Who created the concentration camps in the USSR. Some facts from the history of Auschwitz. Concentrating factories of Dalstroy NKVD

Despite the fact that the concept of "concentration camp" is associated with the Third Reich, it appeared long before the events of World War II. The first concentration camps appeared during the Anglo-Boer Wars in late XIX century, and after they were created not only in Germany, but also in other countries. Numerous Soviet concentration camps also entered the history.

The first concentration camps in Soviet Russia appeared in May 1918 on the orders of the revolutionary Leon Trotsky. The idea to create such camps came with the disbandment of the Czechoslovak Corps. It was a formation within the Russian army, created in the fall of 1917 from captured Slovaks and Czechs, former servicemen of Austria-Hungary, who expressed a desire to participate in the war against Germany.

In the spring and summer of 1918, this corps was involved in hostilities against the Soviet regime. Thanks to the rebellion raised by the corps in Siberia, the Volga region, the Urals and the Far East, conditions were created for the formation of anti-Soviet governments, armed actions of the White troops against the Soviet government began. On May 29, Trotsky issued a decree on the liquidation and disarmament of "all Czecho-Slovaks", as well as on the execution of those who opposed the measures of the Soviet government.

In Soviet Russia, concentration camps began to be called "forced labor camps". It did not take long to build them, as they were created on the basis of camps from the First World War, vacated after the exchange of prisoners of war. They ended up in the Soviet "labor camps" not for some kind of "guilt" before the new government and not prisoners of war, but interned persons, unreliable, who had relatives abroad, who themselves were former citizens of hostile states, etc.

During the civil war in Russia in 1917-1923, the so-called Red Terror was carried out, a set of punitive measures by the Bolsheviks against "class enemies" (kulaks, priests, White Guards, etc.) and persons accused of counter-revolutionary activities. On July 23, 1918, the Soviet authorities made a new decision to create "labor camps". Already in August of this year, concentration camps appear in different cities of Russia. Some of these camps, created in 1918-1919, did not last long, but some of them functioned for several years, were reorganized, and today there are real places of detention on their basis.

Orlovsky camp of captured officers. 1920-1922.

Position former officers in Soviet Russia is still a little-studied problem, despite the intensification of research in the late 1980s. This is especially true for participants white movement, for only a few of which there are separate biographical articles. Fundamental works A.G. Kavtaradze and S.T. Minakov are dedicated to the highest command staff of the Red Army. The historian of the White movement S.V. Volkov reduced the question of the fate of former officers solely to repressions against them, hardly substantiating a number of a priori and ideologically biased statements with sources, which prejudicedly schematizes and even distorts many facts. Ya.Yu. Tinchenko also emphasizes anti-officer repressions, although he cites the most valuable documentary supplements that go far beyond the limits of his author's concept. Other authors, even based on solid factual material, give their works a pronounced journalistic character (for example, N.S. Cherushev). Historiographically, the former whites who remained in their native land were much less fortunate than their fellow emigrants.

The only work devoted to forced labor camps in the Oryol province is a short review article by A.Yu. Saran, in which the prisoners and defectors of the White armies are only mentioned along with other categories of prisoners. This publication contains a number of notable factual inaccuracies.

The completely chaotic and indiscriminate isolation of officers determines the arbitrariness of the studied social material and thereby ensures the relative objectivity of this sample, and hence its representativeness.

In 1920, three camps for captured officers of the White Army operated in the Oryol province. There is extremely scarce information about the Mtsensk camp. It was organized for the urgent accommodation of 2000 Wrangel prisoners, functioned in November 1920 - May 1921, and the stay of prisoners in it combined labor activity and active propaganda. For example, the Day of the Red Barracks was held, which was more like campaigning with pre-conscripts than strict isolation, and as a result there were repeated escapes. The Mtsensk prisoner of war camp can be safely called a soldier's camp, since even among the 401 prisoners for a period until the end of the civil war there was not a single officer.
The Yelets camp was organized in October 1920 to unload the Orlovsky camp, the size of the contingent in which at that time was more than twice the regular one (844 people against 400 places). 120 prisoners from Orel were transferred to Yelets and "small batches of prisoners of war from the Wrangel Front", exclusively ordinary ones, were received, and single officers who happened to be caught were immediately transported to Orel.

The Orlovsky forced labor concentration camp (also called concentration camp No. 1, since the provincial center also had camp No. 2 - especially for captured Poles) was the focus of officers and military officials, although the majority of the general contingent of prisoners were civilians. This is the logic of the entire system of isolation of former whites, when officers and officials were kept separately from soldiers.

However, the Orlovsky concentration camp was in no way a "death camp", like the Arkhangelsk and Kholmogory concentration camps, since executions were not carried out in it at all. The main thing in his activity was not only the isolation of white officers and military officials, but also their repeated, more thorough filtering. To do this, a detailed survey and comparison with previous information was carried out. Almost all the prisoners successfully passed the primary, most stringent check in the filtration commissions of the army Special Departments and, according to their decisions, were sent to Oryol before the end of the civil war. The second stage was the provincial commission for the analysis of cases of prisoners of war officers, consisting of: from the Special Department of the gubChK - A. Terekhov (chairman), from the district military commissariat - Meshchevtsev and from the sub-department of forced labor of the provincial executive committee - Zobkov.

It is the questionnaires that are the main source in the study of the social and ideological characteristics of former officers who remained in Soviet Russia and ended up in a concentration camp. First of all, they contain extensive information about class, service and professional, marital status prisoners. But no less important is the presence of assessments of the Red and White armies, which were required when filling out the forms and which allow us to judge the psychological specifics and socio-political moods of this category of former officers. At the same time, there can be no question of the complete adequacy of the survey, since its very violent nature provoked the concealment and distortion of a number of information. With regard to facts, this concerns, first of all, class affiliation, service in the old army and with the whites, ways of getting captured and family ties. In terms of worldview - quite understandable conformism, glossing over the assessments of the Bolshevik regime and political naivety.

However, an objective analysis of such subjective sources is quite possible thanks to a critical comparison of personal materials and information from the Chekists, who almost always revealed false and - more rarely - hidden information and set them out in detail in the resolution. It should be emphasized that this often did not even require complex verification (interrogation of colleagues, study of personal documents), since obvious contradictions were sometimes contained in the questionnaires themselves.

During a long search, 743 prisoners were identified by name - former officers and 43 - former military officials. Questionnaires and other personal biographical documents are available for 282 officers, and the remaining 461 are known only from lists, and in relation to 365 there is no indication of either the previous rank or the region of participation in the White movement. Therefore, even the most general analysis is possible for only 378 officers. The number of officers in different thematic sections inevitably varies, due to uneven information.

