The largest tank battle. The most famous tank battle of the Great Patriotic War (24 photos)

Year of issue : 2009-2013
Country : Canada, USA
Genre : documentary, war
Duration : 3 seasons, 24+ episodes
Translation : Professional (Single Voice)

Director : Paul Kilbeck, Hugh Hardy, Daniel Sekulich
Cast : Robin Ward, Ralph Raths, Robin Ward, Fritz Langanke, Heinz Altmann, Hans Baumann, Pavel Nikolaevich Eremin, Gerard Bazin, Avigor Kahelani, Kenneth Pollack

Description of the Series : Large-scale tank battles will unfold before you in full view, in all their beauty, cruelty and lethality. In the documentary series “Great Tank Battles”, using advanced computer technology and animations, the most significant tank battles have been reconstructed. Each battle will be presented from a variety of angles: you will see the battlefield from a bird's eye view, as well as in the thick of the battle, through the eyes of the participants in the battle themselves. Each issue is accompanied by a detailed story and analysis technical characteristics equipment that took part in the battle, as well as comments regarding the battle itself and the balance of enemy forces. You will see a variety of technical means combat, starting from the Tigers used during the Second World War and in service fascist Germany and to the latest developments - thermal target guidance systems, which were successfully used during the battles in the Persian Gulf.

List of episodes
1. Battle of Easting 73: The harsh, godforsaken desert of southern Iraq is home to the most merciless sandstorms, but today we will see another storm. During the 1991 Gulf War, the US 2nd Armored Regiment was caught in a sandstorm. This was the last major battle of the 20th century.
2. The Yom Kippur War: Battle for the Golan Heights / The October War: Battle For The Golan Heights: In 1973, Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel. How did several tanks manage to hold off superior enemy forces?
3. The Battle of El Alamein: Northern Africa, 1944: About 600 tanks of the joint Italian-German army broke through the Sahara desert into Egypt. The British deployed almost 1,200 tanks to stop them. Two legendary commanders: Montgomery and Rommel fought for control of North Africa and the oil of the Middle East.
4. Ardennes operation: battle of PT-1 tanks - rush to Bastogne / The Ardennes: On September 16, 1944, German tanks entered the Ardennes forest in Belgium. The Germans attacked American units in an attempt to change the course of the war. The Americans responded with one of the most massive counterattacks in the history of their military operations.
5. Ardennes operation: battle of PT-2 tanks - attack of the German Joachim Pipers / The Ardennes: 12/16/1944 In December 1944, the most loyal and ruthless killers of the Third Reich, the Waffen-SS, carried out Hitler's last offensive in the west. This is the story of the incredible breakthrough of the Nazi Sixth Armored Army of the American line and its subsequent encirclement and defeat.
6. Operation Blockbuster - Battle of Hochwald(02/08/1945) On February 8, 1945, the Canadian Armed Forces launched an attack in the Hochwald Gorge area with the goal of giving Allied troops access to the very heart of Germany.
7. The Battle of Normandy June 06, 1944 Canadian tanks and infantry land on the Normandy coast and come under deadly fire, coming face to face with the most powerful German vehicles: armored tanks SS.
8. Battle of Kursk. Part 1: Northern Front / The Battle Of Kursk: Northern Front In 1943, numerous Soviet and German armies collided in the greatest and deadliest tank battle in history.
9. Battle of Kursk. Part 2: Southern Front / The Battle Of Kursk: Southern Front The battle near Kursk reaches its climax in Russian village Prokhorovka July 12, 1943. This is the story of the largest tank battle in military history, because elite troops The SS face off against the Soviet defenders, determined to stop them at any cost.
10. The Battle of Arrcourt September 1944. When Patton's Third Army threatened to cross the German border, Hitler, in desperation, sent hundreds of tanks into a head-on collision.
11. Battles of the First World War / Tank Battles of the Great War In 1916, Britain, hoping to break the long, bloody, hopeless situation on the Western Front, used new mobile weapons. This is the story of the first tanks and how they changed the face of the modern battlefield forever.
12. Battle of Korea / Tank Battles of Korea In 1950, the world was taken by surprise as North Korea attacked South Korea. This is the story of American tanks rushing to the rescue South Korea and the bloody battles they wage on the Korean Peninsula.
13. The Battle of France At the beginning of World War II, the Germans were the first to introduce new uniform mobile armored tactics. This is the story of the famous Blitzkrieg of the Nazis, where thousands of tanks broke through terrain that was considered impassable and conquered Western Europe within a few weeks.
14. The Six Day War: Battle of Sinai / The Six Day War: Battle for the Sinai In 1967, in response to the growing threat from its Arab neighbors, Israel launches a preemptive strike against Egypt in the Sinai. This is the story of one of the fastest and most dramatic victories in modern warfare.
15. The Battle for the Baltics By 1944, the Soviets had turned the tide of the war in the East and were driving the Nazi army back through the Baltic states. This is the story of German tank crews who continue to fight and win battles even though they cannot win the war.
16. The Battle of Stalingrad By the end of 1942, the German offensive on Eastern Front begins to slow down, and the Soviets place their bets on the defense in the city of Stalingrad. This is the story of one of the most dramatic battles in history, in which an entire German army was lost and the course of the war was changed forever.
17. Tank Ace: Ludwig Bauer / Tank Ace: Ludwig Bauer After the success of the Blitzkrieg, young men throughout Germany flocked to the tank corps in search of glory. This is the story of a German tankman who comes face to face with harsh reality tank troops. He fights in several important battles and survives World War II.
18 October War: Battle for the Sinai / The October War: Battle for the Sinai Seeking to recapture lost territory six years earlier, Egypt launches a surprise attack against Israel in October 1973. This is the story of the final Arab-Israeli war in the Sinai, where both sides achieve success, suffer stunning defeats and - most importantly - enduring peace.
19. The Battle of Tunisia By 1942, Rommel's Afrika Korps had been driven back to Tunisia and met the new American Panzer Corps in North Africa. This is the story of the final battles in North Africa by two of history's most famous tank commanders - Patton and Rommel.
20. Battle of Italy / Tank Battles of Italy In 1943, the tanks of the Royal Canadian Armored Corps made their combat debut on the European mainland. This is the story of Canadian tank crews who fight their way across the Italian Peninsula and, in an offensive breakthrough, strive to liberate Rome from Nazi occupation.
21. Battle of Sinai. Wanting to regain lost territory, Egypt launched an attack on Israel in 1973. This is the story of how the war in the Sinai ended, bringing both defeats and victories to both sides.
22. Tank battles Vietnam War(part 1)
23. Tank battles of the Vietnam War (part 2)

