The ratio of state and national interests. National-state interests of the Russian Federation National-state interests in the system of relations
Russia in the mirror of political science
What are the national-state interests in modern Russia?
National-state interests are a set of common interests that have historically developed in a single state space.
National interests are the perceived needs of the state, determined by its economic and geopolitical relations, cultural and historical traditions, the need to ensure security, protect the population from external threats and internal unrest, environmental disasters etc.
The term “national interest” itself came to Russian political science from Western English-language political literature, in which it has the meaning of “state interest”. National interests are understood primarily as the interests of the state, since Western countries are mono-ethnic states (not so much in the ethnic aspect, but in the social). The nation represents dual unity civil society and states. Western political scientists have no particular difficulty in using such a concept as "national interest". By default, the national interest appears as a general interest that removes the contradiction between the interests of the state and civil society. To talk today about significant differences in the fundamental values of civil society is industrially developed countries do not have to. Citizens in it fully achieve rationally motivated mutual understanding, i.e. mutual understanding, free from anyone else's domination. It is understood that representatives of civil society, the independent public, have an impact on public policy. Internal tasks, private interests of citizens have priority in the formation of foreign policy. National interests in this interpretation include in this course such parameters as the acquisition of resources and the improvement of the material well-being of the population. “What is good for citizens is good for the state” - this is the principle of approach to national interests in countries with a developed civil society.
In domestic political science, differences of a fundamental order are revealed in the understanding of Russia's national interests.
In Russia, where civil society is at the beginning of its formation, where the transition from traditionalist structures to modern ones is taking place, there is no ideological and political consensus on the issue of national interests. The search for a civilizational identity continues, which causes a sharp and painful struggle between Westernizers-liberals (“Atlantists”) and Slavophiles-statesmen (“Eurasians”). The focus of this struggle is the question: “Who is the subject of national interest?” The first consider Russia European country and highlight the universal civilizational advantage of the West. Following in line with Western European policy is, in their opinion, in the national interest. They consider civil society to be a subject that determines the content of national interests. Based on this, the highest interest lies in carrying out economic reform which will make Russia richer and freer.
The other part of the political spectrum identifies Russia as a Eurasian country and sharply distances itself from the liberal understanding of national interests. For this part, national interests are determined, first of all, by the tasks of preserving and strengthening statehood. It is the state that has an undoubted priority in shaping the foreign policy course. Here “national interest” is equated with “state interest”. Ensuring state security is directly linked to the program of strengthening state regulation of the economy. The highest national interest for them is the revival of Russia and its sovereign greatness.
Russia has never existed as an ethnic state, and today it is not, however, the vast majority of the states of the post-Soviet space are focused on building ethnic states.
Russia has historically evolved as a union of ethnic groups, cultures, lands, the basis of which was a common goal, held together by national values and interests. The latter did not deny the diversity of ethnic interests of the subjects inhabiting it, did not fix the fact of the superiority of one nationality over another. On the contrary, circumstances gave rise to the formation of the political unity of ethnic groups. This was reflected in the fact that a number of general conditions for ethnic diversity predetermined as a national interest “the all-round strengthening of the state as an organizing principle, designed to ensure territorial integrity and external security and develop adequate forms of coexistence of various national-ethnic, religious and cultural communities. That is why the historically established national interests of Russia have become predominantly state interests” (S. Kortunov).
The national-state interests of Russia in their content and forms of manifestation were not identical at specific historical stages of its development. Guidelines, values, ideals, mechanisms and methods for achieving them were changing, which affected the essential understanding and implementation of the relationship between society, the state and the individual. Depending on the priority of an individual element of this triad, certain interests were lined up and formed. social actors. For example, the prevalence of the role of the state led to a significant infringement of the actual public interest and most importantly - the interests of individuals. State interests were placed above all other interests, which gave rise to the "imperial" character of Russia, its great power.
At present, in Russia, which has announced the transition to rule of law and civil society, the main interests of the individual, society and the state are unified system national interests. At the same time, the interests of the individual are declared the fundamental basis of public and state interests, which, in turn, are not something secondary, secondary. The concept of national security of the Russian Federation, approved by the Decree of the President of December 17, 1997, fixed that on present stage the interests of the individual consist in the real provision of constitutional rights and freedoms, personal security, in improving the quality and standard of living, in physical, spiritual and intellectual development. The interests of society include the strengthening of democracy, the achievement and maintenance of social harmony, the increase in the creative activity of the population and the spiritual revival of Russia. The interests of the state are to protect the constitutional order, sovereignty and territorial integrity Russia, in establishing the political, economic and social stability, in the unconditional execution of laws and the maintenance of law and order, in the development international cooperation based on partnership.
The concept of national security determines the national-state interests of Russia also in the field of economy, in the domestic political, international, defense and information spheres, in the social field, spiritual life and culture. For example, in the domestic political sphere, these interests consist in ensuring civil peace, national accord, territorial integrity, unity of the legal space, stability state power and its institutions, law enforcement, etc.
The most important tasks are the strengthening of Russian statehood, the improvement and development of federalism and oral self-government. The implementation of the constitutional principle of democracy requires ensuring the coordinated functioning and interaction of all public authorities, a rigid vertical executive power and unity judicial system Russia. This is ensured by the constitutional principle of separation of powers, the establishment of a clearer functional distribution of powers between government institutions, strengthening federal structure Russia by improving its contractual relations with the subjects of the Russian Federation within the framework of their constitutional status. the main objective protection of Russian federalism - to prevent the transformation of federal relations into confederal ones.
Priority in foreign policy is given to ensuring security and integrity as a socio-economic, political, national-historical and cultural community, with the protection of the economic and political independence of the state, the development of Russia's relations with the leading states of the world, comprehensive cooperation and integration within the CIS, as well as full-fledged Russia's participation in world, European and Asian economic and political structures.
In general, the most important national-state interests of Russia include the following:
Completion of the process of formation of Russia within the current borders as a modern Russian state, i.e. beneficial for the Russian Federation "reorganization" of the post-Soviet space and the creation of a belt of friendly states around it;
Further reduction of the threat of a large-scale war, strengthening of strategic stability, consistent demilitarization of relations between Russia and NATO;
Conflict prevention, crisis management, dispute resolution in the former USSR;
Inclusion in world economic relations at the most beneficial national economy conditions.
After the collapse of the USSR and Warsaw Pact in 1990 the world entered
into a new phase of global political development. If before this
moment, global security was based on the principle of nuclear
containment and balance of forces between the two military blocs, then after the dissolution
Warsaw Pact, the balance of power changed in favor of NATO.
Entry into its ranks of the Baltic states and some states
Eastern Europe in 2005 expanded the boundaries of the alliance to state
borders of Russia. In this case, Russia is actually alone
opposes military power NATO. The current situation requires
Russia to develop such a model of behavior in the international arena,
which would enable it to pursue an international policy
her national interests. However, it is not easy to make an ego.
