Combat railway missile system. Railway missile systems - reliable protection of Russia
New military railway missile system « Barguzin» is preparing for the final stage of testing. After their successful completion, the BZHRK will enter the Russian Army and take up combat duty. It will be practically impossible for a potential enemy to detect such a train with a missile in the wide Russian expanses. It is based on extensive experience in the development of similar complexes and the latest technological solutions.
The news about the successful test of the BZHRK "Barguzin" hastened to be made public. The original source was the transfer site Andrew Karaulova"The moment of truth", and there was no confirmation, although the news was distributed on many sites. Interfax then contacted Ministry defense through their channels, and it turned out that although the tests are scheduled for current year until there were no launches. However, there are still two months left until the end of the year.
“It is necessary on a new product to confirm the feasibility of a “mortar” launch of the product and its subsequent withdrawal away from the rocket train, in which there are people and technological equipment, after which the main engine of the ICBM will be launched.
Although the journalists hurried a little, the development is in full swing, so you can discuss Barguzin now.
It is worth briefly recalling its predecessor - BZHRK 15P961 " Well done»:
A good video, but at the end - a juggling: the complexes, it turns out, " served for about 20 years and at the end of the warranty period they were disbanded". The adoption of the first missile regiment with RT-23UTTKh - October 1987, and why didn't they produce new trains, but waited for the end of the guarantee? Yes, and after the guarantee, it was possible to carry out preventive maintenance / modernization, as was done with missiles.
Alas, out of 12 rocket trains two were converted into museum exhibits (located in the AvtoVAZ Technical Museum and in the Museum of Railway Engineering at the Varshavsky railway station Petersburg), and the rest were destroyed, despite Russia's withdrawal from the treaty START-2 in 2002.
Didn't like it very much Washington"Well done" (according to NATO classification - "Scalpel"): strategic missiles with nuclear warheads ride on the railroad, and try to find it. And if you find it, then try to prevent the launch. In 1991, they set up an experiment: not far from Molodets, they piled up a bunch of anti-tank mines that had once been taken out of Germany, about 20 meters high and blew up. The power of the explosion was about a kiloton, resulting in a funnel with a diameter of 80 meters and a depth of 10 meters - and immediately after the explosion, the rocket was launched in a regular manner.
However, it is incorrect to reduce the reasons only to the desire to please Washington. Yes, the hard-to-track BZHRKs made them want to destroy them “by contractual means” - even then, specialists in the United States themselves understood the problems with modern ICBMs, and indeed with military developments in general. Let's say, an analogue of "Well done" Pentagon never managed to develop (projects "Peacekeeper Rail Garrison" and "Midgetman"), while the Chinese are slowly getting something.
But the point is also that the 15Zh61 missiles used by Molodets were produced at the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant (PO Yuzhmash), which, after being destroyed USSR stayed in the area Ukraine, where it is still degrading. It is clear that relying on the reliability of Ukrainian suppliers would be extremely naive and Maidan.
Relying on the reliability of Ukrainian suppliers of high-tech products is extremely naive.
In addition, the Molodets had its drawbacks - for example, it was still noticeable, because due to the weight of the missiles, the train was pulled by three diesel locomotives at once, and the cars with launchers had additional axles, so it was difficult to confuse it with a conventional refrigerated train. Outdated, of course, and navigation equipment.
Therefore, it was decided not to try to restore the Molodets project, but to immediately develop a modern version - Barguzin.
It was reported that according to the plan in 2016, there was only the creation of documentation, but, as you already know, testing of the launch system will begin soon. Everything is logical: the specifics were worked out even on Molodets: a mechanism for diverting electrical wires, a mortar take-off, and redirecting the rocket exhaust to the side at launch.
At the same time, the new rocket train becomes unrecognizable: it uses rockets RS-24 "Yars". Although they have only 4 warheads, and there were a dozen of them on the 15Zh61, the Barguzin itself carries not three missiles, but twice as many. Of course, it still turns out 24 against 30.
However, we must not forget that Yarsy is a more modern development, and the likelihood of overcoming PRO much higher. At the same time, the weight of the rockets is almost half as much, and the weight of the car is comparable to the usual one. Therefore, the camouflage is perfect from the outside, and the train itself can pull a double locomotive. The navigation system has also been updated: it is no longer necessary to set the coordinates of targets in advance, everything can be quickly changed.
Such a mobile complex can cover up to 1000 km per day, running along any railway lines in the country, indistinguishable from a regular train with refrigerated cars up to “X hour”. Time of "autonomy" - a month.
Why did the United States insist so much on the destruction of the "Molodtsev" and now they are very unhappy with the "Barguzin"? It's all about the concept of war: if Russia always plays on defense (although, of course, we must not forget that in some cases, defense can also be a preventive nuclear strike), then the US military doctrine is always attacking. And if the Pentagon is getting worse and worse with nuclear weapons, and its use will not be approved by other significant countries, not to mention the response nuclear attack, then the concept of "Fast Global Impact"(Prompt Global Strike, PGS) provides for a massive global strike by non-nuclear forces.
