Five plans of Napoleon for Russia. "Napoleonic plan" - the meaning of phraseological units and features of use
What did Napoleon want from Russia? At first he almost became an officer in the Russian army, then he wanted to become related to the Russian imperial family. The “Russian factor” became fatal for Napoleon. His campaign against Moscow was the beginning of the end of the Empire.
Military career
Perhaps Napoleon’s very first plans for Russia were his desire to join the Russian army. In 1788, Russia recruited volunteers to participate in the war with Turkey. Governor General Ivan Zaborovsky, commander of the expeditionary force, came to Livorno to “look after Christian volunteers for military affairs”: warlike Albanians, Greeks, Corsicans. By this time, Napoleon graduated with honors from the Paris Military School with the rank of lieutenant. In addition, his family was in poverty - his father died, the family was left with virtually no means. Napoleon submitted a request for readiness to serve the Russian army.
However, just a month before Bonaparte’s request for enrollment, a decree was issued in the Russian army - to accept foreign officers into the Russian corps with a reduction by one rank. Napoleon was not satisfied with this option. Having received a written refusal, the purposeful Napoleon ensured that he was accepted by the head of the Russian military commission. But this did not produce results and, as they say, the offended Bonaparte ran out of Zaborovsky’s office, promising that he would offer his candidacy to the King of Prussia: “The King of Prussia will give me the rank of captain!” True, as you know, he also did not become a Prussian captain, remaining to pursue a career in France.
Be related to the Russian Emperor
In 1809, already being emperor, Napoleon, to his regret, learned about the infertility of Empress Josephine. Perhaps the disease developed during her imprisonment in Carmes prison, when the French Revolution was roaring. Despite the sincere affection that bound Napoleon and this woman, the young dynasty needed a legitimate heir. Therefore, after much outpouring and tears, the couple separated by mutual desire.
Josephine, like Napoleon, did not belong to blue bloods To secure his position on the throne, Bonaparte needed a princess. Oddly enough, there was no question of choice - according to Napoleon, the future French empress should have been the Russian Grand Duchess. Most likely, this was due to Napoleon's plans for a long-term alliance with Russia. He needed the latter in order, firstly, to keep all of Europe in subjection, and secondly, he counted on Russia’s helping hand in Egypt and in the subsequent transfer of the war to Bengal and India. He made these plans back in the time of Paul I.
In this regard, Napoleon urgently needed a marriage with one of the sisters of Emperor Alexander - Catherine or Anna Pavlovna. At first, Napoleon tried to achieve Catherine's favor, and most importantly, the blessing of her mother Maria Feodorovna. But, while the Grand Duchess herself said that she would rather marry the last Russian stoker than “this Corsican,” her mother began to hastily look for a suitable match for her daughter, so long as it did not go to the unpopular French “usurper” in Russia. .
Almost the same thing happened to Anna. When in 1810 the French ambassador Caulaincourt approached Alexander with Napoleon's semi-official proposal, the Russian emperor also vaguely answered him that he had no right to control the destinies of his sisters, since by the will of his father Pavel Petrovich, this prerogative was completely given to his mother Maria Feodorovna.
Russia as a springboard
Napoleon Bonaparte did not at all intend to stop at subordinating Russia. He dreamed of the empire of Alexander the Great; his further goals lay far away in India. So he was going to sting Britain where it hurt the most with the peak of the Russian Cossacks. In other words, get your hands on the rich English colonies. Such a conflict could lead to the complete collapse of the British Empire. At one time, according to the historian Alexander Katsur, Paul I also thought about this project. Back in 1801, the French agent in Russia Gitten conveyed to Napoleon “...Russia from its Asian possessions... could give a helping hand to the French army in Egypt and, acting together with France, to transfer the war to Bengal." There was even a joint Russian-French project - a 35 thousand army under the command of General Massena, joined by Russian Cossacks in the Black Sea region, through the Caspian, Persia, Herat and Kandahar were supposed to reach the provinces of India. And in the fairy-tale land, the allies immediately had to “grab the British by the cheeks.”
Napoleon’s words are known, already during his exile on the island of St. Helena, which he said to the Irish doctor Barry Edward O’Meara assigned to him: “If Paul had remained alive, you would have already lost India.”
Moscow was not included in the plans
The decision to march on Moscow was not military for Napoleon, but political. According to A.P. Shuvalov, relying on politics was Bonaparte’s main mistake. Shuvalov wrote: “He based his plans on political calculations. These calculations turned out to be false, and his building collapsed.”
The ideal decision from the military side was to stay in Smolensk for the winter; Napoleon discussed these plans with the Austrian diplomat von Metternich. Bonaparte stated: “My enterprise is one of those whose solution is given by patience. Triumph will be the lot of the more patient. I will open the campaign by crossing the Neman. I will finish it in Smolensk and Minsk. I'll stop there."
These same plans were voiced by Bonaparte and according to the memoirs of General de Suger. He wrote down the following words Napoleon, what he said to General Sebastiani in Vilna: “I will not cross the Dvina. To want to go further during this year is to go towards your own destruction.”