The hopes of the political elite headed by B. Yeltsin for the Western
assistance during the reform period of the 90s of the XX century. led to rough
miscalculations in domestic and foreign policy, which significantly reduced
economic and military potential of the country. The fall of the economic
The technological and military power of Russia has significantly reduced its international authority, made its leadership accommodating, forced it to make numerous concessions and betray the national interests of the country. When solving acute international problems, the opinion of the Russian leadership is practically not taken into account, as, for example, when resolving the "Yugoslav crisis". Russia's international influence was marked only by its nuclear status. The desire to build partnerships with Russia and integrate it into European and other international structures Western countries did not. The West did not want to write off the debts of the USSR from Russia, which became a heavy burden on the country and its citizens.
It is obvious that the preservation and development of Russia as an economic,
political and cultural-psychological integrity is possible
ensure only through the efforts of its people, and not at the expense of humanitarian,
financial and other assistance from Western countries. Only economic
prosperity, political stability, moral health
Russian society are able to guarantee its national
security and the return of high international prestige to it.
Russia's prestige in the international arena largely depends on the success of
economic, political and socio-cultural transformations
within the country, achieving harmony and peace among its peoples.
Awareness of this and the return of Russia to the number of global players
world politics was associated with the efforts of the presidential administration
V. Putin (1999^2008).
Russia's Foreign Policy Priorities
For the first time since the collapse of the USSR (1991), political leadership
Russia has formulated the basic principles for ensuring
national-state interests of the country in the new geopolitical
situations. This was done by the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin
2007 in Munich. Assessments and positions expressed by V. Putin
in the "Munich speech", formed the basis of modern foreign policy
doctrine of the Russian Federation, developed by the country's Foreign Ministry. President's speech
20 Political science was programmatic and symbolic: it marked the beginning of changes in relations between Russia and Western countries and influenced Russia's relations with the outside world.
It should be noted that the Munich Conference is a kind of
the equivalent of the World Economic Forum, only concentrating
focus on military-political issues and other
security issues. It is attended by representatives of political,
military and business elites of many countries.
Speaking at this meeting, V. Putin gave a general assessment of the situation
in the world and relations between Russia and Western countries, warning
what will he say "without undue politeness" and empty diplomatic
stamps. It turned out abruptly and at times unflattering.
First position: “We have come to the turning point when
should seriously consider the whole architecture of global security
". According to the President of Russia, the basic principle is being violated
international security, the meaning of which can be reduced
to the thesis: “the security of each is the security of all”. Furthermore,
the end of the Cold War, despite the obviousness of such a recipe,
did not lead to the triumph of the named principle. On the contrary, as
V. Putin said that this time was marked by an attempt to create a unipolar
the world is "a world of one master, one sovereign". In his opinion,
“Today we are witnessing an unrestrained, hypertrophied
use of force in international affairs, military force, force,
plunging the world into one conflict after another,
V. Putin, - We see an increasing disregard for the fundamental
principles of international law. Moreover, individual
norms, yes, in fact, almost the entire system of law of one state,
first of all, of course, the United States of America, stepping over
their national borders in all spheres - in the economy, in politics
and in the humanitarian sphere - and imposed on other states?
Who will like it?" According to V. Putin, the US attempt to impose
the model of a unipolar world has failed.
Second situation: growing problems in the field of international
security, first of all, it is stagnation in the field of disarmament and
the threat of the militarization of space. They escalated into last years
and pose a direct threat to Russia's national security.
This threat came from the actions of the US and NATO. Primarily,
it is the intention of the United States to deploy missile defense elements
in Poland and the Czech Republic. In addition, the crisis is
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). It is happened
due to the refusal of NATO countries to ratify the adapted
version of this document. In this connection, V. Putin also recalled
that the United States is establishing forward bases in Bulgaria and Romania, and that NATO
moves its troops to the Russian borders, while the Treaty
binds the hands of Moscow. At the same time, V. Putin recalled that
in the 90s of the XX century. NATO countries gave assurances that they would not stir
NATO troops outside the territory of Germany.
Third position: the international landscape is now essential
is changing, primarily due to new centers of global growth.
These are primarily the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China).
Russia intends to play in international affairs an ever-increasing
role in pursuing an independent foreign policy. Having strengthened
its economy and its positions in the world, Russia is unlikely to agree,
to be treated like a poor relative from now on.
Fourth situation: V. Putin proposed to negotiate on
all international issues. In particular, he spoke out for
for stakeholders to come up with a joint solution
on the issue of missile defense and on the issue of ratification of the modified CFE Treaty.
The harsh assessments expressed by V. Putin caused a wide resonance.
The first reaction to his words was the question: will not lead
whether such a sharp controversy led to the resumption of the Cold War.
Such a fear, however, did not last long, since no one
discovered the termination of cooperation between Russia and the United States and others
Western countries on a number of important international issues.
It is significant that official representatives Washington and NATO
who have become the main object of criticism from V. Putin, do not consider
what's the point Russian President leads to the resumption of "cold
war." Moreover, in response to the calls of the President of the Russian Federation, the administration
Bush promised to "deepen" dialogue with Moscow. Indeed, activation
contacts between both countries on military-political issues
(Meetings have resumed according to the “2 + 2” formula with the participation of Defense Ministers
and heads of foreign affairs departments, several expert
meetings on missile defense) has not brought any new
agreements. Moreover, Moscow announced a moratorium on participation
The place of Russia in the system of modern international relations
The contemporary political landscape is increasingly
signs of multipolarity and asymmetry, in which relations
Russia with various countries will be built taking into account its national
interests, not to the detriment of them. It is possible to identify several
vectors of Russia's foreign policy, the implementation of which is connected
defending its national interests: Russian-American
relations, Russia and Europe, Russia and the CIS.
Russia and the USA: vectors of confrontation
The basic contradiction is connected with the role of Russia in the global energy sector.
From a strategic partnership, relations between Russia and
United States in the second half of the 2000s. entered a period of cooling.
2007 These changes were caused by objective shifts in the global
politics.
First, the fuse of the world struggle against international
terrorism compromised by the US war in Iraq.
Now peoples and governments themselves understand more clearly the contours
terrorist threat without downplaying or exaggerating it.
The terrorists were unable to gain access to weapons of mass destruction,
and in the matter of countering “conventional terrorism”, states have already learned something.
Secondly, the pole of confrontation has changed in the world. In the first
half a decade its most important element was the antagonism
USA with many Islamic countries. In the mid 1990s. imagination
most striking contradictions in NATO between the United
States on the one hand, and France and Germany,
with another. At this point, Russia, drifting cautiously from close partnership
with Washington (since 2001), contrived in a dispute between the United States
and mainland Western Europe to call less American
reproaches than Paris and Berlin. Then diplomacy second
Bush administration regrouped resources and, by weakening
force onslaught in some peripheral, albeit important areas
its policy (DPRK and South Asia) focused on
on the central ones. Relationships have always been one of them.
with NATO. Now relations with the region have risen on a par with them
Greater Middle East, which, according to American ideas,
extends in the north to Transcaucasia, the Black Sea and the Caspian.
The European direction of American policy at the level
practical actions began to transform even faster into a European
Caspian and European-Caucasian. Asianization of NATO
continues. Like three or four years ago, her main stimulus
the United States remains striving to strengthen its strategic position in the regions
alleged presence energy resources. At the same time, the main
formal substantiation of the new "campaign to the East" is the "nuclear
nay threat of Iran”, in the assessment of which Moscow and Washington seriously
diverge.
