Brezhnev's reforms era of stagnation foreign policy. The era of stagnation
After the dismissal of N. Khrushchev, in October 1964, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. Brezhnev became the General Secretary of the Central Committee: A. Kosygin became Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR; member of the Presidium responsible for the ideological sphere - M. Suslov.
All power, including the legislative one, was concentrated in the hands of the executive bodies: the highest, constantly functioning body state power, - the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the highest executive body - the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and in the field - the executive committees of the Soviets. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, consisting of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities, was subordinate to the Supreme Soviets of the Union and Autonomous Republics, the Councils of Regions, Cities and Districts. million people and became one of the largest in the world. Under Brezhnev, his personal secretariat received considerable size. Emphasis on personnel work increased, the former pre-Khrushchev structure of party, Komsomol and trade union bodies was restored. Regional, regional and district party committees were restored instead of the former fabricated and Economic councils were abolished and large state committees were created (Goskomtsen, Gossnab, State Committee for Science and Technology).In 1977, a new ("Brezhnev") Constitution of the USSR was adopted, construction so: called developed socialism.
THE BREZHNEV ERA (1964–1985)
"Golden Age" of nomenclature
Although the leaders who replaced Khrushchev had disagreements, they were united in the main. It was necessary to strengthen power and calmly enjoy the position achieved. Later, they finally became convinced that trying to rebuild the system is very dangerous and troublesome. It's better not to touch anything. It was during this era that the formation of the gigantic bureaucratic machine of socialism was completed, and all its fundamental flaws were clearly manifested. Gradually, some of Khrushchev's measures were canceled, which in one way or another limited the nomenclature, and sectoral ministries were restored.
Political life was now much calmer and even more secret than before. Using his position as General Secretary (Secretary General), L. I. Brezhnev, who did not seem to be a leader, became the main leader. Once again it became clear that under the dominance of the CPSU, the position of General Secretary of the Central Committee is a key one. It was with her help that both Stalin and Khrushchev managed to “take away” power from their more prominent associates.
During the years of Brezhnev's rule, the position of the ruling stratum has strengthened, and its well-being has grown. The nomenclature was still a caste, which had everything special: apartments, dachas, trips abroad, hospitals, etc. She did not know the shortage, since she also purchased goods in special stores. Therefore, those in power were especially interested in low prices: the more difficult it was to buy something for an ordinary citizen, the fuller was the ruble of the nomenklatura.
The nomenklatura was not a completely isolated layer from the people. Rather, they were numerous concentric circles, and the closer each of them stood to the population, the less opportunities they had. Accordingly, an increasing number of positions and professions became the privilege of the nomenklatura, for example, teachers of higher educational institutions. And the defense of a candidate's dissertation began to be furnished with such complex rules, recommendations, directions, which very much resembled the painful path of a medieval student to a master.
The upper strata of the nomenklatura were now less and less filled with people from the lower ones, for the most part these positions were opened only for relatives and friends of high leaders. Such, for example, is the path of Brezhnev's son-in-law Churbanov, who from an ordinary officer became a general and deputy minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On the other hand, those who had already fallen into the corresponding circle were much less likely to be removed from it: they were, as it were, moved from one leading place to another. Because of the love of the nomenklatura for "warm places", the number of officials in the country grew much faster than the total number of employees.
Relations within the nomenklatura system were characterized by servility, bribery and various "gifts", ousting talented people, rubbing points to superiors, appointing only one’s own to positions (and in some, especially non-Russian, republics, selling positions), etc. big caviar business”, when high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Fisheries illegally sold black caviar abroad.
The Brezhnev era is undoubtedly the "golden age" of the nomenklatura. But it ended as soon as production and consumption finally came to a standstill.
Economy: reforms and stagnation.
