Swiss hike. Suvorov's crossing of the Alps. Unknown facts

His path lay in the area of Lake Zurich. There was the main French army in Switzerland under the command of General Massenb (38 thousand people). It was located opposite the Rimsky-Korsakov building. Suvorov planned his route so as to strike at the flank and rear of Massenb. The Russian commander intended to use his traditional method of speed and onslaught. He sought to quickly overcome his path in order to unexpectedly “attack the enemy from the most sensitive side.” Therefore, Suvorov chose the shortest, although the most difficult, route through the St. Gotthard Pass. On September 4, Suvorov's army arrived in Tavern, where its journey to the Alps began. But there were neither pack mules nor food, which the Austrian commissariat had promised to prepare in advance. As a result, the Russian troops had to stay here for five whole days and set out on a campaign only on September 10. “The haste of our campaign turned out to be fruitless,” wrote Suvorov, “the decisive benefits of speed and surprise were lost for the important upcoming actions.” This delay became fatal for the Rimsky-Korsakov corps.

Battle of Zurich (1799). On September 14, 1799, in the area of the Swiss city of Zurich, the Russian corps under the command of General Rimsky-Korsakov (24 thousand people) that arrived there was attacked by a strong French army under the command of the famous General Massenbe (38 thousand people). Before this, the main Austrian units, led by Archduke Charles, left Northern Switzerland and went to Belgium. As a result, Korsakov's corps was actually given over to be torn to pieces by the superior forces of the French. In a brutal two-day battle on September 14-15, it was defeated piece by piece. Having lost 15 thousand people. (more than half the strength), Korsakov retreated north, to Winterthur. The damage to the French side amounted to 7 thousand people. After this victory, the French gained freedom of action in Switzerland, which put Suvorov's army in an extremely difficult situation. The Battle of Zurich was one of the most severe defeats of the Russian army in the 18th century.

Battle of the Gotthard Pass (1799). Suvorov's first major victory in the Alps was the capture of the St. Gotthard Pass by his troops on September 13. The almost impregnable positions on the pass were defended by the French detachment of General Lecourbe (8.5 thousand people). Before the battle, Suvorov sent a detachment of General Rosenberg (6 thousand people) around Saint Gotthard to go behind the French rear. The main Russian forces in three columns attacked the St. Gotthard positions from the front and from both flanks. The French repulsed two attacks, but during the third, General Bagration's detachment managed to climb the mountain peaks and bypass the positions of the defenders. Lekurbe had to leave the pass. At the same time, Rosenberg’s detachment hesitated in the mountains and did not have time to cut off the French’s path to retreat in time. They managed to retreat unhindered to the Devil's Bridge area and take up a new defensive position there.

Battle for the Urzensky Tunnel and Devil's Bridge (1799). On September 14, Suvorov's troops linked up with Rosenberg's detachment. In front of them was the Urzern mountain tunnel (60 m long and 3 m wide). In a dark rocky passage there was a cannon that fired buckshot. An attempt to break into the tunnel on the move was stopped by fire. Then the detachment under the command of Colonel Trubnikov climbed the mountain to bypass the French on the right, and the rangers with Major Trevogin began to descend down to the Reise River. Trubnikov's soldiers were the first to reach the French rear. They quickly attacked the gun crew, destroyed it, and threw the cannon into the river. The path to the tunnel was clear. Unable to detain the Russians in the tunnel, the French retreated across the Reyse River, blowing up the Devil's Mouse behind them. It was located above the river at an altitude of 22-23 m and had a length of 20 m. Having taken up defense on the opposite bank of the Reisse, the French hoped to hold back the onslaught of the Russian army at this steep mountain position. But Suvorov’s soldiers dismantled the nearby barn and, under French fire, began to pave the destroyed span with planks. On the initiative of Prince Meshchersky, they tied up the boardwalk with officers' scarves and belts, and then rushed to attack across the bridge. Meanwhile, Major Trevogin’s rangers had already descended to Reisa, walked waist-deep into ice water a stormy mountain stream, and then began to climb the steep slopes to the top of the opposite bank. Colonel Trubnikov’s detachment also went to the rear of the French. The appearance of Russian detachments on the flanks and in the rear, as well as an attack from the front, forced the French to begin a general retreat from impregnable positions. On September 15, Suvorov's troops took the village of Altdorf in battle, where they were joined by the Austrian detachment of Aufenberg. In three days, Suvorov fought through unfamiliar, high-mountain terrain for more than 60 km. Having reached Aldorf, Suvorov was faced with another, in his words, “treason and duplicity” of his allies. It turned out that the road to Schwyz along Lake Lucerne, which the Russian army had approached, did not exist, and there were no means of transportation for movement by water. Suvorov had to go to Schwyz again through the mountains. On the way through the Rosstok ridge (about 2.5 thousand m above sea level), the soldiers were forced to climb a goat path, on which sometimes even the sole of a boot did not fit. Suvorov's army, lined up in single file, covered this 16 km route to the Mutten Valley in two days.

Battle of Mutten Valley 1799). Having reached the Mutten Valley, Suvorov received the tragic news of the defeat of Rimsky-Korsakov. Now Suvorov’s army found itself surrounded by superior French forces. Having won the battle of Zurich, Massenb moved towards Suvorov. In this situation, the Russian commander decided to change his route. Instead of Schwyz, which was occupied by Massenbe, it was decided to fight our way east to Glaris. On September 19, the Suvorov vanguard under the command of Prince Bagration drove the French brigade of General Molitor back from Glaris and opened the way for the entire army. On the same day, Suvorov's rearguard, led by General Rosenberg (7 thousand people), covering the withdrawal of the main units, entered into an unequal battle in the Mutten Valley with the vanguard of the French army under the command of General Massenb (15 thousand people). The Russians not only repulsed all attacks, but also drove the French back to Schwyz. The next morning Massena resumed his attack. The fierce battle lasted for several hours and ended with the defeat of the French, who again retreated to Schwyz. In these battles, Massena himself was almost captured, whom the grenadier Makhotin tried to pull from his horse. The Russian soldier was left with a torn general's epaulette in his hands. “The enemy,” reported Rosenberg, “was driven more than 8 miles to Schwyz.” In these battles, the French lost 5 thousand people. (including 1.2 thousand prisoners).

Transition from Glaris to Ilanz (1799). Having completed the task, Rosenberg went to Glaris on the night of September 21 and two days later, overcoming the snow drifts, he united with Suvorov. On September 21, Aufenberg’s Austrian detachment voluntarily left Suvorov’s army and went to Ilanets. The Russian commander could not move further to the east, where new battles awaited him with large French forces. He decided to take a roundabout, but very difficult route to the south, to Ilanets through the Paniks Pass. This was the last maneuver of the great commander who saved the army. To repel the onslaught of the French, a detachment of two thousand under the command of General Bagration was left in the rearguard. The most difficult was the passage through the Ringenkopf mountain range in a snowstorm. The guides left the army, and the Russian soldiers moved almost gropingly along narrow paths swept by drifting snow. The road through Panix passed mostly along the edge of a steep, icy cliff. The artillery had to be left at the foot of the pass. The guns were riveted and covered with stones. Finally, Suvorov's army overcame the pass and then crossed the Rhine. On September 26, she reached Ilanz, leaving the zone of action of French troops.

The great Russian commander passed through the Alps undefeated, retaining about 80% of his personnel in the ranks after an unprecedented transition in history, and at the same time withdrawing 1,400 prisoners. “The Alpine mountains are behind us - God is before us: Hurray! The Russian eagles have flown around the Roman eagles!” he told the troops after the end of the campaign. For Italian and Swiss campaign s Suvorov received the title of Prince of Italy and the rank of generalissimo. The crossing of the Alps, which was accompanied by almost continuous battles and skirmishes, lasted 17 days. People who had never been to the mountains, without any special equipment, managed to overcome about 200 km of high-mountain route in a short time and win difficult battles, including against superior enemy forces. The Swiss campaign demonstrated not only the genius of Suvorov, but also the amazing resilience of the Russian soldiers, who did not allow themselves to be destroyed and came out of an almost hopeless situation with dignity.