Obviously, the campaign against Moscow was a forced step for Napoleon. According to historian V.M. Bezotosny, Napoleon “expected that the entire campaign would fit within the framework of the summer - at most the beginning of the autumn of 1812.” Moreover, the French emperor planned to spend the winter of 1812 in Paris, but the political situation confused all his cards. Historian A.K. Dzhivelegov wrote: “Stopping for the winter in Smolensk meant reviving all possible discontent and unrest in France and Europe. Politics drove Napoleon further and forced him to violate his excellent original plan."
Grand coup
The tactics of the Russian army came as an unpleasant surprise to Napoleon. He was sure that the Russians would be forced to give a general battle to save their capital, and Alexander I would ask for peace to save it. These forecasts turned out to be disrupted. Napoleon was killed as a retreat from his own original plans, and the retreat of the Russian army under the leadership of General Barclay de Tolly.
Before the castling of Tolly and Kutuzov, the French were awarded only two battles. At the beginning of the campaign, this enemy behavior played into the hands of the French emperor; he dreamed of reaching Smolensk with few losses and stopping there. The fate of Moscow was to be decided by a general battle, which Napoleon himself called a grand coup. Both Napoleon and France needed it.
But everything turned out differently. At Smolensk, the Russian armies managed to unite and they continued to draw Napoleon deep into the vast country. The Grand coup was postponed. The French entered empty cities, consumed their last supplies and panicked. Later, sitting on the island of St. Helena, Napoleon recalled: “My regiments, amazed that after so many difficult and deadly marches the fruits of their efforts were constantly moving away from them, began to look with anxiety at the distance that separated them from France.”
What did Napoleon want from Russia? At first he almost became an officer in the Russian army, then he wanted to become related to the Russian imperial family. The “Russian factor” became fatal for Napoleon. His campaign against Moscow was the beginning of the end of the Empire.
Military career
Perhaps Napoleon’s very first plans for Russia were his desire to join the Russian army. In 1788, Russia recruited volunteers to participate in the war with Turkey. Governor General Ivan Zaborovsky, commander of the expeditionary force, came to Livorno to “look after Christian volunteers for military affairs”: warlike Albanians, Greeks, Corsicans. By this time, Napoleon graduated with honors from the Paris Military School with the rank of lieutenant. In addition, his family was in poverty - his father died, the family was left with virtually no means. Napoleon submitted a request for readiness to serve the Russian army.
However, just a month before Bonaparte’s request for enrollment, a decree was issued in the Russian army - to accept foreign officers into the Russian corps with a reduction by one rank. Napoleon was not satisfied with this option. Having received a written refusal, the purposeful Napoleon ensured that he was accepted by the head of the Russian military commission. But this did not produce results and, as they say, the offended Bonaparte ran out of Zaborovsky’s office, promising that he would offer his candidacy to the King of Prussia: “The King of Prussia will give me the rank of captain!” True, as you know, he also did not become a Prussian captain, remaining to pursue a career in France.
Be related to the Russian Emperor
In 1809, already being emperor, Napoleon, to his regret, learned about the infertility of Empress Josephine. Perhaps the disease developed during her imprisonment in Carmes prison, when the French Revolution was roaring. Despite the sincere affection that bound Napoleon and this woman, the young dynasty needed a legitimate heir. Therefore, after much outpouring and tears, the couple separated by mutual desire.
Josephine, like Napoleon, did not belong to blue blood; in order to secure his position on the throne, Bonaparte needed a princess. Oddly enough, there was no question of choice - according to Napoleon, the future French empress should have been the Russian Grand Duchess. Most likely, this was due to Napoleon's plans for a long-term alliance with Russia. He needed the latter in order, firstly, to keep all of Europe in subjection, and secondly, he counted on Russia’s helping hand in Egypt and in the subsequent transfer of the war to Bengal and India. He made these plans back in the time of Paul I.
In this regard, Napoleon urgently needed a marriage with one of the sisters of Emperor Alexander - Catherine or Anna Pavlovna. At first, Napoleon tried to achieve Catherine's favor, and most importantly, the blessing of her mother Maria Feodorovna. But, while the Grand Duchess herself said that she would rather marry the last Russian stoker than “this Corsican,” her mother began to hastily look for a suitable match for her daughter, so long as it did not go to the unpopular French “usurper” in Russia. .
Almost the same thing happened to Anna. When in 1810 the French ambassador Caulaincourt approached Alexander with Napoleon's semi-official proposal, the Russian emperor also vaguely answered him that he had no right to control the destinies of his sisters, since by the will of his father Pavel Petrovich, this prerogative was completely given to his mother Maria Feodorovna.
Russia as a springboard
Napoleon Bonaparte did not at all intend to stop at subordinating Russia. He dreamed of the empire of Alexander the Great; his further goals lay far away in India. So he was going to sting Britain where it hurt the most with the peak of the Russian Cossacks. In other words, take over the rich English colonies. Such a conflict could lead to the complete collapse of the British Empire. At one time, according to the historian Alexander Katsur, Paul I also thought about this project. Back in 1801, the French agent in Russia Gitten conveyed to Napoleon “...Russia from its Asian possessions... could give a helping hand to the French army in Egypt and, acting together with France, to transfer the war to Bengal." There was even a joint Russian-French project - a 35 thousand army under the command of General Massena, joined by Russian Cossacks in the Black Sea region, through the Caspian, Persia, Herat and Kandahar were supposed to reach the provinces of India. And in the fairy-tale land, the allies immediately had to “grab the British by the cheeks.”