Third, and most importantly, for the first time in a decade and a half
Russia began to emphatically oppose the habitually assertive
"Eastern strategy" of the United States own unusually offensive line. This new policy includes an unconditional opt-out
not only from solidarity actions with Washington during the 1990s.
20th century, but also from even the firmer course of “selective resistance” to American policy pursued by the Russian
diplomacy during most of V. Putin's administrations.
The nerve of the moment lies in the fact of "counter diplomatic escalation
» Russia and USA. This is not the case in Russian foreign policy.
it was a very long time ago.
Among the sources of Russian-American contradictions lies
disagreement of points of view on many problems: from disagreement
Americans with the orientation of political processes in Russia
to differences in positions on a number of issues of nuclear non-proliferation
weapons and policies for specific countries and situations.
Russia is annoyed that Washington is trying to teach it how to build
relationships with neighbors, including unpleasant or dangerous ones.
In addition, giving "advice" about Russia's relations with its neighbors,
The US itself is not at risk. For them, the Russian border -
"foggy distance", for Russia - a zone of key economic, political and military interests. The essence of the Russian-American
distrust - not in an exchange of barbs about the assessment of "farcical
regimes" in Georgia or Iran, and not even in the consolidation of the military presence
The United States is near the borders of Russia, although it, of course, cannot be considered
sign of friendliness. However, the basic contradiction between the US and
Russia has opposing views on the optimal role
Russia in the global energy sector. Moscow strives to the utmost
strengthen it as consistently as the United States tries to prevent
her in it. "Imitation of integrity" in disputes due to conflicts
in the "pipeline Transcaucasia" and the situation around Iran - derivatives
from Washington's intention to eliminate competitors from the region,
which is considered a possible alternative to the Middle East in
as a global energy store. Everything is exacerbated by the lack
between Russia and the United States a systematic dialogue on global
issues, especially military-political ones. Recreation
a mechanism for such a dialogue appears to be an urgent need,
based on the desire to keep Russian-American
relations in line with at least a "cool", but partnership. Aggravating
the circumstance is the forthcoming elections in 2008 in both countries.
Under these conditions, politicians and diplomats are not up to international
security. There is a threat to miss the moment.
American missile defense in Europe is unacceptable for Moscow
Another vector of disagreement between Russia and the United States is related to the deployment in Europe of the 3rd position area of the American strategic missile defense system. The sharpest disagreements on this issue arose in the spring of 2007, and they culminated on November 21, 2007, when the Russian Foreign Ministry received an official letter from the United States Department of State. It left no doubt: Washington
Rais and Robert Gates will under no circumstances give up
deployment of its strategic missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Even though
that the missile and nuclear threat from Iran could
and not be. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at the General Staff
Russian Armed Forces publicly assessed American intentions
as a military technique aimed at weakening Russian strategic
nuclear deterrence forces. And although the US Congress has so far - until the end of negotiations with the governments of the Czech Republic and Poland, as well as an assessment of the effectiveness of the missile defense system in Europe by independent experts - has not given the green light to the deployment of anti-missile defense elements near the borders of the Russian Federation, Russian generals have already threatened Washington and its allies with adequate and asymmetric measures, including targeting operational-tactical missiles at a radar station in Brdy near Prague and an anti-missile base at Ustka on the Baltic coast. Moreover, chief General Staff Russian Armed Forces Yuri Valuevskiy warned
Poles that Russia's strategic containment system can automatically respond to the launch of an American anti-missile. True, Russian generals for some reason do not remember the first two US strategic missile defense areas located in Alaska and
in California, where there are about forty anti-missiles, not ten,
as planned in Poland. Everything shows that behind the slogans about the strategic partnership of the two states, which were exchanged more than once
Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, in fact, there is a strategic confrontation, the content of which was not only the anti-missile fence with which the United States surrounds Russia, but also the problems
Kosovo, Iran's nuclear power, development of democracy in our country
and freedom of the press. It is unlikely that these problems will disappear on their own.
Russia - European Union
The EU has found a replacement for the Constitution.
Reform Treaty. Operating Principles Document
The EU will enter into force after ratification by all states. Expected,
that this will happen in early 2009. However,
surprises.
Portugal ending its semi-annual presidency
in the European Union, kept her word - presented the promised treaty.
in a solemn atmosphere by the heads of state and government, and
also the leadership of the European Commission. The treaty replaced the draft constitution,
rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005.
The reform agreement provides for the introduction of the post of president
European Council, which will represent the organization on
international arena. High Representative for the Common Foreign
politics and security policy will actually turn into a minister
foreign affairs. Also in the executive branch
there will be changes. From 2014, the number of European Commissioners will be equivalent to
two thirds of the EU member states. In the meantime, each of the 27 states
represented by a member of the European Commission.
The treaty enhances the role of the European Parliament. MPs can influence
on legislation in areas such as justice, security and
migration policy. Total seats in the European Parliament
will be reduced from 785 to 750. National parliaments will have the right
participate in legislative activities at EU level. They are
will be able to make their own amendments to the text of bills. If a third of the national parliaments do not approve the draft law, it will be sent to
revision to the European Commission.
according to the formula of the so-called double majority. According to this
principle, a decision is considered adopted if it is voted for
representatives of 55% of the states in which at least 65% of the EU population lives. However, countries that fail to establish a blocking
minorities, will be able to postpone the decision of the issue and propose
continue negotiations. This system will come into effect in 2014.
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for
common energy policy and implementation of a common strategy
fight against global warming helping one
or several members in the event of terrorist attacks or natural
disasters.
In addition, the document contains an article on the possibility of exit
from the EU, the decision on which will be made following the results of common
negotiations.
European Policy Center analyst S. Hegman said,
that although the signed treaty contains some elements of a European
constitution, these two documents should not be compared.
In form, this is an ordinary intergovernmental agreement, and it is precisely
therefore, for example, it does not mention national symbols,
flag and anthem. According to the expert, the agreement does not refer to the transfer by the governments of the EU member states of part of the powers to the pan-European leadership, but to clarify the list of already transferred powers.
In other words, we are talking on improving the existing
systems. According to the analyst, the signing of the Lisbon Treaty
happened in a completely different environment compared to 2004,
when the draft European constitution was being considered. Euroskeptics became
far less. Particularly because the leadership has changed.
in Poland and Denmark.
The signed document has a very complex structure, and significant efforts are needed on the part of governments and other forces,
so that its meaning and content are correctly understood by the population.
All EU countries, with the exception of Ireland, intend to limit
parliamentary ratification. However, there may be surprises here as well.
In particular, experts do not undertake to predict how things will go in the UK.
Russia and NATO
The Russia-NATO Council was established in 2002, the corresponding treaty
signed by V. Putin and the leaders of 19 NATO countries in Rome. European
leaders said then that in relations between Moscow
and the alliance enters a qualitatively new stage, Russia "with one foot
joined NATO" and the "cold war" finally ended.
At that moment, the European SM And in unison repeated that Russia was ready
join the North Atlantic Alliance, and they quoted V. Putin,
who did not rule out such a possibility even before his election as president.