"From Ancient Rus' to the Russian Empire." Shishkin Sergey Petrovich, Ufa.

Military situation in Italy and Switzerland before the start of the campaign

Lekurbe intended to stop the Russian army, but after the battles at St. Gotthard and the Devil's Bridge and the retreat, he managed to gather only about 6,000 people. Here Lekurbe sent part of the troops under the command of Loison and Gudin in the western and southwestern directions, remaining in Seedorf with a detachment of 700-900 people. Lekurbe sent part of the troops to Fluelen, from where they were evacuated by means of transport.

The transition of the Russian army from Altdorf to the Muten Valley

From September 17 (28) to September 18 (29), the rearguard moved in two columns with an interval of several hours after the main forces. Only on the morning of September 29, Lecourbe, realizing which way the Russian army had gone, sent a message to Massena, Molitor, Mortier and Loison that Suvorov, at the head of 20 - 25 thousand army, had invaded the Muten Valley through the Kinzig-Kulm pass.

The last units of Suvorov's rearguard arrived in the Muten Valley on September 18. On September 18, in the Muten Valley, Suvorov received a written report from General Linken about the defeat of Rimsky-Korsakov (September 14-15) and Hotze (September 14).

Exit of the Russian army from encirclement. Battle in the Muten Valley on September 20

At the military council, it was decided to fight their way east, through the Klental Valley (separated from the Muten Valley by Mount Bragelberg) to Glarus.

On the same day, Aufenberg's Austrian brigade ascended Bragelberg, knocked down French posts and descended into the Klental Valley. It was followed by Bagration's vanguard and Shveikovsky's division (6 thousand). They were followed by troops led by Suvorov. The retreat was carried out under the cover of Rosenberg's rearguard (initial strength of about 4 thousand), who stood at Muten, guarding Suvorov's rear and waiting for the end of the descent into the valley of the packs. In an effort to lock in the Russian army more firmly, Massena sent part of his troops to the exit from the Klental Valley, and he himself, leading a group of 18,000, moved to Schwyz with the aim of striking at Muthen, in the rear of the Russian army. In connection with the successes achieved, a victorious mood reigned in the French army. The plan to defeat the French in Switzerland by the forces of 3 groups of allied forces was thwarted.

« Seeing from this that My troops were abandoned to sacrifice to the enemy by that ally on whom I relied more than on all others, seeing that his policy is completely opposite to My views and that the salvation of Europe was sacrificed to the desire to expand Your Monarchy, having, moreover, many reasons to be dissatisfied with the duplicitous and insidious behavior of your ministry... I... now announce that from now on I will stop caring about your benefits and will take care of my own benefits and those of other allies. I stop acting in concert with you Imperial Majesty » .

On November 15 (26), the Russian army moved from Augsburg to Russia. At this time, Paul I, under the influence of England, was inclined to reconsider the break with the Austrians, provided that Austria fulfilled a number of political demands of Russia. With a rescript of November 20 (December 1), Paul I ordered Suvorov to camp in the area where he would receive this order. Suvorov, having received the order of Paul I in Bavaria, continued, however, the movement and in early December stopped in Bohemia due to the difficulties of food supply to the army in Bavaria. Finally, on January 14 (26), 1800, the Russian army set out for Russia. On February 3 (15), in Krakow, Suvorov surrendered command of the army to Rosenberg and went to Kobrin. The Russian army returned to Russia in March 1800.

Reasons that prevented achieving the goal

Suvorov's Swiss campaign, which aimed to defeat the French army in Switzerland together with the troops of Alexander Rimsky-Korsakov and Friedrich von Hotze, did not achieve its goal due to circumstances beyond Suvorov's control.

Not only the military of that time, but also the general public of Europe saw the reason for the failure of the Swiss campaign in the actions of the Austrians. Stendhal wrote: “ The great Suvorov came to Italy only 4 years later[after Archduke Charles fought there in 1795] and petty squabbles of the Austrians prevented him from entering France". Napoleon made a similar remark: “ the loss of Switzerland and the defeat of Korsakov were the result of an erroneous maneuver by the Archduke“Even with Charles’s army leaving Switzerland, the French were in a very difficult situation. Napoleon clearly said this: “ He(i.e. Andre Massena]) saved the republic by winning the Battle of Zurich". Thus, in the current situation for the French, the only way to save the army (and at the same time, as Napoleon believed, the whole of France) was to prevent Suvorov from uniting with Rimsky-Korsakov, which could be followed by the defeat of the main French forces in Switzerland. However, Massena, who attacked Rimsky-Korsakov on September 14 (25), could not do anything 6 days earlier, when Suvorov, according to his original plan, was supposed to interact with Rimsky-Korsakov, since: preparations for the difficult crossing of the Limmat River took a long time and were completed before the battle itself; Massena could not begin preparations for the battle earlier, since the arrival of Suvorov’s army in Switzerland through Saint Gotthard was not expected by the enemy and came as a complete surprise to him; In planning the offensive against Rimsky-Korsakov, Massena was guided only by the instructions of the Directory, which wanted to expel the allies from Switzerland and reinforce the Rhine Army with part of Massena’s troops. .

Suvorov, who did not intend to fight in Switzerland and was unfamiliar with the topography of the new theater of military operations, while preparing a campaign plan in Asti, summoned officers of the Austrian General Staff. “He said that the entire disposition was drawn up by one Austrian officer who was with him...”. “Of the nine Austrian officers who arrived at Suvorov, the eldest was Lieutenant Colonel Franz von Weyrother. Most likely, it was he who was responsible for developing the route for the movement of troops through St. Gotthard, Altdorf, Schwyz (that is, along a road that did not exist) to Zurich. Historian V.S. Lopatin put forward a hypothesis about Weyrother’s direct complicity with France based on an analysis of all of Weyrother’s military plans: g.: Wurmser’s army was defeated by Bonaparte in Northern Italy (Weyrother held the position of Quartermaster General of Staff, i.e. Chief of Staff of the Army); g. - the offensive plan of the army of Archduke Johann, developed by his chief of staff, Colonel Weyrother, led to the defeat of the Austrians at Hohenlinden; - the complex maneuvering of the Russian-Austrian army near Austerlitz ended in disaster. The plan for this movement was imposed on the commander-in-chief Kutuzov through the mediation of Alexander I, who was with the army. The author of the plan was Major General Weyrother." According to V. Lopatin, this series of disasters “cannot be explained by the pedantry of an armchair strategist who did not understand the essence of the art of war. An impartial researcher has the right to raise the question of Weyrother’s direct complicity with the enemy.” The following detail supports the assumption of Weyrother’s double game: “it was Weyrother who negotiated the supply of mules to the Tavern.” However, there is no direct documentary evidence of Weyrother's betrayal.

Thus, due to the lackluster actions (and, possibly, betrayal) of the Austrians, Suvorov’s Swiss campaign did not achieve its goal and underwent major changes compared to original plan. Although Suvorov single-handedly defeated first the enemy’s right wing under the command of J. Lecourbe, who was defending in practically impregnable positions, and then the enemy center under the command of Andre Massena, the defeat of 70 thousand French army and the cleansing of Switzerland from French troops were not achieved.

Results and evaluation

The Swiss campaign was highly appreciated by both contemporaries and later researchers. According to F. Engels, the Swiss campaign, carried out under the leadership of A.V. Suvorov, “was the most outstanding of all the Alpine crossings completed up to that time.”

“This unsuccessful campaign,” wrote D. Milyutin, “brought more honor to the Russian army than the most brilliant victory.”

Recognizing the hopeless situation of Suvorov’s army, K. Clausewitz called its breakthrough from encirclement a “miracle.” The actions of Archduke Charles, who had the opportunity not only to wait for the arrival of Suvorov’s formation with Rimsky-Korsakov, but also to defeat the French in Switzerland, were appreciated by Clausewitz in the following way: “The Archduke should have used his clear superiority of forces to completely defeat Massena before his retreat. The fact that he didn’t do this is more than caution, it’s cowardice!” . However, Russian studies note that when describing the battle in the Muten Valley, he mentioned a thousand French prisoners, without saying that most The French suffered losses in the battle, killed and keeping silent about the fact that a French general was captured.

