Zefirov Mikhail. Swastika over the Volga. Luftwaffe against Stalin's air defense. On the history of domestic air defense. Letter to the editor Anti-aircraft missile system "Berkut"

As I promised, I am posting a document on the creation of the Berkut air defense system (it is exactly 60 years old).
As you read the resolution, pay attention to the methodology for setting tasks, assigning responsibility, deadlines, incentives, etc.

From archival documents of the Almaz-Antey concern

Commentary on a document marked “Top Secret” (from the material concern).

BY J. STALIN'S DECISION

60 years ago, classified as “top secret,” a Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was issued on the creation of the country’s first air defense system.

On August 9, 1950, the (only recently declassified) Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3389-1426, signed by J.V. Stalin, was issued on the creation of an ultra-modern effective air defense system for cities and strategic facilities under the code “Berkut”.

It was supposed to be built on the basis of a fundamentally new class of weapons -
anti-aircraft guided missiles. But this was not the only thing that made the project unique. The text of the Resolution testifies to the foresight of the political and military leadership of the USSR, its ability to predict the development of events and anticipate them.

Just five years ago the Great Patriotic War ended. Some cities are still in ruins, and a new “cold” war is in full swing - the United States is blackmailing the Soviet Union with atomic bombings from the air. Under these conditions, the country finds the strength and means to create air defense weapons based on new radar controls.

The problem was also to find an organization capable of leading this gigantic project. A new powerful developer was needed, which became Design Bureau No. 1 (now GSKB Almaz-Antey named after Academician A. A. Raspletin). The management of the project was entrusted to the Special Committee created for this purpose under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and JI personally. P. Beria.

This Resolution attracted the best research and design organizations, enterprises of various ministries and departments to solve complex scientific and technical problems in radar, jet and aviation technology. Large material resources and bonus funds were pledged for this.

The team of Design Bureau No. 1 alone was allocated more than a million rubles for these purposes, and the main leaders in the development of the Berkut system were awarded the titles of Hero of Socialist Labor and Stalin Prize laureates. The time frame for the implementation of this daring project is impressive, which even by today’s standards seems simply incredible: 2 years and 4 months.

“It is considered necessary to have by November 1952, in order to provide the air defense of Moscow, a complete set of radar installations, guided missiles, launch devices and carrier aircraft included in the Berkut system,” stated the 5th paragraph of the Resolution.

These deadlines were met. And over the next two years, the construction of two air defense rings around Moscow was completed for the S-25 Berkut system. Each of the 56 anti-aircraft missile systems was ready to simultaneously hit 20 targets with 20 missiles. The production of components has been established, soldiers and officers have been trained.

All this is evidence of the extraordinary systems thinking of the scientific director - A. A. Raspletin, the highest professionalism of the development team, the managerial abilities of project leaders, and the ability to mobilize the best engineering forces to solve grandiose problems. The S-25 "Berkut" system, together with the S-75 (1957), S-125 (1961), S-200 (1967) systems, ultimately allowed the country to successfully solve geopolitical problems. And this cannot but arouse the admiration of modern Russia, which faces the need for a new technological breakthrough in the 21st century - the creation of a Russian aerospace defense system.

AND ANOTHER COMMENT FROM A VETERAN OF THE CONCERN:

The speed of decision-making at the level of the USSR Government commands respect. Having reached Stalin’s desk on August 3, he sent the draft document to L. Beria with the note “For, with amendments.” On August 8, the latter reported that the document had been finalized and all changes had been made. The very next day, August 9, 1950, all members of the Council of Ministers put their signatures, incl. Minister of Armaments D.F. Ustinov, Minister of Industry and Communications G.V. Alekseenko. The document bears the signatures of the developers who were entrusted with the creation of the Berkut system - the chief designers of Design Bureau No. 1 P.N. Kuksenko and S. Beria.

It is noteworthy that KB-1 made proposals for the development of anti-aircraft missiles and the latest radar controls for them in order to create a modern air defense system. These proposals resulted in this landmark Resolution of the 50th year of the last century.

THIS IS THE FIRST PAGE OF THE DOCUMENT WITH STALIN'S AUTOGRAPH AND BERIA'S NOTE.

THIS IS HOW THE FIRST PAGE LOOKED BEFORE STALIN SIGNED IT

This is what a certain Sergei Drozdov told us:

Creation of Moscow air defense.

At the end of the 40s A new organization appeared in the structures of the USSR Ministry of Armament - Special Bureau No. 1, abbreviated as SB-1.
Its director was Pavel Nikolaevich Kuksenko, professor, doctor of technical sciences, one of the elders of Soviet radio engineering; Sergei Lavrentievich Beria, who had just graduated from the Military Academy, was appointed chief engineer.
One of the wits also came up with a decoding of the name SB-1: “Son of Beria” or “Sergei Beria”.

G.V. Kisunko recalled:
“As SB-1 expanded, two “German” departments appeared in it, diluted with Russian specialists, and one design department, the majority of which were prisoners, but there were also quite a few civilians; his technical director was Dmitry Lyudvigovich Tomashevich, a former deputy aircraft designer of Polikarpov, who had once served time for the death of Valery Chkalov. Departments were also created in which there were neither Germans nor prisoners, although 1-2 prisoners were assigned to some of them. The general trend in the management of departments was that officers were appointed as department heads (administrators), and knowledgeable specialists were appointed as technical managers...
SB-1 was entrusted with the task of implementing the ideas for creating a new type of weapon outlined in Sergei Beria’s graduation project. This project, apparently, was carried out under the leadership of P. N. Kuksenko (naturally, together with Sergo) on the basis of German captured scientific and technical materials...
To carry out work on creating a weapon system, which received the code name “Comet,” Kuksenko and Sergo secured the secondment to SB-1 of the most powerful graduates of the communications academy, whom Sergo knew personally and who became his and Kuksenko’s closest assistants. At the same time, those academy graduates who had already been sent to other places were also sent to SB-1.”

As we can see from Kisunko’s memoirs, Sergo Beria played an important role in the selection of personnel for SB-1. Did his father help him with this? Probably helped. There is nothing wrong with such assistance; it was done in the interests of strengthening the country’s defense capability and brought it great benefit:

“Kuksenko and Sergo, in addition to their administrative positions, assumed the responsibilities of the chief designers of the Comet system and carried out all their administrative activities in the interests of developing this system. Two chief designers on one development project seems like an unprecedented thing, but they managed to work according to the principle: “One mind is good, but two minds are better.”
At that time, no one in SB-1, not excluding the founders of this organization, could have known that SB-1 would become the cradle of domestic guided missile weapon systems. No one could have known that the first air-to-sea, air-to-air, shore-to-sea, air-to-ground systems, anti-aircraft missile (anti-aircraft) systems, anti-missile systems, anti-tank guided missiles would be created here , special space technology systems, laser locators (as no one knew that such a word would appear - laser).
No one could have known that in SB-1 (later KB-1) new production buildings would arise, in which thousands of teams of first-class specialists would work, and only gray-haired veterans would remember the special contingents, and KB-1, expanding its subject matter, would allocate newly created independent research institutes, design bureaus, central design bureaus, and central research institutes.”

So, it would not be a great exaggeration to say that SB-1 was a real cradle for many branches of domestic military science and industry.

We must remember the first head of SB-1.
G.V. Kisunko talks about him:
“Pavel Nikolaevich Kuksenko (04/25/1896-02/17/1980) met the First World War as a physics student at Moscow State University. He was drafted into the tsarist army, graduated from the school of signal ensigns and was sent to the Romanian Front, where he rose to the rank of lieutenant. He was wounded and was recovering when the October Revolution took place. After recovery, he joined the Red Army, where he served in the signal troops...

Together with A.L. Mints, he is the author of the development of a bomber radio sight, which was awarded the Stalin Prize for 1946 with the wording: “For the creation of a new type of radio device.” Kuksenko-Mintz radio sights were first used in our air raids on Berlin.
P. N. Kuksenko is the author of many inventions, for the totality of which in 1947 he was awarded the academic degree of Doctor of Technical Sciences. Since 1946 he has been a full member of the Academy of Artillery Sciences.
Also in 1947, he was appointed head of a new organization called Special Bureau (SB) No. 1 for the development of radio-controlled jet weapon systems. The first development of the SB-1 was the air-sea system (code - “Comet”), awarded the Stalin Prize in 1952 (chief designers P. N. Kuksenko and S. L. Beria).”

The story of G.V. deserves special attention. Kisunko about how I.V. Stalin decided to create an air defense system for Moscow:
“The director of SB-1, also the chief designer, Pavel Nikolaevich Kuksenko, used to work in his office until late at night, looking through foreign scientific and technical journals, scientific and technical reports and other literature. This routine was dictated by the fact that there was a Kremlin telephone in Pavel Nikolayevich’s office, and if Stalin called, it was always late at night and precisely through the Kremlin “turntable.” In such cases, the matter was not limited to a telephone conversation, and Pavel Nikolaevich had to go to the Kremlin, where he had a permanent pass. With this pass, he could always go to Stalin’s reception room, where Poskrebyshev sat as a faithful and permanent guard at the entrance to Stalin’s office.”

