Six Day War in the Soviet press. The Six-Day War and the USSR: "We are not going to start a world war"

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The Six Day War is a war in the Middle East between Israel on the one hand and Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Algeria on the other, which lasted from June 5 to June 10, 1967.

Previous events

The July Revolution of 1952 in Egypt overthrew the monarchy. A Revolutionary Command Council was formed, made up of the officers who carried out the coup. Soon, one of them, Gamal Abdel Nasser, became president of Egypt. A republic was proclaimed. Nasser wanted to consolidate the nation, to "export" the revolution to other Arab countries.

Reinforcements sent by Brigadier General Uzi Narkis to the commander of the central forces allowed him to launch an offensive with three brigades. The paratroopers of the units of Colonel Mordechai (Mota) Gur were the main ones in the operation. On the same day, they approached the walls of the Old City, where the Jordanian Brigadier General Ata Ali commanded the garrison.

June 6th Second day. The Israeli advance on was halted by strong and stubborn resistance. However, the encirclement of the city was completed - parts tank brigade captured in the north, another brigade occupied Latrun in the southwest. For the first time since 1947, the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road was open to Israeli traffic.

June 7th. Third day. Colonel Gur stormed the Old City. Around noon was captured, a little later -. Both sides accept the proposal of the UN Security Council for a ceasefire from 20:00.

Jenin-Nablus battle

June 5th First day. Israeli northern forces, led by Major General David Elazar, approximately amounted to two and a half brigades. By midnight, one division and a reinforced tank brigade were approaching Jenin.

June 7th. Third day. The Israelis, continuing the onslaught on, after a bloody battle, took possession of it. The heavily depleted Jordanian forces crossed the Jordan River, where they remained until the ceasefire.

Operations on the Syrian front

5 − 8 June. First - fourth day. held six Syrian brigades (with six in reserve) in the east of Quneitra. On the evening of June 5, Israeli Air Force strikes destroyed approximately two-thirds of the entire Syrian Air Force. For four days, artillery duels took place, the parties did not attempt to seize the initiative.

the 9th of June. Fifth day. Elazar was ordered to urgently launch an offensive early in the morning. He concentrated troops for an initial push through the Dan Banias region north of the Golan plateau, along the foot of the mountain. By nightfall, these forces had broken through the Syrian defenses, and three brigades reached the plateau early the next morning. At the same time, other units fought their way through the hills north of Lake Kinneret, and Elazar ordered the units that had recently fought in the Jenin-Nablus region to move north and hit the Golan Heights south of the lake.

June 10th. Sixth day. The Israelis broke through the Syrian defenses in the northern Golan Heights, then stepped up their frontal attack across the plateau to approach Quneitra from the north, west, and southwest. At the same time, a group of troops redeployed from the Jordanian front threatened Quneitra from the south. By evening, Quneitra was surrounded, and the armored unit entered the city.

The ceasefire went into effect at 19:30.

War at sea

There were no major naval battles during the war.

On June 8, 1967, the US Navy vessel "", which was engaged in electronic intelligence off the coast of the Sinai Peninsula (as stated - "unmarked") and entered the war zone, was attacked by Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats in the afternoon. The attack killed 34 and wounded 173 American sailors.

According to the Israeli side, the ship was "erroneously identified." According to other assumptions, the ship was attacked by the Israelis intentionally to prevent the United States from collecting information about military operations in the region, in particular, to prevent them from detecting the movement of Israeli troops in the Galilee in anticipation of the capture of the Golan Heights.

Israeli saboteur divers were sent to the harbors of Port Said and Alexandria, but failed to damage a single ship. 6 Israeli divers were captured in Alexandria and taken prisoner.

The losses of the belligerents

From the Israeli side. According to various sources, Israel lost 779 people in this war (according to the Israeli Foreign Ministry - 776 people). Of these, 338 died on the Sinai front, 300 on the Jordanian front (including 183 in the battle for Jerusalem) and 141 on the Syrian front, according to other sources, the total irretrievable losses amounted to 983 people.

From the Arab countries that took part in the hostilities

• Egypt - 11,500 dead (according to some estimates - up to 15 thousand), 20,000 wounded, 5,500 prisoners.
• Jordan - 696 dead, 421 injured, 2,000 missing.
• Syria - from 1000 to 2500 dead, 5000 wounded.
• Iraq - 10 dead, 30 injured.

The results of the war

In this war, Israel achieved a landslide victory in a matter of days, capturing the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. 1949 became the administrative border between Israel and the new territories.

On June 28, 1967, by order of the Israeli government, Israeli jurisdiction and the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem were extended to the Jordanian (eastern) sector of Jerusalem and the adjacent parts of the West Bank. Sources and politicians of the time disagreed whether this action constituted official annexation or not. The unequivocal formal annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel occurred on November 30, 1980, when it was passed declaring East Jerusalem to be Israel's sovereign territory and the entire city to be its "one and indivisible capital".

In total, Israel gained control of an area 3.5 times its pre-war area.

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Useful information

six day war
Hebrew מלחמת ששת הימים‎
translit. "Milhemet Sheshet ha-Yamim"
Arab. حرب الأيام الستة‎‎
translit. "Harb al-ayam as-sitta"
or Arab. حرب 1967‎‎
translit. "harb 1967"

Accusation by Egypt and Jordan of the US and Great Britain of hostilities on the side of Israel and its exposure

On June 6, in telephone conversations between King Hussein of Jordan and Nasser intercepted by Israel, Hussein agrees to support Egypt and accuse the US and UK of fighting on Israel's side. However, he quickly drops the accusation when the recording of their conversation becomes public on June 8.

Nevertheless, Nasser managed to bring this accusation in a letter on June 6 to A.N. Kosygin. The Egyptian and Jordanian media picked up this accusation, Syria also accused Australia of the same, mobs of Muslims attacked the US and British embassies in the Middle East and North Africa. Despite his exposure, this accusation is still alive in the Muslim world, including scientific historical publications.

Mutual accusations in executions of prisoners of war

During the Egyptians' erratic retreat from Sinai, Israel captured a huge number of prisoners (presumably over 20,000 people). For the most part, these prisoners, with the exception of the officers, were transported through the Suez Canal and sent home. Many Egyptians died of thirst, were injured, or went missing. About 5 thousand captured Egyptian officers, including generals, were exchanged for 10 captured Israelis.

In the mid-1990s, reports appeared in the Israeli and international press that Israeli soldiers had killed hundreds of unarmed Egyptians in the course of the war.

According to the Associated Press, military historian A. Yitzhaki said in an interview with the AP that in the course of several mass executions (during the war), the Israeli army killed about 1,000 prisoners of war in the Sinai Peninsula. According to him, on June 9-10, 1967, about 400 Egyptian and Palestinian prisoners were killed in the dunes near El Arish after two Israeli soldiers were mortally wounded by fire from their side: “The enraged Israeli soldiers got out of control of the officers and shot all the prisoners." In all, he spoke of 6-7 such cases, "usually provoked."

According to historian M. Pail, some of the participants in the shootings were convicted by an Israeli military court, but information about the courts was hidden by military censorship. According to historian W. Milstein, during the war there were many cases when Israeli soldiers killed prisoners of war after they raised their hands and surrendered.

A. Yitzhaki believed that the cases of mass executions were well known to the then Minister of Defense M. Dayan and the Chief of the General Staff I. Rabin.

In addition, he said that some of the soldiers involved in the executions were under the command of B. Ben-Eliezer (minister in 1995). Ben-Eliezer's spokeswoman said he was "not aware of any such killings." Prime Minister Rabin's secretariat later issued a statement condemning such killings and calling them isolated incidents.

G. Bron (Yediot Ahronot) personally observed how, by order of the Israeli "martial court", at least 10 prisoners were shot, who had previously been ordered to dig their own graves. Israeli soldiers (including Bron), who were watching the executions from afar, were ordered by officers at gunpoint to leave.

M. Bar-Zohar wrote that he personally observed the murder of 3 prisoners of war.

According to the New York Times, the Egyptian government reported in 1995 that it had found 2 burials at El Arish containing the remains of between 30 and 60 prisoners allegedly killed by Israeli soldiers. Deputy Foreign Minister E. Dayan, who arrived in Cairo, offered compensation to the families of the victims, saying that "in accordance with the law on a 20-year statute of limitations, Israel will not pursue those who could be responsible for these cases." The Israeli ambassador to Egypt, D. Sultan, was personally accused by the Egyptian newspaper Al Shaab of being responsible for the murder of 100 prisoners. The Israeli Foreign Ministry denied these accusations, while the ambassador was recalled from Egypt at his own request.

In 2007, after the Israeli TV channel 1 showed a documentary film by R. Edelist "Ruach Shaked" (about the Shaked battalion, then under the command of B. Ben-Eliezer), this topic was raised again. In particular, the film said that the Israelis shot 250 Egyptians in the Sinai Peninsula after the end of the Six-Day War, and did not transfer them to a prisoner of war camp. At the same time, most of the Egyptians were shot while chasing the retreating units of the Egyptian commandos. The screening of the film caused diplomatic complications between Israel and Egypt, and the Egyptian side demanded that those responsible be punished.