One of the first tank battles of the Great Patriotic War took place on its first day. On June 22, at approximately noon, the leading elements of the German 18th Panzer and possibly the 17th Panzer Divisions and the Soviet 30th Panzer Division, which was moving west from Pruzhany, collided near the small Belarusian village of Pelishche. It was a classic oncoming battle, which temporarily delayed the advance of German tank units from Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group. Around the same time, another tank battle took place in the early afternoon, at Alytus in Lithuania, where battle groups of the German 7th and 20th Panzer Divisions encountered the advance guard of the Soviet 5th Panzer Division. It so happens that information about the battles near the city of Alytus is much easier to find today. We’ll talk about the tank battle that took place near the village of Pelishche.

On the Soviet side, tanks from the 30th Tank Division of the 14th Mechanized Corps (14MK, commander Major General S.I. Oborin) of the 4th Army of the Western Special Military District, located at Slobudka (near the city of Pruzhany) took part in it. . The division began to form only in February-March 1941 on the basis of the 32nd Tank Brigade in Pruzhany. The division included the 60th and 61st tank regiments, the 30th motorized rifle regiment and the 30th howitzer artillery regiment. The unit was headed by Colonel Semyon Ilyich Bogdanov, who during the war rose to the rank of Marshal of the Armored Forces (the title was awarded on June 1, 1945). At the start of the war, the division had 211 T-26 tanks; there were no other tanks in service with the division.


By order of the chief of staff of the 14MK, Colonel I.V. Tutarinov, on the night of June 22, 1941, the 30th Tank Division, with one of its tank regiments, conducted night firing at a tankodrome located in the Poddubno area. On the afternoon of June 21, the commander of the 30th Tank Division, Colonel Bogdanov, and the chief of staff of the 4th Army, Colonel Sandalov, were present at the exercises of this regiment.

Troop position Western Front on the first day of the war (map). Original, CA RF Ministry of Defense


The order to bring the divisions of the 14th Mechanized Corps to combat readiness, which was given at 3:30 a.m. on June 22, 1941 by the commander of the 4th Army, Major General A. A. Korobkov, did not have time to be transmitted to the units before the start of hostilities. The divisions of the corps were alerted already under the explosions of shells and bombs. Colonel Bogdanov independently raised the 30th at 4:15 tank division on a combat alert after German aircraft began bombing the Kuplin airfield in the Pruzhany region. The headquarters of the 14th MK, which was located in Kobrin, was subjected to precise and heavy bombardment from the air already in the first hours of the war, losing almost all means of communication from it. Remaining at 20% of its regular strength, the corps headquarters moved to a reserve command post in Tevli, however big losses in the command staff and in the communications battalion significantly complicated the management of divisions and corps units. Later, in a report to army headquarters, the commander of 14MK, Major General Oborin, reported that of all the means of communication he had only one radio station, 5-AK, and communications with the divisions were carried out by communications delegates.

By 6 o'clock in the morning, parts of Bogdanov's division concentrated in the alarm gathering area (in the forest southwest of Pruzhany). The 61st Tank Regiment of Major P.I. Ivanyuk’s division, which was at night firing, joined the main forces of the division an hour later. Without receiving any orders from the headquarters of the 14th MK and the headquarters of the 4th Army, Colonel Bogdanov decided to act according to the cover plan that was developed on the eve of the war. After checking their combat readiness, units of the 30th Tank Division at approximately 7 a.m. set out for the concentration area (Shcherbovo, Boyary) in two columns, with forward detachments consisting of tank battalions reinforced with artillery. At the same time most The personnel of the division, which was not provided with vehicles, as well as a howitzer-artillery regiment (which did not have tractors and shells) were left at the location of the unit in order to organize the defense of Pruzhany.

As you can see, the Soviet tankers had to fight the upcoming battle without sufficient support from motorized rifles and artillery, as well as reliable air cover. From Pruzhany to the village of Pelishche, tanks from the 30th division had to cover approximately 45 kilometers during daylight hours. The latter circumstance led to the fact that already from the beginning of the march, the moving columns of the division were discovered by German aircraft, after which they were subjected to bomb attacks, suffering their first losses on the march. According to the report of the commander of the 14th mechanized corps, Oborin, by 11 o'clock the 30th tank division was on the march to the concentration area and the head of the column of the main forces reached the Poddubno area, having only one ammunition load and one fuel refueling; on the march, parts of the division were repeatedly attacked by enemy aircraft .


