The origin of the concept of “containing the USSR” and its official formalization in the “Truman Doctrine”
In the winter and spring of 1946 in the western public opinion a turning point began in relation to cooperation with the USSR. Representatives of the liberal part of Western intellectuals began to move to critical positions. On February 22, 1946, Charge d'Affaires of the United States in the USSR George Kennan, later a prominent American political and public figure, a publicist, sent another report to the US State Department in Washington in the form of the famous “ long telegram"(8 thousand words), in which he gave a detailed analytical assessment of the possibilities and prospects for the development of US relations with the Soviet Union.
Kennan warned the American leadership against continuing the “Rooseveltian” policy of trusting partnership with the USSR and called for quickly getting rid of illusions and inflated expectations regarding the possibility of cooperating and negotiating with Moscow on a generally accepted diplomatic basis - that is, the basis of weighing and rationally assessing the arguments of the parties, taking into account the interests of the partner, negotiation “trade” and compliance with the principle of fidelity to accepted obligations. The telegram firmly stated: the Soviet leadership respects only force, and therefore dialogue with it must be conducted in a non-provocative but firm manner, making it clear that the United States will not make any concessions without guaranteed reciprocity from Moscow. Characterizing the views of the Soviet leadership, the author of the telegram wrote: “... we are dealing... with a political force fanatically committed to the view that a permanent modus vivendi cannot be achieved with the United States” (an agreement that the parties adhere to in the absence of a formal agreement).
The key point of the telegram was the conclusion about the organic expansionism inherent in Soviet leaders, which encourages and under any circumstances will encourage them to external expansion, to spread their sphere of influence to all new areas of the world. Accordingly, J. Kennan considered the only adequate response to such aspirations of the USSR to be “containment” of Moscow, that is, keeping the Soviet Union firmly within the zones of influence that it had already managed to acquire, and uncompromisingly opposing any attempts by the USSR to go beyond their limits by opposing Soviet encroachments “unbending strength anywhere on the globe.”
Although the “long telegram” was intended only for the US Secretary of State, several thousand people became familiar with it over the course of several months, who determined foreign policy Washington. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, to whom a copy of this telegram was sent by the US Ambassador to the USSR Averell Harriman, ordered it to be mimeographed and sent to other members of the cabinet and senior (♦) officers of the US armed forces. At the same time, by order of the leadership of the State Department, J. Kennan’s text was sent out in key order political information to all foreign US embassies.
However, this telegram was published in print much later - only in July 1947, Kennan’s text, signed “Mr. J. Kennan was able to capture the shifts in the mood of the American political elite, which ceased to see the USSR as a partner in reorganizing the world. He was the first to formulate the key ideas of the thinking of the Harry Truman administration that had changed since the Potsdam Conference: not to provoke the USSR, but to demonstrate to it the firmness of the United States, to defend one’s own American vision, even if it contradicts the opinion and interests of Moscow. After the “long telegram,” J. Kennan was transferred with a major promotion to work in Washington, where for several years he became one of the most influential advisers to the US President with the right to report his assessments directly to President G. Truman. Kennan's views began to largely determine the approaches of American diplomacy to relations with the Soviet Union. In March 1945 Soviet Union Trusted by 55% of Americans surveyed, in March 1946 - only 33%.
USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES INSTITUTE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND CANADA
As a manuscript
ALASANIA Teimuraz Georgievich
THE CONCEPT OF "CONTAINMENT" - ITS SPECIFIC REFRACTION INTO EXTERNAL. AND MILITARY POLITICS OF THE USA IN THE 80S
Specialty 07.00.C6 - history of international
dissertation for the degree of candidate of historical sciences
Moscow, 1988
The work was carried out at the Institute of the United States of America and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
Scientific supervisor - corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences,
Professor Zhurkin V.V. Official opponents - Doctor of Historical Sciences,
Professor Usachev I.G. - Candidate of Economic Sciences Savelyev A.G. “Leading organization - Institute of World History
Academy of Sciences of the USSR
The dissertation defense will take place " " __________
1988 at a meeting of the specialized council D 002.93.01 at the Institute of the United States of America and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences at! 121614, Moscow, Khlebny lane, 2/3.
The dissertation can be found in the library of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
Scientific secretary of the specialized council,
candidate of philosophical sciences|$ y _____ ^ "
"„".* Malashenko I. E.
I Relevance of topics. In today's diverse, but
. . ". -. ¡jo increasingly interdependent, holistic
........"the world has never before seen two approaches sharply collide,
two philosophies of ensuring national and international security, universal peace. On the one hand, this is the concept of “containment”, proclaimed and developed throughout post-war period as the main military-strategic basis for the security of the Rada Western countries. On the other hand, the detailed interpretation of the Philosophy of Peaceful Coexistence, put forward by the 18th Congress of the CPSU, the justification of the concept of a comprehensive system of peace and international security. In the words of M.S. Gorbachev, “we contrasted the militaristic doctrine on which the policy of force is based with the concepts of “balance of interests” and mutual equal security”1/.
The development of such a support model comes to the fore national security, which would not threaten a worldwide catastrophe.
This model of ensuring national security presupposes a certain revision of many of the postulates that have become axiomatic in both foreign policy activities and internal development states Its implementation in the practice of interstate relations will depend on how specific affairs of states (especially in military development) correspond to the declared defensive goals of military doctrines.
There is also no doubt that the largest militarily powers, primarily the USSR and the USA, should set an example in this regard. Therefore, the rejection of the concept of “containment” by Western states, a joint search with the USSR for alternative ways and means of transition to non-offensive military doctrine on the basis of reasonable sufficiency of weapons and armed forces,"
I/ M.S.Gorbachev, Pravda, 02/17/1987
appears as a political and military-strategic directive to limit the military capabilities of states and military alliances to the limits of the minimum need for them solely for the purposes of defense, protection from aggression when offensive operations are impossible "
Being based on fundamentally different views on the problem of national security, methods and means of ensuring it, “containment” essentially became the main practical obstacle to the movement towards a nuclear-free non-violent world, the introduction of new thinking into international political practice, the materialization of the USSR’s attempts, especially over the last three year, to purchase ways of transition from “containment” with nuclear weapons to “containment” by political and legal means. Therefore, it is obvious that with the further development and concretization of the foundations of a comprehensive system of international security, a comprehensive, comprehensive study of the concept of “containment” will become increasingly relevant.
In addition, the concept of “containment” has attracted increased interest for a number of other fundamental reasons.
Firstly, the provisions of the concept of “containment” throughout the post-war decades “served as the basis for determining the programs and intensity of weapons production, and were used by the United States and its Western European allies to justify the creation of all types of weapons, primarily nuclear ones.
Secondly, as a result of a change in the balance of military and political forces on the world stage, a qualitative leap in the development of military technology and the quantitative accumulation of huge potentials nuclear weapons, having unprecedented destructive power, significant changes have occurred in the content of such
Categories and formulas associated with the concept of “containment”, such as “achieving victory in the war”, “ensuring national security”, “preemptive and decapitating strikes”, “arms race”, etc.
Thirdly, influencing<{ормирование взглядов (ХА на такие важнейшие проблемы современности, как направление и основные параметр! гонки вооружений; условия, при которых допускается использование военной силы, или ограничение вооружений путем переговоров; готовность к мирному сосуществованию и сотрудничеству, концепция "сдерживания" превратилась о важную состивную общеполитической ситуации.
