Ranks of German officers in World War II. SS military ranks. Wehrmacht and SS ranks
One of the most cruel and merciless organizations of the 20th century is the SS. Ranks, distinctive insignia, functions - all this was different from those in other types and branches of troops in Nazi Germany. Reich Minister Himmler completely brought together all the scattered security detachments (SS) into a single army - the Waffen SS. In the article we will take a closer look at the military ranks and insignia of the SS troops. And first, a little about the history of the creation of this organization.
Prerequisites for the formation of the SS
In March 1923, Hitler was concerned that the leaders of the assault troops (SA) were beginning to feel their power and importance in the NSDAP party. This was due to the fact that both the party and the SA had the same sponsors, for whom the goal of the National Socialists was important - to carry out a coup, and they did not have much sympathy for the leaders themselves. Sometimes it even came to an open confrontation between the leader of the SA, Ernst Röhm, and Adolf Hitler. It was at this time, apparently, that the future Fuhrer decided to strengthen his personal power by creating a detachment of bodyguards - the headquarters guard. He was the first prototype of the future SS. They had no ranks, but insignia had already appeared. The abbreviation for the staff guard was also SS, but it came from German word Stawsbache. In every hundred of the SA, Hitler allocated 10-20 people, supposedly to protect high-ranking party leaders. They personally had to take an oath to Hitler, and their selection was carried out carefully.
A few months later, Hitler renamed the organization Stosstruppe - this was the name of the shock units of the Kaiser's army during the First World War. The abbreviation SS nevertheless remained the same, despite the fundamentally new name. It is worth noting that the entire Nazi ideology was associated with an aura of mystery, historical continuity, allegorical symbols, pictograms, runes, etc. Even the symbol of the NSDAP - the swastika - Hitler took from ancient Indian mythology.
Stosstrup Adolf Hitler - the Adolf Hitler strike force - acquired the final features of the future SS. They did not yet have their own ranks, but insignia appeared that Himmler would later retain - a skull on their headdress, a black distinctive color of the uniform, etc. The “Death's Head” on the uniform symbolized the readiness of the detachment to defend Hitler himself at the cost of their lives. The basis for future usurpation of power was prepared.
Appearance of Strumstaffel - SS
After the Beer Hall Putsch, Hitler went to prison, where he remained until December 1924. The circumstances that allowed the future Fuhrer to be released after an attempted armed seizure of power are still unclear.
Upon his release, Hitler first of all banned the SA from carrying weapons and positioning itself as an alternative to the German army. The fact is that the Weimar Republic could only have a limited contingent of troops under the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty after the First World War. It seemed to many that armed SA units were a legitimate way to avoid restrictions.
At the beginning of 1925, the NSDAP was restored again, and in November the “shock detachment” was restored. At first it was called Strumstaffen, and on November 9, 1925 it received its final name - Schutzstaffel - “cover squadron”. The organization had nothing to do with aviation. This name was invented by Hermann Goering, a famous fighter pilot of the First World War. He liked to use aviation terms in Everyday life. Over time, the “aviation term” was forgotten, and the abbreviation was always translated as “security detachments.” It was headed by Hitler's favorites - Schreck and Schaub.
Selection for the SS
The SS gradually became an elite unit with good salaries in foreign currency, which was considered a luxury for the Weimar Republic with its hyperinflation and unemployment. All Germans of working age were eager to join the SS detachments. Hitler himself carefully selected his personal guard. The following requirements were imposed on candidates:
- Age from 25 to 35 years.
- Having two recommendations from current members of the CC.
- Permanent residence in one place for five years.
- Availability of such positive qualities like sobriety, strength, health, discipline.
New development under Heinrich Himmler
The SS, despite the fact that it was personally subordinate to Hitler and the Reichsführer SS - from November 1926, this position was held by Josef Berthold, was still part of the SA structures. The attitude towards the “elite” in the assault detachments was contradictory: the commanders did not want to have SS members in their units, so they shouldered various responsibilities, for example, distributing leaflets, subscribing to Nazi propaganda, etc.
In 1929, Heinrich Himmler became the leader of the SS. Under him, the size of the organization began to grow rapidly. The SS turns into an elitist closed organization with its own charter, a mystical ritual of entry, imitating the traditions of medieval knightly Orders. A real SS man had to marry a “model woman.” Heinrich Himmler introduced a new mandatory requirement for joining the renewed organization: the candidate had to prove evidence of purity of descent in three generations. However, that was not all: the new Reichsführer SS ordered all members of the organization to look for brides only with a “pure” genealogy. Himmler managed to nullify the subordination of his organization to the SA, and then completely leave it after he helped Hitler get rid of the leader of the SA, Ernst Röhm, who sought to turn his organization into a massive people's army.