The advanced detachments of the German 18th Panzer Division were already moving towards the Soviet tankers. She began crossing the Bug with the 17th Panzer Division at 4:15 am. Already at 4 hours 45 minutes, the first tanks of the 18th Panzer Division crossed the river and found themselves on Soviet territory. During the boost water hazard the Germans used combat vehicles, which they had already tested during the preparation of Operation Sea Lion. The tactical and technical characteristics of these tanks allowed them to overcome water boundaries up to 4 meters deep.

It is worth noting that the 17th and 18th tank divisions were not only well-equipped with tanks, the military equipment they were armed with was qualitatively superior to the vehicles of the opposing 30th tank division, which was armed exclusively with outdated light tanks T-26 different years release and state of varying technical serviceability. As of June 22, 1941, the 17th Tank Division had 202 tanks (12 PzKpfw I, 44 PzKpfw II, 106 PzKpfw III(with a 50-mm gun), 30 PzKpfw IV and 10 command PzBef), as part of the 18th Tank Division - 218 tanks (6 PzKpfw I, 50 PzKpfw II, 99 PzKpfw III (with a 37-mm gun), 15 PzKpfw III (with a 50-mm gun) 36 PzKpfw IV and 12 command PzBef). Of the 420 tanks of these two divisions, 286 tanks, that is, more than half, were accounted for average PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV, which were superior in armor and armament to the Soviet T-26.

Submarine tanks were able to provide the invasion forces with a fairly significant advantage. They took full advantage of the moment of surprise. Already at 8:15 a.m., units of “diving” tanks break through to the important crossing of the Lesnaya River, which flows east of the Bug, capturing it intact. At 9:45, diving tanks captured another crossing of this river; it was also undamaged. Unlike the Soviet amphibious tanks T-37/38 and even the T-40, German tanks of similar purpose were not special developments, but a common adaptation of linear combat vehicles. For this reason, they had the same combat capabilities as ordinary “troikas” and “fours”, including the ability to fully engage in combat with enemy tanks.

Tank PzKpfw III 18 TD, 1941, after crossing the Western Bug River along the bottom.


However, having vigorously launched the offensive on the morning of June 22, the 2nd Panzer Group slowed down in the afternoon. To the north of Brest, by noon, sappers managed to build crossings across the Bug, but the access roads to them became a bottleneck. Leading from paved roads to the crossing, they walked through a swampy lowland, under the wheels and tracks of dozens of the most different cars approaches to crossings rapidly deteriorated. So the tractors of the 17th Panzer Division had to first pull out the trucks stuck in the mud, and then pull them to the road, which allowed movement in only one direction. In addition, in the evening, at the crossing of the same division, a bridge collapsed under a tank, which stopped the crossing of the Bug for five hours. As a result, the “diving” tanks that had rushed forward into Soviet territory were left without replenishing ammunition or refueling. The war log of the XXXXVII Motorized Corps, which included the 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions, stated: “By the late evening of June 22, only a small part of both divisions had crossed the Bug.”

Apparently, at about noon on June 22, the forward detachments of the 30th Panzer Division encountered the diving tanks of the enemy 18th Panzer Division and other advanced units of the XXXXVII Motorized Corps near the village of Pelishche.

According to reports from the Soviet side, the division came into contact with the enemy with its advanced battalions at 11 a.m., and with its main forces between 12 and 1 p.m. It was reported that the advance detachment of the division's 60th Tank Regiment entered into battle with enemy tanks in the Shchebrovo-Pelishche area. Here an oncoming tank battle unfolded, in which dozens of tanks from each side took part. As a result of the battle, the German tanks retreated a little back to the village of Vidomlya. For a short time, Soviet tank crews managed to delay their advance. At the same time, already from 14:00 in the afternoon, the division again began to be subjected to massive enemy air raids, suffering heavy losses in people and equipment from them.


At about 15 o'clock in the afternoon, the command of the 4th Army decided to begin equipping the rear defensive line on the line of the eastern bank of the Mukhavets River from Pruzhany to Bukhovichi using the forces of the motorized rifle regiment of the 205th Motorized Rifle Division and the foot units of the 30th Tank Division from the 14th MK. At the same time, the main forces of the motorized rifle division were preparing defense in the Bereza areas. But upon receiving at 6 p.m. a directive from the high command to launch counterattacks on the enemy with all available forces, the army command issued a new order: on the morning of June 23, go on the offensive with the entire 14th MK. Of course, the requirements of both the NGO directive and the order of the front and army headquarters no longer corresponded to reality and the prevailing situation. in this direction environment.

By the end of June 22, the 30th Tank Division (more than 120 T-26 tanks) was still fighting on the Pelishche, Podlesie line and with part of its forces north of Ratajchytsia. During the battle on June 22, the division lost about 25% of its personnel, 30% of its tanks, and also lost three battalion commanders and five company commanders, which indicates the intensity of the battle. At the same time, at night, only the 30th Tank Division from the corps fought, since the Germans did not stop attacks in this direction at night, advancing in the light of flares and pushing the division’s units towards Poddubno. The fact that in the battles of June 22 the 30th Panzer Division suffered serious losses is evidenced by the fact that on June 23 about 130 T-26 tanks went on the offensive from it, the rest of the vehicles were apparently destroyed or damaged during the battles June 22, enemy air raids, and also went out of order technical reasons.