The Brezhnev era was later called the "stagnant period". The term "stagnation" originates from the political report of the Central Committee of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, read by M. S. Gorbachev, in which it was stated that "stagnation began to appear in the life of society" both in economic and in social spheres. Most often, this term refers to the period from L. I. Brezhnev's coming to power (mid-1960s) to the beginning of perestroika (second half of the 1980s), marked by the absence of any serious upheavals in the political life of the country, as well as social stability and relatively high standard of living (as opposed to the era of the 1920s-1950s). However, the "stagnation" did not begin immediately. On the contrary, in 1965 they proclaimed an economic reform conceived under Khrushchev. Its essence was to give enterprises more freedom, to force them to fight for increasing profits and profitability, to link the results of labor and earnings (for this, part of the profits was left to enterprises to pay bonuses, etc.).
The reform gave some results, revived the economy. The increase in purchase prices had a positive effect on agriculture. However, its limited nature soon became apparent. The deepening of the transformations meant a weakening of the power of the nomenklatura, which it did not want to go for. Therefore, gradually everything returned to its original place. The plan, the gross figures remained the main ones. The branch ministries continued to take all the profits from those who performed better and to divide everything as they saw fit.
The main reason for the failure of the reform was the very essence Soviet model socialism (as opposed to Yugoslav, Hungarian or Chinese): a rigid concentration of all resources in the center, a gigantic system of redistribution. In power were officials who saw their purpose in planning for everyone, distributing and controlling. And they did not want to reduce their power. The underlying reason for this system was the dominance of the military-industrial complex. It was not possible to make this sector a market one.
The main customer and consumer of weapons was the state itself, which spared no funds for it. A huge number of enterprises of heavy and even light industry were tied to the defense industry, working in secrecy. There could be no talk of any self-financing here. And in order to ease the burden of military spending, the state sent all the best to the military-industrial complex. Therefore, it did not want to allow the free sale of raw materials, materials, energy, the free movement of workers of a certain qualification. And without this, what kind of market can we talk about. So all the enterprises remained tightly tied by controlling and planning bodies to each other without the opportunity to look for partners themselves, to decide what and how much to produce.
Production was much more subordinated to the convenience of planning and control by officials than to the interests of the consumer or profit margins. It was supposed, according to planners, to constantly grow, moreover, “from what has been achieved,” that is, from the indicators of the previous period. As a result, mostly military or waste production often grew. The costs of such growth became more and more significant, the economy was more and more "costly" in nature. In fact, growth was for the sake of growth. But the country was no longer able to give more and more money for him. It began to slow down until it reached almost zero. Indeed, there was a “stagnation” in the economy, and with it a crisis of the system. Returning to the reasons for the failure of reform, let's say that oil revenues became the main opportunity to abandon it. Soviet Union actively developed oil and gas fields in Siberia, in the North (as well as other minerals in the vast expanses of the East, North, Kazakhstan, etc.). Since the beginning of the 1970s, world oil prices have risen many times over. This gave the USSR a huge influx of currency. All foreign trade was restructured: the main exports were oil, gas and other raw materials (as well as weapons), the main imports were machinery, equipment, goods for the population and food. Of course, the currency was actively spent on bribing foreign parties and movements, espionage and intelligence, trips abroad, etc., etc. Thus, the leadership received a powerful source of maintaining the system unchanged. The flow of petrodollars finally buried the economic reform. The import of grain, meat, etc. made it possible to preserve the unprofitable collective-farm-state-farm system. Meanwhile, despite all the efforts and gigantic costs, the results in agriculture were even more deplorable than in industry.
Since the 1950s, the scientific and technological revolution (STR) began in the world, associated with the introduction of electronics, artificial materials, automation, etc. We could not reduce the technological gap with the West in any way. It was possible to compete with him only in the military sphere through exorbitant exertion of forces and industrial espionage. Constant talk about "combining the advantages of socialism with the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution" only emphasized our backwardness. When planning, enterprises had no incentives for technical progress; inventors only annoyed managers. Under these conditions, the Brezhnev team decided that oil exports could also solve the problem of underdevelopment. The country began to sharply increase purchases of modern equipment abroad. In just 4 years from 1972 to 1976, imports of Western technology increased 4 (!) times. Thus, the government managed to slightly increase labor productivity, increase production, and organize the production of many modern goods. But by doing this, she completely corrupted our business executives, lowered the already low technical level of engineers, and drove her designers into a corner.