The bodyguard detachment was transformed first into the Fuhrer's personal guard regiment, and then into the personal SS army. Ranks, insignia, uniforms - everything indicated that the unit was independent. Next, we’ll talk in more detail about insignia. Let's start with the rank of the SS in the Third Reich.
Reichsführer SS
At its head was the Reichsführer SS - Heinrich Himmler. Many historians claim that he intended to usurp power in the future. In the hands of this man was control not only over the SS, but also over the Gestapo - the secret police, the political police and the security service (SD). Despite the fact that many of the above organizations were subordinate to one person, they were completely different structures, which sometimes even were at odds with each other. Himmler well understood the importance of a branched structure of different services concentrated in the same hands, so he was not afraid of Germany’s defeat in the war, believing that such a person would be useful to the Western allies. However, his plans were not destined to come true, and he died in May 1945, biting into an ampoule of poison in his mouth.
Let's look at the highest ranks of the SS among the Germans and their correspondence with the German army.
Hierarchy of the SS High Command
The insignia of the SS high command consisted of Nordic ritual symbols and oak leaves on both sides of the lapels. The exceptions - SS Standartenführer and SS Oberführer - wore oak leaf, but belonged to senior officers. The more of them there were on the buttonholes, the higher the rank of their owner.
The highest ranks of the SS among the Germans and their correspondence with the ground army:
SS officers
Let's look at the features officers. The SS Hauptsturmführer and lower ranks no longer had oak leaves on their buttonholes. Also on their right buttonhole was the SS coat of arms - a Nordic symbol of two lightning bolts.
Hierarchy of SS officers:
SS rank | Lapels | Compliance in the military |
SS Oberführer | Double oak leaf | No match |
Standartenführer SS | Single sheet | Colonel |
SS Obersturmbannführer | 4 stars and two rows of aluminum thread | Lieutenant colonel |
SS Sturmbannführer | 4 stars | |
SS Hauptsturmführer | 3 stars and 4 rows of thread | Hauptmann |
SS Obersturmführer | 3 stars and 2 rows | Chief Lieutenant |
SS Untersturmführer | 3 stars | Lieutenant |
I would like to immediately note that the German stars did not resemble the five-pointed Soviet ones - they were four-pointed, rather reminiscent of squares or rhombuses. Next in the hierarchy are the SS non-commissioned officer ranks in the Third Reich. More details about them in the next paragraph.
Non-commissioned officers
Hierarchy of non-commissioned officers:
SS rank | Lapels | Compliance in the military |
SS Sturmscharführer | 2 stars, 4 rows of thread | Staff sergeant major |
Standartenoberunker SS | 2 stars, 2 rows of thread, silver edging | Chief Sergeant Major |
SS Hauptscharführer | 2 stars, 2 rows of thread | Oberfenrich |
SS Oberscharführer | 2 stars | Sergeant Major |
Standartenjunker SS | 1 star and 2 rows of thread (differing in shoulder straps) | Fanenjunker-sergeant-major |
Scharführer SS | Non-commissioned sergeant major |
|
SS Unterscharführer | 2 threads at the bottom | Non-commissioned officer |
Buttonholes are the main, but not the only insignia of ranks. Also, the hierarchy could be determined by shoulder straps and stripes. Military ranks The SS was sometimes subject to change. However, above we presented the hierarchy and the main differences at the end of World War II.
OFFICER RANKS IN FASCIST GERMANY
OFFICER RANKS IN FASCIST GERMANY, Reichsführer SS corresponded to the rank of Field Marshal of the Wehrmacht;
Oberstgruppenführer - Colonel General;
Obergruppenführer - general;
Gruppenführer - Lieutenant General;
brigadenführer - major general;
Standartenführer - colonel;
Obersturmbannführer - lieutenant colonel;
Sturmbannführer - major;
Hauptsturmführer - captain;
Obersturmführer - Oberleutnant;
Untersturmführer - Lieutenant.
encyclopedic Dictionary. 2009 .
