collect and process the obtained intelligence information, set tasks for the destruction of identified targets and issue target designations to fire weapons, and report reconnaissance results to a senior commander (chief).
If we talk about planning the use of forces and means of military intelligence, then it was necessary to take into account non-traditional methods of conducting combat operations in an armed conflict, when illegal armed groups often evade direct confrontation, inflict surprise strikes on individual objects, block communications, and also carry out subversive, terrorist and sabotage actions. Under such conditions of warfare, maneuverability prevails, combined with tough defense on the scale of a platoon, company, and sometimes even a battalion. Based on this, the task was set, as a rule, immediately before the exit, and the reconnaissance plan was worked out in the form of a reporting document after the reconnaissance and combat missions were completed. It should be noted that when receiving orders for reconnaissance at the tactical level, information about the enemy was given very meager, not corresponding to the level of tasks assigned, although at the operational level of command, as a rule, intelligence about the enemy was quite enough.
The methods of conducting reconnaissance were determined in accordance with the requirements of the chief of the General Staff, the commander of the OGV (C), as well as in accordance with the goals of the upcoming actions. Intelligence agencies (RO, RD, RG) conducted reconnaissance to remove visual communications and fire support, which was no more than 300–400 m from motorized rifle units. An armored group was assigned to support the actions of the reconnaissance agencies, and at least one artillery battery was allocated for direct fire support. In addition, aviation and artillery gunners were included in the reconnaissance bodies without fail, without them it was strictly forbidden to go out for reconnaissance. Rear cover groups operating at a distance of 100–200 m were allocated from intelligence agencies, and, if possible, two intelligence agencies were used, operating on the principle “one after the other”. Thus, in those areas where open opposition from the enemy was expected, the military intelligence agencies acted on foot, like combat reconnaissance patrols sent out from combined arms units. To carry out anti-ambush operations, reconnaissance groups were sent in armored vehicles, sometimes by helicopters, to the areas of crossings over water barriers, road junctions, fashion shows, and dominant heights. At the same time, for the duration of the task, the reconnaissance body appointed a duty unit, ready to immediately arrive to support the reconnaissance.
In the course of reconnaissance, the following methods of obtaining intelligence information were used: observation, ambush, search, raid, study of documents, weapons, interrogation of prisoners, interviewing local residents; interception of conversations conducted by technical means of communication. At the same time, there are also disadvantages to be noted. Thus, the commanders of motorized rifle subunits showed low demands, and often even neglect, in the organization of the surveillance system, the equipment of the NP in platoon and company strongholds. Often, a unified system of reference points was not assigned, which did not allow coordinating the fire of weapons of destruction, there was no clear chain of reports of information about the enemy from the observer to the higher headquarters, so the main part of the data about the enemy was either lost at the very first command posts, or reported with a significant delay. The poor skills of company and platoon commanders in navigating the map, especially in the mountains and at night, the inability to accurately determine their location and coordinates of reconnoitered targets, as well as the lack of training of commanders to work using coded maps and negotiation tables show a formal attitude to the training of junior officers and non-commissioned officers from side of commanders and chiefs, which leads to unjustified losses.
So, the RD of the 91st OPDB, during reconnaissance in difficult weather conditions (fog) and mountainous terrain, lost orientation, went beyond the reconnaissance zone by 2 km. Continuing to carry out the task, I discovered a group of bandits in cars, which carried out reconnaissance of the Vedeno-Kharachoy route (the administrative border of Dagestan). RD entered into battle with the enemy and destroyed up to 20 bandits. Due to the significant superiority of the enemy in manpower, the RD suffered losses and caused artillery and aviation fire. However, due to the loss of orientation, the coordinates of the enemy, issued by the commander of the taxiway, did not correspond to reality. With the arrival of helicopters (MI-8 and MI-24) in the area of the alleged battle in order to evacuate the wounded and destroy the enemy, the enemy was not detected. Later, during the search, the MI-8 helicopter was fired upon, damaged and was forced to return in emergency mode to the Botlikh site. Combat helicopters, having worked on newly identified targets and not finding the location of the scouts, also returned to the Botlikh site. Further attempts to get in touch with the RD were unsuccessful. Due to the loss of communication and the lack of data on the exact position of the taxiway, artillery fire was fired only at pre-planned targets. The sent armored group could not break through to the battlefield due to the deep snow cover on the route. Subsequent searches for the taxiway by aviation and paratrooper units did not give positive results. Subsequently, during a survey of local residents, it was revealed that the RD fought in an area 1.5 km southeast of Kharacha, destroyed up to 20 militants, lost 12 people killed and 2 people were captured.
