Iran has already created a nuclear bomb, it just lies elsewhere. Foreign press about Russia and not only Iran's nuclear potential

The pressure that the United States and the West in general is applying to Iran to keep it from acquiring nuclear weapons is completely in vain. The Islamic Republic already has not only nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union, but enough enriched uranium to produce new weapons. And to make matters worse, Iran has delivery vehicles.

The West has worried for about a decade about Iran's expanding uranium production capabilities, believing that Iran is working on a nuclear bomb, even though the government continues to insist that its uranium enrichment program is purely peaceful.

When Iran started its nuclear program in the mid-1980s, I worked as a CIA spy inside the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Guardian Intelligence at the time learned of Saddam Hussein's attempt to acquire a nuclear bomb for Iraq. Corps command concluded that they needed a nuclear bomb, because if Saddam had one, he would use it against Iran. At that time, the two countries were at war.

Mohsen Rezaei, then commander of the Guardians, received permission from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to start a covert program to acquire nuclear weapons. To this end, the Guardians engaged Pakistani generals and Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.

Commander Ali Shamkhani traveled to Pakistan offering billions of dollars for the bomb, but all talks ended instead with blueprints and centrifuges. The first centrifuge was flown to Iran on Khomeini's private jet.

In a second but parallel attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, Iran turned to the former Soviet republics. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, Iran craved the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons that had been dispersed throughout the former republics of the Union.

In the early 1990s, the CIA asked me to find an Iranian scientist who would testify that Iran had a bomb. The CIA learned that Iranian intelligence agents traveled to nuclear facilities throughout the former Soviet Union, and in doing so showed a particular interest in Kazakhstan.

Muslim Iran was actively courting Kazakhstan, which had a large part of the Soviet arsenal, but which was predominantly Muslim, and Tehran offered him hundreds of millions of dollars for a bomb. Soon there were reports that three nuclear warheads were missing. This was confirmed by Russian General Viktor Samoilov, who dealt with disarmament issues for the General Staff. He acknowledged that three warheads had disappeared from Kazakhstan.

Meanwhile, Paul Muenstermann, then vice-president of Germany's federal intelligence service, said Iran had received two of its three nuclear warheads, as well as medium-range nuclear delivery vehicles, from Kazakhstan. He also revealed that Iran had purchased four 152mm nuclear munitions from the former Soviet Union, which were reportedly stolen and sold by former Red Army officers.

To make matters worse, a few years later, Russian officials claimed that when they compared documents on the transfer of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia, they found a discrepancy of no less than 250 nuclear warheads.

Last week, Mathew Nasuti, a former US Air Force captain who at some point was hired by the State Department as an adviser to one of the provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq, said that in March 2008, during a briefing on Iran at the State Department, a departmental expert on the Middle East told a group that it was "common knowledge" that Iran acquired tactical nuclear weapons from one or more of the former Soviet republics.

Lieutenant Colonel Tony Shaffer, an experienced intelligence officer awarded the Bronze Star ( military medal, American military award for bravery, the fourth highest award in the US Armed Forces, established in February 1944 - approx. transl.), told me that his sources say that Iran now has two working nuclear warheads.

An editorial in the Iranian newspaper Kayhan, a newspaper under the direct supervision of Iran's spiritual leader's office, warned last year that if Iran was attacked, nuclear explosions would follow in American cities.

Despite the firm knowledge that Iranian leaders are seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, Western leaders have chosen the path of negotiation and appeasement in the hope of finding a solution to the Iranian issue. About three years into the Obama administration, we must admit that the policy of first the carrot of goodwill and cooperation, and then the stick of sanctions, failed to convince the Iranians to abandon their nuclear program, and failed to contain their aggressive positioning. Today, Iranian leaders, despite four sets of UN sanctions, continue to pursue both their missile and nuclear enrichment programs and have enough enriched uranium to build six nuclear bombs, according to the latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report. .

There is a fierce debate surrounding President Obama's nuclear deal with Iran, and he has said that 99% of the world community agrees with it. "Here, in fact, there are only two alternatives. Either the problem of obtaining a nuclear weapon by Iran is solved diplomatically, through negotiations, or it is solved by force, through war. Those are the alternatives," Obama said.