The subject of the study is the origins of the US approach to the problem of national security through the prism of the concept of "containment", the impact of internal and external "[actors on ("formation of the main military-strategic doctrine of the West of the post-war period, the struggle between various schools and movements, the influence of "containment" on external ® US policy, the general strategic situation in the world, the arms race, negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament. The dissertation traces the evolution of the concept of “containment”, its specific functional manifestations at various historical stages, and reveals the pattern of changing milestones.
Particular attention is paid to the study of the roots of the crisis currently being experienced by the concept of “containment”. The conclusion is substantiated that alternative ways of ensuring national and international security increasingly diverge from the idea of perpetuating “nuclear deterrence” as the primary basis for preserving Peace. An attempt is also made to show
several possible options for achieving nuclear-free___]
nonviolent world in which the absence of threats bu-_| The child is not connected with the possession of weapons, but with the creation! nium system of political, legal and socio-economic!
guarantees that do not allow the revival of nuclear or other types of weapons of mass destruction, creating an objective prerequisite for the abandonment of military-power concepts of ensuring security.
The purpose of the study and critical analysis from the perspective of Marxism-Leninism of the development of approaches of the US ruling circles to the concept of “containment” is to identify how bourgeois ideology influences American military strategy, how theoretical concepts in military policy are manifested in the practical activities of various American administrations . In this regard, the following tasks are set in the work:
Analyze the essence of the concept of “containment”, its specific functional manifestations in the foreign and military policies of various administrations, trace the main stages of its evolution;
Show the influence of the entire complex of ideological, psychological, economic and socio-political factors and theory on the development of the official US military doctrine;
Analyze methods and ways of adapting American military-strategic concepts to changing conditions while maintaining the idea of “deterrence through deterrence” as a cross-cutting element;
Show the influence of the concept of “containment” on US foreign policy;
To trace the course of the internal struggle of opposing tendencies in American military thought and the formation of Washington's official military policy during this struggle. At the same time, special attention was paid to the role assigned to various kinds of theories and concepts in<|орми-. ровании основных ориентиров практических военных программ и строительства вооруженных сил; влияние на гонку
weapons and arms limitation negotiations, on the general strategic context of Soviet-American relations;
Give a comprehensive assessment of the main American military-strategic concepts in the “containment” strategy, taking into account both their theoretical basis and practical implementation.
Responding to the stated goals, the study represents one of the attempts at a comprehensive analysis from the Marxist-Leninist perspective of the inextricable relationship of the concept of “containment” with the official military policy of Washington from 1945 to the present day, the influence on the economic and foreign policies of various administrations. The scientific novelty of the study, therefore, lies in identifying the influence of various military concepts, theories and doctrines within the framework of “containment” on the general strategic situation in the world, the military confrontation with the USSR, the degree of intensity of this confrontation, the ability of military detente and disarmament, etc. At the same time, an analysis of various concepts - “massive retaliation”, “flexible response”, “realistic deterrence”, “compensatory counteraction”, “active confrontation”, “victory in war”, etc. - is given in the study in parallel with an analysis of the military policies of those administrations whose military programs were based on appropriate specific conceptual approaches.
This work, to a certain extent, fills the gap in the analytical study of the unity of the theoretical and practical approach of the US ruling circles to the problem of forming the official military policy of the country. us.
The novelty of the work carried out is also due to the fact that it introduced into scientific circulation some new sources and materials that contribute to a more complete
an idea of the essence and features of American approaches to the formation of a unified concept of “containment”, and the prospects for the development of this concept until the end of the century.
The scientific and practical significance of the dissertation is determined by the growing threat of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction for the fate of civilization. The Soviet-American military confrontation, competition in the military field practically predetermines the solution of such vitally important problems for all mankind as the problem of war and peace, ensuring national and international security, and preventing a nuclear catastrophe. In this regard, the analysis and study of the foundations of American military doctrine becomes important for determining both the essence of this doctrine and the prospects for its evolution. This allows the results of the study to be used by Soviet practical and scientific institutions both for a retrospective analysis of specific aspects of American military policy and the concept of “containment”, and for assessing possible subsequent modifications of this concept and for determining the position of the USSR in relation to such modifications.
The materials, provisions and conclusions included in the dissertation were used by divisions of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in developing the position and during the work of the 41st, 42nd, and 43rd sessions of the UN General Assembly, the UN Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament, international seminars and symposiums in Dagomys and Sochi, as well as in preparing the Soviet section of the 1986 UN study on “Deterrence: Its Impact on the Arms Race.”
Methodological basis of the study. A critical review of the totality of American theoretical and conceptual views on the military-strategic situation and the problem of national security assumes a comprehensive
analysis of a wide range of issues covering the ideological basis and practical orientation of the concept and doctrines, their historical validity, as well as trends in the conditions of their development and transformation into official policy. The author found the key to understanding the mechanism of the evolution of US military thought after the Second World War in the Marxist-Leninist methodology, which approaches the analysis of the historical process in all its specificity and diversity. Subjectivism, vulgar individualization of events and facts, arbitrariness in their interpretation, introducing an artificial gap between dialectically interconnected individual links of historical evolution, i.e. What is characteristic of bourgeois historiography was opposed to a systematic approach to the study of military-political problems. The basis of the study was the fundamental works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, which formulate the foundations of the theory of military policy, their role and place in the system of international relations, analyze the class essence of military policy, the relationship between military strategy and the foreign policy of imperialist states.
Of particular importance for the development of theses were the works of K. Marx, F. Engels “Can Europe Disarm”, with V.I. Lenin “State and Revolution”, “Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism”, “Militarism - and Anti-Militaristic Tactics of Social -democracy" and others, dedicated to the study of the essence and features of the policy of imperialism, including in the military field, "
The Marxist-Leninist method of analyzing bourgeois military-political doctrines, which combines class partisanship, deep scientific knowledge and practical purposefulness, serves as the basis for assessing American theories of military policy. The famous Leninist book invariably helps to understand the complex labyrinth of conceptual structures of American bourgeois science
statement regarding the class approach: “When it is not immediately clear which political or social groups, forces, figures defend certain provisions, measures, etc., the question should always be asked: “Who benefits?”*/
Review of the used literature. The main party documents used in the dissertation: Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, materials and decisions of the CPSU congresses, especially the XXVII, Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, Resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee, speeches and speeches of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee comrade. Y.S. Gorbachev and other leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state, documents of international meetings of communist and workers' parties are both methodological and documentary material for understanding the policies of the CPSU and the Soviet government, aimed at strengthening universal peace and international security, ensuring the right of peoples to freedom, independence and social progress, as well as for a critical study of US military-strategic theories and concepts, and an assessment of Washington’s military strategy.
The most important source of the research was the documents of the foreign policy of the USSR, in which Soviet peace initiatives, existing treaties and agreements are presented in a concentrated form, factual material is provided that contributes to the development of an objective idea of the strategic situation in the world, the balance of power between the USSR and the USA, illustrating the fundamental difference in the approaches of the USSR and the USA to the problem of war and peace.