By the beginning of the 1980s, the country had exhausted its growth opportunities by attracting new workers, developing new deposits, and building enterprises. When world oil prices went down sharply, it meant a crisis of the entire socialist system. She is too accustomed to petrodollars.
Soviet system, despite the reforms carried out in the 1950s and 1960s, it still retained its characteristic features. In the political sphere: monopoly on power communist party, the suppression of the opposition, the full control of the state over all spheres of society; in economics: total stateization and socialization of property, the creation of a super-centralized management system, directive planning; in social: regulation of all public and private life, ideological control over culture and art, etc. For the formation of a qualitatively new policy radical changes were needed: a sharp increase in the efficiency of production, its scientific and technical equipment, a strong social politics, the development of democratic principles in the management of society, etc.
For such a revolution in politics, a theoretical reassessment of the Soviet and party experience was needed, as well as the rejection of many dogmas of the Marxist-Leninist ideology.
Who came to power after the removal of N.S. Khrushchev’s leadership (First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR N.V. Podgorny) turned out to be unprepared to solve these problems, neither in theory, nor in practice, nor in psychological sense. The political line towards the rejection of major reforms, the conservation of the existing system was not immediately determined.
· The October plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1964) proclaimed a course towards correcting mistakes, overcoming "subjectivism and voluntarism" in the implementation of reforms. In the period from 1965 to the end of the 1960s, attempts were made in the country to carry out economic reform;
since the end of the 60s (the turning point was the suppression ATS countries"Prague Spring" in 1968), the reforms have practically died out;
· Since the mid-1970s, crisis phenomena in the development of the country have clearly emerged.
This time is often called the "twenty years of missed opportunities", the "Brezhnev era". These years became the peak of the military and political power of the Soviet state and at the same time the growing socio-economic and political crisis, manifested in the gradual stagnation of the economy, the impoverishment of the spiritual sphere, increasing corruption and other deformations. public life.
The dominant place in the new leadership of the country in the period from 1964 to 1982. occupied by three people:
1. L.I. Brezhnev - General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR;
2. A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (in October 1980 he was replaced by N.A. Tikhonov);
3. M.A. Suslov, who was in charge of ideological work.
Brezhnev's "team" that came to power did not have a single positive program activities. After criticism of Khrushchev at the Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1964 for ill-conceived reforms, violation of the collegiality of the leadership, frequent shift cadres from the podium, the slogan of "stability" was put forward. It quickly became clear that the politically he meant:
Refusal of radical changes (cessation of further attempts to democratize society and the party, curtailment of criticism of Stalin's "personality cult", etc.);
Strengthening the existing public political system(of a totalitarian regime, an obligatory element of which is the cult of personality of the leader - in this case Brezhnev);
- "quiet restoration" of a number of elements of Stalinism (practice political processes, persecution of dissenters, etc.).
Thus, the new leadership adopted a conservative traditionalist course. Already at the end of 1964, the division of party bodies into rural and industrial ones was abolished. At the XXIII Congress of the CPSU (1966), the traditional names of the highest party bodies were restored: the Politburo of the Central Committee, the General Secretary of the Central Committee. The provision on limiting the stay in party posts to specific terms was excluded from the Charter (in essence, this term became for life). The heads of regions and republics often stayed in one place for 15-20 years. Within the framework of the existing system, this inevitably led to the aging of personnel, an increase in the role of personal ties, and increased a certain independence of local elites from the center in solving particular problems. A form of removal from leadership in case of any conflicts, displeasure of top management, too gross violation laws began to transfer to diplomatic, trade union work, retirement.
The party-state elite is the nomenklatura. significantly strengthened its power. The party apparatus replaced the elected party and Soviet bodies and led all political organizations. This apparatus at the Central Committee consisted of more than 4 thousand people who worked in more than 20 departments. About 100 ministries and departments functioned. In total, 18 million people were engaged in managerial work. The Soviet deputies at all levels were formed exclusively by party bodies. Soviet authority served as a "screen" for the omnipotence of the party-state apparatus.