Napoleon’s words are known, already during his exile on the island of St. Helena, which he said to the Irish doctor Barry Edward O’Meara assigned to him: “If Paul had remained alive, you would have already lost India.”
Moscow was not included in the plans
The decision to march on Moscow was not military for Napoleon, but political. According to A.P. Shuvalov, relying on politics was Bonaparte’s main mistake. Shuvalov wrote: “He based his plans on political calculations. These calculations turned out to be false, and his building collapsed.”
The ideal decision from the military side was to stay in Smolensk for the winter; Napoleon discussed these plans with the Austrian diplomat von Metternich. Bonaparte stated: “My enterprise is one of those whose solution is given by patience. Triumph will be the lot of the more patient. I will open the campaign by crossing the Neman. I will finish it in Smolensk and Minsk. I'll stop there."
These same plans were voiced by Bonaparte and according to the memoirs of General de Suger. He recorded the following words of Napoleon, spoken by him to General Sebastiani in Vilna: “I will not cross the Dvina. To want to go further during this year is to go towards your own destruction.”
Obviously, the campaign against Moscow was a forced step for Napoleon. According to historian V.M. Bezotosny, Napoleon “expected that the entire campaign would fit within the framework of the summer - at most the beginning of the autumn of 1812.” Moreover, the French emperor planned to spend the winter of 1812 in Paris, but the political situation confused all his cards. Historian A.K. Dzhivelegov wrote: “Stopping for the winter in Smolensk meant reviving all possible discontent and unrest in France and Europe. Politics drove Napoleon further and forced him to violate his excellent original plan."
The tactics of the Russian army came as an unpleasant surprise to Napoleon. He was sure that the Russians would be forced to give a general battle to save their capital, and Alexander I would ask for peace to save it. These forecasts turned out to be disrupted. Napoleon was ruined by both the retreat from his original plans and the retreat of the Russian army under the leadership of General Barclay de Tolly.
Before the castling of Tolly and Kutuzov, the French were awarded only two battles. At the beginning of the campaign, this enemy behavior played into the hands of the French emperor; he dreamed of reaching Smolensk with few losses and stopping there. The fate of Moscow was to be decided by a general battle, which Napoleon himself called a grand coup. Both Napoleon and France needed it.
But everything turned out differently. At Smolensk, the Russian armies managed to unite and they continued to draw Napoleon deep into the vast country. The Grand coup was postponed. The French entered empty cities, consumed their last supplies and panicked. Later, sitting on the island of St. Helena, Napoleon recalled: “My regiments, amazed that after so many difficult and deadly marches the fruits of their efforts were constantly moving away from them, began to look with anxiety at the distance that separated them from France.”
Rodina Elena Nikolaevna
State Educational Institution "Secondary School No. 208 of Minsk", Republic of Belarus
The nature of the war
For Napoleon's army the war was aggressive And predatory.
For us - fair, defensive.
Napoleon's plan: compiled in August 1811 - April 1812
Capture Russia in 2-3 years
Force border battles
Defeat the Russian armies one by one during several pitched battles:
in 1812
- advance to Minsk,
2. in 1813
- occupy Moscow,
3. in 1814
- Saint Petersburg.
to undermine the Russian economy by flooding the occupied provinces with counterfeit Russian banknotes (25, 50, 100 rubles).
Russia's defense plan of the "three great unknowns"
It was developed by M. B. Barclay de Tolly and in February 1810 he presented Alexander I with a report “On the protection of the western borders of Russia,” in which he argued for the need to wage a border defensive war in the Western Dvina-Dnieper triangle. Barclay de Tolly motivated the principle of defense for the following reasons:
1) it is not known where Napoleon will direct the main blow (to St. Petersburg, Moscow or Kyiv;
2) it is not known how the Austrians will behave in this situation;
3) it is dangerous to launch offensive actions without completing the Russian-Turkish war.
Disposition of Russian troops:
1st Western Army under the command of a general Barclay de Tolly was located at a crossroads on Petersburg And Moscow, between Vilna and upstream Neman, occupying the Rossiena-Lida defense line with a length of 180-200 km.
Its composition: 127 thousand people and 550 guns
The army headquarters was in Vilna.
Neman And Bug, defended a line of 100 km.
It was assumed that it would act on the flank of Napoleon's army. It was located south of the 1st Army, between Neman And Bug, defended a line of 100 km.
Compound: 45-48 thousand people, 180 guns
The army headquarters was in Volkovysk.
3rd Western Army Lutsk
3rd Western Army under the command of Gen. A.P. Tormasova closed the Kiev direction in the area Lutsk, which was 200 km. south of Bagration's army. The main task of the 3rd Army was to protect Kyiv from a possible attack by the Austrians.
Its composition: 43-46 thousand people And 170 guns
The army headquarters was in Lutsk.