But, there is another alternative - it has long been available, as evidenced by the timing of its development. - In the 60s of the 20th century, the Shah of Iran made an attempt to change the way of life that had developed over the centuries. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, attempted the so-called "white revolution" or, in modern terms, modernization. It was an attempt to westernize the country, to transfer it to the western rails. Thus, on March 5, 1957, Iran signed an agreement with the United States on cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy in the framework of the Atoms for Peace program. In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established, and Iran immediately became a member of the IAEA the following year.

In 1963, Iran joined the Atmospheric, Outer Space and Underwater Test Ban Treaty. The agreement was signed by the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in Moscow on August 5, 1963. The creation of a nuclear center at Tehran University can also be attributed to the important results of this stage. In 1967, an American research reactor with a capacity of 5 MW was commissioned at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center, fueled by more than 5.5 kg of highly enriched uranium. In the same year, the United States supplied the Center with a gram amount of plutonium for research purposes, as well as "hot cells" capable of separating up to 600 g of plutonium annually. Thus, the foundation was laid for the creation of a scientific and technical base for the development of nuclear energy in Iran.

On July 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which provides for the use of nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes, and ratified it in 1970. In 1974, the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, published a plan for the development of nuclear energy, thereby setting the task of building 23 nuclear reactors with a total capacity of 23 GW within twenty years, as well as creating a closed nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). "The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran was established to implement the program.

In 1974, for $1 billion, the AEOI acquired a ten percent stake in a gaseous diffusion plant for uranium enrichment, which was being built in Tricastan (France), from the international consortium Eurodif, co-owned by the Spanish company ENUSA, the Belgian Synatom, the Italian Enea.

At the same time, Tehran received the right to buy out the plant's products and have full access to the enrichment technology developed by the consortium. In order to train Iranian scientists and engineers who were to operate the nuclear power plant, in 1974 in Isfahan, together with French specialists, the construction of the Nuclear Research Center began. By 1980, it was planned to place in it a research reactor and a French-made SNF reprocessing facility. 1979 - the Islamic revolution took place in the country, the Shah was overthrown, the new Iranian government abandoned the nuclear power plant construction program. Not only foreign specialists left the country, but also a large number of Iranians who participated in the nuclear project. A few years later, when the situation in the country stabilized, the Iranian leadership resumed the implementation of the nuclear program. In Isfahan, with the help of China, a training and research center with a heavy water research reactor was established, and uranium ore mining was continued. At the same time, Iran was negotiating the purchase of uranium enrichment and heavy water production technologies with Swiss and German companies. Iranian physicists visited the National Institute of Nuclear Physics and High Energy Physics in Amsterdam and the Petten Nuclear Center in the Netherlands. 1992 - Russia and Iran signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of peaceful use of atomic energy, providing for a number of areas. 1995 - Russia signed an agreement to complete the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Bushehr.

Russian specialists of the Atomstroyexport company analyzed the state of affairs, as a result of which a decision was made on the possibility of using building structures and equipment left on the site after the German contractor left Iran. The integration of different types of equipment required, however, a huge amount of additional research, design, construction and installation work. The cost of the first power unit with a capacity of 1,000 MW is about $1 billion. The supplier of the reactors under the project is the United Machine-Building Plants company, and the equipment for the machine rooms is Power Machines. Atomstroyexport plans to complete installation of equipment at the nuclear power plant in early 2007. Delivery of fuel elements to NPPs from Russia will take place no earlier than autumn 2006. Fuel for Bushehr has already been produced and stored at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant.

Atomstroyexport is also ready to take part in the construction of a second nuclear power plant in Iran - in the southwestern province of Khuzestan. 1995 - The United States unilaterally imposed trade and economic sanctions against Iran, and after the signing of the Gor-Chernomyrdin memorandum, Russia froze the supply of military equipment to Iran. However, Iran has never stopped working on nuclear weapons. And if the beginning of these works was 1957, then more than 50 years have passed since then, and there was plenty of time to implement this project.