A very interesting point should be noted: P.N. Kuksenko in the 30s, under Yezhov, was arrested and convicted on a false denunciation. Then, when L.P. came to the leadership of the NKVD. Beria, hundreds of thousands of cases from the time of the Yezhovshchina were reviewed and innocent people were released.
So, former “repressed prisoner” P.N. Kuksenko enjoyed Stalin’s complete trust, and even had a permanent pass to the Kremlin!

“This time, Pavel Nikolaevich, who arrived at Stalin’s call at two in the morning, was escorted to Stalin’s apartment by a security officer. The owner of the apartment received his guest, sitting on the sofa in pajamas, looking through some papers. In response to Pavel Nikolaevich’s greeting, he replied, “Hello, Comrade Kuksenko,” and with a movement of his hand, holding the receiver, he pointed to the chair that stood next to the sofa. Then, putting the papers aside, he said:
– Do you know when the last time an enemy plane flew over Moscow?.. On the tenth of July, one thousand nine hundred and forty-two. It was a single reconnaissance aircraft. Now imagine that a single plane will also appear over Moscow, but with an atomic bomb. What if several single planes break through from a massive raid, as happened on July 22, 1941, but now with atomic bombs?
After a pause in which he seemed to be pondering the answer to this question, Stalin continued:
– But even without atomic bombs, what remains of Dresden after the massive air strikes of our yesterday’s allies? And now they have more planes, and enough atomic bombs, and they nest literally right next to us. And it turns out that we need a completely new air defense system, capable of not allowing even a single aircraft to reach the defended object even during a massive raid. What can you say about this extremely important issue?
– Sergo Lavrentievich Beria and I carefully studied the captured materials of the developments carried out by the Germans in Peenemünde on the Wasserfall, Reintocher, and Schmetterling guided anti-aircraft missiles. According to our assessments, carried out with the participation of German specialists working for us under a contract, promising air defense systems should be built on the basis of a combination of radar and surface-to-air and air-to-air guided missiles,” answered P. N. Kuksenko.
After this, according to Pavel Nikolayevich, Stalin began asking him “educational” questions about something so unusual for him, related to radio electronics, which was the technology of radio-controlled missiles at that time. And Pavel Nikolayevich did not hide the fact that he himself did not understand much about the emerging new branch of defense technology, where rocketry, radar, automation, precision instrumentation, electronics and much more, for which there is no name yet, should merge together. He emphasized that the scientific and technical complexity and scale of the problems here are not inferior to the problems of creating atomic weapons. After listening to all this, Stalin said:
– There is an opinion, Comrade Kuksenko, that we need to immediately begin creating an air defense system for Moscow, designed to repel a massive enemy air raid from any direction. For this purpose, a special Main Directorate will be created under the USSR Council of Ministers, modeled on the First Main Directorate for Nuclear Issues. The new central administration under the Council of Ministers will have the right to involve any organizations of any ministries and departments in carrying out work, providing these works with material funds and financing as needed without any restrictions. In this case, the head office will need to have a powerful research and design organization - the lead organization for the entire problem, and we propose to create this organization on the basis of SB-1, reorganizing it into Design Bureau No. 1. But in order to set out all this in a resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, you, as the future Chief Designer of the Moscow air defense system, are tasked with clarifying the structure of this system, the composition of its means and proposals for the developers of these means in accordance with the technical specifications of KB-1. Prepare a personal list of specialists for about sixty people, wherever they are, for transfer to KB-1. In addition, KB-1 personnel officers will be given the right to select employees for transfer from any other organizations to KB-1.
All this work on preparing the draft resolution, as Pavel Nikolaevich later recalled, began to spin with incomprehensible speed.
During this period and even after the decree was issued, Stalin summoned P.N. Kuksenko several more times, mainly trying to understand a number of “educational” issues that interested him, but he especially meticulously inquired about the possibilities of the future system to reflect the “stellar” "(that is, simultaneously from different directions) a massive raid and a "ramming" massive raid. However, the questions that Stalin asked Pavel Nikolaevich can only partially be called “educational.”
It seems that Stalin personally wanted to make sure that Moscow’s future air defense system would really be able to repel massive raids by enemy aircraft, and having convinced himself of this, he no longer considered it necessary to call Pavel Nikolayevich for personal conversations, leaving Berkut in the full care of L.P. Beria.

In a decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, the Moscow air defense system received a code name - the Berkut system. P. N. Kuksenko and S. L. Beria were appointed its chief designers.
The system was classified even from the Ministry of Defense. The draft resolution was endorsed by the Minister of Defense A.M. Vasilevsky, bypassing all the authorities subordinate to him.
The customer of the created system was the newly created Third Main Directorate (TGU) under the USSR Council of Ministers. For this purpose, TSU created its own military acceptance facility, its own anti-aircraft missile range in the Kapustin Yar area, and as system objects were created, military formations subordinate to TSU for the combat operation of these objects. In short, the Berkut system was supposed to be transferred to the Ministry of Defense ready for combat duty, with equipment, troops and even residential camps.
According to the original plan, the Berkut system was supposed to consist of the following subsystems and objects: two rings (near and far) of a radar detection system based on a 10-centimeter range radar (code “A-100”, chief designer L. V. Leonov);
– two rings (near and far) for anti-aircraft missile guidance radar (radar code - product B-200, chief designers P. N. Kuksenko and S. L. Beria);
– launchers of anti-aircraft guided missiles located at the B-200 stations and functionally connected with them (missile code - B-300, general designer S. A. Lavochkin; chief designers: rocket engine - A. M. Isaev; combat units - Zhidkikh, Sukhikh, K. I. Kozorezov; radio fuse - Rastorguev; on-board power supplies - N. S. Lidorenko; transport and launch equipment - V. P. Barmin);
– interceptor aircraft armed with air-to-air missiles, loitering in the visibility zones of A-100 radar stations (code G-400). Subsequently, the development of these weapons as part of the Berkut system was discontinued, that is, the fire weapons of the system were defined as part of two echelons (outer and inner ring boundaries) of the B-200 - B-300 anti-aircraft missile systems.
With the reorganization of SB-1 into KB-1 and its reassignment from the Ministry of Armaments to TSU, changes occurred in the leadership structure of this organization. P. N. Kuksenko and S. L. Beria focused entirely on their duties as chief designers, and other persons were appointed head of KB-1 and chief engineer.”

I apologize for such a long quote. Even for me, who served in the country’s Air Defense Forces for many years, many facts from this story by G.V. Kisunko was unfamiliar with how the Moscow air defense system was born.
All this, until recently, was classified, and the direct participation of L.P. Beria and his son Sergo in the creation of the Berkut system was deliberately kept silent for decades.
I think these facts and details will be of interest to many readers.

The organization of work on the Berkut system was entrusted to the Third Main Directorate (TGU) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. It was supervised by L.P. Beria. The decision to create this system was made in August 1950.
As already noted, in addition to this TSU, L.B. Beria also supervised the work of the First Main Directorate (PGU), which dealt with the atomic project, and the Second Main Directorate (VGU), which developed issues of Soviet rocket science. One can only wonder how he had enough time and energy for all this.
The task of developing the Berkut system was assigned to KB-1, headed by chief designers S. L. Beria and P. N. Kuksenko.
At the same time, OKB-301, headed by S. Lavochkin, was entrusted with the development of single-stage V-300 missiles, and already in June 1951, test launches of V-300 missiles were carried out.
A unique sector-viewing radar station was developed and put into service, which was assigned the index B-200. The complex of structures with the B-200 radar was called the RTC (radio technical center) in military documentation. The RTC was deployed in the regiment. The regiment, having twenty firing channels, could provide simultaneous guidance of 3 anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) at twenty targets.
On September 20, 1952, the B-200 prototype was sent to the Kapustin Yar training ground for firing tests with B-300 missiles.
On May 25, 1953, a La-17 target aircraft was shot down for the first time by a B-300 guided anti-aircraft missile.
The S-25 Berkut stationary anti-aircraft missile system was put into service in 1955. It was intended to defend Moscow from enemy air attacks.
For the first time, the anti-aircraft missiles of the complex (B-300) were openly shown at a military parade on Red Square on November 7, 1960.
In accordance with Stalin's instructions, the Moscow air defense system was supposed to be able to repel a massive enemy air raid involving up to 1,200 aircraft.
Calculations have shown that this will require 56 multi-channel anti-aircraft missile systems with sector-view radar and missile launchers located on two rings. On the inner ring, at a distance of 45-50 kilometers from the center of Moscow, it was planned to place 22 complexes, on the outer ring, at a distance of 85-90 kilometers, 34 complexes. The complexes had to be located at a distance of 12-15 kilometers from each other, so that the sector of fire of each of them overlapped the sectors of the complexes located on the left and right, creating a continuous field of destruction.
And so it was done.
Anti-aircraft missile regiments equipped with S-25 systems were located at a distance of 75-85 km from Moscow (at a distance of 10-15 km from each other).
A huge range of work was carried out: in forests and swamps, in off-road conditions, military camps, combat positions, concrete caponiers, command posts and bomb shelters, vehicle parks, communication centers, roads, boiler rooms, barracks and much more were built all year round - you can’t list everything. Moreover, it was built conscientiously.
Let me give you an example.