However, already in the fall of 2002, NATO, despite the objections of Russia,
welcomed seven new members. After that, despite
to ongoing contacts within the Russia-NATO Council,
relations between Moscow and the North Atlantic Alliance have become rapidly
get worse.
In December 2007, a regular meeting of the Council was held in Brussels
Russia - NATO. Representatives of the North Atlantic Alliance stated that relations with Russia had entered a critical phase,
and decided that next year the process of NATO expansion by
east will continue. The parties acknowledged that they could not agree
on any of the key international problems - from the placement
American missile defense system in Europe and Russia's withdrawal from the CFE Treaty before
status of Kosovo.
the next meeting of the Russia-NATO Council in Brussels, at which
Russia was represented by the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S. Lavrov, preceded by
meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation of 26 countries - members of NATO. The main unpleasant
news for Moscow was the statement of the Secretary General
NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who confirmed that already in April 2008 at the summit in Bucharest a decision would be made to admit new members to the alliance. The most likely NATO recruits are Croatia, Albania, Macedonia and Georgia. At the same time, the Secretary General referred to the decisions of the 2006 NATO summit in Riga, where the leaders of NATO member countries confirmed that the doors of the alliance remain open to new members.
It is noteworthy that at the Riga NATO summit, for the first time ever,
time after the collapse of the USSR, the leaders of the alliance discussed the threats posed
from Moscow. However, the specific question of expanding
alliance was not on the agenda at that time, which was announced in December 2006
none other than Jaap de Hoop Scheffer himself. Having withstood a one-year
pause, NATO decided to force the admission of new members into its ranks.
Despite difficulties with Ukraine, NATO does not issue
out of sight and this country. A meeting was also held in Brussels yesterday
Commission Ukraine-NATO, following which Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer promised to make "the foundation of bilateral relations
even stronger." The news that NATO is preparing to make another
step towards the Russian borders, did not come as a surprise to Moscow.
“At the forthcoming NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008
this issue will be one of the central ones, - confirmed the day before
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs R F. - For us, this is an extremely sensitive moment, especially
in relation to the states of the post-Soviet space”. Noting
that "the process of NATO enlargement has nothing to do with
modernization of the alliance itself or to ensure security in Europe
”, on Smolenskaya Square called the planned expansion
alliance "a serious provoking factor, fraught with the appearance
new dividing lines.
The permanent representative of Russia spoke even more sharply
(since January 2008) in NATO D. Rogozin: “When NATO talks about threats
from the south, but at the same time expanding to the east, this indicates how
about the absolute misunderstanding of the situation, and about the insincerity of the leadership
alliance” According to him, “expecting to expand through
former Soviet republics, NATO hopes in vain that the reaction
Russia will not be too sharp,” as it happened before. "They are not
suspect that Russia is no longer what it used to be, ”significantly
noted Mr. Rogozin. “NATO members did not realize the full benefits of cooperation with Russia when it was ready for deeper integration. And now Russia has new ambitions, it has grown from
a shirt that NATO sewed for her,” said D. Rogozin.
In the meeting adopted at the end of the meeting of the heads of the Russian Foreign Ministries of the NATO countries (December
2007) in a joint statement states that “in ten
years after the signing of the first founding document
on cooperation between Russia and NATO, the partnership between them is entering a critical phase.” As a result of the meeting of the Council of Russia-
NATO both sides said they failed to bring their positions closer together.
Disagreements relate to the solution of all fundamental problems:
and the plan for the deployment of American missile defense in Europe, and the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), from which Russia
For example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S. Lavrov criticized
NATO's position on the regime of control over conventional
weapons in Europe. He said: “We do not understand individual actions
alliance, including near the borders of Russia. In particular,
modernization of the military infrastructure in the Baltics, creation of American
bases in Romania and Bulgaria. Steps like these make things worse.
around conventional arms control in Europe, which
has been at an impasse in recent years. Trying to convince partners
refuse to support the independence of Kosovo, S. Lavrov noted,
that the decision on the status of Kosovo would be a precedent for the unrecognized
republics in the post-Soviet space. According to him, "those
who conspires to play freely with international law, with the charter
The UN, with the Helsinki Final Act, must once again
think hard before stepping on a very slippery path, which
may be fraught with unpredictable consequences and not add
stability in Europe". Finally, the Russian minister stated,
what if NATO recognizes the US missile defense system being created in Europe
element of its missile defense, then Russia "will find it difficult
continue to cooperate within the framework of the Russia-NATO Council on this
subject."
Thus, the meeting in Brussels actually drew a line under
period of relations between Russia and NATO, which until the last
moment, despite disagreements, by inertia continued to call
allied. It is noteworthy that the warmest relations
Moscow and Brussels were precisely during the first presidential
V. Putin's term. However, during the second term to replace the "allied
relations” between Moscow and the North Atlantic Alliance came
clash of interests and fierce confrontation in all directions,
increasingly reminiscent of a new cold war.
NATO is concerned about the strengthening of Russia. For this reason, the Pentagon
leaves troops in Germany.
Contrary to the original plans, the US will not reduce in 2008 the number of its troops in Europe. Two American combat brigades
will remain in their places of deployment in Germany. About this USA the other day
notified the Brussels headquarters of NATO. Currently
four combat brigades of the American army are deployed in Germany,
numbering 43 thousand soldiers and officers. The two before them should have been
be returned to the US before the end of 2008. In this case, the number
Pentagon ground forces in Europe would drop to 24,000
Human. But now those plans are on hold.
Officially, the US Department of Defense justifies this by the unavailability of American cantonments intended
for the return of the brigades. However, the commander of the ground forces
USA in Europe D. McKiernan explained with military frankness
revision of the decision to reduce the number of American garrisons
in Germany "new strengthening of Russia". Politicians and military
NATO Express "Bitter Disappointment" at Increasing
Russian criticism of the Alliance, accused
in muscle building. According to the Brussels headquarters
apartment of the organization, behind the criticism of Moscow lies its desire
use its economic recovery to realize its own
foreign policy and military interests. In this regard, the Vienna
the publication sees in the refusal to reduce the number of American
troops in Europe "a definite sign that the military
The US is starting to prepare for a new confrontation with Russia.”
Despite the preventive measures of the Pentagon, the US Ambassador to
NATO V. Nuland does not lose optimism. She believes that achievement
agreements with Russia contentious issues perhaps: "We are standing in front of
threats and dangers that equally concern both Russia,
and us in the West. Therefore, we must find opportunities
cooperation that will benefit both parties.
Meanwhile, in Washington and Brussels, NATO authorities
Moscow's suspension of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
forces in Europe (CFE) is interpreted as another evidence of strengthening
Russia, requiring countermeasures. noteworthy signal
is the call of the leading Republican contender for the presidency
US R. Giuliani to start building up numbers
American armed forces in response to the strengthening of Russia's positions.