For a correct understanding of US military policy, an understanding of the role and place of monopolistic groups, the government apparatus and the scientific elite, and an analysis of the essence of the concept of “nuclear deterrence,” the author relied on the “works of prominent Soviet international relations scholars. Before"
1/b.i.lenin, and collected works, vol. 23, p. 61-62.
in total such works as “The History of Foreign Policy of the USSR”, a collective monograph of the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Capitalism at the end of the century” under the general editorship of A.N. Yakovlev, “Foreign Policy of Capitalist Countries”, “Diplomatic Bulletin” and other works.
To assess the fundamental principles of American political science, the influence of ideology on the formation of military policy, and in order to reveal and analyze the internal ideological and political struggle of various trends, the author relied on the conclusions of the works of G.A. Arbatov, V.F. Petrovsky, A. Karenin. , Yakovleva A.N. and others.
In the analysis, classification and assessment of individual theories, concepts and doctrines influencing or adjacent to “containment”, as well as in determining their role and place in the process of forming new priorities in the field of US defense policy, the works of A.G. Arbatov, R. Bogdanov were used .G., Zhurkina V.V., Kokoshina A.A., Trofimenko G.A., Usacheva I.G., as well as the collective monograph “USA: military-strategic concepts”, “USA: foreign policy mechanism. Organization, functions, - management "etc.
Analysis of the theoretical foundations of American approaches to issues of war and peace, their relationship with official military policy makes it possible to develop a more complete understanding of the process of making military-political decisions and to understand the structure of the system that determines the main directions of military policy.
A significant place in the dissertation is occupied by official documents of the United States: messages of presidents to Congress, speeches of presidents, secretaries of state, secretaries of defense, navy and air force, assistants to presidents on national security issues, annual reports to Congress of the Department of Defense, joint chiefs of staff,
materials of congressional hearings - on the basis of which the author identified the relationship between the concept of “containment” studied in the work, other theories arising on its basis with the official military-strategic course.
As for the selection of works by American authors, primary importance was given to how fully they represent certain trends in theoretical thinking and political ideology, and to what extent the concepts they develop influence US military policy and practice.
In this work, in accordance with the conventional distinction between the basic ideological principles of “conservatives” and “liberals,” the main groupings of theoretical schools are roughly divided.
In this work, G. Morgenthau, W. Lippmann, J. Kennan, M. Shulman, D. Wisner, M. Bundy, W. Thompson, M. Taylor, A. Ekthoven, A. Smoke, are considered as representatives of the “liberals”. L. George, A. Smith, T. Sorensen, W. Tucker, R. McNamara and others; “conservatives” include F. Ikle, I. Alexazzer, M. Vlachos, A. Ulam, D. Rechem, O. Albright, J. Liska, R. Jastrow, C. Bohlen, R. Pryps, E. Luttwak, K .Payne, K.Gray, D.Kirkpatrick, etc.
Particular attention is paid to the theoretical works of such scientists who had the opportunity, being at the leadership of foreign policy and military mechanisms, to practically and purposefully implement their concepts. These are R. McNamara, G. Kissinger, Z. Brzezinski, on whose example the unity of theory and practice of American military policy emerges most clearly.
The work also analyzes the works of those political scientists. who, occupying important political positions, developed individual components of concepts and theories and exerted influence at specific historical stages, in specific political directions, and were involved in solving special military-strategic tasks. These are like this
political scientists like S. Huntington, P. Nitze, M. Bundy, J. Kemp, B. Elehman, M. Shulman and others.
A significant place in the work is given to theoretical works, which provide a detailed analysis of certain specific forms of manifestation of “nuclear deterrence” and the various stages of its development. Particular attention was paid to the works of D. Rosenberg, A. Walstetter, W. Kaufman, A. Enthoven, A. Smith, D. Ball, K. Gray, Canadian R. Byers, A. Cordesman and others.
In order to reflect the acute political and ideological struggle that accompanied the evolution of the concept of “containment,” the author critically analyzed a number of works by American political scientists who assessed this process from different positions. For example, in the works of V. Rocha, W. Slo-combe, Z. Kaplan, M. McGuire and Z. White, the need to prevent any military conflict between the USSR and the USA is noted. Reducing the militant, forceful principle of “containment,” in the opinion of these authors, would have a beneficial effect on the general strategic situation in the world and would push back the threat of nuclear catastrophe.
3 At the same time, a number of authors spoke from the position of strengthening and sharpening “containment.” Similar views are expressed in the works of J. Collins, A. Cordesman, J. Douglas, A. Huber, G. Jackson, K. Gray, A. Sabrosky, E. Teller, G. Mark, J. Fostor, in a collective monograph Committee on Existing Danger - "1in America becoming Humber Two?" Current Trends in the US - Soviet Military Balance".
When analyzing the conceptual approaches of the R. Reagan administration, the author primarily used such collective works as “The United Statea in the CHEvO” (a collective monograph prepared at the Hoover
Institute edited by E. Rebashka), "::utional üocurit.v i l th".- ".u." Francisco), in which the conceptual and target guidelines of the military-political course of the Reagan administration are expressed in a concentrated form.
To study the conceptual approaches of the Reagan administration to Soviet-American relations through the prism of military policy, the works of W. Clemens, J. Collins, & Ikle, J. Kirkpatrick, R. Speed, J. Richelson were also used.
For the same purposes, articles by D. Halloran, R. Toth, R. Scheer, Y. Bundy, R. Jarvis, G. Kissinger, R. McNyaari were reviewed and analytically analyzed.
The chronological scope of the study covers the entire post-war period. The lower limit coincides with the period of a sharp turn in US policy from cooperation with the USSR during the war to the Cold War and confrontation on all fronts.
The upper limit is determined by the emerging positive changes in the world, the beginning of real nuclear disarmament and the gradual introduction of new thinking into the practice of interstate relations.
Research structure. The dissertation consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion and appendices.
The introduction substantiates the relevance of the dissertation topic, its scientific novelty and practical significance, its form.< мулируются предмет и цели исследования, его хронологические рамки, определяется методологическая основа, дается обзор основных источников и литературы.
In the first chapter, the dissertation examines the historical, ideological, military-political roots of the emergence of the concept of “containment”, the main stages of its evolution from 1945 to 1960.
The concept of “containment” originated and was formed in US political and academic circles in the late 40s and early 50s. The emergence and rapid accumulation of atomic weapons, unprecedented in their destructive power, posed the problem of a fundamental revision of the US military doctrine to politicians and the military establishment. First of all, it was necessary to justify the nuclear arms race initiated by the United States in the eyes of our own and the world community. It was necessary to answer the questions: why are US nuclear forces being built up, why on such a scale and in such a structure, where, how and against whom will they be used? What quantity can be applied to many others.
Since these questions were mainly of a purely speculative nature, the process of their analysis itself was abstract and abstract. Over time, the central idea of the concept of “deterrence” began to take shape - the creation of nuclear forces to deter the enemy through intimidation, supported by a declared readiness to use military force.
Thus, the 40s and the first half of the 50s were characterized by the dominance of militant anti-communist theories and, due to the atomic superiority of the United States over the USSR, an open focus on forceful confrontation with the USSR, which underlay the adoption of “massive retaliation.” During this period, the concept of national security was equated with maintaining an order in which America would maintain a privileged position.