At the end of the 80s Work began on the gradual re-equipment of air defense regiments near Moscow from the S-25 (which were on combat duty for more than 30 years!!) to the new S-300 anti-aircraft missile system.
It was necessary to roll into one of the buried concrete storage facilities the cabin of the new complex (S-300), the dimensions of which were only a couple of centimeters larger than the dimensions of the entrance to it allowed.
For several weeks they tried to cut down the extra cm of “Stalinist concrete” grade 500, using first jackhammers and then even explosives - nothing worked.
As a result, they gave up and began to build a new storage facility. This is what concrete was like back then.

(I go to Moscow every day and see recently installed concrete supports, under the platforms, at the Leningradsky station. Their ends are clearly visible. They stood for a couple of years at most. Literally before our eyes, they are rapidly crumbling, independently turning into piles of small pebbles, sand and cement dust. This – a clear demonstration of the level of actions of modern “effective managers”).

The performance characteristics of this anti-aircraft missile system were simply phenomenal for that time.
The areas of responsibility of all S-25 regiments near Moscow were divided into four equal sectors, each of which contained 14 anti-aircraft missile regiments of the near and long echelons. Every 14 regiments formed a corps. Four corps made up the 1st Special Purpose Air Defense Army.
In the country's Air Defense Forces, it received the playfully respectful name of the “First Cavalry” Army.

Regiments of the S-25 anti-aircraft missile system have been on combat duty for more than 30 years. In 1966, parts of the S-25 underwent a major modernization: noise immunity was significantly improved. The dimensions of the destruction zone of the complexes have been increased (its far and lower boundaries have been increased, the service life of the missiles has been extended, etc.)
In the 1990s, all S-25 units were disbanded.

The vast majority of military camps and combat positions were abandoned and looted. Now they make a pitiful and depressing impression: they look just like after a defeat in a war and defeat by an enemy army.
There are many photo reports from these ruins on the Internet. Those who wish can look at this disgrace, which we have been calling “military reform” for decades...

On the diagram: 2 Moscow air defense rings. Now this system no longer exists.

© Copyright: Sergey Drozdov, 2014
Certificate of publication No. 214031000635

This Drozdov lies constantly.

Former chief designer, Doctor of Technical Sciences P. N. Kuksenko, during interrogation on August 19, 1953, testified:
“I have read the volume of S. L. Beria’s doctoral dissertation and claim that the dissertation is a brief compilation of materials from a technical project for the “K” system, located in KB-1... The candidate’s thesis was compiled based on the same materials collected in over a number of years for which the technical project was drawn up. In this case, S. L. Beria showed a certain dexterity, using materials to write his dissertation much earlier than the technical project was drawn up.”
Former leading engineer of the design bureau Korenev G.V. during interrogation
On August 15, 1953 he showed:
“...Since the spring of 1939, I served my sentence at one of the facilities of the 4th special department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs... Before my arrest, I worked on the topic “Controlled Systems”, and was awarded the Order of Lenin for this. While in prison, I did not stop working in this area... I could not complete the work, since Kravchenko (head of the 4th special department) kept all the materials for himself, for what purpose I don’t know. It is typical that in one of the sketches I did not have time to finish the tail of the car. The materials transmitted by Kravchenko did not contain calculations on radar; this is not my specialty.
In 1948, while working at KB-1, I accidentally discovered, while reviewing secret documents, a diploma project signed by S. L. Beria, which contained all my materials that I had transferred to Kravchenko. Somewhat later, in a conversation with S.L. Beria, I noticed to him that the car of his graduation project was missing a tail. Beria Sergei blushed very red, but did not say anything to me. I affirm that part of the diploma project consists of my materials transferred to Kravchenko. I don’t know who developed the second part of the diploma project - the radar one, but I believe that this work could have been done by Kuksenko... At the end of 1949 or at the beginning of 1950, chief engineer S. L. Beria called me and instructed me to prepare a report for the “highest circles" - the theory of the "A" side of the "K" system. The report was prepared in approximately two weeks. In a bound form, I showed S.L. Beria’s report, and he offered to hand it over to the special department... Three months later, at the direction of S.L. Beria, the theoretical department, with the same composition of performers, compiled a second report on the theory of side “B”. .. Later, in the office of the head of the first department, I saw a volume with a report we had compiled, on which was written in ink “The Dissertation of S. Beria.” I don’t know whether it was a candidate’s or doctoral dissertation, but I am convinced that it was a report compiled by me, Koshlyakov, Voronov and Nenartovich... S. L. Beria did not take any part in the preparation of these reports...
The work of SB-1 was aimed towards the development of the diploma project presented by S. L. Beria, in which, I claim, my materials were presented in one part, therefore, S. L. Beria stole my idea and passed it off as his own.”
Gegechkori S.A., during interrogations in 1953, admitted the facts of appropriating materials developed by the design bureau team and using them as dissertations. In particular, he showed:
“Both the dissertation and the doctoral dissertation were written not by me, but by a team of workers in the theoretical department. I acted illegally, appropriated the work of a team of workers in the theoretical department, forced them to work for me, especially since this department was subordinate to me as the chief designer of the topic... I believe that I was incorrectly awarded the academic degrees of candidate and doctor of physical and mathematical sciences.”
It should be borne in mind that, in fact, Gegechkori S.A. was deprived of his academic degrees even before the aforementioned representation from the USSR Prosecutor's Office and the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1954.
By the resolution of the Higher Attestation Commission of December 22, 1953, the decisions of the Moscow State University Council of July 3, 1950 on awarding S. L. Beria the degree of Candidate of Sciences and the Higher Attestation Commission of March 22, 1952 were canceled.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 171. D. 479. L. 150-153. Script. Typescript.

Alexey Nikolaevich Krylov 01/20/2019 11:09 Report violation /

This Krylov is rude stupidly and constantly.
Not knowing the essence of the issue, here he simply “dumped out” quotes from the interrogations of Sergo Beria’s colleagues, made in August 1953, when S. Beria’s father was arrested and PUBLICLY, before any trial, declared an English spy, pervert, etc.
All associates of L.P. Beria (the leaders of Soviet intelligence), who did not renounce him and throw mud at him, were also arrested (and later shot).
And what could the colleagues of ARRESTED Sergo Beria do in THAT situation?!
Tell the investigators that, unlike his “spy father,” he was an honest man and a talented scientist, only to immediately end up in a cell nearby?! There were no takers.
Of course, they should say what the investigators and the political hysteria that arose around this “case” at that time demanded of them.
Then many of them were ashamed of these words spoken in August 1953.
S. Beria himself, after his release from prison, worked for many years in Sverdlovsk for the defense industry.

Sergey Drozdov 01/20/2019 11:32 Report violation / Delete

Well, the fact that this Drozdov stupidly and constantly, in accordance with the programs within which he does not (of course) work for free, is engaged in whitewashing the executioners of the Russian people - Beria, Rennenkampf, and others like them is clear.
One more piece of evidence is important.
P.L. Kapitsa was included in the Special Committee and the Technical Council for the development of the atomic bomb. Today, many people, serious researchers of the history of the Soviet atomic project, emphasize that it was allegedly implemented only because L.P. was put in charge of it. Beria. But here is the description of this “effective manager” given by P.L. Kapitsa in a letter to Stalin dated November 25, 1945:
"Comrade Stalin!
For almost four months I have been sitting and actively participating in the work of the Special Committee and the Atomic Bomb Technical Council (AB).<...>
Comrades Beria, Malenkov, Voznesensky behave in the Special Committee like supermen. In particular, Comrade Beria. True, he has a conductor's baton in his hands. This is not bad, but after him the scientist must still play the first violin. After all, the violin gives the tone to the entire orchestra. Comrade Beria's main weakness is that the conductor must not only wave the baton, but also understand the score. Beria is weak with this. ...I tell him directly: “You don’t understand physics, let us scientists judge these issues,” to which he objects to me that I have nothing in people
I don't understand. In general, our dialogues are not particularly kind. I offered to teach him physics and come to my institute. After all, for example, you don’t have to be an artist yourself to understand paintings. For example, he should have learned from primary sources (and not from popular accounts) how the transoceanic cable was laid, how the steam turbine developed, etc.
He would see the general pattern of these processes and would use this experience in order to understand what is important and necessary in the development of work on AB...
Beria, if he had not been so lazy, then, having worked, with his abilities and “knowledge of people,” he could undoubtedly... become a first-class conductor of the AB orchestra... But for this you need to work, and scribbling with a pencil on draft resolutions in the chairman’s chair is does not yet mean managing the problem. Nothing is working out for me with Beria...