The vast majority of prisoners were taken prisoner in the spring of 1920, after the defeat of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia and the infamous Novorossiysk evacuation. At least 280 officers (96.3%) were named "Denikinites". "Kolchak" were only 14 (3.7%). Only one wartime official, N.A. Lisovsky, was distinguished by a very special service past - during the First World War he was a private, was captured, fled, served as treasurer of the rear department of Russian troops in France (Rennes), and in 1919 ended up in northern army General E.K. Miller and after the departure of the Whites remained in Arkhangelsk.

Captured white officers began to arrive in the Orlovsky concentration camp in June 1920. The simultaneous number did not exceed 287 people (as of October 1, 1920), and often did not reach even a hundred. It is also necessary to take into account the carelessness of the camp documentation regarding the registration of prisoners, surprising for such an important matter.

At the same time, the composition of the prisoners was not constant - some moved to other places of isolation. This rotation was caused by three reasons. Firstly, white officers were isolated strictly outside the places of their former residence - there are practically no local natives in the Oryol concentration camp, but there are many Cossacks. The only exception was Lieutenant E.A. Stuart, who, having been born in Orel, deftly concealed this in the questionnaire - indicating that he comes from the nobility of Riga. Secondly, there was a gradual disbandment of large officer camps in order to avoid an excessive and dangerous concentration of prisoners in the center of Russia - according to some reports, it was in July that the partial unloading of the Kozhukhovsky camp near Moscow, still not noticed by researchers, began. The third reason is interconnected with the second and consists in attracting some of the captured officers to the service.

Former white officers fell into the hands of the enemy in different ways. Information about this is available only in the questionnaires, that is, 249 officers, while the rest are missing. The lion's share - 58.2% - were voluntarily surrendered alone (101 people) and participants in mass surrenders (44 people). This was especially true of the Cossack regiments abandoned by the Volunteer Corps of Lieutenant General A.P. Kutepov in Novorossiysk without means of evacuation, as well as the troops of Major General N.A. Morozov, who initially retreated in marching order. Others simply deserted from the whites during the fighting - 13 people, or 5.2% - and four first switched to the "greens". Still others were abandoned during the retreat in the infirmaries - 25 people (10.1%). The fourth remained in their native area due to the impossibility of evacuation and did not consider themselves prisoners, since they did not surrender to the Red Army - 18 people (7.2%). Nine people (3.6%) were arrested only after appearing for officer registration, four more (1.6%) were previously dismissed by the Whites from the army, and five (2.0%) denied participation in the White movement at all. Only three officers (1.2%) were captured in action. A considerable number did not indicate the method of captivity (27 people, or 10.9%).

Consequently, 132 officers (53.0%) voluntarily left the whites (individually surrendered, deserters and remained at home), 48 (19.3%) due to circumstances beyond their control (participants in mass surrenders and dismissed) - 48 (19.3%), and / 82 / against of their own will (captured in a combat situation and abandoned by the wounded) - only 28 (11.3%). As a result, we can partly agree with the white memoirists and the researchers who followed them, who stated that the most unstable element was eliminated in the event of a defeat. It is obvious that an insignificant proportion of those taken prisoner in a combat situation is due not so much to steadfastness (refuted by the large number of defectors), but to the small chances of escaping reprisal and getting into the camp. At the same time, the departure from the doomed struggle testified not only to demoralization and self-preservation, but also to undoubted courage (given the complete uncertainty of the future), as well as to a worldview change.

Quite interesting and revealing are the prisoners' answers to the last question of the questionnaire: "What is your opinion about the Red and White armies?" It would seem that this is only an elementary test of the degree of hostility. But the staff of the commission for the analysis of the cases of prisoners of war officers could not help but take into account the subjectivity of the prisoners, who even purely psychologically tried to demonstrate loyalty. It must also be remembered that the question was addressed to the military, allowing an indirect assessment of their professionalism.

As a rule, most officers answered briefly, in a poster style, and it could not be otherwise - they simply could not have an objective opinion about the Reds, or it was short-sighted and dangerous to express it. Some were limited common phrases, which would obviously sing aloud through their teeth: “About Red, positive, about White, negative.” But many questionnaires are full of verbose, albeit monotonous, up to a literal repetition of phrases, which are simply boring to quote because of their predictability. “The Red Army is the winner of the Whites and the liberator of the working people”, “The Red Army relies on the idea of ​​the majority of the working people, and therefore it is stronger than the White Army, which relies on a minority of capitalists”, “In its spirit and idea, the Red Army must definitely defeat the White Army”, “Down with the White Army, long live the Red Army as an expression of the interests of the working people!”, “The White Army is an army of scoundrels” (15). As we can see, the answers are declarative and contain neither awareness of the "idea" nor understanding of the "spirit" of Bolshevism. Many frankly went too far, arguing, for example, that "the White aspires only to the monarchy", "the Red Army is waging war for the liberation of the working people from tsarism, the White - to bourgeois privilege." Even taking into account the political inexperience of the officers, such answers are far-fetched and contradictory: the monarchy fell without the participation of the Bolsheviks, and the protection of the “bourgeoisie” attributed to the whites does not fit well with “tsarism”. In an effort to ritually curse the White movement, the demoralized officers did not think about what their own participation in it would look like in this case. Therefore, such statements were not met with much confidence by the inspectors.
Some tried to answer as streamlined as possible, mainly based on their version of non-participation in the Whites: “I did not serve in either army and by definition I can’t say anything”, “I have a negative opinion about the White Army, why I and did not take an active part in it. I have not yet formed an opinion about the Red Army, since I do not know it and have not had the opportunity to get to know it. The impression of her last arrival is the best, ”and someone was completely limited to a dash. The answer given in the second quotation is very cleverly composed - the reasons for evading service are indirectly motivated not only by the Whites, but also by the Reds.

However, some of the officers spoke much more frankly and more specifically. Evaluating the White Army also negatively, they clearly indicate not political, but organizational shortcomings, and often contrast it with the Red Army: “The White Army does not exist now due to its decay. The Red Army is completely organized and disciplined”, “In the Red Army I was struck by order and discipline”, “The White Army, in which there was no discipline and there were mainly robberies, violence, pushed the entire working people away from itself and came to the conclusion that one part she began to desert or settle in the rear, and the other began to go over to the side of the red troops in masses, which is why she finally collapsed, ""... I saw among the commanding persons the former embezzlement, drunkenness, envy of other people's successes, brutal attitudes towards the younger brethren." At the same time, personal discontent often slips through, so characteristic of the masses of ordinary officers: “The White Army fell apart due to internal intrigues”, “There was chaos in the White Army, lack of discipline, speculation and bribery among the command staff”, “The White Army decomposed due to robbery and the fact that the leaders cared little for her, and thus she died a natural death”, “At this time I respect the Red Army more. About Belaya [opinion] is the worst, because she robbed my house. Recall that 25 questioned officers were left wounded and sick. And disappointment in the White movement sometimes became stronger than antipathy for Bolshevism.