The largest researcher of the Swiss campaign, D. Milyutin, estimates the total losses of Suvorov in the Swiss campaign at 5,100 people, of which 1,600 died, including those who crashed during the transitions, and 980 wounded, left in Switzerland, out of 21,000 who set out on the campaign. Thus, more than 3/4 of the troops left the encirclement. The losses suffered by the French army are not precisely determined, but, obviously, they were significantly higher than Suvorov's losses. Only their losses in the battle in the Muten Valley were comparable to Suvorov’s total losses. Suvorov himself believed that the French suffered four times as many losses. 2,818 soldiers and officers of the French army were captured. From the time the Russian army, having descended into the Muten Valley, found itself in a critical situation, Suvorov’s actions were aimed primarily at withdrawing the army from encirclement, and not at defeating the enemy. In accordance with his order, given at the council in the Muten Valley, the pursuit of Massena's defeated troops on September 20 continued only to Schwyz. Suvorov did not want to stretch the army so that Rosenberg would spend less time joining the main forces.

Suvorov's Swiss campaign was one of the largest military events of its time in the mountain theater of operations in terms of its scope and duration of action. “The Swiss campaign of the Russian army is a classic example of combat operations in a mountain theater of military operations. He became the crown of military glory of the commander, the apotheosis of the victories of Russian weapons."

For the Swiss campaign, Suvorov was elevated to the rank of generalissimo on October 28 (November 8) and a monument to him was ordered to be erected in St. Petersburg.

“Defeating the enemies of the fatherland everywhere and throughout our entire life,” wrote Paul I, “you lacked one kind of glory - to overcome nature itself. But you have now gained the upper hand over her too... Rewarding you according to My gratitude and placing you at the highest level of honor and heroism, I am confident that I will elevate you to the most famous commander of this and other centuries.”

Upon learning of Suvorov's death, Massena said:

Monuments to participants

Monument to Russian troops in the Swiss Alps

On the Kinzig-Kulm pass, along which Russian troops crossed the Roshtok ridge, there is a small chapel. Under it, on the rock, there is a bronze plaque with a cross and an inscription on German: “in memory of the transition of Russian troops under the leadership of Generalissimo Suvorov in the fall of 1799.”

The fundamental study of the Swiss campaign was the 2nd edition of the book by Colonel General Staff D. A. Milyutin (later Minister of War and reformer of the Russian army) “History of the war of 1799 between Russia and France in the reign of Emperor Paul I.” (The 1st edition, in which Milyutin was a co-author with A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, was radically revised by him). This work, which contained a deep and comprehensively documented description of the war of 1799, was awarded the Demidov Prize and became a classic work of Russian and world military historical literature. All descriptions of the Swiss campaign in subsequent Russian scientific publications are almost entirely based on this work, including (articles: Suvorov's Swiss campaign; Saint Gotthard; Mutten Valley"), works by A. F. Petrushevsky, I. I. Rostunov, etc. .

Notes

TSB. /The end date of the Swiss campaign was considered by 19th-century historiography to be October 1 (12), the date Suvorov’s army reached the Feldkirch area. This date was indicated in the Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary. Soviet historiography believes that the Swiss campaign ended on September 27 (October 8), when Suvorov's army reached the village of Chur. This date, which is still accepted, is indicated in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. Both of these points are located in Switzerland. The army left the territory of Switzerland on October 8 (19). comment: the definition of Suvorov’s Swiss campaign as the transition of Russian troops from Northern Italy to Switzerland, adopted in the TSB, is inaccurate. The Swiss campaign began already in Switzerland itself, and thus is part the specified transition.
A similar assessment is contained, in particular, in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia
Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron.
Suvorov A.V. Collection of documents. Edited by G. P. Meshcheryakov vol.1-4., vol.4. The excerpt is given
Zamostyanov A. Alexander Suvorov: God of War. - , Eksmo:Yauza 228; pp. 336. - 544 pp. ISBN 978-5-699-25365-4.
V. S. Lopatin. "A. V. Suvorov. Letters", notes to letter No. 646 of Suvorov to Rimsky-Korsakov and Hotze dated 13/IX. 1799. Page 732
According to Reading, both passes have been used since ancient times by peasants for driving cattle and horses. Lekurbe, assuming Suvorov's crossing through Rose-Alp-Kulm, apparently (which is confirmed by Reading), considered the crossing through Kinzig-Kulm impossible.
http://www.ecrusgeneve.ch/rus/razdel06/seng/sen2.htm
Milyutin D. A. t 2, p. 232.
Carl von Clausewitz. II // Swiss campaign of Suvorov = Die Feldzuge von 1799 in Italien und der Schweiz. - M.: Heritage, 2003. - P. 106. - 240 p. - (Military classics). - 1000 copies. - ISBN 5-98233-003-5
Clausewitz K. Swiss campaign.
Bieberg Reading, background Suvorov's Campaign through Switzerland chapter 8.
Ya. Starkov. Stories of an old warrior about Suvorov. M, 1847. Retold by: V. S. Lopatin. A. V. Suvorov. Letters. P.732-733.
Napoleon. Italian company 1796-1797 // Selected works. Voenizdat. 1956. p. 357.
Dragunov G.P. Devil's Bridge. In the footsteps of Suvorov in Switzerland. M., Publishing house "Gorodets". 2008, 2nd ed. - 304 pp. ISBN 978-5-9584-0195-6
The initial number of French troops on October 1 was 10 - 11 thousand people. Throughout the day, other units arrived, unsuccessfully trying to delay the pursuit. At about 6 o'clock in the evening, 3 more battalions of the 67th half-brigade arrived to help the retreating French troops.
Starkov Y. Stories of an old warrior about Suvorov M., 1847. Retold in many sources, including: Mikhailov O. Suvorov. ZhZL, vol. 1 (523) - 2nd ed. M, “Young Guard” 1980, 494 pp., pp. 478-479
Rosenberg, in a report to Suvorov, reported 6,000 killed and 1,000 prisoners. He underestimated the number of prisoners, and the number of those killed, apparently, was exaggerated. Suvorov, in a report to Paul I, reported 6,500 dead, wounded and captured French during 2 days of fighting (1,600 on September 19 and 4,500 on September 20)
In Rosenberg’s report to Suvorov about the battle in the Muten Valley, Rosenberg named the captured general Lacourb, and Suvorov himself wrote the surname “Lecourb” in his report to Paul I. This caused confusion about the capture of General Lecourbe, who opposed Suvorov at St. Gotthard

After the Battle of Novi, the remnants of the Italian army retreated south to the Mediterranean Sea. Moreau decided not to defend the Genoese Riviera and, if Suvorov pursued him, to retreat to the borders of France. A favorable situation has developed for clearing this Italian region of the French. This is exactly what the Russian commander was going to do, having developed an appropriate plan and assigned appropriate tasks to his troops.

But events began to develop in a completely different direction. There were several reasons for this, but, as they say, there is always one reason. In this case, political. One of the allies - England - was not interested in strengthening the other members of the coalition. She was especially concerned about the possibility of Suvorov reaching Genoa, located on the Mediterranean Sea, since in this case ground troops received the opportunity to interact with the Russian fleet located in this sea under the command of Ushakov. This strengthened Russia's position in this region. This means that the British should try to remove Suvorov’s troops from Northern Italy.

The Austrians also liked this intention: after all, they, like the French, were invaders on Italian soil. The flame of a national liberation uprising also smoldered against them. The presence of Suvorov in Italy, his appeals to the population with a call to rise up to fight the French, willingly or unwillingly, awakened thoughts about the fight against the second colonialist - Austria.

The British government developed a new plan for the march of the Allied troops to France through Switzerland. According to this plan, in order to continue the war between the coalition and France and defeat it, it is necessary to regroup the allied forces. All Russian troops should be concentrated in Switzerland into one army under the command of Suvorov. Only the Austrian army remained in Northern Italy under the leadership of Melas. From Switzerland, Russian troops were supposed to move to France, having previously defeated Massena’s army located here. Meanwhile, the Austrian army under the command of Archduke Charles would attack the French from southern Germany. It was also assumed that Holland would be liberated by a special Russian-English landing corps; he, in cooperation with the army of Archduke Charles, was supposed to liberate Belgium.