Ben-Eliezer accused the filmmakers of numerous inaccuracies, arguing that the dead were not Egyptian soldiers, but Palestinian militants trained by Egyptian intelligence, and who died not after surrendering, but during hostilities. Later, R. Edelist himself said that he confused the Egyptian prisoners of war with the Palestinian Fedayeen militants, and they were killed during the battle "during their retreat", and were not executed, but the Israelis used "excessive force".

UN monitors stationed in Egypt during the Six Day War also cast doubt on Egypt's claim that Israeli forces allegedly killed 250 Egyptian prisoners of war. Captain M. Zorc and Private M. Stosic (both from the former Yugoslavia) said that if a large number of POWs had been killed in the area, they would almost certainly have known about it. In addition, Zorch stated that he knew many local Egyptians, none of whom had ever mentioned any massacre in the area.

A number of sources attribute Egypt's reaction to the fact that Ben-Eliezer, as Minister of Infrastructures, tried to end Egypt's monopoly on natural gas supplies to Israel. Lawyer E. Gervits wrote:

• Israel's accusations of executing Egyptian prisoners of war during the Sinai campaign (1956), the Six-Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973) were first made by Israeli historians seeking media attention in this way. In 1994, a book by the historian Uri Milstein was published, in which allegations of this kind were made for the first time. In 1995, another study by the historian Aryeh Yitzhaki was published...
• As a result of such publications, a government commission, designed to test allegations of mass executions of Egyptian prisoners of war. She completed the work in early 1998. The commission's report noted that both sides, both Israelis and Egyptians, were guilty of killing prisoners of war.
• … the families of the Egyptian soldiers who died during the Six Day War filed a lawsuit in the Egyptian court of El Arish against the State of Israel and the then head of government, Ariel Sharon. They accused Israeli forces of torturing and executing 16,000 Egyptian prisoners of war, demanding $12 million in compensation. In January 2005, the court found the claim unproven.

In turn, the same historian A. Yitzhaki and Israeli soldiers who were in Egyptian captivity accused Egypt of mass executions of Israeli prisoners of war. Yitzhaki estimates the number of those executed at 100-120 people. According to Yitzhaki, "Israel behaves passively in everything that concerns propaganda and counter-propaganda" and "should attack, not defend."

The Egyptian Foreign Minister said that Israeli accusations of shooting prisoners of war are "complete nonsense" and "an attempt to gloss over the crimes committed against Egyptian prisoners of war."

Population displacement

Arabs

According to one of the new Israeli historians Benny Morris, during and immediately after the war, the West Bank r. Jordan left about a quarter of its Arab population (between 200,000 and 250,000 people). About 70,000 people left the Gaza Strip, and 80,000 to 100,000 people left the Golan Heights.

According to Morris, in the city of Qalqilya and villages southeast of Jerusalem, houses were destroyed by the Israelis "not in the course of battles, but as a punishment and with the aim of expelling the inhabitants, .... contrary to government policy." In Qalqilya about a third of the houses were destroyed. However, the residents of both districts were then allowed to return. There is evidence of cases where Israeli troops ordered the population to leave their homes and cross the Jordan River. From East Jerusalem, people were taken by Israeli buses to the Jordanian border, but according to Morris, there is no evidence that this was done under duress. When crossing the border, those leaving had to sign a document that they did it of their own free will.

After the war, the Israeli government announced that it would allow any refugees who wished to return. However, in practice, only 17,000 people out of 120,000 who expressed their desire were allowed to return.

According to Morris, taking advantage of the shock caused by the war, in Jerusalem on June 10, the Israeli authorities began the destruction of the so-called Muslim quarter of Mughrabi in the immediate vicinity of the Wailing Wall. In its place was created big square in front of this Jewish shrine.

At the same time, in a letter from the Israeli representative to the UN addressed to its Secretary-General in March 1968, it was indicated that during Jordanian control over this quarter, it turned into a slum, 2/3 of its area either belonged to Jews or was in public use. In April 1968, the Israeli government officially transferred the area in front of the Western Wall to public use, compensation was offered to private landowners (200 Jordanian dinars per family for Arabs).

In the Old City of Jerusalem, about 300 Arab families were evicted from their houses in the Jewish quarter, who settled in them after the expulsion of 1,500 Jews from the Old City by Transjordan during the 1948 war.

Jews in Islamic countries

In connection with the victory of Israel and the defeat of the Arabs, the Jewish minority, still living in the Arab countries, was immediately subjected to persecution and expulsion. As historian Michael Oren writes:

• “Crowds attacked Jewish neighborhoods in Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, burning synagogues and attacking Jews. As a result of the pogrom in Tripoli (Libya), 18 Jews were killed and 25 were injured, the survivors were herded into places of detention.
• "Of the 4,000 Jews of Egypt, 800 were arrested, including the chief rabbis of both Cairo and Alexandria, and their property was requisitioned by the state."
• "The ancient Jewish communities of Damascus and Baghdad were placed under house arrest, their leaders were arrested and fined."
• "In total, 7,000 Jews were expelled, many with only what they could carry in their hands."

Diplomatic consequences

9 June — A meeting of leaders of the ruling parties and governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia is held in Moscow.

On June 9, in his address to the nation, UAR President Nasser announced his resignation and accused the countries of the West that their air forces were secretly fighting on the side of Israel. After massive demonstrations in his support, Nasser remained in office.

June 10 - Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia break off diplomatic relations with Israel (Romania refrained from such a step, and the GDR did not have diplomatic relations with Israel).

June 17 - July 21 - the 5th emergency special session of the UN General Assembly, convened at the suggestion of the USSR, was held in New York. None of the three draft resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict has been adopted. According to A.A. Gromyko, the main reason for this was:

1) The categorical refusal of all Arab delegations to accept any wording calling for an end to the state of war between the Arabs and Israel.
2) A categorical refusal by the United States and the countries that support them to agree to a decision to withdraw troops without a simultaneous call by the Assembly to end the state of war.

Telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko in the Central Committee of the CPSU

On July 4 and 14, three resolutions were adopted on the protection of civilians and the status of Jerusalem. Formally, on July 21, the session was only interrupted, and officially closed on September 18.

November 22 - The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242, demanding "the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, which must include the application of both of the following principles: 1. the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the territories occupied during the recent conflict 2. the cessation of all claims or states of war and respect and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized frontiers, free from the threat or use of force.”

In various countries of the Arab world, mass demonstrations took place in support of Syria, Jordan and Egypt, in some cases there were riots and attacks on the offices of European and American companies.

One important thing this year historical event passed almost unnoticed by the world community - it was 50 years since Israel's victory in the six-day war. There have been publications in a number of foreign media. In Israel and in the countries of the Arab world, they tried not to advertise this date too much. The current military-political situation in the Middle East is not conducive to once again stirring up the memory of this armed conflict. The fragile truce between Jews and Arabs reached today continues to hold. Many in the world understand the real cost of the status quo that has developed in this region of the planet. Accordingly, this explains the attitude of the parties to the events of half a century ago.

The Six Day War is considered by many historians and military experts to be one of the most understudied military conflicts of our time. The experience of the Arab-Israeli confrontation in 1967 is still being studied. The reasons for the stunning success of the Israeli armed forces and the complete defeat of the Arab armies are being carefully studied. The course of hostilities and the results of the war completely contradict the established dogmas of tactics and strategy of warfare that prevailed at that time in the world.

Emphasis of the Arab-Israeli confrontation in 1967

After the last shots of World War II had died down, the Middle East for post-war world became the new powder keg. Religious and socio-political contradictions are closely intertwined in this region. The loss of Great Britain and France of the dominant position in the Arab world, the mass resettlement of Jews in Palestine, led to the aggravation of existing contradictions on religious grounds. The Arabs, having gained independence from their dominions, sought to build their own regional states. The Jews acted similarly, seeking to formalize their statehood. The Arab Middle East resembled a beehive in which two completely opposite and irreconcilable social and religious civil communities, Jews and Muslim Arabs, tried to fit.

Neither the Jews nor the Arabs were ready for a compromise in the socio-political structure. The proximity of the two worlds to each other only inflamed passions, which inevitably turned into an armed confrontation. An attempt under the auspices of the UN to offer the conflicting parties a plan for the formation of two states turned out to be untenable and failed. The first Arab-Israeli war of 1947-49, which resulted in the formation of the State of Israel in 1948, confirmed the irreconcilability of the positions of the Arabs with the Jews. The subsequent events only convinced the parties and the whole world of the inevitability of a military method of resolving conflict issues. It should be noted that the Arab-Israeli conflict could not be resolved either then or today. Even those successes that Israel achieved after the six-day war could not guarantee a peaceful existence for the country.