About enemy losses in battles in the area settlement Pelishche knows nothing. The 18th Panzer Division reported that it had fought its way to the town of Pelishche. The combat log of the XXXXVII Motorized Corps indicated that along the road “several enemy tank detachments numbering up to 40 tanks were defeated.” These were the advanced detachments of the Soviet 30th Tank Division of Colonel Bogdanov. At the same time, the interim report of Army Group Center indicated that the 18th Panzer Division during June 22 “repelled a strong tank attack by the Russians.”

T-26 tanks from the 14th MK, abandoned in Kobrin


The counter battle that took place near the village of Pelishche was typical of the first days of the war. At that time, the Soviet command did not even allow the thought that tank forces could be used for defensive battles at a certain point. Only tank attacks were considered legal. Such attacks against advancing enemy tank units turned into oncoming tank battles, which were more beneficial to the Germans. Such a battle turned into a duel of tank crews in unequal conditions. On our side, mainly tanks took part in the battles, sometimes without infantry at all, while on the enemy’s side, tank actions were supported by artillery and aviation. It is quite natural that Soviet tank crews, already inferior in skill to their more experienced colleagues from the Panzerwaffe, suffered incomparably greater losses in such battles. German tank crews were more successful in hitting the enemy from short stops than Soviet tank crews. In addition, the enemy continuously bombed Soviet tanks. The 30th Panzer Division lost no less combat vehicles from German dive bombers than from enemy artillery and tanks.

Also, the results of the first tank battles were affected by the fact that in the spring of 1941, most of the trained senior mechanics-drivers and tank commanders were transferred with promotion to the newly formed units of the new mechanized corps. As a result of this, the tank crews were renewed; the young soldiers who took their place did not have time to undergo full combat training. At the same time, the artillery training of the crews remained very weak; the fighters did not receive proper training. At the same time, the artillery regiments of the new tank divisions were armed with only howitzers with a very limited supply of ammunition, and there was also a lack of traction equipment for the artillery. Naturally, in such conditions it was inappropriate to engage in oncoming tank battles with the enemy. At the same time, we should not forget that the use of tank units in defense at that time was not worked out in detail, there was no proper experience, and it came to the commanders of the Red Army much later.

Today, the site of the first major tank battle, which took place near the village of Pelishche, has seriously changed: a new road junction has been built at the crossroads near this settlement. Despite the fact that more than 75 years have passed since those events, traces of the battle can still be found in local fields: for example, tracks from the tracks of T-26 tanks are still found here. These are the only silent witnesses to that distant battle, the eyewitnesses of which left virtually no documentary evidence about it.

Sources of information:
http://myfront.in.ua/krasnaya-armiya/divizii/tankovye-16-30.html
Moshchansky I. B. The tragedy of the Brest Fortress. Anthology of feat. June 22 - July 23, 1941 / I. B. Moshchansky. - Moscow: Veche, 2010. - 128 p.
Isaev A.V. Unknown 1941. Stopped blitzkrieg / A.V. Isaev. - Moscow: Eksmo, 2013. - 480 p.
Materials from open sources.

Since World War I, tanks have been one of the most effective weapons of war. Their first use by the British at the Battle of the Somme in 1916 ushered in a new era - with tank wedges and lightning-fast blitzkriegs.

1 Battle of Cambrai (1917)

After failures using small tank formations, the British command decided to launch an offensive using large number tanks. Since the tanks had previously failed to live up to expectations, many considered them useless. One British officer noted: "The infantry thinks that the tanks have not justified themselves. Even the tank crews are discouraged."

According to the British command, the upcoming offensive was supposed to begin without traditional artillery preparation. For the first time in history, tanks themselves had to break through enemy defenses. The offensive at Cambrai was supposed to take the German command by surprise. The operation was prepared in strict secrecy. Tanks were transported to the front in the evening. The British constantly fired machine guns and mortars to drown out the roar of tank engines.

A total of 476 tanks took part in the offensive. The German divisions were defeated and suffered heavy losses. The well-fortified Hindenburg Line was broken through greater depth. However, during the German counter-offensive, British troops were forced to retreat. Using the remaining 73 tanks, the British managed to prevent a more serious defeat.

2 Battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody (1941)

In the first days of the war, a large-scale tank battle took place in Western Ukraine. The most powerful group of the Wehrmacht - "Center" - was advancing to the north, to Minsk and further to Moscow. The not so strong Army Group South was advancing on Kyiv. But in this direction there was the most powerful group of the Red Army - the Southwestern Front.

Already on the evening of June 22, the troops of this front received orders to encircle and destroy the advancing enemy group with powerful concentric attacks from mechanized corps, and by the end of June 24 to capture the Lublin region (Poland). It sounds fantastic, but this is if you don’t know the strength of the parties: in a giant oncoming tank battle 3,128 Soviet and 728 German tanks converged.

The battle lasted a week: from June 23 to 30. The actions of the mechanized corps were reduced to isolated counterattacks in different directions. The German command, through competent leadership, was able to repel a counterattack and defeat the armies of the Southwestern Front. The defeat was complete: Soviet troops lost 2,648 tanks (85%), the Germans lost about 260 vehicles.