See what "OFFICER RANKS IN FASCIST GERMANY" are in other dictionaries:
Officer ranks of the troops of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and the Axis countries during the Second World War. Not marked: China (Anti-Hitler Coalition) Finland (Axis Powers) Designations: Infantry Military naval forces Military air force Waffen... ... Wikipedia
SS BRIGADENFUHRER, see Officer ranks in fascist Germany(see OFFICER RANKS IN FASCIST GERMANY) ... encyclopedic Dictionary
HAUPTSTURMFUHRER SS, see Officer ranks in Nazi Germany (see OFFICER RANKS IN FASCIST GERMANY) ... encyclopedic Dictionary
SS GRUPPENFUHRER, see Officer ranks in Nazi Germany (see OFFICER RANKS IN FASCIST GERMANY) ... encyclopedic Dictionary
OBERGRUPPENFUHRER SS, see Officer ranks in Nazi Germany (see OFFICER RANKS IN FASCIST GERMANY) ... encyclopedic Dictionary
OBERSTGRUPPENFUHRER SS, see Officer ranks in Nazi Germany (see OFFICER RANKS IN FASCIST GERMANY) ... encyclopedic Dictionary
OBERSTURMBANNFUHRER SS, see Officer ranks in Nazi Germany (see OFFICER RANKS IN FASCIST GERMANY) ... encyclopedic Dictionary
Tables of ranks of the German Wehrmacht (Die Wehrmacht) 1935-45.
German officer training system
The German Wehrmacht had a unique officer training system, which guaranteed that the troops were staffed with high-quality officers. A roughly similar system exists today in the Bundeswehr.
Read about the ranks of students at officer schools.
Anyone wishing to become an officer after checking his trustworthiness by the Gestapo, passing exams physical training Through the Jungfolk and Hitler Youth, he passed the entrance exams to the school.
Then the candidate was sent to a combat regiment (during war, necessarily to the regiment leading combat operations) for a year as a soldier (during war, the period was reduced).
After the end of the period, subject to positive feedback At the command of the regiment, the candidate received the rank of "fanejunker" equal to the rank of "corporal" and after short theoretical studies (from 2 to 6 months) he was again sent to another combat regiment for a corporal position for a period of 4 to 6 months. During this period, he should have been given the opportunity to perform the duties of a squad commander part of the time. Fanenjunkers who did not meet the requirements of the command did not return to the school, but remained to serve in the unit as corporals.
Upon returning to the school, the Fanenjunker received the title of “Fahenjunkerunterofficer”, took a 2-6 month course of theoretical training and was sent to the third combat regiment as a squad commander. Part of the time he had to serve as deputy platoon commander and company sergeant major.
Subject to positive feedback from the command upon his return to school, he received the title "Fenrich" and after a short theoretical course sent to the fourth combat unit platoon commander (for an officer position) and after a specified period of service as a platoon commander at the school, he passed the final exams.
After that, with the rank of "Oberfenrich" he was sent to the regiment for permanent service. The assignment of the rank of "lieutenant" depended on the command of the regiment and division. Basically, the time from admission to school to assignment officer rank was more than three years (even during the war, and to ensure sufficient replenishment of the troops with officers, enrollment in schools increased). To be awarded each successive officer rank, it was necessary to undergo 4-6 months of training at the appropriate school or academy for the position to which it was planned to send the officer, and to undergo an internship in a new position.
Thus, there was a constant filtering of quality candidates from random and unfit to lead soldiers. By the time he received the officer rank, the candidate had combat experience and theoretical knowledge; knew how to use all types of weapons, knew how to command soldiers, knew the features of managing various units, and had authority. Internships in various parts from different commanders and their decisive conclusion on the suitability of the candidate guaranteed that the unworthy would not receive the officer rank (due to connections, for father’s merits, for origin, etc.). Moreover, in Peaceful time For each subsequent level of training, no more than 75% of the number of persons who passed the previous level could be accepted.
A significant part of the officers in war time was recruited from among distinguished, capable non-commissioned officers. If necessary, they were given the opportunity to receive military education, and before being awarded the rank of officer, they also underwent a course of theoretical training.
With all the hostility towards the fascists, it is impossible not to note that the German officers were above all praise, which Marshal G.K. Zhukov noted in his memoirs.
The officers knew the soldiers, were close to them, knew how to organize a battle, conduct it stubbornly, unconventionally, with initiative; rushed to victory, trying to save the soldiers. They were not afraid to deviate from the charter in order to achieve success. The soldiers trusted their officers, knowing that each of them had been in a soldier's shoes at one time; they willingly followed them into battle, saw them as their more experienced and senior comrades, and protected them in battle.
Our Victory in the war of 1941-45 over the Wehrmacht, led by such high-class officers, only brings honor to our army.