US military doctrine is always attacking.
“Disarmament” is taking place: non-nuclear, but powerful explosions known military and civilian targets are destroyed, after which the result differs from the use nuclear weapons except for the absence of radioactivity. Let us emphasize the global nature of such an attack - industrial centers will also be destroyed, and not just military facilities. A good example from the past: the bombings Dresden USA and UK. They had no military meaning, the function is purely awesome (as well as the use atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki subsequently).
And against such an attacking strategy, “rocket trains” are a very good “antidote”, since they cannot be destroyed with an accurate strike, and in response to aggression, the “Yarsy” will take off - and, accordingly, will fly in. Until 2020, 5 regiments of the BZHRK "Barguzin" should be put into service - this is, respectively, 120 warheads.
However, it should be noted that, of course, the BZHRK here is not some kind of miracle weapon: if Washington suddenly goes crazy collectively and sanctions such a volley at Russia, then its mass character will be obvious - and, accordingly, in response, you can immediately launch missiles with nuclear warheads, and not just from trains. Those. we get the total nuclear war, in which it is somehow strange to start with non-nuclear charges, the probability of destroying the enemy for the United States is less when its own is guaranteed. Therefore, a “quick global strike” against Russia still does not work, but can be applied to a smaller country. What if in such countries they also learn how to make rocket trains? Russia sets a bad example, no life for the aggressor.
BZHRK on the patrol route / Photo: Press Service of the Strategic Missile Forces
In 2020, the Russian armed forces will receive a new generation of trains with ballistic missile launchers. The Barguzin combat missile railway system will be armed with six RS-24 Yars missiles against three Scalpel ICBMs from its predecessor, the Molodets BZHRK.
It will be impossible to detect the train - in addition to modern means camouflage, it will be equipped with systems electronic warfare and other devices that increase secrecy. The BZHRK divisional set will consist of five trains, each of which will be equated to a regiment.
Former Chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces Viktor Yesin / Photo: Press Service of the Strategic Missile Forces
"The creation of the Barguzin is a Russian response to the deployment by the Americans of a global missile defense system," he said. former boss Headquarters of the Strategic Missile Forces Viktor Esin.
Earlier, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel-General Sergei Karakaev, spoke about the adoption of the Barguzin into service in 2019, but the timing of work on the creation of the train was shifted by a year due to the difficult financial situation. The draft design of the BZHRK has been created, design documentation is being developed. In 2017, Vladimir Putin will be presented with a detailed report on the topic and a plan for the deployment of missile trains.
The Barguzin BZHRK will be armed with six RS-24 Yars missiles against three Scalpel ICBMs from its predecessor, the Molodets BZHRK / Image: oko-planet.su
"The new BZHRK will significantly surpass its predecessor" Molodets "in terms of accuracy, missile range and other characteristics. This will allow this complex to long years, at least until 2040, be in combat strength Strategic Missile Forces. Thus, the troops are returning to a three-species grouping containing mine, mobile and railway-based complexes," S. Karakaev said.
Sergei Karakaev / Photo: Press Service of the Strategic Missile Forces
Of the 12 Soviet missile trains, 10 were destroyed in accordance with the START-2 treaty, two were transferred to museums. They were replaced by Topol-M mobile ground missile systems, which are significantly inferior to trains in terms of mobility and invulnerability. At the same time, it is not difficult to restore the BZHRK system: unique technical solutions and design developments, ground infrastructure, including rocky tunnels, where no intelligence will find a train and a nuclear strike will not get it, have been preserved.
The elusive "well done"
According to legend, the idea to use trains to launch ballistic missiles was thrown to the Soviet Union by the Americans. After the United States considered the creation of railway missile systems to be an expensive, difficult and impractical project, the CIA proposed misinforming Soviet intelligence: they say that such trains are being created in America - and let the Russians pump billions into a utopia.
The operation was carried out, but its result was unexpected - the Soviet Union created the Molodets missile trains, which immediately became a headache for the Pentagon. To track them, a constellation of satellites was put into orbit, and in the late 80s, when the BZHRK had already entered the routes, a container with tracking equipment was sent from Vladivostok to Sweden by rail under the guise of commercial cargo. Soviet counterintelligence officers quickly "figured out" the container and removed it from the train. American General Colin Powell once admitted to the creator of the BZHRK, Academician Alexei Utkin: "Looking for your rocket trains is like a needle in a haystack."
Photo: vk.com
Indeed, the BZHRK, which went on combat duty, instantly disappeared among the thousands of trains traveling along the extensive railway network Soviet Union. Outwardly, "Molodets" was disguised as the usual mixed train: passenger cars, mail, silver refrigerators.