With the coming to power of D. Kennedy, the process of revising the military-strategic concepts of the United States began. The new administration realized that in the conditions of the “balance of fear,” the US advantage could not be transformed into the ability to wage a global war for the unilateral destruction of the enemy. There was a shift toward the need to recognize the new realities of the international situation. Similar "
the shifts have had a certain positive influence on the system of assessing the place and role of the United States in the modern world, which has come to a large extent closer to a real understanding of the alignment of the social and political system in the international arena.
Under these conditions, influential political circles, led by President R. Nixon, agreed to a certain change in US foreign and military policy. However, the implementation and practical implementation of “realistic deterrence” caused not only sharp criticism from opponents of the softening of the militant principle in the US military-strategic concept, but also their active confrontation. The logical development of these concepts was the adoption of Directive V" 59 during the Carter administration.
The second chapter examines the military and foreign policy of the Reagan administration.
The further intensification of anti-Soviet ideological campaigns, the strengthening of moralism, “messianicism” in official rhetoric, the increase in the power factor in military policy and, finally, the orientation of military-strategic concepts towards the admissibility of nuclear war contributed to the strengthening of the influence of the most right-wing and rigidly conservative wing of the American ruling circles, whose representatives are heading towards acquiring nuclear superiority, waging psychological, economic and ideological wars, with the goal of achieving a global change in the balance of forces in their favor.
A reflection of the views of precisely these circles is the policy of the Reagan administration, especially in its first term in power, which is characterized as “the most anti-Soviet and militaristic government of the United States.” The US administration proclaimed the thesis of an “anti-communist crusade” as its official policy and revived in its military policy the concept of global confrontation and the possibility of victory in a nuclear war. In this regard, reliance on force or threat
forcefully moved into the forefront of foreign policy instruments. “Achieving peace through strength” became the main direction of the American position towards the USSR.
Thus, the interpretation of “containment” adopted by the Reagan administration essentially means a return to its original aggressive-offensive interpretation.
However, from about 1985, R. Reagan's views on the role of military force in relations with the USSR, on the place of the process of easing tensions, including through negotiations to limit the arms race, and especially on the foreign policy of the USSR began to noticeably evolve towards moderation and more realism. Among the many factors that determined this shift, a special place is occupied by the new foreign policy philosophy of the USSR and the new political practice formulated on its basis.
The 15th Congress of the CPSU put forward a comprehensive large-scale program for building a comprehensive system of international security, which poses in a non-standard, innovative way the main issues of our time: the Supreme Council and peace, the combination of national and international security, the relationship between military, political, economic, humanitarian and environmental factors in ensuring security.
In addition, a number of other economic, foreign and domestic political factors began to operate. Among them, it is necessary to highlight the problem of the growing budget deficit, the inability of the Reagan administration to ensure military superiority, despite billions of dollars injected into the militarization of the economy, science and technology; dissatisfaction of part of the US ruling class with a policy leading to a dead end and "brinkmanship."
US policy towards Lebanon, Libya, Nicaragua, etc. enjoyed less and less support in the world. And neglect of the process of limitation and reduction
weapons met not only misunderstanding, but also outright resistance from NATO allies.
The economic factor should be especially emphasized. The United States has ceased to be the absolute economic leader in the world that it was in the 50s and 60s. The increasing competitiveness in world markets on the part of Western Europe and especially Japan has raised new questions that require a reasoned answer.
The third chapter examines the problems of the relationship between the concept of “containment” and the specific programs of military development and planning that arise on its basis or within its framework and the general strategic situation in the world, the arms race, and the balance of military forces. Based on participation in the UN study “On the climate and other consequences of nuclear war,” the dissertation author also analyzes a number of updated data related to the concepts of “nuclear winter” and “nuclear night.”
The author examines President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. Initially put forward as an alternative to the concept of “containment” and the transition to non-nuclear defense, SDI in the process of its further detailing and specification revealed an absolutely opposite direction. It currently appears not as a replacement for the concept of “containment,” but as a sharpening and refining of its most dangerous elements. We are essentially talking about strengthening “deterrence,” supplementing ground-based nuclear potential with space-based potential.
This chapter examines the influence of the concept of “containment” on negotiations on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons using the example of 8-year negotiations on a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arms of the USSR and SKA, as well as the INF Treaty, and traces the evolution of the Reagan concept of arms control and its interrelationship with US military programs of the 80s, the influence of these
negotiations for a certain transformation of classical interpretations of “containment”.
Attention is also paid to the analysis of specific ways and means of transition to a nuclear-free demilitarized world. In this context, alternative concepts for ensuring national and international security are analyzed, especially the comprehensive system of international security, the Program of January 15, 1986, the reasonable sufficiency of armed forces and weapons as the quintessence of the new political thinking and way of action that we have put forward, adequate to the realities of the nuclear-space era.
The conclusion outlines the main conclusions to which the dissertation author comes.
I. At various stages of its evolution in the concept of “containment”, first some, say defensive ones, came to the fore, then others, i.e. offensive elements depending on various theoretical constructs that substantiated the main parameters of the concept of “containment”, determined the methods and methods for solving political problems by military means, and set priorities.
In this sense, the concept of "containment" is not a single movement or school of thought. It is rather a general strategic setting for long-term action, the dynamic framework of which is very difficult to determine. The concept of “containment” is a synthesis of various directions that prevail at one or another stage of historical development. There was a change in views on the role of the US armed forces, their nuclear component in the fight against the USSR. Therefore, under the label of “containment” there was a change in various military-political1 concepts from “massive retaliation” to “active confrontation”. But, as the analysis shows, these changes in ~1 were mainly determined by changes in military equipment, the ability of the United States to transform an advantage in one or another
area into a real tangible gain, the balance of political forces both on the world stage and in the United States itself.
Its most significant revisions took place twice: at the end of the 50s, when it was recognized that the United States had lost its reach in a possible nuclear war, and at the end of the 60s, when the United States' views on the composition of the West's likely adversaries in Europe and Asia changed.
As for the political and philosophical basis of “containment,” it remained generally unchanged, regardless of what name it came under. The cutting edge of the strategy has always been directed towards the socialist countries.
2. The essence of the concept of "deterrence" is to use one's military power (both nuclear and conventional) to intimidate the other side and achieve one's political goals. Therefore, from the very beginning, it was based on the desire to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union.
3. This concept cannot be recognized as a reasonable concept of security, since it does not strengthen, but undermines international security, and the security of those very states that adhere to this concept, since it is based on the desire to ensure security for themselves denial of safety for others. This is a purely selfish concept, presented under the guise of a plausible concept of protecting national interests. The concept of “containment” contains an immanent need for an evil enemy, the image of which is persistently formed by all means of propaganda and psychological warfare at the disposal of its authors. Therefore, the concept of “containment” invariably leads to an aggravation of the international situation and a deterioration of the political climate in the world.
The ideal of the concept of “containment” is absolute security for those who created it and stubbornly adhered to it for more than 40 years. However, in the context of a confrontation between the two sides, fueled and aggravated in the process of implementing the concept of “containment,” absolute security for one side would mean an absolute lack of security, an absolute threat for the other side. The persistent desire of the creators of the concept of “containment” for this unattainable “ideal” is the main factor in many negative and dangerous processes of our time.