With outward calm and unanimity in the leadership, there was a struggle between various groups representing the interests of certain structures: the military-industrial complex, the KGB, national republics, etc. In this situation, Brezhnev, right up to a serious illness (1976), showed the qualities of a leader, being, in the words of one of the journalists who observed him, "a merciless man with steel fists, although wearing velvet gloves." As a result of Brezhnev's delicate behind-the-scenes struggle, one after another, his comrades-in-arms in the removal of Khrushchev quietly find themselves retired or obviously in secondary posts (Semichastny, Shelepin, Voronov, Podgorny, Shelest, etc.). In the early 80s. of those who came to power with Brezhnev, only Andropov and Ustinov remained in the political arena.
The “drop-outs” were replaced by people personally close to Brezhnev and especially familiar to him from his work in Dnepropetrovsk (“the Dnipropetrovsk mafia” - A. Kirilenko and K. Chernenko, who became secretaries of the Central Committee and members of the Politburo; N. Shchelokov - Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; D. Kunaev - 1 th Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, etc.). The real control in the party was concentrated in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. A narrow group of oligarchs headed by Brezhnev decided everything critical issues. Under the relatives of Brezhnev and his entourage, not only posts were created, but entire ministries. Protectionism, nepotism, nepotism penetrated the highest authorities.
Natural companions of these processes were:
Corruption on an unprecedented scale.
Shadow economy.
Merging figures of the shadow economy with representatives of the nomenklatura - the formation of organized crime - the mafia (especially in Central Asia, Caucasus and Moscow). Party, Soviet, economic leaders, taking advantage of the confidence of Brezhnev and his entourage, as well as the virtual absence of control "from below", felt themselves full-fledged masters of "their" republics, regions, factories, etc.
Increase in crime (especially bribery and embezzlement). The most affected by these types of crime were trade, services.
The transformation of membership in the party into a necessary condition for career advancement, familiarization with the party nomenclature.
Falling prestige of power.
The spread of drunkenness.
Intrigue, servility, servility.
Often the decisions of the highest party bodies took precedence over the laws. Joint resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR (being by-laws) were officially placed on a par with legislative ones, included in the Code of Laws of the USSR. The laws were also violated by informal decisions, oral instructions of the nomenklatura - the so-called "telephone law". Thus, in the "society of developed socialism" the corporate interests of the nomenklatura completely prevailed over state and public interests.
Conservative, dogmatic tendencies in ideology intensified. Life required a certain modernization of the ideological principles proclaimed in new Program party (XXII Congress of the CPSU), according to which the USSR had to:
In 1970 overtake the developed countries world in terms of production per capita;
In 1980 - to build the material and technical base of communism.
In addition, the exposure of the cult of personality during the "thaw" contributed to the emergence of criticality in relation to power structures. The ideologists of the CPSU were forced to look for answers to questions inherited from the previous period, which was so turbulent for the system (“thaw”).
As a result, the concept of "developed socialism" was constructed, which declared the order that existed in the country to be the highest achievement of social progress. The concept of "developed socialism":
Allowed to state the "great successes" achieved in the USSR under the leadership of the party;
Remove any certainty in achieving specific goals of improving the well-being of the people, democratizing society, and transitioning to public self-government;
Represented the theoretical basis for perpetuating the totalitarian system;
It was designed to distract from solving real economic problems.
The tightening of domestic policy, the persecution of dissent received an ideological justification in the form of the accepted thesis about the aggravation of the ideological struggle of the two systems in conditions of peaceful coexistence (a kind of modification of the Stalinist position on the aggravation of the class struggle as we move towards socialism).
In the field of ideology, a quiet revision of the decisions of the 20th Party Congress and subsequent liberal tendencies in the field of theory began. Theory was increasingly separated from social practice. The problems grew and worsened, but no specific and effective measures by their permission. "Anniversary shifts", "Shock work weeks", months of "friendship" and "culture of service", etc. continuously replaced each other, ending with the distribution, titles, prizes. Party congresses were held under the sign of splendor and pomposity. At the regular congresses of the CPSU, the imaginary successes and achievements of the USSR were very loudly spoken about, an illusory world of demonstrative prosperity was created. Those who spoke at the congresses competed in glorifying the policy of the CPSU and its leadership.