True, some cars had not four pairs of wheels, but eight - but you can’t count them from a satellite. The BZHRK was set in motion by three diesel locomotives. To keep this from being obvious, in the late 1980s, large freight trains began to be driven by three-section locomotives. By 1994, 12 BZHRKs were in service with three missiles each.
folding rocket
During the creation of "Molodets" a lot of complex problems had to be solved. The length of the wagon with the launcher should not exceed 24 meters - otherwise it will not fit into the railway infrastructure. Such short ballistic missiles were not made in the USSR. The most compact ICBM weighs over 100 tons. How to make sure that the composition with three launchers does not crush the railway tracks? How to save a train from the hellish flames of a launching rocket? Over the rails contact network - how to get around it? And this is not all the questions that arose before the designers.
The creation of the BZHRK was carried out by the famous academic brothers Alexei and Vladimir Utkin. The first one made a train, the second one made a rocket for it. For the first time in the USSR, an ICBM was made solid-propellant, with a multiple reentry vehicle. The RT-23 (according to NATO classification SS-24 Scalpel) consisted of three stages and threw 10 thermonuclear warheads with a capacity of 500 kilotons over 11 thousand kilometers. In order for the "Scalpel" to fit in a railway car, the nozzles and fairing were made retractable.
Retractable rocket nozzles / Photo: vk.com
While Vladimir Utkin was inventing a folding rocket, his brother Alexei was conjuring over a sliding train. in KB special engineering designed a launcher with a carrying capacity of 135 tons on four biaxial bogies. Part of its gravity was transferred to neighboring cars. The car was disguised as a refrigerator with fake sliding doors on the sides. In fact, the roof opened, and powerful hydraulic jacks came out from under the bottom, resting against concrete slabs on the sides of the railway track. The BZHRK was equipped with unique retractable devices that diverted the contact wire to the side. In addition, the area where the launch took place was de-energized.
The launch of the rocket was a mortar: a powder charge threw the Scalpel out of the launch container to a height of 20 meters, the corrective charge diverted the nozzles away from the train, the first stage engine turned on and with a smoke trail characteristic of solid fuel rockets SS-24 went into the sky. Invisible and invulnerable By 1991, three missile divisions with 12 BZHRK were deployed: in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, Kostroma and Perm Regions. Within a radius of 1500 kilometers from the places of deployment of the connections, the railway track was modernized: wooden sleepers were replaced with reinforced concrete, heavy rails were laid, embankments were strengthened with denser gravel.
outside combat duty BZHRK were in hiding. Then they advanced to a certain point of the railway network and were divided into three. The locomotives took the launchers to the launch sites - usually they were located around the point in a triangle. Each train included a fuel tank (also disguised as a refrigerator) and a piping system that allowed locomotives to be refueled on the go. There were also sleeping cars for calculation, supplies of water and food. The autonomy of the rocket train was 28 days.
Having worked out the launch of missiles at one point, the train went to the next - there were more than 200 of them in the Soviet Union. In a day, the BZHRK could travel over a thousand kilometers. For reasons of secrecy, routes were laid past large stations, and if it was impossible to bypass them, rocket trains passed them without stopping and at dawn, when there were fewer people. The railway workers called the BZHRK "train number zero."
Since the rocket train was planned as a retaliatory weapon, in 1991 the "Shine" experiments - on the effects of electromagnetic radiation - and "Shift" were carried out. The latter simulated a nuclear explosion of kiloton power. At the training ground in Plesetsk, 650 meters from the BZHRK, 100 thousand anti-tank mines were detonated, taken out of warehouses in eastern Germany and laid in a 20-meter pyramid. A funnel with a diameter of 80 meters formed at the site of the explosion, the sound pressure level in the habitable compartments of the BZHRK reached the pain threshold (150 decibels). One of the launchers showed deactivation, but after reloading the onboard computer complex launched a rocket.
A huge resonance in the professional environment was caused by the news about the freezing of the project of the combat railway missile system (BZHRK) "Barguzin", better known as a nuclear train. Information about this with reference to "an informed representative of the military-industrial complex" was distributed by " Russian newspaper”, the official publication of the government of the Russian Federation.
At the time of preparation of the material, the Ministry of Defense did not comment on the situation. Given the reputation of the WG, it is safe to say that the development of the Barguzin has indeed been suspended. However, it is not clear why they decided to talk about it so delicately at the top, refraining from publicly explaining the reasons, which, probably, there is no point in hiding.
"The topic of creating a new generation of rocket trains is closed, at least for the short term," Rossiyskaya Gazeta reported. At the same time, it is indicated that “if it is urgently needed, our rocket train will be quickly brought to working condition and put on rails.” The reasons for the suspension of the project "Barguzin" understood the "Russian Planet".
Forced disposal
For the first time, the Ministry of Defense announced the progress of work on the creation of a new strategic BZHRK in April 2013. On December 24, 2014, Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov emphasized that the adoption of a railway missile system in the Russian Federation does not contradict the provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-3).
The development of "Barguzin" began at the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT), presumably in 2011-2012. In 2014, a sketch was prepared, and in 2015, development work (R&D) started. In December 2015, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), Colonel General Sergei Karakaev, spoke about the current "development of working design documentation for the units and systems of the complex."