It seems to me that there is a lot of abnormality in the organization of work on the atomic bomb. In any case, what is being done now is not the shortest and cheapest way to its creation...

P.P.S. I would like Comrade. Beria became acquainted with this letter, because it is not a denunciation, but useful criticism. I would tell him all this myself, but seeing him is very troublesome.”

About science and power. Letters. // Compiled by P.E. Rubinin. M.: Pravda Publishing House, 1990. - 48 p. - (Library “Ogonyok” No. 32)

Alexey Nikolaevich Krylov 01/20/2019 12:05 Report violation / Delete

“This Krylov” again demonstrated his own brainlessness.
Firstly, he evaluates other people only by the degree of his own depravity and for this reason he is sure that everyone (like himself, obviously) writes here solely for money.
Secondly, Beria’s merits and organizational abilities in the creation of nuclear weapons in the USSR are now recognized even by his ill-wishers. The only exceptions are idiotic Natsiks or complete dunces. The fact that he had a complex character and was often rude is well known. Kapitsa, (and the excerpts from his letter were cited by Krylov did not play a leading role in this project. It would be much more interesting to get acquainted with the “abusive” letters of Kurchatov, Yu. Khariton and other scientists with similar complaints about Beria (if there were any). But, judging by the fact that they have not yet been published, there were no such letters.

With this, communication with the boorish Krylov is over.
All other posts will be deleted without being read or answered.

Sergey Drozdov 01/20/2019 12:54 Report violation / Delete

It is clear that Drozdov is afraid of discussion; I have repeatedly had to smack his face on the table. Due to his cowardice and rotten inner content, he is trying to discredit the testimony that reveals the “genius” of his idol - Beria and his son. I offer one more testimony from a physicist about the behavioral outline of Beria as a leader and the depth of competence in the atomic project:
Physicist A.P. Alexandrov about Beria

When we at the Kapitsa Institute were developing methods for producing deuterium and we had some success, I sent a proposal to the Defense Committee to introduce our technology at one of the factories. To make the future clear, I will say that other ways were tested in different places, and in one of the laboratories there was a deuterium explosion in a pilot plant.
I receive an invitation to a meeting of Special Committee No. 1. This is the picture. Several military men. Kurchatov, Vannikov, Pervukhin, Malyshev, Zhdanov, Makhnev (the general who dealt with the uranium problem), Meshik (responsible for the regime, later arrested in the Beria case). I am seated on one side of Beria, and Makhnev on the other. He reports: “Here, Lavrenty Pavlovich, Comrade Alexandrov proposes to build a plant for the production of deuterium.” Beria doesn’t seem to see me. He addresses only Makhnev: “Does Comrade Aleksandrov know that the experimental installation exploded?” He told him: “Yes, he knows.” - “And Comrade Aleksandrov does not take down his signature?” - “It doesn’t take off.” I’m sitting right next to him - what should he ask me? “Does Comrade Aleksandrov know that if the plant explodes, he will go to where Makar drives his calves?” I can’t stand it: “I can imagine.” He turns to me: “Aren’t you taking off your signature?” - “No, I’m not filming.” Then he writes: “For. Beria."
Then the plant was built. Thank God it hasn't exploded yet.
Of course, for people like Beria, their entire consciousness was narrowed to a bomb: if we do it, we won’t do it, if it explodes, it won’t explode... I think he had no idea about the multi-purpose and fundamental nature of research. For example, in 1945, it was Beria who banned the idea of ​​atomic ships: first the bomb, everything else later. But even then, at the Institute of Physical Problems, we began to design a nuclear installation for a ship, and I wrote in one of the plans that we wanted to do this. This was much earlier than the Americans made their Nautilus.
Kurchatov considered the utilitarian military applications of atomic energy to be forced. He associated all prospects with its peaceful use.
Alexandrov P.A. Academician Anatoly Petrovich Alexandrov. Direct speech. – M.: “Science”, 2002

Alexey Nikolaevich Krylov 01/20/2019 13:25

Here I want to cite another part of the document that reveals the “genius” of Beria’s son and, by and large, the vileness of both the son and the parent:

“My experience in developing the system and conducting complex tests was used by S. Beria without indicating my role in this matter, and vice versa, with a cunningly conceived and deftly carried out increasing scrubbing of me from work.
On a special form of the parallel approach method, which formed the basis of the initial technical design of the Berkut system (see volumes I and II of the technical design of the system; KB-1 reports No. 961/306, 961/308, 961/311, 961/327 - September - October 1950). The use of this method broke the deadlock in the design of the Berkut system, which then did not work out due to the lack of a suitable guidance method.
For the general parametric guidance method, a special case of which was used in the implemented Berkut system (see the technical design of the second version of the system, report addressed to S. Beria No. 002658 dated March 2, 1951, file 0269, p. 4, KB- report 1, inventory No. 961/442, March 1951).
On the so-called “C” method (in collaboration with others) - a guidance method, which is a special case of my general parametric method and is especially convenient for building a radar (B-200 station). This method provided enormous cost savings compared to the parallel approach method I proposed. It can be said without exaggeration that only the use of these methods made it possible to implement the Berkut system.
Plagiarism by S. Beria on the indicated points and cunning provocative activities of G.Ya. Kutepov, his alter ego, which aimed to hide the systematic plagiarism of S. Beria, caused me very serious moral and material damage, actually depriving me of the opportunity to engage in active creative design work in a specialty in which I am a pioneer and to which I devoted more than 20 years of my life. »

001760 ss/op- 1
Returnable
Sov. Secret (Special folder)
Statement by G.M. Malenkov from the former chief designer of radio-controlled aircraft-projectile systems KB-1 G.V. Koreneva
To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Comrade G.M. Malenkov. From Georgy Vasilievich Korenev, Moscow, Potapovsky lane, 9/4, apt. 98. Phone K-7-88-16.

S-25 "Berkut". In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Soviet Union began one of the most complex and expensive programs of the early Cold War, second only to its nuclear weapons program. In the face of a threat from the strategic bomber forces of the United States and Great Britain, J.V. Stalin ordered the creation of an air defense missile system controlled by a radar network to repel possible massive air attacks on Moscow. The Moscow system was followed in 1955 by a second program aimed at protecting Leningrad.

SAM S-25 Berkut - video

After the end of World War II, the Soviet Union began a program of using captured German military technology. Particular interest was shown in radar technology and anti-aircraft missiles. After a preliminary study of many types of German missiles, it was decided to focus on the Schmetterling and Wasserfall missiles. On their basis, NII-88 specialists developed the R-101 and R-105 missiles. which began testing in 1948. However, both types of missiles showed insufficient combat effectiveness, and the Soviet program suffered from the same problems as Germany: excessive concentration on missile design and insufficient attention to more critical technological problems associated with the radar system and the system. control (guidance). At the same time, other Soviet design bureaus, reinforced by German engineers, were researching key technologies. In particular, at NII-885 (Monino, Moscow Region), a semi-active radar seeker for anti-aircraft missiles was developed, which used the SCR-584 radar, obtained under Lend-Lease, to illuminate the target.

In August 1950, the task of developing the Moscow air defense system. based on anti-aircraft missiles, was assigned to the Moscow SB-1. The main designers of the system were S. Beria (son of J1. Beria), a well-known radio specialist in the country, and P. Kuksenko, previously repressed. The system was named “Berkut” (based on the initial letters of the developers’ last names).

The S-25 Berkut strategic air defense system (SA-1 “Guild” according to the US/NATO classification) was intended to defend Moscow from air raids in which up to 1000 bombers could participate. In accordance with the tactical and technical requirements, it was necessary to develop a Control Center that would ensure the targeting of missiles at 20 bombers flying at speeds of up to 1200 km/h at ranges of up to 35 km and at altitudes from 3 to 25 km. Work on the Berkut system was distributed among several special design bureaus. OKB-301, headed by S. Lavochkin, was entrusted with the development of the associated B-300 rocket (factory index “205”). It made extensive use of German technology, but was different from the previous R-101 system.