Napoleon's Army
Napoleon's Army
consisted of approximately 610 thousand. Human. 50 % it consisted of Polish, Prussian, Austrian, German, Bavarian, Saxon, Italian and others. military formations (there were up to 125 thousand Polish and 25 thousand Belarusian volunteers) and 1372 guns.
However, Napoleon was forced to leave a significant part of the army in France and vassal Germany, so only 420 thousand people But even these 420 thousand approached and crossed gradually.
colonels, captains, lieutenants non-commissioned officer sergeant major recruit deserter(punished severely).
The division and regiment were commanded by generals. The officers were subordinate to them - colonels, captains, lieutenants. The soldiers were subordinate to the officers. Commanded the rank and file soldiers non-commissioned officer(reliable soldier). The senior soldier rank was sergeant major. A young soldier, untrained is recruit, if you ran away from the army during the war - deserter(punished severely).
grenadiers militias
grenadiers - especially tall, strong and persistent soldiers. They were trained to throw grenades. They were placed at the head of the assault columns. militias (warriors) - peasants trained to shoot hastily.
The Russian army was recruited by conscription, i.e. Of a certain number of men, only one served in the army. Consequently, most of the country's men were not trained in warfare.
Corps of Engineers, sappers
Corps of Engineers, sappers - built fortifications, built bridges, earthen fortifications - ramparts, ditch, embankment.
Guard- the best military units. There were guards infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineering units.
- Field Marshal General
Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov - Field Marshal General(from 1812), His Serene Highness Prince (from 1812). Hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, the first full holder of the Order of St. George.
On August 17 (29), Kutuzov received an army from Barclay de Tolly in the village of Tsarevo-Zaimishche, Smolensk province.
Bagration Petr Ivanovich
Bagration Petr Ivanovich- prince, infantry general
Barclay de Tolly Mikhail Bogdanovich- Prince, Field Marshal General
Wittgenstein Peter Christianovich- Prince, Field Marshal General
Platov Matvey Ivanovich - cavalry general
M.A. Miloradovich - infantry general
N.N.Raevsky- Lieutenant General
Tormasov Alexander Petrovich- count, cavalry general
P.V. Chichagov - admiral
Generals:
Napoleon I Bonaparte- Emperor of France in 1804-1815, French commander
marshals
Disposition of Russian troops:
Beginning of the war
June 22, 1812 in Vilkovyshki (Lithuania) Napoleon signed order on the "Great Army", addressed to his soldiers. It said that Russia had violated “its oath” given in Tilsit and declared second Polish war. The appeal was perceived as an official declaration of war on Russia.
On the night of June 24, 1812, Napoleon ordered the crossing of the Neman to begin.
Murat and other parts.
The first to cross were 300 Poles of the 13th Regiment, then the Old Guard, then the Young Guard, the cavalry Murat and other parts.
Vilna
Already on June 28, 1812, the French occupied Vilna. Here Napoleon spent 18 full days, and military historians consider this one of his fatal mistakes.
“The Case of the Cossacks near Mir 07/27/28/12.”
June 27-28 (July 9-10) 1812 - The defeat of the French cavalry by the Cossacks under the command of M.I. Platov Peace during the general retreat of Russian troops.
In Vilna, the townspeople greeted Napoleon with flowers. Arriving in Vitebsk, he took off his sword and announced that the campaign of 1812 was over. It is possible that the map of Europe would have looked very different if he had kept his word.
In Napoleon, the Poles saw a person capable of returning their freedom and avenging the bloody division of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Polish emigrants signed up as volunteers in Napoleon's troops that fought in Spain and Africa. By 1812, in Bonaparte’s army, entire branches of the army (for example, light cavalry - lancers) consisted of Poles. Naturally, with such a composition, the “Grand Army” could only go to war against Russia.
Napoleon
Napoleon little concern for the fate of the Poles and Belarusians. He was interested in war as a process of gaining glory. On August 3 (15), he celebrated his birthday in Vitebsk. The “Master of the Universe” was showered with compliments. In addition, Napoleon understood that the army standing still was disintegrating. He decided to start a campaign in India following the example of Alexander the Great. The road lay through Moscow. The war from a “liberation” war turned into an ordinary one of aggression.
Scheme of the connection of Russian armies near Smolensk in early August 1812
Mass desertion began. Despite the absence of major battles, Napoleonic army lost most of its troops during the movement towards Moscow. To supply the soldiers with food, the last of it was taken from the Belarusian peasants. The result was not long in coming. Partisan detachments smashed supply teams and individual combat units guarding communications.
August 24-26 (September 5-7) 1812
Borodino battle
Russian army offensive
But Napoleon was unable to defeat the Russian army at Borodino, occupied Moscow, which was soon devastated by fires and French marauders, and without waiting for envoys from the Russian emperor with proposals for peace, he was forced to leave the Russian capital, and after short battles, he was forced to retreat back to the western border of the Russian Empire. The retreat turned into a complete rout.
"Battle under Red 3-6 (15-18) November 1812". The French losses in it (36 thousand) were comparable to their losses at Borodino.