First came the Suez Crisis, in which Israel for the first time acted as an aggressor for the Arabs. Further, the Arabs acted as the initiators of military conflicts. The conflict that flared up in 1967 was supposed to be the revenge of the Arab world in the face of Western civilization. Israel was chosen as a convenient adversary, the victory over which could be another attempt to cut the "Gordian knot" that arose in the Middle East.

The situation in Egypt, a country that claims to be the leader of the Arab world, contributed to the growth of tension. After the end of the Suez crisis, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser made every effort to achieve a change in the borders that had developed after the first Arab-Israeli war. Receiving military and economic support from the USSR, Egypt by that time managed to recover from defeats and turned into a regional leader. King Hussein of Jordan and Syrian leader Salah Jadit echoed the tone of the Egyptian leader's policy, seeking to strengthen their positions in the region. The main ideology that united the Arab countries at that time was based on intransigence towards the existence of the Jewish state. The Six-Day War, often attributed to an irresolvable struggle of ideologies, was in fact just another armed attempt to expand spheres of influence and reshape existing borders.

In all directions, on the foreign policy and economic fronts, intensive preparations for a new armed conflict began. Each side pursued its own specific goals. For the Arabs, the main thing was to inflict a severe defeat on Israel, Israel sought to survive in the fight against the coalition of Arab countries. If Gamal Nasser sought to return the territories captured by Israel and his preparations for war may be partly justified, then Jordan and Syria, according to by and large, were involved in the conflict for ideological reasons.

Start of movement from a dead center

Egyptian President Gamal Nasser in May 1967 sent his troops to the Sinai Peninsula, capturing those positions that had previously been occupied by UN troops. The Strait of Tiran with the port of Aqaba, Israel's only outlet to the Red Sea, was blocked by the Egyptian Navy. The leader of Egypt managed to enlist the support of the Syrian authorities, who promised, in the event of an aggravation of the situation, to hit Israel from the north. It should be recognized that the state of the armed forces of Egypt and the power of the Syrian army gave the leaders of the Arab countries complete confidence in the correctness of their actions.

Israel, with its population of just over 3 million people, could not deploy equivalent military contingents immediately on the northern border against the Syrians and in the south, where the Egyptian army was armed to the teeth. In such circumstances, the strategic success of the Arab armies was guaranteed, but the outbreak of the six-day war showed in practice the fallacy of such a strategy. It is impossible not to say that the world silently slipped into another armed conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis. The Soviet Union, although it was an ally of the Arab countries, did not support the intensification of military preparations in the region. The Soviet leadership made it clear to the Arabs that if Israel were the aggressor, the USSR would support Egypt and other Arab countries in military and political terms. Otherwise, when the Arabs act as an aggressive side, the Soviet Union will remain on the sidelines. In Cairo, in Damascus and in Amman, such statements were taken as a "green light" for unwinding military hysteria in civil society.

The United States has taken a wait-and-see position in this regard. Openly and publicly condemning the aggressive preparations and the difficult military-political situation in the Middle East, the Americans secretly supported their ally. Israel was preparing to use a possible military escalation to expand its territory. The IDF command planned, as a result of quick and lightning strikes, to destroy the military potential of the Arab armies, to force the Arabs to abandon their expansionist goals for a long time. Britain and France acted as international arbitrators in an attempt to push plans for a peaceful resolution through the UN conflict situation. Despite this, there has been a movement out of the dead center in the region. The tension that the situation reached in May 1967 could not evaporate so easily. Both sides went too deep in their claims to each other, the degree of civil society was raised too high in both military camps. All this only pushed the opposing sides to an armed clash, which resulted in a six-day short-term and lightning war in 1967.

It has already been said that on May 14, 1967, the Egyptian army took up positions in the Sinai Peninsula, concentrating on the Israeli border. In addition to everything, Nasser announced mobilization in the country, which was already a serious reason for the outbreak of hostilities. The Syrians began to deploy armored units on the Golan Heights. Jordan, which joined the Syrians and Egyptians, also began mobilization in the country. The result of the preparation of the Arabs for war was the formation of a coalition of Arab countries. Algeria and Iraq joined the defensive alliance of Syria, Egypt and Jordan, sending their military contingents to the Middle East.

Forces with which the Arab countries and Israel went to war

The Six Day War is largely regarded by historians as an example of the modern "blitzkrieg". The Israelis were able to show in practice how to modern conditions an effective strategy of lightning war, where everything is decided by the concentration of force and speed of action. The prevailing strategic situation on the frontiers pushed them to this. The IDF was numerically inferior to the coalition forces, especially in the main strategic directions. The Israelis considered technical condition Egyptian and Syrian troops to deal with. Collectively, Arab forces outnumbered Israel in tanks and aircraft. The Egyptian and Syrian navies were also able to counter the Israeli navy. The presence of Iraqi troops in Jordan added weight to the Arab coalition.

The Egyptian and Syrian troops were armed with Soviet tanks T-62 and BTR 60. The air forces of both states had a large number of new Soviet fighters MIG-21 and Tu-16 bombers. Almost all the artillery of the anti-Israeli coalition was represented by Soviet-made guns. Israel could counter this whole armada with a few, but quite modern and mobile armed forces. The Israeli Air Force was equipped with French Mirage fighters. Army Aviation was represented by American AN-I "Hugh Cobra" helicopters, and tank units had fairly new Chieftain and American tanks M60.

From a technical point of view, the armed forces of both sides were quite modern. Another thing is how well the crews managed to master the new equipment and how competently the military command could use samples of modern weapons in the upcoming conflict. In terms of combat training, the IDF was significantly superior to the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria. The discipline and fighting efficiency in the Egyptian and Syrian troops was extremely low. The Jordanian army also did not differ in high morale and training. Units of the Iraqi army deserve special attention. The tank division of the Iraqi Armed Forces, stationed in Jordan, was considered the best unit of the coalition forces.

Didn't differ high level training and officers Egyptian army. The shortage of middle-level officers in combat units located on the front line was 25-35%. The headquarters of the Arab armies lacked specialists responsible for the tactical disposition and technical support of the troops. Gamal Nasser, aware of the serious shortcomings of the Egyptian armed forces, put his stake on the patriotic spirit of the military and technical equipment army. In the weakest of all the countries participating in the coalition, the Jordanian army, it was generally difficult to speak in any excellent style. The armed forces of King Hussein, despite the availability of new weapons, remained at the level of training at the post-war level.

For a complete understanding of the situation in which the six-day war began, you can familiarize yourself with the strength of the troops of the warring parties:

• the army of Egypt, Syria and Jordan together numbered 435 thousand soldiers and officers;
• the contingents of Iraq and Algeria amounted to 115 thousand people;
• tanks and self-propelled guns in the armies of the Arab countries, there were 2.5 thousand vehicles;
• The air forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq totaled 957 aircraft of various types.

Against this armada, the IDF could put up only 250 thousand people, reduced to 31 brigades. The army was armed with 1120 tanks and self-propelled artillery guns. The Israeli Air Force had only 300 aircraft. In addition, the Egyptians and Syrians managed to create a 3-4-fold superiority in manpower and technology in the most important areas.

Why the six day war?

The armed conflict that broke out in the Middle East in June 1967 became known in history as the "six-day war" because:

• it took the Israeli armed forces only six days to defeat the main groupings of the Arab countries, concentrated in the main strategic directions;
• in six days, the Israelis managed not only to push back the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian troops from their positions, but also to capture much larger territories;
• six days of intense fighting went on at once on three fronts, in the Sinai, in the Golan Heights and on the West Bank of the Jordan River;
• in six days, the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian troops lost their entire military-technical potential, which ensures the subsequent conduct of hostilities.

A distinctive feature of the armed conflict of 1967 is that the attacking side turned out to be unprepared for counterattacks by the enemy. The Egyptian troops advanced into position, as well as Syrian army, in the three weeks preceding the firing phase of the conflict, lost their combat potential and offensive spirit. Israel, being in a deliberately losing position, was forced to attack first. The surprise factor played its role, allowing the IDF not only to deliver a preemptive strike to the enemy and destroy his strike groups, but also to seize the strategic initiative in their own hands.

The history of the fleeting six-day war in detail is replete with thousands of facts that indicate that Israel was ready for such a development of events. Having well-placed intelligence and competent commanders in the army units, the Israeli army delivered accurate and lightning strikes to its opponents. The whole bulky army machine of the Arab countries was not ready for such a rapid development of events. The Syrians in the first three days lost their tank forces in useless attacks. The Egyptian army, having lost its air cover, lost its stability and was forced to constantly retreat under the blows of a few IDF units.

Jordan, which was the least prepared for military action, resisted only in the Jerusalem area. In 2-3 days, the Israeli units managed not only to oust the Jordanian troops from the Holy City, but also to continue moving on the West Bank of the Jordan River. Iraqi tank division, considered an elite unit of the Arab armies, was defeated and dispersed by Israeli aircraft. The results of the six-day war impress not only historians, but also analysts. Many experts are still arguing about how a country that is inferior to the enemy in military potential managed to immediately achieve so much success.