In November 2016, at the Plesetsk cosmodrome, throw tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile for the new BZHRK were successfully completed. The tests consisted in the fact that the weight model of the future rocket was "thrown" out of the car with the help of a powder accumulator. Deployment nuclear train was planned for the period between 2018-2020.
"Barguzin" is a deep modernization of the Soviet analogue of the RT-23 UTTH "Molodets" (SS-24 Scalpel - according to NATO classification). The first missile regiment took up combat duty on October 20, 1987 in Kostroma. According to the Ministry of Defense, the main advantage of the Soviet BZHRK was the ability to disperse. Unnoticed by reconnaissance means, the complex could change its location.
“BZHRK structurally was a train of two or three diesel locomotives and special (according to appearance refrigerated and passenger) cars, which housed transport and launch containers (TLC) with intercontinental ballistic missiles, launch control points, technological and technical systems, security equipment, personnel and life support systems, ”explains the Ministry of Defense.
"Molodets" was adopted during the end of the Cold War. By 1994, Russia had 12 BZHRK with three missiles each. Three missile divisions were deployed in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, Kostroma and Perm regions.
In 1993, Moscow and Washington signed the START II Treaty, according to which our country undertook to decommission nuclear trains. In 2002, in response to the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty, Russia denounced START II. However, she decided to dispose of "Molodtsov". Only two trains remained intact: one complex adorns the Varshavsky railway station in St. Petersburg, and the second - the AvtoVAZ Technical Museum in Togliatti.
Unsuccessful attempt
The reasons for the decommissioning of Molodtsov largely echo the situation around the Barguzin project. The operating experience of the BZHRK revealed a number of shortcomings, which in Peaceful time are critical. We are talking about the high cost and unresolved technical problems.
The Ministry of Defense assumed that the nuclear-powered train would be able to move throughout the entire railway network of the USSR. No doubt this would be a gigantic advantage. It was for this purpose that a new delivery system was created. atomic weapons. However, the nuclear train turned out to be too heavy, and the usual railway track could not withstand it. Only one rocket weighed over 100 tons, and there were three of them on each BZHRK.
It is known that within a radius of 1.5 thousand kilometers from the places of deployment of Molodtsov, the railway track was strengthened. Wooden sleepers were replaced with reinforced concrete, ordinary rails were replaced with heavy ones, and the embankment was made of denser gravel. It is obvious that the relocation of all railway lines for the needs of the BZHRK is a senseless process from a military and economic point of view, which will require gigantic costs and an incredible amount of time.
Thus, MIT was faced with the task of developing a lighter and more maneuverable nuclear train. It follows from the comments of experts that the ICBM for the Barguzin was created on the basis of the RS-24 Yars and was supposed to weigh less than 50 tons. Only in this case, the operation of the BZHRK would be justified. It is possible that MIT could have had difficulties with the creation of a lightweight rocket or the train itself.
Similar problems could arise due to the fact that "Molodets" was fully developed and assembled in the Ukrainian SSR. The developer of the RT-23 UTTH is the famous Dnepropetrovsk design bureau Yuzhnoye, and production was established in Pavlograd, located nearby.
The version of an unsuccessful attempt to create an endowed ICBM was indirectly confirmed on July 3, 2017 by Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin. In particular, he stated that the industry is ready to produce a BZHRK and a 100-ton heavy ballistic missile if such a decision is made and nuclear trains are included in State program Arms (GPV) for 2018-2025.
In March 2017, the Zvezda TV channel claimed that the BZHRK was "preparing for the final stage of testing." And during 2017, the federal media repeatedly reported that the Barguzin should be included in the State Armaments Program for 2018-2027. However, the inclusion of a nuclear train with a 100-ton missile in the GPV, as mentioned above, simply does not make sense.
As reported by "Rossiyskaya Gazeta", at the end of this year, the prototype "Barguzin" went "into a long sludge on sidings." Nevertheless, it is not worth burying a unique project. The main reason for the failure is the lack of a lightweight version of the ICBM. Work in this direction probably required an increase in time and funding. The project is frozen, which means that Russia can always return to it if the situation so requires.
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At the very end of last year, the Russian media appeared about a return to an old and almost forgotten idea. According to RIA Novosti, work is already underway to create a new combat railway missile system (BZHRK) and the first rocket train of the new project can be assembled by 2020. Similar systems were already in service with our army, however, the only BZHRK 15P961 Molodets in the history were taken off duty back in 2005 and soon most of the equipment from their composition was disposed of. Trains with rocket weapons were rightfully proud Soviet designers and throughout the country as a whole. Due to their capabilities, these complexes posed a serious threat to potential adversary. However, the history of this type of technology cannot be called simple. At first, a series of not at all pleasant events first severely limited the potential of domestic BZHRK, and then led to their complete disappearance.