The B-300 rocket was single-stage, made according to the “canard” aerodynamic configuration: the air rudders were located in the nose of the hull in two mutually perpendicular planes in front of the two wings, installed in the same planes on the middle part of the hull. The cylindrical body with a diameter of 650 mm was divided into 7 compartments. The tail was equipped with a four-chamber liquid propellant rocket engine Ш9-29 with a displacement feed system, which developed a thrust of 9000 kg. Gas rudders were attached to a special truss in the rear part of the hull. The launch mass of the rocket is 3500 kg. The missile launch was carried out vertically from a special launch pad. The B-200 radar provided tracking of both the target and the missile, and issued control commands to the missile. The B-200 radar antenna systems scanned space in the azimuthal and elevation planes. The radar measured three coordinates necessary to generate missile control commands. The missile was equipped with a proximity fuse, which was triggered at the final interception phase; the system did not have the ability to detonate on command. The E-600 high-explosive fragmentation warhead was supposed to hit enemy aircraft from a distance of up to 75m.

Test launches of the B-300 missiles began in June 1951, i.e., less than a year after the start of the program. During the year, about 50 of these missiles were launched at the Kapustin Yar missile test site. The initial launches were mainly related to aerodynamic and component tests, since the B-200 radar was not delivered to the Kapustin Yar test site until the end of 1952. Testing of the full system began in May 1953, when a Tu-4 bomber was shot down by a B missile -300 at an altitude of 7 km. The choice of the type of target was not accidental; the Tu-4 aircraft was a copy of the American B-29, which dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Specifying production missile samples were tested in 1954, including the simultaneous interception of 20 targets. After the death of I.V. Stalin, significant changes occurred in the leadership of the Berkut program. SB-1 was removed from the subordination of the KGB, Beria was arrested, S. Beria was removed from work, and SB-1 was renamed KB-1 of the Ministry of Agricultural Engineering. Chief designer of NI I-108 A. Raspletin was transferred to KB-1 and headed the Berkut program, which was renamed the S-25 program.

Under the name S-25 "Berkut" the system was put into service and its serial production and deployment began. The most expensive element of the system was the launch sites and the necessary road network. It was decided to create two rings of missile regiments around Moscow: one ring at a distance of 85-90 km from the city center to deliver a decisive blow against bombers, and the other at a distance of 45-50 km to destroy bombers that broke through the first ring. In order to provide access to the launch sites, two ring roads were built. According to American intelligence estimates, the construction of these roads and launch positions in 1953-1955. The annual production of concrete has been used up.

Construction began in the summer of 1953 and ended in 1958. 22 anti-aircraft regiments were deployed on the inner ring, and 34 on the outer ring, i.e. 56 regiments in total. Each launch position consisted of four functional sections-zones: launch, radar, administrative, housing and technical and power transformer substation. The launch zone, with an area of ​​more than 140 hectares, had a developed network of access roads and 60 launchers. At a distance of approximately 1.5 km, a command post was located in a bunker, occupying an area of ​​approximately 20 hectares. On the territory of the point there was a B-200 radar, including an azimuth radar and an altimeter. The main BESM and 20 control posts were deployed in the bunker. Each regiment consisted of about 30 officers and 450 privates. Each facility contained three missiles with a nuclear warhead having a TNT equivalent of about 20 kt. Such a missile could destroy all targets located within a radius of 1 km from the detonation point and should have been used in the event of massive raids using nuclear weapons carriers.

The position configuration allowed the regiment to hit 20 targets simultaneously. Apparently, at the first stage, each regiment could fire at 20 targets with 20 B-300 missiles. After improving the system, shelling could be carried out by three missiles at one target, which significantly increased the probability of destruction. In addition to the launch positions of the 56 regiments, six defense zones were built along the inner ring road. The S-25 system's positions were supported by a large number of country air defense radars, which provided early warning and initial information on targets. Especially for these purposes, NII-224 developed the A-100 surveillance radar. but other early warning radars could also be used. The deployment of the S-25 system coincided with a significant increase in the air defense radar network, particularly in the period 1950-1955. production of radar equipment quadrupled.

Two rings of the S-25 "Berkut" air defense system around Moscow with a radius of 50 and 90 km

Serial production of the S-25 Berkut system began in 1954. By 1959, only approximately 32 thousand B-300 missiles were produced. This was 20 times the scale of ballistic missile construction during the same period. For the first time, the B-300 missile defense system was openly shown at a parade on November 7, 1960. The S-25 system was roughly comparable in scale and construction time to the American Nike-Ajax system. In the USA, 16 thousand missiles were produced and 40 divisions were deployed, in the USSR - 32 thousand and 56 regiments were deployed. The first division of the Nike-Ajax system was deployed near Washington in December 1953, somewhat earlier than in the Moscow Air Defense District. The large scale of production and deployment of the S-25 system in the USSR is partly explained by a simpler guidance system, allowing three missiles to intercept one target to achieve an acceptable level of destruction. The technical parameters of both systems were approximately the same, the actual destruction range was 40-45 km. However, the B-300 missile was three times heavier than the American missile, partly due to the larger warhead mass, but mainly due to the use of a less efficient single-stage design, as opposed to the two-stage Nike-Ajax missile. In both cases, these systems were quickly replaced by more complex ones: Nike-Hercules in the USA and S-75 Dvina in the USSR.

Like many early missile weapon systems, the S-25 system, which N.S. Khrushchev called it the “Moscow stockade” and had obvious shortcomings even at the deployment stage. The system's assets were evenly distributed along the periphery of Moscow without strengthening the most likely directions of attack (Northern and Western). Insufficient fire density could not prevent a breakthrough by superior forces, or the defense could be broken through even before the main forces of bomber aircraft arrived. Although the system was never used in combat, there is no reason to believe that the S-25 was well protected from electronic warfare. While US and British aviation gained significant combat experience in the use of electronic warfare during the Second World War and in Korea, in the USSR they were in their infancy. This made the S-25 system weakly protected from electronic jamming and other electronic warfare methods. The choice of a fixed configuration of combat positions limited the development of the system and its improvement. Huge command bunkers, adapted to accommodate the B-200 RAS antenna system, limited the azimuthal capabilities of the station.

The S-25 system could hit subsonic targets flying at speeds up to 1000 km/h, although at. bombers with supersonic speed appeared in weapons. And finally, in the mid-50s, the USA and USSR developed missiles launched outside the air defense zone: the American AGM-28F “Hound Dog” and the Soviet X-20 (AS-3 “Kangaroo”). They posed a threat because they had a significantly smaller radar reflective surface and could be launched outside the affected area of ​​the S-25 system. The disadvantages and high cost of the S-25 system led to the refusal to deploy it around Leningrad. The S-25 system remained in service for almost 30 years, although its effectiveness continued to decline. In the 80s it was replaced by the S-300P system.

Tactical and technical characteristics of the S-25 Berkut air defense system

- Years of operation: 1955 - 1982
- Adopted: 1955
- Constructor: Lead developer - KB-1

Characteristics of the 1955 model system

Target speed: 1500 km/h
- Damage height: 5.0-15 km
- Range: 35 km

- Number of missiles: 60
- Possibility of hitting a target in interference: no
- Rocket storage life: on the launcher - 0.5 years; in stock - 2.5 years

Characteristics after modernization in 1966

Target speed: 4200 km/h
- Damage height: 1500-30000 m
- Range: 43 km
- Number of targets hit: 20
- Number of missiles: 60
- Possibility of hitting a target in interference: yes
- Rocket storage life: on the launcher - 5 years; in stock - 15 years

Photo of S-25 Berkut air defense system

The vertical antenna of the B-200 station of the S-25 "Berkut" complex is designed to view the airspace in the elevation plane.

Control room of the S-25 complex. In the center is the senior operator's console, on the sides are the workstations of guidance and launch operators, and in the background are air situation tablets.

Remembering the Stalinist era and Stalin, five-year plans, industrialization with collectivization, the atomic bomb and even preparations for going into space immediately come to mind, but if you also mention missile defense (missile defense), everyone will immediately be surprised. Did he also start working on all these Buks, S-400s, S-500s and Iskanders that people are talking about today? Yes, I started. Back in 1945, along with everything that was happening in the country after the War, it began. But not the air defense systems and OTRK systems (anti-aircraft missile and operational-tactical missile systems) specifically, but missile defense in principle and closely related to it, practically by the same complexes, air defense (air defense).

And the reason for this was that in Germany, back in 1942, the development of the unmanned cruise (projectile aircraft) V-1 and the ballistic (ballista - uncontrollability) V-2 rocket began - long-range, up to 320 km, action in 2 parts . Giving speed and direction - accelerating, which then fell off. And then it flies uncontrollably and carries a lethal, weighing up to 1 ton, cargo - the head one. And in the second half of 1944, these missiles began to be actively used against England. And therefore, in July 1945, on the one hand, a special scientific and technical commission on jet technology was created with the task of making something similar to the V-2 ourselves. For this reason, in May 1946, a rocket science direction was created in the defense industry, and NII-88 was opened in the Moscow region of Kaliningrad, in which S. Korolev was appointed chief designer of long-range ballistic missiles.