Adolf Yvon. "Marshal Ney retreats from Russia." Ney, retreating from Krasny, was driven into the forest and decided to cross the barely frozen Dnieper. He was “seen off” by M. Platov’s Cossacks. Result: from the 3000th detachment, only 800 people managed to get to the other side.
11-12 (23-24) November 1812
11-12 (23-24) November 1812
troops of P.H. Wittgenstein
Peter von Hess "Napoleon's crossing of the Berezina River"
Partuno(approx. 4 thousand people).
On November 27, on the left bank, Wittgenstein’s troops (40 thousand people) and the advanced detachments of Kutuzov’s main group (25 thousand people) surrounded the Borisov region and forced the division of General L to surrender. Partuno(approx. 4 thousand people).
Neya And Oudinot Chichagova Victor Wittgenstein, and crossed the river at night.
On November 28, a battle broke out on the Berezina: on the right bank, the troops of marshals crossed Neya And Oudinot(about 12 thousand people) successfully repelled the offensive of troops Chichagova, and on the left bank (near Studenka) troops Victor(about 7 thousand people) held out until the evening against the troops Wittgenstein, and crossed the river at night.
On the left bank there were convoys and approx. 40 thousand lagging soldiers, most of whom drowned during the crossing or were captured.
In total the enemy lost about 3 0 thousand people, and Russians - 8 thousand. Due to Chichagov's mistakes and Wittgenstein's indecisive actions, Napoleon managed to avoid complete defeat and retreat to Vilna, preserving the combat core of his army (9 thousand).
Students and d. Bryli
Monuments to the soldiers of the Russian army who died in 1812 near the village. Students and d. Bryli(left): French soldiers near the village of Bryli
December 21, 1812- order of M.I. Kutuzova
December 21, 1812- order of M.I. Kutuzova by the army on the expulsion of the French from Russia
January 6, 1813 199 years ago, Alexander I signed a manifesto ending the war
Severe frosts that struck during the crossing finally exterminated the French, already weakened by hunger. The pursuit of Russian troops did not give Napoleon the opportunity to gather even a little strength in Vilna.
On December 14, in Kovno, the pitiful remnants of the Great Army, numbering 1,600 people, crossed the Neman River to the Duchy of Warsaw.
The Patriotic War in January 1813 turned into the “Foreign Campaign of the Russian Army.”
The main sources of Russia's victory in the war
National participation in the war
mass heroism of soldiers and officers
military leadership talent of the commander-in-chief of the Russian army Kutuzov and other generals
The painting "In the Petrovsky Palace. Waiting for Peace" by the artist V.V. Vereshchagina (1895), Photo: Mudrats Alexandra/TASS
12/24 June 1812 Grand Army crossed the Neman and invaded the borders Russian Empire, and already on June 25/July 9, Napoleon announced to his immediate circle that he “has the intention to attack Moscow and St. Petersburg”
It would seem that Napoleon's plans for Russia have been known for a long time: to defeat the Russian army, capture Moscow and St. Petersburg, force the Tsar to peace, cut off vast territories from Russia and, as stated in the Proclamation of the French Emperor to the Grand Army, put " an end to fifty years of arrogant Russian influence on European affairs.".
However, historian O. Sokolov considers the above plans to be later inventions. Having declared that Russia was preparing an attack on the French empire, Sokolov must explain Napoleon’s response plan, that is, explain why the “defending” French emperor ended up not at the walls of Paris, but at the walls of Moscow.
Sokolov reveals Napoleon's plan in the following passage: " After the defeat of the main forces of the Russian army, occupy the territory of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and if Alexander shows persistence and does not want to make peace, wait until he is forced to make peace. Napoleon had no intention of moving to the original Russian lands, much less going to Moscow.".
So, it turns out that Napoleon strained the forces of all of Europe, assembled a huge army, suffered colossal financial costs just to recreate the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth? Napoleon was not a fool. Count Langeron, who was in Russian service, recalled that during the capture of enemy prisoners in the winter of 1812 " we came across actresses from the troupe of the French Comedy, which played in Moscow and was part of main apartment Napoleon, and Italian singers from the Murat choir. A crowd of French artists and artisans followed the army and returned with it. There were corporations of mechanics, masons, diamond makers, carriage makers, watchmakers." Was Napoleon going to entertain the quarrelsome Polish gentry with all this in Minsk?
Napoleonic Marshal Segur argued that Napoleon, " Having a grandiose goal in mind, he never made a definite plan and preferred to be guided by circumstances, since this was more consistent with the speed of his genius.". This phrase only means that no one, even those close to Napoleon, knew about his true intentions.
Sokolov claims that the emperor did not have a plan to go to Moscow, since the emperor did not say anything about it, and almost every infantryman knew about the upcoming restoration of Poland in the Great Army. But precisely this well-known goal indicates that it was disinformation. The best proof of this is that, having captured Vilna, Minsk, Vitebsk, and Smolensk, Napoleon did not stop, did not create any Poland, but continued to move forward. No wonder Segur recalled that in Vitebsk Bonaparte, seeing the positions abandoned by the Russians, " He turned sharply to the generals, hearing that they were rejoicing in victory, and cried out: “Don’t you think that I came from so far to conquer this shack?..”
