Nuclear weapons of Belarus. Nuclear Powers of the World. What quick and adequate measures are we talking about?

As a response to the nuclear shield that the United States is about to deploy over Eastern Europe, Russia may place part of its nuclear facilities on the territory of Belarus. Such a statement was made today by the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Belarus Alexander Surikov, specifying, however, that it depends "on the political integration of the two countries." Earlier, Alexander Lukashenko emphasized that he regretted the withdrawal of nuclear facilities from the territory of the republic in the early 90s and that now he would have acted differently.

Russian Ambassador to Belarus Alexander Surikov did not rule out the deployment of new Russian military facilities in Belarus as a response to the deployment by the United States of the Eastern European missile defense system. Moreover, Surikov emphasized that he was talking about "objects related to nuclear weapons," the Interfax news agency reports.

The statement was made by Surikov today. “Everything depends on the level of our political integration,” the ambassador specified, as well as “on the opinions of experts, diplomats and the military: it is necessary, it is possible, when, how.”

The words of the Russian ambassador have already caused a significant stir in the Belarusian media, and a number of politicians (albeit from the category of the former) rushed to comment.

Thus, in an interview with the Belarusian resource “Charter’97”, the former Minister of Defense of the Republic, Pavel Kozlovsky, said that he personally did not understand “what Mr. Surikov is based on.”

“Relations between Russia and Belarus have only been deteriorating lately. There is a clear disintegration. I think that Lukashenka, despite his previous regrets about the withdrawal of nuclear missiles, is not interested in hosting Russian nuclear facilities,” Kozlovsky stressed.

Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus Andrei Sannikov commented on the words of the diplomat in even harsher tones: “Ambassador Surikov apparently forgot that he is not somewhere in the Altai Territory, but in independent Belarus. Such statements, firstly, are not characteristic of diplomats, and secondly, they can be regarded as an encroachment on the sovereignty of the state.”

According to Sannikov, the Russian ambassador could hardly have made such a statement without the sanction of the Russian leadership, which means that these statements should be taken very seriously, "up to the revision of the status of Russian military facilities on the territory of Belarus." His country, according to the former deputy minister, "is being dragged into the new confrontation and arms race."

“Russia once again confirms that it is a source of lower security for an independent state, both energy and military,” notes Sannikov, who in the early 90s participated in negotiations on the withdrawal of nuclear facilities from Belarus.

Recall that in 1990-1991, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, on whose territory part of the nuclear weapons of the USSR were located, transferred it to the Russian Federation, and after the signing of the Lisbon Protocol in 1992, they were declared countries without nuclear weapons.

This protocol is an addition to the Soviet-American Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

Thus, Russia became the legal successor of the USSR, retained the status of a nuclear power, the seat of a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and assumed many common obligations with the union republics, including the payment of debts.

In the future, Alexander Lukashenko expressed regret that all the missiles were removed from the territory of Belarus. Last year, he even suggested the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons if there was an immediate threat to the Union State.

He also stressed that his country once renounced the possession of nuclear weapons without any preconditions. However, if the issue of renunciation of nuclear weapons "would be raised now," he would "not do so."

However, he also noted that “now there is no need to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in the first strike zone” and “there are enough necessary weapons in the Russian Federation, which, in which case, can be used in Belarus.”

All these words were said by Alexander Lukashenko in June 2006, that is, before relations between the union republics became noticeably more complicated due to the “oil and gas war”.

The transfer to Belarus of one or more brigades of the Iskander operational-tactical missile systems, which can be armed with 50 megaton nuclear warheads, will be the cheapest and fastest response to the appearance of a US tank division in Poland.

Nuclear weapons may return to Belarus as a "last resort", says military observer Alexander Alesin .

On October 24, Minsk hosted a meeting of the joint board of the defense ministries of Belarus and Russia. The heads of the military departments of the two countries Andrei Ravkov and Sergei Shoigu discussed the implementation of the Plan of joint measures to ensure the military security of the Union State

“The plans of the Polish government to permanently deploy a division of the US Armed Forces on its territory are counterproductive and do not contribute to maintaining stability and strengthening regional security,” Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said. “Under these conditions, we are forced to take retaliatory measures and must be ready to neutralize possible military threats in all directions.”

What could be the Russian response to the appearance of a tank division in Poland? Possible Answers with a Military Expert Alexander Alesin.