Finally, three of them openly declared their desire to serve in the Red Army, although they were guided not by “ideas”, but by subjective career considerations: “I’m tired of being a worker, as I have been all my life ... to live as they lived - it’s better to die for the truth of labor ! It is quite obvious and understandable this passionate desire of the former ensign from non-commissioned officers M.I. Bondarev to maintain his new social status in order to avoid returning to his former peasant state. The personnel officer, Colonel V.K. Bush, who joined the Red Army “voluntarily on the very first day of registration,” subtly suggested the need to return him to the troops: “After the victories won over Kolchak, Denikin and the Don army, the victory over the Polish army seems to me a task that the Red Army will solve with one blow." However, being a quartermaster, he was clearly not eager to fight and meant returning to the recent "warm" place - to the supply department of the 21st Soviet rifle division.

It is significant that individual officers spoke about the White movement without derogation: “The White Army was strong in spirit when it was not an army, but a detachment at the very beginning of it, when it was led by Kornilov, and then its fighting qualities began to fall lower and lower, and the larger it was in numbers, the worse it became as a fighting force", "The White Army existed as long as it was dominated by volunteers", "The White Army, which at first proclaimed the slogans of democracy and equality of classes, in connection with the successes on the fronts (July 1919) became the "pillar" of the reaction", "Both armies strive for the good of the state and the people, but according to their views." Such answers required not only courage, but also certain convictions, indicating the presence of a moral core and hard character. This demonstrates independence of opinion, that is, a state far from frightened conformism.

Of the 282 officers, six (2.1%) indicated membership or sympathy for socialist parties. One belonged to the Bolshevik Party and two called themselves sympathizers, moreover, with the mention of specific party organizations. Another turned out to be an internationalist Menshevik and two sympathizers with the Left SRs. But, supposing to arouse sympathy with their left-wing convictions, under the conditions of a one-party dictatorship, on the contrary, they could only worsen the impression of themselves.

The results obtained on the basis of the systematization of personal biographical data, which were identified in all the sources used, deserve close analysis.

The question of the ranks of former white officers is beyond the scope of a simple statistical review and can be analyzed in two ways.

On the one hand, these are the general trends in the production of ranks, which quite clearly distinguished between personnel and wartime officers. It is known that by 1917 the rank of staff captain was considered the “ceiling” for a wartime officer, while the surviving regular officers, as a rule, rose to at least the rank of captain. Among the 378 prisoners of the Orlovsky concentration camp there were two colonels (0.5%), four lieutenant colonels (1.1%), 16 captains (4.2%) and five more officers (1.3%), who did not indicate the rank, but were assigned to personnel. However, three more career officers who had lower ranks should be added to them - staff captain A.A. Samokhin and lieutenants L.F. Kuznetsova and V.A. Karpitsky. It would seem that this raises their proportion among prisoners to 7.9%. It is symptomatic that both colonels expressed assessments of the Red Army in the questionnaires that were close to admiration and, it seems, quite sincere. They were fascinated by the discipline of the victorious troops and, despite their age (53 and 54), they clearly would not mind continuing military service; in addition, the colonels, burdened with families and children, were vitally interested in stability.

However, when identifying officers, both special departments and local commissions for the analysis of prisoners of war cases were guided, first of all, by educational criteria, that is, the main attention was paid to the professional level and quality of training. The authorities were interested in military professionals, and not in the social stratum of former career officers in general. Among the above-mentioned persons, one officer was included who graduated from the cadet corps and military school, but belongs to the age group of wartime officers (24 years old). Six holders of "personnel" ranks - Yesauls A.M. Baranov, A.F. Ezhov, P.V. Peshikov, I.P. Svinarev and captains P.N. Korostelev and E.F. Mednis - were wartime officers. This is due to further promotion in the ranks during the years of the civil war, in which there were cases of promotion to colonels and even major generals of former wartime officers, and even persons without a military education. Worthy of mention is the only mistake of the investigation, when L.I. Matushevsky was recognized as a career captain, despite the clearly inappropriate age of twenty-two. As a result of career officers in the Oryol concentration camp, there were 23 people. It should be borne in mind that the rank of lieutenant colonel in the VSYUR was abolished, and its indication in the questionnaire either meant a deliberate underestimation, or could mean sending a retired officer to the camp, who did not serve with the Whites.

On the other hand, chinoproizvodstvo in the Volunteer Army had an arbitrary-chaotic character and at first was mainly an individual award meaning. Then a practice arose in the AFSR, which can be conditionally called "general production." In September 1919, by order of the Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General A.I. Denikin, all warrant officers were renamed second lieutenants, with the abolition of the rank of warrant officer; other ranks were not affected by production. In June 1920, Wrangel issued an order "on the production of all officers up to and including the staff captain" in the next rank.

It is quite clear that most of all among the prisoners were second lieutenants - 113 people (29.9%), followed by lieutenants - 80 people (21.2%) and staff captains - 35 people (9.3%). Regarding the 72 people (19.0%), who / 85 / were ensigns, some doubts arise in the light of the abolition of this rank by Denikin. True, 34 of them wore the Cossack rank of cornet, which was not abolished. Of the remaining 38 people, 32 (8.5%) simply indicated only the first officer rank and hid the subsequent ones (with the exception of six Kolchak ensigns, since this rank was not canceled in the East). Even graduates of accelerated courses of military schools and ensign schools in 1915-1916 did this, which looked completely implausible. Considering the huge losses (as M.M. Zoshchenko, who had risen from ensigns, wrote, the owner of this rank on the front of the First World War lived an average of 12 days), the survivors by 1917 had already become lieutenants, and even staff captains. At the same time, the investigation itself, which at first operated with the concept of “the last rank of the old army”, and not among the whites, intensified the confusion.

Let us make a reservation that in the analysis of the underestimation of ranks there may be a slight error. It is connected with the possible presence among those arrested of persons who did not serve with the Whites and therefore reported the ranks as of 1917. But in fact, it seems to be scanty, since it was extremely problematic for a former officer to evade mobilization even among the whites. And even those who, living in the white territory, could succeed, in the eyes of the Bolsheviks did not have any confidence. It is characteristic that such an attitude persisted even after seventeen years, which was very clearly expressed by the divisional commander I.R. Apanasenko (by the way, a former warrant officer): “What captain can sit at home at this time! At that time I was fighting, and then suddenly the captain was sitting at home. Let me be stabbed so that I believe.