It’s just a pity that this cruel lesson remained unlearned; so no one here understood that the money, time, and resources spent on training officers in peacetime would save a lot of soldiers’ lives during the war. Our current leaders of the country have not learned this lesson, and we are again learning to fight during the war, paying for our studies with the blood of incompetent soldiers and untrained officers. And the Germans in post-war Germany (and after the 1st and 2nd World Wars) carefully preserved their non-commissioned officers and officers, found the opportunity to allocate money from a meager budget for pensions for former military personnel, for their secret training and retraining (including including in the USSR), and when necessary, in the shortest possible time managed to deploy a first-class army. It is only amateurs from military science who can believe that it is enough to hang on the shoulder straps and the general is ready. Military science and the centuries-long experience of all countries clearly say that an ordinary soldier of average quality can be trained in two to three years, a company commander in 8-12 years. It takes another two years to put together such soldiers and officers into a combat-ready regiment. And generals are a piece of goods. More talent is required from a general than from an artist. If an artist’s price for mediocrity is whistles in the hall, then the price for a general’s mediocrity is thousands of ruined lives. After all military art- there is the ability to make the only correct decision in conditions of lack or even complete absence information and acute lack of time. Intuition is required here more than in a chess game. Try to win a chess game with your back to the board and not knowing how your opponent's pieces are positioned. And this is the general’s job. Any graduate of the journalism faculty can kick the general for failure, defeat, and blood shed in vain. “Everyone thinks of himself as a strategist, seeing the battle from the outside,” says an old Greek proverb. But no one here wants to understand the value of a talented officer or general, to save them, to give them the opportunity to develop their talents without war.
Honest performance of duty
I have written more than once that in the Soviet and current military history The biggest secret, even a “forbidden topic,” is how the Germans trained their officers before World War II. The taboo nature of this topic is understandable - neither Russian nor Soviet officers were trained this way, nor current Russian officers they don't cook like that. And when you begin to find out how the Germans raised their officers, the question inevitably arises, why aren’t our officers trained like this? And there is no clear answer to this question, which is why the topic of preparation came up German officers among the taboo topics of Russian military history.
The German army, from the mid-19th to the mid-20th century, was the strongest, and sometimes the most powerful army in the world. Yes, the Germans had very good weapon, however, not so much as to completely determine German victories. These victories were determined by the human composition of the German army, primarily by its officers. Even before the First World War, the Germans trained their officers very thoughtfully, which predetermined the results pointed out by the American historian James Corum in the quote I previously cited, I will repeat it since it is poorly discussed:
“During the First World War from 1914 to 1918, Germany mobilized eleven million and suffered six million casualties. The Allies mobilized twenty-eight million men against Germany alone and suffered twelve million casualties, not counting the fighting against the other Central Powers. Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy collected these and other statistics from that war and developed a system for comparing military effectiveness. Efficiency German army exceeded the same indicator for the British by an average of 1.49 times, the French by 1.53 times, and the Russian by 5.4 times.”
But James Corum's book, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform, not only reports this contempt for the Russian army, but also devotes an entire chapter specifically to how the Reichswehr command staff was trained. (Reichswehr - German army between 1920 and 1935, after 1935 the German army was called the Wehrmacht). That is, the chapter is devoted to how the German army prepared from the end of the First World War until Hitler came to power in Germany and the beginning of a sharp increase in the number of German armed forces.
And so, the more you learn about the training of German officers, the more confidence creeps in that this training cannot be reproduced mechanically. What does it mean?
For example, in Germany at that time, in order to become an officer, you had to enlist as a soldier and go through almost all soldier and non-commissioned officer (sergeant) positions. So what? It would seem, what problems? Let us also introduce such a requirement for the training of Russian officers. There really are no problems - you can introduce them - but there will be no sense, and you will end up with the same officers with whom Russia has been suffering for a couple of centuries. Why?
Because we need to start not by copying German methods of training officers, but by recreating the German military mentality, the German military way of thinking, the German military worldview. What does it mean?
The differences between the German mentality and the Russian one are multifaceted, but if we speak in extremely general terms, then:
YOU NEED TO TREAT YOUR BUSINESS EXCELLENTLY IN CONSIDERATION, TRYING TO ACHIEVE OUTSTANDING RESULTS IN IT.
Outstanding!
Is this why Russian officers join the army?
Thousands of mostly non-fictional stories about all kinds of life events appear on entertainment sites on the Internet. Here is an excerpt from the story about army service, absolutely typical story- there are plenty of them.