4. A dangerous tendency is the desire to achieve military superiority over the other side. This desire reveals a sense of nostalgia for the times of nuclear monopoly or at least nuclear superiority over the USSR.
This, in turn, is accompanied by a painful perception of the existing approximate military-strategic parity and an irrepressible desire to break out of this state and break the existing military balance in one’s favor.
In short, this manifests a desire to create such an offensive potential that would make it possible to count on depriving the other side of the opportunity to properly respond to aggression, especially if a space-based anti-missile “shield” is created to achieve this goal. Obviously, in this case, the aggressor may be tempted to launch or threaten to launch a first “disarming” nuclear strike in the hope of impunity.
5. The course towards military superiority is the main driving force of the arms race. Simultaneously with the proclamation of the concept of “containment,” the United States initiated all the main and most dangerous rounds of the nuclear arms race. They were the first to create and use the atomic bomb.
Now the United States has set itself the goal and is actually starting to extend the arms race to space by creating strike space weapons. Implementing the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" with space-based elements, they are working towards expanding the potential for a first "disarming" nuclear strike.
The challenges facing the international community cannot be solved by the creation and accumulation of ever new and increasingly destructive types of weapons - both on earth and in space. The arms race is threatening to get out of control. Already now, negotiations on ending the arms race and nuclear disarmament between the USSR and the USA, West and East are going very difficult. Tomorrow it will be even more difficult.
b. In addition to the dangers that the concept of “containment” creates in the field of material preparation for nuclear war, it should be pointed out that it directly and directly generates the threat of a global nuclear conflict. Under the guise of the thesis that the ability of the armed forces to “deterrence” must be credible, the United States in recent years has been persistently building up its nuclear forces, increasing their effectiveness, including the ability to deliver a first strike as the main indicator of this “credibility of deterrence.” Moreover, to increase this “credibility”, both indirect and direct threats of using nuclear weapons are used (demonstratively placing one’s strategic nuclear forces on high alert, transferring nuclear weapons carriers closer to the borders of a potential enemy, threatening statements by government officials, etc.). In other words, the concept of “containment” contains a constant risk: those who adhere to it may be the first to use nuclear weapons and start a nuclear war.
7. It is characteristic that the concept of “containment” led to the emergence of new concepts - the preparation and conduct of a “limited” and “protracted” nuclear war. The concept of a “limited” nuclear war was put forward as the idea of excluding the population of countries participating in a nuclear conflict from the “exchange of nuclear strikes” and carrying it out exclusively with the armed forces of the parties. Hence the conclusion was drawn that a “limited” (in time or space) nuclear conflict would be morally justified, partial and relatively bloodless. This is actually not the case.
First of all, such a nuclear conflict cannot be limited by any boundaries. It will inevitably lead to the use of the entire arsenal of nuclear weapons of the parties.
Scenarios of a “limited” nuclear war tied to any one region, for example, Europe, are absolutely unacceptable. The thesis about a “limited” nuclear war in Europe reflects the desire to divert (or weaken as much as possible) the nuclear threat from the United States, making the Europeans its nuclear hostages. A nuclear war in Europe would mean its death, the end of European civilization, and not only European civilization, since it would inevitably develop into a general nuclear catastrophe. The entire world civilization and life itself on our planet would be threatened with destruction.
The only thing that the authors of the concept of “limited nuclear war” are able to achieve is to facilitate the outbreak of a nuclear conflict under the guise that “limited” slaughter is “better than global,” although nuclear war will inevitably become global. Apparently, the very concept of “limited nuclear war” was aimed at “reconciling the world community with the idea of the “applicability” of nuclear weapons, the “acceptability” of nuclear war. Growing out of the concept of "containment" as its more sophisticated
element, the concept of “limited nuclear war” essentially only sharpened the threat of occurrence. nuclear conflict.
The above applies entirely to the concept of a “protracted nuclear war,” which would be a series of “limited” nuclear wars expanding in space or time or simultaneously in both of these dimensions.
8. It is impossible to accept the concept of “containment” as reasonable in ensuring security and therefore< что с<1ера применения этой концепции определена ее авторами как практически безграничная. Это особенно наглядно проявилось в концепции "расширенного сдерживания", предусматривающей угрозу применения силы (в том числе и ядерного о ружил) для отстаивания своих интересов в любом районе мира. Причем сфера действия концепции "расширенного сдерживания" устанавливается произвольно. То ею объявлялась только Европа, то к ней добавляются Ближний и Дальний Восток, зона Персидского залива, Центральная Америка, Индийский океан и т.д. и т.п. Границы этой сферы (объявляемой односторонне, а значит незаконно) сознательно установлены туманно, чтобы иметь возможность произвольно расширять ее, распространяя военную угрозу на ваз новые регионы мира. И в этом отчетливо проявляется наступательный характер Концепции "сдерживания", ее опасное содержание.
9. Looking at the world through the prism of “containment” leads to the perpetuation of confrontational stereotypes, an exaggerated perception of ideological differences, and nihilism regarding international law and universal values. The inhumanity of nuclear deterrence blurs the concept of good and evil, undermines the moral and ethical foundations of civilization, poisons the mind with militarism, and gives rise to a feeling of hopelessness and a mood of permissiveness.
However, reason and the collective will for civilized relations can do a lot. Real positive changes are already taking place in global public consciousness. The voices of political realism are sounding stronger and more authoritative. More and more people are actively defending the position of reason. There is less and less trust in those who are moving away from an equal dialogue, from a serious search for ending the arms race and reducing the nuclear threat. The climate in the world has become different, changes in thinking and action are taking on real shape, centuries-old ideas and categories are changing.
1. “Comprehensive security and disarmament: the need for new approaches”, M., APN, 1967 - 2.5 pp.
2. “A practical step towards a nuclear-free world”, M., “Soviet State and Law”, 1967, If I - 0.9 pp.
3. “Our common planetary home”, M., “Abroad”, 1987, ? 38 - 0.3 p.l.
--
Laid down
· Military pressure on the SS
that is, keeping the Soviet Union firmly within the zones of influence that it had already managed to acquire, and uncompromisingly opposing any attempts by the USSR to withdraw
beyond their limits by contrasting Soviet encroachments with “unbending force anywhere on the globe”
The concrete expression of this foreign policy course was the “Truman Doctrine”
Truman Doctrine.
02.47 WB notified the USA: the financial situation has worsened, Graetz and Turts will no longer be able to help.
For USA Gr and Turts-
--Truman Addresses Congress:
Truman Doctrine
Ø personal freedom, free elections, free institutions and guarantees against aggression vs.
Ø Control over the media, imposing the will of the minority on the majority, terrorism, oppression.
US policy: supporting “free peoples” in their resistance to internal and external threats.
New global role: opposition to the SS and communism. = transition to full-scale cold war
Truman referred to the need to contain the onslaught of “world communism.” The president proposed to do this primarily through economic methods. This was the essence of his doctrine. The presidential speech used the argumentation and terminology of J. Kennan's “long telegram”. It is generally accepted that from the moment G. Truman addressed Congress in March 1947. concept of "containment" was officially adopted as the basis of US foreign policy.