The result of the armed confrontation was the withdrawal of Israel from the dense encirclement. Jordan was removed from the list of real competitors for a long time. Syria, which lost the Golan Heights, was bled dry. Israeli tanks were now within a day's march of Damascus and the Jordanian capital of Amman. On the Sinai front, the Israelis came to the shores Suez Canal, freeing Aqaba and the entire Gulf of Tiran from the blockade.

This war got its name because it lasted only six days: from Monday June 5 to Saturday June 10, 1967.

Six Day War in Sinai (Egyptian Front)

Among the Arab countries, the most powerful air force is all from the latest Soviet aircraft had Egypt. It possessed 45 Tu-16 medium bombers capable of attacking Israeli military and civilian targets. However, the Egyptian defense infrastructure was relatively weak, with no bunkers to protect their air force in the event of an attack.

On Monday, June 5, 1967, the Jews launched Operation Moked (Focus). At 7-45 in the morning, following over mediterranean sea at very low altitude to avoid radar, Israeli aircraft attacked Egypt. The timing of the attack was deliberately calculated: most of the Egyptian fighters and their pilots were already on the ground at that time after the first morning patrol. The Israelis appeared over enemy territory not from the east, from where it was natural to expect them, but from the north and west - having made a preliminary "hook" over the Mediterranean Sea.

Six Day War. Battle for the Sinai Peninsula. video film

All Israeli combat aircraft were involved in Operation Focus, with the exception of only 12 interceptors left to protect their own airspace. In 500 sorties, the Israelis destroyed 309 out of 340 Egyptian military aircraft. The success exceeded all expectations of the Israeli strategists who had long ago developed this plan. The losses of the Jews amounted to only 19 aircraft - and mainly for technical reasons. This gave the Israeli Air Force complete dominance in the skies for the duration of the Six Day War. It predetermined the complete victory of the Jews in it.

Egypt has long lived in conditions of censorship and propaganda. By the evening of the first day of the Six-Day War, the situation of the Egyptian troops had become catastrophic, but the local radio announced major victories and assured that the attacking Israeli planes had been shot down. The people were jubilant. In Cairo, crowds took to the streets to "celebrate the victory," which they thought had already been secured. The Israeli army was moving forward, and the Egyptian generals preferred to hide its defeat from President Nasser himself. In Israel, the radio broadcast only the announcement of the beginning of the war, without naming the winner. The only TV channel in Israel was Egyptian, and the Jewish population believed that their country was close to disaster.

Using air supremacy, the Israeli army attacked the Egyptian troops in the Sinai. Without air support, they lost the ability to resist. The senior officers could not even organize the retreat in order.

On June 8, the Israeli army completed the conquest of the entire Sinai. On the evening of the same day, Egypt accepted a ceasefire agreement.

Six Day War in the West Bank (Jordanian front).

Israel cut off the Jordanian King Hussein from sources of truthful information. Listening to the boastful statements of the Egyptian media, Hussein believed in Nasser's victory. The Jordanian army began shelling Israel from the east and on June 5 occupied the UN headquarters in Jerusalem.

Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, considering the ease with which his troops advanced in the Sinai, withdrew part of them to Jerusalem. Israeli aircraft destroyed the Jordanian Air Force. Until now, only the western part of Jerusalem was in the hands of the Jews, but on Wednesday, June 7, Israeli paratroopers surrounded and took control of the entire city and the entire West Bank of the Jordan River. According to the Jewish calendar, this date was designated as the 28th day of the month of Iyar 5727. Since then, it has been celebrated annually as "Jerusalem Day".

Generals Yitzhak Rabin, Moshe Dayan and Uzi Narkis in Jerusalem, 1967

Six Day War in the Golan Heights (Syrian Front)

Until Friday, June 9, 1967, fighting on the Israeli-Syrian border was limited to bombing. But on June 9, after intercepting a telegram that convinced him that the Soviet Union had no intention of intervening in the war, Moshe Dayan decided to quit Israeli army to conquer the Golan Heights, a very important strategic position for Israel. Syria was an ally of the Soviet Union, and the Israeli army had only a few hours of time - after that the USSR and the United States would inevitably force it into a ceasefire.

On June 9, the fighting went on with varying success: the Syrians lost their advanced positions by evening, but the Israeli advance remained shallow. However, on June 10, the Syrian headquarters, fearing an Israeli bypass through the Lebanese Bekaa Valley, ordered its troops to withdraw from the Golan Heights and build a defensive line around Damascus. The Israeli army rushed into the vacated space. There was such a stir among the Syrians that their radio at 8:45 a.m. announced the fall of Quneitra, although the first Israeli troops approached this city only after noon.

In the face of this development, Brezhnev threatened the United States with direct military intervention. The two superpowers imposed a ceasefire on Syria and Israel that went into effect on the evening of June 10, ending the Six Day War.

Six Day War at Sea

June 8, 1967 Israeli Navy attacked the USS Liberty, who was engaged in the collection of intelligence off the coast of the country. 34 crew members of this ship were killed. The Israeli government later stated that this very serious incident happened "by mistake." But, according to another version, the Liberty was attacked by the Israelis on purpose - in order to prevent the United States from detecting the transfer of Israeli troops to the Galilee in anticipation of the capture of the Golan Heights.

Israeli saboteur divers sent to the harbors of Port Said and Alexandria failed to damage a single ship there. In Alexandria, six of them were taken prisoner.

Israel before and after the Six Day War. Map. Captured the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Golan Heights

UN Security Council Resolution 242

Shortly after the end of the Six Day War United Nations Security Council adopted resolution No. 242 (dated November 22, 1967). She called for "the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East." The first of his principles in it was called "the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the territories occupied during the recent conflict." However, there was also mention of "recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each state in the area", which contradicted the views of the Arabs, who did not consider the very existence of Israel to be legitimate. IN further development of the Middle East conflict, each side sought to see in the controversial Resolution No. 242 a meaning that was beneficial only to itself.

). Israel was given international guarantees of freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran. Israel has repeatedly stated officially that it will consider the resumption of the blockade of the Strait as a pretext for war. The leaders of Egypt and the UN representatives interpreted the status of the UN troops differently. Egypt believed that the UN should withdraw troops from the Sinai at the first request of the Egyptian government, while general secretary UN D. Hammarskjöld argued that an agreement was reached between him and Egyptian President G. A. Nasser that if Egypt demands the withdrawal of UN troops, “the issue should be immediately referred to the General Assembly” for a final decision. In 1960, extremist nationalist sentiments intensified in the Arab countries under the influence of Nasser. On March 8, 1963, after the extremist wing of the left-nationalist Baath Party came to power in Syria, the situation on the Syrian-Israeli border, which had been tense before (for example, in 1957-62 Israel filed complaints with the UN 462 times because of violations by Syria of the terms of the truce), has become even more aggravated. The Syrian leadership sought to deprive Israel of part of the water resources. In 1964, when the construction of the all-Israeli water pipeline was being completed, Syria offered the Arab countries to start a war against Israel in order to prevent the completion of this project. At a meeting of the leaders of the Arab countries (Casablanca, January 1964), this plan was rejected, but it was decided to divert the sources of the Jordan - the Dan, Hermon (Banias), Snir (Hasbani) rivers - into a canal leading to a reservoir on the Yarmuk River in Jordan, which was to deprive Israel of most of the waters of the Jordan. Israel stated that all of this would lead to a sharp drop in the water level in Lake Kinneret, and it would view the implementation of this plan as a casus belli. The route of the canal under construction in 1965–66. Israel repeatedly subjected to shelling and bombing from the air. This forced the Syrians to halt construction, but Syria continued its provocations at the border. So, on August 15, 1966, Israeli police boats were attacked on the Kinneret, in response to this, two Syrian aircraft were shot down by Israeli fighters over the lake (for more details, see Syria). Terrorist actions against Israel were also carried out by Fatah militants (Palestine Liberation Organization; PLO), which was actively supported by Arab countries, especially Egypt.

November 4, 1966 Syria and Egypt entered into a military alliance. Attacks on Israel from Syria intensified. On April 7, 1967, Israeli aircraft shot down six enemy military aircraft in Syrian airspace. On May 10, the Chief of the General Staff of the Israeli Army, General I. Rabin, said that if the provocations did not stop, Israeli troops would attack Damascus and overthrow the regime of Syrian President N. Atasi.

Israel was opposed by a powerful coalition of countries with a significant superiority of the armed forces both in the number of soldiers and weapons, and in quality military equipment.