“My uncle, the commander of the T-62 tank, was drafted to Mongolia in 1979, the best in the unit. In all reviews and inspections, he took the highest places. He served excellently, an example for his colleagues. Their unit receives an order like “Recruitment of volunteers to participate in the interethnic conflict in Afghanistan.” Without hesitation, with the thoughts in his head “I’ll show you Kuzka’s mother,” he agrees. Then the company commander calls him. Without having time to enter the office, my uncle receives “cuffs” and “pills” for 3 minutes in all parts of the body, trying to wave them off with his hands, he mutters: “for what?”
The commander, almost shouting: “You, puppy, don’t understand, there’s a war there, real war, people are dying there, you understand what you are agreeing to. You’re such a rascal, you’re one of the best...” As a result, my uncle didn’t get there... Telling this story, he constantly remembers the Guardian Angel and says that he was in the company commander.”
Is an officer a “guardian angel” of his own skin and excellent soldiers from the war? And this is an officer?? Yes, a typical Soviet officer.
But in this view of service it is not Soviet army guilty.
In the book “If it weren’t for the generals!” I gave a quote from the book “Russian Thundercloud” (1886), written by S.M. Stepnyak-Kravchinsky, who began his independent life as an officer in the Russian army: “The composition of the Russian officers is very different from what we are accustomed to associate with ideas about the military caste. Our officer is the direct opposite of the prim Prussian junker, the ideal of the modern martinet, who prides himself on his uniform and treats the drilling of soldiers with the seriousness of a priest performing divine services. In Russia, army officers are unassuming people, completely devoid of any sense of caste superiority. They feel neither loyalty nor hatred to the existing system. They have no special attachment to their profession. They become officers, just as they might become officials or doctors, because at a young age their parents sent them to a military rather than a civilian school. And they remain in the field imposed on them, because they have to serve somewhere in order to provide themselves with the means to live, and a military career, in the end, is no worse than any other. They do everything to live their lives in peace, devoting as little time and labor as possible to their military duties. Of course, they crave promotion in rank, but they prefer to wait for promotion to the next rank in slippers and a dressing gown. They do not read professional literature, and if they subscribed to military magazines as part of their service, then these magazines lie uncut for years.
If our military read anything at all, it is most likely periodical literature. Military “jingoism” is completely alien to our officer environment. If you hear an officer talk enthusiastically about his profession or be possessed by a passion for drill, you can guarantee that he is a blockhead. With such officer cadres, the army is not able to fully develop its aggressive qualities.”
The revolutionary Kravchinsky was a cadet, a cadet and an artillery officer in the tsarist army, that is, for quite a long time, “from a young age,” he absorbed the worldview of a typical Russian officer. Kravchinsky is sincerely convinced that an officer who “speaks enthusiastically about his profession” is a fool, a blockhead. But this is so “our way”! The Russian officer is sure that receiving money for something you don’t want and don’t intend to do, for which you don’t feel like it, and you serve only because you’re afraid of not earning a living otherwise, is “honest.” It doesn’t even occur to Kravchinsky that this is the extreme degree of meanness - after all, what state, what people needs such a “non-aggressive” army, who needs a toothless dog?
(I remember that at the time of perestroika, former Soviet generals even created a committee “Generals for Peace!” And there’s nothing to say - it’s so Russian!)
If for you a military career is no better or worse than any other, then it’s dishonorable to choose the military! Take care of the one in which you will work, and not designate a service. After all, with such officers, our army is always “non-aggressive”, since the officers are cowardly and do not know how to fight, and due to ignorance of military affairs they are even more afraid to fight, because they know that any more or less serious enemy will definitely beat such “professionals” like them. Our average officer is not entirely a fool, and at least latently, he understands that the only thing he is capable of is to rob the treasury of his native state. Otherwise, this is the best “peace fighter”.
And look with what arrogant contempt Kravchinsky, a representative of a typically Russian officer corps, writes about German officers - supposedly “soldiers” who treat service as a sacred rite. Meanwhile, what the German officers did is called “being honest about what you get paid for.” After all, they received their salaries for training brave and skilled soldiers for Germany, for finding solutions on how to effectively use these soldiers in battles possible war. And therefore, not “in slippers and a dressing gown,” but they did this work honestly - at the training grounds they drove the soldiers until they worked up a sweat, and then the same amount, then they returned home and independently studied everything in military affairs that could be studied.
And in our country, as current officers report, even now in the army, if any of the officers starts to get seriously involved in military affairs and talk about it, then immediately mockery, ridicule, something contemptuous like “Suvorov has been found!” will immediately follow from colleagues.