In the spring of 1947, a new stage began in it. Relying on its economic power, the United States launched a struggle to change the balance of forces in the world in its favor, avoiding a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Until the end of the 40s, the United States successfully realized its advantages as the first economic power in the world. This period was a time of US hegemonic dominance. A similar situation in the world arose again only in the late 90s of the 20th century, after the collapse of the USSR
Marshall Plan. Meaning.
Marshal's Plan .
06/05/47 - Secretary of State Marshall at Harvard with a keynote speech - “Marshall Plan”
1. stabilization of the social and political situation in Western Europe
2. inclusion of Zap Germ in the zap block.
3. reducing the influence of the SS in Eastern Europe. The countries of Eastern Europe could take part in Tolka's plan on the condition that their economies would not be oriented towards the SS. It was supposed to use the raw materials of the East Euro for the restoration of the West.
06.27.47. Bevin (WB) and Bidault (Fr) + SS – Paris-MFA meeting for consultations on Marshall Square.
In Moscow time the plan was received with interest: the possibility of receiving American loans (we want them without preconditions.). But not everyone is in favor, Novikov: “the plan boils down to the creation of a Western European bloc”
The SS resolutely rejects any form of inter-control between the SS and the Eastern European Union.
At the conference: The SS completely excludes the identification and verification of resources of European countries.
We offer: limit ourselves to identifying the needs of European countries for assistance and send these agreed requests in the form of a request to the United States. This is unacceptable for the West.
It is impossible to agree.
--02.07. The SS refuses to participate in the implementation of the Marshall Plan.
Explained: the desire of the SS not to allow the West (USA) to gain the opportunity to influence the situation in the East European region, the sphere of influence of the SS.
02.07 - Bevin and Bidault publish a joint statement: they invite all European states (with the exception of Francoist Spain) to take part in European Economic Conference – to create a joint program for European reconstruction that would reflect the resources and needs of each State.
4.07 – 22 pages sent out. Expected to open 7/12/47 in Paris.
--The SS refused to participate, leading the line to failure.
5.07 – SS ambassadors to the European Union receive a directive to visit the Foreign Minister and report a negative assessment of Marshall’s proposal, “the SS sees in him a desire to interfere in the internal affairs of a European state, to make their economy dependent on the interests of the United States.”
--the issue of tactics has not been resolved: 2 options:
1. allies do not participate in the conference (the conference does not create authority and conditions to facilitate intrigue among the participants)
2. The allies go to the conference, do everything possible to expose the Marshall Square, then defiantly leave it.
At the same time, the initiators of Marshall are seeking to attract the countries of Eastern Europe (primarily Poland and Czechoslovakia) to participate in it in the hope of inducing them to abandon their orientation towards the SS.
The SS is afraid of losing control over the coalition rights of Poland Czechoslovakia.
--result: on the night of 7-8.07. The leaders of the Communist Parties Yugosl, Hungarian, Rum, Pol, Czechosl, Bolg, Alb, Fin are given a directive to refuse to participate in the meeting on Marshall Square. There is severe pressure on their rights.
However Czechosl has already accepted the offer. The Czech delegation is urgently summoned to Moscow, Stalin forces Gottwald to cancel his decision to participate in the conference. (“This would mean the success of the Western powers, the hesitant Shvets and Schweiz would follow your example”)
10.07 - emergency meeting of the government of Czechoslovakia. Pressure from the Kremlin and the forced agreement with it by President Benes predetermined the outcome: members of the government unanimously decided against the countries’ refusal to participate in the meeting, citing the non-participation of countries allied with Czechoslovakia, including the SS.
The position of Moscow is dictated by the logic of the Cold War - any attempts to create a Western bloc under the leadership of the United States are perceived painfully.
The initiators were also skeptical about the participation of the SS, viewed as a donor rather than a recipient of assistance.
Priority direction foreign policy strategy of Moscow - established and strengthened control over the countries of Eastern Europe.
For Stalin, the sphere of influence is the result of the war, the strategist is important, ideologically, geopolitically.
The initiators failed to involve them against the will of the SS in Marshall Square and weaken their orientation towards Moscow.
It's paradoxical, but: refusal of SS participation suits both parties.
· SS maintains and asserts influence on the countries of Eastern Europe
· The United States and others have the opportunity to stabilize the social-political situation in Western Europe, and then create a Western military-political union.
12-15.07 conference of 16 countries (22-8 is not equal to 16!?!?): it was decided to create a special Committee of the European Economic Cooperation And 4 special committees to analyze the balance of resources and needs EUR.
04.48 Marshall Square participants created the Organization of European Economic Cooperation. A plan was outlined, authorities were appointed, but it was not possible to develop a general program.
--Marshall mechanism:
· US government pays US exporters the cost of aid goods
· The government of the recipient country places in a special account the received amount in its currency, equivalent to the cost of American supplies. The funds came mainly from their own importing companies.
· 5% from the special account goes to US law, the rest 95% is used by country law, but only with the consent of the United States.
Total allocations: 04.48-12.51 – 12.4 billion d (WB-2.8, Fr-2.5), 30% (first 50%) - food, fertilizers, consumer goods.
The main goals of US foreign policy in 1945-52. Truman Doctrine. Marshall Plan. Korean War (targets).
According to the plans of Western leaders:
ü the triumph of the market economy and Western democracy
ü Anglo-Saxon-dominated world
ü A world with an international security system.
ü Rely on the financial and economic power of the United States, its nuclear monopoly
ü Americans’ faith in the correctness of their own ideals, infallibility, calling to fill the vacuum of power in certain states
ü Suspicion of SS is enhanced by?Munich syndrome? –
reluctance to repeat the experience of empty compromises with Hitler, the collapse of the course to appease the National German
Manifestation changes in the American regiments in relation to the SS - Truman’s conversation with People’s Commissar Molotov in Washington on the implementation of the Yalta agreements -04/23/45 - very tough
--more Potsdam revealed bipolar structure new MO system:
Stalin and Truman are the main opponents.
+ on the eve of the opening of the conference on July 16 - the first successful test of a nuclear bomb - the tough, offensive position of the United States in relation to the SS
--10/27/45 Truman's speech on the occasion of Navy Day
v the military contingent will not decrease
v The most powerful naval power on Earth
v Will not share information about bomb production
v They will not compromise with the devil - SS
--02/22/46 "long telegram" by J. Kennan- outlines the fundamentals of the foreign policy line in relation to the SS
“The foreign policy of the SS is a continuation of the expansionist traditions of Tsarist Russia, multiplied by the permanent desire of Marxism-Leninism to expand its influence”
Laid down foundations of the American policy of "containment":
· Active promotion by the West of a more attractive ideological and political alternative
· Military pressure on the SS
It is from 02-03.46 that the SS is considered as a potential enemy whose vital interests contradict the interests of the United States
--03/05/46 Churchill's speech in Fulton
o Call for the creation of a “fraternal association of English-speaking peoples” designed to counter the strengthening of the international position of the SS
o Iron forgedly divided Europe along the line “from Schetting on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic”
o Regarded as a public declaration of the Cold War by the SS
Truman Doctrine.
The desire of the SS to consolidate and expand its sphere of influence causes concern in the West (especially 46-47pressure on Turkey and Greece).
For USA Gr and Turts-
1.The field of principle clashes between communism and democracy.
2. occupy an important geostrategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, on the approaches to oil reserves and strategic communications.