Russia is not going to take preventive measures - we are talking about the answer. But the answer will be prompt and adequate to the degree of threat that, according to the Russian Minister of Defense, will arise in this case: the threat of destabilization of the situation in our region. Simply put, if the balance of power changes seriously.

The US tank division, according to various estimates, has up to 300 Bradley tanks with all the means of reinforcement: both multiple rocket launchers and self-propelled artillery mounts. Since the tank division will operate "on the outskirts" of the US Army, then, of course, the division will be provided with everything necessary to conduct independent military operations. A tank division appears to be a rather formidable combat unit numbering no less than 10,000 men.

Russia believes that a tank division may appear on the border with the Russian Federation; however, Belarus has a larger common border with Poland than Russia. Therefore, Belarus can consider the deployment of a tank division in Poland as a threat to itself, as Makei said in Brussels more than a year ago. Recently, a representative of the Foreign Ministry repeated the thesis that this would lead to an imbalance, and Belarus would take measures to ensure its security.

What kind of quick and adequate measures are we talking about?

I believe that such a response could be the transfer to Belarus of one or more brigades of Iskander operational-tactical missile systems, which are armed with the Russian ground forces in the Western Military District, and maybe in the Central. At a speed of 70 kilometers per hour with a power reserve of a thousand kilometers, in 12-15 hours, the Iskander complexes from the territory of the Western Military District can arrive on the territory of Belarus on their own and within a few tens of minutes can be prepared for firing. It turns out "cheap and cheerful."

If this is not a temporary raid, but permanent accommodation, then you will need hangars to accommodate military equipment, repair zones are needed, and most importantly, barracks to accommodate personnel. The rest of the infrastructure (an extensive network of paved and unpaved roads) is present in Belarus, which provides ample room for maneuver.

If we assume that the complexes will receive nuclear weapons (the Iskander may be armed with 50 kiloton warheads), then storage facilities for warheads will also be needed; in Soviet times there were such storages, but I suspect that hardly any of them meet modern requirements and are able to accept warheads for storage.

Before Russia takes retaliatory steps (provided that the transfer of the Iskanders will occur after the creation of the base), the preparation of infrastructure for the deployment of operational-tactical complexes "Iskander" could well be discussed at the joint board of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and Belarus.

Naturally, at the political level, preparatory work should be carried out to legislate the presence of the Iskanders; preparation of an interstate agreement on the deployment of the Russian military in the form of a military base in Belarus should be carried out.

Q: What status can a military base get? If the Russian base receives extraterritorial status, then it is quite possible that nuclear warheads will also appear here. That is, the military base will be considered the territory of Russia, where it will be possible to deploy nuclear warheads. If the military base is under the jurisdiction of Belarus, then there will be no nuclear weapons there: Belarus is not a nuclear power.

Another option is possible: Belarus and Russia have a joint grouping of ground forces. It is possible to carry out a legal maneuver and temporarily transfer the Russian brigade to the disposal of Belarus; although it will be Russian, for some time it may be on the territory of Belarus at the disposal of the command of the Unified Group of Ground Forces. But then you still have to formalize its presence in Belarus legally.

The transfer of aviation squadrons to Belarus is a complex matter that requires very serious preparation: runways, airfield facilities, and navigation equipment. This is a long process, which will be accompanied by resistance both inside the country and outside. I think this option is unlikely.

Just as difficult is the deployment of a Russian mechanized or tank division in Belarus.

I think the cheapest, quickest answer (no one will have time to get scared) is the transfer of one or more brigades of the Iskander operational-tactical complexes. Moreover, our neighbors are very sensitive to the deployment of Iskanders in the Kaliningrad region, and even more so in Belarus. And if it becomes possible to provide the Iskanders with nuclear weapons, then, of course, their appearance will be a serious and resonant step.

If, nevertheless, the agreement on shorter and medium-range missiles is destroyed, it is very likely that the Iskanders will receive new ammunition, the range of which exceeds 500 kilometers, which means that they will be able to hit targets not only throughout Poland, but also in a significant part of Europe . The missiles have not been tested because the INF treaty forbids this. But in the event of the denunciation of the treaty, the missiles will be tested, put into production and, it is possible, will become part of the Iskander complex's ammunition load.

- So, de facto, nuclear weapons can return to Belarus?