3 Battle of El Alamein (1942)

The Battle of El Alamein is a key episode of the Anglo-German confrontation in North Africa. The Germans sought to cut the Allies' most important strategic highway, the Suez Canal, and were eager for Middle Eastern oil, which the Axis countries needed. The main battle of the entire campaign took place at El Alamein. As part of this battle, one of the largest tank battles in World War II took place.

The Italo-German force numbered about 500 tanks, half of which were rather weak Italian tanks. The British armored units had over 1000 tanks, among which were powerful American tanks- 170 "Grants" and 250 "Shermans".

The qualitative and quantitative superiority of the British was partly compensated by the military genius of the commander of the Italian-German troops - the famous “desert fox” Rommel.

Despite the British numerical superiority in manpower, tanks and aircraft, the British were never able to break through Rommel's defenses. The Germans even managed to counterattack, but the British superiority in numbers was so impressive that the German strike force of 90 tanks was simply destroyed in the oncoming battle.

Rommel, inferior to the enemy in armored vehicles, widely used anti-tank artillery, among which were captured Soviet 76-mm guns, which had proven themselves to be excellent. Only under the pressure of the enemy’s enormous numerical superiority, having lost almost all of its equipment, did the German army begin an organized retreat.

After El Alamein, the Germans had just over 30 tanks left. The total losses of the Italo-German troops in equipment amounted to 320 tanks. The losses of the British tank forces amounted to approximately 500 vehicles, many of which were repaired and returned to service, since the battlefield was ultimately theirs.

4 Battle of Prokhorovka (1943)

The tank battle near Prokhorovka took place on July 12, 1943 as part of the Battle of Kursk. According to official Soviet data, 800 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns and 700 German ones took part in it on both sides.

The Germans lost 350 units of armored vehicles, ours - 300. But the trick is that the Soviet tanks that took part in the battle were counted, and the German ones were those that were generally in the entire German group on the southern flank of the Kursk Bulge.

According to new, updated data, 311 German tanks and self-propelled guns of the 2nd SS Tank Corps took part in the tank battle near Prokhorovka against 597 Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army (commander Rotmistrov). The SS lost about 70 (22%), and the guards lost 343 (57%) armored vehicles.

Neither side managed to achieve its goals: the Germans failed to break through the Soviet defenses and gain operational space, and the Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.

To investigate the causes of large losses of Soviet tanks, it was created government commission. In the commission's report fighting Soviet troops near Prokhorovka were called “an example of an unsuccessful operation.” General Rotmistrov was going to be put on trial, but by that time the general situation had developed favorably, and everything worked out.

5 Battle of the Golan Heights (1973)

The major tank battle after 1945 took place during the so-called war doomsday. The war received this name because it began with a surprise attack by the Arabs during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur (Judgment Day).

Egypt and Syria sought to regain territory lost after the devastating defeat in Six Day War(1967). Egypt and Syria were helped (financially and sometimes with impressive troops) by many Islamic countries - from Morocco to Pakistan. And not only Islamic ones: distant Cuba sent 3,000 soldiers, including tank crews, to Syria.

On the Golan Heights 180 Israeli tanks were confronted by approximately 1,300 Syrians. The heights were a critical strategic position for Israel: if Israeli defenses in the Golan were breached, Syrian troops would be in the very center of the country within hours.

For several days, two Israeli tank brigades, suffering heavy losses, defended the Golan Heights from superior enemy forces. The most fierce battles took place in the “Valley of Tears”; the Israeli brigade lost from 73 to 98 tanks out of 105. The Syrians lost about 350 tanks and 200 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles.

The situation began to change radically after the reservists began to arrive. Syrian troops were stopped and then driven back to their original positions. Israeli troops launched an offensive against Damascus.

Battle of Prokhorovka- a battle between units of the German and Soviet armies during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk. It is considered one of the largest battles involving armored forces in military history. Happened on July 12, 1943 on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge in the area of ​​Prokhorovka station on the territory of the Oktyabrsky state farm ( Belgorod region RSFSR).

Direct command of the troops during the battle was carried out by Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Pavel Rotmistrov and SS Gruppenführer Paul Hausser.

Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.

Initially, the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the Yakovlevo - Oboyan operational line. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and Army Group Kempf went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, in position 6- On the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions to the 1st and 7th Guards armies. On July 6, two counterattacks were launched against the advancing Germans from the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki (northern) - Kalinin area by the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repelled by the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

To provide assistance to Katukov's 1st Tank Army, which was waging heavy fighting in the Oboyan direction, the Soviet command prepared a second counterattack. At 23:00 on July 7, front commander Nikolai Vatutin signed directive No. 0014/op on readiness for the transition to active actions from 10:30 on the 8th. However, the counterattack carried out by the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, although it eased the pressure on the 1st TA brigades, did not bring tangible results.

Having not achieved decisive success - by this time the depth of advance of the advancing troops in the well-prepared Soviet defense in the Oboyan direction was only about 35 kilometers - the German command on the evening of July 9 decided, without stopping the offensive on Oboyan, to shift the spearhead of the main attack in the direction of Prokhorovka and reach Kursk through the bend of the Psel River.

By July 11, the Germans took their starting positions to capture Prokhorovka. By this time, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army was concentrated in positions northeast of the station, which, being in reserve, on July 6 received an order to make a 300-kilometer march and take up defense at the Prokhorovka-Vesely line. From this area it was planned to launch a counterattack with the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards Armies. However, in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms, as well as two separate tank corps (2nd and 2nd Guards), were able to go on the attack; the rest fought defensive battles against the advancing German units. Opposing the front of the Soviet offensive were the 1st Leibstandarte-SS Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".