What does it give
Thus, in order to begin to train the kind of officers that the Germans trained before the Second World War, it is necessary, first of all, to develop German HONESTY in relation to their work and to their duty. We must start with honesty. This, of course, is useful in all areas of life, for example, so that you don’t sniffle at the sight of a Mercedes or BMW, and don’t mock the Lada.
And how necessary is the German attitude to business in the army!
But principles are principles, and let us clarify step by step what it means to “have a German attitude to business,” to have the mindset of a German military man of that era.
Let's start with the fact that war is the killing of armed enemy soldiers - the destruction of his troops. Accordingly, the task of every soldier to prepare for this task is to train himself to destroy the enemy as much as possible.
And for this, the soldier must be possessed, if not by a great desire to personally kill or organize a battle, then at least by an unconditional consciousness that the soldier has no right to evade this matter and will never be able to evade it. That even mentally avoiding participation in battle is disgracing yourself. And from here there is one conclusion - to prepare in the most conscientious way, if only in order to reduce your own likelihood of death in battles. I think that in the Reichswehr the majority of the military personnel had this mentality, and in any case it was they who set the tone and created the atmosphere in the army.
This confidence comes from here. At the time of the organization of the Reichswehr, the Germans had a huge choice of those from whom to create the Reichswehr, since the victorious allies allowed the Germans to have an aria of only 100 thousand people with 4000 officers and generals. And after the First World War, Germany had at least 5 million soldiers and 60 thousand officers who had gone through the war. I repeat, there was plenty to choose from. But in Germany there was post-war devastation, it was very difficult for those demobilized from the army to find a job in civilian life, therefore (looking at Russian army) we understand that in the Reichswehr it would be possible to leave both relatives of the bosses and thieves in grain positions.
But the Germans selected 4,000 of the best combat officers and, most importantly, those who had not lost their fighting spirit. Why were they chosen?
I said - because of honesty. Firstly, of course, because of obvious honesty. Because of the awareness that only the best officers are needed by the army, so honestly, this is when the best are left in the army. But in in this case This is not all honesty, there is also that which we started talking about a little higher.
In the German army, in battle, enemy soldiers and equipment were personally destroyed by riflemen (there were no privates in the German army - the Germans had “shooters”) and corporals. And everyone else, starting from the non-commissioned officer and above - sergeant majors, officers, generals and field marshals - organized this destruction, that is, they organized battles and battles. Therefore, secondly, either due to the properties of their German character, or due to their trained readiness to fulfill their duty, these non-commissioned officers, officers and generals, of course, were going to fight personally, I repeat, personally organize the battles. Only with such a willingness to personally fight could they look at themselves as honest people. (These are not company commanders, who personally avoid battle and do not advise soldiers to fight).
And, of course, the Germans were not going to lose future battles.
Accordingly, the German commanders understood that the battle could not be won with unfit subordinates. Hence two aspirations - to have the best, most militant subordinates, and secondly, to be able to personally determine whether this subordinate is suitable for you or not? Can you win the fight with him or not?
You see, if some commission, on the basis of some grades obtained in some exams conducted by some teachers, recognizes some young man lieutenant, then it will be “in Russian”, but not “in German”. In German, this is when the commander of the regiment in which this candidate is to serve recognizes him as a lieutenant. But first, of course, the regiment commander will listen to the commander of the company in which the candidate for lieutenant serves - is this candidate suitable to be a deputy company commander and can he be entrusted with personal command of the first platoon of the company? If the commanders' opinions coincide, then he is a lieutenant. And who examined him somewhere - this is of course also interesting to the company commander and colonel, but for them this is not the main thing. The main thing is whether they see this candidate as a future company commander. Will it be possible to entrust him with 200 soldiers and a combat mission feasible for the company? Is there any hope that he will be eager to complete a combat mission greater than sufficient for a company? Will he be a model of courage, calm and confidence for his soldiers?
But that's not all. An honest attitude to duty - the understanding that in the event of war you will not evade personal participation in battles - underlies the requirement for the exclusive independence of the German commander in battle. But more on that later.
(to be continued)
"Anatomy of an Army"
Rules of conduct and customs of officers
Wehrmacht 1935-45
Preface. This article does not carry a significant information load, however, I think it can help to understand some of the rules and customs of internal relationships among the officers of the Wehrmacht, to equip with an understanding of the figure of the German officer as a thing in itself. At the same time, here I deliberately distance myself from the attitude of German officers towards the enemy, towards to the local population in the occupied territories, especially excluding here and their behavior in our country during the war. Quite a lot has already been said about this, including on my website. Here I want to briefly describe the rules and customs that existed within military groups in Wehrmacht units.