Meanwhile historical facts indicate that it was Moscow that was main goal Napoleon. On December 20, 1811, the emperor wrote to Mara: " Tell Binion in code(French commissioner, something like a consul, in Vilna - P.M.), that if war takes place, it is my plan to establish a secret police at the main headquarters.[…] She needs to select two military Poles, smart, fluent in Russian, who can be trusted. These three officers will have to interrogate the prisoners. They must speak excellent Polish, Russian and German, and also have at their disposal a dozen well-selected agents on the roads St. Petersburg-Vilno, St. Petersburg-Riga, Riga-Memel, on the road to Kyiv and on the roads leading to Moscow.". It is obvious that Napoleon was interested in the directions in which he was going to attack. Moscow, as we see, was in this direction.
On June 12/24, 1812, the Grand Army crossed the Neman and invaded the Russian Empire, and already on June 25/July 9, Napoleon announced to his immediate circle that " has the intention of attacking Moscow and St. Petersburg". Note that by this time even Vitebsk was not occupied by the enemy.
A. Caulaincourt recalled the words Napoleon said in Vilna after a meeting with the Tsar’s envoy, General Balashov: “ I have come to put an end to the colossus of the northern barbarians once and for all. I will sign peace in Moscow".
Napoleon was eager to go to Moscow. Sokolov, who denies this fact, is perplexed: why did the emperor rush to this “provincial city”? These arguments by Sokolov demonstrate that Napoleon understood Russian history better than him. The conqueror was clear that Moscow was not a “provincial city”, but the sacred heart of Russia.
In June - early July 1812, it was much easier for Napoleon to march on St. Petersburg than on Moscow: the distance was shorter, and the forces defending the capital consisted of one corps of Lieutenant General P.Kh. Wittgenstein numbering only 20 thousand people. Nevertheless, Napoleon preferred a long and full of dangers way to Moscow. Why?
We can answer this question only when we understand Napoleon's main strategic plan. Napoleon was not just a head of state and not even just a conqueror. He was the bearer of a certain ideology. Napoleon never hid that his goal was to create a single world state. Russia clearly did not fit into it, so it had to be destroyed. By the time of the attack on Russia, Napoleon had achieved enormous power: all of Europe had been conquered by him. But it wasn't just Europe. Bonaparte had the closest contact with the ruling circles of the United States, which contributed in every possible way to his success.
After Napoleon's invasion of Spain, US troops seize its territories on the American continent. On the very eve of the war, the United States begins a war with England, attacking English possessions in Canada and Florida. With this, the United States actually opened a “second front” to assist Napoleon. While the battles of Borodino, Leipzig and Waterloo were taking place in Europe, the Americans pinned down the British at the battles of Queenstown Heights (1812), Chateauguay (1813) and New Orleans.
Almost simultaneously with North America Napoleon's supporters also came out in the South, which was quickly engulfed in the flames of the so-called wars of independence.
In 1810, S. Bolivar raised an uprising against the Spaniards in New Grenada (present-day Colombia and Venezuela), which lasted intermittently until 1817. Bolivar was in the service of revolutionary France, and after 1800 he became Napoleon's collaborator on special assignments. As Bolivar recalled, Napoleon sent him money, weapons and military advisers to Latin America, mainly through the United States.
During the same period, large-scale revolts took place against the Spaniards in Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Chile. There is no doubt that the “liberated” republics Latin America were intended to be part of Napoleon's worldwide empire, especially considering that all these countries were former Spanish colonies, and the new “king” Joseph Bonaparte sat in Madrid.
There is no doubt that Napoleon was preparing the same fate for Russia. However, the French emperor understood that it was impossible to conquer it like Austria or Prussia. He did not strive for this. Napoleon's plan was simple and at the same time completely optimal: defeat the Russian army, enter Moscow and be crowned there as the new Russian Tsar. After this, having come to an agreement with part of the Russian elite, he could distribute the territories of the Russian Empire to his vassals and create “independent2 states within the framework of the world empire. It was for the “coronation celebrations” that “Comédie Française”, an Italian opera, and two statues of Napoleon himself were brought to Moscow sculptor A.D. Shode, one of which was placed on Red Square, and the other was intended for the Palace in St. Petersburg, jewelers, cooks, waiters were brought from all over Europe for the coronation, and expensive dishes were brought to the ancient capital. and Napoleon's crown. Alexander knew very well about these plans of Napoleon, so Moscow was burned: in the ashes, Bonaparte's coronation lost all meaning.
The Swedish king and Napoleonic marshal Bernadotte, who secretly worked for Alexander I, reported that Napoleon plans, after defeating the Russian army, to oblige Alexander to go against the Turks and drive them out of Europe, and then proclaim himself an eastern and western emperor.
Thus, the campaign in Russia and the capture of Constantinople was supposed to be the final stage in the formation of the worldwide Napoleonic empire.
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F. ENGELS
The French government considered it necessary, through the Parisian newspaper Gonstitutionnel, to again inform the whole world about how the war would be conducted in the coming months. Similar exposes [statements. Ed.] are now becoming not only fashionable, but also periodic, and although they often contradict each other, they still give a good idea of what the chances of success are in at the moment are available from the French government. Taken together, they represent a collection of all possible plans for Louis Bonaparte's military campaigns against Russia and as such deserve some attention as they concern the fate of the Second Empire and the possibility of a national revival in France.