It is difficult to understand what interest Russia had in getting involved in European disputes, especially since Russian troops were sent to fight an enemy that outnumbered them. In addition, autumn was just around the corner with its bad weather, rain and bad roads. Nevertheless, Paul I supported the Allied plan. On July 21 (August 1), he sent a rescript to Suvorov, in which he invited the Russian part of Suvorov’s troops, together with the corps of Lieutenant General Rimsky-Korsakov and Prince Condé to join them, to go to Switzerland and begin there fighting.

Suvorov considered the new Allied plan to be erroneous. In his opinion, it is much easier to go to the French borders from Piedmont. From this point of view, there was no need to move to Switzerland. As for the fight against Massena, why not the Austrian army of Archduke Charles, located there (its number was 50 thousand people)? However, Suvorov failed to achieve mutual understanding with the Austrians. In addition, according to the order of the Gofkriegsrat, Karl’s troops were to immediately leave Switzerland as soon as the Russian corps of Rimsky-Korsakov, “assigned” to Suvorov, arrived there. And indeed, when in mid-August this corps was located near Zurich, parts of the Archduke’s army began to leave Switzerland. As a result, a dangerous situation arose: Rimsky-Korsakov’s army (24 thousand people) found itself in front of the powerful army of Massena (80 thousand people), who any moment could strike. Therefore, Suvorov decides to urgently go to Switzerland. At that moment, he and his 20,000-strong detachment were in Italy beyond the Swiss Alps, 220 km from Zurich.

Swiss Campaign Plan

Suvorov had little knowledge of the Swiss theater of military operations and the French group located there. So he asked for everything necessary information from the commanders of the two Austrian divisions remaining in Switzerland - Gotze and Linken. At the same time, he carried out a certain restructuring of his army, taking into account the specifics of actions in mountain conditions. Suvorov allocated artillery and convoys in a separate column and sent them along the most accessible of the three roads leading from Northern Italy to Switzerland: through Chiavenna, the Splungen mountain pass to Chur and further to Feldkirch and Zurich. For the troops setting out on the campaign, instructions were drawn up with rules for action in the mountains.

Based on the information received from Gotze and Linken, Suvorov developed a detailed order for the entire campaign and outlined a rough plan of action.

The commander decides to go to Switzerland along the most difficult road: from Taverno to Airolo through the St. Gotthard Pass, along the shores of Lake Zurich and further to the north. Its length is about 130 km.

The operation consisted of two stages:

1) the exit of Suvorov’s troops to the Altdorf area and the concentration of the Austrian troops of Gotze, Linken and Elachich in the Molis, Glaris, Einsiedeln area;

2) launching a decisive offensive with all forces simultaneously with the subsequent encirclement and defeat of the main forces of the French troops. To implement this stage: a) the Russian corps of Rimsky-Korsakov (27 thousand people) advances in the direction of Lucerne; b) the Austrians (22 thousand fighters) are conducting an offensive between lakes Zurich and Zug; c) Russian troops, who arrived from Italy together with Suvorov (about 20 thousand people), from Altdorf bypass Lake Lucerne from the north and south, attacking the enemy in a northern direction towards Bremgarten.

Swiss campaign of Suvorov.

Suvorov's central idea was that Allied troops would attack the Massena group from three directions and destroy it. The corps of Derfelden and Rosenberg were supposed to strike in the rear of the French, the corps of Gotze - on their right flank, and the corps of Rimsky-Korsakov - to act in the center of the front.

Russian troops in the Alps. Unknown German artist of the late 18th century.

Suvorov received information about the theater of military operations from the Austrians and, based on them, drew up an operation plan. However, this information contained a number of errors. Gotze reported that the size of Massena's army was 60 thousand people, while it was 20 thousand more. In addition, the same Gotze pointed out that there is a pedestrian path from Altdorf to the canton of Schwyz along Lake Lucerne. Accordingly, in the final disposition, developed by the Austrian Lieutenant Colonel Weyrother at the direction of Suvorov, it was written: “The column departs from Altdorf to Schwyz and goes 14 miles further that same evening.” In reality, there was no land route from Altdorf to Schwyz. Communication between them was maintained only through Lake Lucerne, all the ships on which were captured by the French. It was possible to get to Schwyz only by crossing the powerful Rossstock Pass (6 thousand meters high), along a difficult path, where every wrong step could cost your life. Thus, when Suvorov’s troops entered the Altdorf area, they found themselves in a dead end. On August 31, Suvorov and his army set out on a campaign.

Transition of Suvorov's army through St. Gotthard. Artist A.E. Kotzebue.

Suvorov's crossing of the Alps

Before the march to Switzerland, Russian troops under the command of Suvorov numbered about 25 thousand people in their ranks. The wounded and sick were left in Italy, artillery and convoys with escort teams were sent in a roundabout way. 18 thousand people set out on the campaign: Derfelden’s corps (11 thousand) and Rosenberg’s corps (7 thousand). Having covered 150 km in five days, Suvorov’s units approached Taverno by the evening of September 4. Here they were joined by Strauch's Austrian detachment of 4.5 thousand soldiers.

In such difficult conditions of war, especially great importance The issue of supplying troops with food became an issue. According to the agreements of the allies, responsibility for this was assigned to the Austrian general Melas. By the time Suvorov arrived in Taverno, provisions for 12 days and 1,429 mules for its transportation, as well as for transporting 25 mountain guns that were in service with Suvorov’s group, should have already been prepared there. There was neither food nor mules in the Taverno on September 4th. Only 4 days later 650 mules arrived. Suvorov spent five days resolving issues related to the operation. Only on September 10 did the troops leave Taverno.

French units stood in the way of Suvorov’s army: the brigades of Guden and Loison. Guden's brigade (3.5 thousand people) occupied positions on the St. Gotthard Pass and in the Ursern Pass. In the Altdorf area there was Loison's brigade (4.8 thousand people). A very narrow path led to the pass from Italy, rising steeply from Airolo. Then the path crosses two mountain rivers, descends into tight, deep hollows and again climbs steeply up the mountain. Beyond the pass, the path runs along the right bank of the Reiss River, but it is blocked by huge cliffs that cut vertically into the river bed. A narrow and low hole, about 50 meters long, called the Urzern Hole, has been cut through the cliffs; barely one person gets through it. Coming out of the dark tunnel, the road curves around the mountain and descends steeply to the Devil's Bridge.

On the evening of September 10, Suvorov decides to attack St. Gotthard. One column (under the command of Derfelden) advances directly on St. Gotthard, the other (under the command of Rosenberg) - on Dissentis, bypassing St. Gotthard, with the aim of attacking the French from the rear. At the same time, Suvorov ordered the 3,000-strong detachment of the Austrian general Aufenbach located in Dissentis to go on the offensive towards Amsteg.

Without waiting for Rosenberg to bypass, in the early morning of September 13, Suvorov led his troops in a frontal assault on St. Gotthard. The offensive was led by the main forces of Derfelden's corps - the divisions of Povalo-Shveikovsky and Förster, and Bagration's detachment was supposed to bypass the French positions. At about two o'clock in the afternoon the vanguard of the Russian troops reached the village of Airolo. The French posts stationed there withdrew north of the village where their battalion was located.

Two frontal attacks by the divisions of Povalo-Shveikovsky and Förster were repulsed by the enemy, who only retreated to the top of St. Gotthard, occupying even more strong position. Hiding in ravines and hiding behind rocks, the French targeted Suvorov's soldiers climbing the steep slopes. By 4 o'clock in the afternoon the mountains began to be covered with night darkness. It was impossible to remain in such an uncertain situation overnight. Suvorov gave the order to storm St. Gotthard. It was then that Bagration’s detachment appeared: having climbed high rocky cliffs, his soldiers went around the left flank of the French and struck it simultaneously with a frontal attack. The enemy hastily retreated. Saint Gotthard fell into Russian hands.