Characteristically, the ranks of 14 officers (3.7%) were established during the investigation and are indicated only in the resolutions of the questionnaires. Finally, 22 people (5.8%), being officers, did not indicate their ranks at all, and 29 (7.7%) limited themselves to indicating the position of a junior officer, and even the Chekists failed to establish them. Together with false ensigns, an impressive result is obtained - 25.7%. This partly explains the preventive motives for confining a number of officers to a concentration camp: resolutions often cited the following grounds for confinement to a concentration camp - “As not giving accurate testimony about himself”, “As an unreliable element”, “Suspicious person”, etc.

Even more than the ranks, the imprisoned officers tried to hide the details of their participation in the White movement. Among 282 officers, 14 people, or 5.0%, generally denied serving with the Whites. Others in every way emphasized its rear or non-combatant character - 28 and 26 people, respectively, which in total is 19.2%. Still others did not indicate the name of the military unit - 89 people (31.6%). Hiding the place of service was the most effective way, since only 13 officers managed to find out during the investigation. But at the same time, such behavior aroused the greatest distrust of the Bolsheviks.

At the same time, the personal data of the prisoners seriously correct - if not refute - the categorical statement of the same S.V. Volkov, as if all officers, military officials and soldiers of the “colored” regiments were subject to total execution. So, in the Orlovsky concentration camp there were 27 officers of registered units - 2 Kornilovites, 5 Markovites, 10 Drozdovites and 10 Alekseevites, which accounted for 9.6% of the surveyed prisoners. Moreover, five pioneer officers were identified - participants in the 1st Kuban (Ice) campaign - or, in any case, who joined the Volunteer Army back in 1917. This is Lieutenant Markovets A.D. Luskino, staff captain of the 2nd Don Cavalry Artillery Battalion S.N. Korablikov, captain V.P. Budanov, centurion S.B. Melikhov and who called himself Ensign E.A. Ca/86/mochin. In passing, we note that four of them, except for Luskino, were previously absent even in the most detailed lists first volunteers. Given that these officers indicated the time of entry into the Volunteer Army in the questionnaires with their own hands, and it was not in their interests to lengthen the White Guard experience, we can state that they were established by us for the first time.

In fact, there were more pioneers in the Orlovsky concentration camp, because some managed to hide it. Three - Colonel (who called himself lieutenant colonel) V.A. Velyashev, lieutenants G.I. Kozlov and M.V. Malinovkin - no doubt. In addition, seven more officers can be quite confidently identified as pioneers - the lieutenant N. Bryzgalin, second lieutenant A.F. Mashchenko, lieutenants N.E. Petrova and F.A. Churbakov, staff captains V.V. Dolgov and I.A. Shurupov and who did not indicate the rank of staff captain A.V. Vladimirova. This raises their share among prisoners to 15 people, or 5.3%. One prisoner, cornet P.P. Pavlov, vaguely indicated that, being a cadet, he left "in October 1917 for the Don on vacation." It is known that the Alekseevskaya organization used vacations as one of the ways to legend the transfer of its personnel to the South, so it can be assumed that he belonged to the first volunteers. Three more - Lieutenant V.D. Berezin, Ensign A.F. Veremsky and Lieutenant N.D. Perepelkin - found sympathy and great awareness of " strong spirit» «detachment» L.G. Kornilov, which could also be caused by personal impressions.

It is striking that some allowed flagrant, immediately conspicuous contradictions in the questionnaires. For example, Lieutenant V.M. Chizhsky said that he graduated from a military school on May 1, 1915, and already on May 31 he was taken prisoner (where he was until 1918), but during this month he managed to arrive at the front and change two positions - company commander and head of a machine-gun team, although the newly minted an ensign, and even in 1915, was usually appointed only as a junior officer. Personnel officer D.A. Sviridenko replied that he "did not hold any posts" in the old army. Called cornet S.I. Pismensky pointed out that before the revolution he had the rank of centurion. One of the first volunteers in 1917, when there was still no talk of mobilization, staff captain A.V. Vladimirov wrote that "he was mobilized by Pokrovsky under the threat of execution." Allegedly mobilized lieutenant A.F. Sokhanev immediately reported that he served on the 1st civilian transport. If there were several colleagues in the camp, there was no hope at all to hide anything. For example, out of ten Drozdovites, four served in the 3rd Drozdovsky Regiment, but only one indicated this in the questionnaire, and three were established during the investigation - and it is not difficult to identify the source of information in the person of fellow soldiers, given the absence of soldiers in the concentration camp. All this can be regarded both as an amazing confusion, and as a complete alienation from each other, and as an organic inability to think logically, and as a lack of practical self-preservation.

The service of the imprisoned officers to the Bolsheviks deserves a very special mention. According to the questionnaires, 24 of them (8.5%) served in the Red Army back in 1918-1919, and the Whites got both captured and voluntarily. Another 28 (9.9%) worked in various power structures - revolutionary committees, soviets, all kinds of committees, and there are even police officers, a committee of trouble and a people's judge. One of the officers, M.N. Armeyskov, in 1918 he served under F.G. Podtelkov. True, the truth of the questionnaires is somewhat doubtful, since only five were on trial with the Whites for collaborating with the Bolsheviks, and one more for concealing an officer's rank during mobilization - 2.1%.

Finally, the largest number accounts for those accepted into the Red Army in the spring of 1920 after the defeat of the VSYUR - 65 people, or 23.1%. Their main destinations were the 15th Inzen, 16th and 21st Soviet rifle divisions, as well as various units of the headquarters of the IX Army - and not only insignificant, such as the supply department, trophy team and small offices, but also as delicate as artillery depots and training teams. At the same time, only two occupied the positions of a commander and a commander, while there were eight commanders, and one even a squad leader; this refutes the statement of S.V. Volkov, as if in the Red Army "the positions of platoon commanders for former officers were not supposed." Only one person held a staff position - Captain M.M., assigned to the General Staff. Dyakovsky, head of the operational department of the Caucasian Front. In total, 117 white officers (41.5%) had already served the Bolsheviks before they were sent to the concentration camp; among the rest there were those who were employed in 1920 under the new government in civilian positions, mainly teachers. Of course, one cannot attach excessive importance to this, since past connections with the Bolshevik regime could be considered by these officers upon surrender as some kind of indulgence and exaggerated in every possible way, which undoubtedly strengthened the decision to surrender (for the Chekists, on the contrary, they could look like traitors). However, from the point of view of the moral and psychological appearance, this social material turned out to be not so much conformist and demoralized as positive for growing into the new regime. It seems that some were ready to earnestly serve the new regime, they easily went to eradicate their former comrades-in-arms - the examples of the lieutenant E.S. deserve attention. Aksenov and cornet N.I. Vorobyov, who began to serve the Bolsheviks in very specific military units - in the 1st Rostov punitive regiment and the special-purpose battalion of the Oryol military district, respectively.