“Helping them is not charity, but to protect the American way of life”
--Truman Addresses Congress:
· Allocate 400 million dollars to help Greece and Turkey
· Send American civilians and military personnel there to monitor the use of this assistance.
Truman Doctrine also contains a general assessment of the situation: a conflict between two ways of life:
That. The ideological and propaganda struggle is gaining momentum.
Marshal's Plan .
Spring 47 - the situation in Europe is alarming and unstable. East Europe - the sits of “people's democracies” are taking shape, the SS is establishing ever tighter control. Western Europe - economic crisis, social tension.
May - Deputy Secretary of State Acheson: the need for American assistance in the unification of Europe, “our national security requires this.”
4. stabilization of the social and political situation in Western Europe
5. inclusion of Zap Germ in the zap block.
6. reducing the influence of the SS in Eastern Europe. The countries of Eastern Europe could take part in Tolka's plan on the condition that their economies would not be oriented toward the SS. It was supposed to use the raw materials of the East Euro for the restoration of the West.
Characteristically: when Congress passed the law on providing economic assistance to Europe, The United States preferred to enter into two-sided agreements with the state participants on favorable terms for itself.
The implementation of the Marshall Plan contributed to the stabilization and consolidation of European capitalism:
Overcoming the economic consequences of war
Overcoming the crisis of the trade and financial system.
Easing the acute political crisis
Introduction of American methods of organizing production and increasing labor productivity into the European Union
Feeling the support of American imperialism, political sentiments are leaning to the right.
The Marshall Square organization and the refusal of the SS to participate in it is the most important milestone on the path to the split of Europe into spheres of influence
Lat Am
The US is trying to provide reliable rear + successfully use resources - Latin America.
08-09.47-in Rio-Inter-American conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on “maintaining continental democracy and security”
02.09 -signed under US pressure "Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Defense"(effective from Dec 48)
· The principle of collective defense (an attack on one of their states is regarded as an attack on all, everyone undertakes to help repel the attack).
· Measures to combat direct aggression
This is an important step towards the creation of a military-political bloc of the countries of the Western Hemisphere under the leadership of the United States.
Institutionalization of connections has been completed creation of the OAS-03.48(USA+many Lat Am countries)
The United States is used to put pressure on participants and strengthen positions on the continent.
What is the "Kennan Long Telegram"? What significance did it have for US foreign policy?2. When was the Truman Doctrine formalized? How did US foreign policy develop in the late 1940s?
1. In the winter and spring of 1946, a turning point began in Western public opinion regarding cooperation with the USSR. Representatives of the liberal part of Western intellectuals began to move to critical positions. On February 22, 1946, US Chargé d'Affaires in the USSR George Kennan sent a report to the US State Department in Washington in the form of the famous “long telegram” (8 thousand words), in which he gave a detailed assessment of the possibilities for developing US relations with the Soviet Union.
Kennan warned the American leadership against continuing the “Rooseveltian” policy of trusting partnership with the USSR and called for quickly getting rid of illusions and inflated expectations regarding the ability to cooperate and negotiate with Moscow on a generally accepted diplomatic basis - i.e. based on weighing and rationally assessing the parties’ arguments, taking into account the interests of the partner, negotiating “trade” and observing the principle of fidelity to accepted obligations. The telegram firmly stated: the Soviet leadership respects only force, and therefore dialogue with it must be conducted in a non-provocative but firm manner, making it clear that the United States will not make any concessions without guaranteed reciprocity from Moscow. Characterizing the views of the Soviet leadership, the author of the telegram wrote: “... We are dealing... with a political force fanatically committed to the opinion that a permanent
The most important point of the telegram was the conclusion about the organic expansionism inherent in Soviet leaders, which encourages and, under any circumstances, will encourage them to external expansion, to extend their sphere of influence to new areas. Accordingly, J. Kennan considered the only adequate response to such aspirations of the USSR to be “containment” of Moscow.
Keyword
Containment- keeping the Soviet Union within the zones of influence that it had already managed to acquire, and uncompromisingly opposing any attempts by the USSR to go beyond their limits by opposing Soviet encroachments with “unbending force anywhere on the globe.”
Although the “long telegram” was intended only for the US Secretary of State, several thousand people who determined Washington's foreign policy became familiar with it over the course of several months. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, to whom a copy of this telegram was sent by the US Ambassador to the USSR Averell Harriman, ordered it to be mimeographed and sent to other members of the cabinet and senior officers of the US armed forces. At the same time, by order of the leadership of the State Department, J. Kennan’s text was sent as key political information to all US foreign embassies.
In July 1947, Kennan's text, signed “Mr. X,” was published in a leading American magazine and became the subject of controversy among wide sections of the US political community. J. Kennan was the first to formulate the key idea of the Harry Truman administration: not to provoke the USSR, but to demonstrate to it the firmness of the United States, to defend one’s own American vision, even if it contradicts the opinion of Moscow. In March 1945, 55% of Americans surveyed trusted the Soviet Union, in March 1946 - only 33%.
2. On February 21, 1947, London notified the American administration that due to financial difficulties, Britain would not be able to continue providing assistance to Greece and Turkey. Washington was confident that the Soviet Union would fill the political vacuum if Britain left the Eastern Mediterranean. The situation seemed alarming because of the situation in Greece, where the royal government could not overcome the communists. The possible victory of the Greek left seemed to be the beginning of a revolutionary wave that could sweep over Italy and France, where the communist parties retained great influence.
On March 12, 1947, US President G. Truman asked Congress for $400 million to provide urgent assistance to Greece and Turkey. Congress approved these proposals and funds were appropriated by the end of May 1947. Justifying the request, G. Truman referred to the need to contain the onslaught of “world communism.” The president proposed to do this primarily through economic methods. This was the essence of his doctrine. The presidential speech used the argumentation and terminology of J. Kennan's “long telegram”. It is generally accepted that from the moment G. Truman addressed Congress in March 1947, the concept of “containment” was officially adopted as the basis of US foreign policy.
Until the end of the 1940s, the United States successfully realized its advantages as the world's first economic power. This period was a time of US hegemonic dominance. A similar situation in the world arose again only in the late 90s of the 20th century, after the collapse of the USSR,
After several centuries of the dominance of isolationism, the time began for the dominance of the philosophy of American internationalism (otherwise called interventionism in foreign literature). It was based on the idea of the moral destiny of the United States of America as the world's first state founded on the idea of freedom to fulfill the high mission of protecting freedom and democracy. The United States was ready to go to great lengths to fulfill this mission, justifying them by the need to protect American ideals, the national interests of the United States and the American people.
On June 14, 1948, the US Senate adopted the so-called “Vandenberg resolution” (named after Senator A. Vandenberg who proposed it), according to which it was allowed “the participation of the United States in accordance with constitutional procedure in such regional and other collective agreements that are based on the provision of continuous and collective mutual assistance in matters affecting national security.” The adoption of this resolution meant the abandonment of isolationist concepts of foreign policy and the establishment of permanent blocs with the participation of the United States.
Minimum knowledge
1. In February 1946, US Chargé d'Affaires to the USSR George Kennan sent a “long telegram” to Washington, in which he called for a toughening of US policy towards the USSR and formulated the concept of “containment”—keeping the USSR in its acquired zones of influence. Kennan managed to guess the shift in the mood of the American elite, and his letter served as the basis for changing US approaches to foreign policy.