Rosenberg’s detachment also operated successfully. On the same day, September 13 (24), he went towards the village of Urzern. First, Russian units attacked Mount Crispalt, where two French battalions were defending, and drove them out of there. These battalions withdrew to Ursern and, together with Lekurb's units stationed there, entrenched themselves at the foot of Mount Altkirch. And Rosenberg’s detachment came to its top. In the evening thick fog fell into the valley. Taking advantage of this, Rosenberg's detachment quietly approached the enemy, fired a rifle volley, and then launched a bayonet attack. The French could not stand it and retreated in disorder.

It seemed that now the road to Lake Lucerne had opened for Suvorov. However, he was ahead of him by the French division commander Lecourbe. Having dropped artillery into the Reiss River, he moved through the Berzberg ridge, crossed mountains 2.4 km high without roads, and by the morning of September 14 he descended to the village of Geschenen, north of Urzern. Suvorov's path was again blocked.

Suvorov on St. Gotthard. Artist A.I. Charlemagne.

At the same time, Suvorov’s army set out from Urzern in the direction of Altdorf. At a distance of one mile from Urzern there is the already mentioned Urzern hole. The path, winding around the mountain, ended on the bank of the Reissa. Its waters rushed in a powerful foamy stream, filling the surrounding area with its roar. A stone single-arch bridge called the Devil's Bridge was thrown across the river at an altitude of 23 m, 400 m from the Urzern Hole.

French divisional general K.Zh. Lekurb.

Suvorov's crossing of the Devil's Bridge. Artist A.E. Kotzebue.

Lekurbe placed a detachment at the exit from the Urzern hole, placing a cannon in the tunnel, and placed two battalions behind the Devil's Bridge. Hiding behind the stones, they could keep a close eye on the narrow path and the arch of the bridge.

When the vanguard of the Russian troops under the command of Miloradovich entered the Urzern hole, it was met with heavy fire from grapeshot and bullets. Suvorov decided to bypass the French position on both sides. 300 soldiers and officers under the command of Colonel I. Trubnikov climbed along rocky paths to a great height and from there struck behind enemy lines at the exit from the Urzern hole. At the same time, 200 rangers under the command of Lieutenant Trevogin crossed the ford of Reiss. Another battalion joined them.

From Altdorf to Rossstock. Artist A.N. Popov.

The French began to retreat. Miloradovich immediately resumed the attack through the Urzern hole, broke through it and, together with Trubnikov’s fighters descending from above, began to pursue the retreating enemy. He went behind the Devil's Bridge and began to destroy it. A small gap has formed. The bridge was under fire from the French, but the Russians began to cross it. Having found several logs, they tied them with officer scarves and threw them over the gap. By 4 o'clock in the afternoon the entire army had crossed the Reissa and was on the heels of the French retreating to Altdorf.

On September 15, a battle took place near Altdorf with two French brigades - Guden and Loison. Despite desperate resistance, the enemy was driven out of their positions and retreated to the western bank of the Reissa. Thus, in six days, from September 10 to 15, having marched 100 km from Taverno to Altdorf, Suvorov’s army crossed the Reiss River in difficult conditions and drove the French out of Altdorf. This was a fantastic pace for conducting military operations in mountainous conditions for that era.

Alexander Vasilyevich himself was very ill at that time. He was tormented by a severe cough, fever, and extreme weakness took over his body. However, he continued to lead the troops. Then the “news” hit him: it turned out that there was no land road along the shores of Lake Lucerne, and there were no ships for crossing either. Meanwhile, time was running out: Suvorov was already a day late for the planned formation of allied forces in Schwyz. He feared that Massena would have time to defeat the corps of Rimsky-Korsakov and Gotze. If Suvorov had known that Massena had already defeated these groups, he would probably have found some other way out of such difficult circumstances. But there had been no news of this yet, and the field marshal decided to make his way to Schwyz. He moved his troops through the Rosstock mountain range.

The historic transition of Russian troops through Rosshtok began on the morning of September 19. Bagration's detachment was in the vanguard. It was followed by Derfelden's corps and Aufenberg's brigade. Rosenberg's corps brought up the rear, covering the movement from the rear. The road turned out to be incredibly difficult. The path climbed steeper and steeper, and sometimes disappeared completely. The soldiers moved one by one, sometimes on bare stones, sometimes on slippery clay. I also had to walk through the snow, falling through my knees. And what was it like to lead mules and horses loaded with guns, charges and other cargo! Animals often fell off the path, flew down and crashed, sometimes dragging people along with them. The descent from the top was just as difficult. Shortly before the crossing, it rained here, the ground became extremely viscous and slippery, and in a number of cases it was necessary not to walk, but to slide down the steep slopes.

The distance between Altdorf and the Mutten Valley is 16 versts. After 12 hours of marching, at 5 pm on September 17, Suvorov entered the valley. In the village of Mutten there was a French detachment of 150 people. Bagration's detachment surrounded him on three sides and attacked. The French were forced to surrender.

Suvorov sent reconnaissance from Mutten, which brought him a message about the defeat of Rimsky-Korsakov's corps by troops under the command of Massena on the Limmat River near Zurich. Almost simultaneously, Soult's division from Massena's army completely defeated Gotze's Austrian detachment, and Gotze himself was killed.

As a result, by the time Suvorov appeared in the Mutten Valley of Switzerland, there was not a single Allied army left capable of providing the Russians with any assistance. And their situation was bleak. There was almost no food, no ammunition either; the weather was cold. There were 22 thousand hungry and exhausted people in the ranks, against whom stood a well-fed, well-armed 80,000-strong French army. The death of the Russians seemed inevitable.

Exodus from Switzerland

Massena saw that extremely favorable circumstances had arisen for the destruction of Suvorov's army. It could have been surrounded in the Mutten Valley. Then the French commander-in-chief makes the following decision. One brigade from Mortier's division closes the exits from the Mutten Valley through the Rossstock Pass. Mortier's division (9.5 thousand people), Humbert's brigade (3.5 thousand) and one brigade from Lekurba's division - a total of 16 thousand people - attack Suvorov from the flanks from Schwyz. Finally, Molitor's brigade and Soult's division concentrate in the Molis-Glaris area in order to close the only escape route for the Russians and hit them from the front.

Divisional General A. Massena.

On the evening of September 17, Suvorov convened a military council, at which he described the current situation and set the task of getting out of the encirclement. His decision was this. Having covered the retreat with a strong rearguard from the side of Schwyz, go with the main forces to Glaris, where, possibly, the Austrian units of Linken and the defeated Gotze are located. Having discussed the details of the upcoming actions with the generals present, Suvorov finally accepts this plan. Rosenberg's corps (8 thousand people) covers the retreat of the main forces to Glaris. He can begin his withdrawal only on the orders of Suvorov. The main forces, including Aufenbach's detachment (total strength - 16 thousand people), retreat to Glaris and further, depending on the situation.

Battle in the Mutten Valley. Fragment of a painting by artist A.E. Kotzebue.

The transition of Russian troops through the Paniks ridge. Artist A.E. Kotzebue.

On the morning of September 18, the planned operation began. Bagration's vanguard, consisting of 3 thousand people, set out from the Mutten Valley. Having passed the pass, he encountered the troops of Molitor (11 thousand people) moving towards Mutten. For two days there was heavy fighting near the village of Näfels. On the second day, Povalo-Shveikovsky’s division came to the aid of Bagration. Together, both units launched a decisive attack and drove the enemy north of Schwyz. Thus, on September 20, the main Russian forces were able to concentrate at Glaris.

A.B. Suvorov. Painting by an unknown artist of the 19th century.

Rosenberg's rearguard also coped with its task brilliantly. In the Mutten Valley he was attacked by a 15,000-strong group of French troops under the command of Massena himself. Fierce fighting raged for two days, and the Russian detachment not only repelled all enemy attacks, but also managed to push him back to the north. After this, Suvorov ordered Rosenberg to join the main forces. On the morning of September 23, the rearguard joined them at Glaris.