It is possible that this kind of psychological portrait of a German officer will help the reader understand the reasons for this or that behavior of the Nazis in certain critical situations. For example, why is General Paulus in Stalingrad, fully understanding after the failure of attempts to release the blockade, that the army is doomed not just to defeat, but to total destruction, and that further resistance is simply a crime against by the German people, never decided to take unauthorized actions. And why did all his generals and officers, also realizing their imminent death, continue to obediently carry out orders.
I flatter myself that the article is also read by those who write scripts for films and TV series about the war today, and it will help them avoid many of the blunders that hurt the eyes when you see scenes showing Hitler’s soldiers and officers, and not only them, in battle.
Well, in no army in the world can soldiers argue with an officer about how and where to fight, where to run and who to shoot at. Especially in German. A German soldier cannot behave in a friendly manner with his officer, and they cannot address each other in any form.
This may be on the set, an ordinary lighting technician can prove to the director that he organized this or that scene incorrectly, and argue with the operator about what angle to shoot from. main character, and categorically refuse to do as he was told. Or a television announcer expresses his personal opinion on air, and not the text placed on his desk. Or a journalist can call his editor bad names and insert one article into the newspaper instead of another. Maybe, although I doubt it.
But I know for sure that in war, issues of service and combat are not resolved by meetings or fierce disputes between soldiers and commanders. And under no circumstances will a soldier point his weapon at his commander as an argument, since this in itself is a grave war crime, for which the most severe punishment will inevitably follow.
End of the preface.
So, what standards of behavior were prescribed? governing documents German officer.
First of all, he must perform his duties based on the concepts of honor and dignity of an officer, and not out of fear of punishment or punishment. By his behavior, always and everywhere, he is obliged to emphasize to everyone, and especially to his subordinates, his honesty, punctuality, diligence, accuracy and impeccability.
If he made a mistake, a mistake, an omission, or did not fulfill the order on time, then he must report this to his superior. Any concealment of misconduct from a superior is completely unacceptable for an officer and incompatible with the concept of officer honor.
The more difficult and complex the situation and the more tired the officer is, the more to a greater extent he must monitor his performance. References to fatigue and lack of strength as reasons for incomplete and dishonest performance of duty are considered unsoldier behavior and unworthy of an officer. He must be firm and tough, first of all, in relation to himself.
An officer must be secretive. This applies not only to compliance with state and military secrets in general, but also the immediate intentions and plans of the senior commander and their own. He must not disclose official or personal information about himself or his comrades and subordinates. He can tell others only what concerns them directly and affects the performance of the combat mission.
An officer must be a model of diligence and obedience for his subordinates. Any criticism of senior commanders, analysis and analysis of their decisions and orders, even among officers equal in position and rank, not to mention subordinates, is completely unacceptable. All that can be discussed is how best to carry out the received order. References to the lack or lack of funds and strength for this are unacceptable. The boss is supposed to know better strength and the capabilities of subordinates than themselves. Doubts about his awareness are excluded.
In official communication, it is not allowed to interrupt the boss and make excuses. If an officer believes that he was reprimanded unfairly, then he must find an opportunity to explain himself to his superior during off-duty hours, but only with his permission. The boss’s refusal to provide explanations cannot serve as a basis for appeals to higher authorities or further hostility towards the boss.
The officer answers the boss’s questions briefly and without unnecessary turns of phrase, without lengthy explanations. Interrupting the boss is not allowed. If the officer believes that the superior has misunderstood him or the superior has made an erroneous decision, he should wait until the superior's speech ends and ask permission to clarify. Form of request for permission (appearance is always only in the third person): “I ask Mr. Major’s permission to explain something.”
If the officer does not understand the question or order, he turns to the superior: “Mr. Hauptmann, what did you order?” or “I did not understand Herr Hauptmann’s question.” At the same time, it is prohibited to express disagreement with the order in this form. It is believed that in this case the subordinate is trying to put pressure on the boss, which is completely unacceptable in the Wehrmacht.
In all cases of conversation with a superior, the subordinate’s speech begins with the words “Mr. Oberleutnant...” or ends with the same address “..., Mr. Oberleutnant.” Failure to use these requests is considered gross violation disciplines.