Especially magnificent epithets from the beginning of the 70s. got L.I. Brezhnev: "the great Leninist revolutionary", "an outstanding political and statesman modernity", "an outstanding writer". There was a kind of revival of the cult of personality, but in the form of a farce. Volumes of his writings were published, busts were cast, portraits were painted, biographical pictures were shot. Awarding of the highest orders and medals, honorary titles, prizes, gold named weapon. During these years, L. I. Brezhnev received 5 Hero stars, 16 orders, 18 medals, one marshal's star, 70 foreign ones, became a laureate of two Lenin Prizes (struggle for peace and literature), etc. All this became the subject of a huge number of anecdotes among the people.
In October 1977, a new, 4th Soviet Constitution was adopted - the "Constitution of Developed Socialism". Soviets of Working People's Deputies became known as Soviets people's deputies, which meant the onset of social homogeneity of Soviet society. At the same time, Article 6 of the Constitution legally formalized the monopoly position of the CPSU in the Soviet political system, defining the party as "the leading and guiding force of society, the core of its political system." Such an article was not even in the Stalinist Constitution (1936). The CPSU, in accordance with the decisions of the 25th Congress, was now defined as the party of the whole people, while remaining by its nature supposedly the party of the working class. This logically incorrect thesis contrasted more and more with real social processes, when the party apparatus acquired more and more new privileges and the gap in the standard of living of workers and managers widened. The thesis was put forward about the complete and final solution of the national question, about the formation of a “new historical community- the Soviet people. The thesis of a nationwide state, constitutionally formalized in 1977, was nothing more than a declaration.
In society, there was a process of legalizing double morality - official and real (examples were set by the party elite and Brezhnev himself). The government was losing credibility in the eyes of millions of ordinary citizens, the prestige of the social system it represented (“developed socialism”) was falling, which caused social apathy and the spread of drunkenness.
Attempt to suspend further development negative processes in Soviet society was undertaken after death by a new General Secretary The Central Committee of the CPSU Andropov, who led the country for 15 months (November 1982 - February 1983). As a proponent of strengthening the system, Andropov set about modernizing it through emergency administrative measures (which often went beyond constitutional measures):
He made serious personnel changes (according to published data, 18 union ministers and 37 first secretaries of regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the union republics were replaced);
Reduced the personal apparatus of the General Secretary;
Stimulated the investigation of a number of criminal cases (which were curtailed on the personal instructions of Brezhnev and his leadership);
He began a large-scale campaign to restore elementary order and industrial discipline (in practice, this turned into frequent curiosities: organizing raids among idle people, in hairdressers, cinemas, airplanes and trains, etc.);
Persecution of dissenters.
However, the merit of Andropov as the leader of the party and the state is that for the first time in many years in the article "The Teachings of Karl Marx and Some Questions of Socialist Construction in the USSR": a) questioned the dogmatic understanding of Marxism-Leninism; b) introduced an element of doubt into the assessment of what the country had achieved (warned "against possible exaggerations in understanding the degree of the country's approach to the highest phase of communism"); c) recognized the existence of contradictions and difficulties in socialist society.
Andropov's drastic measures frightened the old political elite, which was afraid of losing their leading positions, but shook the country, aroused sympathy for the energetic leader, and gave rise to hopes in society for changes for the better. but quick death Yu.V. Andropov in March 1984, who did not leave political testament, again gave rise to an acute crisis in the country and gave rise to apathy in society.
In February 1984, the completely incompetent K.U. became the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Chernenko, whose election was insisted on by the conservative majority of the Politburo, headed by Marshal Ustinov. The election took place in a tough struggle with Gorbachev and his supporters Gromyko, Vorotnikov, Aliev and Solomentsev. Under Chernenko, almost all the processes that were characteristic of the Brezhnev period resumed.