It should be noted that by this time the German offensive on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge had already begun to dry up - from July 10, the advancing units began to go on the defensive.

When the battle for Ponyri was lost by the Germans, a radical turning point occurred in the entire Battle of Kursk. And in order to somehow turn the combat situation differently, in their favor, the Germans brought in tank troops near Prokhorovka.

Strengths of the parties

Traditionally, Soviet sources indicate that about 1,500 tanks took part in the battle: about 800 from the Soviet side and 700 from the German side (eg TSB). In some cases, a slightly lower figure is indicated - 1200.

Many modern researchers they believe that the forces brought into the battle were probably significantly smaller. In particular, it is indicated that the battle took place in a narrow area (8-10 km wide), which was limited on one side by the Psel River and on the other by a railway embankment. It is difficult to introduce such significant masses of tanks into such an area.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE

Official Soviet version

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area occurred on the evening of July 11. According to the recollections of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17 o’clock he, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by two tank brigades.

At 8 am Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18, 29, 2 and 2 Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle, Soviet tank crews gained a significant advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west.

Very soon the battle formations were mixed. The high density of the battle, during which tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tank crews were able to target the most vulnerable spots of heavily armored German vehicles.

Battle formations mixed up. From a direct hit from shells, the tanks exploded at full speed. The towers were torn off, the caterpillars flew to the sides. No individual shots were heard. There was a continuous roar. There were moments when in the smoke we distinguished our own and German tanks only by their silhouettes. Tankers jumped out of burning vehicles and rolled on the ground, trying to put out the flames.

By 14 o'clock the Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy in a western direction. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

Russian historian V.N. Zamulin notes the lack of a clear presentation of the course of hostilities, the lack of a serious analysis of the operational situation, the composition of the warring factions and the decisions made, subjectivity in assessing the significance of the Prokhorov battle in Soviet historiography and the use of this topic in propaganda work. Instead of an impartial study of the battle, Soviet historians until the early 1990s created the myth of “the largest tank battle in the history of war.” At the same time, there are other versions of this battle.

Version based on the memoirs of German generals

Based on the memoirs of German generals (Guderian, Mellenthin, etc.), about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle, of which about 270 were knocked out (meaning only the morning battle on July 12). Aviation did not take part in the battle; even reconnaissance aircraft did not fly from the German side. The collision of the tank masses was unexpected for both sides, since both tank groups were solving their offensive tasks and did not expect to meet a serious enemy.

According to Rotmistrov’s recollections, the groups moved towards each other not “head-on”, but at a noticeable angle. The Germans were the first to notice the Soviet tanks and managed to reorganize and prepare for battle. The light and most of the medium vehicles attacked from the flank and forced Rotmistrov’s tankers to pay full attention to themselves, who began to change the direction of the attack on the move. This caused inevitable confusion and allowed the Tiger company, supported by self-propelled guns and part of the medium tanks, to unexpectedly attack from the other side. Soviet tanks found themselves under crossfire, and only a few saw where the second attack was coming from.

The tank battle took place only in the direction of the first German attack; the “tigers” fired without interference, as if in a shooting range (some crews claimed up to 30 victories. It was not a battle, but a beating.

Nevertheless, Soviet tank crews managed to disable a quarter of the German tanks. The corps was forced to stop for two days. By that time, Soviet counterattacks had begun on the flanks of the German strike groups and the further offensive of the corps became hopeless. As at Borodino in 1812, tactical defeat ultimately became victory.

According to the version of the famous Western historian, professor of the royal department modern history Cambridge University (UK) Richard J. Evans, The Battle of Kursk is by no means over Soviet victory, although for some reason the Germans retreated all the time after this battle (which Evans is still forced to admit). The quality of this scientist’s research can be assessed at least by the fact that greatest number There were about 8 thousand Soviet tanks (according to Western sources) that the Red Army could use in the Battle of Kursk (Zetterling and Frankson), of which, according to Evans, 10 thousand were lost by the end of the battle. Evans writes about Prokhorovka:

Rotmistrov's units (more than 800 tanks) moved out from the rear and covered up to 380 km in just three days. Leaving some of them in reserve, he threw 400 vehicles from the northeast and 200 from the east against the battle-weary German forces, which were taken completely by surprise. With only 186 armored vehicles, of which only 117 were tanks, the German forces faced the threat of complete destruction. But the Soviet tank crews, tired after three days continuous forced march, they did not notice the huge anti-tank trench four and a half meters deep, dug shortly before in preparation for the battle. The first rows of T-34s fell straight into the ditch, and when those behind finally saw the danger, they began to turn aside in panic, crash into each other and catch fire, as the Germans opened fire in the meantime. By mid-afternoon, the Germans reported that 190 Soviet tanks had been destroyed or disabled. The scale of the losses seemed so incredible that the commander personally arrived on the battlefield to make sure of this. The loss of so many tanks infuriated Stalin, who threatened to put Rotmistrov on trial. To save himself, the general agreed with his immediate superiors and member of the front’s military council, Nikita Khrushchev, to claim that the tanks were knocked out during a major battle in which heroic Soviet troops destroyed more than 400 German tanks. This report later became the source of a persistent legend, which noted Prokhorovka as the site of “the largest tank battle in history.” In fact, it was one of the biggest military fiascos in history. The Soviet army lost a total of 235 tanks, the Germans - three. Rotmistrov became a hero, and today a large monument has been erected on this site.