Hopes were reinforced by the fact that the vast majority of wartime officers had good education for that time and civilian specialties, which made it possible to find a source of livelihood outside military service, especially - without emigration. Such data are available for 282 officers. Higher education, including unfinished ones, were received by 60 people (21.3%). Various schools - real, higher primary and special - graduated from 54 people (19.2%). A significant proportion of those who received Teacher Education- 42 people (14.9%). Only military education was indicated by 38 people (13.5%), both regular officers and persons without any other education - mainly from among those who completed only accelerated courses and ensign schools. On the contrary, some career officers graduated from civilian educational institutions before military schools. Among them, two graduated from an accelerated course and a one-year quartermaster course at the Academy of the General Staff. Another 25 people (8.9%) studied at gymnasiums and 20 people (7.1%) went through external studies. A small number studied in theological seminaries - 8 people, or 2.8%. The remaining 10.2% were uneducated, home-educated, self-taught, and graduates of parochial schools. Only 6 people (2.1%) did not provide information about education.

This is quite logical, since civilian professions not only could not aggravate the fate, but were considered as confirmation of their usefulness in the wild. Only a few officers tried to demonstrate almost illiteracy, distorting individual words with the most in a wild way. So, M.T. Mordvintsev wrote that he was "vyakuirovan", I.P. Sereda - that the Red Army is "inspired", and D.M. Bogachev - about the path to the already mentioned "bourgeois privilege". Such an exaggeration of the common people looked implausible, because the remaining items of the questionnaire were filled out quite competently, and two indicated that they had a pedagogical education.

As already noted, there were 23 regular military men, which amounted to 7.6% of 304 officers or 8.2% of 282. The rest were distributed according to the pre-war occupation in the following way. The largest group was made up of students from various educational institutions - often mobilized in the course of training and therefore, even having received a specialty, they did not have time to work in it - 109 people (38.9%). They are followed by teachers - 54 people, or 19.2%. Attention is drawn to the fact that only 42 of them had a special pedagogical education, while the rest managed with a general one. In the questionnaires there are quite curious answers of some former teachers in the column about education - "I did not study." Another 27 people (9.6%) were petty employees. Only two (0.7%) were called farmers, while 10 people (3.5%) were assigned to the “Other” category, among which were, for example, one drama artist, two merchants, one shoemaker, one railway mechanic and workers. At the same time, 59 officers (20.9%) did not indicate their previous civilian professions, which is quite understandable if they were called up immediately after completing their training - they simply did not have time to find a job. That is, in fact, it further expands the group of former students. Fatigue from wars and the desire for a peaceful life in their homeland naturally pushed them into captivity.

The class composition of the prisoners as a whole reflected the general trend of the democratization of the officer corps at the beginning of the 20th century. and especially during the First World War. Of the 282 people, only 12 (4.3%) were hereditary nobles, and another 11 (3.9%) were the children of officers and officials. (We should not forget that all officers received personal nobility until the end of 1917.) The largest class group was the Cossacks - 87 people, or 30.9%. At first glance, this corrects the available data, according to which the percentage of Cossacks among volunteer officers ranged from 7.8% to 16.1%. But in reality, there is no contradiction, since the prisoners of the Orlovsky concentration camp were the ranks of the All-Union Socialist Revolutionary Federation, "washing out" in them a more "Russian" than "Cossack" Volunteer Army. In addition, the disproportionate number of Cossacks is associated with their deliberate expulsion from their places of residence. The next in number were peasants - 66 people (23.4%), then petty bourgeois - 41 people (14.5%) and honorary citizens - both hereditary and personal - 17 people (6.0%). Four (1.4%) came from a clergy and one (0.4%) from a merchant.

Symptomatically and characteristically understandable, but naive desire of some officers to hide their origin - both in the presence of "non-proletarian" roots, and due to unwillingness to give detailed information about yourself in general. Here, too, there was inconsistency and inconsistency. So, second lieutenants brothers B.N. and V.N. The Shchekins-Krotovs indicated - one origin from the nobility, and the other from honorary citizens, and the owner of a loud noble family Markovian Staff Captain N.N. Sheremetev limited himself to the words "I live in Belgorod." As a result, 43 officers (15.2%) have no class affiliation, although this cannot seriously correct the above figures.

The question of the marital status of imprisoned officers seems to be very important, which reflects the perception of their social status in terms of stability. True, only 249 surveyed officers have information about relatives. So, bachelors prevailed among them (137 people, or 55.0%). and 99 (39.8%) were married, and 13 (5.2%) did not provide information about families. It should be remembered that we are talking about prisoners who were mostly defectors or surrendered en masse, that is, about those officers who voluntarily left the White movement and remained in Russia. Not the last motive was the hope to return to relatives, and therefore among the prisoners the percentage of family was the largest, especially with a significant proportion of traditionally family and large Cossacks among them.

If we compare these figures with similar indicators - for example, for former officers who served at the same time in the military institutions of the Oryol province - then the picture becomes especially contrasting. Of the 170 people, 51 were single, 111 married, as well as two widowers, and there are no records of six. The significant predominance of family (65.3%) over bachelors (30.0%) allows us to conclude that the majority of former officers perceive their position in the Soviet service as fairly stable. The share of family former officers in the Oryol military administration is almost twice as high as the corresponding percentage among whites.

At the same time, 19 imprisoned officers (7.6%) indicated relatives who served in the Red Army and in other institutions - of course, hoping for their intercession. Some occupied prominent positions in the leadership of the Red Army, large headquarters and even local departments of the Cheka, which made hopes by no means groundless. For example, staff captain V.V. Dolgov named his great-uncle D.M. Bonch-Bruevich and his brother. Apparently, M.D. and V.D. Bonch-Bruevichi, although the confusion with the initials makes one doubt the close contact with them before. Personnel officer N.B. Tropin referred to his wife's cousin, former officer F. Shlyakhdin, inspector of infantry and cavalry of the North Caucasian Military District. Before his arrest, the centurion S. B. Melikhov managed to serve in the 21st Soviet Rifle Division of the IX Army, where he was clearly attached by his uncle, a former Lieutenant Colonel I.N. Varlamov. Such connections created certain prospects in comparison with the rest of the prisoners.