On the night of September 24 (October 5), Suvorov's troops began to retreat from Glaris to Illanz along a narrow mountain road. The path lay through the Panike ridge and was free from enemy troops. The transition took place under very difficult conditions. Deep snow covered the road and frost struck. People did not have the opportunity to dry themselves and warm up, and their damp clothes froze. Miloradovich's vanguard was the first to overcome the pass. By the evening of September 25, the remaining troops only reached the top. There we spent the night in incredibly difficult conditions. In the morning we began to descend from the ridge, the slopes of which were covered with an ice crust. Suvorov shared with his subordinates all the difficulties of the transition.

The French tried to pursue Russian troops with a 5,000-strong detachment. But Bagration’s 2,000-strong vanguard repulsed all enemy attacks and gave the main forces the opportunity to retreat, driving him back with a bayonet attack to Glaris. After this, Massena stopped trying to pursue Russian troops.

On September 26, Suvorov’s army approached Illanets, where they stopped to rest. On October 1, passing through the Rhine valley, she approached Feldkirch, in the vicinity of which she camped. Thus ended the Swiss campaign of Field Marshal Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov and his miracle heroes.

On October 29, 1799, Suvorov received a rescript from Paul I, which announced the severance of the alliance with Austria and the cessation of hostilities against France. The document stated that the withdrawal of Archduke Charles's army from Switzerland was the reason for the defeat of Rimsky-Korsakov's corps. Suvorov was ordered to prepare troops to return to Russia. On January 14, 1800, Suvorov's army moved from Bohemia to Russia, where it arrived in the spring.

Results of the Swiss campaign

From the point of view of military science, the Swiss campaign of Russian troops under the command of Suvorov has several interesting features. First of all, most of the events took place in the most difficult conditions: 1) a battle with the enemy who occupied impregnable positions (St. Gotthard, Devil's Bridge); 2) the most difficult transition through the Rosstok Pass; 3) escape from encirclement in the Mutten Valley.

I admire the flexibility of the methods of warfare used by Suvorov: 1) bypassing and enveloping the enemy’s flanks (St. Gotthard); 2) crossing the Rossstock Pass after the defeat of the French at Altdorf; at the same time, the commander is not at all concerned about the presence of these defeated units in his rear; 3) the strongest rearguard in the Mutten Valley during the retreat to Glaris. In general, rearguard battles are very characteristic of Suvorov’s tactics. His rearguards used offensive actions even against superior numbers of the enemy, bypassing and enveloping his flanks and short pursuit. This explains the high efficiency of Suvorov’s rearguards.

Operating in the mountains, the Russian commander chose the shortest path to the enemy, regardless of any obstacles, and tried to hit him from the most unexpected side. The choice of direction of action on Schwyz corresponded to this principle: after passing through the “insurmountable” obstacle - the Rossstock mountain pass, inflicting an unexpected blow on the French in the flank and rear, combined with a blow in the center.

Finally, perhaps most importantly: the indomitable spirit, steely will and self-confidence, naturally characteristic of a brilliant commander, were transmitted to the Russian soldier and officer, making them invincible. This is the spirit of our nation, which we must cherish and manifest in our current affairs.

Briefly about the article: Suvorov's Swiss campaign is an article dedicated to the famous September campaign of the Russian army.

Steeper than the mountains

Swiss campaign of Suvorov

This is how it should be, the military explained. The army is, first of all, order and organization. It's all the more amazing that real war from the point of view of order and organization, it surprisingly resembles a brothel engulfed in fire.

Andrzej Sapkowski "Baptism by Fire"

At the end of the 19th century, near the Swiss village of Andermatt (which is not far from the Devil’s Bridge) a granite cross was erected with the inscription: “ To the valiant companions of Generalissimo Field Marshal Count Suvorov-Rymniksky, Prince of Italy, who died while crossing the Alps in 1799" Covering the opening of the monument, Swiss newspapers noted that even in their day - a full century after the campaign - the bodies of Russian soldiers are still sometimes found in glaciers.

The war is not over until the last soldier is buried, said Suvorov. Swiss shepherds talked for a long time about the ghost of a short man in a black cloak walking through the mountains and calling his army. Today, in September, on the threshold of the anniversary of this campaign, we will tell you about the Swiss campaign of the legendary Russian commander Suvorov.

Second anti-French coalition

In 1798, the aggressive policy of France led to the fact that Austria, England, the Kingdom of Naples, Russia and Turkey decided to jointly put an end to the pan-European threat. The Russian Empire could not lay claim to territorial acquisitions in the event of victory. But even then its most far-sighted politicians sensed the danger emanating from the republic.

One of these visionaries was Field Marshal Suvorov, who noted that Napoleon " walks wide" And he will either tear his pants or go all the way to the Vistula. After all, if Prussia and Austria, together with Russia, participated in the divisions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, then France traditionally supported the idea of Polish independence.

It may seem strange that a small France would inspire such concern in Russia. But at that time, France not only produced 2 times more weapons, but also surpassed Russia (without the extremely “unreliable” Poland) in population. In addition, a significant part of the empire’s subjects were semi-savage non-Slavic peoples, whose desire and ability to fight for the tsar gave rise to reasonable doubts.

Suvorov considered it necessary to defeat France before it destroyed Russia's potential allies. That is, its three ancient rivals and enemies: Austria, Prussia and Turkey. Emperor Paul I also accepted this point of view.

According to Suvorov's plan, the 100,000-strong Russian army was supposed to concentrate on the Rhine and, taking advantage of the scattered forces of the French on several fronts, move to Paris by the shortest route.

But Austria had the decisive voice in the coalition, sending twice as many troops to fight the French as the rest of the allies combined. The Austrians saw in this war only a favorable opportunity to seize the Italian states under the pretext of their liberation. Another tasty target for them was the French-occupied Netherlands, which was also once the possession of the Austrian Habsburgs.

According to the plan, “pushed through” by Austria, two Russian corps with a total number of 31 thousand people were transferred to the north of Italy. The fleet was supposed to attack Naples from the sea Ushakova. Rimsky-Korsakov's 24,000-strong corps was heading to Switzerland. Finally, another Russian corps of 17 thousand people was supposed to participate in a joint landing with the British in the Netherlands.

Field Marshal Suvorov was offered to lead the 117,000-strong group of allied forces in Italy. This was the condition of the Austrians. Essentially, the participation of Alexander Vasilyevich was considered by the allies as Russia’s main contribution to the common cause.

Paul I did not like Suvorov, but he also did not see a worthy replacement for him.

Napoleon, who had not yet become emperor, was absent from Italy at that time. But there were 92 thousand French troops there under the command of experienced and determined generals MacDonald and Moreau. Arriving in April, Suvorov inflicted three defeats on the French: on the Adda River, on the Trebbia and at Novi. Ushakov's landings and the uprising of the Italians completed the matter. By the beginning of August, the peninsula was almost completely cleared of occupiers. Moreau managed to hold only Genoa.

Curriculum Vitae

Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov was born in 1730 in the family of a major military leader, Chief General Vasily Suvorov. Already at the age of 12, he was enlisted in the Semenovsky regiment as a soldier, which, of course, was a pure formality. Until the age of 18, Suvorov studied at home, under the guidance of his father, and received the best military education of his time, which included exact sciences, ballistics, engineering, military history, strategy, and tactics. Mastered German, French, Italian languages. Later, during his service, he learned Polish, Turkish, Arabic, Farsi and Finnish.

In 1754, Suvorov was promoted to officer. Then there were Kunersdorf, Berlin, Kolberg, Orech, Landskrona, Stolovichi, Krakow, Turtukai, Girsovo, Kozludzh, Kinburn, Foksanakh, Rymnik, Izmail and Warsaw. Suvorov fought in Prussia, Poland, Turkey, and again in Poland. Suppressed the Pugachev rebellion. And I never knew defeat.

Swiss campaign

In Switzerland, things were also favorable for the Allies. After the arrival of Rimsky-Korsakov's corps, the Austrian commander Archduke Charles had 82 thousand soldiers there against the French general's 58 thousand Massena.