This time we will take a look at historical portrait General Secretary, who was remembered by everyone for his thick eyebrows and kisses. :*
Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev (1964-1982)
Leonid Ilyich was one of the initiators of Khrushchev's dismissal. He came to power not young (57 years old), and the time of his tenure as the First, and then the Chief Secretary of the Party was 18 years, one can say that his reign fell on advancing years. In addition, during this period, the average age of members of the ruling party was about 60 years old, so often the Brezhnev era is used
the term "gerontocracy" (from other Greek geron - old man, kratos - power, state). I must say that this is not the only word that is usually called the reign of Leonid Ilyich, and now, in conjunction with the characteristics of the areas of activity, we will consider other names.
Domestic politics
- Transition to the concept of developed socialism
Since Brezhnev was an aged man, he had conservative political preferences, in some cases even reactionary ones. In the best traditions of historical ping-pong, Brezhnev curtailed many of the reforms begun by Khrushchev (the first seven-year plan, criticism of Stalin's personality cult, and so on) and domestic politics took the course of building communism.
In 1977, the "Brezhnev" Constitution of the USSR was adopted, which was based on the concept of "developed socialism" (a stage of society on the path to communism, in which a harmonious combination of all spheres of society is achieved). Before its adoption, this constitution was actively discussed among all segments of the population: at enterprises, in institutes, and on collective farms. Everyone had the right to propose their ideas for the draft Basic Law. This was one step towards establishing the sovereignty of the people.
But we can say that the desire of the authorities to listen to the opinion of the people was ostentatious, in fact, the new constitution legislated leadership The CPSU in society and in fact replaced the Soviet organs of state power with the party apparatus.
- Kosygin's reform
Kosygin's economic reform was carried out in 1965-1970. Its essence was to increase the interest of enterprises in increasing production volumes and the subsequent improvement of the economic situation. The SNKh (councils of the national economy), created under Khrushchev in 1957, were liquidated, elements of cost accounting were introduced into enterprises, but the administrative-command system was preserved. Enterprises could now independently determine the range of production, the number of personnel and its wages, raw material suppliers and so on. At the same time, enterprises were obliged to fulfill the plan set by the state, but they also had the opportunity to sell above-plan products and increase their profits.
- Attempts to bring the industry out of the crisis
In an effort to improve the situation of industry, the state gave preference to an extensive development path, that is, many new plants, industries and factories were built, but at the same time, working conditions and technologies at existing enterprises did not improve.
Attempts were also made to modernize established forms of management and planning. The Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976-1980) was called the "Five-Year Plan of Efficiency and Quality", it was planned to direct the industry on the path of extensive development, but the plan was not fulfilled, on the contrary, a lag in the industry was noted.
- Fighting the agricultural crisis
In the fight against the difficulties of the agricultural sector of the economy, the amount of capital investments and the supply of equipment was increased.
In order to increase the production of rural products, associations were created - agro-industrial complexes (AIC). They were associations of collective farms, enterprises for the processing of agricultural raw materials, transport and trading companies. But these associations did not bring the expected effect - the crisis continued to progress.
After numerous interruptions in providing the population with food, in 1982 the Food Program of the USSR was adopted, which was aimed at the development of all agriculture in the complex, that is, all instances on the way of production from the field to the counter.
To improve fertility, extensive chemicalization and reclamation of soils was carried out.
But all these actions did not help to overcome the crisis of the agro-industry.
- Social sphere
The main characteristics of public life under Brezhnev can be divided into several points
BUT) Spreading the leveling principle of distribution of material wealth among the bulk of the population.
This is due to the simultaneous increase in wages for low-paid workers and lower wages for engineers. When evaluating work, the quality of work and any personal merit were not taken into account.
B) Residual principle of allocating funds for social needs
Most likely, this principle was followed by many Soviet leaders parties. First place in material support there is always military production and heavy industry, then the needs of the party elite, and already at the very end of the list "social needs". The village lacked hospitals, kindergartens and canteens, which caused many villagers to move to the city.
IN) The introduction of a particularly privileged position of the party-state nomenclature
But the party elite lived well, sanatoriums and hospitals were specially built for them, and the best food was delivered. But such a difference in social position soon contributed to the fall of the prestige of the party.