Tsagh al(Israel Defense Forces). The size of the Egyptian army was 240 thousand people, tanks - 1200, aircraft - 450; Syria - fifty thousand people, 400 tanks, 120 aircraft; Iraq - seventy thousand people, 400 tanks, 200 aircraft. Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Arab countries declared their readiness to provide military contingents for the war with Israel. After the mobilization of Tsakh ala, Israel numbered 264 thousand people, 800 tanks, 300 aircraft. The main threat to Israel was from the Sinai strike force Egyptian troops, numbering about a hundred thousand people and more than 800 tanks (mostly Soviet-made). The government and people of Israel understood what terrible threat hung over the country. On May 20, the reservists were mobilized. Israel hoped that the United States of America, England (see Great Britain), France, as guarantors of the freedom of navigation of Israeli ships in the Strait of Tiran, would be able to achieve the lifting of the Egyptian blockade. On May 23, US President L. Johnson declared that the blockade was an illegal act and that the United States was determined to guarantee the territorial integrity of all countries in the Middle East. England put her warships in the Mediterranean on alert. Britain and the United States declared that the strait should be opened to international navigation and that "possible military action should not be ruled out." But the trip of Israeli Foreign Minister A. Even to the United States, England and France showed Israel that the state can only rely on itself. Thus, French President Charles de Gaulle demanded in an ultimatum that Israel not be the first to start hostilities. The leaders of England and the United States, expressing support for Israel, talked about the need to send an international squadron to open the Strait of Tiran, but did not take on any specific obligations.

The threat of war, the isolation of Israel in the international arena increased tension in the country. Representatives of various political forces demanded to expand the ruling coalition (see State of Israel. Political life, parties) and introduce M. Dayan and D. Ben-Gurion into the government. This was especially insisted on by the Rafi party, headed by D. Ben-Gurion and Sh. Peres, as well as the Gahal bloc (as part of Herut and the United Liberal Party / see Liberal Party in Israel /) headed by M. Begin. On June 1, M. Dayan entered the government as minister of defense and M. Begin, minister without portfolio, on June 4, I. Sapir (see Sapir, family) - minister without portfolio. On the same day, the government decided to attack the Egyptian army in the Sinai Peninsula. To make the Israeli strike unexpected for the enemy, the command carried out a number of measures: on June 3, thousands of Israeli soldiers received leave. Photos of Israeli soldiers relaxing on the beaches went around the press all over the world, and M. Dayan said: "The government, even before I joined it, turned to diplomacy, we must give it a chance."

air strike. The offensive began on Monday, June 5, with an attack by Israeli Air Force aircraft on Egyptian military airfields. Israeli intelligence has established that the most convenient time for an attack is 7 hours 45 minutes (favorable meteorological conditions: fog is dissipating; Egyptian pilots are only heading for aircraft, there is not a single fighter on duty in the air). Israeli planes were flying very low and were not seen by either Soviet radar (on military vessels) or Egyptian ones. Air Force Israel, with a relatively small number of aircraft, during the first three hours of hostilities attacked ten Egyptian military airfields without interruption. This became possible thanks to the high professionalism of the Israeli pilots and the well-coordinated work of the Air Force ground services. The sortie, including the return, refueling and inspection of the aircraft, took the Israelis 57 minutes, while the Egyptians needed about two hours. Israeli planes made several runs over the target, trying to achieve a more accurate hit. As a result, during the first hours of the war, Egyptian aviation, as a serious combat force capable of supporting ground forces, ceased to exist. By the end of the second day of the war, Egyptian aviation had lost 309 aircraft and helicopters, including all 30 Tu-16 long-range bombers.

On the same day, Syrian aircraft attacked an Israeli military airfield near Megiddo, where they destroyed several models, then Israeli aircraft attacked Syrian airfields. By the end of the first day of the war, 60 Syrian aircraft had been destroyed. Jordanian planes attacked the Israeli air base in Kfar Sirkin, destroying a transport plane. The Israelis attacked Jordanian air bases and by the end of the second day of the war, Jordan had lost 40 aircraft. Despite the fact that Egyptian aviation had aircraft that were superior to Israeli aircraft in terms of their technical and tactical indicators, 50 Egyptian MIGs were shot down in air battles; Israel has not lost a single Mirage. The brilliant victory of the Israeli Air Force predetermined the outcome of the war.

The first day of fighting on land. Three Israeli divisions under the command of Generals I. Tal (1924-2010), A. Ioffe (1913-83), A. Sharon attacked the Egyptian army in Sinai.

At 8 o'clock, the 15th division of General I. Tal launched an offensive in the north of Sinai to Khan Yunis, where the soldiers of the 20th Palestinian division, which was part of the Egyptian army, held the line of defense. After a heavy battle, during which 35 Israeli tank commanders were killed, the Palestinian front was broken and Israeli troops advanced on Rafah (Rafah) and El Arish. The offensive had to be carried out, overcoming active Egyptian resistance, storming numerous fortified positions. During the fighting near Rafah, one of the Israeli battalions was surrounded and for several hours repulsed the attacks of an entire Egyptian brigade until help arrived. By the end of the first day of the war, the Egyptian 7th division, which was defending Rafah-el-Arish, was defeated. On the night of June 5-6, the last centers of the Egyptian defense in the El-Arish area were suppressed.

The division of A. Ioffe, much south of the place of operations of the division of General I. Tal, launched an offensive through the dunes to the Egyptian fortified position at Bir-Lahfan. The Israelis were advancing on a sector of the front where there were no fortified Egyptian positions. At 6 p.m., the Israelis occupied Bir Lahfan, cutting off the road along which the Egyptians could transfer reinforcements from the central sector of the front to El Arish. On the evening of June 5, the Egyptian tank and part of the motorized brigade were sent from Jabal Libni to El Arish. They ran into the division of A. Ioffe in the Bir-Lahfan area; the battle went on all night; Egyptian units suffered heavy losses and were forced to start a retreat.

The division of General A. Sharon at 9 o'clock in the morning began to advance in the southern sector of the front to the fortified Egyptian position of Abu Agheila. The fortification consisted of three concrete lines of trenches with tanks, anti-tank guns and mine fortifications between them. At 2245 hours, six artillery battalions opened fire on Egyptian positions, and an assault began half an hour later. The main role was played by tank units and a battalion of paratroopers. At 6 am on June 6, the last pockets of Egyptian resistance were crushed. Abu-Ageyla was completely occupied by A. Sharon's division.

L. Eshkol on the morning of June 5, shortly before the start of the Israeli air attack, sent a message to King Hussein through Canadian General O. Bull (the commander of the UN observers in the Jerusalem area): “We will not take any action against Jordan. But if Jordan starts hostilities, we will respond with all our might, and he [Hussein] will have to bear full responsibility.” Despite the warning, at 0830 hours on 5 June, the Jordanians opened fire along the border line in Jerusalem; At 11:30 a.m., fire was fired along the entire line of the Israeli-Jordanian border. On the morning of June 5, the commander of the Central Front U. Narkis (1925–97) asked I. Rabin to allow the troops of the front to attack a number of objects in Jerusalem and around the city, but was refused. At 1 pm Jordanian soldiers occupied the UN headquarters in Jerusalem, which was guarded by several Israeli policemen. Soon after a heavy battle, the residence was recaptured by the Israelis. To reinforce the Israeli troops in the Jerusalem area, a brigade of paratroopers was sent to the city under the command of M. Gur, which they planned to throw in the rear of the Egyptian troops, but due to the rapid advance of the Israeli troops on the Southern Front, it was decided to abandon this plan. At 2:30 am, Israeli artillery began shelling the main stronghold of the Jordanian troops in Jerusalem - Giv'at-h ha-Tahmoshet, which was dominated by the building of the former police school. The battle for Giv'at-h a-Tahmoshet was very difficult. The position was perfectly fortified, the Israeli command was not aware of the large number of bunkers in which there were Jordanian soldiers. During the fighting in Jerusalem, U. Narkis allowed the use of aviation, tanks, artillery in limited quantities in order to avoid civilian casualties and not damage the historical monuments of Jerusalem. Jordanian soldiers defended themselves with incredible tenacity, often engaging in hand-to-hand combat. The Israeli paratrooper brigade suffered heavy losses.

Israeli troops occupied a number of fortified points around Jerusalem to prevent the transfer of Jordanian reinforcements to the city. After a battle lasting several hours, a tank brigade took possession of the village of Beit Iksa between Ramallah (see Ramallah) and Jerusalem; a Jordanian armored unit en route to Jerusalem on June 6 at 6 a.m. was ambushed and suffered heavy losses. Jordanian armored and motorized units were practically unable to move due to the frequent bombing of Israeli aircraft. On the morning of June 6, paratroopers occupied Latrun, the Jordanian soldiers and Egyptian commandos defending the monastery withdrew without putting up resistance.

The second day of fighting on the Southern Front. The liberation of Jerusalem and the defeat of the Jordanian army. On the morning of June 6, one part of the division of General I. Tal launched an offensive to the north-west, towards the Suez Canal. The other part moved south, to the Jabal-Libni area, which they were supposed to take possession of together with the soldiers of General A. Ioffe. Jabal Libni was taken as a result of a joint attack by soldiers from two Israeli divisions. Another infantry brigade of I. Tal's division, reinforced by tank units and paratroopers, occupied Gaza by noon.