The prospects of war were already clearly visible to Suvorov. Having finished off Moreau, he intended to invade France from the south. Karl at the same time was supposed to put an end to Massena. The Allied armies could then unite at Lyon to advance on Paris.

And here thunder struck from a clear sky. Rescripts from the high command announced the emergence of a “new war plan.” According to him, Suvorov prohibited do something else against the French in Italy. With a corps of 20,000 he was to immediately proceed to Switzerland. Karl, without waiting for him, departed with the Austrian part of the army to the Netherlands.

The plan caused outrage not only among the Russians, but also among the Austrian officers. The Allies missed a very favorable situation and themselves turned it into an unfavorable one. After Charles' departure from Switzerland, Masséna would gain a more than twofold advantage against Rimsky-Korsakov, while Suvorov's army would still be on the march.

But the Austrian armchair strategists had their own ideas. They urgently needed to remove Suvorov from Italy. The Russian commander saw it as a springboard for an attack on France and in every possible way contributed to the creation of their armies by the Italian states. The Austrians viewed the peninsula as their trophy. They did not need an independent Piedmont.

Suvorov was not left any time to contact the emperor and explain the situation to him. By the time the dispatch reached St. Petersburg, Massena would probably have destroyed the Russian corps in Switzerland. Even despite the fact that Archduke Karl, outraged by the received order no less than Suvorov himself, partially sabotaged the “new plan”. Gotze's 22,000-strong corps was left to help Rimsky-Korsakov.

But Massena allocated only 18 thousand against Gotze. The remaining 40 could attack the Russians at any moment. Suvorov without hesitation moved to Switzerland along the shortest route. Pass Saint Gotthard led his army directly to the rear of the French.

According to Suvorov's plan, no later than September 26, his troops, as well as the corps of Rimsky-Korsakov and Gotze, were to attack the enemy from three sides.

Path through the Alps

Suvorov was going to march to Switzerland on September 8, 1799. But Moreau unexpectedly launched a sortie. Trying, in violation of the order, to still impose a final battle on the French, Suvorov wasted three days. Taking advantage of his troops' advantage in mobility, Moreau withdrew.

Suvorov lost another five days due to the sluggishness of the Austrians, who did not collect 3,000 mules by the required time to create a pack train. As a result, half of the mules had to be replaced with Cossack horses, and bags for luggage had to be collected from local population. Suvorov took only 25 mountain guns with him to Switzerland.

Only on September 21, Suvorov’s army, which now consisted only of Russian units, finally gathered for a campaign. Three days later she reached the pass. The French allocated a brigade of about 4.5 thousand people to cover St. Gotthard, but this was more than enough to defend an almost impregnable position.

By evening, Suvorov took the pass. Having attracted the enemy's attention with fierce frontal attacks, he sent a detachment under the command of the prince to go around the goat paths Bagration.

And the very next day the legendary battle for Devil's Bridge - an arch supposedly built by the Devil himself across a 25-meter gorge. But first we had to get to the bridge itself. The path to it ran through a 60-meter tunnel cut into the rock. Of course, the French occupied this natural fortress.

Assault on the Devil's Bridge.

Here too, Suvorov resorted to the tactics that had worked the day before: he launched a hopeless attack from the front to divert the enemy’s attention from the flanks, and he himself sent two detachments around. And it happened again: having passed through the mountains, the Russian musketeers attacked the French from the rear and captured the tunnel. The impression of the victory was somewhat blurred only by the fact that one of the regiments sent to bypass in full force disappeared to God knows where. No traces of him could be found.

When the Russians reached the bridge, it became clear that the French had managed to partially collapse the arch. Suvorov ordered one of the peasant houses to be dismantled and the span paved with logs. There were not enough ropes, and under hurricane fire from the enemy, the logs had to be tied together with soldiers' belts and officers' scarves.

After the partial restoration of the bridge, the real battle was to begin. Now Suvorov’s troops had to “seep” through the “eye of the needle” of the shaky and dangerous crossing under fire and attack the French on the other side of the gorge. Under such conditions, the enemy would constantly have an overwhelming numerical superiority.

And then something unexpected happened - by no one, including Suvorov himself. The French again heard in their rear the painfully familiar battle cry “Hey, your mother!" Which, as they already knew, translated from Russian meant “ Let's die for the king!».

This was the regiment that disappeared during the battle for the tunnel. Having moved around according to the principle “ a hundred miles is no detour for a mad dog", the musketeers got lost and, in some still unidentified, physically impossible way, reached the other side of the gorge.

The bridge was captured by an attack from both sides, and the next day - September 26 - the surface of Lake Lucerne began to sparkle in front of Suvorov. Only here did he learn that the road along the coast to Schwyz, along which the march was originally planned, existed only on the map. Instead of one day, it took his troops three whole days to go around the lake. In addition, overcoming the extremely difficult Kunzig-Kulm pass, the Russian army was stretched over several day marches. Suvorov's rearguard descended into the Muten Valley only on October 1.

The bullet is a fool, the bayonet is great

The tactics of the Napoleonic era consisted of a combination of rifle chains, which gradually wore down the enemy with shelling, and columns intended for a bayonet strike. Only when enemy cavalry appeared did the infantry reform into a square.

Considered a French invention, this tactic was used by all belligerents to reduce casualties from artillery fire. But unlike the Austrian commanders, who accepted it entirely, Suvorov continued to emphasize the bayonet strike. Wherever the terrain allowed, his soldiers had to resolutely, in tight formation, approach the enemy, using guns according to the principle “ pierce the first, shoot the second, bayonet the third with a karachun».

Suvorov's decision proved to be correct. The low accuracy and rate of fire of flintlock rifles made them unsuitable for small arms combat. By the time of the invasion of Russia, the French themselves had abandoned the tactics of rifle chains.

Retreat

The delay at Kunzig-Kulm no longer played a role. On the 25th, while Suvorov was storming the Devil's Bridge, Massena went on the offensive. By September 26, Rimsky-Korsakov and Gotze were completely defeated.

Suvorov learned about this only on September 29. On the same day it became known that all exits from the valley were blocked by the French. Having barely crossed the Alps, the Russian commander not only did not take Massena by surprise, but also found himself surrounded.

The decision to retreat was not easy for Suvorov. So far he has never backed down. " Dig my grave here!", he shouted to the soldiers.

But there was no time to lie in the grave. Clearly outnumbered, without supplies, without cavalry, and practically without artillery, his troops had no chance of success in the fight against the French. If not the campaign, then at least the army needed to be saved. The most difficult transition through the Alps, which seemed to be already behind us, was just beginning.

Time was against Suvorov. Massena hastily transferred forces for a decisive attack on his last enemy. On September 30, when the “tail” of the Russian army was just being drawn into the Muten Valley, its main forces had already begun to break through. The next day, Suvorov, who personally led the attack, shot down the enemy from the Pragel Pass.

Seeing that the enemy was slipping away, French troops poured into the valley. Retreating, Suvorov had to fight fierce rearguard battles. Already on October 2, repelling the attacks of enemy cavalry, the Russians used up all their ammunition. Then they launched a counter-offensive, defeated a 10,000-strong French detachment and took 1,200 prisoners, including Massena himself.

Having escaped from the encirclement, Suvorov's corps gathered in the Upper Linta valley. But fresh French divisions were rushing there along all the roads. Even after the defeat in the Muten Valley, the enemy retained a three-fold numerical superiority. Without ammunition, the Russians could not withstand a new battle.

On October 4, Suvorov decided to leave through the Panix Pass - despite the fact that the Swiss guides refused to go this way. The pass was impassable. The saddle was located above the line of eternal snow. There were no “goat trails” there. Only the glacier. In addition, a blizzard was raging in the mountain gorges.

The transition took 4 days. The guns had to be immediately thrown into the abyss. All the remaining supplies went there too. But even without them, horses and mules jumped off the icy cornice and flew away to places where it was better not to look. People also lost their temper. They say they fell silently: their screams could have awakened an avalanche. Suvorov was led all the way - almost carried - by the arms of two grenadiers.

On the ridge it became clear that the Swiss knew their mountains well. There really was no way down at all. The descent was a continuous ice cliff, dotted with cracks and black teeth of rocks.