2. In 1947, “containment” was formalized within the framework of the “Truman Doctrine,” which involved providing significant economic support to countries that were under the communist threat. Under Truman, American foreign policy shifted to interventionism.
INTERNATIONAL YOUTH EDUCATIONAL FORUM
"FOROS - SIBERIA - 2011"
as part of a long-term educational project
“POLITICS XXI CENTURY. FUTURE ELITE OF THE CIS"
Theoretical foundations of the doctrine of “containment” during the Cold War
Executor: 3rd year student of NSUEU Khlyustina K.V.
Scientific supervisor: Doctor of Philology, Professor of the Department of International Relations
1. Introduction
After the Second World War, the world found itself in the center of the struggle of the great powers for a new redistribution of spheres of influence, each of which sought to ideologically justify the legitimacy of its practical actions. At this stage, the dynamics of the development of international relations, in general, took shape under the influence of the then existing confrontation between the Western capitalist bloc, led by the USA, and the socialist countries, led by the USSR, as well as their struggle for influence on economically backward countries, which had that moment national statehood and formally independent and dependent colonies.
The end of the Cold War and the destruction of the bipolar system of international relations caused a radical transformation of the world, the contours of which still remain incompletely defined and extremely fluid.
The relevance of the research topic is determined by the search for an effective model of political interaction between the Russian Federation and Western countries, the formation of relations between which continues to be influenced by the legacy of the Cold War.
The consequences of the Cold War are of great importance not only for its two main participants - the United States and the already disappeared USSR - its results are important for the whole world, as a historical example of a confrontation between superpowers, taking place on the brink of a nuclear war, which could lead to irreversible catastrophic consequences.
Thus, it is not possible to understand and comprehend the current stage of international relations without studying the historical past, in particular, American diplomacy and foreign policy of the previous period. In the modern situation, a critical analysis of past experience, not based on ideological priorities, makes it possible to find the best ways to balance national interests and establish cooperation in the economic, scientific, technical and partly military spheres.
Object research is US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union in the early period of the Cold War.
Subject research The doctrine of “containment” is advocated, conceptually formulated by J. Kennan and which was the main foreign policy strategy of the United States in the post-war years.
Chronological framework of work– 1945-1961 – determined based on the fact that the policy of “containing” communism, as a rule, is most often associated with the names of two US presidents - Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower.
The doctrine of “containment” of the Soviet Union and communism was key and system-forming for American foreign policy throughout the entire period of the global confrontation between the USA and the USSR, determining the vector of its development and specific content.
The doctrine of “containment” as an important part of the American foreign policy process of the second half of the 20th century is presented in detail in domestic and foreign historiography, being an indispensable attribute of any research on the Cold War.
In Soviet historiography, assessments of “containment” were clearly negative; the dominant idea was that it was aimed primarily against the Soviet Union, which was and remains the main barrier to the expansionist claims of US financial and political circles (N.N. Inozemtsev, V.I. Lan , N.V. Sivachev, V.K. Furaev).
Modern Russian historical literature is characterized by the desire to present “containment” in connection with other areas of US global policy, Soviet foreign policy and the entire complex of international problems that existed in the post-war years (V.L. Malkov, G.N. Sevostyanov, V.O. Pechatnov).
In foreign historiography, American-Soviet relations are also covered quite well. All researchers note the huge differences between Roosevelt and his successors in their attitude towards the Soviet state.
A distinctive feature of foreign historical science is the existence of many schools and directions in the study of the history of the Cold War. Traditionalist historians (A. Schlesinger Jr., W. McNeil, G. Feis) welcomed the ideas of “containment,” considering them the best evidence of the desire of the Truman administration to protect US national interests. Revisionist historians (W. Williams, G. Alperovitz, J. and G. Kolko, W. Gardner, W. LaFebre) interpreted “containment” as aimed at establishing US global hegemony and based on preconceived facts, and not on logical conclusions regarding the Kremlin's intentions. Among post-revisionist historians (D. Yergin, M. Lefler, T. Paterson, M. Hogan), synthesizing the views of traditionalists and revisionists who were in polemics, there was a desire to carefully and carefully approach the assessment of the doctrine of “containment.”
Purpose of the study is an attempt to analyze the policy of “containment” of communism pursued by the United States during the initial period of the Cold War.
To achieve this goal, the following were set: tasks:
1. consider the reasons for changes in US foreign policy after the end of World War II;
2. reveal the essence of the main documents of US foreign policy, which formed the basis of the doctrine of “containment”;
3. review the major changes in US foreign policy under President Eisenhower;
4. draw a conclusion about the results of the United States policy of “containing” communism.
2. Presidency of Harry Truman
2.1. The emergence of the concept of “containment” of the USSR
By the end of World War II, the United States had become the strongest in all
relations as a world power. The country's loss of life was relatively
insignificant - about 400 thousand dead, but the growth of economic power
amazing: US national income rose from $64 billion in 1938
to 160 billion in 1944. Besides by the end
war, the United States created powerful armed forces - army, navy, aviation, and in the end
During the war, the American leadership had at its disposal a new weapon - the atomic bomb, successfully tested in August 1945 in Japan.
It is difficult to say whether Franklin Roosevelt would have been able to resist the temptation to take advantage of new opportunities, but in April 1945 he died and was succeeded by Harry S.
Truman (1945-1953), a man of a completely different caliber and mentality and
character. Truman completely revised his predecessor's foreign policy course and dismissed supporters of liberal reforms and continuation of the previous course. For Truman, the idea of "American peace" did not cause any
doubts, and from the very first day of his new post he began to
implementation.
True, on the way to the desired goal, one thing still remained
obstacle - the second power in terms of military power and authority has become
The Soviet Union, which also embodied the hatred of American orthodoxy
the idea of communism.
Truman's perception of the world was based on the fact that all international crises have a very specific source - the USSR, an ungovernable and unpredictable country. The second “pillar” of Truman’s foreign policy credo is the absolute confidence that all global and regional processes are directly related to America and can receive a fair decision from its hands.
Being at the crossroads of two roads: either the continuation of the alliance of five countries - the main participants in the anti-Hitler coalition, in which the United States would have to take into account the opinions and interests of its partners, or unconditional supremacy over at least three of them (Great Britain, France, China), G. Truman without much hesitation, he chose the second path, which promised him effective leadership of the Western world and gave him hope that the forceful predominance of the West would incline the East, bloodless by the war, to submission.
The struggle against the USSR thereby turned into not just
rivalry for world dominion, but a crusade against the world
communism under the slogans of protecting democracy and order from the forces of chaos and
destruction. From this time on, US foreign policy can be considered
mainly through the prism of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Started
The Cold War, which became the core of international relations throughout
subsequent period.
On September 18, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the Guidelines for the Formulation of Military Policy, which considered the Soviet Union as an adversary of the United States. The document contained a provision for the United States to deliver a “first strike” in a possible war against the USSR; at the same time, the use of nuclear weapons was allowed.
There is no doubt that the main organizing principle in the fierce anti-Soviet and anti-communist campaign that unfolded in the late 1940s. and transformed into a long-term “cold war”, the concept of “containing communism” appeared.