According to him, Russian intentions “still cause
anxiety." Therefore, R. Giuliani convinced voters in the state of South
Carolina, USA "needs to become even stronger militarily
". In turn, the American analytical center Stratfor
foresees the mobilization of Western intelligence agencies. According to RIA
News, the employees of the center are experienced experts in the field
intelligence and business, and its services are used by hundreds of large firms,
government and military departments. In a recently published
in Washington, a Stratfor policy brief reads, in part:
“Abandoned CFE Treaty will force NATO to at least step up
their reconnaissance efforts in order to track the movements
Russian armed forces and receive information that the Russians would normally provide themselves under the mechanisms
Russia in the post-Soviet space
One of the main vectors of Russia's global policy is
maintaining influence on former republics USSR became independent
states after 1991. The initial organizational
legal form of "civilized divorce" of the former Soviet
republics after the collapse of the USSR became the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), which included 11 states. However, as shown
practice, poorly integrated groupings, like the CIS, are ineffective. Decisions made at the CIS forums are not enforced.
In addition, the elites of the Commonwealth countries have different political
orientation. Some of them are weary of Russian influence and turn
their views on the United States (as Ukraine and Georgia do), others, on the contrary,
still focus on Russia (for example, Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan), and still others (Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan)
are trying to build a multi-vector foreign policy related to
with equal distance from the two poles of influence. post-soviet
space is attractive mainly for its significant
natural resources that are currently being fought over
different states. Taking into account this fact, Russia strives
more clearly declare their national-state interests,
using a new tactic: where political
arguments, it is quite possible to try to solve the problem with economic
methods, increase the attachment of the economies of the CIS countries to Russian
financial and stock markets.
RF and Belarus
Closest relationship (allied) due to geopolitical
positions are developing between Russia and Belarus, which
announced the construction of a union state. different ideas about
models of union (federal or confederate) caused controversy
between countries. This became an obstacle to the construction of a new
states. Under these conditions, Russia decided to change in relation to
Belarus tactics. Where political arguments fail,
it is quite possible to try to solve the problem not too big
money for Russia. If Belarus does not give up Russian
cheap money, which is extremely unlikely, the degree of integration of economies
two countries will inevitably increase, as well as the affection of Belarus
to the Russian financial and stock markets.
2007 to Moscow, was dumbfounded by the unexpected generosity of Russia.
The total amount of state loans promised to Belarus until 2008
to issue to Russia, increased from $1.5 billion to $3.5 billion, which is
7% of Belarusian budget expenditures in 2008. In addition, vice
prime minister A. Kudrin, who realized an attraction of unprecedented generosity,
promised Belarus loans in the domestic Russian market for 10 billion rubles.
rub. Belarus, apparently, will not resist, coming across the desire of Russia
Russian interstate loan to cover losses from the increase
supply prices Russian oil and gas in the amount of 1 billion.
dollars, the promised money was allocated. Vice Prime Minister and Minister
Finance A. Kudrin and Belarusian Minister of Finance N. Korbut signed
agreement on the provision of a state loan to Belarus in the amount of
$1.5 billion. In addition, another loan was promised to Belarus
in 2008 in the amount of $ 2 billion, and it was proposed to place bonds
in the Russian market in the amount of 10 billion rubles. and if, these papers
receive demand, repeat this operation as needed.
As A. Kudrin explained, 1.5. Billion USD provided by Russia
for a period of 15 years at a rate of LIBOR + 0.75%. The agreement provides
and a 5-year grace period during which interest is paid
will not. At the current rate LIBOR + 5% A. Kudrin
estimated the cost of the loan for Belarus "about 6%". But right after
signing the agreement, the Deputy Prime Minister announced that Russia is ready
provide Belarus with another $2 billion loan in 2008
N. Korbut tried to object that this amount should be commercial
loan from Russia to Belarus. But Mr. A. Kudrin insisted
that the type of loan - a government loan or a commercial loan "will be studied." But before that, “one of the next steps is to place
public loan of Belarus in the Russian market”, issued another
the secret of Russian-Belarusian financial relations A. Kudrin.
According to him, “the Russian side has already received a request for registration
such a loan. After that, N. Korbut had to admit
that the volume of placement can be up to 10 billion rubles. in 2008 He
he only clarified that "this will not be a one-time placement, but in tranches."
Russia will provide the first $1.5 billion to Belarus with more than two
portions, but immediately. As N. Korbut explained, the country expects to receive
will be used to finance the Belarusian budget deficit,
which for 2008 is already set at 1.9% of GDP, or $1.2 billion.
A loan in the amount of $1.5 billion, according to A. Kudrin, will increase the gold and foreign exchange reserves of Belarus, and the budget of Belarus will receive
amount converted into Belarusian rubles. Where will they be directed
another 2 billion dollars, as well as money from Belarusian bonds, was not specified. For Belarus, we note that 3.5 billion dollars of loans in
2007-2008 - macroeconomically significant amounts. It's about 7%
expenses of the country's consolidated budget for 2008 (24.4 billion rubles)
dollars), and slightly less than the size of the social support fund (combines
part of the functions pension fund and social insurance systems) -
$5.6 billion in 2008
Even on the eve of V. Putin's visit, political scientists assumed that
Russia's loan to Belarus may be a price for the consent of A. Lukashenko
agree on the Russian version of the provisions on Union State.
However, now that the rates have increased by 2.5 times, the reason
they see it differently. Most likely, an agreement was reached with A. Lukashenko on
wide admission of Russia to the country's economy, and not only about
participation of Russian companies in the privatization of Belarusian ones, but also about
wider cooperation. Plus security agreements
because Belarus borders on Poland. Finally, perhaps
that this is a fee for a possible transition to the Russian ruble.
Russia and countries Central Asia
Of particular interest to Russia are the pantries of the countries of the Central
Asia, which make the region attractive for everyone.
As economic growth increases, the need for energy increases.
After the collapse of the S S S R, Central Asia was the region where Moscow
traditionally dominated. However, in recent years this region
is rapidly turning into a springboard for geopolitical struggle
between losing ground Russia, growing "draconian
» at the pace of China, habitually seeking its interests around
to the world of the United States and striving to reduce energy dependence
from Russia to Europe. The fiercest struggle thus unfolds
for oil and gas produced in Central Asia. All
of these players, other than the United States, are either negotiating or already
agreed to build in their direction from this region
oil and gas pipelines. The situation in the Central Asian
countries is ambiguous.
Kazakhstan. In 2007, Kazakhstan continued to move towards the set
goal is to enter the top 50 developed countries of the world. In 2007, according to
annual report The Global Competitiveness Report (on the global
competitiveness), he took 68th place out of 131. In addition, President Nursultan Nazarbayev's long-standing dream came true - in 2010
Kazakhstan will become the chairman of the OSCE. And this despite the criticism
international observers of the past parliamentary elections.
Recall that the pro-presidential "Nur Otan" received more than 88% of the vote
voters, and the rest could not overcome the 7% threshold.
Thus, the new legislative body (maji-lis) turned out to be
The national interests of Russia are determined by the needs of the survival, security and development of the country, as well as the values of the historical and cultural heritage, Russian image life, aspirations and incentives for the activities of subjects of state policy that serve to increase national power (economic, scientific and technical, spiritual, military, etc.), as well as improve the welfare of citizens.