The creation of a railway missile system was very difficult. Despite the fact that the corresponding order of the country's leadership and the Ministry of Defense appeared back in 1969, the first full-fledged launch of the new RT-23UTTKh missile took place only in the 85th. The development of the BZHRK was carried out in the Dnepropetrovsk design bureau "Southern" named after. M.K. Yangel under the leadership of V.F. Utkin. Specific operating conditions new system forced to develop a lot of new solutions, from a newly designed launcher car, disguised as a refrigerator, to a folding missile nose fairing. Nevertheless, more than fifteen years of work were crowned with success. In 1987, the first Molodtsov regiment took up duty. Over the next four years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, three divisions were formed, armed with a total of twelve new BZHRK.
Unfortunately, shortly after the formation of the last third division, several unpleasant things happened that had a very bad effect on the further service of the BZHRK. In 1991, during international negotiations on the future START-I treaty, the Soviet leadership agreed to several disadvantageous proposals from the American side. Among them was a restriction regarding the patrol routes of the “rocket trains”. With the light hand of the President of the USSR M. Gorbachev and some of his associates, the BZHRK could now move only within a radius of several tens of kilometers from the bases. In addition to the obvious military-political disadvantages, such a restriction also had economic consequences. Simultaneously with the commissioning of the Molodets complexes, the Ministry of Railways was working to strengthen the tracks within a radius of several hundred kilometers from the bases of the BZHRK. Thus, the Soviet Union lost both the main advantage of the BZHRK, and a lot of money spent on the reconstruction of the tracks and the preparation of launch positions.
The next international treaty - START-II - meant the removal from duty and disposal of all RT-23UTTKh missiles. The year 2003 was called as the completion date for these works. Especially for dismantling and disposal at the Bryansk Repair Plant of the Missile Forces, with the participation of the United States, a cutting room was assembled technological line. Fortunately for the BZHRK, shortly before the deadline for the disposal of missiles and trains, Russia withdrew from the START-II treaty. However, over the next few years, recycling continued, albeit at a much slower pace. To date, only a few carriages of the former BZHRK have been preserved, which are used as museum exhibits.
As you can see, the short history of the Molodets missile systems was difficult and unsuccessful. Almost immediately after entering service, trains with missiles lost their main advantage and after that they no longer posed the same threat to the enemy as before. Nevertheless, the complexes continued to be in service for a decade and a half. Now there is every reason to believe that the disposal of "Molodtsev" occurred only when they exhausted their resource and the available stock of missiles came to an end. One of the most serious blows to Russian missile trains was the collapse of the Soviet Union. Because of him, the Yuzhmash plant, which assembled complexes and missiles for them, remained on the territory of sovereign Ukraine. This country had its own views on the future work of rocket production and therefore the trains were left without a new one.
In discussions about the news about the start of the development of a new BZHRK, the advantages and disadvantages of this type of technology are often considered. The first, of course, include the possibility of being on duty at a great distance from the base. Once a train with rockets has entered the public railways, its detection becomes very, very difficult. Of course, three diesel locomotives, nine refrigerated cars (three rocket modules) and a tank car gave out the old BZHRK to some extent, but enormous efforts were required to guarantee tracking their movements. In fact, it was necessary to "cover" the entire or almost the entire territory of the Soviet Union with reconnaissance means. Also, the advantage of the complex can be considered a successful liquid rocket RT-23UTTH. A ballistic missile with a launch weight of 104 tons could deliver ten warheads with a capacity of 430 kilotons each to a range of up to 10,100 kilometers. In light of the mobility of the missile system, such characteristics of the missile gave it simply unique capabilities.
However, it hasn't been without drawbacks. The main disadvantage of the BZHRK 15P961 is its weight. Due to the non-standard “load”, several original technical solutions had to be applied, but even with their use, the three-car launch module exerted too much pressure on the rails, almost at the limit of the latter’s capabilities. Because of this, at the end of the eighties, the railway workers had to change and strengthen a huge number of tracks. Since then, the country's railways have again undergone wear and tear, and before putting into service a new missile system, most likely, it will be necessary another update ways.
Also, the BZHRK is regularly accused of insufficient strength and survivability, especially in comparison with mine launchers. To test the survivability back in the eighties, appropriate tests began. In 1988, work on the topics "Shine" and "Thunderstorm" was successfully completed, the purpose of which was to test the performance of trains with rockets in conditions of strong electromagnetic radiation and thunderstorms, respectively. In 1991, one of the combatant trains took part in the "Shift" tests. At the 53rd research site (now the Plesetsk cosmodrome), several tens of thousands of anti-tank mines were laid with a total explosion power of about 1,000 tons of TNT. At a distance of 450 meters from the ammunition, the train's rocket module was placed end to end. A little further - 850 meters - they placed another launcher and command post complex. The launchers were equipped with electrical missiles. During the detonation of mines, all BZHRK modules were slightly damaged - glass flew out and the operation of some minor equipment modules was disrupted. The training launch with the use of an electric rocket model was successful. Thus, a kiloton explosion less than a kilometer from the train is not capable of completely disabling the BZHRK. Added to this is the more than low probability of an enemy missile warhead hitting a train while it is moving or next to it.