For comparison, let's consider how long the atomic bomb was created in the USSR, given that then this project was really new, and stealing today is even easier, and what to steal if this is no longer news. On August 5, 1949, a plutonium charge was accepted by a commission headed by Khariton and sent by letter train to KB-11. By this time, work on the creation of an explosive device was almost completed here. Here, on the night of August 10-11, a control assembly of a nuclear charge was carried out, which received the index 501 for the RDS-1 atomic bomb. After that, the device was dismantled, the parts were inspected, packed and prepared for shipment to the landfill. Thus, the Soviet atomic bomb was made in 2 years 8 months (in the USA it took 2 years 7 months).

The test of the first Soviet nuclear charge 501 was carried out on August 29, 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site (the device was located on the tower).

The power of the explosion was 22 Kt. The design of the charge repeated the American "Fat Man", although the electronic filling was of Soviet design. The atomic charge was a multilayer structure in which plutonium was transferred to a critical state by compression by a converging spherical detonation wave. In the center of the charge was placed 5 kg of plutonium, in the form of two hollow hemispheres, surrounded by a massive shell of uranium-238 (tamper). This shell The first Soviet nuclear bomb - the scheme served to inertially contain the nucleus swelling during the chain reaction, so that as much of the plutonium as possible had time to react and, in addition, served as a neutron reflector and moderator (low-energy neutrons are most effectively absorbed by plutonium nuclei, causing them division). The tamper was surrounded by an aluminum shell, which ensured uniform compression of the nuclear charge by the shock wave. A neutron initiator (fuse) was installed in the cavity of the plutonium core - a beryllium ball with a diameter of about 2 cm, covered with a thin layer of polonium-210. When the nuclear charge of the bomb is compressed, the nuclei of polonium and beryllium approach each other, and alpha particles emitted by radioactive polonium-210 knock out neutrons from beryllium, which initiate a chain nuclear fission reaction of plutonium-239. One of the most complex knots was an explosive charge consisting of two layers.

The inner layer consisted of two hemispherical bases made of an alloy of TNT and RDX, while the outer layer was assembled from individual elements with different detonation velocities. The outer layer, designed to form a spherical converging detonation wave at the base of the explosive, was called the focusing system. For safety reasons, the installation of the node containing fissile material was carried out immediately before the charge was applied. To do this, in the spherical explosive charge there was a through conical hole, which was closed with a cork made of explosives, and in the outer and inner cases there were holes closed with lids. The power of the explosion was due to the fission of the nuclei of about a kilogram of plutonium, the remaining 4 kg did not have time to react and was uselessly sprayed. During the implementation of the RDS-1 creation program, many new ideas arose for improving nuclear charges (increasing the utilization factor of fissile material, reducing dimensions and weight). New samples of charges have become more powerful, more compact and "smarter" than the first.

So, comparing two well-known facts, we conclude that Iran has nuclear weapons, and negotiations were conducted on a different issue, for example, that Iran would sell oil for dollars, etc. And what else could stop America from attacking Iran. The fact that Iran does not officially recognize that it has a bomb frees it from many problems, and those who are supposed to know already know.

The controversy over Iran's nuclear program turns out to be nothing more than ordinary hysteria. Here, for example, as Senator John McCain said: "There can be only one thing worse than military action: if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon." I want to quote Shakespeare: "Much Ado About Nothing." Only now there is really too much noise, and some people at the top are too serious about the fact that it is really time to launch military operations and prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Why is it so important and why for them?

First, what terrible thing will happen if tomorrow Iran has a nuclear weapon? To date, nine countries have it - the United States, Great Britain, Russia, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. What will change if Iran becomes tenth? Who will he be a threat to? Who will he bomb? At the moment, it doesn't look like Iran is being aggressive. No, the current president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, spoke out extremely hostilely about Israel, which is located quite far from Iran. But does this mean that he is going to bomb Israel and that he has enough military power for this? Talking is one thing, acting is quite another.

But if Iran is not going to bomb anyone, why does it need weapons? The reasons are obvious. Of the nine states that possess weapons, at least eight could well direct them against Iran. It would be very naive for the Iranian government not to think about it. Also, the United States invaded Iraq but didn't touch North Korea - precisely because Iraq didn't have nuclear weapons and North Korea did, that's the whole difference.