The Battle of Kursk ended not with a Soviet victory, but with Hitler’s order to end it. However, ultimately the fiasco at Prokhorovka had no real value for the general balance of power in the Kursk region. Overall, German losses in this battle were relatively light: 252 tanks against almost 2,000 Soviet tanks, about 500 artillery pieces against almost 4,000 on the Soviet side, 159 aircraft against almost 2,000 Soviet fighters and bombers, 54,000 in manpower compared to nearly 320,000 Soviet troops. And since soviet armies advanced along the front, instead of breaking through it, they suffered further huge losses. By the time the counteroffensive ended, on August 23, 1943, the Red Army as a whole had suffered approximately 1,677,000 killed, wounded or missing against 170,000 Germans; more than 6,000 tanks - compared to 760 for the Germans; 5,244 artillery pieces - compared to about 700 on the German side and more than 4,200 aircraft versus 524 for the Germans. In general, in July and August 1943, the Red Army lost almost 10,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and the Germans only a little over 1300. And yet the Germans were much less able to withstand their much smaller losses. “From here onwards” they were in continuous retreat.

According to V.N. Zamulin, July 12, 1943 in the 5th Guards. A and 5th Guards. At least 7,019 soldiers and commanders were out of action in the TA. Losses of four corps and the vanguard of the 5th Guards. The tanks consisted of 340 tanks and 17 self-propelled guns, of which 194 were burned out, and 146 could be restored. But due to the fact that most of the damaged combat vehicles ended up in territory controlled by by German troops, cars that were to be restored were also lost. Thus, a total of 53% of the army’s armored vehicles that took part in the counterattack were lost. According to V.N. Zamulin,
the main reason for the high loss of tanks and the failure to complete the tasks of the 5th Guards. TA was the incorrect use of a tank army of a homogeneous composition, ignoring the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 325 of October 16, 1942, which accumulated the experience accumulated over the previous years of the war in the use of armored forces. The dispersion of strategic reserves in an unsuccessful counterattack had a significant impact negative impact on the results of the final stage of the Kursk defensive operation.

The counterattack of Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area was an expected move for the Germans. Back in the spring of 1943, more than a month before the offensive, the option of repelling a counterattack from the Prokhorovka area was being worked out, and units of the II SS Panzer Corps knew very well what to do. Instead of moving to Oboyan, the SS divisions “Leibstandarte” and “Totenkopf” exposed themselves to the counterattack of P. A. Rotmistrov’s army. As a result, the planned flank counterattack degenerated into a head-on collision with large German tank forces. The 18th and 29th tank corps lost up to 70% of their tanks and were actually taken out of the game...

Despite this, the operation took place in a very tense situation, and only offensive, and I emphasize, offensive actions of other fronts made it possible to avoid a catastrophic development of events.

However, the German offensive ended in failure, and the Germans did not undertake any more such large-scale attacks near Kursk.

According to German data, the battlefield remained behind them and they were able to evacuate most of the damaged tanks, some of which were subsequently restored and brought back into battle.

In addition to their own vehicles, the Germans also “stole” several Soviet ones. After Prokhorovka, the corps already had 12 thirty-fours. The losses of Soviet tankers amounted to at least 270 vehicles (of which only two tanks were heavy) in the morning battle and a couple of dozen more during the day - according to the recollections of the Germans, small groups of Soviet tanks and even individual vehicles appeared on the battlefield until the evening. It was probably the stragglers on the march who were catching up.

However, having disabled a quarter of the enemy’s tanks (and given the qualitative balance of forces of the parties and the surprise of the attack, this was extremely difficult), the Soviet tankers forced him to stop and, ultimately, abandon the offensive.

Paul Hausser's 2nd Panzer Corps (actually only as part of the Leibstandarte division) was transferred to Italy.

Losses

Estimates of combat losses in different sources vary greatly. General Rotmistrov claims that about 700 tanks were disabled on both sides during the day. The official Soviet “History of the Great Patriotic War” provides information about 350 shot down German cars. G. Oleinikov criticizes this figure; according to his calculations, more than 300 German tanks could not have taken part in the battle. He estimates Soviet losses at 170-180 vehicles. According to the report presented to Stalin by Headquarters representative A.M. Vasilevsky following the battle, “within two days of fighting, Rotmistrov’s 29th Tank Corps lost 60% of its tanks, irretrievably and temporarily out of action, and the 18th Corps, up to 30% of its tanks.” To this must be added significant infantry losses. During the battles of July 11-12, the 95th and 9th Guards Divisions of the 5th Guards Army suffered the greatest losses. The first lost 3,334 people, including almost 1,000 killed and 526 missing. 9th Guards The airborne division lost 2525, killed - 387 and missing - 489. According to the military archive of the Federal Republic of Germany, the 2nd SS Tank Corps lost 4178 people from July 10 to July 16 (approximately 16% combat personnel), including killed - 755, wounded - 3351 and missing - 68. In the battle on July 12, he lost: killed - 149 people, wounded - 660, missing - 33, in total - 842 soldiers and officers. 3 Tank Corps lost 8,489 people from July 5 to July 20, of which approximately 2,790 people were lost on the approaches to Prokhorovka from July 12 to July 16. Based on the data provided, both corps (six tank and two infantry divisions) lost about 7 thousand soldiers and officers from July 10 to 16 in the battles near Prokhorovka. The ratio of human losses is about 6:1 in favor of the enemy. Depressing numbers. Especially considering that our troops defended themselves with superiority in forces and means over the advancing enemy. Unfortunately, the facts indicate that by July 1943, our troops had not yet fully mastered the science of winning with little bloodshed.