So it looks like there's no "grande guerre" ["great war". Ed.] will not happen, 500,000 Austrians and 100,000 French will never appear on the Vistula and Dnieper. Nor will there be a general uprising of those “oppressed nationalities” whose eyes are constantly turning to the West. The Hungarian, Italian and Polish armies will not appear on a whim magic wand the man who destroyed the Roman Republic. All this is now in the past. Austria has fulfilled its duty towards the West. Prussia fulfilled its duty. The whole world has done its duty. Everyone is happy with each other. The current war is not a big war at all. It does not pursue the goal of reviving the glory of the previous wars of the French against the Russians, although Pelissier, by the way, claims the opposite in one of his reports. French troops are not sent to Crimea to reap the glory of victories there; they are simply performing police service there. The issue that needs to be resolved is of purely local significance - dominance in the Black Sea - and it will be resolved there, on the spot. To expand the scope of the war would be madness. The Allies will “respectfully but firmly” repel any Russian attempt to resist on the Black Sea and its coast; and when this is done, then, of course, they either the Russians or both sides will agree to peace.
Thus, another Bonapartist illusion was dispelled. Dreams of the French border along the Rhine, of the annexation of Belgium and Savoy, dissipated, and an unusually sober modesty took their place. We are not waging a war in order to return France to its rightful position in Europe. Not at all. We are not fighting for civilization, as we have repeatedly stated quite recently. We are too modest to claim such an important mission. The war is being waged simply because of the interpretation of the third paragraph of the Vienna Protocol! This is the language he speaks now imperial majesty Napoleon III, by the grace of the army and thanks to the tolerance of Europe, became Emperor of the French.
But what does all this mean? We are told that the war is being waged to resolve a question of purely local significance and can be successfully brought to an end by purely local means. Only deprive the Russians of actual dominance in the Black Sea, and the goal of the war will be achieved. Having become masters of the Black Sea and its coast, hold on to what you have captured, and Russia will very soon give in. This is the latest of numerous campaign plans drawn up by the main headquarters in Paris. Let's look at it in more detail.
Let us describe the current state of affairs. The entire sea coast from Constantinople to the Danube, on the one hand, and the Circassian coast, Anapa, Kerch, Balaklava to Evpatoria, on the other, were taken from the Russians. So far only Kafa and Sevastopol are holding out, and Kafa is in a difficult situation, and Sevastopol is so located that if a serious threat arises, it will have to be abandoned. Moreover, the Allied fleet plies the waters of the inland Sea of Azov; their light ships reached Taganrog and attacked all important coastal points. It can be considered that not a single section of the coast remained in the hands of the Russians, with the exception of the strip from Perekop to the Danube, that is, one fifteenth of what belonged to them on this coast. Now suppose that Kafa and Sevastopol also fell and Crimea ended up in the hands of the allies. What then? Russia, being in this position, will not make peace, it has already publicly stated this. That would be crazy on her part. This would mean abandoning the battle due to the fact that the vanguard was thrown back at the very moment when the main forces were approaching. What can the Allies do after achieving such success at the cost of enormous sacrifices?
We are told that they can destroy Odessa, Kherson, Nikolaev and even land a large army in Odessa, fortify there so as to repel the onslaught of any number of Russians, and then act depending on the circumstances. In addition, they can send troops to the Caucasus and almost destroy the Russian army under the command of Muravyov, which now occupies Georgia and other parts of Transcaucasia. Well, let’s assume that all this has been accomplished, but here the question arises again: what will happen if even after this Russia refuses to make peace, and it will certainly do so? It should not be forgotten that Russia is in a different position than France and England. England can afford to conclude an unfavorable peace. After all, as soon as John Bull feels that he has had enough of unrest and war taxes, he will make every effort to get out of trouble and leave his respected allies to sort out the mess themselves. The guarantee of the real power of England and the sources of its strength should not be sought in this direction. For Louis Bonaparte, too, the moment may come when he will prefer an inglorious peace to a life-and-death war, for it should not be forgotten that when such an adventurer finds himself in a desperate situation, the opportunity to extend his reign for another six months will prevail over all others. considerations. At the decisive moment, Türkiye and Sardinia, with their pitiful resources, will be left to their own devices. There is no doubt about it. Russia, like Ancient Rome, can't make peace while the enemy is on its territory. Over the past one hundred and fifty years, Russia has never concluded a peace under which it would have to make territorial concessions. Even the Peace of Tilsit led to the expansion of its territories, and it was concluded at a time when not a single Frenchman had yet set foot on Russian soil. Making a peace at a time when a large army was in readiness on Russian territory, a peace involving the loss of territory or at least the limitation of the Tsar's power within his own dominions, would mark a sharp break with the traditions of the last century and a half. A king who has just ascended the throne and is new to the people, whose actions are being watched with concern by a strong national party, cannot take such a step. Such a peace cannot be concluded until all offensive and, above all, all defensive Russian resources. And such a time will certainly come, and Russia will be forced to abandon interference in other people’s affairs, but this will be done by a completely different enemy than Louis Bonaparte and Palmerston, and as a result of a much more decisive struggle than the “local” punitive measure applied to her in her Black Sea possessions. Suppose, however, that the Crimea is conquered and 50,000 allies are stationed on its territory, the Caucasus and all possessions in the south are cleared of Russian troops, the allied army holds back the Russians in the Kuban and Terek, Odessa is taken and turned into a fortified camp, in which there are, say, 100,000 Anglo-French soldiers, and Nikolaev, Kherson and Izmail were destroyed or occupied by the allies. Let us even assume that, in addition to these “local” operations, some more or less important results were achieved in the Baltic Sea, although based on the data at our disposal it is difficult to predict what achievements there may be. What will happen next?