The relationship between superiors and subordinates requires compliance with certain customs and norms. Tactful behavior with superiors should also be observed during off-duty conversations. However, this politeness should in no case be tinged with embarrassment or ingratiation. The officer complies external forms communication even if the officer doesn’t like the boss. He shows in all cases self-confidence and the courage of responsibility. Training and explanations from the superior must be understandable to the subordinate and should be accepted with gratitude.
For an officer, stubbornness is the same manifestation of weakness of character as inappropriate gentleness.
In telephone conversations, if an officer is called by a superior, the subordinate begins the conversation with the words “Here, Herr Oberst” (Hier, Herr Oberst). Calls from subordinates to superiors are excluded. If there is a need to inform the boss about something, the subordinate must call the communication center and inform the duty telephone operator about the need to talk with the boss. The telephone operator reports to the boss and he calls the subordinate.
When meeting a superior, a subordinate greets the superior first. At the same time, his left hand should not be in a clothing pocket.
It is not allowed to overtake the boss while driving. If the situation requires it, then, having become close to the boss, you should ask for permission to overtake.
The relationships between officers in the officer team are specifically stipulated. They must be friendly and everyone must sacrifice something in the interests of the team. In officer society, manifestations of selfishness and isolation (isolation) are unacceptable.
First of all, an officer must take an active part in all activities of the officers' society. If he is not married, then it is highly desirable that he dine with other unmarried officers of the unit at the common officers' table. It is also mandatory to periodically visit the officer’s casino in the evenings and on weekends, which is considered a means of instilling a corporate spirit, developing friendly relations, and perceiving military traditions.
From the author. Here the casino should be understood not as some kind of gambling establishment where millions of dollars are lost, but as a closed officers' club where officers spend their leisure time. At the casino they can have lunch, dinner, drink beer or schnapps, watch a movie, chat with friends, listen to musicians, read newspapers and magazines, play chess or dominoes. Card games are not forbidden, but they are only one of the means of pastime here. Wherein card games must be of a sporting nature (poker, bridge, etc.). Gambling games such as roulette and others that do not develop tactical thinking are not allowed.
An officer arriving at his new unit, when visiting the casino for the first time, must be introduced to the officer group by the oldest officer of the regiment and must behave freely and naturally, but with restraint. Until he acquires a certain authority in the team, during conversations and conversations he should only listen, without expressing his opinion.
Smoking at the table is considered permissible only if the meal is finished and only at the sign of the oldest officer sitting at the table. Also, only with his permission can you leave the table if the officer is called on official business or to the telephone. For other reasons, getting up from the table is considered impolite. If a senior officer raises a toast to one of those present, then he is obliged to stand. Raising a toast to the elders by the younger ones is not completely prohibited, as well as toasts to the Fuhrer, to the victories of German weapons.
From the author. A very common mistake made by those making films about war is to transfer the customs of our feasts to German soil. In Wehrmacht officer groups, during feasts, toasts in honor of the Fuhrer, senior military leaders and events that were recognized above those sitting at the table were considered unacceptable and offensive to high-ranking persons and events. Toasts and raising glasses in honor of someone were perceived by others as signs of goodwill and reward from commanders to their subordinates. It is clear that the Fuhrer and senior commanders do not at all need the approval of juniors
In the officer team, among equals in position and rank, manifestations of rudeness, lecturing and mutual disputes are not allowed. The junior does not have the right to prove that he is right and insist on his assessment of the situation or events. The opinion of the elder is automatically considered the only correct one.
It is believed that an officer should not be prone to gambling and, in any case, he should not, as a result of gambling, get into debt that he cannot repay. The officer team must monitor officers who are prone to such behavior and correct them in a timely manner.
Drinking alcoholic beverages is not prohibited for officers, but they must take care of themselves and their comrades so as not to become drunk.
According to German views, discipline and obedience of subordinates during war depend little on the authority of the position and officer rank. The officer is obliged to take care of the moral conquest of the souls of his subordinates, which is achieved by high personal authority. An officer is obliged to know and be able to know more than his subordinates, to use all his abilities and capabilities to improve living conditions, preserve the lives and health of his subordinates, and provide weapons, ammunition, and food. He must promptly notice the differences and exploits of his subordinates and strive to ensure that this is promptly and adequately rewarded, but without flirting.
In the photo: Nazi officers packing the loot
Sources and literature
1. F. Altrichter. Der reserveoffizier. Verlag von E.S.Mittler & Sohn. Berlin. 1943
2.H.Dv.130/2a. Ausbildungsvorschrift fuer die Infanterie. Heft 2a. Shuetzenkompanie. Verlag Offene Worte. Berlin. 1941