At the same time, the weakest link in the intelligence control system was the organization of communications, especially at the tactical level. As such, the communication system of the regiment's intelligence chief was simply not created due to the poor staffing of standard communications equipment and the lack of independent closed communication channels. As a result, the head of intelligence was forced to queue up for communication with other officials of the department, which made it impossible for him to quickly transmit information. The greatest difficulties arose when organizing closed communications at the lower level (company, platoon, squad, reconnaissance body), since the reconnaissance units were not provided with sufficient numbers of R-159 radio stations with the Historik closing equipment, and the radio stations used in the tactical level control, bugged by the enemy. In addition, there were problems with the provision of existing means of communication with power sources - batteries, chargers and power plants. The presence in units and subunits of means of communication of several generations with their own power sources causes difficulties with their charging and interchangeability, especially in small units that do not have a sufficient base for this. Insufficient equipment of both reconnaissance and combined arms units with technical reconnaissance equipment, especially night vision batteries for them, significantly reduced the effectiveness of reconnaissance at night and in conditions of limited visibility. In addition, ignorance of combat capabilities, poor skills of personnel in working with technical reconnaissance equipment, including the SBR-3 and PSNR-5 radars, led to their insufficient use. Also, due to the lack of batteries, the Realiya-U reconnaissance and signaling equipment was not used.
On the whole, the units of all types of reconnaissance carried out the tasks assigned to them, while demonstrating high moral and combat qualities, military skill and soldier's ingenuity. It should be noted that in the performance of combat missions, reconnaissance units experienced certain difficulties and difficulties, especially in logistical support. The low efficiency of reconnaissance equipment, the insufficient number of modern, small-sized portable radio communications equipment that ensure secrecy and efficiency of control, and the low level of training of individual commanders of reconnaissance units also had a negative effect on reconnaissance results. At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize a number of shortcomings that have had a significant impact on the use of forces and means of reconnaissance units, characteristic of most units and subunits:
1. The commanders and staffs of combined arms units in peacetime pay insufficient attention to the combat training and coherence of reconnaissance units, in tactical exercises, and sometimes in a combat situation, they use reconnaissance units for other purposes, often attracting scouts to protect the command post, do not train intelligence agencies to act in various conditions of the situation, even in their own interests, and reconnaissance classes in the city are not held at all. Unfortunately, gaps in training had to be filled in battle, while suffering unjustified losses.
2. Combined-arms units arrived at the combat area not at full strength, so most of the reconnaissance units were understaffed, and there was a particularly acute shortage of camouflage equipment and protective clothing, especially winter camouflage coats.
3. The commanders of units and subunits did not independently organize and conduct reconnaissance in the zone of responsibility, but only carried out the instructions of the grouping headquarters, received in the form of reconnaissance orders, so information about the enemy was practically not received from the headquarters of the regiments.
4. On the part of the command, due attention was not paid to the preparation of reconnaissance bodies for the performance of combat missions, an reconnaissance reserve was not created, in addition, scouts were constantly at the forefront in the combat formations of the advancing troops, and during a short rest they constituted a combined arms reserve.
After the commanders of combined-arms formations and units were given personal responsibility for the timely provision and preparation of reconnaissance units for the performance of tasks, the situation changed. The command took measures to staff the reconnaissance units to the full state, to provide the necessary reconnaissance equipment, especially communications equipment and night vision devices. The heads of military branches and services also bore personal responsibility for the timely replenishment of material and technical means, satisfying the requests of the commanders of reconnaissance units in the first place. Ultimately, the professional personal readiness of the combined arms commander, from the platoon commander and above, the skillful leadership of the headquarters, the clear setting of combat missions, including for reconnaissance units, the competent organization of interaction between all units taking part in the battle, timely and full technical and logistical support - components of achieving the main goal - victory over the enemy.
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CONDUCTING INTELLIGENCE EXERCISES WITH THE OFFICERS OF THE REGIMENT HEADQUARTERS
Combat experience teaches that reconnaissance must be carried out during any combat operations of troops, day and night, continuously and everywhere: in front of the front, on the flanks and in the rear. Obtaining information about the enemy must be of a concrete nature, and any new information must either be supplemented, or refined, or, finally, existing ones should be developed.
At the regimental headquarters, intelligence work is planned by the regimental intelligence officer. At the same time, he proceeds from the instructions of the regiment commander and chief of staff about what data and by what time it is necessary to obtain, what forces and means can be used for reconnaissance. However, regardless of whether instructions are received or not, the intelligence officer must always be ready to report to the chief of staff his thoughts on the organization and conduct of intelligence. To do this, he must continuously and carefully study the enemy.