In general, even a short operation of the Molodets BZHRK with serious restrictions on routes clearly showed both the advantages and the difficulties associated with this class. military equipment. Probably, precisely because of the ambiguity of the very concept of the railway complex, which at the same time promises greater mobility of missiles, but at the same time requires strengthening the tracks, not to mention the complexity of creating a train and rockets for it, design work on the creation of new "rocket trains" has not yet been resumed . According to the latest data, at present, employees of design organizations and the Ministry of Defense are analyzing the prospects for the BZHRK and determining the necessary features of its appearance. Therefore, now it is impossible to talk about any nuances of the new project. Moreover, due to the presence of Topol, Topol-M and Yars mobile ground-based missile systems (PGRK) in service, which do not need a solid railway track, the creation of a new BZHRK can be completely canceled.
A variety of opinions are now being expressed about the possible appearance of a promising BZHRK. For example, it is proposed to equip it with missiles of existing projects, such as the RS-24 Yars. With a launch weight of about 50 tons, such a missile, which is also already used on the PGRK, can be a good replacement for the old RT23UTTKh. With similar dimensions and half the mass, the new missile, with certain modifications, can become the armament of the new BZHRK. Wherein combat characteristics complex will remain approximately at the same level. So, the gain in range (up to 11,000 km) will be compensated by a smaller number of warheads, because only 3-4 (according to other sources, six) charges are placed in the head of the RS-24. However, the Yars missile will have been in operation for about ten years by the expected date of putting into service of the new BZHRK. Thus, new missile trains will need a new ballistic missile. It is quite possible that its appearance will be formed along with the requirements for the entire complex.
At the same time, rocket designers can use the experience gained in creating relatively small rockets like the Topol or Yars. In this case, it will be possible to create a new rocket with a wide use of mastered solutions and technologies, but at the same time suitable for use in railway complexes. As the basis for a new missile for the BZHRK, the existing Topoli-M or Yarsy will be suitable, among other things, due to the fact that they are adapted for operation on mobile systems. However, the final decision regarding the "origin" of the missile and the requirements for it, it seems, has not yet been made. Given the duration of development and testing of new missiles, in order to be in time by 2020, rocket designers should receive requirements within the next years or even months.
Finally, the need to build infrastructure must be taken into account. Judging by the available information about the state of the old BZHRK bases, everything will have to be built anew. In a matter of years, the old depots, control rooms, etc. were decommissioned, deprived a large number special equipment, rendered unusable and sometimes even partially looted. It is quite clear that for effective combat work, the new railway missile systems will need appropriate facilities and equipment. But the restoration of existing buildings or the construction of new ones will significantly increase the cost of the entire project.
Thus, if we compare railway and ground missile systems, the comparison may not be in favor of the former. Hypothetical mobile unpaved launcher, with the same rocket as a railway one, it is less demanding on the condition of the road, much easier to manufacture, and also does not need to be coordinated with third-party organizations, for example, with the management of the railway. An important advantage of ground missile systems is also the fact that all the infrastructure necessary for them is simpler and, as a result, cheaper than for railway ones. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the middle of the 2000s, the command of the Strategic Missile Forces officially announced the abandonment of the BZHRK in favor of the PGRK. In the light of this decision, the resumption of work on the railway complexes looks solely as an attempt to expand the possibilities nuclear forces and, if there are certain prospects, to equip them with another type of equipment.
In the current situation, it is not worth waiting for news regarding the start of construction of the first rocket train of the new project, because it has not even been decided what it will be and whether it will be at all. Therefore, it remains to be hoped that an analysis of the possibilities and prospects, including a comparative one (BZHRK or PGRK), will be carried out with all responsibility and its results will bring our missile troops only benefit.
Type of strategic missile systems of mobile railway basing. It is a specially created railway train, in the cars of which strategic missiles (mainly of the intercontinental class), as well as command posts, technological and technical systems, security equipment, personnel ensuring the operation of the complex and its life support systems are located.
The name "Combat railway missile system" is also used as a proper name for the Soviet missile system 15P961 "Molodets" (RT-23 UTTKh), the only BZHRK brought to the stage of adoption and serial production. 15P961 "Well done" was on alert in the Strategic Missile Forces Armed Forces USSR and Russia in the period from 1987 to 1994 in the amount of 12 units. Then (by 2007) all the complexes were dismantled and destroyed, with the exception of two transferred to museums.
On railways ah of the USSR and Russia had the symbol "train number zero".
The first studies on the use of a train as a carrier of strategic missiles appeared in the 1960s. Works on this direction were carried out both in the USSR and in the USA.
History
IN THE USA
The idea of rail-based ballistic missiles was first considered in detail in the United States in the early 1960s. The advent of the Minuteman solid-propellant ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile), which did not need pre-launch refueling, was resistant (unlike early liquid-fuel rockets) to vibration and shaking in motion, made it possible for the first time to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles from a moving platform. It was assumed that trains with missiles would be regularly redeployed between pre-calculated positions - since ICBMs of that time needed exact definition coordinates of the launch site for the operation of their inertial navigation system - and, thus, will be practically invulnerable to a Soviet missile attack.