As a last resort, if the situation escalates to such an extent that some European countries will give permission to host American medium-range missiles. Or the American grouping in Poland will be larger than declared.

On Monday, the Russian Ambassador to Belarus Alexander Surikov, when asked by Interfax about whether Russia would deploy new military facilities in Belarus in connection with the deployment of the American missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, answered quite unexpectedly:

It already depends on the level of our political integration. And also from the points of view of experts, diplomats, the military: it is necessary, it is possible, when, how. I mean facilities related to nuclear weapons.

Quite a diplomatic answer right down to the last sentence. But no one pulled the ambassador's tongue, and the informational nuclear bomb exploded.

The next day, Alexander Surikov hurried to correct the situation. He told ITAR-TASS that his position on military cooperation "has been completely misinterpreted". At the time of writing, official Minsk and Moscow refrained from commenting. But on both sides of the ocean there is a discussion of prospects. The American senators are outraged, the Minister of Defense of Lithuania calls for prudence.

The entire military infrastructure of the Belarusians is in perfect condition, this also applies to the launchers of missiles with nuclear warheads, which were taken to Russia after the collapse of the USSR. Returning missiles to the mines is much faster than building a radar in Poland, says Ivan MAKUSHOK, Assistant Secretary of State of the Union State of Russia and Belarus.

He is echoed by some Russian generals. For example, the president of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, believes that Russia should place tactical nuclear weapons (with a range of less than 5,500 km) on the territory of Belarus.

The deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus does not make Minsk a nuclear power and does not violate its international obligations, Interfax quotes Ivashov. - Just as US nuclear weapons stationed in Germany do not make Germany a nuclear power.

In general, the military is already making plans.

FIRST HISTORY

Stanislav SHUSHKEVICH, initiator of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarus: I understood what a threat it was to the country

Enough with Belarusian lives to defend Russia, - Stanislav Shushkevich reacted to the statement, under which they began to withdraw nuclear weapons from Belarus. - Remember the Second World War. Belarusians have suffered millions of losses, which cannot be compared with any other nation. Do they again want to set Belarus up and turn it into a nuclear test site, which will be struck first in the event of a conflict? Why is it necessary?

- But, perhaps, the Belarusian side will receive financial benefits?

You can't trade lives.

- But in the event of a nuclear war, will there be a difference where the missiles are located - in Lida or Smolensk?

This is a very big difference. When there were nuclear weapons in our country, we had so many missiles that Belarus had to be destroyed in the first place.

- And how did the withdrawal process begin?

From the Belovezhskaya agreement. I immediately said that without any preconditions or compensation, we are ready to remove nuclear weapons from our territory. The operation was also beneficial for Russia - it received weapons without compensation.

- And what were you guided by when making such a decision?

- I headed the Department of Nuclear Physics for 20 years and understood what a threat these weapons pose to Belarus. It was very easy for me to convince the government of this.

P.S. Stanislav Shushkevich nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. The initiative comes from former Polish President Lech Walesa. Shushkevich is nominated for his main peaceful achievement - the withdrawal of nuclear missiles from Belarus.

HOW IT WAS

In 1996, the last strategic missile was withdrawn from Belarus.

Our country voluntarily gave up nuclear weapons.

Belarus inherited 81 intercontinental ballistic missiles (with a range of more than 10,000 km) and 725 tactical-class warheads from Soviet times. An army with such an arsenal could destroy a target anywhere in the world. On the other hand, enemy missiles were also aimed at Belarus.

In April 1992, the government voluntarily gave up nuclear weapons. And in February 1993, the Supreme Council decided to join the Republic of Belarus to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

A gradual withdrawal of nuclear weapons to Russia began. The last echelon with RS-12M Topol missiles was withdrawn on November 27, 1996.

BY THE WAY

Russian bombers count on the airfield in Baranovichi

Russian strategic bombers Tu-160 and Tu-95 resumed flights to the US coast. In order to fly to the destination, the so-called jump airfields are used - sites where aircraft can be provided with technical assistance, refueling, and rest for crews. One of these airfields is located in Baranovichi. Russian generals reported that now the bombers are flying without nuclear weapons on board.

SAID

I don’t think there will be such a situation and a situation for delivering tactical nuclear weapons here... If there is a threat to our peoples, nothing needs to be ruled out, we must ensure our security with all our strength and means. (Alexander LUKASHENKO during the Union Shield-2006 exercises.)