On the Central Front, Israeli troops continued operations to liberate Jerusalem and the West Bank of the Jordan River from Jordanian troops. Colonel U. Ben-Ari's tank brigade (1925–2009) launched an assault on Ramallah. At 7 pm the city was occupied by the Israelis. The troops of the Northern Front under the command of General D. El'azar on the same day launched an offensive on the western bank of the Jordan River. On the night of June 6-7, the troops of D. El'azar captured Jenin. The Israelis continued their offensive towards Nablus, misleading the Jordanian command about the direction of the strike. Before the arrival of Jordanian troops, Israeli units took up positions north of Shechem. An attempt by Jordanian soldiers to dislodge the Israelis from these positions was repulsed. On the night of June 7-8, Shechem passed into the hands of the Israelites.

The fighting in Jerusalem did not stop day or night. After the capture of Giv'at-x a-Tahmoshet, M. Gur's paratroopers continued their offensive. At 6 o'clock in the morning on Tuesday, the Ambassador Hotel was occupied, fighting began for the American Colony Hotel and the Rockefeller Museum. Israeli soldiers came under heavy fire from the walls of the Old City. At 10 am on June 6, the entire area around the walls of the Old City was occupied by the Israelis. But I. Rabin and M. Dayan did not give permission to start the assault on the Old City. It was ordered to take the heights that dominate Jerusalem. The paratroopers captured the Augusta Victoria Church and a number of other heights. At 5 o'clock in the morning on June 7, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General H. Bar-Lev, gave permission to U. Narkis to storm the Old City. At the same time, he stressed the need to hurry: “We are already being pressured to stop hostilities.” The Israeli command gave the order not to damage the holy places during the shelling of the walls of the Old City. At 9 am on June 7, paratroopers led by M. Gur broke into the Old Town through the gates of St. Stephen. A subdivision of the Jerusalem Brigade entered the Old City through the Garbage Gate. Before the start of the assault, M. Gur addressed the soldiers: “We will be the first to enter it. Israel is waiting. This is a historic moment." Heavy fighting took place on the Temple Mount, where several dozen soldiers were holed up in the Mosque of Omar, who met the paratroopers with fire. At 2 pm M. Dayan, I. Rabin and U. Narkis went through the Old City to the Wailing Wall (see Western Wall).

By the evening of June 7, Israeli troops captured the entire territory of the western bank of the Jordan River. Israeli planes continuously bombed the Jordanian units, as a result of which the roads were blocked by broken military equipment and movement along them became impossible. The Jordanians were also forced to abandon many tanks and armored personnel carriers that ran out of fuel.

The Jordanian army offered more active resistance to the Israelis than the armies of Egypt and Syria. During the fighting with the Jordanian units, 180 Israeli soldiers were killed (most in Jerusalem).

Continued fighting on the southern front. The defeat of the Egyptian army. On the morning of June 6, Israeli troops on the Southern Front continued their offensive. The division of General I. Tal was to take the Egyptian fortified point of Bir al-Hamma, then take Bir-Gafgafa and block the Egyptian troops from retreating to the north, to Ismailia. The soldiers of General A. Ioffe were moving along the Southern road to the Mitla pass. They were supposed to block the only road for the retreat of the Egyptian vehicles. Parts of A. Sharon were to take Nakhl, storm the Mitla Pass and drive the Egyptian troops into a trap that A. Ioffe and I. Tal had prepared for them. The troops of General Tal took Bir al-Hamma. Leading the attack on Bir Gafgafa, the Israeli column was ambushed by Egyptian heavy tanks. Having lost several tanks, the Israelis broke through and blocked the road to Ismailia north of Bir Gafgafa. At 9 o'clock in the morning on Wednesday, the soldiers of A. Ioffe occupied Bir-Hasne. A. Ioffe described the actions of his soldiers: “We, like crazy, rushed into the passage between the mountains, called the Mitla pass ... It was ordered to surround the enemy forces and delay their retreat to the canal.” An advanced detachment was sent to the pass, consisting of two tank battalions. Under enemy fire, carrying on steel cables seven tanks that ran out of fuel, Israeli tanks took up positions on the pass.

The division of General A. Sharon, advancing from Abu Agheil to Nakhlu, came across Egyptian heavy tanks abandoned by soldiers. In the battles for Nakhl, the Egyptian troops suffered huge losses, about a thousand were killed (A. Sharon called the battle area "the valley of death").

The Egyptians were surrounded in the area of ​​the Mitla Pass; they were continuously bombed from the air and attacked with tanks from all directions; they sought to make their way to the canal in small groups or alone. Some units maintained their order of battle and tried to overcome Israeli ambushes. So, on Wednesday evening, the Egyptian brigade tried to break through in the area north of Bir Gafgafa. Egyptian troops came to her aid with tanks from Ismailia. Two Israeli infantry battalions light tanks they fought all night, repulsed the attacks and held out until reinforcements arrived.

Thousands of Egyptian vehicles, despite the frenzied bombardment, continued to advance towards the Mitla Pass, not knowing that it was in the hands of the Israelis. The Egyptians sought to break through at any cost; on Wednesday, June 7 at 10 pm, they managed to surround one of the brigades of General A. Ioffe at the pass. After a stubborn night battle, the Egyptian units were defeated. On Thursday, June 8, the divisions of A. Ioffe and I. Tal rushed to the canal. In the evening, the soldiers of I. Tal, during a heavy battle, during which about a hundred Israeli tanks were destroyed, went to the canal opposite Ismailia. On Friday at 2 pm A. Ioffe's soldiers came to the canal.

On the night of June 8-9, the Egyptian government agreed to a ceasefire. By this time, the 100,000th Egyptian army had been defeated. Thousands of Egyptian soldiers, without food or water, wandered towards the canal; there were about ten thousand killed, about five thousand prisoners (although the Israelis, as a rule, took only officers prisoner, and soldiers were often helped to get to the canal).

Fighting on the Syrian front. The Syrians began hostilities against Israel on land on June 6. The bulk of the Israeli troops operated in the south against Egypt and Jordan; the Syrians concentrated 11 brigades on the border, but did not attack Israeli positions, limiting themselves to shelling Israeli settlements. On June 7 and 8, Israeli troops operating against Jordan began to move towards the border with Syria. The Syrian troops, occupying the dominant heights, have created a powerful line of fortifications in the 19 years since the end of the War of Independence. The commander of one of the Israeli divisions, General E. Peled (born in 1927) recalled: “These fortifications went more than ten miles in depth. There were no so-called first, second and third lines of defense: only solid fortifications and firing positions row after row. 250 artillery pieces were placed in positions. Early in the morning on Thursday, June 8, Israeli aircraft began to bomb the line of the Syrian defense. The bombing continued uninterrupted until the end of the fighting. Although the heaviest bombs used by the Israelis could not penetrate the lining of the bunkers, the bombardment damaged the morale of the Syrian soldiers, and many of them fled the bunkers.

On Friday, June 9, at 11:30 am, Israeli troops went on the offensive. The Israeli command was in a hurry to defeat the Syrians before the ceasefire agreement came into force. Israeli soldiers delivered the main blows on the northern and southern sectors of the front. In the north, a group of troops went on the offensive, consisting of a tank brigade, parachute, motorized rifle units and sappers. The Israelis were advancing on one of the most impregnable positions, the Golan plateau. Under the fire of dug-in Syrian tanks, suffering heavy losses, the advanced Israeli detachment took up Syrian positions. Following this, the infantry units attacked Tel Azaziyat, Tel el-Fakhr, Bourges-Braville and, after a fierce battle, occupied them. The heaviest battle was at Tel el-Fakhr, where there was a strong defensive position. The fight lasted three hours and was fought, according to General D. El'azar, "with fists, knives and rifle butts."

At a time when the main group of Israeli troops went on the offensive, an auxiliary strike was launched in the area of ​​​​Gonen and Ashmura, on central section Syrian front. In the direction of the main attack, the Israeli tank group launched an attack on the city of Quneitra, the main point of the Syrian defense. The Golani Brigade stormed another stronghold, Banias. On Saturday at 13:00 the Israelis surrounded Quneitra, at 14:30 it was taken.

At dawn on June 10, Israeli troops under the command of General E. Peled launched an offensive in the southern sector of the front. Israeli commandos were landed in the rear of the Syrians. Syrian troops were defeated. On Saturday, at 7:30 pm, after a repeated call from the UN Security Council, the parties agreed to a ceasefire. On June 10, Israeli troops occupied the western and southern parts of the Hermon mountain range. During the fighting, nine Syrian brigades were defeated (two brigades did not take part in the battles and were withdrawn to Damascus), more than a thousand soldiers were killed, and a huge amount of military equipment was captured. The road to Damascus was open. General D. El'azar stated: "I think it would take us 36 hours to enter this city." Israeli losses amounted to 115 people killed.