But from the other side, at the Air Force Engineering Academy. N. Zhukovsky created the Research Bureau of Special Equipment (NIBS) headed by G. Mozharovsky, whose task was to develop the project “ Anti-Fau"on "possibility of counteraction missile vs missile with radar support." (True, we must pay tribute, similar work has begun to be carried out in the USA). And soon the Kuntsevo Research Institute-20 developed the Pluto radar consisting of two stationary pulse locators. One in the meter wavelength range for search and detection in the range from 500 to 2,000 km, and the second for precise location of targets in the centimeter wavelength range. And this should be a rotating structure of 4 parabolic antennas with a diameter of 12-15 m on a tower 30 m high.

However, industry was not ready for the production of such a system at that time, and therefore on February 14, 1948, the task of working out the parameters of a “system for combating long-range missiles and long-range bombers” with the creation missile defense PR was already assigned to NII-88. The idea of ​​which, in contrast to the project of G. Mozharovsky, was the following: a group of detection radars, each in its own sector, was supposed to “look through” the space for 1,000 km, providing all-round visibility. Next, the target coordinates were transmitted to the command post, from where to the required group of precise bearing stations, which “guided” the target, starting from a range of 700 km. The calculating device of this defense sector determined the pointing angles of the launcher (PU) from the coordinates received from the precise bearing radar, and the “interceptor” was supposed to be brought to the target by the active homing head(GSN). The start was given from the ground at a distance of 1.5 - 2 km from the target; at a distance of 75 - 400 m from it, a detonation command was issued warhead(warhead) of the “interceptor”, and this was supposed to cause the detonation of the warhead of the intercepted missile, which would achieve its destruction. Thus, in a certain area, protection (i.e., missile defense) was provided from the attack of 20 ballistic missiles.

However, in the same 1948, missiles with a range of up to 3,000 km and detachable warheads appeared, the speed of which was much higher, and the reflective surface was many times smaller - and therefore the development of missile defense against such missiles was again entrusted to G. Mozharovsky's NIBS on February 6, 1949 . However, the difficulty here immediately manifested itself in this: if previously, in order to solve the problem of repelling an attack on a limited area by ballistic missiles carrying a total of 20 tons of explosives, it was necessary to have 17 long-range (up to 1,000 km) detection radars, and 16 for the near zone, now, since the missile and the warhead separated from it already represented two targets - which the radar of those years could not distinguish between, and both had to be shot down - the number of accurate bearing stations should be 40, and in total a minimum of 73 radars were required.

In December 1949, G. Mozharovsky’s group completed research to substantiate the tactical and technical requirements for missile defense, in principle. However, in the face of such technical difficulties, I. Stalin then decided to switch to a simpler missile defense modification - air defense, and on August 9, 1950, the Decree “On the deployment of work on the creation of an air defense system for Moscow and the Moscow industrial region” was issued. To do this under the supervision of L. Beria at KB-1 (now the Almaz Central Design Bureau), headed by Amo Sergeevich Elyan, rocket scientist Sergo Beria (son) and an outstanding radio engineer, chief designer of the air-sea system, began to do this. Comet”, adopted for service in 1952, twice winner of the Stalin Prize Pavel Nikolaevich Kuksenko. They became the Chief Designers of the Moscow defense system based on a combination of radar and guided missiles - the S-25 Berkut air defense system, named after the first letters of their surnames (“Ber” - “Ku”).

For the timely detection of enemy aircraft, it was planned to deploy all-round radars, and then, 50 and 90 km from the center of the capital, there should be two “rings” - up to 1,000 anti-aircraft missile systems in each - for the simultaneous destruction of up to 20 targets in an area in 10 -15 km. In June 1951, the first test launches were carried out, on April 25, 1953, a Tu-4 target aircraft was shot down for the first time by a guided missile, but 1953 came. I. Stalin died, then, on a tip from Khrushchev, L. was killed in the struggle for power. Beria, and the “cleansing of his personnel” began. NIBS G. Mozharovsky was disbanded, the test results of the Berkut system were questioned, Sergo Beria was arrested and P. Kuksenko and A. Elyan were removed from their positions. Moreover, such injustice so shocked the latter, an outstanding organizer of the defense industry, that three strokes occurred one after another, he was completely paralyzed, and brain function was seriously impaired.

The line under the Stalinist development of missile defense (air defense) by Khrushchev seemed to have been drawn, however, realizing the detrimental nature of such acts for the defense of the country, seven Marshals immediately, in August, turned to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee with a note on the need to create, after all, a system missile defense. Therefore, in September a meeting was held to complete the state. tests of the S-25 Berkut air defense system, and then part of the KB-1 forces, including the restored P. Kuksenko, were redirected to solving new missile defense problems. They also connected the Radio Engineering Laboratory of the Academy of Sciences - RALAN (now the Radio Engineering Institute named after A. Mints). According to the “Barrier” project, along the missile flight path at a distance of 100 km from each other, it was necessary to place three stations with antennas pointing upward - and the warheads of the missiles sequentially crossed three narrow radar beams, making it possible to quite accurately calculate their trajectory from three points and falling point. In May 1955, the world's first anti-aircraft missile system S-25 "Berkut" was put into service (before its analogues were created in the USA and Great Britain). And then, within the framework of KB-1, SKB-30 was organized, which was headed by G. Kisunko from 1956 and headed all the work on developing further projects of the missile defense system. But this is a different, new story, but for now let’s just accept for ourselves that it was I. Stalin who started it, after all, back in 1945.

Gennady TURETSKY

Anti-aircraft missile system "Berkut"

The post-war transition in aviation to the use of jet engines led to qualitative changes in the confrontation between air attack and air defense systems. The sharp increase in the speed and maximum flight altitude of reconnaissance aircraft and bombers reduced the effectiveness of medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery to almost zero. The production of anti-aircraft artillery systems by the domestic industry consisting of 100- and 130-mm anti-aircraft guns and radar gun guidance systems could not guarantee reliable protection of protected objects. The situation was significantly aggravated by the presence of nuclear weapons in the potential enemy, even a single use of which could lead to large losses. In the current situation, along with jet fighter-interceptors, guided anti-aircraft missiles could become a promising means of air defense. Some experience in the development and use of guided anti-aircraft missiles was available in a number of USSR organizations that, since 1945-1946, were engaged in the development of captured German missile technology and the creation of domestic analogues on its basis. The development of fundamentally new equipment for the country's Air Defense Forces was accelerated by the Cold War situation. The plans developed by the United States to launch nuclear strikes on industrial and administrative facilities of the USSR were supported by the build-up of a group of B-36, B-50 strategic bombers and other carriers of nuclear weapons. The first target for anti-aircraft missile defense, which required ensuring reliable defense, was determined by the country's leadership to be the capital of the state - Moscow.

The resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the development of the first domestic stationary anti-aircraft missile system for the country's Air Defense Forces, signed on August 9, 1950, was supplemented by the resolution of J.V. Stalin: “We must receive a missile for air defense within a year.” The resolution determined the composition of the system, the parent organization - SB-1, developers and co-executing organizations of several industries. The anti-aircraft missile system being developed was given the code name "Golden eagle".

According to the original design, the Berkut system, located around Moscow, was supposed to consist of the following subsystems and objects:

• two rings of a radar detection system (the closest one is 25-30 km from Moscow and the farthest one is 200-250 km) based on the Kama all-round radar. The Kama 10-centimeter range radar complex for the A-100 stationary radar units was developed by NII-244, chief designer L.V. Leonov.
• two rings (near and far) for anti-aircraft missile guidance radar. The code for the missile guidance radar is “product B-200”. Developer - SB-1, leading radar designer V.E. Magdesiev.
• B-300 anti-aircraft guided missiles, located at launch positions in close proximity to the guidance radar. Developer of the OKB-301 rocket, General Designer - S.A. Lavochkin. The launch equipment was entrusted to be developed by the GSKB MMP, Chief Designer V.P. Barmin.
• interceptor aircraft, code "G-400" - Tu-4 aircraft with G-300 air-to-air missiles. The development of the air interception complex was carried out under the leadership of A.I. Korchmar. Development of the interceptor was stopped at an early stage. G-300 missiles (factory code "210", developed by OKB-301) - a smaller version of the V-300 missile with air launch from a carrier aircraft.
• Apparently, it was intended to use the D-500 long-range radar detection aircraft, developed on the basis of the Tu-4 long-range bomber, as an element of the system.

The system included a grouping of anti-aircraft missile systems (regiments) with detection, control, and support means, missile weapons storage bases, residential camps and barracks for officers and personnel. The interaction of all elements was to be carried out through the central command post of the System via special communication channels.