G) The dominance of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the suppression of any dissent (persecution of dissidents)
Since the course was taken to build communism, censorship was again tightened, in addition, a struggle began with those who did not want to come to terms with the established rules and openly expressed their opinion (dissidents)
D) Diktat of atheism and oblivion of religion
We know that under Khrushchev there was a persecution of Orthodoxy, churches were closed. Under Brezhnev, relations between the state and the Church reached a new level, the Council for Religious Affairs was created under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which in fact completely subjugated the Church. In addition, compared with the times of Khrushchev, the number of lectures promoting atheism was increased.
E) Holding in MoscowXXIIOlympic Games (summer 1980)
Perhaps the most significant event cultural life period of stagnation. Summer Olympic Games passed at a height, this event is still fresh in the memory of the people, many still have tears when they remember the words from the song “Goodbye, our affectionate Bear”.
Foreign policy
- The policy of "détente"
IN international relations the issue of reducing international tension continued to be relevant . Under Brezhnev, military parity was achieved between the USSR (OVD) and the United States (NATO) through the following treaties:
- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons between the USSR, USA and Great Britain (1968)
- Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the limitation of systems missile defense and OSV-1 (1972) and OSV-2 (1979)
The development of economic and cultural relations with the capitalist countries (Soviet-French declaration) received a new round, and trade relations with Europe expanded.
- USSR and socialist countries
The Soviet Union considered the strengthening of the world socialist camp to be paramount in foreign policy.
In 1968, the ATS army was introduced into Czechoslovakia to suppress the "Prague Spring" - an attempt by the new party secretary to decentralize government and democratize the country.
In 1964-1973, the USSR provided assistance to Vietnam, where socialism was also established, during the US aggression.
Military-political (OVD) and economic (CMEA) cooperation was deepened.
Results of activity:
Brezhnev's rule marked a regularity and stability in the life of the country; under him, the so-called era of "stagnation" began. During Brezhnev's 18 years in power Soviet government pursued a policy in the direction of "developed socialism" (in 1977, a new "Brezhnev" constitution of the USSR was adopted). Attention was paid to solving the problems of public consumption: resources were directed to Agriculture, light and food industry. The result of such reforms was a slight increase in the standard of living of the population, especially in rural areas, but after the first period of real growth in the country's economy, by the mid-1970s, signs of stagnation appeared. Chemicalization of soils has led to the deterioration of the ecological state of the land, the deterioration of the state of the economy of the agricultural sector. Full control was exercised over the intelligentsia, there was a struggle with dissidents. In the international arena, Brezhnev continues to follow the course initiated by Khrushchev to develop a dialogue with the West. The first bilateral disarmament agreements were tangible achievements of the policy of détente, culminating in the signing of the Helsinki Accords. These successes, however, were seriously undermined by the Prague Spring, and then by the direct invasion of Afghanistan, after which international affairs tension reappears.
And finally cool video from Enjoykin:
And also, anecdotes on the topic. To see them, please like on one of your social networks:
Brezhnev went to the mirror and thought aloud:
“Yes… old became, very old, SUPERSTAR!”.
Lenin proved that even cooks can run the country.
Stalin proved that one person can rule the country.
Khrushchev proved that even a fool can govern a country.
Brezhnev proved that the country can not govern at all.
Brezhnev arrived at the Kremlin on the first day of Easter. Ustinov meets him:
Brezhnev nodded and moved on. Towards Chernenko, smiling sycophantly:
- Christ is risen, Leonid Ilyich!
Thanks, I've already been told.
After the dismissal of Khrushchev, L.I. became the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Brezhnev (since 1966 - general secretary, since 1977 - at the same time Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR). The post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was taken by A.N. Kosygin.
Both in character and intellect, Brezhnev did not possess the qualities of a leader of a great power, necessary for the implementation of a radical renewal of society. The unofficial "small" Politburo, which included Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov, Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko, Secretary of the Central Committee M.A. Suslov, KGB Chairman Yu.V. Andropov, who determined domestic and foreign policy.
The basis of the course is "stability", which meant the rejection of any attempts at a radical renewal of society. Both the government and society are tired of emergency conditions and the constant tension in which the country lived for the previous half century.
political development.