Attitudes towards the Six-Day War of governments and public opinion various countries of the world. Results of the Six Day War. The outbreak of hostilities caused a controversial reaction in the world. The position most hostile to Israel was taken by the Arab countries and the Soviet Union, although the statements of Soviet officials were restrained, since the Soviet leadership, misled by H. Nasser's false statements about the victories of the Egyptian army, had no real idea of ​​what was actually happening. But already on the first day of the war, the Soviet media accused Israel of aggression against Egypt, and TASS announced that the Soviet government "reserves the right to take any action that the situation may require." Nevertheless, on June 5, Chairman of the Council of Ministers A. Kosygin sent a telegram to US President L. Johnson stating that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the Arab-Israeli conflict if the United States did not interfere either. As soon as Soviet leaders received objective information about the course of hostilities, they sharply tightened their anti-Israeli position. On June 7, the Soviet representative on the Security Council proposed a ceasefire resolution at 8 p.m. and stated that the Soviet Union would break off diplomatic relations with Israel if it refused to comply with the terms of the resolution. This proposal was rejected by the Arab countries. The Soviet Union made sharp anti-Israeli statements, threatening to intervene in the course of hostilities. The movement of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean Sea towards the conflict area was observed, in a number of southern military districts, the transfer of military formations to airports and ports. Readiness number one was announced in some landing units. On the evening of June 8, speaking in the Security Council, the Soviet representative K. Fedorenko stated: "Israel is responsible for the crimes committed and must be punished with all severity." On June 10, the Soviet Union severed diplomatic relations with Israel. Soviet representatives submitted a number of proposals to the UN Security Council in which Israel was called the aggressor, but these proposals were rejected by a majority of votes. In July 1967, speaking at a UN session, A. Kosygin compared the actions of the Israeli military against the Arab population with the actions of Wehrmacht soldiers. From August 1967, a steady stream of weapons from the Soviet Union went into Egypt and Syria, including latest samples Soviet tanks, planes, missiles. These receipts not only compensated for the losses of the Arab countries, but made them more powerful in terms of quantity and quality of weapons than before the Six-Day War.

On June 5, 11 Arab countries declared their solidarity with Egypt. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia provided colossal financial assistance to Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The Arab countries announced that they were sending military contingents to the front, but these troops were never sent to Egypt, Syria, Jordan. In various Arab countries, the representations of England and the USA were crushed; Jewish pogroms took place in Tunisia, Libya, Syria and some other countries. Saudi Arabia, Libya, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates temporarily stopped selling oil to England and the United States. Despite the appeal of the Israeli government to the Arab countries for the immediate start of peace negotiations, Arab leaders at a conference in Khartoum said a triple "no" to the Israeli proposal: "... there will be no peace with Israel, there will be no recognition of Israel, there will be no negotiations with Israel ". The Arab countries supported the terrorist struggle of the PLO against Israel.

After the outbreak of the war, French President Charles de Gaulle took a sharply anti-Israeli position, despite the active support of Israel by wide sections of the French public and various political forces. In 1968, France imposed an arms embargo on Israel.

Since the beginning of the conflict, Jews around the world have expressed solidarity with Israel. The Jews of the West provided Israel with great financial assistance, thousands of Jews turned to Israeli embassies with a request to help them get to the front. The victory of the Israeli army contributed to the awakening of national consciousness among many Soviet Jews and the emergence of a Jewish national movement in Soviet Union.

The high morale of the Israeli army, the excellent training of soldiers and officers, the talented leadership of military operations of the highest command staff under the command of I. Rabin and M. Dayan, complete air supremacy, achieved already in the first hours of the war, were the key to Israeli victory.

Israel won one of the greatest victories in its history in the Six Day War. The armies of three Arab countries were defeated, which lost more than fifteen thousand killed, about six thousand soldiers and officers were taken prisoner. Israel lost 777 people killed.

As a result of the Six Day War, united Jerusalem became the capital of Israel, and the Golan Heights, which were of strategic importance, were annexed to Israel. Sinai and the West Bank of the Jordan River came under Israeli control, which subsequently made it possible to negotiate and conclude a peace treaty with Egypt (in 1979) and to accept a peace agreement between Israel and the PLO (in 1993).

On June 10, 1967, the Six Day War ended. In just six days of hostilities, the Israeli army managed to inflict serious damage on the troops of the Arab coalition and occupy territories three times the size of Israel itself. The reasons that led to the war are still being debated. Moreover, despite the transience, this war had far-reaching consequences, changing the balance of power in the Middle East.

The United States has traditionally provided significant financial assistance to Israel, and the USSR helped the Arab countries with money and weapons. Therefore, the shadow of the superpowers loomed behind the countries fighting in that war. The United States and its allies have traditionally placed the blame for the start of the war on the USSR. In the Soviet Union, the war was traditionally blamed on "the American imperialist military" and "international Zionists". But these were rather ritual accusations, obligatory for that era. In reality, neither the US nor the USSR had a direct bearing on the start of the war. Moreover, both sought to keep their Middle Eastern protégés from taking too radical steps.

There is no one reason that served as a pretext for war. A whole range of factors played their role: long-standing enmity between states, political ambitions of individual national leaders, mutual suspicion and distrust, and finally, a sense of one's own invulnerability. Both sides were well aware that their powerful patrons would not allow a complete defeat and would intervene in one way or another when the situation became critical. That is, in any case, things will not come to unconditional surrender, no matter how the course of hostilities develops. This patronage from the superpowers led to the fact that all the participants in the conflict were not averse to waving their fists, relying on the help of "senior comrades." It was for this reason that the war took place so quickly, when it seemed that not all diplomatic means had yet been exhausted.

New Saladin

The President of Egypt at that time was Gamal Abdel Nasser. Although he was a believing Muslim, in political life he preferred a secular dictatorship. And he was also a pan-Arabist, i.e. staunch supporter of Arab unity. In Arab culture for many centuries, one of the most popular was the figure of Salah ad-Din (the Europeans called him Saladin). He was considered the embodiment of wisdom, courage and nobility. And he also managed to unite under his command a very significant part of the Arab lands. And crush the crusaders by recapturing Jerusalem from them.

Nasser, of course, would very much like to become a modern-day Saladin. And become at least an informal leader of the Arab world. And he did a lot for this. For example, he managed to convince Syria to join Egypt and create a joint United Arab Republic that lasted for several years. In some Arab countries, Nasser's admirers came to power, treating him with great respect.

Nasser knew how to make bright populist statements, in every possible way demonstrated his closeness to ordinary people and defended the idea of ​​justice. His speeches to thousands of people drove them into ecstasy. By the early 1960s, Nasser had become the most popular figure in the Arab countries, and pan-Arabism had become the dominant ideology among many Arabs.

As a unifying idea, Nasser chose the most obvious - hatred of the State of Israel in particular and Western imperialists, these new crusaders in general. The idea was obvious because since the emergence of this state in the late 40s, almost all Arab countries have been extremely hostile to it.

Significantly increased the popularity of Nasser in the Arab world, the Suez crisis, which became a kind of forerunner of the Six Day War. Egypt has been for a long time British colony, but after Nasser came to power, who carried out a coup, he managed to achieve the withdrawal of the British from the country and the closure of their military bases. Nasser conceived the ambitious Aswan Dam project and, to finance it, nationalized the Suez Canal, controlled by the British and French. After the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt, the British and French offered Israel to attack Egypt, and they themselves planned to regain control of the canal on the sly. Israel did not have to be persuaded for long, since Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships, which was clearly not the friendliest act.

In the end, everything went according to plan, Israel captured the Sinai, the British and French took control of the channel. However, their actions aroused indignation among both the USSR and the United States. It was a rare event in history cold war when the Soviet Union and America acted from the same positions. After their pressure and threats, the participants in the conflict retreated and returned everything as it was. And in Sinai, in agreement with the UN, peacekeeping forces were sent.

Although formally Egypt suffered a military defeat in this conflict, the attackers did not achieve their goals and eventually retreated. Nasser did not have much merit in this, nevertheless, his popularity in the Arab world increased sharply and he gained a reputation as a tamer of the "crusaders".

Preparations for a new war

However, by the mid-60s, Nasser's popularity began to decline. His reforms did not bring a serious change in the standard of living. The grandiose project of the Aswan dam also did not justify the hopes that were placed on it. The economic situation in Egypt was deteriorating. In addition, in other Arab countries, where Nasser did not control the media, skeptical voices were increasingly heard. Radical journalists and public figures continually accused him of ranting a lot, but doing little to solve the "Jewish question."

Little by little, Nasser began to become a hostage to the role he had taken on. At the same time, relations between Israel and Egypt at that time were, in general, normal and a new war was not expected. True, this could not be said about Syria and Jordan. Relations with Syria escalated to the limit in 1964. Back in the mid-50s, Israel began the creation of the All-Israel Water Pipeline, but part of its route ran through the demilitarized zones. After complaints from Syria to the UN, the project was closed. Instead, it was decided to take resources from the Sea of ​​Galilee. In 1964 the aqueduct was built.

After that, Syria, with the support of other Arab states, began the construction of a canal to divert water from the tributaries that fed the Jordan River. As the river empties into the lake, this diversion was supposed to drastically lower the lake's water level and derail an ambitious Israeli program to irrigate the arid south.

The Syrians started the construction of the canal three times. And every time there was a raid by Israeli aircraft, destroying equipment. All this, of course, worsened the already bad relations between the countries.