In everyday life, staying in the Orlovsky concentration camp differed little from other places of temporary isolation. It was located in three two-story buildings of the former hard labor prison on the street. Barracks (now Krasnoarmeyskaya). In two buildings there were 20 common cells, and in the third a hospital and 12 solitary cells. Water supply and sewerage, which were available only in the 1st building, did not work; the power supply worked, but there were no light bulbs; in all the cells there were solid stoves, but there was a constant lack of firewood. However, it was much better than in the Mtsensk camp, located in wooden barracks. The prisoner's diet consisted of 1 pound of bread, 1 pound of potatoes (with the possible replacement of cabbage or beets), 1/4 pound of meat or fish (if not, 3/4 pound of meat failure or 3 spools of animal or vegetable oil were replaced), 3 spools of salt and 1.44 spools of subbolt flour (for gruel) per day, and hot food was given out only at lunchtime. This was recognized as insufficient even by the camp commandant, who requested that the prisoners be provided with a hot supper, tea and sugar.

The pastime of imprisoned officers was filled various works- from one-time physical labor to regular service in Soviet institutions (despite the objections of the Chekists) - in various departments of the provincial executive committee, the revolutionary tribunal, the provincial Cheka, schools and even the Oryol State University. In the office of the concentration camp itself, out of 10 employees, seven were imprisoned officers (and two more were sent to the office of concentration camp No. 2), which for them meant acceptance as full-time employees, that is, a noticeable improvement in nutrition.

Freedom of movement inside the camp - through the buildings and the yard - was not limited during the daytime, but after lights out was punishable by arrest for three days. The escort of prisoners was especially poorly organized, as a result of which only from September 2 to September 10, 1920, 12 officers fled "from external work". By October 1920, several copies of newspapers were received daily in the camp, there was a library of 1685 volumes, a choir and a drama troupe, and lectures on agriculture, beekeeping were also held, road tenants were trained - that is, social adaptation was carried out in case of release.

Later, a Special Commission was established to review the cases of prisoners of war. According to the results of her work in the Orlovsky concentration camp, at first 82 officers and one military official were left until the end of the civil war. (In fact, these figures turned out to be even lower, because at least 21 of them were scheduled for employment in the same 1920.) The rest left due to mobilization in the Red Army or forced employment, but there are no full figures for the distribution of these two categories. . It has been established that by July 10, 1920, 57 former white officers were transferred to the spare parts of the Oryol garrison alone, and in September 1920, another 77, mainly to the positions of a platoon commander. By October 1, 1920, another 73 officers were sent to Moscow to transfer the Cheka to the command staff of the All-Glavshtab.

With regard to the September appointments, the following breakdown by department and institution is available. Nine people were sent to the district headquarters (engineering department - three, veterinary department - two and one each to the artillery, economic, reserve troops and procurement departments) and five to the headquarters of the 1st reserve brigade. The bulk of the replenishment fell on the 19th reserve regiment - 10, the 20th reserve regiment - 17, the 21st reserve regiment - nine, the 32nd reserve regiment - eight, the 4th reserve cavalry division - 17, the 2nd reserve artillery battalion - five and the 2nd reserve machine-gun battalion - two. One person each was assigned to the 2nd Reserve Cavalry Regiment, the 5th Telegraph and Telephone Division, the Oryol Infantry Courses and the Bryansk Sugar Factory.

From the autumn of 1920 to March 1921, officers convicted by the Special Commissions (mainly the Oryol GubChK, as well as the Caucasian Labor Army) continued to enter the Oryol concentration camp, mainly to 3 years in prison for serving in the White Army. By the beginning of 1922, at least 219 of them were kept in the Orlovsky concentration camp. This amounted to 29.5% of the total number of white officers who passed through it. The vast majority of them were subject to various decrees and amnesties, both regional and general. For example, on the basis of the decree of the Central Executive Committee of the Mountain ASSR “On benefits for serving sentences” dated December 16, 1921, four officers were released from the camp - its native. During the amnesty for the 4th anniversary of October, according to the decisions of Gubust of February 11 - 12, 1922, 105 former white officers received freedom and from February 13-14, 1922 - another 107; only three prisoners of this category were reportedly left in the camp. Thus, 212 people were transferred for employment to the jurisdiction of the Oryol Gubernia Executive Committee.

It is documented that in 1922-1923. some officers - former prisoners of the Orlovsky concentration camp from among those who retired ahead of schedule - were not only free, but also served in the Red Army. This is Lieutenant E.N. Kozlovtsev, centurion T.V. Bokov and cornet G.V. Kozlov, and two of them were removed from the special register of former whites. (Bokov subsequently worked in Moscow as an accountant for the Khamovniki consumer society and was shot in the Vesna case; at the same time, in 1930, two more former white officers from the Oryol concentration camp, Ya.A. Pokusaev and Kh.A. Usalko, were imprisoned ). Finally, in 1937-1938. in the Oryol province, 316 former officers of the old and White armies were repressed, among which only four were former white prisoners of concentration camp No. 1 (three of them were sentenced to death and one to imprisonment).

Thus, the former white officers isolated in the Orlovsky concentration camp can be conditionally divided into three groups. One includes the few who were captured against their will, and therefore demoralized, wary and hiding their past and views on the present. It was they who were most suspicious of the authorities and had the most vague future. The second, larger group consisted of those who voluntarily surrendered, who simply sought to return to civilian life. They are characterized by sufficient conformism, combined with relative frankness, limited only by the silence of individual episodes of the Whites' service. Observing the unsightly underside of the collapse of the White movement, its disillusioned participants began to seek stability from the winners. In the third group, one can combine the most energetic part of the former white officers who had experience of cooperation with the Bolsheviks and were not only ripe for its continuation, but also wished for it. Their activity could not but cause the authorities to be wary, but in the face of a shortage of military and civilian specialists, it faced the expediency of preserving and using them.

Having remained in Soviet Russia, most of the former white officers consciously made their choice. The homeland turned out to be higher than politics for them.

Former officers - prisoners of the Oryol concentration camp. 1920-1922
P.M. Abinyakin

Khersones concentration camp

After the evacuation from the Crimea in the fall of 1920, the remnants of the Russian army of Baron P.N. Wrangel, the Soviet authorities did a great job of clearing the peninsula from the "counterrevolutionary element". Thousands of surrendered officers and soldiers of the Russian army were destroyed or sent to concentration camps, as well as those who, due to their social origin, did not fit into the scheme of building a new society. In Crimea, one of the places where representatives of the “exploiting classes” served their sentences was the Sevastopol concentration labor camp for “counter-revolutionary elements”, located on the territory of the Chersonese and St. George monasteries.