Characteristic features of the political development of the country in the second half of the 1960s - the first half of the 1980s. became the centralization and bureaucratization of the administrative apparatus. The adopted resolutions on the further democratization of public life remained declarative.
Brezhnev's rule was a "golden time" for the bureaucracy. Under Stalin, she lived under constant fear of arrest; under the constant Khrushchev reorganizations, she also felt restless. After the death of Stalin and the removal of Khrushchev, the elite wanted a quiet life, confidence in tomorrow, wanted to protect themselves from personnel changes. Brezhnev was ideally suited to the role of spokesman for the interests of the bureaucracy.
The total number of managers by the end of Brezhnev's rule amounted to almost 18 million people (for 6-7 employees - one manager). The rapid growth of the bureaucracy was ensured by numerous benefits and privileges. To maintain such an apparatus by the mid-1980s. more than 40 billion rubles, or 10% of the budget, were spent annually.
By the beginning of the 1980s. in the management of the national economy alone, up to 200,000 various orders, instructions, and other by-laws accumulated, which regulated every step of business executives and fettered their initiative.
Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, whose years of rule fell on the so-called era of stagnation, does not cause such heated debate among compatriots as Stalin or even Khrushchev. However, this person also causes very controversial assessments, and the corresponding period left a variety of impressions in the public mind.
Leonid Brezhnev. Years of government of the USSR
Today, this period is associated primarily with light industry and the growing backlog of the Union from its main Western competitor in
heavy. Leonid Brezhnev, whose years of rule fell on 1964-1982, even in power turned out to be an unusual way for those times. In the previous forty years of the existence of the Soviet state, it was difficult to imagine that its leader could be removed from office through bureaucratic mechanisms. Both Lenin and Stalin, despite the contradictory assessments of their activities, were figures of such magnitude that the change of power could and did take place only after their death. The end of totalitarianism in the state, including party purges, was put by Nikita Khrushchev. The 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 contributed a lot to this. The state has never had such a large-scale and individual leader. As a result, Khrushchev was removed by a party decision in 1964. His successor was Leonid Brezhnev, whose years of rule began with the decision of the plenum. This period was the apogee of the development of the Soviet country and at the same time the beginning of its collapse.
Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. Years of government and trends in domestic politics
Today this page national history It is customary to call it stagnation, recalling the shortage of essential goods and the stagnation of the economy. In fairness, it should be noted that among the first political decisions of Leonid Ilyich in office was the deployment economic reforms. The activity started in 1965 was aimed at transferring partly to the market track. The independence of large economic enterprises state, instruments were introduced to ensure material
incentives for employees. Indeed, the reform began to give brilliant results. Brezhnev period became the most successful in the history of the country. However, the reformers never completed their undertakings. The economic liberalization reform that produced clear results was not backed up by social and political liberalization. The introduction of market mechanisms at large economic facilities was not complemented by the liberalization of market relations themselves in the country. Actually, the half-heartedness of the reforms determined the slowdown in the pace of development already in the early 1970s. In addition, oil deposits were discovered in Siberia at that time, promising easy income for the treasury, after which state leaders finally lost interest in reforming economic and social life. In the future, the well-known tendencies of “tightening the screws” (mass executions never happened again, but mental hospitals became the talk of the town), a decrease in the profitability of production, when the industry demanded everything big investments but gave less and less results. More and more unbalanced state economy. The need to invest resources in a negative impact on the lung, resulting in the infamous commodity shortage.
L.I. Brezhnev. Years of government and trends in foreign policy
In addition to domestic problems, despite all efforts, mistakes in the international arena are becoming more and more obvious. If in the Khrushchev era, despite all its ridiculous epics, the USSR spoke on equal terms with the United States during the period and was the first in space exploration, then in 1969 the Americans for the first time outstripped the Union in landing on the moon. The last resounding success of the domestic space program was the first successful landing spacecraft on Mars. Increasingly intense fermentation begins in the friendly republics of the socialist camp. to a large extent laid the foundation for problems that frankly manifested themselves during perestroika and pushed the state to the final collapse.