The second (also obvious) reason is the public interest. It should not be forgotten that Iran has been striving to become a nuclear power even before the current president came to power - from the time of the Shah, even before the revolution. Of course, the status of a “middle” power, which includes Iran, will greatly increase in the geopolitical arena if it becomes a member of the nuclear club. Iran acts in the public interest, like any other country, and no doubt would like to play the main fiddle in its region.

But do his aspirations threaten the rest of the region? When the first nuclear tests were carried out in the Soviet Union in 1949, the West began to feverish. But now there is no doubt that from the time of testing in 1949 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, hostilities between the States and the USSR were avoided mainly due to the fact that both powers had nuclear weapons. It was on the fear of mutual destruction that the world was kept even at times when relations between the two sides were especially strained - during the joint occupation of Berlin, the Caribbean crisis and the war in Afghanistan. Clashes between India and Pakistan over Kashmir have not led to serious action precisely because both sides have nuclear weapons.

Couldn't the threat of mutual destruction similarly balance power in the Middle East? Perhaps if Iran gets a nuclear weapon, it will pacify its neighbors. It is commonly objected that the Iranian government is not "rational enough" to refuse to use a nuclear bomb. This is complete nonsense - moreover, smacking of nationalism. The Iranian government is no more stupid than the Bush government and does not openly declare its intentions to attack anyone.

Then what caused all this hysteria? Henry Kissinger already explained everything a year ago, and recently Thomas Friedman repeated the same thing in The New York Times. There is no doubt that as soon as Iran has nuclear weapons, the dam will burst, and at least 10-15 more countries will make every effort to join the ranks of nuclear powers. Among the obvious contenders are South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, Egypt, Iraq (yes, Iraq), South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and many European countries. In 2015, the number of nuclear weapons holders may reach twenty-five.

Dangerously? Of course, because there can always be some lunatic or a group of lunatics who will get to the button. But in the nine nuclear powers that exist today, there are certainly such crazy people, and it is unlikely that there will be much more of them in the fifteen pretender powers. Nuclear disarmament is still necessary, but non-nuclear disarmament must also be carried out within its framework.

Why is the United States haunted by the possible transformation of Iran into a nuclear state? Because if medium-sized states have nuclear weapons, this will greatly weaken the States. But there is no question of disturbing the peace of the world. Should we then expect a United States invasion of Iran or an Israeli attack? It is unlikely, since the United States now does not have enough military power, the Iraqi government will not provide support, and Israel alone will not be able to cope. There is only one conclusion - much ado about nothing.

The problem of the possibility of Iran's creation of nuclear weapons has long been among the first topics of world politics. In recent months and days, she has become one of the main ones. Especially after last week Iranian President M. Ahmadinejad, speaking at the youth conference "World without Zionism", stated the following: "Imam Khomeini said that the Zionist regime should be wiped off the face of the earth and with the help of divine power the world will live without USA and Israel. Although the president only quoted the words of the late ayatollah, his words, perceived by many as an unofficial declaration of war on Israel, were condemned with varying degrees of harshness throughout the non-Muslim world, including Russia. The Palestinian leader openly distanced himself from the words of the Iranian president. Some figures in Iran, including those in the ruling circles, pointed out that the statement is contrary to Iranian interests and exacerbates the country's foreign policy positions.

There are rumors that the country's top spiritual leadership, which has most of the real power, intends to limit the powers of the president in the field of foreign policy. Most of the leaders of Muslim countries remained silent.

But the statement sharply aggravated the discussion around the problem of Iran and nuclear weapons. Now it will no longer fade into the background and may, in the coming months, lead to a sharp aggravation of the international situation. Russia faces a difficult problem.

I will try to give my own, of course, as far as possible an objectivist interpretation of this most complicated situation.

Iran, with its more than sixty million people, has managed to make significant progress in recent decades. Unlike all other Muslim countries in the wider Middle East, the country managed to curb population growth even before the start of the oil boom, showed growth in GNP per capita. Its elite, both spiritual and secular, are not only highly educated. Iran by the standards of the region is a relatively democratic state. There is an opposition press, regularly closed, opposition parties, whose representatives are often not allowed before the elections. This "democracy" is "over-managed", even by our standards, but much more developed than in many CIS countries. Elections are being held in Iran. The current president, considered a radical conservative, defeated the more moderate former president Rafsanjani, who heads the Expediency Council, one of the two highest bodies through which the religious establishment actually runs the country.