In the summer of 1960, as part of a theoretical study, the operation " Big Star”(Eng. Big Star), in which prototypes of future railway launch complexes moved along US railroads. The purpose of the exercises was to test the mobility of the complexes, the possibility of their dispersal along the railways in use. As a result of the operation in 1961, a project was prepared and a prototype of a railway train was assembled, which could carry five Minuteman missiles on specially reinforced platforms.
It was assumed that the first mobile Minutemen would enter service in the summer of 1962. The US Air Force expected to deploy 30 trains carrying a total of 150 missiles. However, the cost of the project was too high. Mine launch complexes for the Minutemen were considered more effective solution- cheap (in comparison with the mine installations of the previous liquid ICBMs "Atlas" and "Titan") and protected from existing Soviet ICBMs, which at that time had extremely low accuracy. In the summer of 1961 the project was closed; the created prototypes of launch trains were used as transporters for the delivery of Minutemen from factories to mine deployment bases.
In 1986, the idea of a railroad deployment was adopted for the new American LGM-118A "Peacekeeper" heavy ICBM, also known as the MX. When designing this heavy ICBM, much attention was paid to its ability to survive a sudden Soviet missile attack against the US nuclear forces. Many different proposals for basing the MX were considered, but in the end it was decided to deploy 50 MX missiles in conventional silos from Minuteman ICBMs, and another 50 on special trains.
Each such train - designated as the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison - would have to carry two heavy ICBMs with 10 individually targetable warheads each. Thus, it was supposed to deploy 25 trains, which, dispersed over the US rail network and constantly changing position, would be practically invulnerable to a Soviet attack.
In 1990, the prototype train was tested, but by this time cold war already ended, and in 1991 the entire program was curtailed. In our time, the US Air Force does not plan to develop new similar railway complexes or new heavy ICBMs.
In the USSR/Russia
The order "On the creation of a mobile combat railway missile system (BZHRK) with the RT-23 missile" was signed on January 13, 1969. The Yuzhnoye design bureau was appointed as the main developer. The leading designers of the BZHRK were academicians brothers Vladimir and Alexei Utkin.
V. F. Utkin, a specialist in solid fuel topics, created a launch vehicle. A.F. Utkin created the launch complex, as well as cars for the rocket-carrying train. As conceived by the creators, the BZHRK was supposed to form the basis of a retaliatory strike grouping, since it had increased survivability and, with a high probability, could survive after the enemy struck the first blow. The only place in the USSR for the production of missiles for the BZHRK is the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant (PO Yuzhmash).
"The task that the Soviet government set before us was striking in its enormity. In domestic and world practice, no one has ever faced so many problems. We had to arrange an intercontinental ballistic missile in a railway car, and yet a rocket with a launcher weighs more than 150 tons. How to do it? After all, a train with such a huge load should move along the nationwide tracks of the Ministry of Railways. How to transport strategic missile with a nuclear warhead, how to ensure absolute safety on the way, because we were given the design speed of the train up to 120 km/h. Will the bridges withstand, will the track not collapse, and the start itself, how to transfer the load to the railway track during the launch of the rocket, will the train stand on the rails during the start, how to raise the rocket to a vertical position as quickly as possible after the train stops?
- V. F. Utkin, General Designer of Yuzhnoye Design Bureau
Flight tests of 15Zh61 missiles of the RT-23 UTTKh complex took place in 1985-1987. at the Plesetsk cosmodrome (NIIP-53), a total of 32 launches were carried out. 18 exits of the BZHRK were made along the country's railways (more than 400 thousand kilometers were covered). The tests were carried out in various climatic zones countries (from tundra to deserts).
Each composition of the BZHRK received a missile regiment. More than 70 military personnel, including several dozen officers, were on the train, which was on combat duty. In the cabs of the locomotives, in the places of the drivers and their assistants, there were only military officers - officers and ensigns.
The first missile regiment with RT-23UTTKh went on combat duty in October 1987, and by the middle of 1988 five regiments were deployed (15 launchers in total, 4 in the Kostroma region and 1 in the Perm region). The trains were located at a distance of about four kilometers from each other in stationary structures, and when they took up combat duty, the trains dispersed.
By 1991, three missile divisions were deployed, armed with BZHRK with RT-23UTTKh ICBMs:
10th Guards Rocket Division in the Kostroma Region;
-52nd Missile Division stationed in Zvezdny ZATO (Perm Territory);
-36th Missile Division, ZATO Kedrovy (Krasnoyarsk Territory).
Each of the divisions had a command and four missile regiments (a total of 12 BZHRK trains, three launchers each). Within a radius of 1500 km from the bases of the BZHRK, joint measures were taken with the Ministry of Railways to replace the worn-out railway track: heavier rails were laid, wooden sleepers were replaced with reinforced concrete, and embankments were strengthened with denser gravel.