Staff training exercises should be subordinated to the correct education of staff officers in this direction. This article aims to help the chief of staff of the regiment organize training sessions on reconnaissance issues on one of the topics "Breakthrough of the enemy's positional defense by a reinforced rifle regiment." To do this, we use the experience that has justified itself in practice in working on this topic in one of the rifle regiments.
At first, the chief of staff of the regiment conducted a group exercise with the staff officers, then headquarters training exercises, command-staff exercises, and, finally, exercises with the troops were sequentially held.
There were two training staff sessions on the topic under consideration. At the first of them, the issues of reconnaissance planning at the regimental headquarters (drawing up an reconnaissance plan) and the procedure for setting tasks for reconnaissance agencies were worked out; on the second - methods of processing intelligence data and compiling a report of an intelligence officer to the chief of staff of the regiment. Each of these sessions took 2 hours. Classes were conducted by the method of group exercise on a box of sand. Below, using the example of the first lesson, we show the methodology for training staff officers and senior adjutants of battalions on intelligence issues.
On the eve of the lesson, the chief of staff handed over the following task to all participants (given in abbreviated form).
The task
Topic: "The work of the intelligence officer of the regiment to organize intelligence when breaking through the positional defense of the enemy".
General environment. The enemy, having been defeated in battles at the turn of 30-35 km northwest and north of the river. Sosnovka, withdrew to a previously prepared defensive line along the southern and southwestern banks of the river. Sosnovka.
The advanced units of the N-th Infantry Division, pursuing the retreating enemy, reached the northeastern bank of the river. Sosnovka; their further advance was stopped by the enemy's rifle-machine-gun and mortar-artillery fire.
Private setting. The 1st battalion of the 95th regiment, acting in the vanguard, reached the line of Lyakhovo, Sosnovka by 14.00 on 20.8.46, where it was stopped by organized fire from the southwestern and southern banks of the river. Sosnovka. The position of the units of the 95th Infantry Regiment, neighbors and the enemy is shown in diagram 1.
The regimental headquarters officers know that the 95th regiment with the 1st battery of the N-th anti-tank division and two sapper companies 24.8 breaks through the enemy defenses in the Lyakhovo, Sosnovka sector (both claims), destroys the enemy in the area of \u200b\u200bheight 280.3, " Lesnaya" and masters the height "Forest".
On the right, in the direction of Lipovo, the 91st Rifle Regiment of the N division is advancing. The dividing line with him - according to the scheme.
On the left, in the direction of height 262.8, the 94th regiment is advancing. The dividing line with it is shown in the diagram.
The chief of staff assigned the following tasks to the intelligence officer of the regiment:
- find out which part of the enemy is acting against the regiment and what is the nature of the fortifications in the area of its defense, especially on the northwestern edge of the grove (0.75 km southeast of Leonov);
- clarify the front line of defense: the presence of artificial obstacles in front of the regiment's front, the location of anti-tank guns, long-term firing points, wood-earth firing points; pay special attention to the exploration of the area south and southeast of Leonovo;
- on the night of August 23, organize a search to capture prisoners in the area of the northeastern edge of the grove (0.75 km southeast of Leonovo), report the results of the search by 7.00 23.8; check the organization of observation in the battalions and establish the interaction of the observation posts of the regiment, battalions and regimental artillery group;
- report the reconnaissance plan, the scheme of organization of observation by 20.8.46, the search plan - by 16.00 22.8; when drawing up a search plan, take into account that the actions of scouts during the search will be supported by the fire of a mortar company and an artillery battalion.
Assignment to trainees. By the beginning of the lesson, draw up a plan for reconnaissance of the regiment for the period of preparation for a breakthrough.
Having handed this task to the officers, the chief of staff recalled that when drawing up a reconnaissance plan, it is necessary first to determine what information, in addition to those required by the division commander and headquarters, may be needed for a more complete and correct assessment of the enemy, which of the already available data needs to be checked, what information can be obtained from battalions, artillerymen, neighbors and higher headquarters, and finally, to obtain what data new intelligence agencies should be sent.
Conducting training sessions
At the appointed hour, when the officers gathered, the chief of staff explained on what scale the box with sand was prepared for training (the box was covered with a net; each cell of 10 cm corresponded to 250 m on the ground). After that, the chief of staff suggested that the officers study the name of the local objects depicted on the sand box.