Will the allies limit themselves to those. that they will hold their positions and wear down the Russian forces? Diseases would claim Allied soldiers in the Crimea and the Caucasus faster than replacements could arrive. Their main forces, for example in Odessa, will have to be supplied with the help of the fleet, since the lands for hundreds of miles around Odessa are not cultivated. The Russian army, having at its disposal Cossack units, especially useful when operating in the steppes, will attack the allies whenever they try to leave their camp, and may be able to take up permanent positions near the city. Under such conditions it will be impossible to force the Russians to give battle; they will always have the great advantage that they will be able to lure the enemy into the interior of the country. They would respond to every Allied advance with a slow retreat. Meanwhile, it is impossible to keep a large army in a fortified camp inactive for a long time. The gradual increase in indiscipline and demoralization will force the Allies to take some decisive action. Illness will also complicate the situation. In a word, if the allies occupy the main points on the coast and wait there for the moment when Russia deems it necessary to concede, this will lead to nothing. There are three chances against one that the Allies will be the first to tire and the graves of their soldiers on the shores of the Black Sea will soon number in the hundreds of thousands.
Such a course of action would be wrong from a military point of view. To dominate the coast it is not enough to capture its main points. Only possession of inland territory guarantees possession of the coast. As we have seen, the circumstances arising from the very fact of the Allies' capture of the coast in southern Russia will force them to move their troops inland. But this is where the difficulties begin. Up to the borders of Podolsk, Kyiv, Poltava and Kharkov provinces, the land is a poorly irrigated, almost uncultivated steppe, on which nothing grows except grass, and in summer the grass dries out from the sun's heat. Suppose that Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson will be turned into operational bases, but where is the object of operations against which the allies could direct their efforts? There are few cities there, they are located far from each other, and among them there is not a single one so significant that its capture would give the operations a decisive character. There are no such significant points before Moscow, and Moscow is 700 miles away. To march on Moscow you need five hundred thousand people, but where can you get them? The situation is certainly such that if events unfold in this direction, then a “local” war will in no case yield decisive results. And let Louis Bonaparte, with all the wealth of his strategic imagination, try to find a different way!
However, to implement all these plans, not only the strict neutrality of Austria is needed, but also its moral support. Whose side is this power on now? In 1854, Austria and Prussia declared that they would consider the advance of Russian troops into the Balkans as a casus belli [cause for war. Ed.] against Russia. Where is the guarantee that in 1856 they will not consider the French attack on Moscow or even Kharkov as a reason for war against the Western powers? It should not be forgotten that any army moving from the Black Sea into the interior of Russia will have an exposed flank from Austria no less than the Russian army that is moving into Turkey from the Danube; therefore, at a certain distance, her communications with the base of operations, that is, her very existence, will be made dependent on the mercy of Austria. In order to force Austria not to enter the war, at least for a while, it will have to be bribed by giving Bessarabia to Austrian troops. Having reached the Dniester, the Austrian army will be as complete master of Odessa as if this city had been occupied by the Austrians. Could the Allied army, under such conditions, rush into a madcap pursuit of the Russians into the interior of the country? That would be crazy! But this madness, we recall, is a logical consequence of the last plan of Louis Bonaparte - the plan of “conducting local war».
The first plan of the campaign was "grande guerre", in alliance with Austria. This plan assigned to the French army in numerical terms the same subordinate place in comparison with the Austrian one as the English army now occupies in comparison with the French one. This plan provided Russia with revolutionary initiative. Louis Bonaparte could do neither the first nor the second. Austria refused to participate in the war; the plan was dropped. The second plan was a “war of nationalities.” This plan would have caused a storm among the Germans, Italians and Hungarians on the one hand, and a revolt of the Slavs on the other, which would have immediately affected France and swept away the empire of the decline of Louis Bonaparte for more short term than what was required to create it. Fake " iron man", posing as Napoleon, retreated in horror. The third and most modest of all plans is the plan for “local war in the name of local goals.” The absurdity of this plan is immediately apparent. Once again we are forced to ask the question: what next? After all, it is much easier to become Emperor of the French when all circumstances favor it, than to be this Emperor, even when long exercises in front of the mirror have made His Majesty an excellent connoisseur of all the external attributes of imperial power.
Published as an editorial in the New York Daily Tribune No. 4431, July 2, 1855
Printed according to newspaper text
Translation from English
Published in Russian for the first time