Since 1991, after a meeting between the leaders of the USSR (Gorbachev) and Great Britain (Thatcher), restrictions were imposed on patrol routes of the BZHRK, they were on combat duty at a point of permanent deployment, without leaving the country's railway network. In February - March 1994, one of the BZHRK of the Kostroma division carried out a trip to the country's railway network (the BZHRK reached at least Syzran).
According to the START-2 treaty (1993), Russia was to decommission all RT-23UTTKh missiles by 2003. At the time of decommissioning, Russia had three rds (Kostroma, Perm and Krasnoyarsk), a total of 12 trains with 36 launchers. For the disposal of "rocket trains" at the Bryansk repair plant of the Strategic Missile Forces, a special "cutting" line was assembled. Despite Russia's withdrawal from the START-2 treaty in 2002, during 2003-2007, all trains and launchers were disposed of (destroyed), except for two demilitarized and installed as exhibits in the museum of railway equipment at the Varshavsky railway station in St. Petersburg and in AvtoVAZ Technical Museum.
In early May 2005, as the Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov, officially announced, the BZHRK was removed from combat duty in the Strategic Missile Forces. The commander said that in exchange for the BZHRK, from 2006, the Topol-M ground mobile missile system would begin to enter the troops.
On September 5, 2009, Deputy Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Vladimir Gagarin, said that the Strategic Missile Forces did not rule out the possibility of resuming the use of combat railway missile systems.
In December 2011, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Sergei Karakaev, announced a possible revival in Russian army BZHRK complexes.
On April 23, 2013, Deputy Minister of Defense Yu. Borisov announced the resumption by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (developer of the Bulava, Topol and Yars missiles) of development work to create a new generation of railway missile systems.
In December 2013, information appeared in the press about the revival of BZHRK complexes in Russia on a new technological base as a response to the US Global Instant Strike program. The Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT) at the beginning of 2014 will complete work on the preliminary design of the BZHRK. New complex The BZHRK, armed with an ICBM with a multiple reentry vehicle designed on the basis of the Yars, will be disguised as a standard refrigerated car, the length of which is 24 meters with a missile length of 22.5 meters.
The new model of the BZHRK will be called "Barguzin".
Advantages and disadvantages
The official reasons for the removal of the BZHRK from service were called outdated design, the high cost of recreating the production of complexes in Russia and the preference for mobile units based on tractors.
BZHRK also had the following disadvantages:
The impossibility of complete camouflage of the train due to the unusual configuration (in particular, three diesel locomotives), which made it possible to determine the location of the complex using modern satellite reconnaissance equipment. Long time the Americans could not detect the complex with satellites, and there were cases when even experienced railway workers from 50 meters could not distinguish the composition covered with a simple camouflage net.
Lower security of the complex (unlike, for example, mines), which can be overturned or destroyed by a nuclear explosion in the vicinity. To assess the impact of an air shock wave of a nuclear explosion in the second half of 1990, a large-scale experiment "Shift" was planned - an imitation of a close nuclear explosion by detonating 1000 tons of TNT (several railway echelons of TM-57 anti-tank mines (100 thousand units) taken out from the warehouses of the Central Group of Forces in East Germany, laid out in the form of a truncated pyramid 20 meters high). The “Shift” experiment was carried out at 53 NIIP MO (Plesetsk) on February 27, 1991, when the explosion formed a funnel with a diameter of 80 and a depth of 10 m, the level of acoustic pressure in the habitable compartments of the BZHRK reached a pain threshold of 150 dB, and the BZHRK launcher was removed from readiness, however, after carrying out the modes to bring it to the required degree of readiness, the launcher was able to conduct a “dry launch” (imitation of a launch using an electric rocket model). That is, the command post, launcher and rocket equipment remained operational.
Depreciation of the railway tracks along which such a heavy complex moved.
Supporters of the BZHRK operation, including the engineer of the launch team at the first tests of the BZHRK, the head of the group of military representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense at the Yuzhmash Production Association, Sergey Ganusov, note the unique combat characteristics of the products that confidently overcame the anti-missile defense zones. The breeding platform, as confirmed by flight tests, delivered warheads solid or total weight of 4 tons at a distance of 11 thousand km. One product containing 10 warheads with a yield of about 500 kilotons was enough to hit an entire European state. The press also noted the high mobility of trains capable of moving along the country's railway network (which made it possible to quickly change the location of the starting position over 1000 kilometers per day), in contrast to tractors operating in a relatively small radius around the base (tens of kilometers).
Calculations carried out by American specialists in relation to the railway version of the MX ICBM basing for the US railway network show that with the dispersal of 25 trains (twice as many as Russia had in service) on sections of the railway with a total length of 120,000 km ( which is much longer than the length of the main track of Russian railways) the probability of hitting the train is only 10% when using 150 ICBMs of the Voevoda type for an attack.