The first concentration camps in Soviet Russia were organized by order of L.D. Trotsky at the end of May 1918, when it was planned to disarm the Czechoslovak corps. They were usually created on the site of the camps of the First World War that were vacated after the exchange of prisoners of war. In June-August 1918, during the aggravation of the events of the Civil War, the idea of ​​concentration camps as part of the repressive policy of the Bolsheviks was further developed.

The beginning of the legislative registration of the existence of concentration camps is associated with the adoption by the Council of People's Commissars on September 5, 1918 of the decree "On the Red Terror", which granted the authorities of the Cheka the right to isolate all potentially dangerous enemies of the Bolsheviks in concentration camps. Confinement to the camp did not require practically any judicial procedure, since it was only an “administrative” measure in relation to the “doubtful”.

At the 8th meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in February 1919, the chairman of the All-Russian Cheka, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, noted:

“I propose that these concentration camps be left for the use of the labor of the arrested, for gentlemen who live without work, for those who cannot work without a certain coercion, or if we take Soviet institutions, then a measure of such punishment should be applied here for an unscrupulous attitude to business , for negligence, for being late, etc. With this measure, we will be able to pull even our own workers.”

The final organizational formalization of the camps for the purpose of isolating and suppressing the opponents of Bolshevism took place in April 1919 after the adoption of the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (3) of the RSFSR "On forced labor camps" and the subsequent decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which, in particular, indicated that the costs associated with maintenance of convicts, should be paid off by their work. Thus, the principle of self-sufficiency of places of deprivation of liberty was proclaimed, which in fact has not lost its significance to this day. On May 13, 1919, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted a special instruction on concentration camps, which were first at the disposal of the Cheka, then the OGPU. By the end of 1920, 84 “forced labor camps” were created on the territory of the RSFSR, in which about 50 thousand people were kept.

The Sevastopol concentration camp for "counter-revolutionary elements" was established on January 1, 1921. By this time, two independent penitentiary services had been formed in the city: one was under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Justice (Sevastopol prison, from March 1921 - correctional house), on the other - the NKVD (concentration camp). However, preparations for its creation began, one might say, from November 1920, from the time the Reds entered the city: units of the 51st Infantry Division and the auto detachment of the 1st Cavalry Army.

S.A. Krylom, chairman of the Sevrevkom, and later the first chairman of the Sevgorsovet, in the book “Red Sevastopol”, describing the events of the first year of the formation of the Soviets, notes that one of the priority measures of the new government was the organization of a concentration camp. This process began with the mandatory registration of former soldiers and officers of the Russian army who did not have time to evacuate, as well as officials and foreign citizens. The first registrations were carried out by order of the Krymrevkom No. 4 of November 17 and No. 167 of December 25, 1920, then by order of the head of the garrison and the Sevgorvoenkomat. The fate of those registered was determined by quite numerous punitive bodies that were then in Sevastopol: the shock group of the special department of the Southern Front, the special department of the 46th division, the Chernazmores and the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Chernazmores. As a rule, imprisonment in a concentration camp was the most lenient sentence for the so-called counter-revolutionary elements.

A number of factors contributed to the opening of the concentration camp in the Chersonese Monastery: remoteness from the city, the relatively good condition of buildings that could accommodate up to 120 people, the way of life established earlier by the monks and the material base for small-scale handicraft production. The same can be said about the St. George Monastery. V.I. further destinies counter-revolutionaries during the liquidation of the consequences of the uprising of the Don Cossacks in February 1919.

The concentration camp was under the jurisdiction of the sub-department of public duties and forced labor of the Department of the Sevrevkom Directorate, which was headed by the former worker of the shipbuilding workshop of the shipyard Vasily Nikitovich Semenov. In addition to working in the administration, V.N. Semenov was a permanent representative of the military revolutionary committee in the commission of the Cheka of the special department of the 46th division for the liquidation of the remaining Wrangel troops, as well as the bourgeoisie and for cleaning Soviet institutions from an alien element. As a former fighter of the revolutionary detachment of A.V. Mokrousov, he had rich combat experience: he participated in the disarmament of the Makhnovist troops that arrived in Sevastopol in November 1920 with units of the Red Army, led a detachment to protect the city in the area of ​​​​the Truzzi circus during the registration of former military personnel of the army Wrangel. Remembering that time, he remarked: "The work required a lot of effort, enthusiasm and time, they worked day and night."

The commandant N. Bulygin managed the camp. His "office" was located in the former bishop's hotel of the Chersonese monastery. There was also a bathhouse, workshops, as well as a temple, which occupied 250 square meters, nearby. sazhen. As Archimandrite Theodosius testifies, “painting, blacksmithing, carpentry, tailoring, and bookbinding workshops were located on the territory of the camp, which in 1921 were requisitioned from the monastery in favor of the concentration camp.”

The guard team initially consisted of 18 junior police officers, then increased to 28 people, and 14 civilian bakers, cooks, dressmakers, shoemakers, blacksmiths, and laundresses worked on the household side.

Reporting on April 2, 1921 on the work of the camp to the sub-department of public duties and forced labor of the Department of the Administration of the Sevastopol Revolutionary Committee, the camp commandant N. Bulygin reported that “from the moment the concentration camp was organized, it was filled with arrested deserters of labor, the bourgeoisie, speculators, a total of 295 people accepted from Sevastopol department of Komtrud. By January 13, 1921, by order of the head of the Department of the Sevrevkom Saltykov, many were released on warrants, and from January 13, only prisoners were kept in the camp to serve sentences for terms of 6 months to 20 years on the verdicts of the special departments of the 46th division, Chernazmori, the revolutionary military tribunal Chern.-Az. Morey, SevChKa.

Based on this report, it is possible to partially determine who was imprisoned in the camp and for what. Partly, because such information was not available about all those who served their sentences. So, it was known about 106 prisoners that they "pass through the line of the Special Department with 46 divisions." There were also people convicted by the Sevastopol Cheka for desertion, speculation, harboring speculators, banditry, hiding state property, spreading counter-revolutionary rumors, discrediting the Soviet government, bribery, theft, or simply an "idle element." Violators of labor discipline also languished in the camp. So, in one of the orders for the 2nd Sevastopol Theater dated March 24, 1921, it was indicated that for being late for the performance, the artist Agrelia was fined in the amount of two weeks of earnings, and in the event of a repetition of the incident, her case would be sent to the command labor [labor committee] for placement her to a concentration camp."

By April 1921, there were 150 people in the Chersonesos camp. It is interesting that for many of them, according to a court order, the Donbass was determined as the place of serving, less often the North, so it is not clear why they remained here. The longest term - 20 years - had only six people who were sentenced by special departments at the 46th division and Chernazmory. Five were imprisoned "until the end of the civil war." The largest group of prisoners served sentences ranging from 1 to 5 years. There were also those who received six months for theft, the acquisition of stolen goods, for parasitism. During the period from January to April 1921, three escapes were made from the camp, and this despite the fact that for the first time the term of imprisonment increased tenfold, and for the second they could be shot.