Organization of work on the Moscow air defense system "Berkut", carried out to the strictest extent
secrecy, was entrusted to the specially created Third Main Directorate (TGU) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The lead organization responsible for the principles of building the System and its functioning was determined by KB-1 - the reorganized SB-1; P.N. Kuksenko and S.L. Beria were appointed chief designers of the System. To successfully carry out the work in a short time, the necessary employees from other design bureaus were transferred to KB-1. German specialists who were brought to the USSR after the end of the war were also involved in working on the system. Having worked in various design bureaus, they were collected in department No. 38 of KB-1.

As a result of the hard work of many scientific and labor teams, a prototype of an anti-aircraft missile system, projects and samples of some of the main components of the system were created in an extremely short time.

Field tests of an experimental version of the anti-aircraft missile system, carried out in January 1952, made it possible to draw up a comprehensive technical design for the Berkut system, which included only ground-based detection means, anti-aircraft missiles and their guidance means for intercepting air targets from the originally planned range of means.

From 1953 to 1955, at the 50- and 90-kilometer lines around Moscow, the forces of the “special contingent” of the Gulag carried out the construction of combat positions of anti-aircraft missile divisions, ring roads to ensure the delivery of missiles to firing divisions and storage bases (the total length of roads is up to 2000 km) . At the same time, construction of residential camps and barracks was underway. All engineering structures of the Berkut system were designed by the Moscow branch of Lengiprostroy, headed by V.I. Rechkin.

After the death of I.V. Stalin and the arrest of L.P. Beria in June 1953, a reorganization of KB-1 and a change in its leadership followed. By government decree, the name of the Moscow air defense system "Berkut" was replaced by "System S-25", and Raspletin was appointed chief designer of the system. TSU under the name Glavspetsmash is included in the Ministry of Medium Machine Building.

Combat position of the S-25 air defense system

Deliveries of System-25 combat elements to the troops began in 1954; in March, equipment was being configured at most facilities and components and assemblies of the complexes were being fine-tuned. At the beginning of 1955, acceptance tests of all complexes near Moscow were completed and the System was put into service. In accordance with the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated May 7, 1955, the first formation of anti-aircraft missile forces began the phased implementation of a combat mission: protecting Moscow and the Moscow industrial region from a possible attack by an air enemy. The system was put on permanent combat duty in June 1956 after an experimental duty with missiles placed in position without refueling with fuel components and with weight mock-ups of combat units. When using all missile units of the system, it was fundamentally possible to simultaneously fire about 1000 air targets when targeting up to 3 missiles at each target.

After the S-25 air defense system, created over four and a half years, was adopted by the Glavspetsmash headquarters: Glavspetsmontazh, which was responsible for commissioning the standard facilities of the system, and Glavspetsmash, which oversaw the development organizations, were liquidated; KB-1 was transferred to the Ministry of Defense Industry.

To operate the S-25 system in the Moscow Air Defense District in the spring of 1955, a
A separate special purpose army of the country's Air Defense Forces under the command of Colonel General K. Kazakov was deployed.

Training of officers to work on System-25 was carried out at the Gorky Air Defense School, personnel - at a specially created training center - Training Center-2.

During operation, the System was improved with the replacement of its individual elements with qualitatively new ones. The S-25 system (its modernized version - S-25M) was removed from combat duty in 1982 and replaced by medium-sized anti-aircraft missile systems
range S-ZOP.

Anti-aircraft missile system S-25

Work on the creation of a functionally closed anti-aircraft missile system of the S-25 system was carried out in parallel across all its components. In October (June) 1950, an experimental prototype of the SNR (Missile Guidance Station) B-200 was presented for testing, and on July 25, 1951, the first launch of the B-300 rocket was made at the test site.

To test the full range of complexes at the Kapustin Yar test site, the following were created: site No. 30 - a technical position for preparing S-25 missiles for launches; site No. 31 - residential complex for service personnel of the S-25 experimental system; site No. 32 - launching position for B-300 anti-aircraft missiles; site No. 33 - site of the prototype TsRN (Central Guidance Radar) S-25 (18 km from site No. 30).

The first tests of a prototype anti-aircraft missile system in a closed control loop (a test site version of the complex in its entirety) were carried out on November 2, 1952, when firing at an electronic imitation of a stationary target. A series of tests was conducted in November-December. Shooting at real targets - parachute targets - was carried out after the TsRN antennas were replaced at the beginning of 1953. From April 26 to May 18, launches were carried out against Tu-4 target aircraft. A total of 81 launches were carried out during testing from September 18, 1952 to May 18, 1953. In September-October, at the request of the Air Force command, control range tests were carried out while firing at Il-28 and Tu-4 target aircraft.

The decision to build a full-scale anti-aircraft missile system at the test site for repeated State tests was made by the Government in January 1954 based on a decision of the State Commission. The complex was presented for State tests on June 25, 1954, during which from October 1 to April 1, 1955, 69 launches were made against Tu-4 and Il-28 target aircraft. Shooting was carried out at radio-controlled target aircraft, including passive jammers. At the final stage, a salvo of 20 missiles was fired at 20 targets.

Before the completion of field tests, about 50 factories were connected to the production of components for air defense systems and missiles. From 1953 to 1955, combat positions of anti-aircraft missile systems were built at the 50- and 90-kilometer lines around Moscow. In order to speed up the work, one of the complexes was made the main reference complex, and its commissioning was carried out by representatives of the development enterprises.

Station B-200

At the positions of the complexes, the B-200 - (TsRN) station, functionally connected with the missile defense launchers, was located in a semi-buried reinforced concrete structure, designed to survive a direct hit from a 1000-kg high-explosive bomb, embanked with earth and camouflaged with grass. Separate rooms were provided for high-frequency equipment, the multi-channel part of the locator, the command post of the complex, operator workplaces and rest areas for combat duty shifts. Two target sighting antennas and four command transmission antennas were located in close proximity to the structure on a concrete site. Searching, detecting, tracking air targets and pointing missiles at them with each System complex was carried out in a fixed sector of 60 x 60 degrees.

The complex made it possible to track up to 20 targets along 20 firing channels with automatic (manual) tracking of the target and the missile aimed at it while simultaneously aiming 1-2 missiles at each target. For each target firing channel at the launch position there were 3 missiles on the launch pads. The time for putting the complex on alert was determined to be 5 minutes, during which time at least 18 firing channels had to be synchronized.

Launching positions with launch pads of six (four) in a row with access roads to them were located at a distance of 1.2 to 4 km from the central control center with a distance towards the division’s sector of responsibility. Depending on local conditions, due to the limited area of ​​the positions, the number of missiles could be slightly less than the planned 60 missiles.

At the position of each complex there were facilities for storing missiles, missile preparation and refueling areas, vehicle depots, service and living quarters for personnel.

During operation, the system was improved. In particular, moving target selection equipment, developed in 1954, was introduced at standard facilities after field tests in 1957.

A total of 56 serial S-25 systems were manufactured, deployed and put into service (NATO code: SA-1 Guild) in the Moscow air defense system, one serial and one experimental complex were used for field tests of hardware, missiles and equipment. One set of TsRN was used for testing radio-electronic equipment in Kratovo.

B-200 missile guidance station

At the initial design stage, the possibility of using narrow-beam locators for precise target tracking and a missile with a parabolic antenna, which created two beams for tracking the target and the missile aimed at it, was investigated (the head of work at KB-1 is V.M. Taranovsky). At the same time, a version of the missile was being developed, equipped with a homing head that would turn on near the meeting point (work manager N.A. Viktorov). Work was stopped at an early design stage.

The design of the sector locator antennas with linear scanning was proposed by M.B. Zakson, the construction of the multi-channel part of the radar and its target and missile tracking systems was proposed by K.S. Alperovich. The final decision to accept the development of sector guidance radars was made in January 1952. An angular antenna with a height of 9 m and an azimuth antenna with a width of 8 m were located on different bases. Scanning was carried out with continuous rotation of antennas consisting of six (two triangular) beamformers each. The antenna scanning sector is 60 degrees, the beam width is about 1 degree. The wavelength is about 10 cm. In the early stages of the project, it was proposed to supplement the beam shapers to complete circles with non-metallic radio-transparent segments.

When implementing a missile guidance station, to determine the coordinates of targets and missiles, the “C method” and the “AZh” radio-electronic circuit, proposed by German designers, were adopted, using quartz frequency stabilizers. The “A” system, based on electromechanical elements, and the “BZh” system, an alternative to the “German” one, proposed by KB-1 employees were not implemented.

In order to ensure automatic tracking of 20 targets and 20 missiles aimed at them, and the formation of guidance control commands, 20 firing channels were created in the central control center with separate tracking systems for targets and missiles for each of their coordinates and a separate analog computing device for each channel (developed by KB "Almaz", leading designer N.V. Semakov). The firing channels were combined into four five-channel groups.

To control the missiles of each group, command transmission antennas were introduced (in the original version of the TsRN, a single command transmission station was assumed).