Looking at the soaring at the bottom Orlov, Suvorov turned up the tails of his cloak and rolled down the slope. He got lucky. Many others do not. Surprisingly, the descent from the pass (which, unlike the ascent, took virtually no time) survived by several Russian horses. The last Italian mules died on the way to the ridge.

Even more amazing is that Suvorov managed to keep 1,400 French prisoners alive during this transition.

Results

On September 9, 14 thousand Russian soldiers - all that remained of Suvorov's army - reached Austrian warehouses in the town of Kura.

No... the 69-year-old fighter did not think it was all over. As soon as he left the glacier, he began to dictate a letter to Archduke Charles, setting out in it a plan for a joint attack on Massena. Suvorov was going scary take revenge on the Frenchman.

But Emperor Paul no longer wanted to deal with the Austrians. Russia left the war. The army remained to winter in Bavaria, and Suvorov was recalled and sent into retirement.

The king was dissatisfied with his commander, reproaching him for the three-day delay in leaving Italy. After all, it was precisely those three days during which Suvorov chased Moreau that ultimately were not enough to forestall Massena. The losses of only one Suvorov corps in the Swiss campaign were twice as high as all the Russian losses in the Italian campaign! And the result? Defeat!

Suvorov had previously aroused the wrath of rulers more than once. But only now the weight of fair accusations fell on his shoulders. The fact that delays caused by the Austrians' failure to supply mules and the state of Swiss roads could not be foreseen was no excuse for the commander. He had to foresee inevitability similar phenomena and have “option B” in case, as this certainly happens in war, everything will not go as planned.

Moreover, even in Italy, Suvorov understood that the campaign plan he had drawn up was doomed. Even in the best case scenario, his forces remained divided into three parts, which the enemy could defeat separately. And Suvorov himself with his corps appeared, perhaps, in the rear of the French, but without supplies, without communications, without the ability to advance in this labyrinth of ridges and gorges.

The plan was a gamble. It could only work if the enemy was lucky and completely incompetent. But in this situation he was the only one. The real reason The defeat was a politically motivated departure of Charles' main forces. After that, nothing could be done... Having written “ I was driven to Switzerland to be destroyed there", Suvorov rushed into the mountains in the desperate hope that the curve would somehow take him out.

I didn’t take it out.

French army

By the end of the 18th century, the French army was no longer a crowd of recruits under elected commanders, as it was in the first revolutionary years, but had not yet achieved the splendor that it acquired after the coronation of Napoleon. The French soldiers were battle-hardened and inspired by victories. They had new guns, and most importantly - young, talented and desperate generals.

On the other hand, the insufficient development of horse breeding in France led to the weakness of the French cavalry. The French also had three times fewer guns in relation to the number of soldiers than the Russians and Austrians. Artillery, in turn, was often transported on requisitioned peasant horses or even oxen.

To increase the mobility of troops, the French supplied supplies not from warehouses, but mainly through requisitions from the local population. The convoy was reduced due to the abandonment of tents. At night, the soldiers either occupied the houses of ordinary people or went to sleep in the open air. These innovations caused frequent uprisings in the territories occupied by the French, and later destroyed " great army"in Russian forests.

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A few months after his return, Suvorov died on his estate. And 12 years later his prediction came true. Even both predictions. Napoleon came to Russia, but he still tore his pants and had to be escorted home. The attack on Paris planned by Alexander Vasilyevich - albeit later, even if not according to his plan - nevertheless took place.

Alexander Suvorov's crossing of the Alps - a brilliant operation or historical myth? How did he prepare, what were his specifics? A few facts you might not know.

Bad plan

It is known that when preparing a very risky plan for crossing the Alps, Suvorov relied on the disposition prepared by the Austrian Colonel Weyruther. Theoretically, the ideas proposed by Weyreuther were very interesting and provided for the encirclement and destruction of French troops in Switzerland by the forces of three autonomously operating Allied groups.

But the plan, built without taking into account the specifics of military operations in the mountains and providing for the presence of a passive enemy, was erroneous from the very beginning.

Again, it was compiled using the staff method, without reconnaissance of the area and according to very conditional cards, where, as it later turned out, a number of roads existed only on paper. True, this lesson was of little use to anyone, and the author of the plan, Weyreuther, once again “distinguished himself” in 1805 in the field of Russian-Austrian military cooperation, preparing the disposition of the Battle of Austerlitz, which was notorious for the allies.

Along roads or cornices

Often, when they talk about military campaigns through the Alps, we are talking about heavy fighting in mountain warfare. In reality the mountains are relatively low. Even in the Roman era, excellent roads were laid there, along which trade and military communications between Rome and the provinces north of the Alps were carried out.

In the Middle Ages, there were many military campaigns across the Alps, from the time of Frederick Barbarossa to the Italian Wars between France and Spain. In the Alps there is even a so-called “road of the weak”, along which even a person who is not distinguished good health, can overcome mountains. But in conditions of hostilities, all good paths are often blocked by the enemy, and all that remains is the path along the “cornices” - narrow paths along the abyss. The minimum width of the “eaves” is 50 centimeters. If one person passes easily, then for an army with convoys, artillery and cavalry such a path is extremely difficult.

Only three commanders decided to cross the Alps along the “cornices”: Hannibal (218 BC), Napoleon (1796) and Suvorov (1799).

All three commanders achieved success, partly due to the fact that they chose an extremely risky path where the enemy did not have strong enough barriers.

Fight in the Muten Valley

On September 20, 1799, the largest battle of Russian troops took place during the entire Swiss campaign. The seven thousand strong Russian infantry detachment and Cossack units (where only half retained horses) were opposed by up to 11 thousand soldiers and officers of the French army. After several rifle salvoes, the Russian infantry overthrew the thick French chains with a bayonet attack. While the Cossacks surrounded the enemy from the flank.

In the short-lived battle, the French lost about 1 thousand killed and wounded and about 1,200 prisoners.

The battle in the Muten Valley was unique in many ways. Firstly, this is the only battle during Suvorov’s Italian and Swiss campaigns that took place on the plain. Secondly, the course of the battle itself was characteristic of Suvorov’s tactics, but took place without the direct participation of the Russian commander.

Mountain warfare tactics

During the five-day forced wait for the mules and food promised by the Austrians, Suvorov prepared the rules of mountain warfare, which became one of the first instructions for conducting military operations in the mountains.

If traditionally the commanders of the New Time tried to avoid clashes in the mountains, then Suvorov admitted the possibility of defeating the enemy in a mountain war.

Moreover, as in “The Science of Victory,” the main emphasis was on offensive actions in a new mountain environment both for the Russian troops as a whole and for Suvorov himself. In this case, Suvorov relied on both frontal pressure and flanking maneuvers. In practice, such actions often forced French military leaders, faced with the threat of encirclement, to leave advantageous and even considered impregnable positions. This was the case in the battles at St. Gotthard, on the Devil's Bridge. Considerable attention was also paid to the need to occupy key heights: “If the enemy hesitates to capture the heights of the mountains, then he must quickly climb onto them and attack the enemy from above with bayonets and shots.”

Victory or defeat

The action plan of the allied Russian-Austrian troops in 1799 in Switzerland completely failed. Of the three corps, two were defeated, and Suvorov’s troops, at the cost of considerable losses, managed to escape the trap. Nevertheless, crossing the Alps in conditions of numerical superiority of the enemy, lack of adequate supplies and in a constantly changing situation allows us to speak of success. In such conditions, there would be no shame in “begging pardon” and capitulating. It is no coincidence that all participants in the transition from the commander to the lower ranks were awarded.

Suvorov was promoted to generalissimo on October 28, 1799, becoming the fourth of five generalissimos in the Russian military history and the first to be awarded this rank in full accordance with the military regulations.

In a letter to Suvorov, Rostopchin noted: “Every single one of you has been awarded, all non-commissioned officers have been promoted to officers.” Later, the famous military theorist and Russian Minister of War Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin assessed the Swiss campaign as follows: “This unsuccessful campaign brought more honor to the Russian army than the most brilliant victory.”