Based on materials from wikipedia.org

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, 1943, the largest tank battle of World War II took place.

Battle of Prokhorovka became the culmination of a grandiose strategic operation, which went down in history as one that was decisive in ensuring a radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War.

The events of those days unfolded as follows. Hitler's command planned to carry out a major offensive in the summer of 1943, seize the strategic initiative and turn the tide of the war in its favor. For this purpose, a military operation codenamed “Citadel” was developed and approved in April 1943.
Having information about the preparation of the Nazi troops for an offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive in the Kursk salient and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike forces. Thus it was planned to create favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive.
July 12, 1943 near the railway station Prokhorovka(56 km north of Belgorod), the advancing German tank group (4th Tank Army, Task Force Kempf) was stopped by a counterattack by Soviet troops (5th Guards Army, 5th Guards). Initially, the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the Yakovlevo - Oboyan operational line. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and Army Group Kempf went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, in position 6- On the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions to the 1st and 7th Guards armies. On July 6, two counterattacks were launched against the advancing Germans from the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki (northern) - Kalinin area by the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repelled by the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps.
To provide assistance to Katukov's 1st Tank Army, which was waging heavy fighting in the Oboyan direction, the Soviet command prepared a second counterattack. At 23:00 on July 7, front commander Nikolai Vatutin signed directive No. 0014/op on readiness to begin active operations from 10:30 on the 8th. However, the counterattack carried out by the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, although it eased the pressure on the 1st TA brigades, did not bring tangible results.
Having not achieved decisive success - by this time the depth of advance of the advancing troops in the well-prepared Soviet defense in the Oboyan direction was only about 35 kilometers - the German command, in accordance with its plans, shifted the spearhead of the main attack in the direction of Prokhorovka with the intention of reaching Kursk through the bend of the Psel River . The change in direction of the attack was due to the fact that, according to the plans of the German command, it was in the bend of the Psel River that it seemed most appropriate to meet the inevitable counterattack of the superior Soviet tank reserves. If the village of Prokhorovka was not occupied by German troops before the arrival of Soviet tank reserves, it was planned to suspend the offensive altogether and temporarily go on the defensive, in order to take advantage of the favorable terrain, preventing the Soviet tank reserves from escaping from the narrow defile formed by the swampy floodplain. the Psel River and the railway embankment, and prevent them from realizing their numerical advantage by covering the flanks of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

Destroyed German tank

By July 11, the Germans took their starting positions to capture Prokhorovka. Probably having intelligence data about the presence of Soviet tank reserves, the German command took action to repel the inevitable counterattack of the Soviet troops. The 1st division of the Leibstandarte-SS "Adolf Hitler", better equipped than other divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, took a defile and on July 11 did not undertake attacks in the direction of Prokhorovka, pulling up anti-tank weapons and preparing defensive positions. On the contrary, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" supporting its flanks waged active offensive battles outside the defile on July 11, trying to improve their position (in particular, the 3rd Panzer Division covering the left flank The SS Totenkopf expanded the bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psel River, managing to transport a tank regiment to it on the night of July 12, providing flanking fire on the expected Soviet tank reserves in the event of an attack through the defile). By this time, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army was concentrated in positions northeast of the station, which, being in reserve, on July 6 received an order to make a 300-kilometer march and take up defense at the Prokhorovka-Vesely line. Concentration area of ​​the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards combined arms armies was chosen by the command of the Voronezh Front, taking into account the threat of a breakthrough by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of the Soviet defense in the Prokhorovsk direction. On the other hand, the choice of the indicated area for the concentration of two guards armies in the Prokhorovka area, in the event of their participation in a counterattack, inevitably led to a head-on collision with the strongest enemy group (2nd SS Panzer Corps), and given the nature of the defile, it excluded the possibility of covering the flanks of the defender in this direction of the 1st Leibstandarte-SS Division "Adolf Hitler". The frontal counterattack on July 12 was planned to be carried out by the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards armies. However, in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms, as well as two separate tank corps (2nd and 2nd Guards), were able to go on the attack; the rest fought defensive battles against the advancing German units. Opposing the front of the Soviet offensive were the 1st Leibstandarte-SS Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".

Destroyed German tank

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area occurred on the evening of July 11. According to the recollections of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17 o’clock he, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by two tank brigades.
At 8 am, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18, 29, 2 and 2 Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle, the Soviet tank crews gained some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. The high density of the battle, during which tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tank crews were able to target the most vulnerable spots of heavily armored German vehicles.
To the south of the main battle, the German tank group “Kempf” was advancing, which sought to enter the advancing Soviet group on the left flank. The threat of envelopment forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction.
At about 13:00, the Germans withdrew the 11th Tank Division from reserve, which, together with the Death's Head division, struck the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to their aid and the attack was repulsed.
By 2 p.m., Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy westward. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

This day was the coldest in the history of weather observations. July 12 was in 1887 year, when the average daily temperature in Moscow was +4.7 degrees Celsius, and the warmest was in 1903 year. That day the temperature rose to +34.5 degrees.

See also:

Ice battle
Battle of Borodino
German attack on the USSR