The national interests of Russia are the highest interests realized by the main part of society, expressing historical traditions, the fundamental socio-political, economic and spiritual needs of society and the state, uniting the interests of both the subjects of the federation and the peoples of the country as a whole. The interests of society lie in the strengthening of democracy, in the creation of a legal, welfare state, in achieving and maintaining social harmony, in the spiritual renewal of Russia. The interests of the state consist in the inviolability of the constitutional order, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia, in political, economic and social stability, in the unconditional provision of law and order, in the development of equal and mutually beneficial international cooperation. The realization of Russia's national interests is possible only on the basis of sustainable development economy. Therefore, Russia's national interests in this area are key. Russia's national interests in social sphere are to ensure a high standard of living for the people.
The national interests in the spiritual sphere are to preserve and strengthen moral values society, traditions of patriotism and humanism, cultural and scientific potential of the country.
Russia's national interests in international sphere consist in ensuring sovereignty, strengthening the position of Russia as a great power - one of the influential centers of the multipolar world, in developing equal and mutually beneficial relationship with all countries and integration associations, primarily with the member states of the Commonwealth Independent States and traditional partners of Russia.
The national interests of Russia in the information sphere lie in the observance of the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens in the field of obtaining information and using it, in the development of modern telecommunication technologies, in the protection of state information resources from unauthorized access.
The national interests of Russia in the military sphere are to protect its independence, sovereignty, state and territorial integrity, to prevent military aggression against Russia and its allies, to provide conditions for the peaceful, democratic development of the state.
The national interests of Russia in the border area consist in creating political, legal, organizational and other conditions for ensuring reliable protection of the state border of the Russian Federation, in observing the procedure and rules established by the legislation of the Russian Federation for the implementation of economic and other types of activities in the border space of the Russian Federation.
The national interests of Russia in the environmental sphere are to preserve and improve the environment.
The most important components of the national interests of Russia are the protection of the individual, society and the state from terrorism, including international, as well as from emergencies natural and man-made nature and their consequences, and in wartime - from the dangers arising from the conduct of hostilities or as a result of these actions.
Here are the factors that together create a wide range of internal and external threats to the national security of the country:
- 1. the state of the domestic economy;
- 2. imperfection of the system of organization of state power and civil society;
- 3. socio-political polarization Russian society and criminalization of public relations;
- 4. the growth of organized crime and the increase in the scale of terrorism;
- 5. exacerbation of interethnic and complication international relations.
The foreign policy of a state is determined by many determinants, including the level of socio-economic and socio-political development, the geographical position of the country, its national and historical traditions, the goals and needs of ensuring sovereignty and security, etc. All of them translated into foreign policy focus on the concept of national interest.
What is the national interest? What are its essence and backbone parameters? How does it relate to the concept of "state interest"? What is the relationship of the national interest with national security? These and some related issues have been the subject of quite lively discussions in recent years.
National interest is an abstract and subjective category, since its parameters are determined by the picture of the world and the value system that prevails in a given society and state. The reality of the national interest is revealed in the process and in the measure of its implementation. And this, in turn, presupposes the presence of strong-willed and active principles, as well as means for the realization of the goals set by the state. From this point of view, politics can be viewed as the most important means of realizing national interests.
State interests are understood primarily as national interests, since Western countries are mono-national states (not so much in an ethnic aspect, but in a social one). The nation represents the dual unity of civil society and the state. By default, the national interest appears as a general interest that removes the contradiction between the interests of the state and civil society. It is understood that representatives of civil society, the independent public, have an impact on public policy. Internal tasks, private interests of citizens have priority in the formation of foreign policy. “What is good for citizens is good for the state” - this is the principle of approach to state interests in countries with a developed civil society.
We will use the concept of "national-state interests".
The main component of the national-state interest This is the imperative of the state's self-preservation. contours, outer packaging national interest is largely determined by an ideal that reflects the values of a given society, but still this ideal itself is unthinkable without the fundamental imperative of self-preservation. There is a certain set of critical parameters, the violation of which gives grounds to say that the state is not able to defend its sovereignty and independence. When developing national interests and making certain foreign policy decisions on their basis, the leaders of states take into account objective economic, political, geographical and other factors, domestic political interests, political maneuvers of various socio-political forces, interested groups, organizations, etc. Also taken into account are the possible reactions to these decisions in the international arena on the part of those states that they, one way or another, affect.
Thus, the main determining force of foreign policy activity is the national or state interest. But the very concept of national interest is permeated with value norms and ideological content. In the formulation of interests and in the formation of a foreign policy strategy designed to implement them, the system of value orientations, attitudes, principles and beliefs is of no small importance. statesmen- their perception of the surrounding world and assessment of their country's place among other states that make up the world community.
Thus, national-state interest is an integrated characteristic of a concrete-historical compromise between various social groups and strata of society, the ruling elite regarding the nature, scope, hierarchy and ways of implementing the fundamental needs related to ensuring the functioning and development of the nation as a single social organism.
The formation and formation of the national interest is directly influenced by geopolitical, national-ethnic, religious and other features that are historically inherent in a given people and the elite representing its interests. As a result, not only the content, direction, but also the forms and methods of achieving national-state interests have their own national specifics.
Consequently, the national-state interests are determined by the social, economic and political nature of the subjects of politics, their place in social structure(internal and external) and, most importantly, the totality of cultural and value, worldview positions. As a result, national-state interests cannot be fixed and unchanged - interests change depending on changes in the subject itself (changes in the ruling elite, changes in the balance of social or political forces within the country), in the environment social environment(in the system of international relations, in other countries), in the system of value orientations of the subject (the transformation of the elite can cause significant changes in the value orientations of the nation as a whole. As such, national interests are a socio-historical phenomenon and cannot exist independently of the consciousness of their bearers. They have the closest relationship with the identity of a particular nation.
So, the national-state interest is a fundamental principle of ensuring the vital activity of the state, following which allows not only to preserve the nation as a whole, but also to provide it with fairly stable growth prospects.
It should be noted that the national-state interest is an integral system of interests based on the integrity of the needs of the functioning and development of the nation as an organic integral organism. The systemic nature of national-state interests presupposes the existence of their structure, functional connections, and hierarchy.
The structure of the system of national-state interests is due to the specifics of the manifestation and refraction of national-state interests in various fields the life of man, society and the state.
From the standpoint of the hierarchy of the system of national-state interests, it is legitimate to single out fundamental, primary, and secondary interests. The higher the level of interests, the less likely it is to find compromises in their implementation, the more fierce the struggle to achieve them.
Main Interests associated with the most important issues ensuring the life and development of the nation. These include, for example, military security issues, economic development, social protection citizens, education, etc.
Minor Interests, although they lie in line with the entire system of national-state interests, nevertheless, they either have more distant prospects or cover those areas of life that are not directly related to providing favorable conditions for the functioning and development of the nation. For example, the problems associated with the exploration of deep space, archaeological research and many others, although necessary for the normal development of the nation, do not directly threaten national interests. Based on this, secondary national-state interests can be postponed for a while, or their implementation is carried out according to a truncated program.
Indigenous national interests are directly related to the very existence of the nation as a social organism, as an integral system. These include issues of integrity, national and cultural self-identification, the security of the existence of the nation, without their implementation, not a single nation is able to exist for any long time, therefore, these interests constitute highest level the entire system of national-state interests, its core, and they can never and under no circumstances be sacrificed to any other interests.