The experimental prototype of the TsRN was tested in the autumn of 1951 in Khimki, in the winter of 1951 and in the spring of 1952 on the territory of the LII (Zhukovsky). A prototype of the serial TsRN was also built in Zhukovsky. In August 1952, the prototype of the TsRN was fully equipped. Control tests were carried out from June 2 to September 20. To monitor the passage of “combined” signals from the missile and the target, the onboard missile transponder was placed on the tower of the BU-40 drilling rig remote from the central control center (in the serial version of the complex it was replaced by a telescopic structure with a radiating horn on top). Fast scanning (scanning frequency about 20 Hz) antennas A-11 and A-12 for the prototype of the B-200 station were manufactured at plant No. 701 (Podolsk Mechanical Plant), transmitters - in the radio engineering laboratory of A.L. Mints. After control tests were carried out in September, the prototype of the TsRN was disassembled and sent by rail to continue testing at the test site. In the fall of 1952, a prototype of the CRN was built at the Kapustin Yar training ground with the equipment located in a one-story stone building on site 33.

In parallel with the tests of the central rocket launcher in Zhukovsky, the control loop for missile guidance at targets was tested on a complex modeling stand in KB-1.

The complex stand included simulators of target and missile signals, systems for their automatic tracking, a computer for generating missile control commands, onboard missile equipment and an analog computing device - a model of the missile. In the fall of 1952, the stand was moved to the training ground in Kapustin Yar.

Serial production of TsRN equipment was carried out at plant No. 304 (Kuntsevo Radar Plant), antennas for a prototype of the complex were produced at plant No. 701, then for serial complexes at plant No. 92 (Gorky Machine-Building Plant). Stations for transmitting control commands to missiles were produced at the Leningrad Printing Machines Plant (production was later allocated to the Leningrad Radio Equipment Plant), computers for generating commands were produced at the Zagorsk Plant, and vacuum tubes were supplied by the Tashkent Plant. The equipment for the S-25 complex was manufactured by the Moscow Radio Engineering Plant (MRTZ, before the war - a piston plant, later a cartridge plant - produced cartridges for heavy machine guns).

The TsRN adopted for service differed from the prototype in the presence of control devices and additional indicator devices. Since 1957, moving target selection equipment developed at KB-1 under the leadership of Gapeev was installed. For shooting at jamming aircraft, the “three-point” guidance mode was introduced.

Anti-aircraft missile V-300 and its modifications

The design of the V-300 rocket (factory designation "205", lead designer N. Chernyakov) began at OKB-301 in September 1950. A version of the guided missile was submitted for consideration to TSU on March 1, 1951, the preliminary design of the missile was defended in mid-March.

The rocket with a vertical launch, functionally divided into seven compartments, was equipped with radio command equipment for the control system and was made according to the “duck” design with rudders for pitch and yaw control placed on one of the head compartments. Ailerons located on the wings in the same plane were used for roll control. In the rear part of the hull, jettisonable gas rudders were attached, which were used to deflect the rocket after launch towards the target, stabilize and control the rocket at the initial stage of flight at low speeds. Radar tracking of the missile was carried out according to a signal from the on-board radio transponder. The development of the rocket autopilot and on-board missile sighting equipment - the TsRN probing signal receiver and the on-board radio transponder with a response signal generator - was carried out at KB-1 under the leadership of V.E. Chernomordik.

The missile's onboard radio equipment was checked for stability in receiving commands from the central control center using an aircraft that hovered in the radar viewing area and had on board the missile's radio units and control equipment. On-board equipment for serial missiles was produced at the Moscow Bicycle Plant (Mospribor plant).

Testing of the "205" rocket engine was carried out at a firing stand in Zagorsk (currently Sergiev Posad). The performance of the rocket's engine and radio systems was tested under simulated flight conditions.

Training launch of V-300 missile defense system

The first rocket launch took place on July 25, 1951. The stage of ground tests to test the launch and rocket stabilization system (autopilot) took place in November-December 1951 during launches from site No. 5 of the Kapustin Yar test site (a site for launching ballistic missiles). At the second stage, from March to September 1952, autonomous missile launches were carried out. Controlled flight modes were tested by specifying control commands from a software on-board mechanism, and later from equipment similar to the standard equipment of the central nervous system. During the first and second stages of testing, 30 launches were carried out. From October 18 to October 30, five missile launches were carried out with their capture and tracking equipment of a prototype of the CRN test site.

After modifications to the on-board equipment, on November 2, 1952, the first successful launch of a rocket took place in a closed control loop (as part of an experimental test site version of the complex) when firing at an electronic imitation of a stationary target. On May 25, 1953, a Tu-4 target aircraft was shot down for the first time by a B-300 missile.

Due to the need to organize, in a short time, mass production and delivery of a large number of missiles for field tests and to the troops, the production of their experimental and serial versions for the S-25 system was carried out by 41.82 (Tushino Machine-Building) and 586 (Dnepropetrovsk Machine-Building) plants.

The order to prepare serial production of the B-303 anti-aircraft missiles (a variant of the B-300 missile) at the DMZ was signed on August 31, 1952. On March 2, 1953, the four-chamber (two-mode) liquid propellant rocket engine S09-29 (with a thrust of 9000 kg with displacement) was tested
system for supplying hydrocarbon fuel and oxidizer - nitric acid) designed by OKB-2 NII-88, Chief Designer A.M. Isaev. Fire tests of the engines were carried out on the basis of the branch of NII-88 in Zagorsk - NII-229. Initially, the production of S09.29 engines was carried out by the pilot production of SKB-385 (Zlatoust) - now KBM named after. Makeeva. Serial production of missiles was launched by the DMZ in 1954.

Onboard power supplies for the rocket were developed at the Gosplan Research Institute under the leadership of N. Lidorenko. The E-600 warheads (of various types) of the B-300 missiles were developed at the NII-6 Design Bureau of the Moscow Agricultural Machinery in teams led by N. S. Zhidkikh, V. A. Sukhikh and K. I. Kozorezov; radio fuses - in the design bureau led by Rastorguev. A high-explosive fragmentation warhead with a destruction radius of 75 meters was accepted for serial production. At the end of 1954, State tests of a missile with a cumulative warhead were carried out. Some sources cite a variant of the missile warhead, whose operating principle is reminiscent of a 76-mm anti-aircraft projectile of the 1925 model: upon explosion, the warhead was divided into segments connected by cables that cut the elements of the target airframe when they met.

During many years of operation in the S-25 system and its modifications, missiles “205”, “207”, “217”, “219” of various variants developed by OKB-301 and the Burevestnik design bureau were created and used.

The development of the "217" rocket with a S3.42A liquid-propellant rocket engine (with a thrust of 17,000 kg, with a turbopump fuel supply system) designed by OKB-3 NII-88, Chief Designer D. Sevruk, began in 1954. Flight tests of the rocket have been carried out since 1958. A modified version of the "217M" missile with the S.5.1 engine developed by OKB-2 (with a thrust of 17,000 kg, with a turbopump fuel supply system) was put into service as part of the S-25M complex.

Options for the development and use of the S-25 System

Based on the S-25 Berkut system, a prototype of the complex with a simplified composition of equipment was developed. The antennas of the complex were located on the KZU-16 anti-aircraft artillery cart, the cabins: radio path “R”, equipment “A”, computing equipment “B” were located in vans. The development and refinement of the prototype led to the creation of the SA-75 "Dvina" mobile air defense system.

RM Strizh based on 5YA25M and 5YA24 missiles. Photo from Buran.ru website

On the basis of the missiles and launch equipment of the S-25 System, in the early 70s, a target complex was created (with control over the flight of the SNR S-75M air defense missile target) for conducting live missile firing at air defense ranges. Target missiles (RM): "208" (V-300K3, a modernized version of the "207" missile without a warhead) and "218" (a modernized version of the 5YA25M missile of the "217" family) were equipped with an autopilot and flew with a constant azimuth with varying altitudes according to the program Depending on the assigned task, the PMs simulated targets with different reflective surface areas, flight speeds and altitudes. If necessary, maneuvering targets and jammers were simulated. For exercises "Belka-1" - "Belka-4" the flight altitude ranges of the RM were: 80-100 m; 6-11 km; 18-20 km; flight following the terrain. For the Zvezda-5 exercises, the target missile is a simulator of strategic cruise missiles and multi-purpose attack aircraft. The duration of the target missile's flight is up to 80 seconds, after which it self-destructs. The operation of the target complex was carried out by the ITB - test technical battalion. RM were produced by Tushinsky MZ.

Additionally You can read about target missiles based on the S-25 anti-aircraft missiles on the Buran.ru website.

Information sources

S. Ganin, FIRST DOMESTIC ANTI-AIRMISSILE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM OF MOSCOW - S-25 "BERKUT". Nevsky Bastion No. 2, 1997

Materials on the topic were kindly provided by D. Boltenkov, V. Stepanov and I. Motlik