The Iranian elite believes that the country is in a strategic environment and does not trust or fear most of its neighbors. She has reasons for this. No one helped Iran in the war with Iraq, even when Hussein used chemical weapons.

The United States, which has not been able to forget the humiliation associated with the overthrow of the Shah and the taking of hostages in the American embassy for three decades, and suspecting Tehran of supporting a number of terrorist movements, is pursuing an openly hostile policy towards Iran. Only recently have there been signs of readiness for dialogue. The Americans dominate neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq and are very influential in a nuclear-armed Pakistan. The Iranian elite, which feels like the heir to the great Persia, treats its Arab neighbors with suspicion, if not contempt. Nearby is not officially, but really nuclear Israel, to which Tehran treats with undisguised hostility and suspicion. The feeling is mutual. The country feels wounded, seeks to break out of international semi-isolation and ensure the country's security. The view from Tehran suffers from a "besieged fortress" complex, strikingly reminiscent of the attitude of the Soviet leadership in the late 70s and early 80s.

It is against this background that Iran's nuclear program is developing. Officially, Iran, a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), says it does not build such weapons. But few people believe him, although he has not yet formally violated the Treaty.

With all due respect to the leadership of Iran, I do not believe his assurances either. Any country in the geopolitical situation of Iran, which has neither allies nor security guarantees, seeking to increase its political status, would strive to create weapons, or at least to get the opportunity to create them. Especially with India, Pakistan, Israel in front of our eyes, who created nuclear weapons without losing their political status.

But understanding is not the same as accepting. Obtaining weapons by Iran threatens to seriously undermine regional and global security. An almost fatal blow to the NPT will be dealt, neighboring Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, Egypt) will receive a powerful incentive to create their own bomb. A nuclear arms race could unfold in the world's most explosive region. We will have to forget about the "strategic stability" formula. We will have to think about how to manage strategic instability. No one can rule out preemptive strikes. The possession of nuclear weapons by an ideological regime that fears everyone and develops delivery systems of great antiquity cannot but create a sense of danger in many countries - from Europe to Russia and China. Nor will it enhance Iran's security. It will automatically become a target for the arsenals of nuclear powers, including, I think, Russia.

What to do. After the Iranian president's statement, it is unlikely that anyone will veto new sanctions against Iran if the issue of its nuclear weapons does come to the Security Council. But these sanctions will be obviously ineffective, like most sanctions, and will only strengthen the radical elements in Iran.

Whether there is still an opportunity to stop Iran's nuclear program, which looks like a military one, will largely depend on the leadership of Iran. But also from the skillful diplomacy of other countries. First of all the USA. A few months ago, after decades of hostile ignorance, they seemed to hint at the possibility of direct negotiations, and the "European troika", which played the role of "good cop" but achieved little from Tehran, could do something. The latter, it seems, even managed to use negotiations with her to gain time.

Russia will have to get involved more actively, as it secretly plays the role of yet another intermediary. We have almost completed the construction of Bushehr, despite severe pressure, and have proved to all potential customers of nuclear reactors that we are a reliable partner.

But we didn't build Bushehr for a power that violates the NPT.

I think that we should try to solve the problem of Iran's nuclearization in a broader context. Russia hinted at it, and now it must openly and clearly offer it. The main driving force behind Iran's suspected nuclear program is the sense of danger among the Iranian elite, the widespread distrust of each other in the wider Middle East region.

It is high time to propose the creation of a security system for this region, guaranteed by the great powers, including India and China. It is necessary to initiate the Helsinki process for the region with the participation of these powers. Otherwise, even if we once again solve the "Iranian crisis", it and others like it will arise again and again.

And the Ransky Foreign Ministry gave Europe two months to decide.

During this time, European countries should give Tehran clear guarantees that they will comply with the terms of the 2015 nuclear agreement. Otherwise, Iran reserves the right to make a "forced decision". This was announced in an ultimatum form by Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran Abbas Arakchi on May 13, 2018.