Forms and means of achieving fundamental interests may change, the main interests fade into the background, and the secondary ones take their place, but in any case, all these evolutions will take place around the fundamental interests of the nation.
Determining the national interests of any individual state implies the obligatory consideration of the interests of other states, and in some ways the interests of the entire world community.
However, it should be noted that the state cannot ensure the implementation of all goals in full. In most cases, this is due to difficult negotiations or bargaining with other states. Often, the fundamental national interests related to the security and self-preservation of the state cannot be realized alone, without alliances and coalitions with other states. For example, destruction Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan became possible precisely because the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain, despite huge ideological differences, managed to create a coalition to counter the common enemy. This goal was achieved thanks not only to the development of a viable strategy for the joint conduct of military operations, but also to the creation of a powerful production and technical base for its implementation.
1. The category "national interest" is one of the main and most common in the system of concepts of the theory of international relations. The very sphere of international relations is often regarded as a kind of field of conflict and interaction of various national interests, within which their implementation is (or is not) carried out. At the same time, the problem of the content of the concept of "national interest" remains debatable both in domestic and foreign political science.
In some cases, disputes arise more due to misunderstandings than the presence of real ground for them. For example, in English, the main and first meaning of the word "People" is a state-organized nation, and when translating the phrase "national interest" into Russian, the term "state interest" would be the most appropriate option. The synonymy of the concepts "nation" and "state" reflects the historical specifics of the formation of European, predominantly single-ethnic states in Western political science, the concept of "national interest" has never included an ethnic content. Thus, an Englishman, speaking of the "national interests" of Great Britain, by no means means the interests of only the British, but of the whole state - the United Kingdom, which also includes the Scots, the Welsh, and the inhabitants of Northern Ireland. Thus, doubts about the legitimacy of raising the question of Russia's "national interests" on the grounds that it allegedly allows for an ethnic interpretation, understood as "Russian interests" in the multinational Russian Federation (or "Russian interests" with the inclusion of the Russian-speaking population of neighboring sovereign states of the CIS with Russia) are not substantiated in principle. In world political development, there were situations when the state claimed to protect the interests of compatriots living outside its borders and being citizens foreign countries(Germany under the regime of A. Hitler, Germany in relation to citizens of the GDR, when there were two German states). However, in these cases, such claims were specifically stipulated when determining the specific content of national interests and were included in the formulation of the foreign policy strategy.
Nevertheless, in order to avoid misunderstandings and in order to bring the lexicon of Russian science closer to the categories accepted in the world, it would seem justified both in translations and in considering Russia's interests to speak of "national-state" and not just "national" interests. It is more justified that the Russian Federation is only at the beginning of its statehood, and at this stage of development, as world experience shows, the question of the specific content of national-state interests is always controversial.
2. In principle, national interests are basically objective, they reflect the aspirations of the citizens of the state to:
Ensuring stable and sustainable development of society, its institutions, raising the standard of living of the population;
Minimization (optimally absent) of threats to the personal and public security of citizens, the system of values and institutions on which the existence of this society is based.
These aspirations are embodied in the concept of national interest, the specific content of which is also determined mainly by objective parameters, such as:
The geopolitical position of the state on the world stage, whether it has allies or opponents that pose a direct threat;
Position in the system of international economic relations, degree of dependence on foreign markets, sources of raw materials, energy, etc.;
The general state of the system of international relations, the predominance of elements of rivalry or partnership, force or law in it.
With the change in objective realities, the needs of society in the field of international communication, the content of national interests may also change. The illusion of their eternity and constancy has developed in the low-dynamites, from the point of view of the emergence of qualitatively new factors of development, in the 18th-19th centuries. In reality, when determining the specific content of national interests, it is necessary to proceed from the existence in objective reality of both relatively stable (changing only for decades) and variable, subject to frequent changes, values.
3. It is most difficult to find a "formula" of national interest for a society that is changing the paradigm of its own development or that is split along social, ethnic or geographical lines, in other words, for a society where the consensus of the majority on the fundamental issues of its life and development has not formed or collapsed. A typical example of a "split" society is the USA in the middle of the 19th century. In formally one state, in fact, there were dia with completely different types of economic development (industrial-capitalist North and agrarian-slave-owning South) and, accordingly, differently understood national interests. The United States managed to resolve this conflict only by going through a civil war, during which the industrial North broke the separatism of the South and ensured the preservation of the country's unity.
A change in the paradigm of internal development - the transition from totalitarianism to democracy, for example, although it may not affect the geopolitical position of the state, also causes a revision of views on the content of its national interests. Thus, a totalitarian state is characterized by the desire for the highest possible degree of control over all spheres of society, including the economic one. Only such development is considered safe and stable, which is ensured by own resources, on the basis of complete (in extreme cases - partial) autarky. The transition to democracy and a market economy, as a rule, gives rise to aspirations for openness, participation in the international division of labor, the formation of relations of interdependence in the economic sphere with other states, which in a totalitarian society is perceived as one-sided dependence, a threat to national security.
The problem here is that the concept of national (national-state) interest is formulated and can only be implemented as a national doctrine shared and supported by the majority of society. In practice, however, such a full consensus is difficult to achieve for the following reasons.
First, in assessing the objective parameters and realities underlying the determination of national interests, there is inevitably an element of subjectivity, the burden of views and judgments of the past, ideological motives that affect the mentality of even the most far-sighted leaders and theorists. Accordingly, opposition to the ongoing course always has the opportunity to question the adequacy of the chosen doctrine to the objective content of national interests.
Secondly, the political choice of the state is influenced by various pressure groups, reflecting the objectively existing differences in most societies in determining the foreign policy priorities of the state, the content of its national interests. Such discrepancies are inherent not only in "split", but also in normally developing countries, they are associated, for example, with the specific interests of various social, gender and age, ethnic, confessional groups, various factions of business circles (for example, the military-industrial or "agrarian" lobby in the United States ), the peculiarities of the development of individual regions within the state (in the United States, for example, there are specific interests of the ruling elites of the Pacific and Atlantic states).
National (nationwide) consent is achievable, as a rule, only at extreme moments of development, for example, the situation of the appearance of a common, visibly and clearly perceived threat (England, the USA during the Second World War). According to the former director of the CIA R. Kline, in order to determine the degree of purposefulness of a state's actions in the international arena, not only its absolute power (military, economic), but also indicators of its "national strategy" based on a clear understanding of national interests, as well as "national will" - the ability of society to share and maintain an understanding of these interests. For "split" societies, these indicators for Klein are spun to "0", for societies in more severe conditions, to "1". For the majority of states (the United States), these coefficients were determined by Clyde in the range of 0.5-0.7, which reflects a fairly high degree of national consensus on the content of national interests.
4. The problem of the correspondence of national interests, in the form in which they are determined by the state, to the real interests of society became especially acute in the 20th century, which gave many vivid examples of how attempts to implement the found formula of national interest led to failures, and even catastrophes. This is Germany, Japan and Italy in the 30s of the XX century, which headed for the creation of such "new orders" in Europe and Asia, in which their interests would dominate the international arena. This is the USSR, which exhausted its forces in the "cold war" , largely generated by his desire to ensure the triumph on a global scale of those ideas and principles on which Soviet society itself was built, this is partly the United States during the Vietnam War, the unsuccessful course of which for America made Americans doubt the correctness of their ideas about national US interests.