Although the work of the concentration camp was built on the principle of self-sufficiency, the workshops did not bring profit, both due to the lack of a sufficient number of tools and materials, and due to the fact that in the conditions of the post-war crisis there were quite a few external applications. True, the prisoners also worked outside the camp. So, in January-April 1921, 127 contracts were executed according to the requirements of various institutions. Initially, an 8-hour working day was established for prisoners in jobs involving manual labor, and a slightly longer one in clerical work. Later, the working day was reduced to 6 hours. No responsible affairs were entrusted to the prisoners. Part of the campers went to work under escort, part - without it. At the same time, the prisoners were required to arrive at the camp by 6 pm. Otherwise, they were declared fugitives and subject to appropriate punishment.

In addition to the workshops, the concentration camp also had a land plot of 10 acres. Of these, 6.5 acres were cultivated, the rest of the land was empty.

As for the medical care of prisoners, in case of serious illnesses they were sent for treatment to the 1st Soviet Hospital. However, on March 30, 1921, according to the order of the department of the Sevrevkom Administration, an emergency room for 5 beds was created on the basis of the camp, which was periodically visited by city doctors.

Much search work remains to be done to identify the prisoners, although some work has already been done in this direction. So, in the State Archives in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea there is a personal file of Elena Petrovna Kalabina, who was “arrested for serving with the Whites” and on January 12, 1921 was sentenced by the “Troika of the Crimean shock group of the Yuzhugzapfront Administration” to 20 years in labor camp. Together with the wives of officers of the Wrangel army, she was assigned to the Chersonesos camp, where she worked as a nurse. Together with her, Ekaterina Vasilyevna Turkenich was serving her sentence, sentenced by the same “troika” to 10 years in labor camps (for serving with the whites in the Drozdov division). Despite her professional skills as a nurse, she worked as a gardener in the camp. Together with the sisters of mercy, military officials and military experts of the Russian army, 30 monks of the Chersonese monastery, headed by 73-year-old Archimandrite Zosima, also ended up in the camp. audit, carried out in the city after the establishment of revolutionary power, the need for the services of the former "specialists" disappeared and they were all sent to the Chersonese camp.

The concentration camps on the Crimean land did not function for long. The main reason was the organization of camps for counter-revolutionary elements in the north of the country. Another reason is the rapidly progressing cholera epidemic, which could find a fertile environment in places of detention, and such camps would be huge sources of the spread of the disease. So they tried to get rid of them all. It was proposed to replace the terms of imprisonment with surety, bail, to apply early release in the widest possible amounts, etc. On August 1, 1921, at a meeting of the Sevastopol Executive Committee, chaired by S.N. Krylov, they heard the question of disbanding the concentration camp. Decided to "disband the concentration camp, transfer the property to the social security." However, on August 10 of the same year, a clarifying telegram was received from the Krymrevkom to the Sevgorsovet: “All the workshops, 2 working horses of the liquidated concentration camp, indicated in the act of the liquidation commission, are placed at the disposal of the central camp in Simferopol, to which an receiver will be sent. Transfer 20 beds to the Krymevak Sevmedical and Nutrition Center, the rest of the property will be at your disposal.”

So far, the question of the fate of the people who were in the Chersonesos camp after its liquidation remains unclear. As for the concentration camp at the Georgievsky Monastery, it is reliably known that it functioned in 1930, but all this requires a thorough study. The employees of our museum continue this work, which is of particular relevance in connection with the preparation of events dedicated to the 90th anniversary of the end of the Civil War in Crimea.

RYAZAN CONCENTRATION CAMP

“... Then the authorities liked to set up concentration camps in former monasteries: strong closed walls, solid buildings and - they are empty (after all, monks are not people, they are thrown out anyway). So, in Moscow there were concentration camps in the Andronikov Monastery, Novospassky, Ivanovsky. In the Petrograd Krasnaya Gazeta dated September 6, 1918, we read that the first concentration camp "will be set up in Nizhny Novgorod, in an empty convent ... At first, it is planned to send to Nizhny Novgorod 5 thousand people to a concentration camp "(my italics - A.S.). In Ryazan, a concentration camp was also established in a former convent (Kazansky). Here's what they say about it. Merchants, priests, "prisoners of war" were sitting there (as they called the officers taken who did not serve in the Red Army). But also - an indefinite audience (Tolstoyan I. E., whose trial we already know about, ended up here). There were workshops at the camp - weaving, tailoring, shoemaking and (in 1921 it was called already) - "general work", repair and construction in the city. They were taken out under escort, but single craftsmen, by the nature of work, were released without escort, and these residents were fed in houses. The population of Ryazan was very sympathetic to the deprived ("deprived of freedom", and not prisoners were officially called them), the passing column was given alms (crackers, boiled beets, potatoes) - the convoy did not interfere with accepting alms, and the dispossessed shared everything they received equally. (Every step is not our customs, not our ideology.) Particularly successful dispossessed got a job in institutions (E-v - on the railway) - and then they received a pass to walk around the city (and spend the night in a camp). They fed in the camp like this (1921): half a pound of bread (plus another half a pound fulfilling the norm), in the morning and in the evening - boiling water, in the middle of the day - a scoop of gruel (it contains several dozen grains and potato peels). On the one hand, camp life was decorated with denunciations of provocateurs (and arrests based on denunciations), on the other hand, with a drama and choral circle. They gave concerts for the people of Ryazan in the hall of the former noble assembly, the dispossessed brass band played in the city garden. The disenfranchised people became more and more acquainted with the inhabitants, it turned out to be unbearable, and then the “prisoners of war” began to be sent to the Northern Special Purpose Camps. The lesson of the fragility and frivolity of the concentration camps was that they were surrounded by civilian life. That is why special northern camps were needed. (Concentration abolished after 1922.). All this camp dawn is worthy of a better look into its overflows. At the end of the civil war, the two labor armies created by Trotsky had to be disbanded due to the grumbling of the detained soldiers - and thus the role of forced labor camps in the structure of the RSFSR naturally increased. By the end of 1920 there were 84 camps in 43 provinces in the RSFSR. According to official (albeit classified) statistics, 25,336 people were kept there at that time, and in addition, another 24,400 "prisoners of war of the civil war." Both figures, especially the last one, seem to be understated. However, if we take into account that this does not include prisoners in the Cheka system, where the unloading of prisons, the sinking of barges and other types of mass destruction the score began many times from zero and again from zero - maybe these numbers are true. In the future, they caught up ... ".