In 1965, by decision of the League of Arab States, the PLO, the Palestine Liberation Organization, was created, which at the initial stage of its existence was engaged exclusively in sabotage and terrorist attacks. The main camps of the PLO were located in Jordan, where, after previous Arab-Israeli conflicts, a huge number of refugees from Palestine settled, who did not have to be persuaded to join the organization for a long time.

The existence of these camps caused a lot of inconvenience to the Jordanian king Hussein, but he did not dare to take radical measures, fearing armed resistance and losing popularity in the Arab world. In November 1966, an Israeli border patrol hit a mine. Three people died. Two days later, the Israeli army carried out a retaliatory action in the village of Samu on the West Bank of the Jordan, which was under Jordanian control.

A large Israeli detachment, supported by tanks, entered the village. All residents were taken out of their houses and gathered in the square, after which the village was razed to the ground under the pretext that alleged terrorists lived in the village. Jordanian troops tried to interfere, after which a firefight ensued between them, in which one Israeli soldier, 16 Jordanians and three more local residents were killed. After a three-hour battle, the detachment went across the border.

This action caused a storm of indignation in Egypt and Syria, whose leaders accused Hussein of cowardice, and the Palestinian refugee camps also rebelled. All this gave the Jordanian king a lot of unpleasant moments, and his attitude towards Israel deteriorated sharply. And this despite the fact that Hussein was one of the few regional leaders who focused not on the USSR, but on the United States and its Western allies.

Syria and Egypt conclude a military alliance. However, further passions gradually calm down. Only in April 1967 did the conflict flare up again, this time on the Syrian-Israeli border. Both sides accused each other of provocations and complained to the UN.

On May 13, 1967, the USSR warns Egypt about a possible attack by Syria. Before that, Israel had warned Syria several times about the possible use of force. Nasser sent General Fawzi to the Syrian border, who was supposed to deal with the situation on the spot. Fawzi returned to Nasser with a report and said that there were no signs of an impending military invasion of Syria. However, Nasser had already decided to pose as a leader and protector of the Arab world by sending out UN peacekeepers and moving troops to the border.

A few days later, the Egyptian army begins to take up defensive positions in the border areas, and Nasser demands that the UN Secretary General withdraw peacekeeping forces from the demarcation line between Israel and Egypt. The Secretary General offers to place them from the Israeli border, but is also refused, after which he orders the withdrawal of forces. Their position is occupied by the Egyptian army. Soviet Ambassador Pozhidaev meets with Field Marshal Amer, who assures him that the advance of Egyptian troops into the Sinai is necessary to contain Israel. According to his explanation, the Egyptian army in the Sinai was supposed to demonstrate the determination of the Egyptians to defend Syria in the event of an invasion by the Israeli army.

In response, Israel begins to mobilize. At the last moment, the pro-Western Jordan, whose king has not forgotten last year's humiliation, joins the Syrian-Egyptian coalition. Mobilization is announced in the country, in Syria too. Egypt is the last to mobilize.

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It is unlikely that Nasser seriously planned to attack Israel first. With his militant rhetoric, he killed two birds with one stone. On the one hand, he confirmed his place as the informal leader of the Arabs. On the other hand, he provoked Israel into retaliatory actions. He knew perfectly well that Israel's policy at that time was based on the principle of an eye for an eye. Among the leadership, the opinion prevailed that the Arabs understand only strength and perceive any concessions as weakness, so Israel meticulously responded to every aggressive act against it.

By closing the Straits, Nasser seemed to be calling on Israel to act. He probably thought it was to his advantage. In the event of an Israeli attack, Egypt became a victim of aggression, moreover, as he believed, he would not lose anything. The army is heavily armed and will be able to contain the IDF for a week or two before the superpowers intervene and reconcile everyone. The authority of Nasser will increase, at the same time, under the pretext of Israeli aggression, it will be possible to bargain for some bonuses through the mediation of the USSR and the USA. And if events develop very well, then it will even be possible to defeat the Israeli army and return the territories lost in previous wars. Nasser's confidence was fueled by the generals, as well as Field Marshal Amer, his right hand, who assured Nasser that the army was in perfect condition and could easily cope with Israeli troops.

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Complicated the situation inept command. Already on the second day of fighting in the Sinai, after the fall of Abu Agheil, Field Marshal Amer panicked and ordered a retreat from the peninsula. This order finally demoralized the units that were still quite combat-ready and practically not affected by fire, which began to retreat in disarray. At the same time, the columns were regularly attacked by Israeli aircraft, as well as attacks by their own artillery (due to the general chaos and confusion). In the end, the army abandoned all the equipment and ran aimlessly. The soldiers were scattered throughout the Sinai, in a desert area, with virtually no water. The total losses of Egypt amounted to about 10 thousand, and it is difficult to say how many of them died as a result of attacks by the Israeli army and air force and how many died of thirst in the desert.

Nasser and his closest associate Amer quarreled. The field marshal blamed the president for the defeat, he blamed the field marshal, who told him stories about the brilliant readiness of the army. As a result, Amer demanded the resignation of Nasser along with a group of loyal generals. However, the majority supported Nasser, and Amer was expelled from the army. Later, Nasser carried out purges in the army, getting rid of his people, and Amer tried to organize a military coup, but was arrested and, according to the official version, committed suicide in custody.

But that was later. In the meantime, Israel was deciding whether to attack the Golan Heights. A significant part of the leadership, including Minister of Defense Dayan, was initially against it. A powerful defense was built on the Golan Heights, and, according to analysts, its breakthrough could cost at least 30 thousand dead.

Therefore, Israel did not take active action for four days. But after it was possible to find out through intelligence channels that the Syrians were completely demoralized and were preparing to announce a ceasefire, Dayan ordered to act, and as quickly as possible, since a truce was expected in a day or two at most.

The Syrian army, already aware of the Egyptian failures, now had no desire to fight. The officers, as soon as they learned about the approach of Israeli soldiers, simply ran away. Some soldiers followed suit, some surrendered. The resistance was from a minority. Numerous reserves, which were supposed to support the defensive line, fled even earlier. As a result, the defense was broken through in just a few hours, and the Golan Heights were occupied in a day, despite the fact that analysts considered this area the most difficult and predicted heavy and bloody battles in the spirit of the First World War.

Jordanian troops put up the most serious resistance, especially in the battle for East Jerusalem, which became one of the fiercest, since Israel did not use the air force. As a result, more Israeli soldiers died in the battle for this part of the city than during the breakthrough of the most powerful defensive system of the Golan Heights.

Many contemporary sources report that 35 Soviet servicemen died in the conflict. However, this information is most likely not correct. At present, it is known about almost 50 Soviet military personnel who died during their stay in Egypt. Their names and circumstances of death are known. Some died during the fighting (mainly air defense personnel), some from accidents and diseases. However, almost all deaths date back to 1969 and 1970, when the USSR deployed a military contingent in Egypt during the so-called. wars of attrition. In 1967, only four dead military personnel are known. All of them were sailors of the B-31 submarine, on which a fire broke out due to the careless handling of fire by one of the sailors. The USSR sent a fairly large squadron (30 ships and 10 submarines) to the region, which, however, did not interfere in the course of events and silently watched from the sidelines.

But it is known about the death of 34 American sailors from the ship "Liberty". An electronic intelligence vessel was attacked by Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats in the Mediterranean on 8 June. As a result of the attack, the ship remained afloat, although it received serious damage. Disputes about the circumstances of the attack are still ongoing. Israel issued a formal apology, stating that the ship was unmarked and was mistaken for an Egyptian ship (however, the Americans assured that the flags were in place). One way or another, both sides chose to hush up the case, and Israel paid compensation to the families of the victims of about $ 70 million (in current prices).

As is always the case in military conflicts, each side sought to underestimate its own losses and exaggerate the enemy's. According to more or less objective estimates, the Egyptian army lost about 10 thousand people dead and missing in the desert, the Jordanian army lost about 700 people, the Syrian army lost about one to one and a half thousand. Israel lost from 750 to a thousand soldiers, according to various estimates.

Loss count

On June 10, hostilities were stopped under pressure from the US and the USSR. Nasser demanded more support for him, but the Kremlin did not want to get involved in the war, so they limited themselves to a symbolic gesture. On June 10, the USSR and the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact (with the exception of Romania) severed diplomatic relations with Israel under the pretext that it was an aggressor.

temporarily occupied territories" and they were planned to be used for further diplomatic bargaining (with the exception of the part of Jerusalem that previously belonged to Jordan, which had an important symbolic value for Israel), but later they were officially annexed to the country. With the exception of the Sinai Peninsula, which in the early 80- x was returned to Egypt.

A direct consequence of the Six Day War was the Yom Kippur War in 1973. It lasted 18 days. This time, the initiative was on the side of the Arab coalition, which was the first to strike, for which the Israeli army was not ready. Although Israel eventually managed to go on the counteroffensive, the losses it suffered in the war were much greater than in 1967. The failures of the early days led to the resignation of the government and the fall in popularity of the Six-Day War legend Dayan, who also lost his post as defense minister.