Having completed the study of the relief, the leader proceeds to review the reconnaissance plans drawn up by the trainees. At the same time, comparing plans, he refrains from evaluating them, giving the trainees themselves the opportunity to discuss this or that plan. So, when comparing two identical plans, in which intelligence issues were not fully reflected, the leader demanded that one of the officers, who had a more complete plan, analyze these plans. The officer noted that the proposed plans do not contain an indication of reconnaissance by observation, there are no requests from neighbors, the task is missed - to establish the nature of the fortifications and the availability of firepower along the northern and northwestern edges of the grove; time of the search was not specified.
The head approved the assessment made by the officer, adding at the same time that the plans under consideration still lack the task of determining the grouping of enemy reserves. He ordered the trainees to double-check their plans and make corrections to them. 10 minutes were allotted for this work.
After the expiration of the specified period, the head again heard the officers and, having made instructions about the insufficiently clear setting of tasks, formulated the tasks himself. Then, for training purposes, he distributed to the officers his reconnaissance plan, which he had previously drawn up (see plan below).
INTELLIGENCE PLAN
95 cn for the period of preparing a breakthrough on 20-24.8.46
| Tasks or objects of intelligence | Performers and means | Exploration time | Time, methods and points of delivery of reports | |
| Start | the end | |||
| 1. Clarify the front edge of the enemy defensive zone in the Lyakhovo, Sosnovka sector and the presence of bunkers (bunkers); establish the nature of the fortifications, artificial obstacles, the presence and location of anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns, especially in the area of the northern and northwestern edges of the forest, the northern and northeastern slopes of height 280.3. | Command intelligence of officers of the regiment, battalions and regimental artillery group. Application for aerial reconnaissance. | To the command post of the regiment by 10.00 and 20.00 - daily. Same |
||
| 2. Reconnoiter which part of the unit is defending the front line in the Leonovo, Sosnovka sector; where are the joints and flanks of the units | Reconnaissance group - night search to capture prisoners. Request neighboring parts. | By 5.00 a personal report on the results of the search. | ||
| 3. Determine - the grouping of enemy reserves in the offensive zone of the regiment - in the areas of the eastern slopes of a height of 280.3, a forest 1.5 km southeast of Leonovo, a height of "Forest". | Request to the tripod. Interrogation of prisoners. Request neighbors. | By 20.00. 23.8 | ||
| 4. Establish an enemy artillery grouping in the regiment's offensive zone. | Observation posts of the regiment and battalions. | Daily at 7.00 and 20.00 | ||
After a break, the head began to work on the second training issue - "Setting tasks for intelligence agencies."
“In the intelligence plan,” the leader said, “the tasks and objects of intelligence are indicated, as well as who performs these tasks. You are required to think through and verbally set the task for the intelligence agencies. For example, consider the procedure for setting the task of conducting a search.”
After giving a few minutes to think over the issue, the head called one of the officers and ordered him to assign a task to the commander of the reconnaissance platoon participating in the search.
The summoned officer decided to set the task while at the observation post. It was an erroneous decision, and the leader invited another trainee to answer the question: where will he set the task for the platoon commander? The officer replied that he would have set the task from the trenches of the 1st battalion of the 95th regiment, i.e., being against the search object. Only from this place it is possible to set a specific task and, together with the platoon commander, think over a plan of action. This decision was recognized as correct, and the head, approving it, suggested that the first officer continue to set the task.
The officer, having familiarized the platoon commander (one of the trainees played for him) with the situation, gave the following order: "Your platoon on the night of 23.8 to conduct a search in the area of \u200b\u200bthe northern edge of the forest (showed on the ground). The actions of the platoon will be supported by the mortar company of the battalion and the artillery battalion "Today and tomorrow carefully reconnoiter the object of the search by observation. By 16.00 23.8, develop a search plan for a report on it to the chief of staff of the regiment."
The leader, wanting to know how the officer understood the problem, suggested that he repeat the order received.
In the same order, the leader forced two or three more officers to set a task for the platoon commander and, summing up the decisions, formulated it himself.
With this, he ended the first lesson and briefly reviewed it.
The second lesson was held by the chief of staff of the regiment on the same assignment. Now the inputs were in the nature of intelligence data obtained from various sources. This obliged the officers to process the data and report their findings about the enemy.
The lesson was carried out in the same way. At the same time, the leader paid attention to how the trainees compare the information received with the data already available before, how they determine the degree of reliability of new information, and how, based on the results of intelligence, they draw a conclusion about the enemy, his grouping, forces and intentions.
The training sessions given by us, which are simple in their organization and methodology, will be the more useful for the officers, the more thoughtfully the leader treats them.
"Military Bulletin" No. 16 for 1946