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) establishes that states that carried out a nuclear explosion before January 1, 1967 are recognized as nuclear powers. Thus, de jure, the "nuclear club" includes Russia, the USA, Great Britain, France and China.

India and Pakistan are de facto nuclear states, but de jure they are not.

The first test of a nuclear charger was carried out by India on May 18, 1974. On May 11 and 13, 1998, according to the statement of the Indian side, five nuclear charges were tested, one of which was thermonuclear. India is a consistent critic of the NPT and still remains outside its framework.

A special group, according to experts, consists of non-nuclear states capable of creating nuclear weapons, but refraining, due to political and military inexpediency, from becoming nuclear states - the so-called "latent" nuclear states (Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Japan and others).

Three states (Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan), which had on their territory nuclear weapons left after the collapse of the Soviet Union, signed in 1992 the Lisbon Protocol to the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. By signing the Lisbon Protocol, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus acceded to the NPT and were included in the list of countries that do not possess nuclear weapons.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources

The Republic of Belarus is an important participant in global efforts for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Belarus first announced its intention to make its territory a nuclear-free zone in 1990 in the Declaration "On State Sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus". By signing the Lisbon Protocol in 1992, Belarus became a member of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). This step was inextricably linked with the adoption of the most important political decision on the accession of Belarus to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a state without nuclear weapons.

In July 1993, Belarus officially acceded to the NPT, becoming the first state to voluntarily renounce the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons left after the collapse of the USSR. It should be emphasized that Belarus refused to possess the most modern military nuclear potential without any preconditions and reservations. Thus, our country actually initiated the process of settling the issues of nuclear disarmament in the post-Soviet space in the interests of international peace and security. Welcoming the fact of Belarus joining the NPT as a non-nuclear state, Great Britain, Russia and the United States provided security guarantees to Belarus, fixing their obligations in the Budapest Memorandum on December 5, 1994.

The withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of Belarus was completed in November 1996.

Belarus considers the obligation of nuclear-weapon states under Article VI of the NPT to negotiate effective measures for nuclear disarmament as the main strategic goal of the Treaty. We support a balanced and phased approach to nuclear disarmament. Belarus welcomed the signing by Russia and the United States on April 8, 2010 of a new Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms as the next step towards the reduction of nuclear weapons. We consider it necessary to continue efforts at the national, regional and global levels to move towards the goal of universal nuclear disarmament.

The problem of guarantees of the non-use of nuclear weapons against the states parties to the NPT that do not possess such weapons remains topical. The provision of unambiguous security guarantees is a guarantee of trust and predictability in international relations and can help strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the NPT. Belarus intends to continue working on obtaining legally binding guarantees, which could be formalized in the form of a separate international document.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons laid the foundation for an international system of guarantees excluding the use of peaceful nuclear energy for military purposes. Such a system operates under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency and involves the conclusion by each state party to the NPT of separate agreements with the IAEA.

In accordance with its obligations under the NPT, in 1996 Belarus concluded an Agreement on the Application of Safeguards with the IAEA. The verification activity of the Agency carried out on the basis of this Agreement confirms the fulfillment by Belarus of obligations on the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities. In 2005, Belarus and the IAEA signed the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement. This document significantly expands the IAEA's ability to carry out verification activities.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons clearly guarantees the right of states to pursue peaceful nuclear programs, subject to the fulfillment of non-proliferation obligations. This provision of the NPT is especially relevant due to the fact that at present there is an increase in the attention of the world community to the development of nuclear technologies, primarily to the creation of national nuclear energy programs. In this regard, Belarus is interested in seeing the rights of the participating States enshrined in the Treaty be fully implemented and on a non-discriminatory basis.

In May 2010, the five-yearly NPT Review Conference was held in New York, in which a Belarusian delegation took part. The conference concluded with the adoption of a final document including conclusions and recommendations for future action. The Belarusian delegation took an active part in the work of the conference, in particular, in the development of the plan of action in the field of nuclear disarmament approved by the final document. We believe that paragraph 8 of the action plan, which indicates the obligation of nuclear states to comply with existing security guarantees, is directly applicable to the guarantees provided to Belarus in accordance with the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, especially taking into account the fact that the UN registered this document on November 13, 2012 as an international contracts.

The preparatory process for the 2015 Review Conference is currently under way.