It is not difficult to guess what these “forced decisions” will be. Iran will once again start developing its own nuclear weapons. And it will take him very little time. The fact is that Iran, as a very reasonable country claiming regional status, probably made sure.

Nuclear arms race in the Middle East

So, Iran's statement clearly hints that Iran is preparing to resume its military nuclear program. The Saudis have the same plans, and Israel, as we know, has long been a member of the nuclear club with an alleged couple of hundred ammunition. Moreover, Saudi Arabia, most likely, expects to “accelerate” work on the creation of a nuclear bomb through negotiations with Pakistan, to which it once gave money to create the first “vigorous loaf” in the Islamic world.

I am sure that this path is the least expensive and most feasible for the kingdom. Iran, on the other hand, has been developing nuclear weapons independently and thoroughly. By the beginning of the 2010s, he achieved quite a lot of success in this direction, but under pressure from the United States he was forced to curtail work. I have every reason to believe that they were not completely rolled up. Or rather, not folded at all, but in a different place ...

Iran's missile program (nuances)

We touched on this topic in detail when we considered the capabilities of the Iranian strategic missile forces and Israel's missile defense system to repel their strike, if required in the future. Now the time has come to tell what I then preferred to keep silent, but which I had already mentioned in passing. I have always been "embarrassed" by the obvious complementarity of North Korea's nuclear missile program and Iran's nuclear missile shield program.

Iran has created good BR SD, but did not make ICBMs. In turn, the DPRK focused on these missiles. Iran has created new warhead guidance systems. And also a separable warhead, which primarily makes sense for nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Koreans not only created a nuclear charge, but also worked on its miniaturization (how successful is the question, but it's a matter of time and money) and did not "bother" with the creation of accurate guidance systems and multiple warheads.

Interesting logic, right? If we dig deeper, then the sharp intensification of the development of nuclear weapons and new missiles in the DPRK began precisely when Iran abandoned such developments at home. And it was then that they were able to achieve great and most importantly for many unexpected successes in this matter. And few people wondered where the DPRK got the resources for all this.

Of course, one can assume that the whole point is in China and its help. There is logic in this too. What if it's Iran? It is no secret that Pyongyang obtained many secrets by buying them from countries such as Ukraine. The developments of Soviet designers largely served as the basis for the work of North Korean specialists. But few people already remember that since the beginning of the 2000s, it was Iran that has been very densely hilling the Ukrainian leadership and has received a lot of valuable knowledge from it in the field of rocket science and even bought samples from it (for example, several X-55 cruise missiles).

And it's not a secret that earlier Iran and the DPRK cooperated very closely in this industry and the scheme of Iranian money in exchange for a missile product has long been worked out in relations between the two countries. This, together with the presence of serious financial opportunities in Tehran and the lack of such in the DPRK, make us look at the problem of creating an Iranian nuclear bomb in a completely different way. But what if it is already created and just lies in another place.

Denuclearization of North Korea or nuclearization of the Middle East

No one knows how many nuclear warheads the DPRK has today. Like no one knows about the secret agreements between the two regimes. And how can one not recall here the suddenly serious revision by Pyongyang of its attitude towards its nuclear program. Kim Jong-un is now very willing to meet the United States on the issue of nuclear disarmament. A year ago, he declared that his country would never part with a nuclear bomb, and today Washington is even announcing the dates when such an event could happen (2020).

Let them be hypothetical for now, but still the breakthrough is very remarkable. And if we assume that all developments on the bomb, as well as part of the warheads, will be transported to Iran? Say it's impossible? Not sure. Then, having its own centrifuges and production facilities, in a couple of years Tehran will be able to become a full owner of nuclear weapons (and intercontinental missiles to boot). And for the first time, in order to discourage Israel from doing stupid things, a dozen North Korean charges will suffice. After all, the Israeli missile defense system is not yet ready to counter this threat, and in ten years all this may become meaningless... So, as we see the nuclear threat from Iran, this is not a bluff at all. Moreover, the most interesting thing is that Tehran did not violate the terms of the 2015 agreement.