The contradictions between the objective interests of society (nation, people) and the concept of national interests (or the doctrine on the basis of which foreign policy and military-political strategies are determined) in some cases are the product of subjective miscalculations by governments. More often, however, we are talking about deeper causes associated with the general orientation of the development of society and the ideology that dominates it. Thus, the German NSDDP came to power under the slogan of revenge for the defeat in the First World War and the conquest of "living space" for the Germans by force of arms. Thus, the possibility of a different choice of means and ways to satisfy the interests associated with Germany's desire to achieve a revision of the humiliating articles of the Versailles Treaty and create for itself a "sphere of influence" corresponding to its economic weight - were sharply limited. Ca^a ideology of the NSDAP - revenge, the approval of the Germans as a "race of masters" - predetermined the inevitability of Germany's clash with a coalition of states that surpassed it in military power.
The USSR, which was formed not as a state focused on ensuring its own interests, but as the base of the "world revolution", led by the CPSU, which always proceeded from the fact that the strength of the Soviet system is directly dependent on the development of revolutionary processes in the world, was also doomed to confront with states whose peoples did not share socialist values. In other words, the interests of the USSR in the form in which they were officially formulated and implemented, despite the fact that they were shared by society for several decades, were objectively illusory. Following a course based on "proletarian internationalism" aggravated the military confrontation in " cold war", which undermined both the standard of living of the population and the chances of raising it, increased the degree of danger associated with the nuclear threat both for the peoples of the USSR and for the whole world.
Thus, we can conclude that a society whose nature gives rise to interests that are not realized in principle or are fraught with a national tragedy is fundamentally unviable. It seems far from accidental that an attempt to revise the paradigmatic understanding of the interests of the USSR on the world stage, undertaken by M.S. Gorbachev, ultimately ended in the collapse of the USSR, the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. political system, its core - the CPSU. Initially, this attempt was not connected with a revision of the paradigm of Soviet foreign policy; at the level of declarations, it was only about changing the means of realizing its goals (without an arms race, without military confrontation between blocs, etc.).
Another question is that the essential content of interests is inextricably linked with the means and methods of their implementation. The ability to find alternatives without undermining the foundation, the foundation of a certain type of social development is the most important indicator of the conformity of this development with the general, global trends in the progress of civilization.
5. Flexibility in determining the content of national interests, the choice of means and methods for their implementation becomes especially relevant in modern world. This is due to the development of regional and global interdependence of the states of the 5 nations in matters of ensuring military security, protecting economic interests, and solving environmental problems.
On the one hand, interdependence makes its own adjustments to the choice of means and methods for ensuring national-state interests. Modern weapons exclude the possibility of ensuring the security of the people and society by unilateral efforts, and participation in military alliances is also insufficient. The security of one state is inextricably linked with universal security ensured by the collective efforts of the entire world community, ensuring dominance in international relations by the force of law, and not the law of force. Economic stability, including the stability of the national currency, also depends on the state of the international economy as a whole. Preservation of the human environment in individual states - from the ability of others to pursue environmentally sound policies.
All this testifies to the fact that national interests can be realized not by unilateral, but by joint actions of states that respect each other's interests, resolve their conflicts by peaceful means, in compliance with common legal norms common to all. Instruments for the protection of national-state interests are increasingly becoming international organizations, to which their participants voluntarily transfer the rights and powers arising from their sovereignty as subjects of interstate relations.
More than that, the factor of interdependence gives rise to new interests that actually act like two sides of world politics”: regional and local (common civics).
It is of particular interest to thaw development where and when integration processes are gaining momentum. The interests of an integration bloc (such as, for example, the EU) are not only the sum of the national interests of the states participating in the integration. Moreover, certain conflicts can arise between the interests of the latter, which, however, does not negate the importance of the fact that at the level of the world economy, attitudes to global political and military issues, the collective interests of the members of the integration association dominate. These collective interests are a kind of synthesis of coinciding mainly the national-state interests of the countries of the region in relation to those problems that can be solved by their joint efforts more effectively than on an individual, separate basis.
It seems that the situation is somewhat more complicated with global, universal interests. The theoretical recognition that the entire world civilization has a common interest in solving the problems of ecology, demography, energy and others, ensuring safe, sustainable and stable development does not yet mean the possibility and ability reflection of these realities in concrete, everyday politics. In principle, in the long term, societies that are unable to refuse development "at the expense of others" or at the expense of the destruction of nature and adjust their interests accordingly, turn out to be historically doomed. But, on the one hand, it is too great the force of circumstances for many countries, forcing them to proceed from current, specific problems, rather than long-term considerations.On the other hand, the interests of solving global problems of our time and, ultimately, the survival of mankind^ becoming an integral element of the national-state interest in every country, inevitably prio take on their own, nationally specific coloration, differing in their national interpretations of each other.
Thus, a number of states in the most underdeveloped "belt" of the world (especially in the equatorial Africa) cannot, in setting their priorities, ignore the fact that the physical survival of the population of this region has been called into question. In other states that are potentially capable of making a great contribution to solving universal problems and, in principle, not ignoring common, global interests, due to the difficult economic situation (the zone of the CIS countries, for example), it is objectively impossible to pay due attention to environmental issues, rational use of resources. The countries of the developed zone of the world - North America, Western Europe, industrial centers of Asia. To the extent that the solution of global problems is in their national interest (which is indisputable), they could contribute to the solution of these problems. At the same time, it would seem the most logical, from the point of view of universal interests, such a way of solving the problems of development, modernization, reconstruction, etc., does not at all look realistic for a number of reasons.
First of all, it conflicts with the priorities of the national and regional development advanced countries, since it requires the diversion of significant resources, which is hardly compatible with their national interests (or national egoisms). Further, such a path implies that countries that have encountered difficulties will develop at the expense of others, more developed ones, which will form a model of dependent-dependent development. The mere acceptance of aid, even under strict conditions, by no means guarantees its effective use. If it is effective, it will turn out that the developed countries have created new economic "centers of power" capable of competing with them in world markets, which again is hardly compatible with their national interests.
Thus, if the national-state interests selected countries At the regional levels, they turn out to be not only compatible, but also mutually complementary to such an extent that it is already possible to speak with good reason about the interests of, say, the EU countries as a very specific reality, but at the global level, everything is more complicated. The ideal variant of harmony of common human, regional and national interests turns out to be difficult to achieve, the balance between them develops with great difficulty, and the compromises found are rarely optimal for everyone. In this regard, it can be assumed that if in the past the content of international life was determined by the confrontation and interaction of the national-state interests of individual countries, then already now, and even more so in the coming decades, it will be determined differently: the search for generally accepted balances between national-state^ regional and global (universal) interests, the confrontation over the opportunistic and perspective-oriented understanding of them, the scope of which will lie not only and not so much on the international, but on the national-state arenas of individual countries and will be connected with the definition of new, more advanced paradigms of their development.
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